Antonio Gramsci's Marxism: Class, State and Work

Author(s): James P. Hawley

Source: Social Problems, Vol. 27, No. 5, Sociology of Political Knowledge Issue: Theoretical
Inquiries, Critiques and Explications (Jun., 1980), pp. 584-600
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for the Study of Social
Problems
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SOCIALPROBLEMS,Vol.27, No. 5, June1980

ANTONIO
GRAMSCI'S
MARXISM:
STATE
AND
WORK*
CLASS,
JAMES P. HAWLEY
University of California, Davis
Threethings are attemptedin this paper:to locate (briefly)Gramsci'sMarxismin
its historicalcontext;to describe Gramsci'sMarxismas an attemptat the creationof
a theory of advanced capitalist society, especially in his treatmentof the central
concepts and/orrealitiesof class, state and work;and to evaluate the limitationsof
his Marxismas a criticaltheory of society, specificallyhis discussion of work,sexualityand technology.
The paper develops Gramsci's concepts of the historical bloc, his use of
historicism,the importanceof organic intellectualsand his concept of hegemony
and its relationto the modalitiesof class rule,and suggests thatthese are aspects of
a stunningand new criticaltheory of society. His-analysisof work, however, was
ultimatelybased on a Tayloristconceptionof productivetechnologyand of the social
relationsand organizationwhich necessitated the "regulation"of human(sexual)instincts in the divorce of mindfrombody, object fromsubject and, ultimately,theory
frompractice.This reintroducedthroughthe back doorthe Hegeliandualitybetween
thoughtand being. I stress the conservativeimplicationsof these formulationsand
conclude that Gramsci'sanalysis lacked both an holistic discussion of workand a
criticalanalysis of production-as-technique.
The totalityis the territoryof the dialectic

GeorgLukacs

Antonio Gramsci'sPrison Notebooks (1971;hereafterPN) were writtenbetween1929-1935

underconditionsof extremephysicalduress,nearcompleteisolationandwithalmosta total lack
of researchmaterial.Gramscihimselfstressedthat the ideas and historyin the Notebookswere
extremelytentativeand initial.Nevertheless,they representone of the few originalcontributions
to Marxismin the westduringthis period,alongwiththe workof the HegelianMarxists,George
Lukacsand KarlKorsh(Piccone, 1974:32-45). The Notebookswerewrittenduringthe rise of
fascismin Italyand laterin Germany,duringan era characterized
of the inby the retrenchment
ternationalrevolutionarymovementwhose primaryrole turned out to be the defense of the
U.S.S.R. and the developmentof antifascistfronts. This situation is often reflectedin the
Notebooks by Gramsci'sconcernwith defensivestrategies.
TheNotebooksexaminethe specificItaliannationalexperienceand culture(withthe exception
of the noteson "AmericanismandFordism")in orderto createthe basisfor a globalcritique,an
forcesdetermining
the formof the
analysisof the specificconjunctureof nationalandinternational
crisisandthe resultantstrategy.Gramsci'sconcernwithItaly(e.g., the extendeddiscussionof the
mezzogiorno,the southernquestion)reflectshis criticismof the purelyformalcharacterof the
of the SecondInternational
reformistinternationalism
(whichcollapsedwiththeoutbreakof World
WarI) andwitha similarformal,albeitrevolutionary-inclined,
of the ThirdInterinternationalism
national."Thedevelopmentis in thedirectionof internationalism,"
wroteGramsci,"butthe point
of departure
is 'national,'andit is fromherethatone muststart"(quotedin Merrington,
1968:149.)
Gramsci'swritingsand life experienceas a revolutionaryrepresenta breakthroughin the
of the revisionist
debatewithinsocialdemocracypriorto the RussianRevolution,as well
parameters
* An earlier version of this paper was presented to the annual
meetings of the American Sociological Association, Boston, Massachusetts, August, 1979.
I have benefited from the critical comments of a number of people, especially Gary Hamilton, Bruce C.
Johnson and two anonymous reviewersfor Social Problems. Richard Gambrell and Bernie Tarallo assisted me
in parts of the researchas well as in their comments and suggestions. (Translation of a few quotations from the
French are mine.)

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Gramsci'sMarxism

585

as with the line of thinkingof the earlycommunistmovement.His influencewas not to emerge

until after the SecondWorldWar, and even then was restrictedto the ItalianCommunistParty.
Only with the developmentof a Europeannew left in the 1960'sand its theoreticaldevelopment
in the 1970's was the importanceof his work fully realizedand perhapseven transcended.
Gramsci'scritiqueof the limitsof the "revisionistdebate" (fromleft to right, from Luxemburg
to Bernstein)revolvedaroundthreeproblems:1) the reductionof superstructure
to appearance
or epiphenomenaof emanationsfrom the economicbase; 2) the developmentof economism,a
relianceon the objectiveeconomicsituationand contradictionsto createthe revolutionarycrisis;
and 3) more generally,the tendencyto reduceMarxism(the philosophyof praxis)to positivism
and empiricism-to the level of a naturalscience. This reductionisttendencyobjectifiesthe
discrete,atomisticdata of immediateactivity,breaksdown the totalityof social processesinto
fragmentaryfacts of reality,and consequentlycreatesuniversalcategories.
Gramsci argued that Marxism in the west ". . . has been a 'moment" of modern culture" which

enrichedandto a certainextent"determined"currentsin thatculture.Butthe "orthodoxy"(social

It hadignoredits owndevelopment,because". .. the most
democracy)hadnot beenself-reflective.
combination
that
has taken place has been betweenthe philosophyof
importantphilosophical
and
various
idealistic
tendencies
praxis[Marxism]
... [e.g., Croceand Sorel]whichappearedto
social democracyto be 'an absurdity,'if not an actualpieceof chicanery.""The philosophyof
praxishasitselfbecomea 'prejudice'anda 'superstition'" (PN:388).Marx'sdialecticalsynthesisof
Hegel and Feuerbachand of Frenchmaterialismcreateda "man walkingon his feet," a revolutionarypraxis.For Gramsci,the historyof the "laceration"of Hegelianismhad beenrepeatedin
Marxism: ". . . from dialectical unity there had been a regressto philosophical materialism on the

one hand,whileon the otherhand,modernidealisthigh culturehas triedto incorporatethat part

of the philosophyof praxiswhichwasneededin orderfor it to finda newelixir"(PN:396).In short,
Marxismhad becometransformedfrom a way of interpretingthe worldand actingupon it, to
alchemy:a philosophicalmaterialistelixirof scientismand positivism;and an idealistelixirof the
pure idea, pure spirit(or for Croce, pure history).
In placeof thepositivistinterpretation
of Marxismas a scienceof society,yet beyondsocialwill,
Gramscireintroduced
theelementsof willandconsciousness.("Will"for Gramscialwaysmeantcollective,politicalwill-not individualwill.)WhenEugeneGenovese(1967:84)wrotethat "Gramsci
did for EuropeanMarxismwhatMao Tse-tungdid for Asian," he meantthatGramsciintroduced
an authenticLeninisminto the west (Paggi, 1979:113-67):2 the developmentof a criticalMarxism
based on praxis which, in one critic's words, ". .. actualizes theory in relation to each specific con-

juncture,locatingthe changingcentersof contradictionin the capitalistworldandelaboratingthe

appropriate
strategy"(Merrington,1968:146).In placeof all formsof determinismof socialforces
andobjectiveconditions,Gramsci'sMarxismpositsthe developmentof a determinatesituation-a
creationof historicalforceswhichdo not predetermine
andmakeinevitablethe directionor nature
of socialaction.RatherGramscian
Marxismattemptsto createthe consciousnessof pastconditions
whichlive in the presentin humanmindsand institutionsas ideology.The historicistcharacterof
Gramsci'sthought is rooted in part in his originsin and criticismof Croce's school of Italian
idealism;it is alsobasedon Engels'famousstatementthateconomicfactorsareonly determiningin
the final analysis.That last lonely day, of course, neverarrives.3
1. Moment of time and an aspect, a feature as well as a motive force.
2. Whether, to what degree, and at what period of his life Gramsci was a "Leninist" is the subject of a substantial, if somewhat sterile, debate. There are many Lenins (and many more readings of these Lenins), as
well as many Marxs and Gramscis (see for instance: Davidson, 1977:232-43; de Giavanni, 1979:259-88;
Hobsbawm, 1974:39-44; Paggi, 1979:113-67; Piccone, 1976:485-512; Salamini, 1974:364-69; and
Salvadori, 1979:237-58.)
3. See also Boggs, 1976:21-36.

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586

HAWLEY

The collective will of a class, its potential praxis, leads Gramscito formulate "laws of
tendency"-lawsbecausefuturepraxisflows froma determinatesituation;tendencyor possibility
becausehistoryis made, not determined.Gramsci'sviewof Marxismis summedup in his phrase
"dialecticalhistoricism"
-not "dialecticaland historicalmaterialism."
Marxismwasmeantexplicitlyto overcomeboth
Gramsci'scritiqueof automaticandreductionist
materialistandidealistphilosophy(Martinelli,1968:2-8)andto reassertthe dialecticalinterplayof
subject/objectandpast/present.'Salamini(1974:370)correctlyconcludes:"Gramsci'shistoricism
fostersthoughtand actionin termsof differentand alternativestrategiesratherthan in termsof
necessary,constant,or immutableeconomiclaws."Thus,for Gramsci,historicismis revolutionary
fromtheir'objectivefacticity,'in the
since,Salaminicontinues,". .. it seeksto freesocialstructures
Durkheimiansense, and revealsnew possibilitiesfor social existence."
Thussocialact of will(whatMarxoftencalledclass"for itself")is for the modernproletariatthe
of a worldviewautonomousof andopposed
creationof a counterhegemonic
force,the development
to capitalistsocialrelations.In PrisonNotebookshegemonybecomesrootedin the revolutionary
partywhichis ledby "organicintellectuals."Thepartyis an organizationof cultureandeducation,
a stateof a newtypein gestation.In Gramsciworkers'councilperiod(1919-22),he attributedto the
councilsthe task of hegemonicleadership.As discussedbelow, thesetwo organizationalvehicles
maywellcontradicteachother;butbothhavein commona theoryof consciousness,of superstructure, autonomousfrom the economicbase and dialecticallyinteractivewith it in the form of a
determinate
historicalbloc. An historicalblocis morethana politicalalliance:it is an "ensembleof
ideasandsocialrelations"givena specifichistoricalconjuncture(Boggs,1976:80-81;PN:366-67).
Thedevelopmentof revolutionaryconsciousnessdoes not flow innatelyfroma particularsocial
Imsituationandlife experienceof oppression,butis a stagein theprocessof socialself-realization.
plicit is a criticismof what Genovese(1967:89)calls Marx'slapses into the abstractionof the
predominanceof the materialover the ideological, and what Wellmarcalls Marx's "latent
positivism."Gramsciquotesoften from Marx'sPrefaceto The Contributionto the Critiqueof
PoliticalEconomy(1970:12)thatit is ". .. theideologicalformsin whichmenbecomeconsciousof
thisconflict[betweenthe forcesof productionandtherelationsof production]andfight it out." In
otherwords,the forcesof production-most of all the proletariatfor itself, a "material"forceGramsciviewedthe
fightout theissueof therelationsof productionon the levelof superstructure.
in
of
and
more
narrow
as
a
force
rather
than
the
traditional
senseof forceof
production,
proletariat
the
material
of
the
implements production.Thus, proletariatitselfbecomes
productionbeingonly
of
the
contradiction
between
the
relationsof productionand the forcesof production.This
part
of
historical
and
subject
unity
object, whichalwaysexistsin a unifiedform sincecontentcannot
exist withoutform, is an "historicalbloc."
ForGramsci,theunderstanding
of bothstateandclasscenteraroundthe analysisof the developmentof a specifichistoricalbloc. The stateis an historicalbloc of a specificrulingclass.Marxdid
not developa theoryof theroleof thestatein society,thatis, a theoryof rule,butlimitedhimselfto
observationsabout the state, treatingit often as a coerciveforce. In 1875Marxwrote:
Freedomconsistsin convertingthe statefroman organstandingabovesocietyinto one completelysubordinatedto it, and todayalso the formsof the statearemorefreeor less freeto the extentthattheyrestrict
the 'freedomof the state'. . . . The GermanWorkers'Party. . . insteadof treatingthe existingsociety...
as the basisof theexistingstate. .. treatsthe stateratheras an independententitythatpossessesits ownintellectual,moralandfree bases(n.d.:576;emphasisin original).
Marx's historical writings (especially The Eighteenth Brumaire [1963] and Class Struggles in

France[1964])describein somedetailthe processof the statestandingabovesociety,that is, in a

4. Gramsci's historicism has been especially attacked by Marxist structuralists. See Althusser and Balibar,
1971; Mouffe, 1979:168-204; and Poulantzas, 1976.

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Gramsci'sMarxism

587

positionof domination.ScatteredthroughoutCapitaland otherwritingsare similardiscussions.

But nowhereis found a theoryof the state in its relationto the mode of capitalistrule (Jessop,
1977:353-73).The centralityof the state in Marxismis evident from the very idea of a ruling
class.Marx'sfailureto developa theoryof the stateis rootedin his historicalexperiencelimitedas
it was by the then only recentdevelopmentof industrialcapitalism.His historicalexperiencewas
not much greaterthan Hegel's-limited by the only embryonicdevelopmentof craft organizations, "friendlysocieties," Jacobinclubs, secretconspiraciesby small groupsand journalistic
organizations(Thompson, 1964). In addition, his failureto develop a theory of the state was
becauseof his death priorto completionof a numberof projectedvolumesof Capital,one of
whichwas to be on the state. The consolidationof bourgeoisrule, of bourgeoissocial relations
and of the bourgeoisieitself by the end of the 19th and the beginningof the 20th centuriesin
western Europe placed new demands on the role of the state, ultimatelytransformingit
qualitatively.It was this new situationwhichGramscimadethe focal point of his analysis.
Bourgeoisrule ("rationality"in Weber's[1978:85-90]terms)opens up new channelsof democracy,Gramsciargued,in that it tends " . . . to constructan organicpassagefrom the other
classesinto theirown, i.e., to enlargetheirclasssphere'technically'and ideologically .... " The
bourgeoisie is a class in continuous movement, " . . . capable of absorbing the entire society,

assimilatingit to its own culturaland economiclevel. The entirefunctionof the state has been
transformed;the statehas becomean 'educator'... " (PN:260; my emphasis),Assimilationto
its own economicand culturalleveldoes not implyequaldistributionof incomeand power,but
ratherthe universalizationof bourgeoissocial relationsand aspirations.It is preciselythis question of rulingthat is the problematicof Gramsci'swritings.
Withthe Bolshevikseizureof powerin 1917,the revisionistdebatehad beenredefinedthrough
revolutionarypractice,but definedon the terrainof Russianpoliticaldevelopmentsand on the
foundation of Russian backwardnesstypified, in Gramsci'sanalysis, by the overdeveloped
characterof the czariststate and the underdevelopedcharacterof the overwhelminglypeasant
civilsociety.Withthe formationof the ThirdInternational,Bolshevism(later"Leninism")in the
west becamedefinedprimarilyin termsof the seizureof power,the rejectionof economismand
spontaneity,and an often contradictoryanalysis of the relation between the state-as-means
(socialism)and society-as-end(communism)-Lenin's WhatIs to Be Done? (1964)vs. Stateand
Revolution(1964):in short, the substitutionof a theoryof the seizureof powerfor a theoryof
society. For Gramsci,Leninismin Russiawas a correctanalysisand strategy;it wasa theoryof
Russiansociety,but mechanicallytransposedto the westbecamea fetteron revolutionaryactivity. In Gramsci'swritingsis an analysisof stateand classin westerncapitalism:the beginningsof
and a groundworkfor a theoryof advancedcapitalism.
CLASS AND STATE

A discussionof Gramsci'sanalysisof class and state must begin with a brief outline of his
theoryof the social role of intellectuals.Traditionally,social democracyhad viewedits intellectuals as refugeesfrom differentsectionsof the bourgeoisiewho had allied themselveswith the
workers(usuallyin positionsof leadership)and wereinstrumentalin the creationof theory.The
intellectualsof the bourgeoisordertendedto be defined professionally-for example,literati,
technicalor scientific.In contrast,Gramscisuggeststhat Lenin'sdemandfor the obliterationof
all distinctionsbetweenintellectualsand workersin the revolutionaryparty (in WhatIs to Be
Done? [1969])shouldbe relatedto the theoryof the formationof the classas a whole;that is, to
the verydefinitionof class"for itself." Thus,Gramscidistinguishes"organicintellectuals"from
traditional ones. The former have "entrepreneurial qualities"; that is, they " . . . must have the

capacityto be an organizerof societyin general,includingall its complexorganismof conditions

most favorableto the expansionof theirown class." The entranceof a newclassin historyis ac-

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588

HAWLEY

companiedby the developmentof its own organic intellectuals,". .. which every new class
creates alongside itself and elaborates in the course of its development ...

" (PN:5-6). Feudal

lords, for example,possesseda "particulartechnicalcapacity,militarycapacity,and it is precisely fromthe momentat whichthe aristocracylosesits monopolyof technico-military
capacitythat
the crisisof feudalismbegins" (PN:5-6). Organicintellectuals,such as ecclesiasticswere to the
landedaristocracy,emergeinto historyfrom a precedingeconomicand social structure:they are
an expressionof this past, dying culture. There are "categoriesof intellectualsalreadyin existencewhichseemedindeedto representan historicalcontinuityuninterruptedeven by the most
complicatedand radicalchangesin politicaland social forms" (PN:7).
In a fundamentalsense, all peopleareintellectuals,but not all functionas suchin society.This
centralidea underlinesthe importanceof all forms of ideologicalleadershipand the abilityof
subalterngroups and classes to break certain forms of ideologicalleadershipat a particular
historicalmoment. Traditionalintellectualsdo not exerciseany political function over the instrumentalmasses;or if they do, the political aspect of leadershipis supersededby the more
sociallygeneralizedideologicalleadershipof organicintellectuals.A factorytechnician,for example,is a traditionalintellectual(PN:9, 15). Organicintellectualsconstitutewhat Moscacalled
the "politicalclass," but for Gramsci(PN:6, footnote) are "nothingother than the intellectual
categoryof the dominantsocial group."
The transitionof a class from "in itself" to "for itself" is indicatedespeciallyby the development of its own organicintellectuals.The developmentof proletarian(and moregenerallywhat
Gramscicalls "subaltern"class)hegemonydependson the developmentof intellectualsof a new
type. Gramsci,reflectingon his experiencesas editor of the newspaperL'OrdineNuovo (The
New Order)duringthe factorycouncilmovementof 1919-20,wroteten yearslaterthat a major
reasonfor its successwas that, "The mode of beingof the new intellectualcan no longerconsist
in eloquence. . . but in active participationin practicallife, as constructor,organizer,'permanent persuader' and not just a simple orator . . . from technique-as-work one proceeds to

and to the humanisticconceptionof history, without which one remains

technique-as-science
'specialized'and does not become 'directive'(specializedand political)"(PN:4).'
It is the processof becomingdirectivethatlinksGramsci'sanalysisof the economicfoundation
of class rule to the natureof rule itself; that is, to the state. Centralto Gramsci'sthoughtis the
autonomyof ideas-ideas as a social (material)force. Politics thus becomes an autonomous
scienceand is the basisfor Gramsci'sdevelopmentof the idea of praxis-the " . . . conceptof the
'historicalbloc,' i.e., unitybetweennatureand spirit(structureand superstructure),
unityof opposites and of distincts .

. " (PN:137). As one critic of Gramsci has written:

One cannot envision that structurecan be separatedfrom superstructure.They form an "historical

bloc"-a dialecticalinteraction-and such a determinatestructure("structuredonn6e") always correspondswith a determinedideologywhichis historicallyorganicratherthanarbitrary(Buzzi, 1967-174).
The State, therefore, can never be considered an epiphenomenon of economic structure; that is,

all politicaland social forms have their own nature,their own history, preciselybecauseof the
necessary reciprocal relations they have with economic structures. There cannot be an actual, real
dualism between structure and superstructure, between two necessary relations, relations which
result in the making of a real identity between the economic, pholosophical and political (Buzzi,
1967:274).
The rejection of metaphysical materialism-the scienticism common to both vulgar Marxism
and sociology from Comte to Pareto (Salamini; 1975:65-86)-is based on an epistemology
5. In Italian,"dirigente"--leading,hegemonic,directive.For a tellingcriticismof theproblemof producing
organicintellectualswithina socialistmovement,see Karabel(1976:146-56).

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Gramsci'sMarxism

589

neither pholosophically materialist nor idealist, but historicist: "The educator himself must be
educated" (PN:445). Praxis becomes the only social mode of scientific prediction:
. o.one can 'scientifically' foresee only the struggle, but not the concrete moments of the struggle, which
cannot but be the result of opposing forces in continuous movement, which are never reducible to fixed
quantities since within them quantity is continually becoming quality. In reality one can only 'foresee' to
the extent that one acts . . and therefore contributes concretely to creating the result 'foreseen.' Prediction reveals itself thus not as a scientific act of knowledge, but as the abstract expression of the effort
made, the practical way of creating a collective will (PN:438).

In short, there can be no separation of the thing known (object) from the process whereby
knowledge is acquired (subject).
Gramsci credited Lenin with the development of the modern doctrine of hegemony, "as a complement to the theory of the State-as-force, and as the present form of the Forty-Eightest doctrine
of 'permanent revolution'."6 A class is a ruling class in two ways: it is leading and dominant.
It leadsthe classeswhichare its allies, and dominatesthose whichare its enemies.Therefore,evenbefore
attaining power a class can (and must) 'lead'; when it is in power it becomes dominant, but continues to
'lead' as well ... there can and must be a 'political hegemony' even before the attainment of governmental
power, and one would not count solely on the power and material force which such a position gives in
order to exercise political leadership or hegemony (PN:56-57, footnote).

Gramsci defines the state not only as political society, not only as the coercive apparatus to
bring the mass of people into conformity with the specific type of production and economy, but
in addition as an "equilibrium between political society and civil society (or hegemony of a social
group over the entire national society exercised through the so-called private organizations, like
the Church, the trade unions, the schools, etc.); it is precisely in civil society that intellectuals
operate especially" (PN:56).
Gramsci's concept of civil society, and more generally the numerous meanings of civil society
in western political theory, is controversial and somewhat confusing. For instance, Bobbio
(1979:30-56) suggests that Gramsci introduces a profound innovation within the Marxist tradition, stressing that civil society "does not belong to the structural [political-economic] moment,"
as in Marx, but "to the superstructural one" (Bobbio, 1979:30). For Bobbio this distinguishes
Gramsci from Marx, and links Gramsci directly to Hegel's use of civil society (Bobbio,
1979:31)-as the political and cultural (that is, normative and ethical) hegemony of a ruling social
group over the whole of society. Yet Bobbio's reading of Gramsci as a theorist of the primacy of
superstructure over structure misses Gramsci's essentially historicist unification between an
historical bloc and its hegemony over civil society. Bobbio reverts to a dualism between base and
superstructure, thereby negating Gramsci's innovative concept of the historical bloc as a dialectical unity and interpenetration.7
6. Gramsci's credit to Lenin for the concept of hegemony belies his own unique contribution which went far
beyond anything Lenin articulated concerning hegemony. (See Karabel, 1976:136-46.)
'Forty-Eightest' refers to the revolutionaries of 1848 in Paris. Marx wrote that communism is the "
declaration of the permanence of the revolution, the class dictatorship of the proletariat as inevitable transit
point to the abolition of class differences generally, to the abolition of all the production relations on which
they rest, to the abolition of all the social relations that correspond to these relations of production, to the
revolutionizing of all the ideas that result from these social connections" (Marx, n.d., Vol II: 188-89). That
is, the permanence of the social character, of the totality of the revolutionary process in a society, and not in
Trotsky's sense of permanent-that is the immediate transition from bourgeois rule to proletarian rule in
socialist Russia given an underdeveloped bourgeoisie incapable of rule in its own right.
7. Bobbio has a rather simplistic reading of Marx (as merely the determinist) on ideology and superstructure,
relying selectively on a reading of The Preface to The Critique of Political Economy and German Ideology.
Yet, were he to contrast these admittedly more economistic and deterministic works with Marx's more
historical and dialectical writings (e.g., The Eighteenth Brumaire, The Civil Wars in France and sections of
Capital and the Grundrisse), he would observe the profound ambiguities and contradictions within Marx's
works. See, for instance, Jessop (1977:353-73) on Marx's theories of the state; Texier (1979:48-79) for a

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590

HAWLEY

Marramao(1977:226)developsthis point. He suggeststhat far frombeinga theoreticianof the

superstructure,Gramsci'snotion of intellectuals(and hence of workingclass organicintellectuals)is closelyrelatedwithhis developmentof the ideathatthe workingclass("for itself")is the
developmentof the subjectiveside of the productiveforces. This importantbut relatively
underdevelopedthemein Gramsciis closelyrelatedto muchcontemporarywritingon the nature
of postindustrialand service economies in which knowledgeand consciousnessincreasingly
become a productiveforce (Block and Hirschhorn,1979;Bell, 1973:49-144).Thus, Gramsci's
viewof the stateis not merelyas superstructure
but is composedof two levels:civilsociety-"the
ensembleof organismscommonlycalledprivate,"and politicalsociety-the state. "Thesetwo
levelscorrespondon the one handto the functionof 'hegemony'whichthe dominantgroupexercises throughoutsocietyand on the otherhandto that of 'directdomination'or commandexercised throughthe Stateand 'juridical'government."Thesetwo levelsfunctionorganizationally
withthe intellectualsexercisingthe "subalternfunctionsof socialhegemonyandpoliticalgovernment." Hegemonyis realizedin the" ... 'spontaneous'consentgivenby the greatmassesof the
populationto the generaldirectionimposedon social life by the dominantfundamentalgroup;
this consentis 'historically'causedby the prestige. .. whichthe dominantgroupenjoysbecause
of its position and function in the world of production."'The state functionsto impose its
disciplineon those groupswhichdo not consent,eitheractivelyor passively."Thisapparatusis,
however,constitutedfor the whole of societyin anticipationof momentsof crisisof command
and directionwhen spontaneousconsenthas failed" (PN:12).
In PrisonNotebooksGramsci'swritingson the statearefragmentary,andin severalimportant
placescontradictory.He baseshis discussionon the natureof the statein the west distinguishing
between"war of position" and "war of maneuver"as two polar strategiesof revolution:the
formermost appropriateto the west, the latterto Russia,the east. The problemis that he uses
"war of position" in two differentways: one signifyingan historicalsituationwhen thereis a
relativelystable, albeittemporary,equilibriumbetweenthe fundamentalclasses;that is, whena
frontalattack(warof maneuver)on the stateis impossible.The otheruse of warof positionis to
signify that there is a proper relationbetweenthe state and civil society (that is, developed
capitalism).This doubleusage poses the questionof the natureof the transitionprocessin the
west from war of positionto war of manuever.Somereformistinterpretationsof Gramscisuggest that perhapsthere is no transitionat all, but Gramsci'slife experienceand other writings
arguestronglyagainstthisviewpoint.Gramscimakesthe connectionbetweenhis two uses of war
of positiononly once: he suggeststhat in the westcivil societyresists;that is, mustbe conquered
beforethe frontalattackon the stateoccurs.In otherwords,revolutionaryhegemonymustlead
beforethe act of dominationoccurs.This processis, however,certainlya dialecticalone, as illustratedby Gramsci'sown experiencewith the Workers'Councils.9
The structureof the statein the west is like a trenchsystemin warfarewhich" . . is resistant
to the catastrophic'incursions'of the immediateeconomicelements(crisis,depressions,etc.)...
A crisiscannotgive the attackingforcesthe abilityto organizewith lightningspeed . . still less
rather dogmatic assertion of the virtual unity of Gramsci and Marx; Davidson (1972:448-61) for a summary
of aspects of the Gramsci debate; and Bates (1974:355-57) for a different interpretation of Gramsci's meaning of "civil society" which follows Croce.
8. The basis for spontaneous consent is what Gramsci (PN:419) calls "common sense"-the philosophy of
the non-philosophers," the conception of the world which is "uncritically absorbed by the various social and
cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man is developed." In other words,
common sense is the folklore of philosophy characterized by being fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in "conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is."
This formulation is strikingly similar to Weber's (1978:941-55) concept of legitimate domination. See
Karabel (1974:56-65) for a discussion of the relation between hegemony and organic intellectuals.
9. See also Anderson (1976-77:5-78) and Femia (1979:66ff).

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can it endow them with fighting spirit" (PN:235). In the west the question is ". .. whether civil
society resists before or after the attempt to seize power. . .. " Trotsky's theory of permanent
revolution reflects a stituation in the east where war of maneuver is most appropriate; but it is,
". .. in the last analysis, a reflection of the general economic-cultural-social conditions in a
country in which the structures bf national life are embryonic and loose, and incapable of becoming [a] 'trench and fortress'." In the west,
. . the socialstructureswereof themselvesstill capableof becomingheavilyarmedfortifications.... In
Russiathe Statewaseverything,civilsocietywas primordialandgelatinous;in the Westtherewasa proper
relationbetweenStateandcivilsociety,andwhenthe Statetrembleda sturdystructureof civilsocietywas
at once revealed.The Statewas only an outerditch, behindwhichtherestood a powerfulsystemof fortressesand earthworks... (PN:237-38).
This terminological confusion results from Gramsci's different and contradictory uses of state:
1) as an "outer ditch," that is, separate from the social institutions of western society, the
democratic-bureaucratic state of political society (PN:268); 2) the state in the "organic, wider
sense of the State proper plus civil society": that is, exactly the opposite of number 1 (PN: 170);
and 3) the state as a balance between political and civil society (PN:56). The terminological confusion reflects the descriptive level of Gramsci's discussion of state structure. Nonetheless, the
importance of his discussion of the three typologies of the state rests in the state's relation to
hegemony and the role of the state vis-a-vis the organization of hegemonic social institutionssuch as schools, media, churches and trade unions. His primary concern is with modes of rules
rather than with the institutional state as such.'" It is this formulation which places strong emphasis on culture, on the then lost dialectic of object/subject, on the role of the proletariat as a
productive force-in short, emphasis on the question of conscious praxis ("will") which gives
Gramsci's Marxism its vitality. It transcends the revisionist debate by positing that structures and
superstructures form an historical bloc: that is, " . . . the complex, contradictory and discordant
ensemble of the superstructuresin the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production" (PN:336). There can be no objective conditions without subjective ones: that is, of past
conscious social action (PN: 113, 445). The catharsis of elaborating structures into superstructure
(the "purely economic into the ethico-politico") in the minds of men is the passage of objective
to subjective (the ability to act) and for Gramsci also the pasage from necessity to freedom. For
Gramsci this cathartic movement becomes the starting point for Marxism (PN:367).
A serious omission in Gramsci's writings on the state is the absence of any discussion of the
economic roles and functions of the modern (or premodern) capitalist state. Writing before the
"Keynesian revolution," Gramsci seriously underestimated the important capital accumulation
functions of the state, especially the use of monetary, fiscal and tax policies for the attempted
regulation and direction of the economy. Anderson (1976-1977) makes proper note of this. Since
the state (especially the fascist state) increasingly assumed responsibility for the regulation of
overall economic development, the issues of legitimacy with which Gramsci deals so provocatively become increasingly entangled with economic policy as such. Capital accumulation, social
reproduction and all forms of legitimation are qualitatively more interactive than Gramsci
recognizes (Adler, 1977:71-90.)
STATE AND HEGEMONY
Yet while Gramsci's analysis of the economic role of the modern capitalist state was deficient, his
critique of the Stalinist analysis of fascism was significant. The dialectic of subject/object relation led Gramsci to an innovative analysis of the development of Italian fascism having many
10. Anderson (1976-1977) misses this larger concern of Gramsci's and hence the provocative ambiguities in
Gramsci's discussion of the state.

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HAWLEY

similaritieswith Marx's analysis of Bonapartism.Rejecting the dominant position of the

Gramsci(PN:276)arguedthat
pre-1935ThirdInternationalwhichequatedfascism-capitalism,
"Caesarism"'-dominates when a crisisof authorityoccurs, whenthe rulingclass has lost its
consensusand becomesno longerleadingbut only dominating;when the masseshave become
". .. detachedfromtheirtraditionalideologies.... Thiscrisisconsistspreciselyin the factthatthe
old is dyingand the newcannotbe born;in this interregnuma greatvarietyof morbidsymptoms
appear."A similarphenomenonmayoccurin the historicallivesof all socialclasses,not only the
masses (PN:210). The key factor in the rise of fascism is not the developmentof counterhegemonyfrom below, but the degenerationof consensus.Thisgivesthe traditionalrulingclass
the advantagebecauseit has " . . . numeroustrainedcadre[andis able to change]men and programmes,and with greaterspeedthanis achievedby the subordinateclasses,[andtherebyis able
to reabsorb]the controlthat was slippingfrom its grasp"(PN:210).The left, Gramsciasserts,
has traditionallyneglected"to give importanceto the bureaucraticelements, both civil and
military,as a social base for the developmentof fascism"(PN:212).Thus, fascismin Italywas
the culminationof the centralweaknessof the Risorgimento:its lack of mass social participation-a passive revolution, a "revolutionwithout a revolution"(PN:59; Buci-Glucksmann,
1979:207-236).Fascismwas not simplya new formof bourgeoisrule, of domination-but a new
contentof leading,and as suchis distinguishedfromparliamentary
ruleby its abilityto mobilize
a section or sections of social classes outside of establishedstructuresof rule (hence also of
developinga new mode of recruitmentto the rulingclass).
The relationbetweenthe state and the concept of hegemonyhas anotheraspect:the ethical
state. Everystateis ethicalin as muchas one of its most importantfunctionsis to raisethe mass
of the populationto a particular"culturaland morallevel ... whichcorrespondsto the needsof
the productiveforces for development,and hence to the interests of the ruling classes"
(PN:258-60).The form and contentof the state-as-educator
vary:from the elementaryczar-asFatherimagein Russia,to the complexcorporatistdevelopmentof westerncapitalism.The question of "who will educatethe educator?"is the basis for differenttypes of transformationsof
state structuresand the content of hegemony.
In June 1919Gramsci(1968:29)wrotethat, "The socialiststatealreadyexistspotentiallyin the
institutionsof sociallife characteristic
of the exploitedworkingclass ... [whichmust]prepareto
in
all
its
essential
functionsof administrationand controlof the national
replace... [the state]
The
of
the
Turin
commissioni
interne(workers'shop stewardtypeof comexperience
heritage."
in
movement
with
1919-20
Gramsci
a concreteinstanceof whatthe development
mittee)
provided
of this "stateof a newtype"wouldbe like.Thisprefigurative
"stateof a newtype"wasseenin the
transition from the commissioni interne as they developed into a revolutionaryand selfdeterminedconsiglidifabbrice (factorycouncils)of the workingclass as a whole. The councils
werenot to replacethe tradeunions, but wereratherto supplementthem sincethe formerwere
reflectiveof the relationsof industriallegalitywhilethe latterwereorgansof transformationof
the industrial order. For Gramsci the councils " . . . must be organs of proletarian power, replac-

ing the capitalistin all his useful functionsof managementand administration"(1968:30).The

councilswereelecteddemocratically,wereto representthe whole workingclass-unionized and
nonunionized-and were to be politicallyrepresentative
of all trendsin the workingclass (e.g.,
anarchists).Each factory(and neighborhood)would be representedin a generalcounciland all
delegatessubjectto immediaterecall.This structurewouldincreasethe masses'readinessfor the
exercise of power, " . . . since it has been spontaneously generated from living historical ex-

11. "Caesarism" is used as a reference to Mussolini, but also in a broader sense including nonfascist, corporatist rule, e.g., the British National Government, 1931; the development of "Fordism," etc.

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Gramsci'sMarxism

593

perience.The dictatorshipof the proletariatmustceaseto be a mereformula.... He who wants

the end must also want the means.The Statecannotbe improvised"(1968:31).Adlersummarizes:the " .. . factorycouncilswereto be autonomousboth frommanagementandworkers'syndicates:Theywereto be transformativeratherthan integrativebodies, representingthe workers
as producersratherthan as wage-earners. . . prefiguringin embryonicform the proletarian
state" (1977:72;emphasisin original).
The differencebetweenthe RussianSovietsin 1905and 1917and the consiglidi fabbrice in
Turinin 1919-20is that the formerturnedout to be organsin the strugglefor statepoweronly
duringperiodsof acute nationalcrisis, while the latterwereseen by Gramscias institutionsof
hegemony.Oncethe peak of the two Russiancriseshad passed-that is, once the Sovietshad to
serveas institutionsof cultureand for the transmissionof culture-they wererepressedand failed
(Adler, 1977:67-90).For Gramsci,the consiglidifabbriceservedalmostexactlythe oppositepurpose: they wereinstitutionsof hegemonicdevelopment,of the developmentof self-government
and administration,of the autonomousdevelopmentof the workingclass. The key indicatorof
workingclasshegemonyfor the councilmovementduringthe 1920generalstrikein Turinwasthe
abilityto maintainfactoryproductionduringthe strikeat as close to the pre-strikelevelsas possible.'2If the workingclass could operatethe factoryas well as the capitalistand managers,so
wentthe logic, then this was proof of the abilityof the proletariatto becomea futurerulingclass
of a new type.'3The Turincouncilmovementproposedthe self-governanceof the factorywithin
the ideologicaland physicalboundariesof the existingsocioeconomicsystem;that is, it assumed
and continuedthe existingdivisionof labor and mode of production.
The factorysystembecamethe expressionand the modelof the socialrelationsof the newstate
in gestation-the presentmaterialbase for the workingclassas futurerulingclass. The goal was
" ... to makethe factorythe nucleusof the new state,andto buildthenewstateas an expression
of the industrial relations of the factory system" (Gramsci, 1968:46; my emphasis). The social re-

lationsof the factorycreatedthe climatefor the developmentof revolutionaryconsciousness,not

the organizedtrade unions and politicalpartieswhich Gramscidefined on the terrainof the
bourgeoisstatewhere" . . . relationsof citizento citizensubsist.The revolutionaryprocesstakes
placeon the terrainof production. .. wherethe relationsarethoseof oppressorto oppressed...
wherefreedomfor the workerdoes not exist, wheredemocracydoes not exist. The revolutionary
processoccurswherethe workeris nothingand wants to becomeeverything"(1968:32).
Writingin PrisonNotebooksmorethanten yearslater,Gramscirejectedhis previousideathat
consciousnesswas primarilyrooted at the point of production,replacingit with his theory of
organicsocial crisis. The most importantaspectof this theorywas that fundamentalcontradictions in the complexmatrixof powerin civil society are increasinglyautonomousof economic
foundationsof the society. Yet whilehis conceptof organiccrisisis qualitativelydifferentfrom
the earliertheory of consciousness-in that it locates power in the socioculturalinstitutionsas
well as in the productiveones and in the state-it neverthelessremainslockedinto the boundaries
of early20th centuryindustrialization.
The fundamentalquestionsof the natureof the socialand

12. For a fuller discussion of the council movement and its relation to the Italian revolution that failed, see:
Cammett, 1967:67-122; Clark, 1977; Davidson, 1977; Joll, 1977:36-65; Williams, 1975.
13. It was during the immediate post-Russian Revolution era (1918-21) that Gramsci most forecfully articulated what is often seen as an unreconstructed Leninism. Yet a closer reading of Gramsci and close observation of the conditions in Italy make it clear that Gramsci's celebration of the Soviets in Russia and of Lenin
as their defender is based on a reading of Lenin's most visionary work, State and Revolution, as well as on
Gramsci's self-admitted sketchy and secondhand knowledge of developments in Russia during this period
(e.g., suppression of the Workers' Opposition, the crushing of the Kronstadt rebellion, Trotsky's attempt at
the militarization of labor; see Adler, 1977:83-90; Karabel, 1976:131-33; Luke, 1977:237-39).

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594

HAWLEY

technicaldivisionof labor, of the relationsof personto person,of people to machine,are not

raised:in short, the specifichistoricalcontentof freedomand necessityis ignored.
WORK, LABOR AND THE STATE

Because of Gramsci'semphasis on consciousness,his discussion of the central role of

hegemonyin relationto the state, to power,he is an importantantecedentof the new left in the
1960's:he poses not only the questionof power,but as requisiteto that powerunderconditions
of advancedcapitalism,the qualityof power (II Manifesto, 1970:30-37).While he poses the
questionof the qualityof power, his answersare at once self-consciouslytentativeand unconsciouslyanchoredin a technologicallydeterminedvisionof capitalistand futuresocialistor communistsocial relations-a vision all too often found in Marx.The essenceof this technological
determinismis that Gramsciseessocialrelationsunderconditionsof communismas afunction of
ratherthan dialecticallyas part of production
the mode of production(technique-as-science)
underconditionsof post-scarcity.14The formervisionplacesthe realmof freedomoutsideof the
time allocatedto sociallynecessarywork, or in Gramsci'scase to mentalfreedomduringwork.
Work, in other words, by its nature is oppressive-freedom consists in nonwork, or selfalienationfrom work.
The questionof the natureof work and labor at the root of Gramsci'sfailureto developa
dialecticbetweenhumanworkand naturestandsin strikingcontrastto his discussionsof organic
social crisis. Why was this so? Part of the answeris rooted in the historicalperiod-industrial
mechanizationwas only in its final stagesof completion,and manystillremainedin awe of it. In
theirmindsit developedan independentlife of its own apartfromsociety.The slogan,for example, that "Sovietsplus electrificationequal socialism,"capturesthe tone. This issue becomesa
centralproblemin the transitionto a classlesssociety,and the verynatureof the transitionitself
becomesincreasinglyon the politicalagendaas societybecomesmore complex.Wellmar'scritiqueof Marx'streatmentof workand technologyin his philosophyof historyis also applicable
to Gramsci:
If ... the humanpraxis which constitutesand transformssociety, and with it "production,"and the
transformationof men's societalconsciousness,appearultimatelyas derivationsand functionsof their
workin transformingnature,thenthe dialecticalinterplaybetweenthe world-historical
processof formation of consciousnessandsocialinstitutionson the one hand,andthe historicaldevelopmentof productive
forces on the other, mustbe misconceivedas a functionalrelationship(1970:70-71).
For Gramsci, as for Marx, the political and social development of society proceeds dialectically, through praxis: the class struggle as a process of self-creation and emancipation of the pro-

letariat;whereas,class antagonismis a reified, objectivistcategory.Yet in the antagonismbetweenhumanityand technique,Gramsci'sdialecticis displacedby a functionalrelation."

14. See Bookchin (1971) for a discussion of the concept of post-scarcity; and Block and Hirschhorn (1979)
for a similar discussion of a postindustrial analysis of production and technique.
15. Wellmar takes as the starting point of his criticism of Marx, Jurgen Habermas' (1971) work, where
Habermas attempts to show that in Hegel's early writings there were three equally orginal, irreducible dialectical patterns in the process of formation of Geist: language, labor and communicative interreaction. In
Marx's philosophy of history (not in his political and social writings), Habermas argues these three become
reduced to labor alone-Marx's political economy subsumes other forms of human self-creation and recreation. Wellmar (1970:107-09) quotes German Ideology extensively and especially he relies on the Grundrisse
to substantiate his point. I find parts of his argument convincing, while other parts less so. What I am convinced of is whatever the origin in Marx's work of the problem of the relation of technique to human
freedom-the theoretical possiblity of communism-the problem is unresolved by Marx, and in part confounded by sections of his work.
Georg Lukacs writes: "It is undeniable that quotations from Marx and Engels can be found which it is
possible to interpret in this way." "Technique is a part, a moment, naturally of great importance of the
social productive forces, but it is neither simply identical with them nor . .. the final or absolute moment of
the changes in these forces" (1966:29).

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Gramsci'sMarxism

595

An exampleof socialrelationsbeinga functionof necessaryproductivetechniqueis Gramsci's

discussionof sexuality.He beginswiththe insightthat the sexualquestionhasbecomeincreasingly independentof the economicbasebecauseof suchfactorsas the advancesin medicalscienceor
of changeddemographicpatterns,etc., and this in turn raisesa myriadof related"superstructural"problems.He observesthat, "Untilwomencan attainnot only a genuineindependencein
relationto men but also a new way of conceivingof themselvesand theirrole in sexualrelations,
the sexualquestionwill remainfull of unhealthycharacteristics... " (PN:296).But whatis the
relationof sexualityto production?The mass assemblyline technique,the "Taylorization"of
work(whichhadbecomeof centralimportanceto productivetechniquein theU.S.S.R. as wellas
in westernEurope),was in the processof creatinga " . .. newtypeof man [sic]demandedby the
rationalizationof productionand work." But this new man cannot"be developeduntil the sexual instincthas been suitablyregulatedand untilit too has beenrationalized"(PN:297).The rationalizationof sexualityis importantbecause,"Thesenew methods[of industrialorganization]
demanda rigorousdisciplineof the sexualinstincts(at the levelof the nervoussystem). .. andof
the regulationand stabilityof sexual relations."Abuse and irregularityof sexual functionis,
" . . . after alcholism, the most dangerous enemy of nervous energies .

. " (PN:300, 304).

Gramsci(PN:317)suggestsin only one sentencein his notes of "Americanismand Fordism"

that it is the workers " . . . who 'must' find for themselves an 'original,' and not Americanized,

systemof living, to turninto 'freedom'what is today 'necessity'."He does not definethe direction of originalsolutions.His wholediscussionof the sociologyof workand productionis based
on the assumptionof an increasingrationalizationof the workprocess-in Weber's(1978:85-6;
111;223-25) senseof formalreplacingsubstantiverationalityundersocialistor capitalistmodes
of industrialism.
Gramsci'sreferenceto "freedom/necessity"is important.He asksdirectly:"Whatis the point
of referenceof the new world in gestation?The world of production:work. Collectiveand individuallife must be organizedwith a view to the maximumyield of the productiveapparatus"
(my emphasis).Workis the sole referencepoint, hencethe only startingpoint of the new society.
Further,workis measuredquantitativelyby yield-at least at the point of production.In politics
and sociallife Gramsciarguesfor the hegemoniCforcebeingboth specializedand political.Butat
the level of production,techniquetendsto determinesocialrelations,hencethe workertendsto
become specializedonly. When revolutionarysocial transformationfrom below has createda
new society, it " .

. will permit new possibilities for self-discipline; i.e., for freedom, including

that of the individual"(PN:242).

Freedomfor Gramsciultimatelybecomesdefinedas internalizingwithinthe individualwhat
formerlywas the externalizationof coercionandhegemonyby the statein the widersense.Under
conditions of self-disciplinethe state will wither away. The state standingabove society thus
becomes transformedinto the state within each individual,much as in traditionalFreudian
becomessuperego.Insteadof necessitybeing raisedto the level of
theoryauthority-the-Father
is
to the levelof necessity:the statewithersawayin proportionto the
freedom
lowered
freedom,
of
the
internal
state.
The conditionsand techniqueof work limit the developmentof a
growth
free personat work, while creatingthe basis for freedomaway from work, and/or necessarily
alienatedfromwork.'6Workbecomessociallynecessarydrudgery.Taylorizationandrationalization destroythe unityof humanbeingsandtheirlaborpower,as Marxdescribedin the Economic
and PhilosophicManuscripts(1961); but this is not, Gramsciargues, the "spiritualdeath of
man." "Once the processof adaptation[to workingconditionsand technique]has been comMarxcameto find the locusof freedomin the
16. SimilarlyWellmar(1970:106-15)arguesthatin Grundrisse
"reduction of working time" and to see work as necessarily alienated independent of the social relations of
capital.

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pleted, what really happens is that the brain of the worker . . . reaches a state of complete
freedom. [!] The only thing that is completely mechanized is the physical gesture; the memory of
the trade, reduced simply to gestures repeated at an intense rhythm . . . leaves the brain free and
unencumbered for other occupations" (PN:309). [!] In other words, the material basis for
freedom and the transcendence of necessity is the absolute psychic alienation from socially
necessary work. All work, using Hannah Arendt's distinction, becomes labor; labor becomes
necessary for freedom, but not part of freedom, and is therefore a socially coerced necessity
whose cognition constitutes part of actualizing freedom. Freedom at work necessitates the
divorce of mind from body, of thought from being. Thus, Gramsci revertsto the Hegelian duality
between thought and being, theory and practice, and ultimately, object and subject (Lukacs,
1966:15-16). Logically, then, in Gramsci's (PN:263) terms communism is "regulated
society"-regulated by the imperatives of work-as-science, as labor, where, "The new methods
[e.g., Taylorization] demand a rigorous discipline of the sexual instincts at the level of the nervous system . . . and the regulation and stability of sexual relations," that is, some form of
monogamy (PN:300).
Two elements are lacking in Gramsci's discussion of work (and therefore in his vision of communist society). One is a vision of an ecologically sound post-scarcity society. This is understandable given the development of technology-the mass assembly line: he wrote in an era prior to
cybernation and the electronics revolution. But given that limitation, what is still lacking is a vision of what Wilhelm Reich (1970a:3-40; 1970b:285-316) called "work democracy." That would
be a social order based on the reorganization of the nature of work, and the integration of
humanity into its own creation and recreation. This necessitates a vision of a liberatory social
mode of work which dialectically transcends the constraints of the techniques of production,
from the outside-that is, from the process of liberating social relations in general. Related to this
weakness in Gramsci's thought is his lack of a revolutionary psychology-a concrete explanation
and analysis of the psychology of oppression/repression in capitalist society, and on this basis the
projection of what the content and forms of possible social relations could be under conditions of
freedom. In Marcuse's (1956:81-105; 155-58; 218-37) terms, he lacks a bio-social basis for
freedom, and lacking this the realm of freedom collapses into the realm of necessity. Gramsci's
vision, ultimately, is limited and not transcendent.
Yet a revolution must be positive. It must be capable of the reorganization not simply of production, not simply to produce more and better, but-as a critique of Gramsci by the Italian 11
Manifesto group (1970:333) states-" . . . of production in a different manner, of different
suppression of capitalism as a
goods, of giving a new form to the relations among men [sic].
,The
mode of social production (suppression of alienation, the social division of labor, of the individual model of consumption, of the State) must begin at the moment even where the revolution realizes itself and must even sketch it out in the course of the struggle for power" (1970:333).
The lack of a transcendentvision in Gramsci's writings affects the nature and the role of the two
institutions of hegemonic leadership to which he devoted his life: the workers' councils (1919-22)
and the vanguard conception of the Communist Party (1922-37). The workers' councils in Turin
had four main elements: 1) the ability to give strength to militancy, to pose the question of revolution, while not being bound up in the economist role of the trade union (which by necessity
negotiates about the terms of the sale of labor power); 2) the embryonic appropriation of work,
the work place, and the product of work by the workers; 3) the potential that the working class
could become through its self-conscious activity the productive forces (a class for itself) imprisoned by capitalist social relations; and 4) the creation of a vision/reality of a new social order in
gestation, the ability to rule. Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks period criticizes the "unitary
character" of the problematic of the councils-the councils' vision of revolutionary struggle
focusing too strongly on the work place to the exclusion of the total social character of the

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Gramsci'sMarxism

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organic crisis. Gramsci's need in Prison Notebooks was to develop an overall strategic design able
to understand and cope with the total social crisis. The Party came to replace the councils as the
major vehicle for hegemonic leadership-a party primarily of culture and education of a new
type, but nevertheless a vanguard party of a new elite of organic intellectuals which " ... cannot
be formed or developed without a hierarchy of authority and intellectual competence growing up
within them" (PN:340).
The Party should consist primarily in this: 1) the rank and file, whose participation is characterized by discipline and faith; 2) the leadership which provided cohesion; and 3) the cadre,
which mediate between the first two. The long-term goal of the party is to eliminate the distinctions among all three groups by continously expanding the content and form of the organic intellectuals. Of the three groups, the leadership was to prove pivotal because there can be no army
without generals.
The most telling criticism of the role of a vanguard party in advanced industrial capitalism is
that the goal of the development of a dialectic between the proletariat as historical subject in the
process of self-creation and the object-the society produced by capitalist social relations-becomes displaced by the dialectic between class and vanguard. This tension exists in
Gramsci's thought: between workers' councils and the "Prince" (the Party). Rossana Rossanda
comments:
4" . . . in [Gramsci's] notes of Machiavelli the accent [on self-developmentof the proletariat]is displaced:it is the vanguard,the Prince,who aloneinterpretsreality.. .. Thetruthof Gramsci's
thoughtlies in his route ["itineraire."The tensionis] echoed theoreticallyin the revolutionsin the last
twentyyears,in the reflectionon the complexityof the relationsbetweenspontaneityandorganizationin
the stormof concretehistory,in a periodwherethe stageof the movementseemedto leaveonlyhope with
referenceto the internationalscene, to the U.S.S.R.; and to maintainat all costs a vanguardforce,
howeverrestricted,in each country"(1970:292-93).
The development of western capitalism in the past fifty years has called forth qualitative
changes: the technological potentialities for post-scarcity; the domination of work by a majority
of the population as working class, but at the same time the tremendous growth of all forms of
stratification and hierarchy within the working class itself. These changes in the working class
and aspects of the mode of production have changed the strategic problems of western
capitalism: "rationalization" no longer appears socially rational, and hence the nature of the
strategic historical bloc also must change. The social basis for the creation of organic intellectuals
is proportionately larger than at the turn of the century; the mode of production has already
moved beyond the Taylorization and the assembly line; and the social character of fundamental
contradictions is greater (perhaps qualitatively so) than in the 1920's.
The importance of Gramsci's thought and life experience is in his revitalization of the dialectic
of human social praxis, and whatever his historical and philosophical limitations, it is necessary
to understand in order to transcend.
REFERENCES
Franklin
Adler,
1977 "Factorycouncils, Gramsciand the industrialists."Telos 31 (Spring):67-90.
Althusser,Louis and EtienneBalibar
1971 ReadingCapital.New York:New Left Books.
Anderson,Perry
1977 "The Antinomiesof Antonio Gramsci."New Left Review100(November1976/January1977):
5-78.
Bates, ThomasR.
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