Group 8

Li, Kimberly
Paculba, John Philip
Sanoria, Irene
Tejana, Ritchie
Tidoso, Philip
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS (RULE
135)

PROMPT AND IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE [Sec. 1, Rule

135 ROC]

General Rule: Courts of justice shall always be open for the filing of any
pleading, motion or other papers, for the trial of cases, hearing of motions,
and for the issuance of orders or rendition of judgments. Justice shall be
impartially administered without necessary delay.
Exception: Legal holidays
[Related law:] Art. VIII, Sec. 15, 1987 Constitution
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for
the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.
xxx
(3) Upon expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued
and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served
upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has
not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court,
without prejudice to such responsibility as may have incurred in consequence
thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for
determination, without further delay.
Judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda
within the given period. Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification
for failure to decide cases. [Salvador v. Salamanca (1986)]

PUBLICITY OF PROCEEDINGS AND RECORDS [Sec. 2, Rule 135 ROC]

The sitting of every court of justice shall be public, but any court may, in its
discretion, exclude the public when the evidence to be adduced is of such
nature as to require their exclusion in the interest of morality or decency.

The records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be
available for the inspection of any interested person, at all proper business
hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records,
unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in
the interest of morality or decency.

PROCESS OF SUPERIOR COURTS [Sec. 3, Rule 135 ROC]

Process issued from a superior court in which a case is pending to:

1. bring in a defendant, or
2. for the arrest of any accused persons,
3. or to execute any order or judgment of the court,
may be enforced in any part of the Philippines.

PROCESS OF INFERIOR COURTS [Sec. 4, Rule 135 ROC]

General Rule: The process of inferior courts shall be enforceable within the
province where the municipality or city lies. It shall not be served outside the
boundaries of the province in which they are comprised
Exceptions:
(1) Except with the approval of the judge of first instance of said province;
and
(2) Only in the following cases:
(a) An order for the delivery of personal property lying outside the province is
to be complied with;
(b) An attachment of real or personal property lying outside the province is
to be made
(c) The action is against two or more defendants residing in different
provinces; and
(d) The place where the case has been brought is that specified in a contract
in writing between the parties, or is the place of the execution of such
contract as appears therefrom.
Writs of execution issued by inferior courts may be enforced in any part of
the Philippines without any previous approval of the judge of first instance.
Criminal process may be issued by a justice of the peace or other inferior
court, to be served outside his province, when the district judge, or in his
absence the provincial fiscal, shall certify that in his opinion the interests of
justice require such service.

INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS [Sec. 5, Rule 135 ROC]

Every court shall have power:

(a) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence
(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons
empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
(c) To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and processes, and to the
lawful orders of a judge out of court, in a case pending therein;
(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers,
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in
every manner appertaining thereto;
(e) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein;
(f) To administer or cause to be administered oaths in a case pending therein,
and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of its
powers;
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice;
(h) To authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be
filed and used instead of the original, and to restore, and supply deficiencies
in its records and proceedings.
The general rule is that it is the ministerial duty of the court to order the
execution of its final judgment. However, Rules of Court, Rule 135, Section
5(g) provides that the trial court may amend and control its process and
orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. It has the
inherent power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial offices, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.
The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every
question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. The court
may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher
interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the decision
when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it. The court is also vested with inherent power
to stay the enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which
show fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent
on the record. (Mejia vs. Gabayan, 455 SCRA 499)

MEANS TO CARRY JURISDICTION INTO EFFECT [Sec. 6, Rule 135 ROC]

When by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all

auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by
law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.

TRIALS AND HEARINGS; ORDERS IN CHAMBERS [Sec. 7, Rule 135

ROC]
All trials upon the merits shall be conducted in open court and so far as
convenient in a regular court room. All other acts or proceedings may be
done or conducted by a judge in chambers, without the attendance of the
clerk or other court officials.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS OUT OF PROVINCE [Sec. 8, Rule 135 ROC]
A judge of first instance shall have power to hear and determine, when
within the district though without his province, any interlocutory motion or
issue after due and reasonable notice to the parties. On the filing of a
petition for the writ of habeas corpus or for release upon bail or reduction of
bail in any Court of First Instance, the hearings may be had at any place in
the judicial district which the judge shall deem convenient.
SIGNING JUDGMENTS OUT OF PROVINCE [Sec. 9, Rule 135 ROC]
Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or branch of a
Court of First Instance in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction, or by expiration of his
temporary assignment, without having decided a case totally heard by him
and which was argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or
their counsel, it shall be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in
said case anywhere within the Philippines. He shall send the same by
registered mail to the clerk of the court where the case was heard or argued
to be filed therein as of the date when the same was received by the clerk, in
the same manner as if he had been present in court to direct the filing the of
the judgment. If a case has been heard only in part, the Supreme Court,
upon petition of any of the parties to the case and the recommendation of
the respective district judge, may also authorize the judge who has partly
heard the case, if no other judge had heard the case in part, to continue
hearing and to decide said case notwithstanding his transfer or appointment
to another court of equal jurisdiction.

JURISPRUDENCE

[G.R. No. 125799. August 21, 2003]

DANILO CANSINO AND LINDA DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. JUDGE, RTC OF KALOOCAN CITY, BR. 120 AND SPS.
FRANCISCO E. CASTRO and ROSARIO B. CASTRO and,CESAR L. CRUZ,
SHERIFF IV, RTC KALOOKAN CITY, BR. 120, respondents.
The case stemmed from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
respondent spouses against petitioners. Petitioners averred that their

possession was premised upon honest belief that the lot they are still
occupying was a public land and they had been in possession ever since
1977.
MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioners ruling that plainitff has burden
of proving prior physical possession of property which respondents failed to
discharge the burden. On appeal with RTC, court affirmed in toto the decision
of MeTC. It held that respondents were not able to present evidence of their
actual possession prior to that of petitioners.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration where they
appended more documentary evidence showing their ownership over
property, as well as ownership and possession of their predecessors-ininterest. RTC reversed its previous decision. CA affirmed ruling of RTC on the
ground that it is the inherent right of the court to amend and control its
processes.
Issue: Whether or not section 5 Rule 135 of the revised rules of court is
applicable in a motion for reconsideration where documents in the motion for
reconsideration are not to be considered as evidence to prove supervening
events.
Held: No, the rule is not applicable.
Section 5 Rule 135 of Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Inherent powers of courts. Every court shall have the power:
xxxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice;
xxxxx
This inherent power is not absolute. The rules do not contemplate
amendments that are substantial in nature. They merely cover formal
changes or such that it will not affect the crux of the decision, like the
correction of typographical or clerical errors. Courts will violate due process if
they make substantial amendments in their decisions without affording the
other party the right to contest the new evidence presented in a motion for
reconsideration.
[G.R. No. 149765. April 12, 2005]
ARTURO MEJIA, Petitioners,
vs.
FILOMENA GABAYAN, ALBIN RUEME, ERNESTO MEJIA, CARLOS
RAMOS, JOSEFINA LACADIN and PEDRO GAVINO, Respondents.
Mejia is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Isabela. The
lot was a portion of a large tract of land covered by a homestead patent

granted to his father. On August 13, 1978, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) over portions of the property to the
following tenant-beneficiaries: Carlos Ramos, DancesoGavino, Francisca
Rueme, Pedro Gavino (some of respondents in present case)
In the meantime, the Courts decision in Alita v. Court of Appeals was
promulgated, wherein it was held that properties covered by homestead
patents were not covered by PD No. 27. Mejia filed a petition with the
DAR, for the exclusion of the property from PD No. 27. Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order recommending the denial of
the petition. Instead of pursuing his appeal in the DAR case, Mejia opted to
file a complaint in the RTC of Isabela against the tenant-respondents for
declaratory relief and recovery of the possession of the property
alleging that the parcel of land was originally owned by his father to whom a
homestead patent was granted and that the land was not covered by PD No.
27 as held by this Court in Alita v. Court of Appeals; In their answer to the
complaint, the tenant-respondents averred that there was a pending petition
with DAR filed by Mejia for the exclusion of the property from the coverage of
PD No. 27; the action was beyond the jurisdiction of the court because the
dispute between the parties is agrarian, and as such, within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication
Board (DARAB).
On January 25, 1995, the RTC rendered a summary judgment in favor
of Mejia and against the tenant-respondents. Tenant-respondents appealed
the decision to the CA.
In the meantime, on May 23, 1995, the DAR Regional Director issued
an Order granting the petition of Mejia exempting his property from the PD
27, BUT ordering him to allow the respondents-tenants to remain in
possession of the property and to execute Leasehold Contracts in their
favour. Plus, DAR Sec ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of
Mejia (declaratory relief and recovery of possession case). This order became
final and executory.
Despite the DAR ruling becoming final and executory, Mejia filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment in the RTC
CASE. The trial court issued a writ of execution. (The writ was implemented
but Mejia failed to take actual possession of the property)
(Basically there are 2 cases:
1) Agrarian case where Mejia sought the exclusion of her land from PD
27 and
2) RTC case for declaratory relief and recovery of possession of the
property.

RTC rendered a judgement first ruling that the property was exempt
from PD 27. Subsequently, DAR Secretary ruled the same BUT allowed the
tenant-respondents to stay in possession and to have Leasehold Contracts
executed in their favour. Mejia wants to implement the RTC decision)
The issue now is which decision should prevail?
Mejia avers that the RTC decision had long become final and executory
and can no longer be modified or set aside; that the trial court was dutybound to implement its decision; that the Order of the DAR Secretary is not a
supervening event barring the enforcement of the RTCs final and executory
decision.
The tenant-respondents, on the other hand, aver that RTC is mandated
to respect the Order of the DAR Secretary; that the Order of the DAR is a
special and exceptional circumstance warranting the suspension of the
execution of the decision of the trial court in the higher interest of justice.
Issue: WON the execution of the RTC ruling should suspended
Held:YES
The general rule is that it is the ministerial duty of the court to order
the execution of its final judgment. However, Rule 135, Section 5(g) of the
Rules of Court provides that the trial court may amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. It has
the inherent power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial offices, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto. The inherent power of
the court carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law
which may be involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the
execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has
the authority to cause a modification of the decision when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events
warrant it. The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the
enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which show fraud in
its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the record.
More importantly, it is the DAR who has jurisdiction over the case.
Having first acquired jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, DAR
retained the same until final disposition of the case.
[G.R. No. 162144-54. 13 November 2012]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS.
HON. DELA TORRE-YADAO, ET AL.

The combined forces of the Philippine National Polices Anti-Bank

Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force
Habagat, then headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed
11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. Subsequently, SPO2
Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told
the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the
police and those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman
for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved. On review,
however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed
charges of murder against the police officers involved before the
Sandiganbayan. On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the
provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the
accused for trial following the recantation of the principal prosecution
witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.
The case was reopened in March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered a
Decision, granting Lacsons petition on the ground of double jeopardy but on
appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to try the case. It was re-raffled
to branch 81 presided by Judge Yadao. Yadao in 2003 junked the murder
case against Lacson and other police officials for lack of probable cause.On
March 3, 2004 the prosecution filed the present special civil action of
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
adopted certain policies concerning the conduct of hearings in her court

Held: The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only
one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor for all the offended parties
but allowed each of the counsels representing the individual respondents to
be heard during the proceedings before it. She also unjustifiably prohibited
the prosecutions use of tape recorders. But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules
of Court gives the trial court ample inherent and administrative powers to
effectively control the conduct of its proceedings.
Thus: Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. Every court shall have power:
xxxx
(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or
persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;

xxxx
(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial
officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before
it, in every manner appertaining thereto;
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice;

x x x x There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadaos policy of allowing

only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor to address the court
during the hearing for determination of probable cause but permitting
counsels representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The
burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused is upon him,
not upon the private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients
damages claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a
common position on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of
the accused is entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him. As for the
prohibition against the prosecutions private recording of the proceedings,
courts usually disallows such recordings because they create an unnecessary
distraction and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer, party, witness, or
reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist on being given the
same privilege. Since the prosecution makes no claim that the official
recording of the proceedings by the courts stenographer has been
insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadaos
policy against such extraneous recordings.

[G.R. No. 183546. September 18, 2009]

WILSON A. GO
VS.
HARRY A. GO,
Petitioner Wilson A. Go instituted an action for partition with
accounting against private respondent Harry A. Go in the RTC. Petitioner
alleged that he and private respondent are among the five children of

Spouses Sio Tong Go and Simeona Lim Ang; that he and private respondent
are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land; that, upon mutual
agreement between petitioner and private respondent, petitioner has
possession of the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. V-44555; that on said
land there are seven warehouses being rented out by private respondent to
various businesses without proper authority from petitioner; that from March
2006 to September 2006, private respondent collected rentals thereon
amounting to P1,697,850.00 without giving petitioner his one-half (1/2)
share.
Petitioner filed a motion to require private respondent to deposit
with the trial court petitioner's one-half (1/2) share in the rental collections
from the date of the filing. The trial court issued an order granting the motion
not only with respect to the one-half (1/2) share prayed for but the entire
monthly rental collections. Upon motion, CA reversed the order.
Issue: Whether the Court Appeals erred when it nullified the order requiring
private respondent to deposit the monthly rentals over the subject land with
the trial court during the pendency of the action for partition and accounting.
Held: The appellate court held that the order granting petitioners motion to
deposit monthly rentals is premature because the question of co-ownership
should first be resolved before said motion may be granted. However, as
correctly argued by petitioner, the assailed order is merely preservatory or
provisional in nature. It does not amount to an adjudication on the merits of
the action for partition and accounting for the rentals are merely kept by the
trial court until it is finally determined who is lawfully entitled thereto.
Although the Rules of Court do not expressly provide for this kind of
provisional relief, the Court has, in the past, sanctioned such practice
pursuant to the courts general power to issue such orders conformable to
law and justice and to adopt means necessary to carry its jurisdiction into
effect.
In The Province of Bataan v. Hon. Villafuerte, Jr., the Court sustained
the escrow order issued by the trial court over the lease rentals of the
subject properties therein pending the resolution of the main action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance. In upholding the authority of the trial
court to issue such order, the Court ratiocinated thus: In a manner of
speaking, courts have not only the power to maintain their life, but they have
also the power to make that existence effective for the purpose for which the
judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate means, do all things
necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the
judiciary an effective institution of Government. Courts have therefore
inherent power to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and to
insure effectiveness in the administration of justice.

To lend flesh and blood to this legal aphorism, Rule 135 of the
Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Section 5. Inherent powers of courts Every court shall have
power:
. . . (g)
To amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice.
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect When by
law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or officer, and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
conformable to the spirit of said law or rules. (Emphasis ours)
As can be seen, the order to deposit the lease rentals with the trial
court is in the nature of a provisional relief designed to protect and preserve
the rights of the parties while the main action is being litigated. Contrary to
the findings of the Court of Appeals, such an order may be issued even prior
to the determination of the issue of co-ownership because it is precisely
meant to preserve the rights of the parties until such time that the court
finally determines who is lawfully entitled thereto. It does not follow,
however, that the subject order in this case should be sustained. Here,
petitioner categorically prayed for in his motion for deposit with the trial
court of only one-half (1/2) of the monthly rentals during the pendency of the
case. It was, therefore, highly irregular for the RTC to order the deposit of the
entire monthly rentals.[In the case, the Court ruled that petitioner is not
entitled to have of the income deposited because he was not able to
substantiate his claim.]

BAR QUESSTIONS

(no questions in the Bar Examination in legal ethics that specifically covered this topic)