Resolution

Resolution
The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic
and/or diplomatic engagement with the Peoples Republic of China.
Categories violation
Uses of this violation

You should read this against any affirmative that takes an expansive interpretation
of diplomatic or economic engagement. It is designed to exclude military
affirmatives and affirmatives that are based upon cultural contacts from the topic.
There is overlap between military and diplomatic, and between economic and
cultural. For example, tourism is cultural engagement, but it also has enormous
economic effects. Many interactions the military may take are diplomatic as well.
The challenge for the negative is in convincing the judge that there is a unique
meaning of diplomatic and economic in the context of engagement. The
resolution uses those words distinctly with the intent of distinguishing them from
each other, and from other types of engagement. If the judge were to consider
military affirmatives to be topical, there would be very little reason for the words
diplomatic or economic to even be in the resolution in the first place. The
affirmative interpretation is an extremely broad topic that would probably consider
every conceivable interaction with China as diplomatic. If the affirmatives
interpretation were correct, the use of the word economic in the resolution would
be completely redundant, given that all economic interactions also involve
diplomacy. Only an interpretation of the topic that considers military, cultural,
diplomatic and economic as discreet categories is capable of giving a distinct
meaning to each word in the resolution, as well as creating a slightly better limit on
an extremely broad topic.
Sample affirmative plan and 2ac

This plan and 2ac block is taken verbatim from the Emory camp, which turned out a
military affirmative.
PLAN The United States should establish guaranteed annual military-to-military

exchanges with the Peoples Republic of China demanding that China abandon
military expansionism in the South China Seas.
1. We Meet the plan makes a diplomatic push to have China

stop making claims in the South China Sea that meets their
interpretation.
2. We meet military-to-military contacts occur as a summit

meeting the PLA is a head-of state which meets their
interpretation.
3. counter-interpretation Engagement must be the

establishment of continual political communication
Sheen, 2 associate professor at the Graduate School of International Studies,
Seoul National University (Seongho, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.
XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, US Strategy of Engagement During the Cold War and Its
Implication for Sunshine Policy
http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/14/seongho_sheen.pdf)
Can the sunshine policy really bring positive changes within the North Korean regime and peace to the Korean peninsula? The logic
behind Kim Dae-jungs policy is a refinement of one of the major strategies of economic statecraft and military competition. In his
discussion of US economic statecraft towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Michael Mastanduno provides a useful
engagement promotes
positive relations with an enemy as a means of changing the behavior or policies of a target
government. It accepts the legitimacy of that government and tries to shape its
conduct. Engagement also requires the establishment and continuance of
political communication with the target. In engaging the enemy, the state sees political polarization
framework for understanding President Kims engagement policy towards the North. In general,
with target or isolation of the target country as undesirable.
We meet that interpretation we make mil-mil contacts

permanent and annual that creates a predictable limit on the
topic and locks in neg ground.
4. Their interpretation destroys the heart of the topic most of

our interactions with China are over military issues South
China Sea, North Korea, nukes excluding anything to do with
the military makes the topic anti-educational.
5. Diplomatic engagement includes the military

Reveron 07 U.S. Naval War College [Derek S. Reveron, Shaping and
Military Diplomacy, Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, August 30 - September 2, 2007,
http://www.faoa.org/resources/documents/apsa07_proceeding_210193.pdf]
While the Department of State is the lead foreign policy organization within the U.S.
government, the Department of Defense plays an increasingly important role in diplomacy
largely through its a long tradition of international engagement through shaping the security environment.
With a forward presence, large planning staffs, and various engagement tools, geographic combatant
commanders pursue regional-level engagement by hosting international security conferences,
promoting transparency through military-to-military contacts, and providing American
military training and equipment. Throughout history, officers, such as Commodore Matthew Perry,
General Tony Zinni, and Admiral Joseph Prueher, have played critical roles in U.S. foreign policy
formulation and implementation. Officers like these provide ready evidence that the military does much
more than fight the nations wars. This paper considers military diplomatic engagement
activities as a part of U.S. grand strategy and explores the legal and policy implications of an
Abstract:
increasingly militarized foreign policy
6. Topicality should be evaluated in terms of what is

reasonable if we are topical and have a reasonable
interpretation that should make us topical.
Negative
1nc categories
Engagement is the attempt to influence Chinese policy change
through enhancing political contacts economic and
diplomatic contacts are distinct from military and cultural
Resnick, 1 Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan,
Journal of International Affairs, Defining Engagement v54, n2, political science
complete)
A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes,
I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political
behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and
enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic,
military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that
such contacts might include:
DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS
Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations
Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes
Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government
officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa
MILITARY CONTACTS
Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and viceversa
Arms transfers
Military aid and cooperation
Military exchange and training programs
Confidence and security-building measures
Intelligence sharing
ECONOMIC CONTACTS
Trade agreements and promotion
Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants
CULTURAL CONTACTS
Cultural treaties
Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)
Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a
relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of
"normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple
domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state
wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased
contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic
and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could
adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For
instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low
or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its
objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by
directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing
the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions
that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in
the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target
state.
This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to
constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of
contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states
are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a
highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective
policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US
engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political
behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be
significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill
those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to
engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement
by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the
Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)
Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it
represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This
means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms
and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's
Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.
This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly
conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than
ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged,
explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of
multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown
below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.
Its a voting issue

1. limits this is already the largest topic in history and
including the military makes it impossible to prepare for
2. Precision its key to effective policy analysis
complete)
In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a

precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in
an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk
exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars
who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical
research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define
"engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.
The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of
engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices
available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related
approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the
groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of
engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used
effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information
necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21st century.
1nc categories short version

Engagement is the attempt to influence Chinese policy change
through enhancing political contacts economic and
diplomatic contacts are distinct from military and cultural
Lee, 12 - Instructor, Department of Military & Strategic Studies, Republic of Korea
Air Force Academy (Jeongseok, Hedging against Uncertain Future: The Response of
East Asian Secondary Powers to Rising China
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_18064.pdf
The Seventh option is to engage with the ascending power. Engagement is defined
as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the
comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across
multiple issue-areas. (Resnick 2001: 559) Instruments of engagement policy
include diplomatic contacts (e.g. extension and elevation of diplomatic relations,
summits, high level meetings, etc.), military contacts (e.g. military exchange, joint
training or exercise, confidence building measures, intelligence sharing), economic
contacts (e.g. agreements, foreign aids and loans, coordination of macroeconomic
policies), and social contacts (e.g. cultural exchanges, improvement of tourism,
youth exchange programs). Through these forms of interactions, minor powers can
try to induce its target to more moderate and peaceful path of ascendance.
Although secondary states influence over shaping perceptions and behaviors of
rising power is not as powerful as great powers, engagement is a considerable
option. If ascending states thinking and behavior can be altered to a more
favorable direction even to the slightest degree, it is worth to attempt because it
does not require significant compensations nor costs, and it does not risk provoking
antagonism.
Its a voting issue

1. limits this is already the largest topic in history and
including the military makes it impossible to prepare for
2. Precision its key to effective policy analysis
complete)
In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a

precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in
an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk
exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars
who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical
research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define
"engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.
The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of
engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices
available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related
approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the
groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of
engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used
effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information
necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21st century.
Link arms sales / military training

Arms sales and military training are military engagement
Haass and OSullivan, 2k - *Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies
at the Brookings Institution AND **a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program
at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, Terms of Engagement:
Alternatives to Punitive Policies Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000 ,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer
%20haass/2000survival.pdf
Similarly, limited forms of military engagement are almost always helpful in

achieving foreign-policy goals, whether these aims be modest or ambitious. In
societies such as Pakistan, where the military is a key institution in political and
daily life, maximising contact with the armed forces particularly makes sense. If the
transfer of arms or dual-use technology would be counterproductive, programmes
like Americas International Military Educational Training amount to sound
investments and should almost never be rescinded as a sanction. Not only do they
enable the US to influence the conduct of the military today, they allow America to
build connections with military leaders who may be important political figures later
in their political careers.
Economic and diplomatic engagement are conceptually distinct

from military to military contacts
Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives.

Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits,
investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid.3
Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as
trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic
relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the
economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most
potent incentives in todays global market. Similarly, political engagement can
involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international
institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders or the termination of
these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international
military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority
and human rights among a countrys armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish
relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these
areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or
civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding
nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting
the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between
countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.
Link funding NGOs / remittances / student

exchanges / tourism
Economic and diplomatic engagement are conceptually distinct
from people to people contacts

areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or
civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding
nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting
the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between
countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.
AT: Diplomatic includes military

Diplomatic engagement is limited to presidential visits and
State Department diplomatic actions thats distinct from
military engagement even though the military sometimes does
diplomacy
Derrick, 98 - LIEUTENANT COLONEL, US Army (Robert, ENGAGEMENT: THE
NATIONS PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE? http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA342695
Economic engagement covers a wide range of programs. Financial incentives are an

effective engagement tool since countries usually interact with the US when money
is involved. Whether it is obtaining funding for a national program; acquiring
materiel, food or medicine; or maintaining Most Favored Nation Status, financial
aide has always been a preferred way for the US to affect the behavior of others.
Diplomatic engagement ranges from recognition of sovereign states and foreign
governments, to presidential visits, to all aspects of the embassy itself. The mere
existence of an embassy is an engagement tool. Through official diplomatic
ceremonies, informal meetings, and embassy employees living among the locals,
the Department of State's presence is engagement in and of itself.
Similarly, "...overseas...forces embody global military engagement. They serve as
role models for militaries in emerging democracies; contribute uniquely to the
stability, continuity, and flexibility that protects US interests; and are crucial to
continued democratic and economic development."14 In addition to our presence
overseas, our military engagement consists of a variety of military to military and
political to military events. U.S. and host nation defense forces conduct combined
exercises to improve cooperation and strengthen ties.
Theres a distinct diplomatic engagement budget and it

exclusively refers to State Department public diplomacy and
embassy programs
State Department, 15 - Released by the Bureau of Budget and Planning and the
Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (Department of State Evaluation Policy
1/29, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/evaluation/2015/236970.htm
Specific Programs: In addition to its routine activities, the Department undertakes

programs to achieve specific objectives. These programs, broadly defined to include
projects, activities, and efforts, are time-bound and have separate resources
budgeted for them. They fall under two categories: foreign assistance and
diplomatic engagement. Foreign assistance programs are designed to achieve a

wide range of objectives such as preventing conflict and stabilizing war-torn
societies, rehabilitating refugees and internally displaced persons, supporting
human rights and gender equality, and combating hunger, HIV/AIDS, and
environmental degradation. Diplomatic engagement programs are designed for
engaging other governments and global partners through a variety of efforts, such
as public diplomacy; promoting economic and business relations; staffing bureaus,
posts, and consulates to engage host country governments and international
organizations; providing American citizens services; and providing grants to foreign
countries to generate goodwill and friendship.
A budget-based definition creates a clear bright-line

Pitkin, 16 - Director, Bureau of Budget and Planning, U.S Department of State
(Douglas, Congressional Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management,
International Operations and Bilateral International Development, 3/1,
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030116_Pitkin_Testimony1.pdf
As the Director of the State Department Bureau for Budget and Planning, I am here
today to discuss our request for our people; diplomatic and embassy security
programs; public diplomacy efforts; treaty based contributions to United Nations
peacekeeping efforts and international organizations, and our global management
platform, otherwise known as the Diplomatic Engagement portion of the
Departments budget. The Diplomatic Engagement budget is about 32% of the total
State/USAID request, with foreign assistance rounding out the remaining 68 %. The
FY 2017 request for this portion of the budget totals $16.1 billion, an increase of
$560 million over the FY 2016 level.
The budget includes clear categories the affirmative doesnt

meet
State Department, 14 (BUREAU OF THE COMPTROLLER AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SERVICES FY 2014 Department of State Agency Financial Report, 11/17,
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2014/html/235057.htm
The FY 2014 Diplomatic Engagement budget totaled $14.9 billion. This includes $9.8
billion for Administration of Foreign Affairs, which includes Diplomatic and Consular
Programs (D&CP), Worldwide Security Protection (WSP), and Embassy Security,
Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) and Other Administration of Foreign Affairs
appropriations. The remainder of the Diplomatic Engagement budget is comprised
of Contributions to International Organizations and International Peacekeeping
Activities ($3.1 billion), Related Programs ($169.2 million), and International
Commissions ($125.9 million) appropriations. Diplomatic Engagement also included

$1.8 billion in OCO funding for selected accounts, primarily D&CP. Separating OCO
from enduring expenses makes the Department's budget more transparent and
reduces overlap by aligning spending in the Frontline States with the Department of
Defense, which also receives OCO funding.
AT: Military is core of topic

Diplomatic engagement through the State Department can
focus on all relevant China issues - they just cant use the
military as their mechanism
State Department, 16 (CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION Appendix 1:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT Fiscal Year 2017,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252732.pdf
The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) focuses on

increasing American security and prosperity by enhancing strategic stability around
the world using both traditional tools such as the negotiation and implementation of
arms control, verification and compliance treaties and agreements, and new tools
such as missile defense deployments and transparency and confidence building
measures (TCBMs). These efforts span the globe and cut across the Department of
State to involve its regional and many of its functional bureaus, as well as a number
of other U.S. Government agencies. The Departments and Bureaus efforts are
focused on implementing the national security guidance in the Presidents April
2009 Prague speech, the National Security Strategy of 2015, the Nuclear Posture
Review of 2010, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review of 2010, the National Space
Policy of 2010, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review of 2015, and
the Joint State-USAID Strategic Goals and Priorities.
Going forward, AVC also will focus on emerging security challenges such as cyber
security, threats to our space-based assets, and international security interests in
the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The Bureau will expand its diplomatic engagement
in Asia, and particularly with China. In FY 2017, AVCs highest priority will continue
to be to enhance global strategic stability to reduce, prevent, and thwart the spread
of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. AVC
will do this through the development and implementation of arms control,
transparency, disarmament agreements, cooperative arrangements and missile
defense for European, Middle Eastern and Northern Asian security that protect the
United States, our allies, and friends.
AT: We meet effects

Engagement should be defined as the means, not an end its
necessary for education and effective policy analysis
complete)
DEFINING ENGAGEMENT TOO NARROWLY

The third trap that has ensnared numerous scholars is the tendency to needlessly
circumscribe the parameters of engagement. This results from attempts to: define
engagement as ends rather than means; stipulate the types of states that can
engage or be engaged; restrict the types of behaviors that comprise engagement;
and limit the types of behaviors that can be modified through engagement. Each of
these restrictions hampers the task of evaluating the utility of engagement relative
to other policies objectively accurately.
Some scholars have excessively narrowed the definition of engagement by defining
it according to the ends sought rather than the means employed. For example,
Schweller and Wohlforth assert that if any distinction can be drawn between
engagement and appeasement, "it is that the goal of engagement is not simply
tension-reduction and the avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize [a]
dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order."(n17) Such ends-based
definitions hinder the study of engagement in two ways. First, because the act of
policymaking consists of selecting from a variety of alternative means in the pursuit
of a given end(s), it stands to reason that policy instruments are more effectively
conceptualized in terms of means rather than ends. When defined as different
means, policies can be more easily compared with one another across a whole
spectrum of discrete ends, in order to gauge more accurately the circumstances
under which each policy is relatively more or less effective.(n18)
Second, scholars who define engagement as the end of peaceful socialization
inevitably create a bias for future empirical research on engagement outcomes. This
is because it is difficult to imagine a more ambitious foreign policy objective than
the peaceable transformation of a revisionist state that rejects the dominant norms
and practices of the international system into a status-quo state that embodies
those same norms and practices. The equation of engagement with socialization
alone forecloses the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish
more modest goals such as tension-reduction. Therefore, all else being equal,
scholars using this loaded definition will be predisposed to conclude from
examination only of the hardest cases of attempted socialization that the policy is
ineffective.(n19) Considering engagement as a set of means would enable analysts
to more fairly assess the effectiveness of engagement relative to other policies in
achieving an array of ends.
Allowing effects topicality is a limits disaster on this topic

everything the US does effects the international economy
Derrick, 98 - LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT R. DERRICK United States Army
(ENGAGEMENT: THE NATIONS PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE?
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA342695)
In addition to the agencies that administer the programs listed in figure 3, the State
Department proclaims that "...protecting national interests and advancing US goals
involve virtually every agency of the government...."16 US governmental agencies
with international reach directly engage as a part of their daily routines. Agencies
that deal strictly with domestic policy indirectly engage through the effect
their actions have on US markets and thus world markets. For example the
Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture, Transportation, and Energy, have both
domestic and international responsibilities. From trade status to travel status, from
immigration rules to export of tools, from training flights to basing rights, US
agencies directly and indirectly engage through hundreds of programs. US
governmental agencies that inadvertently operate at crosspurposes, through
misunderstanding or ignorance, must ultimately be coordinated at some point.
Since there is no single director below the President to coordinate the US
engagement activities of the three elements of national power, it becomes the
responsibility of the regional CINCs and Ambassadors.
Determining topicality based on effect ruins precision and

makes any policy topical
Baldwin 85 David A., Professor of World Order Studies and Political Science at
Colombia, Economic Statecraft, p. 33-36
Alternative Concepts
As with policy options, the value of a particular conceptualization is best measured by comparing it with available
economic statecraft is defined in terms of means, alternative concepts

are usually defined in terms of actual or intended effects of a policy or in terms of the process by which
alternatives. Whereas
the policy was made.
Foreign Economic Policy
The term "foreign economic policy" is sometimes used in much the same way as "economic statecraft" is used here.
Other uses, however, should be noted. Benjamin Cohen and Robert Pastor define it in terms of governmental
actions intended to affect the international economic environment.17 An important drawback to this conception is
that it makes it definitionally impossible to consider foreign economic policy as an option when a statesman wants
to affect the noneconomic aspects of the international environment, say the international climate of opinion with
respect to the legitimacy of the government of Rhodesia. Rational adaptation of means to ends in foreign policy
making is not facilitated by defining some policy options in terms of particular ends. Still another objection to this
definition is that it says nothing about the means to be used, thus leaving open the possibility that the use of
noneconomic techniques, such as threats of violence, could be considered foreign economic policy. Such a
possibility strays needlessly from common usage.
Destler offers a definition of foreign economic policy in terms of the actual

impact of governmental actions on foreign and economic concerns. This definition
implies nothing whatever about either the means used or the effect intended; instead it focuses on the
actual effects intended or not. Thus, a nuclear war could be labeled as foreign
economic policy if it had important side effects on foreign economic matters . Any
conception of foreign economic policy that cannot differentiate between nuclear
attack and trade restrictions is hopelessly at odds with common usage. Any
conception of policy that ignores both means and ends is unlikely to be of much use in
assessing the rationality of a given policy.
I. M.
International Economic Policy

Stephen D. Cohen argues that the term "international economic policy" is preferable to the more commonly used
phrase, "foreign economic policy." He contends that "international economic policy must be viewed as being a
separate phenomenon, not a tool for use by either foreign policy or domestic economic policy officials." The reasons
underlying Cohen's position can be summarized as follows: (1) "International economic policy" is the "preferable
term because . . . policy making in this area must take account of too many questions of domestic. . . policy to be
considered 'foreign.' " (2) "The term 'foreign economic policy' usually connotes a subdivision of foreign policy as a
whole and is therefore an oversimplification." And (3) acceptance of international economic policy as a distinct
policy area is the "best and quickest way" to improve understanding of the "forces of economics in international
economic policy" and of "the global political impact of U.S. international economic policy."19 The following points,
however, should be noted in response to Cohen's position: (1) Foreign policy has traditionally been defined in terms
of attempts to influence foreigners, not in terms of the factors that should be taken into account in formulating the
policy. The fact that making international economic policy requires consideration of foreign and domestic political
and economic factors in no way distinguishes it from traditional conceptions of foreign economic policy. (2) It is not
self-evident that treating foreign economic policy as a subdivision of foreign policy as a whole constitutes
"oversimplification." Cohen provides little evidence or argument to support this contention. Indeed, from an a priori
standpoint, it would seem simpler to consider international economic policy by itself than to treat it as part of a
larger whole. Treating more variables may lead to overcomplexity, but it rarely leads to oversimplification. And (3)
the question of whether Cohen's approach is the "best and quickest way" to enhance understanding is best
answered after consideration of alternative
three common meanings of the term economic sanctions may be identified .

The first is a rather narrow concept referring to the use of economic measures to enforce international law. The
second refers to the types of values that are intended to be reduced or augmented
in the target state. And the third usage corresponds to the concept of economic techniques of statecraft as
used here. The first is narrowly legalistic and therefore unsuitable for general foreign policy analysis. The
second emphasizes intended effects rather than the means for achieving those
effects. The difficulty is that any or all of the policy instruments discussed in the previous
chapter can be used to affect the economic values in a target state. Diplomatic
pressure on other states can be used to discourage trade with the target; propaganda can be
used to undermine confidence in the target states currency; and military attack can be used to
destroy factories. Thus, conceiving of economic sanctions in terms of the intended
effects on the receiving state is no help at all in distinguishing economic from
noneconomic tools of statecraft. The term economic sanctions is used in so many different ways that
At least
there is much to be said for avoiding it altogether. Unfortunately, the term is so deeply embedded in the literature
of economic statecraft that ignoring it is impossible. Later chapters will therefore use this term, but only in its third
sense.
QPQ violation
Uses of this violation

This is probably the main violation most teams will extend on this topic. You would
read it against any affirmative that did not condition the plan explicitly on a
particular Chinese behavioral change.
One thing to be careful about: affirmatives will try to meet this violation by saying
that every plan is an offer to China that China is free to reject. While this is true
on every foreign policy topic, the difference is that there is no express condition
involved in the plan. Every plan is an offer, but the only topical plans are offers that
are made in exchange for a specific Chinese concession.
Sample plan and 2ac

The United States federal government should establish a summit meeting with Xi
Jinping to discuss human rights.
We meet the plan is conditional on China saying yes if

they say no, theres no summit meeting
Engagement can be conditional or unconditional
Kahler and Kastner, 6 (Miles Kahler and Scott L. Kastner, Graduate School of International
Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, Department of Government and Politics, University
of Maryland, May 1, 2010, "Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean
Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait", Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)
Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic

engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on
the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional. 1 Conditional
policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic 'carrots', are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of
threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement
policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change. Drezner (1999/2000) has
proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional strategies and the conditions of
their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies
(because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of
international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among
adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used. coercive threats are first used. The success of a conditional
engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state's influence over domestic firms. If those firms find
market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must
convince them to deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have
strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional
strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a
target states behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a
democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities
and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (HI), therefore, is that
conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially
Unconditional
engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that
they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an
when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.2
adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target's foreign policy
How increased economic integration at

the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political
environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased
behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict.
economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists
At a
minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by
pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic
interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of
the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming
agent that reshapes the goals of the target state.
(e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996).
They overlimit and wreck topic education quid pro quos are a
strategy for ADVERSARIES, not countries we have good
relations with it kills all meaningful China affs.
They destroy aff ground if were forced to include conditions,
we cant read relations advantages, which are the core
advantage ground on an engagement topic wed also lose
every debate to the add a condition CP or the unconditional CP
Defining engagement conditionally guarantees the aff loses all
debates its a historical failure err towards realistic policy
definitions instead
Suettinger, 2k senior analyst at Brookings; United States President Bill Clinton's
national intelligence officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council (NIC)
from 1997-1998 (Robert, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign
Policy, ed: Haass and OSullivan, p. 26-28)
The twists and turns of the U.S. policy of engagement with China suggests several
problems and lessons. The first is that it is essential to provide more conceptual and
substantive clarity to the use of the term engagement. The expression has become
shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means. Most
recently, it has come to symbolize Republican dissatisfaction with both the content
and the conduct of the Clinton administration's China policy.
Similarly, engagement in the second usage of the term laid out earlier in this
chapterthat is, as a grand strategy of managing a strategic relationship through
the explicit offering of incentives and the threat of sanctions has not been
particularly successful as a strategy for changing the Chinese government's internal
political behavior, at least not in ways visible to critics in the United States. Efforts
to link MFN trade status with Chinese human rights failed abjectly, only delivering
the Clinton administration a painful retreat and a huge amount of U.S. domestic
criticism. China's modern history is in many ways focused on recovering from and
preventing foreign interference in its domestic affairs. Linkage that seeks to force
change in China's management of its internal security is resented and resisted.
Even were this not the case, linkage of one or more issue areas to progress in
another puts the entire relationship at risk.
Neither has this form of strategic engagement influenced China to adopt new
policies on international issues, mainly because there were few explicit incentives
the United States could offer that China did not already have. Although China
occasionally complained that the United States sought to isolate and contain it,
China is a member in good standing of the international community. It will expand
or contract its interaction with the international community, contribute or detract

from consensus on international norms as its leadership sees fit, not in response to
American incentives. China is too large, complex, and interdependent with the
United States for Washington to try to manipulate the entire relationship toward a
particular strategic, economic, or other goal. Complicating any such efforts is the
reality that the creation of a web of overlapping relationships between China and
the United States has drawbacks as well as benefits. While such a web might induce
China to alter its behavior on one front, it would also constrain the United States by
inhibiting American policy flexibility in a similar way. One need only take note of the
annual ritual congressional voting on China's normal-trade-relations (formerly mostfavored-nation) status to see the web process operating in reverse. The intense
lobbying of Congress and the executive branch taken up every year by wellorganized and well-financed business organizations attests to the fact that
engagement creates reverse dependencies as well, making the reversal of American
policy a costly proposition.
Finally, the U.S. government (including both executive and legislative branches) is
too cumbersome, disaggregated, and diverse to enforce the kind of rigid discipline
that such a carefully managed strategic engagement process entails. Particularly
when the presidency and Congress are controlled by different parties, managing a
foreign relations process that does not involve the most urgent matters of national
security has become extraordinarily difficult.
In contrast, engagement in the third sense of a dialogue, as a process of
communication and management of relations or as a means to an end, should be
not only maintained, but also strengthened and reaffirmed. Engagement in this
most modest sense of the word is indispensable to the achievement of any
American foreign policy goals with China and, when clearly understood and
effectively practiced, can achieve significant results in changing Chinese behavior. It
should not be seen as an alternative to sanctions, nor should it be regarded as
relying principally on incentives (or in the overused metaphor, the "carrot") rather
than disincentives (the "stick"). Successful engagement does not necessarily
preclude the use or threat of sanctions.
Engagement means positive inducements qpqs are punitive

and not engagement
Lampton, 1 - Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (David, Same Bed, Different
Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000, p. 135-136) italics in original
The period from 1989 to 2000 can be understood as a time when Washington tried
two broad approaches to promoting human rights in the PRC. The first approach,
termed engagement, focused on interacting with Beijing in ways that supported the
social, economic, and structural changes already underway in China in order to
bring PRC behavior into increasing alignment with international norms over a
protracted period. The term engagement is rightly associated with a classified

memorandum written by Winston Lord to President Clinton in mid-July 1993 that
called for "comprehensive engagement" and was adopted that September; as Lord
subse- quently put it to me, "The president wanted a broader framework" for dealing with China.64 However, the term was not entirely new. In his inaugural address
President Bush had spoken of a "new engagement" in interpersonal relations,
between branches of government and with other nations, saying, "To the world, too,
we offer new engagement."*5 The approach emphasized positive inducements,
dialogue, and closed-door diplomacy rather than public stigmatization and openly
delivered threats, and assigned high value to economic cooperation.
The second approach, the punitive approach, focused on the obvious abuses of
individual and group rights in the PRC and employed sanctions and shame as the
tools of choice. This approach sought to employ economic ties as a lever to extract
human rights concessions from Beijing, with concessions often defined as improved
conditions (justice) for identifiable individuals.
No ground loss they can read a condition CP against every

unconditional aff there are core topic generics
The lack of a modifier means this violation isnt predictable
Kennedy, 3 - deputy director of the Freeman Chair in China Studies and director of
the Project on Chinese Business and Political Economy at CSIS (Scott, China Cross
Talk: The American Debate over China Policy since Normalization, p. xx)
With an understanding of the parameters of the present volume, a few words should
be offered about the parameters of the debate itself. Since the mid- 1990s in the
United States, the policy options on China usually have been portrayed as a choice
between engagement and containment. There also has emerged a stream of
intermediate options that use parts of these two terms: "constrainment,"
"congagement," and "conditional engagement" are the three most popular.
However, this spectrum is illogical since engagement and containment are not polar
opposites; the term "engagement" without a modifier simply means interaction,
whereas "containment" implies a confrontational stance toward ones opponent.
Policy alternatives, in fact, have varied according to how much one thinks the
United States ought to accommodate China. At one end is the notion that the United
States ought to use all means at its disposal to check China, whether it be on
Taiwan or human rights. The most radical form of this view is a policy of rollback,
which posits that U.S. interests can be served only by the replacement of the
Communist government. One step toward the middle is the option of using
cooperative tools, not outright confrontation, to make China accommodate U.S.
interests. The next point on the spectrum also stresses cooperative relations but
countenances American steps to accommodate Chinese interests as well. The final
point on the continuum represents a one-sided American accommodation of Chinas

preferences.
Prefer reasonability competing interpretations are arbitrary

and not predictable- they can just shift the goalposts to a
more limiting interpretation
Aff at: appeasement

Appeasement is not offering concessions and its not defined
by whether its unconditional
Resnick, 9 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan,
Debating British Decisionmaking toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s International
Security, Summer, Project Muse)
By broadly characterizing appeasement as concessions, Ripsman and Levy fail to

substantively differentiate appeasement from other positive sanctions, given that all
such sanctions involve the provision of some form of concessions. By definition,
appeasement differs from other positive sanctions according to the sustained and
asymmetrical manner in which the policy is implemented, even if the substance of
the policy is otherwise identical. Thus, the only possible alternative instruments of
positive sanctions permitted by this definition would be those in which equally
nebulous concessions are delivered on a sustained and (expected) symmetrical
basis, a nonsustained and (expected) symmetrical basis, or a nonsustained and
(expected) asymmetrical basis. [End Page 184] This convoluted method of
differentiation is acceptable only if it is neither possible nor fruitful to establish
meaningful substantive differences between different types of concessions.
In this regard, it is instructive to note that international relations scholars have
constructed a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of
negative sanctions.7 Although there has been no shortage of disputes among these
scholars regarding the proper definition of economic sanctions, coercive diplomacy,
power balancing/containment (subdivided into internal and external variants, with
the latter in turn subdivided into hard and soft variants), preventive and preemptive
war, strategic bombing, covert action, terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, and
deterrence, all of these terms have been defined at a level of nuance and precision
that far surpasses what would be the antipode of Ripsman and Levys conception of
appeasement: a strategy of sustained, asymmetrical punishments in response to a
threat. In contrast to Ripsman and Levys definition of appeasement, each of the
aforementioned negative sanctions specifies the substantive character of the
punishments being threatened or imposed, which involve distinct sets of endemic
risks, costs, and benefits. This glaring disparity in conceptual development can be
largely attributed to the fact that political scientists have traditionally concentrated
their attention on negative sanctions and have largely ignored positive sanctions.8
An Alternative Definition of Appeasement
In place of Levy and Ripsmans definition of appeasement, I propose another: the
attempt to influence the behavior of a state or nonstate actor through the provision
of territory or an enlarged sphere of geopolitical influence to that actor.9 By defining
appeasement in substantive terms, analysts can delineate multiple strategies of
appeasement that vary according to the manner in which the policy is implemented
(e.g., conditionally or unconditionally, single-shot or iterated series of

concessions) and the scale of the objective(s) sought.10
Importantly, this definition accords with the two historical cases that scholars have
most closely associated with appeasement: British policy toward Nazi Germany
during the 1930s and Britains earlier policy toward the United States at the turn of
the twentieth century.11 Both consisted of British actions that match those
identified in my definition. Britain appeased the Third Reich between 1936 and 1939
by acquiescing to that regimes military reoccupation of the Rhineland, annexation
of Austria, acquisition of the Sudeten territory from Czechoslovakia, and subsequent
annexation of the rest of [End Page 185] Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile Britains
appeasement of the United States between 1896 and 1903 consisted of the
formers submission to Washingtons urgings to submit a border dispute between its
colony of British Guiana and Venezuela to international arbitration, formal
acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine, renunciation of its previous opposition to a U.S.built and fortified Central American canal, and acquiescence to U.S. claims
pertaining to the border between Alaska and the Canadian Yukon.12
My definition of appeasement also averts the chief handicaps of Ripsman and Levys
definition. First, it is relatively easy to operationalize. Cases in which states have
sought to influence the behavior of another actor through the promise or actual
extension of territory or spheres of influence to that actor are readily gleaned from
the historical record, are not subject to ex ante versus ex post differences in
interpretation, and do not necessitate scrutinizing the contemporaneous attitudes
and beliefs of political leaders in the sender state to judge whether the policy was
one of appeasement. Second, the definition does not lead to selection bias; as
articulated, it does not prejudge whether the senders exchange of territory and/or
sphere of influence in return for changed behavior by the target is likely to achieve
success in any given case. Third, by substantively restricting appeasement to the
provision of certain types of concessions, the definition permits the differentiation of
multiple instruments of positive sanctions, which consist of identifiably discrete
behaviors that differ in key respects.
In particular, this conception of appeasement facilitates the clear differentiation of
that policy from another, typically dubbed constructive engagement, which has
occupied the attention of both policymakers and analysts in recent years.13
Although the term constructive engagement has been invoked by analysts to
depict U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union during the early 1970s period of dtente,
apartheid South Africa and Saddam Husseins Iraq during the 1980s, and Vietnam,
North Korea, Russia, and China in the 1990s, it has been as murkily and
inadequately conceptualized as that of appeasement.14 In each of these cases, U.S.
policymakers attempted to influence the political behavior of the target state via
the establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple
issue areas (diplomatic, economic, military, and/or cultural), creating an increasingly
interdependent relationship between the two states.15 [End Page 186] Specifically,
such contacts included the normalization of diplomatic relations; arms transfers;
military aid; intelligence sharing; exchanges of military officials; trade agreements;
foreign economic assistance; inauguration of travel and tourism links; and sports,
academic, and educational exchanges.16 In each of these cases, however, even as

the United States vigorously engaged the target states in question, it opposed their
territorial and geopolitical expansion. Most notably, after Iraq invaded Kuwait in
early August 1990, the George H.W. Bush administration immediately severed all
remaining bilateral diplomatic, economic, and military contacts with Saddam
Husseins regime; successfully lobbied the United Nations Security Council to
impose comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq; and eventually launched a
full-scale war to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait.17
Its not appeasement because China isnt aggressive

Tang, 10 Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs
(SIRPA), Fudan Univeristy, Shanghai, China (Shiping, A Theory of Security Strategy
for Our Time: Defensive Realism, p. 101)
A strategy of appeasement is to retreat repeatedly (i.e., being accommodating or

conciliatory) despite the adversary repeatedly taking advantage of one's goodwill
and pressing with its aggressive goals (Edelstein 2002, 5; Resnick 2001, 561-562;
Ziring et aL 1995, 264-265).4 Defined as such, a conciliatory gesture or concession
can be regarded as an appeasement gesture only if the other side is
aggressive. In contrast, a conciliatory gesture or a concession when the other side
is not aggressive should not be conflated with an appeasement gesture, even if
the gesture was not reciprocated initially (see chapter 5 for details).
Negative
1nc QPQ
Diplomatic and economic engagement is the offer of positive
inducements in exchange for specific concessions
Hall, 14 - Senior Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University
(Ian, The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, p. 3-4)
This book explores the various modes of engagement employed in the Indian case,
their uses, and their limits. It follows the growing consensus in the literature that
defines engagement as any strategy that employs "positive inducements'' to
influence the behavior of states.8 It acknowledges that various, different
engagement strategies can be utilized. In particular, as Miroslav Nincic argues, we
can distinguish between "exchange" strategies and "catalytic" ones. With the first
type of strategy, positive inducements are offered to try to "leverage" particular
quid pro quos from the target state.9 An investment might be canvassed, a trade
deal promised, or a weapons system provided in return for a specific
concession. With the second type of strategy, inducements are offered merely to
catalyze something bigger, perhaps even involving the wholesale transformation of
a target society. In this kind of engagement, many different incentives might be laid
out for many different constituencies, from educational opportunities for emerging
leaders to new terms of trade for the economic elite.
The objects of engagement can include changing specific policies of the target state
or transforming the wider political, economic, or social order of a target society.
Both of these objectives could be pursued with coercive strategies employing either
compellence or deterrenceor indeed with a mixture of both engagement and
coercion." But much recent research has argued that the evidence for the efficacy
of both compellence and deterrence in changing target state policies is
inconclusive.12 Both military and economic sanctions have been shown to have
mixed results, and many scholars argue that coercion rarely works." By contrast,
there is some considerable evidence that engagement strategies can both elicit
discrete quid pro quos from states and generate wider political and social change
within them that might in the medium to long term lead to changed behavior at
home or in international relations.14 Moreover, it is clear that engagement is both
more commonly utilized than often recognized by scholars of international relations
and that it is generally considered more politically accepted to politicians and
publics in both engaging states and in the states they seek to engage.15
Engagement strategies take different forms depending on their objectives. They can
emphasize diplomacy, aiming at the improvement of formal, state-to- state
contacts, and be led by professional diplomats, special envoys, or politicians.
Alternatively, they can emphasize military ties, utilizing military-to- military
dialogues, exchanges, and training to build trust, convey strategic intentions, or
simply foster greater openness in the target states defense establishment.16 They
can be primarily economic in approach, using trade, investment, and technology
transfer to engender change in the target society and perhaps to generate greater
economic interdependence, constraining a target state's foreign policy choices.17
Finally, they can seek to create channels for people-to-people contact through statedriven public diplomacy, business forums and research networks, aid and
development assistance, and so on.
Violation the plan is an unconditional offer it happens

regardless of whether China changes its behavior
Voting issue to protect limits and ground. The number of
solvency advocates defending a QPQ is narrow, and an
affirmative that cant defend a QPQ would lose to an
unconditional counterplan. We create a functional limit on the
topic the alternative is resolved: China which is not
debatable
2nc QPQ
Engagement is the act of using political and economic contacts
as a strategy to create long-term patterns of cooperation its
distinct from pure diplomacy because it requires a bargain to
be struck. The aff is appeasement because its a unilateral,
one-time concession
Dueck, 6 - Colin Dueck is an Associate Professor in George Mason Universitys
School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs (Strategies for Managing
Rogue States, Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223241,
doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2006.01.004
The term rogue state, which has come into wide usage only over the past decade,
has more to do with American political culture than with international law.1
Nevertheless, it does capture certain undeniable international realities, namely, the
continuing existence of numerous authoritarian states that support terrorism, seek
weapons of mass destruction, and harbor revisionist foreign policy ambitions.
Loosening this definition a bit, we can see that rogue states are really nothing new.
Over the past century, Western democracies have been faced with a series of
challenges from autocratic, revisionist, and adversarial states of varying scope and
size. The democracies have always had five basic strategic alternatives in relation
to such adversaries: appeasement, engagement, containment, rollback, and nonentanglement.
Appeasement
The strategy of appeasement, while seemingly discredited after 1938, has recently
attracted surprising and favorable attention from scholars of international
relations.2 Part of the problem surrounding the term has been a failure to agree on
its meaning. Properly speaking, appeasement is not synonymous with diplomatic
negotiations or diplomatic concessions, but refers only to those cases where one
country attempts to alter or satiate the aggressive intentions of another through
unilateral political, economic, and/or military concessions.3
It is sometimes argued that appeasement can work under certain circumstances,
and that Neville Chamberlain's performance at Munich in 1938 was simply a case of
appeasement badly handled.4 The drawbacks of appeasement, however, are
inherent. They lie in the fact that concrete concessions are made by one side only,
while the other side is trusted to shift its intentions from hostile to benign. With this
strategy, there is nothing to stop the appeased state from pocketing its gains and
moving on to the next aggression.5 Britain's rapprochement with the United States
in the 1890s is often described as a successful case of appeasement.6 Skillful
British diplomacy indeed played a part in significantly improving relations between
the two over the course of that decade, but that case does not deserve the term.
The United States was not particularly hostile to Great Britain in the first place, and
no vital conflicts of interest existed between the two powers. The Anglo-American
rapprochement was more the result than the cause of that commonality of
interests.7 In sum, appeasementstrictly definedis a strategy best avoided.
Realistic bargaining or negotiations involving mutual compromise and presumably
fixed intentions is another matter entirely, however, and should not be confused
with appeasement.
Engagement
Engagement, a popular concept in recent years, actually has several possible
meanings and is used in a number of different ways. It can refer to (1) a stance of
diplomatic or commercial activism internationally;8 (2) the simple fact of ongoing
political or economic contact with an existing counterpart or adversary; (3) using
such political or economic contact as a strategy in itself, in the hopes that this
contact will create patterns of cooperation, integration, and interdependence with a
rogue state;9 (4) a strategy under which international adversaries enter into a
limited range of cooperative agreements, alongside continued rivalry or
competition;10 or (5) the very act of diplomacy, negotiating, or bargaining,
regardless of its content. Only the third definition, focusing on integration
through contact, is analytically useful. The first is too vague to be of much use; the
second is a condition rather than a strategy; the fourth is more accurately captured
by dtente; and as to the last definition, there is no compelling reason to abandon
the words diplomacy, negotiating, or bargaining when they have served very
well up to now. 11
Engagement as a strategy of integration through contact rests upon liberal
assumptions regarding international affairs. Specifically, it typically assumes that
increased economic interdependence, membership in international organizations,
and transnational contact between civil societies will combine to shape adversarial
regimes in a more democratic and peaceful direction.12 In the 1970s, Western
analysts viewed America's dtente with the Soviet Union as this sort of strategy,
and the collapse of the ussr is in fact frequently attributed in large part to the
subversive influence of increased contact with the West. But Western trade,
technology, and recognition in the second half of the Cold War did as much to prop
up as to undermine the Soviet bloc.13 Western policies toward various rogue states
(and toward China) over the last twenty years have often been predicated on the
assumption that increased political and economic contact with the outside world will
undermine these regimes. Yet there is remarkably little evidence that integration
through contact has ever actually worked in managing existing international
adversaries.
The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy team, with which dtente is most closely linked,
did not see it primarily as a strategy of integration, but rather as a strategy of
disciplined rivalry alongside expanded areas of cooperation.14 In other words, they
held to the more traditional definition, in which tensions were reduced while
continued competition with one's adversary was considered inevitable. In this very
limited sense, the Soviet-American dtente of the early 1970s was indeed a positive
achievement, in that the risks of war were reduced for both sides. Only when
liberals came to view dtente as having more ambitious, overarching goalsas

restraining Soviet expansion through a web of interdependencedid it have to be
considered a failure.
Engagement as integration, engagement as dtentewhat about engagement as
diplomacy? Observers often call for the United States to engage rogue states such
as North Korea or Iran when what they seem to mean is negotiate. Obviously one
cannot speak of negotiations in the abstract: it all depends on the precise
bargain that is on offer. Yet this is exactly what observers so often do when they
urge the United States to try diplomacy without regard to the particular terms that
are actually available from the other side. If a rogue state is willing to come to an
agreement, however limited, that advances American interests, then diplomatic
efforts should be embraced. If not, then we ought to recognize that diplomacy is not
an end in itself.
Engagement requires means that are linked to the larger goals

of socializing China to meeting international norms
Finamore, 14 Doctoral Researcher at the University of Cambridge, Department of
Politics and International Relations (Salvatore, The EU, the US and China: Towards a
New International Order?, ed: Men and Shen, p. 111-114)
As the previous section illustrated, even a brief sketch of American and European
experiences with respect to China's rise is sufficient to draw some key parallels in
US and EU China policies, as well as to outline some of their main differences. In
order to move beyond this contextual level and take the analysis further, however,
it is necessary to develop an analytical framework capturing the main elements of
their engagement strategies. To this end, this section proposes a framework based
on socialization theory, which will serve to highlight the different policy instruments
available to the EU and the US and the way they have been employed in pursuit of
their specific engagement goals with respect to China. Constructing a framework for
the study of engagement, however, is a harder task than it would initially appear,
not least because of the existence of profound disagreements in the academic
literature over the meaning and scope of engagement as a foreign policy strategy
(Resnick 2(H) 1: Suetlinger 2000. p. 17).
Broadly speaking, most scholars would agree that engagement refers to one of
several possible strategies that can be adopted in the attempt to influence the
behavior of 'problem regimes' (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000, p. I). In some more
specific instances, it can also be understood as an approach through which
established powers can deal with the emergence of new actors posing a threat to
the international status quo (Schweller 1999). From this perspective, engagement
could then be grouped within the same category as other foreign policy strategies,
such as balancing, containment or appeasement. In fact, many commentators point
in particular to the existence of shared traits between engagement and
appeasement, with some even arguing that engagement is essentially nothing but a
new and more acceptable term for a policy otherwise fallen into historical disrepute
(Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, p. 81: George 1993, p. 61). According to Stephen
Rock (2000. pp. 22-23), both engagement and appeasement rely on positive
inducements to produce a relaxation of tensions and a change in the behavior of the
target actor, with a potential scope for socialization and learning. The difference
between these two concepts would rest mainly in the fact that engagement is
situated in a longer time horizon, implying 'a broader, more wide-ranging approach'
aimed at "shaping the long-term evolution of the adversary's economic and/or
political system'. From this point of view, appeasement would essentially constitute
'a subcategory of engagement'. According to other authors, if a distinction can be
made in principle between engagement and appeasement, this would consist
precisely in the fact that the former constitutes an 'attempt to socialize the
dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order' (Schweller 1999, p. 14;
Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, p. 81), rather than simply aiming for more 'modest'
goals such as tension-reduction and the avoidance of war (Resnick 2001, p. 557).
This definition of engagement as aiming at the socialization of a target actor has
been strongly criticized by some authors. Evan Resnick in particular argues that, as
an ends-based definition, the notion of engagement as socialization may be too
restrictive, as it would limit the ability to compare engagement to other policies,
and foreclose the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish
other goals rather than socialization. Instead, he proposes what he regards as a
means-based definition of engagement as 'the attempt to influence the political
behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and
enhancement of contacts ... across multiple issue-areas' (Resnick 2001, p. 559).
Resnick's attention to the importance of contacts is commendable, as it underlines
the essentially relational nature of engagement. However, overlooking its goals and
focusing on the means alone leaves out an essential part of the analysis of
engagement as a foreign policy strategy. In fact, at least since the time of Carl von
Clausewitz, strategy has generally been conceived in terms of a relation between
ends and means (see Howard 2002, pp. 16 and 36). This is true for military
strategy, which can be defined as 'the link between military means and political
ends' (Betts 2000, p. 5), but it also holds true for strategy in general. It follows that
in order to analyze engagement as a foreign policy strategy, one needs to pay
attention both to its goals and to the instruments by which they are achieved.
A serious analysis of engagement then needs to have at its foundation a clear
understanding of its goals, and particularly of what is entailed by socialization in
international relations (Johnston 2008, p. 2). Socialization is normally defined as 'a
process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community', whose
outcome is 'sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms'
(Checkel 2005, p. 804); or similarly, as 'the process by which states internalize
norms originating elsewhere in the international system' (Alderson 2001, p. 417).
One of the key features of socialization, according to this view, is a shift in the logic
of action for the socialized agent, from a logic of consequences to a logic of
appropriateness (see March and Olsen 2006). Some of the recent literature,
however, has pointed out how internalization, far from being a monolithic concept,
can in fact refer to several different phenomena. Alastair Iain Johnston (2008, p. 22),
for example, has argued that there can be several degrees of internalization,
forming a spectrum of pro-social behavior which ranges from that motivated by
'appropriateness' to that motivated by the mere expectation of material
consequences. Jeffrey Checkel (2005, pp. 804-805), on the other hand, has
identified two different types of internalization/socialization, building on the
observation that there can be different ways to follow a logic of appropriateness.
According to this view, 'Type I internalization' requires agents to understand what
constitutes a socially accepted standard of behavior within a community, and to act
'appropriately by learning a role ... irrespective of whether they like the role or agree
with it'. 'Type II internalization' constitutes a further stage in socialization, as it
implies that socialized agents accept the norms of the community as 'the right thing
to do', thereby adopting the interests and identity of the community as their own.
Given this variety of forms of socialization, it follows that engagement policies can
be aimed at achieving one or more of several possible socialization goals. Building
on the categories of socialization processes identified by Checkel and Johnston, the
analytical framework adopted in this chapter classifies engagement goals into three
main groups: strategic calculation, social influence and persuasion.
Strategic calculation describes the process whereby policy change is elicited as a
result of rational and strategic cost-benefit calculation. Because change in behavior
in this case is simply a response to material incentives and disincentives, strategic
calculation is a short-term process, which does not imply any internalization of new
norms and interests, nor a shift from a logic of consequences to a logic of
appropriateness. As such, it might not be strictly regarded as a mechanism of
socialization per se. There are, however, valid reasons for it to be included in this
conceptual framework. On the one hand, an analysis of engagement could not be
complete without a discussion of how the Western powers attempt to use material
rewards and punishments to influence Beijing's behavior. On the other hand, the
literature provides several convincing arguments as to how pro-normative change
induced by rational cost- benefit calculation can lead to deeper forms of
socialization, as compliant behavior is institutionalized over time (Checkel 2005. p.
809; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990. pp. 290-292). It should be noted that strategic
calculation is used here to refer only to behavioral changes brought about by
material considerations, and not by means of social rewards and sanctions (Checkel
2005, pp. 808-809). Because the impact of social inducements is strongly
dependent on the socialized actor's prior group identification (Johnston 2008, p. 80),
the socialization process at play in this case can be argued to be of a substantially
different nature, and thus falling within a second category. The second socialization
process in this conceptual framework is therefore social influence, whereby an
actor's compliance with norms and standards of conduct is regarded as deriving
from the desire to acquire legitimacy within a social group. In this instance, the
actor does not adopt pro-normative behavior because of spontaneous adherence to
the norms advocated by the group, but rather because these norms are perceived
to be a standard of legitimacy to which one must conform in order to avoid isolation.
This process constitutes one step further towards socialization. The norms are not
yet internalized and taken for granted, but they are recognized to be the acceptable
standard of behavior of a group that the actor perceives as legitimate and

authoritative, and to which it naturally aspires to belong. Finally, persuasion
represents socialization in its purest form, "whereby novices are convinced through
a process of cognition that particular norms, values, and causal understandings are
correct and ought to be operative in their own behavior' (Johnston 2008. p. 25). The
result of this long-term process is the internalization of norms and values that therefore come to be taken for granted. The actor's pro-normative behavior then is no
longer motivated by the expectation of material or social benefits, but rather by a
fundamental adherence to the norms and values of the reference group, which
become constitutive of the actor's perception of its own identity and interests.
Engagement is an offer of cooperation mixed with hedging

that means it has to be conditional and this is the core
component that distinguishes it from appeasement
Tang, 10 Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs
(SIRPA), Fudan Univeristy, Shanghai, China (Shiping, A Theory of Security Strategy
for Our Time: Defensive Realism, p. 101-103)
A strategy of appeasement is to retreat repeatedly (i.e., being accommodating or

conciliatory) despite the adversary repeatedly taking advantage of one's goodwill
and pressing with its aggressive goals (Edelstein 2002, 5; Resnick 2001, 561-562;
Ziring et aL 1995, 264-265).4 Defined as such, a conciliatory gesture or concession
can be regarded as an appeasement gesture only if the other side is aggressive. In
contrast, a conciliatory gesture or a concession when the other side is not
aggressive should not be conflated with an appeasement gesture, even if the
gesture was not reciprocated initially (see chapter 5 for details).
A reassurance attempt is essentially an invitation toward genuine cooperation to the
other side, in the hope of moving toward more extensive cooperation and moving
the relationship toward a more cooperative mode. A reassurance strategy, which
consists of many reassurance attempts, cannot be an independent strategy by
itself: It is usually a part of a strategy called "engagement" (see chapter 5).
Contra Schweller and Wohlforth that "engagement is simply a new, 'more
acceptable' term for an old policy that used to be called appeasement" (Schweller
and Wohlforth 2000, 81; see also Mearsheimer 2001, 163-164; Schweller 1998,74;
1999, 14; Craig and George 1995, 156-157, and Johnston and Ross 1999, xii, xivxv), engagement and appeasement are distinctly different (Resnick 2001, esp. 554559; see also Edelstein 2002, 5). By equating engagement with appeasement,
Schweller and Wohlforth basically reject any strategy that explores the possibility of
cooperation as "appeasing," thus debilitating and dangerous. This competitive bias
is consistent with offensive realism, but not defensive realism.
Yet, as Schweller stated explicitly earlier, "Engagement is more than
appeasement...engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers
are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as
carrots, in their attempts to satisfy the rising power" (Schweller 1999, 14-15;
emphasis added). More precisely, the strategy of "engagement" contains three
major components. First, it seeks to reassure the other side that one is not
threatening. Second, it extends an invitation to cooperate (with a possibility toward
extensive cooperation) in order to gauge the other sides intentions (see chapter 5
for a more detailed discussion). Third, it hedges against the possibility that the
other side is an incorrigible aggressor. When the other side keeps pressing ahead, a
state that pursues the strategy of engagement does not retreat repeatedly, because
it has prepared a more hardened policy.* Engagement thus has both a reassurance
element and a defense/deterrence element embedded inside. At the core of
engagement, there is an inherent hedging element and a difficult trade-off between
reassurance and deterrence/defense within the strategy (Wolfers 1952, 497; Stein
1991,451).
Thus, engagement, when properly understood and properly crafted, can serve four
critical purposes simultaneously: (1) to assure the other side of one's own benign
intentions and to gauge the other side's true intentions without putting one's own
vital interest at risk; (2) to deter the other side or, at least, to hedge against the
possibility that the other side is actively thinking of aggression;6 (3) to change the
other side's intentions if the other side is not an incorrigible aggressor even if it may
be malignant at the beginning; (4) to buy time to arm against the possibility that
the other side is really an incorrigible aggressor (Schweller 1999, 14-16). Moreover,
the second and third purposes can only be served by an engagement strategy (see
chapter 5).7
Fourth, the strategy of containment can, and should, be further differentiated into
two different forms: passive and active. A purely passive containment approach is a
combination of deterrence and defense, without either an element of reassurance or
an element of active rollback. A passive containment strategy reacts to other sides'
aggressive moves but does not actively provoke the other side.
In contrast, a state that pursues a strategy of active containment does not merely
defend against and deter another state. It also actively initiates confrontations
either to gain advantages or seek excuses for overt aggression. Active containment
is thus a more hardened strategy than passive containment.8 Understood as such,
Copeland's "crisis initiation" (Copeland 2001), or provoking more generally, is an
integral part of an active containment strategy.
Finally, and most critically, the option of security cooperation, which has been
completely missing in Schweller's and Copeland's schemes, is central to defensive
realism's approach toward security (Glaser 1994-1995; Jervis 1978).9 Here, it is
necessary to bring another fine differentiation into the discussion: seeking extensive
cooperation with another state and extending an invitation to cooperate to another
state are two very different things. Defensive realism recognizes that seeking
extensive cooperation among states is conditional. Specifically, defensive realism
recognizes that seeking extensive cooperation is a viable means of self-help for a
defensive realist state only when it faces a like-minded defensive realist state (Jervis
1982, 361; 1999, 50; Glaser 1994-1995). In contrast, seeking extensive cooperation
is likely to be disastrous or even suicidal for a defensive realist state when facing an
offensive realist state (i.e., it is in a false security dilemma) because the defensive
realist state may end up being the ultimate sucker.
Defensive realism, however, also recognizes that when facing a state with unknown
intentions, a defensive realist state will still be well-advised to explore the possibility
of cooperation but at the same time guard against the possibility that the other
state may be an offensive realist state. And it is under this circumstance that
reassurance, that is, extending an invitation to cooperate, comes into the picture.10
Defensive realism understands that whereas pursuing extensive cooperation is a
viable strategy only when a defensive realist state faces a like- minded defensive
realist state, extending an invitation to cooperate is a viable strategy under most
circumstances if a defensive realist state takes some precautionary measures to
guard against the possibility that the other side may be an offensive realist state.
Contrary to what many (offensive realists) have asserted or believed, to learn
another state's true intentions by extending an invitation to cooperate, when it is
done properly, does not have to be such a gamble that it risks a state's survival: to
explore the possibility of cooperation "need[s] not to be so crippling" (Snyder 1985,
179)."
Overall, defensive realism recognizes that extending an invitation to cooperate is an
effective means of gauging other states' intentions, and the condition for its
applicability is far less demanding than the condition of pursuing extensive
cooperation. Also, whereas seeking extensive cooperation can be an independent
strategy when facing a like-minded defensive realist state, extending an invitation
of cooperation to a state with unknown intentions functions as a part, although an
indispensable part, of an engagement strategy.
With these clarifications, realism's ladder of (grand) strategies, from the least
confrontational to the most confrontational, runs from appeasement, to doing
nothing, to extensive security cooperation, to engagement, to passive containment,
to active containment, and, finally, to preventive war (figure 4.1).
Link diplomatic engagement

Diplomatic engagement requires seeking a behavioral change
through mutual concessions
Takeyh, 9 - senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations (Ray, The Essence of Diplomatic Engagement Boston Globe, 10/7,
http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/essence-diplomaticengagement/p20362
As the Obama administration charts its foreign policy, there is increasing unease
about its lack of achievements. The Iraq war lingers, Afghanistan continues to be
mired in its endless cycle of tribal disarray and Islamist resurgence, Guantanamo
remains open. Still, Obama has introduced important changes in both the style and
substance of US diplomacy. An honest dialogue with the international community
has at times led the president to acknowledge our own culpabilities and
shortcomings. Even more dramatic has been Obama's willingness to reach out to
America's adversaries and seek negotiated solutions to some of the world's
thorniest problems.
It is Obama's declared engagement policy that has raised the ire of critics and led
them to once more take refuge in the spurious yet incendiary charge of
appeasement. Columnist Charles Krauthammer recently exclaimed, "When France
chides you for appeasement, you know you're scraping bottom." Acknowledgement
of America's misjudgments is derided as an unseemly apologia while diplomacy is
denigrated as a misguided exercise in self-delusion. After all, North Korea continues
to test its nuclear weapons and missiles, Cuba spurns America's offers of a greater
opening, and the Iranian mullahs contrive conspiracy theories about how George
Soros and the CIA are instigating a velvet revolution in their country. Tough-minded
conservatives are urging a course correction and a resolute approach to the gallery
of rogues that the president pledges to embrace.
Such views miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement. Diplomacy is likely to
be a painstaking process and it may not work with every targeted nation. However,
the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies, but to seek
adjustments in their behavior and ambitions. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran
would be offered a path toward realizing their essential national interests should
they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation.
Should these regimes fail to grasp the opportunities before them, then Washington
has a better chance of assembling a durable international coalition to isolate and
pressure them. One of the problems with a unilateralist Bush administration that
prided itself on disparaging diplomatic outreach was that it often made America the
issue and gave many states an excuse for passivity. The Obama administration's
expansive diplomatic vision has deprived fence-sitters of such justifications. An
administration that has reached out to North Korea, communicated its sincere desire
for better ties to Iran, and dispatched high-level emissaries to Syria cannot be
accused of diplomatic indifference.
The administration's approach has already yielded results in one of the most
intractable global problems: Iran's nuclear imbroglio. The Bush team's years of
harsh rhetoric and threats of military retribution failed to adjust Iran's nuclear
ambitions in any tangible manner. A country that had no measurable nuclear
infrastructure before Bush's inaugural made tremendous strides during his tenure.
Unable to gain Iranian capitulation or international cooperation, the Bush
administration was left plaintively witnessing Iran's accelerating nuclear time clock.
In a dramatic twist of events, the Obama administration's offer of direct diplomacy
has altered the landscape and yielded an unprecedented international consensus
that has put the recalcitrant theocracy on the defensive. Iran's mounting nuclear
infractions and its enveloping isolation caused it to recalibrate its position and open
its latest nuclear facility to inspection and potentially ship out its stock of lowenriched uranium for processing in Russia. Deprived of such fuel, Iran would not
have the necessary resources to quickly assemble a bomb. In a short amount of
time, the administration has succeeded in putting important barriers to Iran's
nuclear weapons aspirations.
The United States will persistently confront crises that require the totality of its
national power. The tumultuous Bush years have demonstrated the limitations of
military force. Diplomatic interaction requires mutual concessions and
acceptance of less than ideal outcomes. Moreover, as the United States charts its
course, there is nothing wrong with acknowledging past errors. Instead of clinging to
its self-proclaimed exceptionalism, America would be wise to take into account the
judgment of other nations that are increasingly central to its economy and security.
Link removing sanctions

Removing sanctions is a form of appeasement
Stern, 6 (Martin, November 27, University of Maryland Graduate, Debunking
Dtente http://www.diamondbackonline.com/article_56223e79-7009-56a3-8afe5d08bfff6e08.html)
Appeasement is defined as "granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain
peace." Giving Iran international legitimacy and removing sanctions would have maintained peace
with a potential enemy without changing the undemocratic practices of the enemy.
If this isn't appeasement, I don't know how better to define the word.
Thats distinct from engagement because it doesnt establish

interdependence or contacts
Resnick, Professor PolSci at Yeshiva University, 1 (Evan, Spring, Defining
Engagement Journal of International Affairs, Vol 54 Issue 2, EbscoHost)
In contrast to many prevailing conceptions of
engagement, the one proposed in this essay allows a substantive distinction to be
drawn between engagement and appeasement . The standard definition of appeasement--which derives from the
DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT AND APPEASEMENT
language of classical European diplomacy, namely "a policy of attempting to reduce tension between two states by the methodical removal of the
principal causes of conflict between them"(n29)--is venerable but nevertheless inadequate.(n30) It does not provide much guidance to the contemporary
policymaker or policy analyst, because it conceives of a foreign policy approach in terms of the ends sought while never making clear the precise means
A more refined definition of

appeasement that not only remains loyal to the traditional connotations but also establishes a firm conceptual
distinction from engagement might be: the attempt to influence the political
behavior of a target state by ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence to that
state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of appeasement, Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of Nazi
involved. The principal causes of conflict between two states can be removed in a number of ways.(n31)
Germany in the 1930s, reveals that much of this appeasement adopted precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the USacceptance of the Monroe Doctrine-permission for the US to build and fortify a Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the
border between Alaska and the Yukon--consisted of explicit acknowledgement of American territorial authority.(n32) Meanwhile, the appeasement of the
Third Reich by Great Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938);
acquisition of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia (1939).(n33)
A more contemporary example of appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the on-again off-again diplomatic
a rigid conceptual distinction can be

drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add
negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Thus,
to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition,
engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly

interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any
juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some
(ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state .(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not
involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser
and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one
party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on
the part of the target state.
AT: WM catalytic / communicative engagement

Prefer definitions that define engagement as a strategic
interaction it means it has to be linked to a behavior change.
Thats vital to distinguish it from everyday diplomacy which
unlimits the topic and destroys ground
Cha, 2k Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University (Victor, Engaging North Korea Credibly,
Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 13655)
Engagement is a process of strategic interaction designed to elicit cooperation from

an opposing state. Its means are generally non-coercive and non-punitive, seeking
neither to undercut an adversary nor to pressure it into submission. The strategy
also differs from capitulation as it does not entail simply deferring to the opponents
desires, but seeks some form of accommodation. However, engagement is more
than everyday diplomacy. It is a discrete type of security response to a
threatening power, actively seeking to transform the relationship into a nonadversarial one and to change the threatening states behaviour and goals in the
process.3 Arguably, containment could be described in a similar way. Moreover,
engagement is not credible to the opponent without some semblance of strength on
the part of the engager. The primary difference, however, is that engagement does
not explicitly leverage the threat of conflict or punishment to exact cooperation.
Even if engagement can include communicative actions that

requires communication linked to agreement over some goal
they dont meet this
Fong, 13 Commander, US Navy; paper submitted to the US Army War College
(Chi, Dancing with the Dragon:
U.S.-China Engagement Policy http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
AD=ADA589225
Engagement is defined as the use of non-coercive means to improve the nonstatus

quo elements of a rising major powers behavior. Engagement strategists will
generally intend to induce a rising power to adopt foreign or domestic policies in
line with the norms of the dominant international order.26 The engagement is
usually designed to produce a set of desired actions or strategic outcomes.
Engagement strategies are policies designed to create more cooperative or
desirable relations between the two states. The two types of engagements can be
either strategic engagements or communicative engagements. 27
Strategic engagements are designed to produce strategic actions; the initiating

party aims to alter or manipulate the behavior of another party by using threats and
incentives (carrots and sticks) in order to bring it in line with the initiators
preferences. State policies using such strategies will treat the other state as an
object, rather than as an equal partner. These approaches are considered strategic
because they are formulated with a set of directions and rules configured to achieve
the initiators objectives. The target state is influenced and expected to accept
these directions and rules. 28 Current engagement policy to China is intended to be
strategic, designed to influence and affect Chinas behavior.
Communicative engagement seeks to gain consensus via dialogue; it relies on
reason rather than coercion. This kind of engagement encourages two-way
communications that considers both parties interests. Communicative engagement
is not a one-way street from an initiator (U.S.) to a target (China). Such engagement
through communicative dialogue seeks to attain a mutually acceptable and
satisfactory international arrangement. More importantly, communicative
engagement tends to create harmony, so both parties will accept an agreed-upon
new arrangement as legitimate. 29
Communicative engagement is more than just communication

it requires explicit attempts to change behavior
Faizullaev, 14 - Professor and Director of the Negotiation Laboratory at the
University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Alisher, Diplomatic Interactions and
Negotiations Negotiation Journal Volume 30, Issue 3, pages 275299, July 2014,
Wiley)
The term interaction is widely used in the study of international relations and
diplomacy to refer to how actors act on each other. The concept, however, has been
developed and theorized primarily in sociology and social psychology. In other
words, current interactionism as a conceptual model is mainly socially defined
interactionism or social interactionism.
Thus, an interactional approach to the study of international relations, international
politics, and diplomacy inevitably draws on elements of social thinking. Most
notably, Alexander Wendt used a social-interactional approach to international
relations to develop his social theory of international politics (Wendt 1999).
According to Wendt, by interacting with each other, agents (actors) create a socially
determined international system. For Wendt, the agencystructure problem in
international relations is a social problem because international structure is a social
phenomenon, and states are socially determined entities.
Applying an interactional perspective to negotiation analysis makes sense because
negotiation requires interactions between parties. This is particularly apt when
taking a psychological approach to negotiation (Rubin 2002). In the diplomatic
context, the term engagement fully expresses the idea of interaction and denotes
not just communication between the states but the range of their actions and
influences on each other whether to engage with certain countries might be a
question of morality, of interests, of the assertion of identities, or a combination of
all these. Diplomatic engagement requires parties to listen and take into account
the views and concerns of the other side it was the diplomatic engagement of the
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 that
saved them from military engagement.
When analyzing negotiation, scholars often refer to communication and
interaction. These are closely related concepts, but communication primarily
concerns the exchange of information, and interaction is about actions that parties
take upon each other. Negotiation cannot take place without communication (Fisher,
Ury, and Patton 1991), and it can be seen as a subclass of social communication
(Jnsson 2002). Interaction refers not simply to communication but to interactive
communication in which parties influence each other. International negotiation, in
essence, is not only communication (Stein 1988) but an interactive communication
process (Shell 2006: 6). Applying communication theory and research to
negotiation studies but recognizing that the term communication covers a wide
array of phenomena, theoretical perspectives, and research methods, Phillip Glenn
and Lawrence Susskind defined their research as moving from communication to
interaction (Glenn and Susskind 2010: 119). That is an essential theoretical point
which provides a nuanced methodological modus operandi in the study of
negotiation. Every interaction is a communicative process, but not every
communication involves actual action upon each other, nor will the communication
always mean that the parties will have real impacts on each other. For example,
sometimes during international conferences, diplomats restrict themselves to
reading prepared texts. But when negotiators simply try to act on the other side in
this manner without accepting the possibility of being acted upon, it creates few
opportunities for actual negotiation. Successful negotiation interaction will not occur
when parties speak without listening or act upon the other side without being acted
upon.
AT: WM - contacts
It has to be comprehensive contacts and must be linked to
changing the target states behavior
Turner, 8 - Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Discipline of
History School of History and Politics University of Adelaide (Sean, Containment
and Engagement: U.S. China Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/48391/8/02whole.pdf
3 As Evan Resnick points out, the term "engagement" is used to denote so many
different things in international relations that it has been stripped of any precise
meaning. The term, as it is used here, is broadly comparable to Resnick's
description of "engagement" (one of several offered) as "the attempt to influence
the political behaviour of a target state through a comprehensive establishment
and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e.
diplomatic, military, economic, cultural)." Resnick, "Defining Engagement," Journal
of International Affairs 54 (Spring 2001): 551 -52, 559.
Inducements that dont build mutual economic or political ties are

appeasement, not engagement
Rock, Professor PolSci at Vassar College, 2K (Stephen, Appeasement in
International Politics p 22-23)
Appeasement and engagement are not identical. Appeasement can be a strategy
with short-run aims, while engagement almost necessarily implies a lengthy process
and a distant time horizon. More importantly; engagement is a broader, more wide-ranging approach to
dealing with an opponent. It places greater emphasis on cooperation on matters of mutual interest, enmeshing the
adversary in a web of commercial connections, rules, and institutions, on the
development of increased leverage, and on shaping the long-term evolution of the
adversary's economic and/ or political system. Appeasement tends to be somewhat
narrower in scope, relying more heavily on inducements to remove the causes
of conflict and reduce tensions.
One-shot incentives mean the plan is appeasement only a

policy that builds long term cooperation is engagement
Roberts, 4 (Liam, Engagement Theory and Target Identity: An Analysis of North
Korean Responses to Contemporary Inter-Korean Engagement
https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/id/56483/ubc_2004-0612.pdf)
"short-term versus "long-term" engagement is ultimately
the distinction between appeasement and engagement. The delivery of incentives
These understandings are problematic. Firstly,
with short-term objectives is tantamount to "buying off" a dissatisfied power. The

"short" nature of such action, though, negates any opportunity for socialization of
the target, or the inculcation of new norms of cooperation, thus disregarding the change-oriented,
constructivist elements to engagement objectives. Engagement, then, is inherently long-term in nature,
and addresses a range of concerns that motivate dissatisfied challengers - as Rock
acknowledges in his understanding of long-term strategy, sources pursuing engagement seek to
fundamentally change the nature of their adversarial relationship with the target,
"securing good will and cooperation on matters of common concern."
AT: WM incentives
Offering incentives requires reward in exchange for changing
behavior
Borer 4 [Dr. Douglas A. Borer, PhD, Visiting Professor of Political Science at the US
Army War College, Problems of Economic Statecraft: Rethinking Engagement,
Chapter 12, U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/12borer.pdf]
Visiting Professor of Political Science, Department of National Security and Strategy,
US Army War College
The policy of
engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive
incentives , by one state to alter the elements of another states behavior .

As such, some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of appeasement. 21 However, I concur with the view articulated by
Randall Schweller that, while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an important qualitative
difference exists between the two: Engagement is more than appeasement, he says: It encompasses any attempt to socialize the
engagement may be distinguished

from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on
the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the targets
behavior. . . . The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in
the stability of the system. . . . Engagement is most likely to succeed when the
established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks
as well as carrots . . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more.
dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. In practice
22
That implies a quid pro quo

De LaHunt, 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in
Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, Perverse and unintended
Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)
Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis this for that. If you change your
behavior, Ill give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program do as I say
and Ill let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didnt
have before in exchange for new behavior , so that pretty much puts coercion in its own
box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion,
incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons unintended consequences and perverse
incentives.
AT: Doesnt solve limits

We solve limits only a narrow range of carrots would be
viable
Drezner 99 [Daniel Drezner, Assistant Prof of Political Science at CU-Boulder,
former John M. Olin National Security Fellow at the Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, The Sanctions Paradox:
Economic Statecraft and International Relations, pp 27-28]
The rest of the chapter considers the implications of relaxing some of the models technical assumptions. What
happens when states realign their position in the international system, altering conflict expectations? The model
predicts that it will increase the likelihood of a coercion event, but reduce the sender countrys ability to extract
meaningful concessions from the target. What happens when demands become non-negotiable? The model predicts
that stalemates over indivisible issues are more likely to occur between adversaries than allies, leading to
How do senders choose between economic coercion

and economic inducements to influence the target. The model argues that
senders will be far more willing to use inducements with allies than
adversaries. Carrots as well as sticks are of limited use against adversaries;
prolonged sanctions imposition.
only under a narrow set of circumstances will the sender prefer to offer a
carrot over accepting a stalemate outcome. This result suggests that without the willingness to
use brute force, even great powers are constrained in their ability to influence an
adversarys behavior.
Unconditional violation
Sample plan and 2ac

The United States federal government should offer to increase commercial space
cooperation with the Peoples Republic of China in exchange for measurable
progress on Chinese human rights protections.
We meet we unconditionally make the offer to China

Engagement can be conditional or unconditional
Kahler and Kastner, 6 (Miles Kahler and Scott L. Kastner, Graduate School of International
Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, Department of Government and Politics, University
of Maryland, May 1, 2010, "Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean
Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait", Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)
Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic

engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on
the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional. 1 Conditional
policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic 'carrots', are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of
threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement
policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change. Drezner (1999/2000) has
proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional strategies and the conditions of
their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies
(because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of
international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among
adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used. coercive threats are first used. The success of a conditional
engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state's influence over domestic firms. If those firms find
market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must
convince them to deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have
strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional
strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a
target states behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a
democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities
and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (HI), therefore, is that
conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially
Unconditional
engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that
they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an
when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.2
adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target's foreign policy
How increased economic integration at

the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political
environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased
behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict.
economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists
At a
minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by
pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic
interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of
(e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996).
the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming

agent that reshapes the goals of the target state.
No ground loss they can just counterplan to do the plan

unconditionally
They overlimit and destroy education most China-specific
solvency advocates are about using inducements to change
Chinese behavior thats the core of the topic
They destroy aff ground wed lose every debate to the
condition CP if were forced to advocate the plan
unconditionally
1nc unconditional
Engagement is the unconditional provision of incentives it
excludes coercive strategies
Johnston and Ross, 5 - professor of political science at Harvard AND professor of
political science at Boston College (Alastair and Robert, Engaging China: The
Management of an Emerging Power, p. xv)
The volume's comprehensive approach to studying engagement means that the

contributors have vastly different research agendas. To encourage a common
dialogue among the contributors and to facilitate the generation of a common
understanding of engagement with cross-national applications, the contributors
have worked within a common definition of engagement. For the purpose of this
volume, engagement is defined as follows:
The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a
rising major power's behavior. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used
in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order.
In this approach, amelioration of the rising power's behavior does not include efforts
to hinder the accretion of relative power. This is better understood as
"containment". We have neither defined nor limited the methods of amelioration,
preferring that individual authors characterize the methods used by the respective
countries and/or multilateral institutions. "Non-coercive methods" include such
strategies as accommodation of legitimate interests, transformation of preferences,
and entanglement in bilateral and multilateral institutional constraints.
The contributors clearly differentiate engagement from containment. In contrast to
containment, engagement seeks neither to limit, constrain, or delay increases in the
target country's power nor prevent the development of influence commensurate
with its greater power. Rather, it seeks to "socialize" the rising power by
encouraging its satisfaction with the evolving global or regional order. Our definition
of engagement specifically excludes coercive policies.
B. Violation the plan conditions their policy on a result

C. Voting issue for limits and ground - allowing conditions
explodes the topic because conditions are by definition open
ended they allow attaching condition on any external issue,
regardless of whether it is economic in nature. They arent
predictable and can be used to avoid politics links
2nc must be unconditional

Engagement is structural linkage, not tactical linkage means
it must be unconditional
Mastanduno, 12 professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael,
Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases edited by Steve Smith, p. 217)
Positive economic statecraft can be defined as the provision or promise of economic

benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state. It is important to
distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a well-specified
economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or domestic policies of the
target government. I call this version tactical linkage; others refer to 'carrots' or
'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I term structural linkage and
others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or 'long-term engagement, involves an
effort to use a steady stream of economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of
political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be
unconditional; the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in
target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic
engagement will eventually produce a political transformation and desirable
changes in target behaviour.
Tactical linkage and long-term engagement are each informed by a different logic.
Tactical linkage operates at a more immediate level; the sanctioning state
calculates that the provision of a particular type of economic reward will be
sufficient to convince policy makers in the target to reconsider their existing
policies. For example, immediately after the Second World War, the USA offered
sizeable reconstruction loans to Britain, France, and the Soviet Union- in exchange
for political concessions. The British and French were generally willing to
accommodate US demands that they liberalize their domestic and foreign economic
policies; the Soviets were not. In 1973, European states and japan offered economic
inducements in the form of aid and trade concessions to Arab states during the
OPEC crisis in a largely successful attempt to ensure that they would receive access
to oil supplies at predictable prices. In 1982, the USA offered to increase sales of
coal to its West European allies to discourage them from a gas pipeline deal with the
Soviet Union. This influence attempt failed.
Long-term engagement, however, works at a deeper level, and its logic was most
clearly articulated in the classic work of Albert Hirschman (Hirschman 1980 [1
9451). The sanctioning government provides an ongoing stream of economic
benefits which gradually transform domestic political interests in the target state.
Over time, internationaIist' coalitions that favour interdependence with the
sanctioning state will form and strengthen, and will exert influence over the policy
of the weaker state in a direction preferred by the sanctioning state. Hirschman
demonstrated how Nazi Germany used an array of economic inducements to
inculcate economic dependence, and eventually political acquiescence, on the part

of its weaker central European neighbours during the inter-war period.
Engagement is distinct from conditionality

Smith 5 Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the
European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005
(Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?, Global
Europe: New Terms of Engagement, May, Available Online at
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/24863/ichaptersection_singledocume
nt/273de787-0ede-4c7e-a001-94d09f793f1b/en/03_Conditionality.pdf, Accessed 0725-2013, p. 23)
First, a few definitions. Engagement is a foreign policy strategy of building close

ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another
state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic
practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal
ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and
encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously
labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of oxygen: economic activity
leads to positive political consequences.19
Conditionality, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation,
of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the
fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. Positive conditionality
entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; negative
conditionality involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the
state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of
asphyxiation).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no
strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of
looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in
another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy.
Direct interaction violation
1nc direct interaction
Engagement requires direct, sustained political communication

with a target government
Can the sunshine policy really bring positive changes within the North Korean
regime and peace to the Korean peninsula? The logic behind Kim Dae-jungs policy
is a refinement of one of the major strategies of economic statecraft and military
competition. In his discussion of US economic statecraft towards the Soviet Union
during the Cold War, Michael Mastanduno provides a useful framework for
understanding President Kims engagement policy towards the North. In general,
engagement promotes positive relations with an enemy as a means of changing the
behavior or policies of a target government. It accepts the legitimacy of that
government and tries to shape its conduct. Engagement also requires the
establishment and continuance of political communication with the target.
In engaging the enemy, the state sees political polarization with target or isolation
of the target country as undesirable.
The affirmative violates they merely remove restrictions on

US policy they dont fiat a direct interaction with China
Voting issue for limits and ground. Theyve prevented us from
reading diplomatic capital DAs, shunning, and any argument
about the Chinese government. There are hundreds of
unilateral policy actions the US can take that might effect
China its not predictable.
2nc direct interaction

Engagement is direct contacts to induce cooperation or reduce
tensions
Fields, 7 A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
( Adversaries and Statecraft: Explaining U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Rogue States,
Google books)
I define engagement as a diplomatic posture that employs direct (even if it is at a

low level) political contact as a strategy to foster cooperation, build confidence,
reduce tensions, or to create a space for further interaction.10 I separate the use of
incentives from the definition, though positive incentives can be an important part
of an engagement strategy. Engagement in and of itself without the use of
incentives can signal a willingness to cooperate on issues or at a minimum that
relations between two states are important enough to maintain a vehicle for direct
diplomacy. The United States has engaged Syria for many years. Even after
Washington recalled its ambassador in 2005, the United States continued to talk
with Syria about regional matters. The negotiations that eventually disarmed Libya
took place in secret over the course of a decade - while Washington and Tripoli did
not have diplomatic relations. These are notable cases of engagement that stand in
contrast the episodes of isolation of Iran and North Korea.
Engagement can, however, make exclusive use of negative incentives. Haass and
O'Sullivan consider incentives as bound into the definition of engagement. They
write: "In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to
a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."11 Therefore,
though Haass and O'Sullivan's approach is quite useful, I modify their definition of
engagement to disaggregate incentives. And as they note, engagement "does not
preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments."12 This is
certainly the case and why I contrast engagement, broadly defined, with isolationist
policies.
Footnote 10
10 I emphasize direct, official contact recognizing that states that are isolated
diplomatically by the United States such as Iran often are still engaged regularly
through track-two diplomacy.
It cant be a byproduct of policy it has to involve the active

cultivation of relations
Lynch, 2 - Williams College (Marc, Why Engage? China and the Logic of
Communicative Engagement European Journal of International Relations Copyright
2002 SAGE Publications and ECPR, Vol. 8(2): 187230 (13540661 [200206] 8:2;
187230; 023827)
Johnston and Ross define engagement generically as the use of noncoercive means
to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major powers behavior
(1999: 14).11 Engagement strategies generally intend to induce a rising power to
adopt foreign or domestic policies in line with the norms of the dominant
international order. A strategic mode of action might seem to be built in to such a
definition, since it implies the purposive use of a policy by one state to change the
behavior of another state. The concept of communicative action does not rule out
purposive action, however. The distinction rests upon the orientation of the action
and the approach to the other. Whether strategic or communicative, engagement
strategies are intentional policies aimed at creating more cooperative relations
between states, not a condition defined by empirical levels of interaction or an
unintended byproduct of interaction. Engagement typically involves some
combination of the provision of incentives, the increase of trade and investment,
diplomatic dialogues, the building of interdependencies and the induction of the
target state into international organizations.
Strategic engagement strategies follow the logic of strategic action, in which the
initiator aims to manipulate the behavior of an actor through threats and incentives
in order to bring it in line with ones preferences.12 What characterizes these
strategies as strategic is that they are instrumental state policies attempting to
shape a targeted states behavior in a predetermined direction. They take the target
as an object, rather than as an equal partner. These threats and incentives may
lead the target to rationally recalculate its interests as it realizes the costs of the
proscribed behavior, but the mechanism of change is ultimately a behavioral one
(Schimmelfenig, 2000). American engagement policies, for example, rely upon high
levels of trade and membership in international economic organizations to
moderate the targets conception of its interests by shifting incentives, building
networks of interdependence and giving it a stake in the status quo. Such strategic
engagement strategies aim to influence and affect Chinas behavior through a
consistent penalty-reward mechanism. The problem, however, is that the model
does little to accommodate and incorporate Chinas strategic concerns and
demands (Wang, 1998: 70).
Taking the reflexivity and awareness of target states seriously forces the state
pursuing engagement to deal with the other as a partner rather than as an object
(Berejikian and Dryzek, 2000). Rationalist models of engagement seem to assume
that the targeted state is not aware of the behavioral modification strategy being
employed against it. Behavioral change directly reflects a rational adjustment to
environmental incentives, independent of the targets beliefs, intentions or
consciousness. For the targeted actor to acquiesce would require either ignorance
(implausible), an acceptance of the desirability of change (likely to be distributed
unevenly) or a calculated gamble based on asymmetric information about the
regimes ability to manage change. The engager must implicitly assume a superior
understanding of the nature of international relations or of political behavior, which

will enable it to trick the target into accepting a Trojan Horse. Such assumptions of
ignorance become even harder to sustain when top American officials repeatedly
state this logic in public.13
Communicative engagement takes seriously the awareness of both actors, who
enter into a dialogue oriented towards achieving consensus through the give and
take of reasoned argument.14 Rather than a sender (the US) using engagement to
manipulate a target (China) in pursuit of predefined interests, communicative
engagement initiates a dialogue to produce international arrangements
amenable to the interests of both parties. Within a communicative logic of action,
actors should make a sincere effort at empathy, to understand the interests and
concerns of the other in order to arrive at a formula which can satisfy both. Ideally,
participants in a dialogue temporarily set their self-interest aside, formulating
generalizable arguments oriented towards a consensus position acceptable to all
affected parties. Where strategic engagement aims to induce the other to accept a
predefined set of institutions, communicative engagement aims to arrive at a
mutually acceptable solution which does not rest upon coercion or manipulation.
Giving all affected actors a voice in shaping institutions, rather than socializing new
actors into existing institutions or punishing deviant behavior, characterizes the
underlying logic of communicative engagement.
Engagement is a long-term process of sustained interaction

with another state to boost relations
Takamine, 6 - assistant Professor of Politics in the Department of Integrated Arts
and Science at Okinawa National College of Technology (Tsukasa, Japan's
Development Aid to China: The Long-Running Foreign Policy of Engagement, p. 18)
The various policy objectives pursued by Japans China ODA described above
illustrate the striking flexibility of Japanese ODA as a foreign policy instrument.
Nevertheless, certain key underlying concepts have remained consistent since I979,
notably the concept of engagement. In this book, the term engagement means a
relationship of sustained interaction over a long period , intended by a state
in order to promote positive relations with another state. In turn, such interaction is
expected to promote or increase the national interests of the state which initiated it.
A policy of engagement is potentially composed of a number of different
dimensions, for example, political, economic, military and cultural. Engagement
further implies a dynamic interaction and, of course, is a two-way relationship.
Japan's engagement policy with China, addressed in this book, essentially consists
of Japan`s attempt to interact with China politically and economically, with military
and cultural considerations less prominent. As Reinhard Drifte points out, sustained
economic and political interaction with China are expected to 'steer China towards a
peaceful and sustainable pathwhile simultaneously hedging against any Chinese
strategic breakout or policy failure. This book will also demonstrate, however, that
engaging China is also expected to serve Japan`s own economic and political
interests. Of course, in this case as in others, engagement is a two-way street, and

Chinese perceptions of Japans policy of engagement must be expected to differ
from Japans. Such considerations, however, are beyond the scope of this research.
Engagement requires DIRECT talks means both governments

must be involved
Crocker 9 [9/13/09, Chester A. Crocker is a professor of strategic studies at the Walsh
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, was an assistant secretary of state for
African affairs from 1981 to 1989. Terms of Engagement,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?_r=1&]
OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he
masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey. Given the furor that
will surround the news of Americas readiness to hold talks with Iran, he could start with
engagement one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon The Obama
administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its
predecessors resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers . His critics
PRESIDENT
show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making nice with nasty or
hostile regimes. Lets get a few things straight. Engagement
in statecraft is not about sweet

talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would
talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not improved
relations. It is not akin to dtente, working for rapprochement, or
appeasement. So how do you define an engagement strategy? It
does require direct talks. There is simply no better way to convey
authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing
talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is to change the other
countrys perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its
policies and its behavior.
Only our definition makes sense in the context of China policy

Sutter 11 Robert G. Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the
Elliott School of George Washington University, Making China Policy: Lessons from
the Bush and Clinton Administrations, p. 86
Viewed broadly, the
Bush and Clinton administrations have followed a policy of engagement
toward China. Though hard to define precisely, the policy has emphasized
preserving and expanding constructive U.S. interaction with the Chinese
government , seeking to manage points of difficulty and conflict, while developing
areas of common ground. The policy is assumed to meet broad U.S. goals of promoting China's greater
interaction with the world, especially the developed world. Such interchange, especially trade, investment, and
other economic interchange, is seen to make the Chinese leaders realize how interdependent China has become
with the rest of the world. In turn, this is presumed to make Chinese leaders more likely to conform to international
norms of salient concern to the United States.
Trade only violation
1NC trade only

A. Interpretation - Economic engagement is long-term strategy
for promoting structural linkage between two economies
Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice
http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/b
ook/Mastanduno.pdf
The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic
politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a longterm, transformative strategy . As one state gradually expands economic
interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates
vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of
interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by
pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence.
Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage ; it is a means to get
other states to want what you want, rather than to do what you want. The causal
chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to
foreign policy accommodation.
B. Violation the plan is an economic inducement

engagement requires trade promotion
Celik, 11 masters student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and
Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies
http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagementpolicies)
Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are
significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans
on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et
al,2001).Ecenomic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and
target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction
over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual
gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from
carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow
goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her
to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not
want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely;
sender works deliberately to improve the target countries Gdp, trade potential,
export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important
goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has
the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender
state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.
(Kroll,1993)
C. Voting issue
1. limits broad interpretations of engagement include anything that effects the
economy, which means everything
2. negative ground trade promotion is vital for a stable mechanism for disad links
and counterplan ground
2NC Trade Only

Economic engagement is a strategy not a specific tactic
structural linkage means a topical affirmative must develop
a policy of continual economic benefits to foster greater
interdependence between two countries
Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases edited by Steve Smith, p. 217)
Positive economic statecraft can be defined as the provision or promise of economic

benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state. It is important to
distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a well-specified
economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or domestic policies of the
target government. I call this version tactical linkage; others refer to 'carrots' or
'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I term structural linkage and
others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or 'long-term engagement, involves an
effort to use a steady stream of economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of
political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be
unconditional; the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in
target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic
engagement will eventually produce a political transformation and desirable
changes in target behaviour.
Tactical linkage and long-term engagement are each informed by a different logic.
Tactical linkage operates at a more immediate level; the sanctioning state
calculates that the provision of a particular type of economic reward will be
sufficient to convince policy makers in the target to reconsider their existing
policies. For example, immediately after the Second World War, the USA offered
sizeable reconstruction loans to Britain, France, and the Soviet Union- in exchange
for political concessions. The British and French were generally willing to
accommodate US demands that they liberalize their domestic and foreign economic
policies; the Soviets were not. In 1973, European states and japan offered economic
inducements in the form of aid and trade concessions to Arab states during the
OPEC crisis in a largely successful attempt to ensure that they would receive access
to oil supplies at predictable prices. In 1982, the USA offered to increase sales of
coal to its West European allies to discourage them from a gas pipeline deal with the
Soviet Union. This influence attempt failed.
Long-term engagement, however, works at a deeper level, and its logic was most
clearly articulated in the classic work of Albert Hirschman (Hirschman 1980 [1
9451). The sanctioning government provides an ongoing stream of economic
benefits which gradually transform domestic political interests in the target state.
Over time, internationaIist' coalitions that favour interdependence with the

sanctioning state will form and strengthen, and will exert influence over the policy
of the weaker state in a direction preferred by the sanctioning state. Hirschman
demonstrated how Nazi Germany used an array of economic inducements to
inculcate economic dependence, and eventually political acquiescence, on the part
of its weaker central European neighbours during the inter-war period.
Only trade promotion meets this specific inducements dont

Celik, 11 masters student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and
Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies
http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagementpolicies)
Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves

with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic
Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic
intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic
interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the
political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots
or inducement tools , they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not
restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be
unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties.
Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting
institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major
concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and
non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international
political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and
Kastner define the engagement policies as follows, It is a policy of deliberate
expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of
target state and improve bilateral relations.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional
economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains
and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement
motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that the direct and positive
linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the
position of others in the same direction.
AT: Trade Overlimits

Trade is massive it could be its own topic
Ilias, 13 - Specialist in International Trade and Finance for the Congressional
Research Service (Shayerah, U.S. Government Agencies Involved in Export
Promotion: Overview and Issues for Congress CRS Report for Congress, 1/31,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41495.pdf)
Federal government agencies perform a wide variety of functions that contribute to

export promotion, including providing information, counseling, and export
assistance services; funding feasibility studies; financing and insuring U.S. trade;
conducting government-to-government advocacy; and negotiating new trade
agreements and enforcing existing ones.
Approximately 20 federal government agencies are involved in supporting U.S.
exports directly or indirectly. Nine key agencies with programs or activity directly
related to export promotion are the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department
of Commerce, Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), Small Business Administration (SBA), Department of State,
Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR), and Department of the Treasury. The USDA has the largest level of export
promotion funding, followed by Commerce. Some agencies charge fees for their
services.
Excludes commerce violation
Sample plan and 2ac

The United States federal government should increase investment credits for
renewable energy for United States companies to fund energy projects within the
Peoples Republic of China.
We meet the plan increases economic investment in the PRC

even if companies do the investment, the money comes
directly from the US government
C/I EE isnt gov-to-gov
The provision of economic incentives to the private sector of a target country can be
an effective mode of unconditional engagement, particularly when the economy is
not state dominated. In these more open economic climates, those nourished by the
exchanges made possible under economic engagement will often be agents for
change and natural allies in some Western causes. To the extent that economic
engagement builds the private sector and other non-state actors, it is likely to widen
the base of support for engagement with America specifically and the promotion of
international norms more generally. Certainly, US engagement with China has
nurtured sympathetic pockets, if not to American ideals per se, then at least to
trade and open economic markets and the maintenance of good relations to secure
them. The only constraint on the scope and development of unconditional
engagement is the range of available collaborators in civil society or the private
sector. Fortunately, globalisation and the explosion of economic entities that has
accompanied it while making economic isolation more difficult to achieve
presents a multitude of possible partners for unconditional engagement with nonstate actors.
Commerce is a subset of economic engagement.

Zutshi 8 B.K. Zutshi, Former Indian Ambassador to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and Former Deputy Chairman of the Telecom Regulatory Authority
of India, Training Needs for Commercial and Economic Diplomacy: An Indian Case
Study, http://www.cuts-citee.org/pdf/rreport08-01.pdf
2.1 Defining Commercial and Economic Diplomacy Teaching of and research in commercial and economic diplomacy
is a relatively new field in pedagogy and academics, with the result that even the definition of the subject matter is
At the first place, the distinction between commercial and economic is

not at all clear: the difference between the two varies among authors, experts and
analysts of the subject. Geza Feketekuty defines commercial diplomacy as
encompassing all the activities related to analysing, developing, negotiating, and implementing
trade agreements1 and economic diplomacy as diplomacy related to all economic
issues.2 In this light, commercial diplomacy can be said to be a subset of economic diplomacy. In common
parlance, commercial and economic are interchangeably used for the same set of
activities.
not settled.
They overlimit they eliminate all trade policies, which is the

core of the US-China debate
They destroy aff ground wed lose every debate to the nongovernmental CP and a shunning or dipcap DA
No neg ground loss they have core predictable CP ground like
conditions, pressure and containment
1nc excludes commerce

Engagement requires sustained government to government
interaction. That means an affirmative can promote trade
agreements but cannot promote private investment or
commerce
Daga, 13 - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and
a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, Economics of
the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:
U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela, National Center for
Policy Analysis, 5/15, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf)
Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this
document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1)
international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2)
government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government
economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3)
international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and
migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the
countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic
engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with
respect to some countries than to others.
Its is exclusive---means no channel other than US

government engagement
Douglas F. Brent 10, attorney, June 2, 2010, Reply Brief on Threshold Issues of
Cricket Communications, Inc., online:
http://psc.ky.gov/PSCSCF/2010%20cases/201000131/20100602_Crickets_Reply_Brief_on_Threshold_Issues.PDF) Italics and bold
in the original
AT&T also argues that Merger Commitment 7.4 only permits extension of any
given interconnection agreement for a single three year term. AT&T Brief at 12.
Specifically, AT&T asserts that because Cricket adopted the interconnection
agreement between Sprint and AT&T, which itself was extended, Cricket is
precluded from extending the term of its agreement with AT&T. Id
This argument relies upon an inaccurate assumption: that the agreement
(contract) between Sprint and AT&T, and the agreement (contract) between Cricket
and AT&T, are one and the same. In other words, to accept AT&Ts argument the
Commission must conclude that two separate contracts, i.e. the interconnection
between Sprint and AT&T in Kentucky (Sprint Kentucky Agreement) and the
interconnection between Cricket and AT&T in Kentucky (Cricket Kentucky
Agreement), are one and the same.
Upon this unstated (and inaccurate) premise AT&T asserts that the ICA was
already extended; id. at 14, and the ICA Cricket seeks to extend was extended by
Sprint . . . .; id. at 15, and, finally, Cricket cannot extend the same ICA a second
time . . . . Id. (emphasis added in all). Note that in the quoted portions of the AT&T
brief (and elsewhere) AT&T uses vague and imprecise language when referring to
either the Sprint Kentucky Agreement, or the Cricket Kentucky Agreement, in hopes
that the Commission will treat the two contracts as one and the same.
But it would be a mistake to do so. The contract governing AT&Ts duties and
obligations with Sprint is a legally distinct and separate contract from that which
governs AT&Ts duties with Cricket. The Sprint Kentucky Agreement was approved
by the Commission in September of 2001 in Case Number 2000-00480. The Cricket
Kentucky Agreement was approved by the Commission in September of 2008 in
Case Number 2008-033 1.
AT&T ignores the fact that these are two separate and distinct contracts because it
knows that the merger commitments apply to each agreement that an individual
telecommunications carrier has with AT&T. Notably, Merger Commitment 7.4 states
that AT&T/BellSouth ILECs shall permit a requesting telecommunications
carrier to extend its current interconnection agreement . . . . As written, the
commitment allows any carrier to extend its agreement. Clearly, the use of the
pronoun its in this context is possessive, such that the term its means - that
particular carriers agreement with AT&T (and not any other carriers
agreement). Thus, the merger commitment applies to each agreement that an
individual carrier may have with AT&T. It necessarily follows then, that Crickets
right to extend its agreement under Merger Commitment 7.4 is separate and
distinct right from another carriers right to extend its agreement with AT&T (or
whether such agreement has been extended).
Voting issue for limits and ground. Prior engagement topics

prove allowing export promotion or investment is a limits
disaster that destroys education. It creates tiny affirmatives
with terrible advantages but they dont link to anything
2nc excludes commerce

Commercial and economic engagement are conceptually
distinct --- the plans only commerce
Vickers, Research Associate on Global Economy at Institute for Global Dialogue,
12 (Brendan, South Africas Economic Diplomacy in a Changing Global Order
pub in South African Foreign Policy Review by Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van
Wyk, p 112-113)
Conceptually, it is also possible to distinguish between 'economic' and
'commercial' diplomacy or, in another sense, the 'high' and 'low' politics of a country's
international economic relations. In this chapter, economic diplomacy refers to the ways and
means by which the South African government formally negotiates South Africa's place in the world
economy at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Economic diplomacy has clear
political economy objectives such as increasing the country's relative power or influence in
international bargains: improving the country's (or an industry's) competitive advantage relative to others; and
using political tools to achieve economic ends, and vice versa . Economic diplomacy thus encapsulates
global policy-making processes, for example, in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UIMCTAD). the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (W1PO); as well as regional economic policymaking In the African Union <AU), the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).a South Africa's economic diplomacy agenda comprises four core policy
imperatives: to expand trade and Investment links in Africa and advance regional integration in Southern and Eastern Africa: to consolidate links with
traditional trade and investment partners in the North: to build industrial complementarities with the dynamic emerging economies of the South; and to
By contrast, commercial
diplomacy entails a narrower set of activities that include export development
and export promotion, facilitating inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI), promoting
technology sharing and cooperation, positioning South Africa as a preferred tourism
destination, and marketing South Africa more widely abroad. The objective of commercial
diplomacy is to support South African business to gain tangibly from the opportunities created by broader economic diplomacy
rebalance global trade rules in favour of developing countries through the VVTO's Doha Round negotiations/'
processes.1
At best, the plan is governmental support for private

engagement not governmental engagement
Vickery, 11 former Assistant Secretary of Commere for Trade and Development in
the Clinton Administration and former Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson
Center (David, The Eagle and the Elephant: Strategic Aspects of U.S.-India
Economic Engagement, p. 283-284)
Also raised as an impediment to government partnering with the private sector on

economic engagement issues is the specter of market distortion abroad. The
problem is somewhat akin to that of subsidization. Questions of subsidization are
subject to the WTOs disciplines. Where government support of economic
engagement does not run afoul of these disciplines, such support should be
accepted as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Governments routinely and
acceptably work to promote the economic engagement of companies operating
from their national territories. Where there is specific activity that can be seen as
furthering particular US private-sector interests over those of a foreign competitor,

US governmental involvement usually operates to level the playing field against
foreign competition. Thus, the United States should move more fully to involve its
private sector as a partner in the use of economic engagement to promote strategic
cooperation. The challenges to this involvement can be met by facing the
difficulties indicated and by providing for fair and open mechanisms to promote it.
Theyve coopted what should be strong counterplan ground on

an otherwise huge topic
Vickery, 11 former Assistant Secretary of Commere for Trade and Development in
the Clinton Administration and former Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson
Center (David, The Eagle and the Elephant: Strategic Aspects of U.S.-India
Economic Engagement, p. 281-282)
The private sector should be an integral part of using economic engagement to

further US strategic interests. In a country where capitalism, free enterprise, and
markets are the primary means of producing goods and services, any economic
engagement component of foreign policy that does not include the private sector
will be incomplete and anemic. In most instances, US public international
assistance cannot be funded at levels to make an economic impact sufficient to
achieve the desired goals. There simply cannot be Marshall Plans to meet all
important strategic goals. The amounts that are available from the government will
be dwarfed by the size of modern trade and investment flows. Where it is available,
aid should be viewed as a lever or catalyst to promote the sort of private-sector
activity that will advance the interests of both donor and recipient. In many
instances, private-sector, nonprofit entities will be the most adept at leveraging
assistance to create international partnerships. It is not just private-sector, for-profit
enterprises that need to be involved; private foundations, funds, and
nongovernmental organizations should also be integrated into the effort. The
government should employ the leveraging and catalytic qualities of these kinds of
organizations wherever public and private interests coincide. The same can be said
for private business on a broader scale. The economic engagement impact of
private, for-profit business can extend far beyond that of government and
nonprofit organizations. Private, for-profit economic engagement can lead directly
to the production of goods, services, and wealth that promotes or frustrates US
goals for international strategic cooperation.
Removing selective restrictions on specific goods isnt economic

because it doesnt broadly affect economic life
Davidsson 3 Elias Davidsson, Human Rights Researcher and Activist, Reporter for
the Arab American News, Contributing Editor for Global Research, The Mechanism
of Economic Sanctions: Changing Perceptions and Euphemisms, November,

www.aldeilis.net/english/attachments/2877_econsanc-debate.pdf
Economic sanctions, a mode of coercion in international relations resuscitated in recent

years, has prompted renewed and lively scholarly interest in the subject . Why have such
measures become so popular? One answer is that they constitute a means of exerting international influence that
is more powerful than diplomatic mediation but lies below the threshold of military intervention[1]. Another answer
is that they engage comparatively less internal political resistance than other candidate strategies [...]. They do
not generate sombre processions of body bags bringing home the mortal remains of the sons and daughters of
constituents[2], in other words, they cost little to the side imposing the sanctions. The notable predilection by the
United States for economic sanctions [3], suggests that such a tool is particularly useful for economically powerful
states that are themselves relatively immune to such measures. This tool of collective economic coercion, with
antecedents such as siege warfare and blockade going back to biblical time [4], was used during most of the 20th
Century, particularly in war situations. Although the United Nations Charter, drafted during the later stages of World
War II, includes provisions for the imposition of economic sanctions (Article 41), the Security Council - empowered
to resort to this tool - only used it twice between 1945 and 1990, against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in
In our discussion we designate economic sanctions as coordinated restrictions

on trade and/or financial transactions intended to impair economic life within a
given territory[5]. To the extent that measures intend to impair economic life within
a given territory through restrictions on trade and/or finance, they constitute, for
our purposes, economic sanctions. Selective or individualized measures, such as
1977.
restrictions on specific goods (arms, luxury items, some forms of travel), are
therefore not considered as economic sanctions . Symbolic economic deprivations, such as partial
withholding of aid, do not amount to economic sanctions if their intended effect is primarily to convey displeasure,
rather than to affect the economy.
Economic engagement uses economic means for specific foreign policy

objectives --- merely altering trade is commerce
Saner 3 Dr. Raymond Saner, Professor in Organization and International
Management at the University of Basle, International Economic Diplomacy:
Mutations in Post-modern Times, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, p. 12-13
Efforts by specialised Ministries to conduct policy related international negotiations and to influence the structure
and mechanisms of global governance have eclipsed the previous prominence of MOFAs in economic and trade
arenas. The rise of this non-traditional genre of multi-ministry international diplomacy is for instance apparent in
Genera where many industrialised countries' Embassies to the WTO are staffed by a greater number of officials than
is the case at their bilateral Embassies to Switzerland in Berne. The greater number of staff is mostly due to the
Economic diplomacy conducted

has been defined as follows:
ever increasing number of non-MOFA diplomats and government officials.

by MOFA or other government ministry officials
Economic diplomacy is concerned with economic policy issues, e.g. work of

delegations at standard setting organisations such as WTO and BIS . Economic diplomats
also monitor and report on economic policies in foreign countries and give the home government advice on how to
Economic Diplomacy employ's economic resources, either as

rewards or sanctions, in pursuit of a particular foreign policy objective. This is
sometimes called "economic statecraft"."
best influence them.
Governments are also keen to support national economic development by providing support to their own
enterprises for instance in the form of export advice, legal assistance, export incentives and backstopping when
needed. Such support includes helping national enterprises establish subsidiaries in other markets. At the same
time, their function can also include the provision of support to foreign enterprises interested in investing in the
respective country.
Commercial diplomacy on the other hand describes the work of diplomatic missions
in support of the home country's business and finance sectors in their pursuit of
economic success and the country's general objective of national development. It
includes the promotion of inward and outward investment as well as trade.
Important aspects of a commercial diplomats' work is the supplying of information about export
and investment opportunities and organising and helping to act as hosts to trade missions
from home. In some cases, commercial diplomats could also promote economic ties through
advising and support of both domestic and foreign companies for investment decisions.
2nc excludes specific products

Economic engagement broadly establishes the framework for individual
transactions --- targeting specific exports/imports makes the plan
commercial
Woolcock 13 Stephen Woolcock, Lecturer in International Relations at The London
School of Economics, and Sir Nicholas Bayne, Fellow at the International Trade Policy
Unit of the London School of Economics, The Oxford Handbook of Modern
Diplomacy, p. 387
Before suggesting some ways in which economic diplomacy could be seen as a

distinct branch of diplomacy it is helpful to limit the scope of the term by saying
what it is not. Our definition of economic diplomacy does not include the use of economic leverage, either in
the form of sanctions or inducement, in the pursuit of specific political or strategic goals. This we would define as
sanctions or perhaps economic statecraft.2 Economic diplomacy is about the creation and distribution of the
economic benefits from international economic relations. Clearly political and strategic interests will be a factor in
economic negotiations, whether in terms of promoting a liberal, capitalist world order or in choosing negotiating
partners tor trade agreements. 'I he conclusion of a trade or economic agreement can be seen as a means of
promoting economic stability, growth, and employment and thus political stability in a country, such as in the
countries of North Africa that have undergone reform since the spring of 2011. But the means remain the economic
agreement, the substance of which will be shaped by a range of domestic sectoral and other interests. In other
words, political objectives will not infrequently be a factor in decisions to initiate negotiations, but the concrete
agenda, content, and conduct of the negotiations will be largely determined by economic factors and interests. We
include international environment negotiations in our definition of economic diplomacy because of the close
interdependence between economic and environmental objectives. By extension we also see economic diplomacy
as an integrated part of a grand strategy combining political, military, and economic relations.
Nor does our definition of economic diplomacy include the promotion of exports or
investment, whether outward or inward. While governments have always intervened to promote their
national industries, there has been a trend towards more active involvement of foreign services or even diplomatic
services in seeking markets for national companies in recent decades.* This differs from more traditional industrial
policy or mercantilist trade policies. As traditional forms of intervention such as tariffs, subsidies, and other
instruments that used to promote national champions have been disciplined by WTO and other trade regimes,
governments have used diplomatic links, trade fairs, or visits of heads of state to promote commercial interests.
Such activities are better captured by the term commercial diplomacy , which
contrasts with economic diplomacy ; the latter facilitates trade and investment by
establishing the framework of rules and disciplines within which markets and such
commercial diplomacy function.4
Economic engagement covers general trade and financial policy, not

specific export or import decisions
Rul 12 Huub Rul, Senior Lecturer/Senior Researcher in International
Management at the University of Twente, and Lennart Zuidema, MSc degree in
Business Administration from University of Twente, Commercial Diplomacy: A
Survey Among Dutch Embassies and Consulates, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy,
No. 123, March,
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20120504_cling_research_artikel_discus
sionpaperindiplomacy_123_ruel_and_zuidema.pdf
Commercial diplomacy defined
Commercial diplomacy is often confused with economic diplomacy6 and other types of
diplomacy such as trade diplomacy and financial diplomacy. 7 Economic diplomacy is concerned with
general economic policy issues and trade agreements 8 Even though both have an
overarching economic objective,9 commercial diplomacy is much more specific.
Mercier (2007) and Kostecki & Naray10 (2007) both recognize that the term commercial
diplomacy is often used to cover two different types of activities: policy-making and
business support. While many agree that the core of commercial diplomacy focuses on the specific business
support,11 many of the proposed definitions by various authors differ.
to help bring out specific

commercial gains through promoting exports, attracting inward investment, and
preserving outward investment opportunities, and encouraging the benefits of
technological transfer.12
Potter, for instance, defines it as the application of tools of diplomacy
Lee13 defines it as the work of a network of public and private actors who manage commercial relations using
diplomatic channels and processes. This definition suggests that both private and public actors conduct
commercial diplomacy. Saner & Yiu14 have noted that when commercial diplomacy is conducted by private actors,
it is called corporate or business diplomacy. Consequently, private actors should preferably be excluded from the
definition of commercial diplomacy. Finally, Naray defines it as an activity conducted by public actors with
diplomatic status in view of business promotion between a home and a host country. It aims at encouraging
business development through a series of business promotion and facilitation activities.15
These activities are performed by members of foreign diplomatic missions, their staff, and other related agencies.16
This notion slightly contradicts the definition offered by Naray, as it only focuses on those public actors who possess
diplomatic status, whereas in our view the regular staff can also conduct commercial diplomacy. Having taken this
consideration into account, (i.e. those actors without diplomatic status) Narays definition will be used in this paper.
Commercial diplomacy centers around a series of activities in order to promote and

facilitate international business. These activities have been identified and classified by numerous
researchers. Naray distinguishes six types of activities: intelligence, referral, communication, advocacy,
coordination, and logistics. He relates these activities to specific areas such as markets and goods or intellectual
property rights. Country image building, export support services, marketing, and market research and publications
are other activities that belong to commercial diplomacy, according to Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton.17 In
contrast to the former activities identified by Naray, the ones identified by Lederman et al. are focused on a more
general country level. Kostecki and Naray18 distinguish between support activities of commercial diplomacy and
primary activities of commercial diplomacy. The support activities, which include intelligence, networking and public
relations, contract negotiations, and problem solving, provide the input for primary activities: trade promotion,
promotion of FDI, science and technology cooperation, promotion of tourism, and national business community
advocacy.
Interestingly, Kotabe and Czinkota19 only distinguish between export service programs and market development
programs. The former focuses on export counseling and advice. The latter identifies market opportunities. Potter20
adds the distinction of broader-in and broader-out activities. Broaderin activities are carried out by domestic actors
and aim at preparing firms to do business across borders. Broader-out activities are carried out by actors at foreign
posts and focus on market development. It appears that broader-out activities deliver the most value since they are
carried out in a host country. Preparing firms to do business in a foreign country can be achieved more easily by
domestic actors. Lee21 divides the broader-out activities into three main categories. She distinguishes gathering
and dissemination of market information, development and introduction of government relations, and promotion of
home country products and services by means of trade fairs, lobbying, and organizing seminars.
systematically clustering can lead to the following

most important activities of commercial diplomacy: (1) intelligence, and (2)
assistance with fairs, trade missions, and networking, (3) problem solving and
assistance with trade disputes, and (4) partner search and negotiation . The first activity
As the aforementioned classifications differ,
comprises information search and dealing with business inquiries, the second activity includes organizing business
and export promotion events, the third activity is about advising in cases where businesses face problems with
creditors, contract disputes, or market access issues, and the fourth activity deals with bringing together business
partners from home and target countries.
AT: Overlimits
Trade is still topical they can negotiate new trade
agreements with the government- but general export
promotion unlimits
Ilias, 13 - Specialist in International Trade and Finance for the Congressional
Research Service (Shayerah, U.S. Government Agencies Involved in Export
Promotion: Overview and Issues for Congress CRS Report for Congress, 1/31,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41495.pdf)
Federal government agencies perform a wide variety of functions that contribute to

export promotion, including providing information, counseling, and export
assistance services; funding feasibility studies; financing and insuring U.S. trade;
conducting government-to-government advocacy; and negotiating new trade
agreements and enforcing existing ones.
Approximately 20 federal government agencies are involved in supporting U.S.
exports directly or indirectly. Nine key agencies with programs or activity directly
related to export promotion are the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department
of Commerce, Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), Small Business Administration (SBA), Department of State,
Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR), and Department of the Treasury. The USDA has the largest level of export
promotion funding, followed by Commerce. Some agencies charge fees for their
services.
Gov to Gov
Uses of this argument

This violation is meant to exclude either affirmatives that target civil society within
China instead of the PRC, or to exclude affirmatives that work with more than just
the PRC (ie also engage Japan or South Korea).
Affirmative: Engagement can be multilateral

Engagement can be bilateral or multilateral
Delury 12 John Delury, Associate Director of the Asia Societys Center on U.S.-China Relations and
Director of the China Boom Project, Assistant Professor of Chinese Studies at Yonsei University, holds a Ph.D. in
History from Yale University, 2012 (Triple-Pronged Engagement: China's Approach to North Korea, American
Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Volume 34, Issue 2,
Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online)
So what is revealed about China's approach to Korea if Americans and South Koreans clear out a priori hopes and
fears, and analytically privilege state behavior (how is Beijing actually approaching North Korea) over public
discourse (how do the Chinese say they should approach North Korea)?
The main feature of

China's approach to North Korea is neighborly engagement. Beijing's
engagement approach has three prongs: bilateral political ties,
bilateral economic cooperation, and multilateral diplomatic
engagement.
If we attend to Beijing's conduct, a fairly consistent pattern comes into focus.
Bilateral political engagement is anchored in maintaining strong ties

between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Korean Workers
Party (KWP), with the CPC Central Committee International Liaison Department as the lead organizational entity.
This approach implicitly promotes the strengthening of KWP rule within the DPRK system. But Beijing is pragmatic
about the reality of One Party Rule with Korean Characteristics. Beijing accepts the Kim family's paramount status,
on public display when the entire Standing Committee of the Politburo met Kim Jong-il on the first of four visits to
the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the last two years. Beijing also gave early recognition to Kim Jong-un as heir
apparent, effusively embracing the succession moves after Kim Jong-il's death.
The political systems and ideologies of China and North Korea, as variations on the original Soviet blueprint, bear
deep structural affinitiesdespite the unique dynastic element and weaker Party role in the DPRK and despite 30
years of reform and opening in China. This affinity, combined with their long and, for the most part, brotherly
history, makes it considerably easier for China to maintain close bilateral ties. The political affinity also makes it
natural for Beijing to support the continued existence of the DPRK as a communist party state and to prefer an
improved version of the status quo to contingencies like regime collapse.
The second key component of China's approach (an improved version of the status quo) is reforming and
the second prong of the pitchfork of

Chinese engagementbilateral economic engagement . This core feature of
China's approach to North Korea is pursued regardless of diplomatic vicissitudes .
strengthening the North Korean economy. Thus,
Economic engagement includes state-backed assistance, marketbased provincial trade, and long-term strategic investment.
Assistance includes technical assistance, knowledge sharing and
human capacity buildingin effect, educating North Korean counterparts on the China model of
market transition and authoritarian capitalism. What is hoped is that trade will stimulate growth in bordering Jilin
and Liaoning provinces. Long-term investment is aimed at North Korean mineral resources and, perhaps, an East
Sea port (at Rason).
North Korea's lack of basic infrastructure frustrates China's hopes for strategic development. The DPRK's refusal to
introduce basic market reforms, moreover, renders North Korea an inhospitable business environment for Chinese
entrepreneurs and traders. Nevertheless, Beijing persists in encouraging North Korea to take steps on the road to
authoritarian economic reformboth out of its own economic self-interest and its geopolitical interest in a more
prosperous, and thus more stable, Communist neighbor.
The third prong of China's engagement approach is multilateral

diplomatic engagement (i.e., the Six Party Talks). Both the ends and means of the Six Party Talks
appear acceptable as the endgame for the Korean Peninsula so far as Beijing is concerned. The North gives up its
nukes but improves its security, perhaps at long last triggering economic reform and opening. The way to get there
is lots and lots of dialogue hosted by Beijing.
The Six Party Talks, from their initiation in 2003, was a rare example of China taking a proactive, leadership role in
global diplomacy. For the fleeting period when the Talks were making progress (from early 2007 until the fall of
2008), Beijing was justly proud of its diplomatic success, and North Korea had even leapt to the top of the list of
positives in SinoU.S. relations.
The Six Party Talks are structurally flawed, with multiple political factors responsible for their breakdown in late
2008. But the salient point here is that Beijing always saw its role in the Six Party Talks as mediating a deal between
the DPRK and the United States. The presumption that Pyongyang and Washington are the principals is North
Korea's long-held position (Pyongyang might like to cut out even Beijing's role as convener). But Washington does
not want to sit in the driver's seat. Its path of least resistance is to prioritize the ROK alliance and leave the
diplomatic initiative to the Chinese. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is in no hurry to reengage the North,
Washington doubts that the North Koreans can be trusted to really denuclearize, and President Obama's political
advisors would no doubt warn him of the costs of direct engagement with an Axis of Evil regimealthough
considerable progress was made in U.S.DPRK talks in the final months of 2011 (abruptly interrupted by Kim Jongil's death). Thus, we find ourselves in the current Six Party whirlpool. For Beijing, the Six Party Talks is a multilateral
fig leaf to help the United States and North Korea make a deal. But Washington too easily looks to Beijing to make
Pyongyang behave and prove its seriousness of purpose.
Common in U.S. foreign policy discourse is talk of China as the only party with leverage over Pyongyang. The one
place that sentiment is rarely heard is in China, where claims of influence are modest. It is ironic, from a Chinese
perspective, that Americans regularly call upon Beijing to exert its influence by enforcing sanctions and cutting off
aid to pressure Pyongyang to cease provocation and dismantle its nuclear program. Why is it that China is the only
country left with any direct influence on the DPRK? Precisely because Beijing has continued to engage Pyongyang,
whereas the ROK and United States have disengaged. So, from a Chinese perspective, the demand to exercise
influence by cutting off its source is illogical.
Even more ironic is that the most effective leverage Beijing could gain over Pyongyang would consist of the ability
to bring Washington back to the negotiating table with a deal assuring North Koreans that they would get what they
wanteconomic aid, diplomatic normalization, and security assurances. It is significant that the most recent U.S.
DPRK bilateral talks, which reportedly made progress toward agreements on resuming U.S. humanitarian aid and
freezing the DPRK's uranium program, were held in Beijing. Until then, China had struggled to persuade the United
States to reengage. The Six Party Talks configuration was an anomaly to begin withand the United States and
China are still not experienced at working proactively with each other on an issue of such delicacy and complexity.
So, when U.S.China relations take a downward turn, the Six Party Talks can easily founder. For now, the Six Party
Talks represent the one broken prong of China's three-fold engagement approach to North Korea.
Negative
1nc gov to gov

Engagement is exclusively bilateral between governments
Kane, 8 US Marine Corps Major, thesis SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES for
the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting (Brian, Comprehensive Engagement: A
Winning Strategy http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504901) NSS =
National Security Strategy
Engagement strategies are not new. Since the end of the Cold War, engagement
strategy has been called comprehensive containment, conditional containment,
conditional engagement, limited engagement, quid pro quo engagement,
congagement, unconditional engagement, and comprehensive engagement.8 As a
result, engagement strategy represents a conceptual fog in todays
environment.9
However, the Clinton Administration attempted to dissipate this fog with the first
post-Cold War, multi-faceted definition proposed in its NSS, which stated that
engagement strategy is:
(1) a broad based grand strategic orientation;
(2) a specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through
the
unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state;
(3) a bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a
state;
(4) a bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual
interest
with a target state; and
(5) a bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to
facilitate
economic and political liberalization in a target state.10
This definition of engagement has been the most successful historically.11
Its is exclusive---means no channel other than US

government engagement
Douglas F. Brent 10, attorney, June 2, 2010, Reply Brief on Threshold Issues of
Cricket Communications, Inc., online:
http://psc.ky.gov/PSCSCF/2010%20cases/2010-
00131/20100602_Crickets_Reply_Brief_on_Threshold_Issues.PDF) Italics and bold

in the original
AT&T also argues that Merger Commitment 7.4 only permits extension of any
given interconnection agreement for a single three year term. AT&T Brief at 12.
Specifically, AT&T asserts that because Cricket adopted the interconnection
agreement between Sprint and AT&T, which itself was extended, Cricket is
precluded from extending the term of its agreement with AT&T. Id
This argument relies upon an inaccurate assumption: that the agreement
(contract) between Sprint and AT&T, and the agreement (contract) between Cricket
and AT&T, are one and the same. In other words, to accept AT&Ts argument the
Commission must conclude that two separate contracts, i.e. the interconnection
between Sprint and AT&T in Kentucky (Sprint Kentucky Agreement) and the
interconnection between Cricket and AT&T in Kentucky (Cricket Kentucky
Agreement), are one and the same.
Upon this unstated (and inaccurate) premise AT&T asserts that the ICA was
already extended; id. at 14, and the ICA Cricket seeks to extend was extended by
Sprint . . . .; id. at 15, and, finally, Cricket cannot extend the same ICA a second
time . . . . Id. (emphasis added in all). Note that in the quoted portions of the AT&T
brief (and elsewhere) AT&T uses vague and imprecise language when referring to
either the Sprint Kentucky Agreement, or the Cricket Kentucky Agreement, in hopes
that the Commission will treat the two contracts as one and the same.
But it would be a mistake to do so. The contract governing AT&Ts duties and
obligations with Sprint is a legally distinct and separate contract from that which
governs AT&Ts duties with Cricket. The Sprint Kentucky Agreement was approved
by the Commission in September of 2001 in Case Number 2000-00480. The Cricket
Kentucky Agreement was approved by the Commission in September of 2008 in
Case Number 2008-033 1.
AT&T ignores the fact that these are two separate and distinct contracts because it
knows that the merger commitments apply to each agreement that an individual
telecommunications carrier has with AT&T. Notably, Merger Commitment 7.4 states
that AT&T/BellSouth ILECs shall permit a requesting telecommunications
carrier to extend its current interconnection agreement . . . . As written, the
commitment allows any carrier to extend its agreement. Clearly, the use of the
pronoun its in this context is possessive, such that the term its means - that
particular carriers agreement with AT&T (and not any other carriers
agreement). Thus, the merger commitment applies to each agreement that an
individual carrier may have with AT&T. It necessarily follows then, that Crickets
right to extend its agreement under Merger Commitment 7.4 is separate and
distinct right from another carriers right to extend its agreement with AT&T (or
whether such agreement has been extended).
Voting issue
1. limits a government limit is the only way to keep the topic manageable
otherwise they could use any 3rd party intermediary, lift barriers to private
engagement, or target civil society it makes topic preparation impossible
2. negative ground formal governmental channels are key to predictable relations

disads and counterplans that test engagement
2nc gov to gov
AT We meet:
the plan text never says that its direct relations with
china.
Affs that meet: ISS, Space coop, and market econ affs are
pretty chill
Economic and diplomatic engagement works with state
institutions the plan is civil society engagement

areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions,
cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts.
Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and
promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people
between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of
engagement.
Engagement is a long-term process of sustained interaction

with another state to boost relations
Takamine, 6 - assistant Professor of Politics in the Department of Integrated Arts
and Science at Okinawa National College of Technology (Tsukasa, Japan's
Development Aid to China: The Long-Running Foreign Policy of Engagement, p. 18)
The various policy objectives pursued by Japans China ODA described above
illustrate the striking flexibility of Japanese ODA as a foreign policy instrument.
Nevertheless, certain key underlying concepts have remained consistent since I979,
notably the concept of engagement. In this book, the term engagement means a
relationship of sustained interaction over a long period, intended by a state
in order to promote positive relations with another state. In turn, such interaction is
expected to promote or increase the national interests of the state which initiated it.
A policy of engagement is potentially composed of a number of different
dimensions, for example, political, economic, military and cultural. Engagement
further implies a dynamic interaction and, of course, is a two-way relationship.
Japan's engagement policy with China, addressed in this book, essentially consists
of Japan`s attempt to interact with China politically and economically, with military
and cultural considerations less prominent. As Reinhard Drifte points out, sustained
economic and political interaction with China are expected to 'steer China towards a
peaceful and sustainable pathwhile simultaneously hedging against any Chinese
strategic breakout or policy failure. This book will also demonstrate, however, that
engaging China is also expected to serve Japan`s own economic and political
interests. Of course, in this case as in others, engagement is a two-way street, and
Chinese perceptions of Japans policy of engagement must be expected to differ
from Japans. Such considerations, however, are beyond the scope of this research.
Engagement requires sustained government-to-government

interaction
Can the sunshine policy really bring positive changes within the North Korean
regime and peace to the Korean peninsula? The logic behind Kim Dae-jungs policy
is a refinement of one of the major strategies of economic statecraft and military
competition. In his discussion of US economic statecraft towards the Soviet Union
during the Cold War, Michael Mastanduno provides a useful framework for
understanding President Kims engagement policy towards the North. In general,
engagement promotes positive relations with an enemy as a means of changing the
behavior or policies of a target government. It accepts the legitimacy of that
government and tries to shape its conduct. Engagement also requires the
establishment and continuance of political communication with the target.
In engaging the enemy, the state sees political polarization with target or isolation
of the target country as undesirable.
2nc NGOs limits disad

Limits outweigh- the fact that any non governmental
organization can become topical proves the infinite amount of
abuse. Default to the negatives impact claims150 types of NGOs that are not under the jurisdiction of the US
government- explodes limits
Merrick 98 (Robert R. Merrick, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army, Engagement:
The Nations Premier Grand Strategy, Who's In Charge?, April 1 1998,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA342695, DTB)
While engagement activities of the various governmental agencies are synchronized
by the Ambassador and the deployed military force fall under the control of the
CINC the 150~ NGOs, PVOs and lOs are not controlled by any single agency . Diplomatic
relationships, fostered by mutual respect and concern, provide the best conduit to influence the strategies of the
NGOs, PVOsand 10e. However, it is apparent that neither the CINC nor the Ambassador can control ALL the
engagement efforts in a region. So, while Selective Engagement remains the most preferred of the post-cold war
Grand Strategies, the problem of implementing a cohesive strategy used by both government and private agencies
As long as private agencies are permitted to operate autonomously, the

Presidents ability to execute engagement activities, through his Ambassadors and
CINCs, is confined solely to US governmental agencies and organizations.
remains.
Using NGOs EXPLODES limits- there are over a MILLION NGOs

in the use, and they can participate in any cause imaginable
U.S. Department of State 12 (U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in the United States, January 12, 2012,
http://www.humanrights.gov/2012/01/12/fact-sheet-non-governmentalorganizations-ngos-in-the-united-states/, DTB)
Approximately 1.5 million NGOs operate in the United States . These NGOs
undertake a wide array of activities, including political advocacy on issues such as
foreign policy, elections, the environment, healthcare, womens rights, economic
development, and many other issues. Many NGOs in the United States also operate in fields that
are not related to politics. These include volunteer organizations rooted in shared religious faith,
labor unions, groups that help vulnerable people such as the poor or mentally ill,
and groups that seek to empower youth or marginalized populations . Indeed, NGOs
exist to represent virtually every cause imaginable . Their sources of finance include donations
from private individuals (American or foreign), private sector for-profit companies, philanthropic foundations, or
grants from federal, state, or local government. Sources of finance may also include foreign governments. There is
no prohibition in U.S. law on foreign funding of NGOs, whether that foreign funding comes from governments or
non-government sources.
Positive incentives
Affirmative positive incentives

Engagement can include negative incentives as long as its net
positive
Pernaa, 7 paper submitted for a Master of European Affairs at the Department of
Political Science at Lund University (Emilia, Catering Sticks and Carrots for the
Global Security http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?
func=downloadFile&recordOId=1324375&fileOId=1324376
Here I will use the term of engagement to some extent in line with the definition of
Haass and OSullivan. Thus, the term engagement is understood as a positive
foreign policy strategy, which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives
to achieve its objectives. However, the engaging strategy does not preclude the
simultaneous use of negative instruments, such as sanctions or military force,
but in order to be understood as engaging strategy the use of positive incentives
should play leading role (2000:2). Thus, the term engagement is seen in a
positive light, referring to constructive efforts in order to engage the country in case
to the international community. Even though some negative means might be used
to some extent by side of the engaging strategy, engagement means generally a
conflict preventing approach which can be understood as tension reduction,
conciliation, appeasement and incentives and use of positive methods to cooperate
with proliferators (Baldwin 1985:111).
Engagement can include positive and negative sanctions

Levitt, 10 - A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Dorothy F. Schmidt College of
Arts and Letters in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master
of Arts ; Florida Atlantic University (Jason, DRIVING A HARD BARGAIN: U.S.
SANCTIONS STRATEGIES http://fau.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/fau
%3A3576/datastream/OBJ/download/Driving_a_hard_bargain.pdf
It is unclear why Haass and OSullivan (2000) view the use of negative and positive
sanctions as evidence of separate but concurrent strategies. Suettinger (2000: 27)
better defines engagement as a grand strategy of managing a strategic
relationship through the explicit offering of incentives and the threat of sanctions.
Cortright and Lopez (2000: 28) offer a bargaining model to describe essentially
the same policy one that views sanctions not as a policy unto themselves but as
part of a continuum of policy instruments from the negative to the positive.5
Suettinger (2000: 18) writes that the Clinton administration viewed its engagement
strategy toward China as an alternative to a punishment-or-sanctions-only means.
This alternative strategy is distinct from the punitive strategy one that more
closely resembles Morgenthaus (1960: 566) view of diplomacy:
The objective of foreign policy is relative and conditional: to bend, not to break, the
will of the other side as far as necessary in order to safeguard ones own vital
interests without hurting those of the other side. The methods of foreign policy are
relative and conditional: not to advance by destroying the obstacles in ones way,
but to retreat before them, to circumvent them, to maneuver around them, to
soften and dissolve them slowly by means of persuasion, negotiation, and pressure.
In consequence, the mind of the diplomat is complicated and subtle. It sees the
issue in hand as a moment in history, and beyond the victory of tomorrow it
anticipates the incalculable possibilities of the future.
Negative
1nc positive incentives

Engagement requires the provision of positive incentives
Haass 2k Richard Haass & Meghan OSullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy
Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 12
The term engagement was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued
by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term
remains a source of confusion . To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of
normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept
behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a
regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one
capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs
the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more
than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy
strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its
objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments
itself
such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when
the distinguishing feature of

engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives
to shape the behavior of countries with which the U nited S tates has important
disagreements.
the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet
Plan is negative pressure --- voting issue:

Limits --- they more than double the topic, its essentially Resolved:
China without a stable plan mechanism
Ground --- coercive pressure is containment, not engagement --- their
interpretation destroys ground because it accesses a vastly different
literature base
Johnston and Ross, 5 - professor of political science at Harvard AND professor of
political science at Boston College (Alastair and Robert, Engaging China: The
Management of an Emerging Power, p. xv)
The volume's comprehensive approach to studying engagement means that the

contributors have vastly different research agendas. To encourage a common
dialogue among the contributors and to facilitate the generation of a common
understanding of engagement with cross-national applications, the contributors
have worked within a common definition of engagement. For the purpose of this
volume, engagement is defined as follows:
The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a

rising major power's behavior. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used
in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order.
In this approach, amelioration of the rising power's behavior does not include
efforts to hinder the accretion of relative power. This is better understood as
"containment". We have neither defined nor limited the methods of amelioration,
preferring that individual authors characterize the methods used by the respective
countries and/or multilateral institutions. "Non-coercive methods" include such
strategies as accommodation of legitimate interests, transformation of preferences,
and entanglement in bilateral and multilateral institutional constraints.
The contributors clearly differentiate engagement from containment. In contrast to
containment, engagement seeks neither to limit, constrain, or delay increases in the
target country's power nor prevent the development of influence commensurate
with its greater power. Rather, it seeks to "socialize" the rising power by
encouraging its satisfaction with the evolving global or regional order. Our definition
of engagement specifically excludes coercive policies.
2nc positive incentives only

Engagement is only positive inducements --- negative pressure like
sanctions, coercive diplomacy, or force arent topical
Ikenberry 12 G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at
Princeton University, Review of The Logic of Positive Engagement, Foreign Affairs,
January / February, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136888/miroslavnincic/the-logic-of-positive-engagement-cornell-studies-in-security-aff
When the United States seeks to change the behavior of rival or adversarial states, what are the available tools and
American foreign-policy makers tend to

resort to negative pressures, such as the use of force , coercive diplomacy , and
strategies? In this provocative study, Nincic observes that
economic sanctions . Less appreciated and less understood, Nincic argues, are the tools and
strategies of engagement, policies that use positive inducements to alter the
incentives and orientations of other states. Nincic is surely correct: policymakers know
more about the use of sticks than carrots . The book seeks to explain the bias in American foreign
policy toward threats and punishments and argues that it is a legacy of the Cold War, which taught politicians to
worry about charges of appeasement. Nincic also sees biases in the American security-studies community, where,
he claims, realist understandings of the world shift attention away from nonmilitary tools of influence. The books
most useful contribution is to spell out how strategies of engagement and positive inducements can work, using the
United States experiences with Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria as case studies.
Promising rewards is engagement --- threatening punishment isnt

Borer 4 Douglas A. Borer, Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Problems of Economic Statecraft: Rethinking Engagement,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/12borer.pdf
Bridging the Gap in Theory and Practice: Inverse Engagement
engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive

incentives, by one state to alter the elements of another states behavior. As such, some
The policy of
scholars have categorized engagement as a form of appeasement.21 However, I concur with the view articulated
by Randall Schweller that, while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an
important qualitative difference exists between the two: Engagement is more than appeasement, he says:
In
practice engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its
It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order.
goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of
punishment to influence the targets behavior. . . . The policy succeeds if such concessions
convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the system. . . . Engagement
is most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats,
to use sticks as well as carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to
demand more.22
Engagement cannot include punitive measures

Marashi 12 Reza Marashi, Research Director at the National Iranian American
Council, Dealing with Iran, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs,
http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=258
Obamas Strategy
It should now be clear that U.S. policy has never been a true engagement policy.
By definition ,
engagement entails a long-term approach that abandons punitive measuresthe

sticks and reassures both sides that their respective fears are unfounded . Obama
administration officials realized early on that they were unlikely to adopt this approach. Instead, after the conclusion
of Obamas policy review, a carrot and stick strategy similar to that of the Bush administration has been pursued.
This dual trackas it has been referred as since January 2009utilizes positive and negative inducements to
convince Iran that changing its behavior would be its most rewarding and least harmful decision. The key difference
between the Bush and Obama approach has been an effort by the latter to avoid the tactical mistakes of the former.
By publicly disavowing regime change, striking diplomatic quid pro quos with key allies, and dropping preconditions
to diplomacy with Iran, Obama changed tactics, but maintained an objective similar to his predecessormaking
Iran yield on the nuclear issue through pressure. By changing tactics, the U.S. has managed to build a more robust
consensus for international sanctionssomething the Bush administration was unable to achieve.
Link threatening sanctions

Imposing sanctions is containment, not engagement
Rock 2k Stephen R. Rock, Professor of Political Science at Vassar College,
Appeasement in International Politics, p. 22
Engagement, as typically conceived, is not a global national security strategy, but an approach to dealing with a
In this more common sense

of the term, "engagement" is often contrasted with "containment." Rather than
specific state (or states) exhibiting hostile or otherwise undesirable behavior.
confronting ones opponent through economic sanctions or even military threats,

engagement involves establishing or enhancing contacts , communication , and
exchanges , especially in the commercial realm.78 This notion of engagement is articulated in
those portions of A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement in which the document discusses
China and certain other countries, and is the basis of America's current China policy. In fact, however, it predates
the Clinton presidency. U.S. administrations from Nixon to Reagan pursued engagement with respect to South Africa
and the practice of apartheid. The Bush administration did so in its approach to China before and after the shooting
of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tienanmen Square.79
Sanctioning is not economic engagement

elik 11 Arda Can elik, Masters Degree in Politics and International Studies from
Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 13-14
Garzke et al,(2001)point outs that economic relations have pacifying affect on political tensions. Long term
economic relations even create their own bodies and instructions thus, they do not necessitate for frequent political
interactions. Regulated trade intensifies the mutual dependence and additional bodies which wants to sustain the
benefits of mentioned dependence. Kroll (1993) defends that interdependence does not create a dependence out of
complex political manoeuvres nor from trade. Modern state have the capacity to reach the optimum solutions for its
own benefit and it has the tools to establish rational policies. Papayoanou(1997) contributes as follos; Trade
generates information via institutions and those information removes the uncertainty between the states.
Additionaly it establishes a trust between the parties and paves the way for additional signalling mechanisms in
case of mistrust. Furthermore; Signalling measures such as additional taxations or adjusted tariffs gives a leeway
for set of options before the possibility of conflict. If the country does not have 13 strong economic ties, there would
Therefore economic engagement policies are not only

different from economic sanctions but also they design the former ones from early
phases. This argument has similarities with the conditionalists in a sense that economic sanctions are more
be no tools for signalling mechanisms.
effective between interdependent countries albeit it is more costly. (Kroll,1993)
AT: WM avoid punishment

Incentives are distinct from coercion --- the test is that the incentive
must provide something you didnt have before the offer
De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in
Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, Perverse and unintended
Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)
Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis this for that. If you change your behavior,
Ill give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program do as I
say and Ill let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you
didnt have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts
coercion in its own box , one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the
incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons
unintended consequences and perverse incentives.
Avoiding punishment isnt an incentive --- incentives require linkage to a

specific reward
Stern 6 Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola Chicago University School of Law
(Stephanie, Fall, Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral Analysis
of Financial Incentives, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 541, Lexis Law)
[*548] Third, when regulations are enforced, the resulting penalties may demoralize individuals and create
negative attitudes towards conservation. n34 Punishment is effective at reducing the frequency of undesirable
behaviors, but may impair pro-environmental attitudes and perceptions of self-efficacy. n35 For example, if a
homeowner has to pay a steep environmental fine for destroying habitat, she may generalize the negative
emotions from the punishment to species protection or environmentalism generally. Indeed, the enforcement of the
Endangered Species Act has resulted in a strong citizen backlash against species-protection legislation and
regulation of private land. n36 Given the imperfect translation of attitudes to high-cost behaviors, antienvironmental attitudes will not necessarily prompt habitat destruction or polluting behaviors. However, negative
attitudes are likely to affect political choices, such as voting against candidates who support environmental
Enforcement of any program, including incentives, is inevitably negative at

least some of the time (i.e., an individual may perceive the removal of an expected
incentive as punishment). n37 However, traditional command and control regulation is more
protection.
punitive in tenor because individuals interact directly with the regulatory authority
only for the purpose of punishment. In incentive programs, there are generally a
large number of compliant participants whose interaction with the state is explicitly
positive (i.e., the receipt of rewards ).
Exclusive evidence --- incentives are positive, only disincentives are
negative
Veer 5 Author of Multiple Books on Indian Affairs
(Veer, Modern Teaching of Population Education, Google Books)
Incentives have been defined by Rogers as, Direct of indirect payments in cash or
in kind that are given to an individual couple, or group in order to encourage some overt behavioral
change. Incentives are offered to the individuals, couples or groups, they may be in cash or in kind. They may
Incentives:
be immediate or differed. As a general rule incentives have been valuable indirect anti-capitalist measures.
However it has been pointed out that they are unethical and seem to be an exploitation of poverty. There is ample
scope for cheating and fraud. The motivational aspect is neglected. However, these deficits may be overcome.
Disincenitves:
While incentives are positive rewards, disincentives are negative
rewards. While incentives impel , disincentives restrict . The variety of disincentives may be
visualized by the following disincentives provided in Singapore in 1968. (i) Couples with a large number of children
would not have priority over newly-wed couples in the allocation of subsidized public housing, (ii) Under the
Employment Act; no paid maternity leave would be given after the third child, (iii) The subsidized accouchement
fees in Government Maternity Hospitals were modified so that higher fees were charged for higher parity
confinements. Other disincentives, which came into effect on August 1, 1973, were announced by the Singapore
Government in order to discourage larger families. Accouchement fees, maternity leave, priority points for public
housing and income-tax relief were all adjusted to, encourage each family to have no more than two children.
Disincentives have been criticized on the ground that they penalize innocent children. The population also
represents them Therefore, generally they are used in exceptional cases and certainly not as much as incentives.
Limits Impact
Unlimits --- the number of potential sanctions is huge
Magaisa 9 Dr. Alex T. Magaisa, Lawyer Specialising in Economic and Financial
Services Law and Columnist for the Zimbabwe Independent Newspaper,
Zimbabwe: Sanctions, the Economy and Democratic Process, 11-12,
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/magaisa6.13113.html
The theoretical basis of sanctions is that they compel the government of the target country to change its approach
in relation to certain problematic issues. In recent years sanctions have been variously used against a number of
states for allegedly violating human rights. It is believed that the pressure of sanctions would compel the
government to change its conduct and attitude towards certain issues that the loss of certain privileges could
persuade or force them to change their ways. Alternatively, though this aim is less pronounced, the effect of
There are a number of

types of sanctions economic, diplomatic, etc. In recent years there has been
increasing use of targeted sanctions also known as smart sanctions whereby
certain individuals or organisations within a country are specifically targeted using
for example, travel bans, asset-freezing, etc.
sanctions might cause the citizens to demand change from their government.
Distinguishing positive from negative sanctions is the only way to prevent

an overly broad topic
Delevic 98 Milica Delevic, Assistant Foreign Minister in Charge of European
Integration for Serbia, Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of
Yugoslavia, The International Journal of Peace Studies, 3(1),
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/Delvic.htm
Economic statecraft, as defined here, is intentionally broad , since it has to include all
economic forms of influence. However, the distinction can be made between
negative sanctions (withholding economic advantages) and positive sanctions
(offering economic benefits), as well as trade and financial sanctions . For the purposes of
this study, using the case of Yugoslavia, economic sanctions will be used to describe the technique
of economic statecraft that withholds economic advantages through either trade or
financial restrictions.
Ground Impact
Their interpretation ruins ground --- changes links to politics, trade, and
perception DAs
Cortright 00 David Cortright, Director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and Chair of the Board
of the Fourth Freedom Forum, Positive Inducements in International Statecraft,
June, http://oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/forum/2000/06/section_05_full.html
Comparing Incentives and Sanctions
There are many differences between sanctions and incentives that point to the advantages
of an incentives-based strategy. One important difference between the two concerns relative costs. In narrow
accounting terms, a sanction is not a cost . When countries impose an embargo on an offending
state, this does not show up as a line item in the national budget. As a result, some policy makers naively consider
economic sanctions a kind of foreign policy on the cheap. In reality sanctions impose significant costs on private
companies and local communities. Because these losses do not appear as specific government expenditures,
By contrast, foreign assistance, loan guarantees, and

financial aid are listed as specific budgetary allocations, which can make
them easy targets for budget cutters, especially in an era of fiscal austerity . On the
however, they are easily overlooked by political leaders.
other forms of
other hand, trade preferences and technology incentives appear to be relatively cost free to governments and have
become a favorite tool of economic statecraft. Trade incentives have the benefit of opening up new opportunities
for commerce that can benefit domestic constituencies. Whereas sanctions impose costs on particular industries
and communities, trade incentives can bring benefits to these groups. As a result, domestic constituencies in the
sender state may gain a stake in maintaining trade preferences and provide political support for sustaining the
incentives policy. As noted earlier, incentives can create similar dynamics within the recipient country. In contrast
with sanctions, which cause hardships for both sender and recipient, trade incentives bring benefits to both. They
are a classic win-win proposition.
An important advantage of incentives is that benefits can be designed and targeted to ameliorate the root causes
of conflict. Whether the primary needs are economic, political, or security-related, inducement strategies can be
packaged and delivered to meet those needs and lessen the likelihood of conflict. In the case of Ukraine, security
assurances were added to the package of economic benefits offered to Kiev as a way of addressing concerns about
Ukrainian vulnerability vis--vis Russia. This targeting of resources to meet specific political objectives is an
important way in which incentives differ from sanctions. Whereas sanctions take away resources or deny benefits to
contending parties, incentives add resources. When these rewards are targeted strategically to address the sources
of conflict, their effectiveness is enhanced.
Incentives also differ from sanctions in their relation to market forces . When incentives are
offered, there is no natural tendency, as with sanctions, for black marketeers or third-party actors to step in and
circumvent trade restrictions. As Eileen Crumm observes, Where market forces work against negative sanctions,
they can reinforce positive ones. Many scholars have noted that economic sanctions generate countervailing
pressures that can undermine the effectiveness of such measures. A tightly enforced embargo will raise the price of
imports in the target country and in the process create powerful motivations for cheating. By contrast, an offer of
incentives such as foreign assistance or concessionary loans will not create market pressures for another party to
do likewise. Competing offers of assistance may result from political motives, but they are not generated by market
forces. During the cold war the United States and the Soviet Union vied to provide incentive offers, but such
competition is less likely now. Positive incentives work in harmony with the natural forces of the market and thus
have a significant economic advantage over negative sanctions.
Sanctions and incentives also have differing impacts on international trade and the
prospects for economic cooperation. One of the most significant, some would say most hopeful,
characteristics of the post-cold war world has been the widespread expansion of free markets and the substantial
increase in international commerce. Richard Rosecrance has spoken of the trading state phenomenon as a
powerful antidote to war and armed conflict. Expanding trade and economic interdependence can establish the
foundations of peace and international cooperation. The use of economic sanctions runs counter to this trend. Peter
van Bergeijk argued that the great use of negative sanctions threatens the expansion of trade, thereby weakening
the incentive for political cooperation that comes with increasing economic interdependence. By contrast, positive
measures encourage trade and international cooperation and thereby contribute to the long-term prospects for
peace. Incentive policies provide a basis for long-term cooperation and understanding and create the foundations
for international stability.
the greatest difference between sanctions and incentives lies in their impact on human
behavior. Drawing on the insights of behavioral psychology, Baldwin identified key distinctions between the two
Perhaps
approaches. Incentives foster cooperation and goodwill, whereas sanctions create hostility and separation. Threats
tend to generate reactions of fear, anxiety, and resistance, whereas the normal responses to a promise or reward
are hope, reassurance, and attraction.
Threats send a message of indifference or active hostility,
according to Baldwin, whereas promises convey an impression of sympathy and concern. Incentives
tend to enhance the recipient's willingness to cooperate with the sender, whereas negative measures may impede
such cooperation. Roger Fisher argued that imposing pain may not be a good way to produce a desired decision or
to influence another's actions. Whereas threats and punishment generate resistance, promises and rewards tend to
foster cooperation.
These differences have important implications for the conduct of political

communications. One of the drawbacks of sanctions is that they close off channels of commerce and
interaction, which can intensify misunderstanding and distrust. Inducement strategies do not carry this burden.
Because incentives create less resentment and obstinacy in the recipient, communication is clearer and more
precise, and negotiations are more likely to succeed. Punitive measures may be effective in sending a message of
disapproval, but they are not conducive to constructive dialogue. Whereas sanctions may generate communications
gridlock, incentives open the door to greater interaction and understanding.
Engagement spec
Sample plan and 2ac

The United States federal government should diplomatically engage China over
human rights.
We meet- we specified human rights, and we specified a

diplomatic mechanism, deal with it.
No resolutional basis the rez just says diplomatic
engagement, weve met the burden this isnt a T violation,
its an arbitrary theory construct that isnt predictable
Infinitely regressive its impossible to meet their standards
for spec since everything can always be more specific
CI the aff only needs to specify diplomatic or economic
engagement plus the issue area it covers. Thats key to core
topic education
No ground loss you still get ALL NON ENGAGEMENT
counterplans so quit whining
They destroy aff ground wed lose every debate to stupid
engagement PICs- the topic literature doesnt have enough
depth to support this
Cross-ex checks abuse we would answer any reasonable
question they had for the purposes of DAs only
Reasonability what weve done isnt that bad; dont punish us
for potential abuse
1nc engagement spec

A. Interpretation Substantial is meaningful
WordNet, 6 (WordNet 3.0, 2006 by Princeton University.
Dictionary.reference.com/ browse/substantial
Substantial, adjective
2. having a firm basis in reality and being therefore important, meaningful, or
considerable; "substantial equivalents"
Increase requires specification

OED, 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, Online through Emory)
increase, v.
3. To become greater in some specified quality or respect; to grow or advance in.
Engagement is a strategy that depends on positive incentives

The term engagement was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about
the Reagan administrations policy of constructive engagement towards South
Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few
instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably
engages states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a
meaningful subject of analysis, the term engagement must refer to something
more specific than a policy of non-isolation. As used in this article, engagement
refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on
positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the
simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military
force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when
the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the
distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the
extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which

the US has important disagreements.
B. Violation they dont specify and therefore cant be an

engagement strategy their use of the term is meaningless
Litwak, 7 Vice President for Scholars and Director of International Security
Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Robert, Regime
Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11, p. 107)
Sound target-state analysis provides policymakers with the basis for selecting an
appropriate strategy along a continuum of choice, which ranges from total regime
change (or rollback) to containment to engagement. These terms have become
standard reference points in the American foreign policy debate, but officials and
policy analysts often use them without precision, almost as shorthand to indicate
their positive or negative attitude toward a particular state. George observed that
each of these terms encompasses an array of alternative strategies:
It should be recognized that "containment" and "engagement" are general concepts
that require specific content in order to become strategies. Each of these
concepts is capable of generating significantly different strategies. Policy planning
and the development of policies for dealing with rogue states must develop a
specific containment strategy and/or a specific engagement strategy. The question
that must be addressed is, "which type of containment strategy" and/or "which
type of engagement strategy" and "which particular combination of containment
and engagement strategy?" Unless this question of how to transform these general
concepts into specific strategies and tactics is adequately and clearly answered,
they are likely to encourage inconsistent, even contradictory behavior toward the
rogue state.
C. Voting issue
1. limits not requiring the aff to specify explodes the literature base it frees them
from having to find specific solvency advocates or defenses of particular
engagement strategies and allows them to dodge links through vagueness
2. negative ground if they dont specify, it prevents us from accessing most of the
literature written against engagement which is geared towards contrasting
strategies theyve destroyed legitimate CP ground
2nc specification key to debate

Precision is vital for education and quality debates their
interpretation makes the word engagement meaningless
complete)
While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in
the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft.
Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously
debating the merits of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of
unsavory regimes. The quality of this debate, however, is diminished by the
persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and
analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement. In this essay, I begin with a
brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt
to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for drawing a
sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches,
especially appeasement, isolation and containment.
In the contemporary lexicon of United States foreign policy, few terms have been as
frequently or as confusingly invoked as that of engagement.(n1) A growing
consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for
managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years,
engagement constituted the Clinton administration's declared approach in the
conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and
Vietnam.
Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National
Security Council, remarked that the word engagement has "been overused and
poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become
shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."(n2)
The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:
(n3)
1. A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is
considered synonymous with American internationalism and global
leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony
Lake observed that American public opinion was divided into two rival camps:
"On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign engagement; on the
other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and
expanded trade."(n4)
2. A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state
through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state:
During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the
Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive

engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded
for progress, but refused to impose penalties for intransigence."(n5)
3. A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to
a target state: The Clinton administration announced in May 1993 that the
future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be
conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human
rights record.(n6) Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and
North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with
heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and
economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear
weapons program.(n7)
4. A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of
mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is the
idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and
not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and
friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward China in
May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the
Chinese government's human rights record.(n8) Similarly, the
administration's foreign policy toward the Russian Federation has largely
been one of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of
agreement and...develop policies to manage our differences."(n9)
5. A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to
facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state: In its 1999
national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of
engagement with each of the NIS [Newly Independent States]" consisted of
"working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and emerging
entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help strengthen civil
society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the laws,
institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and
corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."(n10)
Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to
conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following
critical errors: (1) treating engagement as a synonym for appeasement; (2) defining
engagement so expansively that it essentially constitutes any policy relying on
positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.
The aff fails to specify the exact mechanism for engagement

this model of debate crushes education and justifies an unfair
expansion of the topic
Hayden 13 (Dr. Craig Hayden is an assistant professor in the International
Communication Program at American University's School of International Service.
Engagement is More Convenient than Helpful: Dissecting a Public Diplomacy
Term., http://intermap.org/2013/06/20/engagement-is-more-convenient-thanhelpful-dissecting-a-public-diplomacy-term/
I think this tension is readily apparent in efforts to use social media for public
diplomacy.Case in point how does the use of Facebook or Twitter constitute
engagement? Does the larger base of people who Like an embassy page indicate
a successful campaign of engagement? Or, does it reflect a productive use of
advertising techniques to recruit likes, while not necessarily providing the implied
more meaningful connections that social networks can sustain? When an
ambassador uses Twitter, does this constitute a robust effort to sustain dialogue
with publics, or, does it represent a kind of performance that humanizes the chief of
mission? Im not suggesting one is better than the other. What I am saying is that
there a few clear parameters for what constitutes engagement. In my research on
US digital public diplomacy, I have heard a lot of critiques about what is being done
from a practical standpoint, but not so much on the bigger question of why. What
does this mean for practitioners? For starters, it makes it harder to design the kind
of formative research needed to plan an effective public diplomacy program that
takes into account both the contextual factors and the strategic needs that the
program will serve. The conceptual ambiguity also makes it difficult to pin down
how and when a program can be deemed effective in post hoc evaluation. While I
readily acknowledge that measurement and evaluation imperatives can ultimately
distort the practice of public diplomacy or even conceal the less democratic forms
of communication involved in public diplomacy outreach, I think its also important
to acknowledge that the ambiguity of a term like engagement makes it potentially
about everything all the touch-points, communications, and connections that are
involved in public diplomacy. I dont think this helps practitioners, policy-makers, or
commentators. Instead, it perpetuates jargon, and elides more persistent questions
about both the purpose and the operative theories that underscore efforts to reach
foreign publics.
Specification is key their decision-making model makes any

true engagement policy education impossible
Wallin 6/11/2013 (Matthew, Masters in Public Diplomacy at the University of
Southern California in 2010, Fellow and Office Manager at the American Security
Project, Engagement: What does it Mean for Public Diplomacy?,
http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2013/engagement-what-does-it-mean-forpublic-diplomacy/
If anything, using the term engagement can sometimes provide the user with a
perceived ability to forgo one of the most difficult parts of public diplomacythat is
demonstrating metrics which indicate whether or not ones efforts are succeeding at
influencing the target audience. In other words, the user of engagement may feel
as though they neednt actually explain the effects of their activities because they
are engaging by nature of the word. This is why analyzing the content of
engagement is vital. Is a forum post engaging? Is a billboard engaging? Is a TV
advertisement engaging? This can be difficult to determine, and cannot be
assumed. What practitioners and policymakers should understand is that core of

public diplomacy is not really about undefined engagementit is about building
relationships. By focusing on relationship-building, and eliminating engagement
from the PD lexicon, practitioners and policymakers may begin to better employ the
thinking that is required for better public diplomacy. Rather than speaking about PD
in abstract terms, emphasizing relationship-building forces those participating in the
PD debate to consider the types of activities that are necessary to gain influence.
Rather than counting one-off twitter postings as engagement, practitioners should
focus on substantive, comprehensive and continuing dialogue. One of the biggest
problems in public diplomacy is that few understand what it is, and the terminology
itself doesnt help. Soft power, public diplomacy, and engagement all need to be
explained in order to be understood. These terms have no immediate recognition
like war, peace, freedom or competition. For this reason, perhaps building
relationships should be used more often by those exploring or explaining the
subject.
Hold their feet to the fire vague approaches to engagement

strategies destroy the discipline and avoid the most difficult
and essential questions behind the topic
Lord and Lynch are right to note that the practice of public diplomacy may be
disconnected from strategic imperatives. It is a call to think about public diplomacy
as not an end in itself but a means to policy objective. But as is evident, the
definition seems not all that different. Strategy is implicated in practice, whether
implicit or explicit. It seems that in the case of engagement, the meaning is
almost always deferred, implied, or left open to suit the argument of the moment. I
dont think this helps build a broader constituency for the practice of public
diplomacy. This little diversion into deconstruction is important, because I think the
term the term engagement conceals as much as it reveals. It implies distinctions
between efforts of persuasion and relation-building, yet retains the connotation of
influence. Engagement also amounts to a bit of rhetorical rehabilitation for the
ethics of public diplomacy. To engage is better than to advertise, message, or brand.
Engagement is a kind of image repair for public diplomacy itself. Yet the
ambiguity of engagement also provides cover for policy-makers seeking some relief
from the mandate of measurement and evaluation. One of Wallins arguments is
worth quoting at length: If anything, using the term engagement can sometimes
provide the user with a perceived ability to forgo one of the most difficult parts of
public diplomacythat is demonstrating metrics which indicate whether or not
ones efforts are succeeding at influencing the target audience. In other words, the
user of engagement may feel as though they neednt actually explain the effects
of their activities because they are engaging by nature of the word. If
engagement is something that unfolds over time, and involves a number of
intervening moments that cumulate into something like influence it doesnt fit
neatly into existing measurement models that test specific theories of persuasion,
attitude change, or whatever the user wants out of engagement. But just because
measurement is hard doesnt mean we shouldnt think clearly about how acts serve
the strategic ends of public diplomacy.
Other words
Resolved the USFG should
Resolved = Express by Formal Vote

Resolved means to express by formal votethis is the only
definition thats in the context of the resolution
Websters Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1998 (dictionary.com)
Resolved:
5. To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote; to declare or
decide by a formal vote; -- followed by a clause; as, the house resolved (or, it was
resolved by the house) that no money should be apropriated (or, to appropriate no
money).
The Denotes Specificity

The denotes a specific, unique object.
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2000

(dictionary.com)
the
Used before singular or plural nouns and noun phrases that denote particular,
specified persons or things: the baby; the dress I wore.
Used before a noun, and generally stressed, to emphasize one of a group or type as
the most outstanding or prominent: considered Lake Shore Drive to be the
neighborhood to live in these days.
Used to indicate uniqueness: the Prince of Wales; the moon.
Used before nouns that designate natural phenomena or points of the compass: the
weather; a wind from the south.
Used as the equivalent of a possessive adjective before names of some parts of the
body: grab him by the neck; an infection of the hand.
Used before a noun specifying a field of endeavor: the law; the film industry; the
stage.
Used before a proper name, as of a monument or ship: the Alamo; the Titanic.
Used before the plural form of a numeral denoting a specific decade of a century or
of a life span: rural life in the Thirties.
The means unique, as in there is one USFG

Merriam-Webster's Online Collegiate Dictionary, 08, http://www.mw.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
b -- used as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is a

unique or a particular member of its class <the President> <the Lord>
USFG is the National Government

Federal government is the national government that expresses
power
Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, June 1, 2004, pg.716.
Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree

of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of
power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters
Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government
Also termed national government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United
States - - 2-3]
Federal government is central government

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY WORDNET, 1997, p. http://www.dictionary.com/search?
q=federal%20government.
Federal government. n: a government with strong central powers.
Federal government is in Washington, D.C.

WEST'S LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY, 1985, p. 744.
United States: Usually means the federal government centered in Washington, D.C.
Federal means relating to the national government of the

United States
Blacks Law Dictionary, 1999
federal, adj. Of or relating to a system of associated governments with a vertical

division of governments into national and regional components having different
responsibilities; esp., of or relating to the national government of the United States.
Should is a Duty or Obligation

Should is a duty or obligation
Webster's II, 1984, p. 1078
Should is used to express duty or obligation
Should is equal to obligation

WORDS AND PHRASES 1953, Vol. 39, p. 313.
The word should, denotes an obligation in various degrees, usually milder than ought. Baldassarre v.
West Oregon Lumber Co., 239 p.2d 839, 842, 198 Or. 556.
Should indicates obligation or duty

Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 8 (should, 2008,
http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/should?view=uk)
should
modal verb (3rd sing. should) 1 used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness. 2
used to indicate what is probable. 3 formal expressing the conditional mood. 4 used
in a clause with that after a main clause describing feelings. 5 used in a clause
with that expressing purpose. 6 (in the first person) expressing a polite request or
acceptance. 7 (in the first person) expressing a conjecture or hope.
USAGE Strictly speaking should is used with I and we, as in I should be grateful if
you would let me know, while would is used with you, he, she, it, and they, as in you
didnt say you would be late; in practice would is normally used instead of should in
reported speech and conditional clauses, such as I said I would be late. In speech
the distinction tends to be obscured, through the use of the contracted forms Id,
wed, etc.
Should Expresses Desirability

Should expresses desirability
Cambridge Dictionary of American English, 07
(http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=should*1+0&dict=A)
should (DUTY)
auxiliary verb
used to express that it is necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform
the action of the following verb
Should Excludes Certainty

Should isnt mandatory
Taylor and Howard, 05 - Resources for the Future, Partnership to Cut Hunger and
Poverty in Africa (Michael and Julie, Investing in Africa's future: U.S. Agricultural
development assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa, 9/12,
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf)
Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more
targeted: plant biotechnology research and development ($25 million), the
American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), womens leadership
capacity ($15 million), the International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3
million), and clean water treatment ($2 million). Interestingly, in the wording of the
bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with only two of these eight
earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount available.
The difference between shall and should may have legal significanceone is clearly
mandatory while the other is a strong admonitionbut it makes little practical
difference in USAIDs need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of
its ability.
Should is permissiveits a persuasive recommendation

Words and Phrases, 2002 (Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition Vol. 39 Set
to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 370)
Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1976. Term should, as used in statutory provision that motion to
suppress search warrant should first be heard by magistrate who issued warrant, is
used in regular, persuasive sense, as recommendation, and is thus not mandatory
but permissive. Wests Ann.Pen Code, 1538.5(b).---Cuevas v. Superior Court, 130
Cal. Rptr. 238, 58 Cal.App.3d 406 ----Searches 191.
Should means desirable or recommended, not mandatory

Words and Phrases, 2002 (Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition Vol. 39 Set
to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 372-373)
Or. 1952. Where safety regulation for sawmill industry providing that a two by two
inch guard rail should be installed at extreme outer edge of walkways adjacent to
sorting tables was immediately preceded by other regulations in which word shall
instead of should was used, and word should did not appear to be result of
inadvertent use in particular regulation, use of word should was intended to
convey idea that particular precaution involved was desirable and recommended,
but not mandatory. ORS 654.005 et seq.----Baldassarre v. West Oregon Lumber Co.,
239 P.2d 839, 193 Or. 556.---Labor & Emp. 2857
Substantial
Substantial = Contextual
Substantially should be defined by context
Devinsky, 2 (Paul, IP UPDATE, VOLUME 5, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2002, Is Claim "Substantially" Definite?
Ask
Person of Skill in the Art, http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/c2c73bdb-9b1a42bf-a2b7-075812dc0e2d.cfm)
In reversing a summary judgment of invalidity,
that the district court,
the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
found
by failing to look beyond the intrinsic claim construction evidence to consider what a
person of skill in the art would understand in a "technologic context,"
erroneously concluded the term
"substantially" made a claim fatally indefinite .
Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., Case No. 01-1417

(Fed. Cir. November 14, 2002). The patent in suit related to an improved push rod for an internal combustion
engine. The patent claims a hollow push rod whose overall diameter is larger at the middle than at the ends and
has "substantially constant wall thickness" throughout the rod and rounded seats at the tips. The district court
found that the expression "substantially constant wall thickness" was not supported in the specification and
prosecution history by a sufficiently clear definition of "substantially" and was, therefore, indefinite. The district
court recognized that the use of the term "substantially" may be definite in some cases but ruled that in this case it
was indefinite because it was not further defined. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court
erred in requiring that the meaning of the term "substantially" in a particular "technologic context" be found solely
in intrinsic evidence: "While reference to intrinsic evidence is primary in interpreting claims, the criterion is the
the Federal
Circuit instructed that "resolution of any ambiguity arising from the claims and specification
may be aided by extrinsic evidence of usage and meaning of a term in the context of the invention."
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instruction that "[t]he question is not
whether the word 'substantially' has a fixed meaning as applied to 'constant wall thickness,'
but how the phrase would be understood by persons experienced in this field of
meaning of words as they would be understood by persons in the field of the invention." Thus,
mechanics, upon reading the patent documents."
Alternative interpretations are even more ambiguous and destroy limits

Stark 97 patent attorney from Tennessee (Stephen, NOTE: KEY WORDS AND
TRICKY PHRASES: AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT DRAFTER'S ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT
THE LANGUAGE OF 35 U.S.C., Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Fall, 1997 5 J.
Intell. Prop. L. 365, lexis)
In patent law, ambiguity of claim language necessarily results in uncertainty in the
scope of protection. This uncertainty impairs all of society--the patentee, the
competitor, and the public. The process of determining a particular meaning to
define a term in a patent claim may result in ambiguity.
1. Ordinary Meaning. First, words in a patent are to be given their ordinary meaning
unless otherwise defined. n30 However, what if a particular word has multiple
meanings? For example, consider the word "substantial." The Webster dictionary
gives eleven different definitions of the word substantial. n31 Additionally, there are
another two definitions specifically provided for the adverb "substantially." n32 Thus,
the "ordinary meaning" is not clear.
The first definition of the word "substantial" given by the Webster's Dictionary is "of
ample or considerable amount, quantity, size, etc." n33 Supposing that this is the
precise definition that the drafter had in mind when drafting the patent, the
meaning of "ample or considerable amount" appears amorphous. This could have
one of at least the following interpretations: (1) almost all, (2) more than half, or (3)
barely enough to do the job. Therefore, the use of a term, such as "substantial,"
which usually has a very ambiguous meaning, makes the scope of
protection particularly hard to determine.
Substantially means in the main

Substantially means in the main, including the essential part
Words and Phrases, 2 (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, Substantially,
Volume 40B, p. 324-330 October 2002, Thomson West)
Okla. 1911. Substantially means in substance: in the main; essentially; by
including the material or essential part.
Substantially means essential and material

Words and Phrases, 2
Ind. 1962. Substantially
(40B W&P 328)
means meeting requirements in essential and material parts .
Substantial has to be materially

Words and Phrases, 2 (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, Substantial,
Volume 40A, p. 448-486 October 2002, Thomson West)
Ala. 1909. Substantial means belonging to substance; actually existing; real; * * *

not seeming or imaginatary; not illusive; real; solid; true; veritable. Elder v. State,
50 So. 370, 162 Ala. 41.
Substantial means real

Substantially means real, not imaginary
Wollman 93 (Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals 8th Circuit, Kansas City Power &
Light Company, a Missouri corporation, Appellee, v. Ford Motor Credit Company, a
Delaware corporation; McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation, a Delaware
corporation; HEI Investment Corp., a Hawaii corporation, Appellants, 995 F.2d 1422;
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 13755, L/N)
Instruction No. 10 was not given in isolation, however. The district court's
instructions also contained a definition of "substantial." Instruction No. 11 defined
"substantial" as meaning "true, real or likely to materialize" and as not meaning
"imaginary or unlikely to materialize." This instruction properly limited the potential
bases for the jury's decision, which is the essential function of jury instructions.
When combined with the contract and the verdict-directing instructions, [*1432]
which tracked the operative language of the contract, Instruction No. 11 required
the jury to find that KCPL had determined a real risk, not some imaginary
hypothetical risk premised solely on a reduction in the DRD. Because the contract
provided only one means of creating a risk of making an indemnity payment--a
demand notice from an Investor--the jury's discretion was properly channelled into
deciding whether KCPL had sufficiently studied and honestly considered the
likelihood of receiving such a demand notice. That determination is all that the
contract required.
Substantially means real at present time

Words and Phrases 1964 (40 W&P 759) (this edition of W&P is out of print; the
page number no longer matches up to the current edition and I was unable to find
the card in the new edition. However, this card is also available on google books,
Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 8, p. 7329)
The words outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive, in connection with a change of
possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free
from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely
can be, but is opposed to potential , apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain;
absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually
existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v.
Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.
Substantially is without material qualification

Substantially is without material qualification
Blacks Law Dictionary 1991 [p. 1024]
Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.
Increase
Increase means net increase

Increase means net increase
Words and Phrases, 5 (Cummulative Supplementary Pamphlet, v. 20a, p.295)
Cal.App.2 Dist. 1991. Term increase, as used in statute giving the Energy
Commission modification jurisdiction over any alteration, replacement, or
improvement of equipment that results in increase of 50 megawatts or more in
electric generating capacity of existing thermal power plant, refers to net increase
in power plants total generating capacity; in deciding whether there has been the
requisite 50-megawatt increase as a result of new units being incorporated into a
plant, Energy Commission cannot ignore decreases in capacity caused by
retirement or deactivation of other units at plant. Wests Ann.Cal.Pub.Res.Code
25123.
increase requires evidence of the preexisting condition

Ripple, 87 (Circuit Judge, Emmlee K. Cameron, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frances
Slocum Bank & Trust Company, State Automobile Insurance Association, and
Glassley Agency of Whitley, Indiana, Defendants-Appellees, 824 F.2d 570; 1987 U.S.
App. LEXIS 9816, 9/24, lexis)
Also related to the waiver issue is appellees' defense relying on a provision of the
insurance policy that suspends coverage where the risk is increased by any means
within the knowledge or control of the insured. However, the term "increase"
connotes change. To show change, appellees would have been required to present
evidence of the condition of the building at the time the policy was issued. See 5 J.
Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 2941 at 4-5 (1970).
Because no such evidence was presented, this court cannot determine, on this
record, whether the risk has, in fact, been increased. Indeed, the answer to this
question may depend on Mr. Glassley's knowledge of the condition of the building at
the time the policy was issued, see 17 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law
and Practice, 9602 at 515-16 (1981), since the fundamental issue is whether the
appellees contemplated insuring the risk which incurred the loss.
Increase is quantitative
Increase means to become bigger or larger in number, quantity, or degree.
Encarta World English Dictionary, 7 (Increase, 2007,
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?
refid=1861620741)
Increase
transitive and intransitive verb (past and past participle increased, present
participle increasing, 3rd person present singular increases)
Definition:
make or become larger or greater: to become, or make something become, larger in
number, quantity, or degree
Increase Means to Make Greater

Increase means to become larger or greater in quantity
Encarta Online Dictionary. 2006. ("Increase."
<http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?
refid=1861620741>.)
increase [ in krss ]
transitive and intransitive verb (past and past participle increased, present
participle increasing, 3rd person present singular increases)Definition: make or
become larger or greater: to become, or make something become, larger
in number, quantity, or degree
noun (plural increases)
Increase does not mean to decrease

Websters Dictionary. 1913 ("Increase." <http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgibin/WEBSTER.sh?WORD=increase>.)
In*crease" (?), v. i.
To become greater or more in size, quantity, number, degree, value, intensity,
power, authority, reputation, wealth; to grow; to augment; to advance; -- opposed to
decrease.
Increase is the opposite of decrease.

Cambridge Dictionary, 8 (increase, 2008,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=increase*1+0&dict=A)
increase
[Show phonetics]
verb [I/T]
to become or make (something) larger or greater
The opposite of increase is decrease.
Its
Its = Possesive
A. Its is a possessive pronoun showing ownership
Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005
(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)
Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to
substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.
EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows
that it belongs to me.)
Its means possession
Encarta, 9 (Encarta World English Dictionary,
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?
refid=1861622735)
its [ its ]
adjective Definition: indicating possession: used to indicate that something
belongs or relates to something
The park changed its policy.
Its must exclusively refer to the preceding subject to make any sense
Manderino, 73 (Justice for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Sigal, Appellant, v.
Manufacturers Light and Heat Co., No. 26, Jan. T., 1972, Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, 450 Pa. 228; 299 A.2d 646; 1973 Pa. LEXIS 600; 44 Oil & Gas Rep.
214, lexis)
On its face, the written instrument granting easement rights in this case is ambiguous. The same sentence which refers to the right
to lay a 14 inch pipeline (singular) has a later reference to "said lines" (plural). The use of the plural "lines" makes no sense because
ambiguous because other

key words which are "also may change the size of its pipes" are dangling in that the possessive pronoun "its " before
the word "pipes" does not have any subject preceding, to which the possessive pronoun
refers. The dangling phrase is the beginning of a sentence, the first word of which does not begin with a capital letter as is
the only previous reference has been to a "line" (singular).
The writing is
additionally
customary in normal English [***10] usage. Immediately preceding the "sentence" which does not begin with a capital letter, there
appears a dangling [*236] semicolon which makes no sense at the beginning of a sentence and can hardly relate to the preceding
The above deviations from accepted

grammatical usage make difficult, if not impossible, a clear understanding of the
words used or the intention of the parties. This is particularly true concerning the meaning of a disputed
sentence which is already properly punctuated by a closing period.
phrase in the instrument which states that the grantee is to pay damages from ". . . the relaying, maintaining and operating said
pipeline. . . ." The instrument is ambiguous as to what the words ". . . relaying . . . said pipeline . . ." were intended to mean.
Its means belonging to something previously mentioned i.e the USFG

Cambridge Dictonary ( Its, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/its)
Definition
belonging to or relating to something that has already been mentioned
The dog hurt its
paw.
Their house has its own swimming pool.
The company increased its profits.
I prefer the second option - its advantages are simplicity and cheapness.
Its means belonging to

Oxford English Dictionary, 89 (2nd edition, online)
its, poss. pron.

A. As adj. poss. pron. Of or belonging to it, or that thing (L. ejus); also refl., Of or
belonging to itself, its own (L. suus)
Its requires a possessor/agent

Websters, No Date (Its, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/its)
of or relating to it or itself especially as possessor, agent, or object of an action

<going to its kennel> <a child proud of its first drawings> <its final enactment into law>
Its means associated with

Its means associated with
Oxford Dictionaries Online, No Date (Its,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/its?view=uk)
its
Entry from World dictionar
Pronunciation:/ts/
possessive determiner
belonging to or associated with a thing previously mentioned or easily identified: turn the
camera on its side
he chose the area for its atmosphere
Its can mean relating to

Macmillan Dictionary, No Date (Its
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/american/its)
Its is the possessive form of it.

belonging or relating to a thing, idea, place, animal, etc. when it has already been
mentioned or when it is obvious which one you are referring to
1
Diplomatic engagement
Includes quiet diplomacy

Diplomatic engagement includes quiet diplomacy
ZKAN, 10 - Sevilla University, Spain (MEHMET ZKAN* and BROL AKGN**
Turkeys Darfur Policy: Convergences and Differentiations from the Muslim World
Insight Turkey Vol. 12 / No. 4 / 2010 pp. 147-165
The term quiet diplomacy describes two things: first, the overall framework is
diplomacy, rather than sanctions and military actions; while second, the adjective
quiet refers to the style of the diplomatic engagement defined as a combination of
measures that include behind the scene engagements, secret negotiations, and
subtle coaxing.36 Basically it is defined as discussing problems with officials of
another country in a calm way.37 In the literature, as Graham argues, the term
quiet diplomacy is used extensively to refer to many types of soft diplomatic
initiatives but in a loose way without having any agreed definition.38 However, for
the purposes of this article, drawing on the existing literature39 we define quiet
diplomacy using three characteristics.
The first and most important characteristic of any initiative that would be called
quiet diplomacy is that there must be some sort of personal and direct diplomacy
between the heads of states or governments. This is the most logical first step
because only with such type of interaction could the initiator talk, reason and
discuss the issue and be able to persuade his counterpart or involved parties in a
conflict. This is also important as it shows the seriousness of the initiator and gives
assurance to the other side that the initiator indeed cares about the issue in
question and is interested in helping solve it. Despite criticism, the visit of Sudanese
President Omar Al Basher twice in 2008 and several other meetings at international
forums such as the Arab League summit in Khartoum was aimed to serve for this
purpose: talking directly to the head of state and criticizing him in a most sincere
and open way.40 These meetings were also aimed at creating a balanced approach
between the EU and the USs position and those of the Arab and African
countries.41
Includes space diplomacy

Diplomatic engagement includes space diplomacy
Stewart, 15 - Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and
Compliance at the State Department (Mallory, Formulation, Coordination, and
Implementation of Promoting Space Security and Sustainability 12/9,
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/250567.htm
Protecting the national security of the United States and its allies by preventing
conflict from extending into space and avoiding or deterring purposeful interference
with our space systems is a major goal of our diplomatic engagements. This goal is
described in the 2010 U.S. National Space Policy which makes clear that it is not in
anyones interest for armed conflict to extend into space. The 2010 Policy also
states that purposeful interference with space systems, including supporting
infrastructure, will be considered an infringement of a nations rights.
There are two main diplomatic approaches to achieving this goal: (1) we are
strengthening space cooperation and information sharing with allies and partners to
enhance collective space situational awareness and maximize the interoperability
and redundancy of our space assets, and (2) we are encouraging the development
of best practices and norms of responsible behavior in the space faring
community to enhance resiliency through the prevention of mishaps,
misperceptions, and the chances of miscalculation.
The first category of our diplomatic engagement strives to gain international
support for common ends, including sharing space derived information to support
ongoing operations. It also prepares the way for closer military-to-military
cooperation to address mutual threats and to develop capabilities with shared
compatibility standards (and thus greater redundancy in the event of a failure). One
mechanism we use to discuss cooperative approaches with our allies and space
partners is through space security dialogues. The State Department currently has
15 bilateral and multilateral dialogues around the world. These dialogues address
each sides understanding of the threat, and include discussions of our respective
diplomatic and national security goals. Such discussions are critical in developing
common positions on issues such as the benefits and challenges of transfers of
dual-use technologies or on the development of common positions related to rules
of behavior in outer space.
Such discussions are also a useful format for discussing further ways of
strengthening technical cooperation that could assist with the goal of increasing
resiliency. That is why the Department of State works closely with the Department
of Defense to strengthen international cooperation in satellite communications and
space-based maritime domain awareness. Tomorrow, I will be co-chairing an EU
space security dialogue with our EU counterparts to address space security
cooperation. These kinds of engagements, coupled with our ongoing discussions
with the European Union on opportunities for U.S. Government users to access the
full range of the EUs positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services, are a great
example of the types of cooperation we seek with our allies and partners.
A final example of this type of diplomatic engagement, for which the State
Department and the Department of Defense work in tandem, is the expansion of
Space Situational Awareness, or SSA, through SSA information sharing agreements
and arrangements with foreign partners. International cooperation on SSA is crucial,
as international partnerships multiply capabilities, expertise, and geographical
advantages. Furthermore, international cooperation enables us to improve our
space object databases and pursue common international data standards and data
integrity measures. To date, the United States has signed 11 bilateral SSA
agreements and arrangements with national governments and international
intergovernmental organizations, and 51 with commercial entities. And we will
continue to pursue opportunities for cooperation on SSA with other nations and
nongovernmental space operators around the world. The more we can establish a
collective picture of what is happening in space, the more secure we can be in the
safety of our own assets.
The second category of the State Departments diplomatic engagement includes
the promotion of the responsible use of outer space. Specifically, we aim to further
enhance space resiliency through the multilateral development and implementation
of voluntary guidelines for space activities. These guidelines can include, for
example, establishing appropriate communication and consultation mechanisms
and national regulatory frameworks, providing contact information for information
exchanges among space owners and operators, and implementing practical
measures to eliminate harmful radiofrequency interference.
We use diplomatic engagement in this way to reduce the chances for conflict
extending into space through the promotion of international norms of behavior, both
bilaterally and multilaterally. Such norms matter because they help define
boundaries and distinguish good behavior from bad behavior.
With
With means interaction

With means interaction
Dictionary.com, 16 (with http://www.dictionary.com/browse/with
with
preposition
1.accompanied by; accompanying:
I will go with you. He fought with his brother against the enemy.
2. in some particular relation to (especially implying interaction, company,
association, conjunction, or connection):
I dealt with the problem. She agreed with me.
With means doing something together

Cambridge Dictionaries, 16 (with,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/with?a=british
with preposition (TOGETHER)

used of people or things that are together or doing something together:
Shes in the kitchen with Dad.
Hes an impossible person to work with.
I think Ill have some ice cream with my pie.
Ill be with you (= I will give you my attention) in a moment.
Shes been with the magazine (= working for it) for two years.
With means an exchange relationship

MacMillan Dictionary, 16 (with,
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/american/with
with
used for saying that people share or exchange things
She shares her food with all the family.

Most countries had already stopped trading with South Africa.
Standards
Precision good
Precision is vital for education and quality debates their
interpretation makes the word engagement meaningless
complete)
Vietnam.
(n3)
2. A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state

3. A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to
4. A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of
5. A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to
Narrow definitions good

Our interpretation is key to neg ground core question on the
topic is whether or not engagement is the optimal foreign
policy strategy none of the alternative foreign policy
strategies are competitive counterplans if the aff is allowed to
blur the topic into being any action towards China. This
precision is the vital internal link to every topicality standard
complete)
Vietnam.
(n3)
2.
3.
4.
5.

A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state
A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to
A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of
A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to
Reject broad definitions of engagement theyre so vague that

it hinders effective policy analysis and makes any positive
action topical
complete)
DEFINING ENGAGEMENT TOO BROADLY

A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is
the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst.
For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "noncoercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction
could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston
and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous.
According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive
methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's
behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert
Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited
volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard
Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that
depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its
objectives."(n16)
As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in
the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose--including covert action,
deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only
reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm
of positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with positive
sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be
analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.
Competing Interpretations Good

You MUST be able to establish a theoretical baseline for
topicality evaluating anything else knowing it when you see
it is an awful standard
The term engagement matters because it implies a specific practice, to facilitate a
certain objective or outcome, and yet it doesnt actually identify a practice. And as
Wallin notes, its hard to discern engagement in relation to public diplomacy if we
dont have some standards or definition. Public diplomacy watchers and scholars
may know it when they see it, but Im not sure how this helps provide constructive
critique.
Ambiguity over engagement is bad just because finding a

line is difficult doesnt mean we should stop trying to find and
enforce one
Lord and Lynch are right to note that the practice of public diplomacy may be
disconnected from strategic imperatives. It is a call to think about public diplomacy
as not an end in itself but a means to policy objective. But as is evident, the
definition seems not all that different. Strategy is implicated in practice, whether
implicit or explicit. It seems that in the case of engagement, the meaning is
almost always deferred, implied, or left open to suit the argument of the moment. I
dont think this helps build a broader constituency for the practice of public
diplomacy. This little diversion into deconstruction is important, because I think the
term the term engagement conceals as much as it reveals. It implies distinctions
between efforts of persuasion and relation-building, yet retains the connotation of
influence. Engagement also amounts to a bit of rhetorical rehabilitation for the
ethics of public diplomacy. To engage is better than to advertise, message, or brand.
Engagement is a kind of image repair for public diplomacy itself. Yet the
ambiguity of engagement also provides cover for policy-makers seeking some relief
from the mandate of measurement and evaluation. One of Wallins arguments is
worth quoting at length: If anything, using the term engagement can sometimes
provide the user with a perceived ability to forgo one of the most difficult parts of
public diplomacythat is demonstrating metrics which indicate whether or not
ones efforts are succeeding at influencing the target audience. In other words, the
user of engagement may feel as though they neednt actually explain the effects
of their activities because they are engaging by nature of the word. If
engagement is something that unfolds over time, and involves a number of
intervening moments that cumulate into something like influence it doesnt fit
neatly into existing measurement models that test specific theories of persuasion,
attitude change, or whatever the user wants out of engagement. But just because
measurement is hard doesnt mean we shouldnt think clearly about how acts serve
the strategic ends of public diplomacy.
Contextual evidence bad

Contextual uses of engagement are virtually infinite and ruin
precision
Traub 10 James Traub, Fellow of the Center for International Cooperation and
Contributing Writer for the New York Times Magazine, Terms of Engagement,
Foreign Policy, 2-19,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/19/terms_of_engagement?
print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full
Virtually all conversations with Obama administration foreign-policy officials, no matter

where they begin, come to rest at "engagement" -- that vexing, mutable, all-purpose
word. The U.S. president has "engaged" with rogue states, civil society, the United Nations,
and citizens around the globe. Iran vindicates the policy of engagement -- or discredits it. China is a failure
of engagement, Russia a success. Inside the Obama realm, engagement has come to mean "good diplomacy."
To critics on both the left and right, however, it has come to mean "bad diplomacy" -- cynical or naive, depending on
which side you come from.
These days -- these shaky days -- the critics seem to be gaining the upper hand, making those Obama officials increasingly defensive about their policy toward autocratic states, whether
in the Middle East or Eurasia, Iran or Sudan. Having spent years thinking hard thoughts in universities and think tanks, magazines and books, they cannot believe that they are losing the
definitional war over their own policy. They are eager, and maybe a little desperate, to set things aright. And so it was, earlier this week, that when I asked to talk to one official about
democracy promotion, I wound up having a 75-minute phone conversation with four White House figures, much of it about "engagement."
"A lot of the baggage we carry," said an officeholder I might as well designate as Senior Official #1 -- the conversation was on background and the White House that offered up these
folks to defend the policy was insistent they not do so on the record -- "is the word 'engagement.' People hear the word and they think 'constructive engagement.'" I'm not sure this is
true outside certain New England common rooms, but it's definitely not an association the Obama White House would like to encourage. After all, Ronald Reagan's administration used
that expression to justify the United States's ongoing relationship with South Africa's apartheid government, a policy widely derided as a cynical pretext to preserve ties with a Cold War
ally. And it failed.
If "constructive engagement" is one definition the Obamans are eager to avoid, another is straightforward, old-fashioned Kissingerian "realism" -- if by realism one means dealing with
the interests of states, including brutal states, to the exclusion of those of ordinary citizens. As another interlocutor -- call him Senior Official #2 -- growing rather hot under the
telephonic collar, put it, "A lot of my friends said, 'You guys are a bunch of engagement realists. They'll never talk about democracy and human rights.'" Barack Obama himself arguably
encouraged this view during his 2008 presidential campaign by criticizing George W. Bush's moralistic bluster, by regularly expressing his high regard for archrealists like James Baker
and Brent Scowcroft, and by stipulating his willingness to meet "without preconditions" with even the worst tyrants. And since becoming president he has muted criticism of the regimes
in Sudan and Burma, and referred respectfully to "the Islamic Republic of Iran."
The allegation of realpolitik is still intolerable -- even baffling -- to these officials, who pledged themselves to Obama out of a deep faith in his redemptive promise. But if engagement
rests upon the expectation that treating autocrats and theocrats with respect will significantly alter their behavior, then it suffers less from cynicism than from credulity -- which is the
other article of baggage under which engagement now staggers. How can anyone believe that? Administration officials have been at pains to deny that they ever did, especially since
Iran has trampled Obama's entreaties underfoot. The goal of engaging Iran, they now say, was not to change Iran's behavior but to change the behavior of more tractable states, like
Russia and China, by showing that the United States was willing to go the last mile even with the Axis of Evil.
Of course, there is abundant evidence that Obama and some of his chief advisors really did hope that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would moderate nuclear policy if they
showed due regard for his country's national interests, as Helene Cooper recently noted in the New York Times. But it's also true that from the outset, officials have made the secondary
argument for the virtues of engagement. The SOs insisted to me, as other SOs have in the past, that Obama's Iran policy in fact constitutes a triumph of engagement because Russia has
increasingly come around to the American view on the imperative for sanctions. They argue that the Russian change of heart owes not only to the country's growing alarm over Iranian
ambitions, but also to the White House's persistent effort to put relations with Russia on a less adversarial footing than they were at the end of the Bush years. We have engaged with
Russia and reaped the benefits. Of course, Russia hasn't yet signed on to a tough sanctions measure against Iran; and China, which so far has pocketed Obama's shows of deference
without much display of gratitude, may scotch the whole affair.
Let us stipulate, then, that engagement is not quite so naive as it appears. But is it not, still, a realist bargain, trading away those universal values that the president so often evokes in
the hopes of geostrategic wins, whether on Iran or climate change or the global economy?
"We're trying to say 'no,'" says SO #2. "We're not going to accept that tradeoff. We're going to do this in parallel."
Trying, of course, isn't doing. But in Russia, this official argues, Obama successfully lowered the temperature with President Dmitry Medvedev while still meeting with dissidents and civil
society groups, and he criticized the country's undemocratic elections last fall. And it was "parallel," not a "tradeoff": Obama didn't offer to go easy on human rights, or for that matter
missile defense, to get an arms deal, nor did he insist that progress on arms control would depend on democratization.
There is a term for such a nuanced policy: "double-track engagement," an expression used by George Shultz, secretary of state during Reagan's second term, who pursued national
interests while at the same time helping to pry open such autocratic Cold War allies as Chile and the Philippines. And since Obama, unlike Reagan, puts real store by the United Nations
and other multilateral institutions, he is in fact practicing a yet more nuanced "triple-track engagement" -- with states, with peoples, and with international bodies. The United States has
rejoined the Human Rights Council, paid up its U.N. dues, and promoted the G-20 over the G-8.
It became clear enough, after 75 minutes, that engagement is not one thing, or two things.
It's three or four things. It's "multifaceted and complex." It's complicated because the world is
complicated. Maybe that's why the Obama administration clings to its favorite word -- because complicated is hard
to explain. Simple policies, like Bush's Freedom Agenda, afford immediate gratification -- and then deep
disappointment down the road. Nuanced, many-things-at-once policies require patience and a tolerance for
ambiguous victories. We now have abundant evidence that this is not a patient or tolerant moment. You have to
wonder how long complicated can survive in the absence of big wins.
All of which leaves our senior officials increasingly defensive. "Does it take time to get a bureaucracy oriented
around the idea of multitrack diplomacy?" asked SO #1. "All the habits of interaction are binary. So it does."
Sometimes, as in China or Egypt, engagement with the state seems to preclude engagement with the aspirations of
Of course, we might feel less

confused if the Obamans used some term other than "engagement" to cover virtually
citizens and you get, well, realism. Other times, folks like us just don't get it.
everything they do.
Prefer intent to define and precision otherwise the topic

becomes unmanageable getting likes for a Chinese company
could be a topical aff
Wallin 6/11/2013 (Matthew, Masters in Public Diplomacy at the University of
Southern California in 2010, Fellow and Office Manager at the American Security
Project, Engagement: What does it Mean for Public Diplomacy?,
http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2013/engagement-what-does-it-mean-forpublic-diplomacy/
But missing from the discourse about engagement and its attractiveness as a term
is a substantial discussion of exactly what it means. Since engagement is used so
commonly without explanations of what it actually entails, it appears to have
become little more than a buzzword developed to encompass various activities that
are otherwise difficult to succinctly describe. Lets look at a few examples of how
the term engagement has been used. When presenting statistics about social
media activities undertaken by the State Departments Center for Strategic
Counterterrorism Communications, Ambassador Alberto Fernandez described the
number of engagements the CSCCs digital outreach team had made that year as
in the thousands. Explaining what an engagement is, Fernandez stated that
engagements consist of written text posted to online forums, Facebook, or the
comments sections of media Web sites. So does each post the CSCC makes in a
forum count as an engagement? Does each post on Facebook count as an
engagement? If so, this appears to set a low bar for what is considered
engagement. In another case, the military uses the term to describe personal
relationships and building partner capacity. However, engagement doesnt always
imply benign activities eitheras when the military uses the word engage, it is
often in the context of destroying a target.
AT: China-specific engagement definitions

Theres no China-specific meaning of engagement
Suettinger, 2k senior analyst at Brookings; United States President Bill Clinton's
national intelligence officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council (NIC)
from 1997-1998 (Robert, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign
Policy, ed: Haass and OSullivan, p. 17-18)
The term engagement can be used and understood in a number of ways, depending
upon the context of the relationship being described. With respect to China, the
Clinton administration has used the term in three ways. This conceptual
confusion has resulted from the fact that the word itself has been overused and
poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speech writers. This ambiguity
has contributed to domestic and international bewilderment about both the
meaning of the term and the various policies and attitudes that engagement has
been intended to portray.
First, in its broadest and most general sense, the Clinton administration used the
term engagement to signify a policy that implied involvement and interaction as
opposed to isolationism. Such a formulation was largely intended for the domestic
American audience. This usage entailed a willingness to continue to be involved
actively in international affairs, and especially to provide international leadership,
rather than retreating from international responsibilities and paying more attention
to American domestic issues. In a post-cold war world, with a president known to be
more interested in domestic issues, the Clinton administration felt obligated to
defend its actions in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and the Middle East as constituting
positive engagement, consistent with American interests. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher gave voice to this philosophy in September 1993, in a speech at
Columbia University. "The United States chooses engagement .We must reject
isolationism for the dangerous argument that it is .We must remain engaged not
out of altruism ... but because there are real American interests that will suffer if we
are seduced by the isolationist myth."14
The second way in which engagement was used by the Clinton administration in
reference to China was to connote a strategic agenda involving the carefully
considered extension of incentives and penalties to influence Beijing's behavior.
This strategy was conceived as an alternative to a punishment-or-sanctions-only
means of dealing with recalcitrant or hostile states. Its rhetorical opposite appears
to be containment, the policy applied to the Soviet Union and China from the 1940s
to the early 1970s. In this sense, engagement implies a willingness to use positive
incentives as a means of rewarding good behavior and, to a certain degree, linking
these incentives to other areas of behavior. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake,
in a speech delivered the day after the Christopher speech cited above, appeared to
be reflecting both this somewhat more strategic understanding of the term
engagement and the ambivalence about China that had characterized the
administration from its outset. Lake called for the United States to pursue a
"strategy of enlargementenlargement of the world's free community of market
democracies."" China, however, did not fit into a neat category, and Lake's
description of the administration's China policy did not provide much clarity. China
was not lumped in with hostile "backlash" or "rogue" states like Iran or Iraq, but
neither was it a new democracy, like Russia, and certainly it was not included
among the friendly or cooperative nations with which the United States would work
together in a multilateral context to achieve common goals. Advocating
engagement in this strategic sense, Lake declared:
We cannot impose democracy on regimes that appear to be opting for liberalization,
but we may be able to help steer some of them down that path while providing
penalties that raise the costs of repression and aggressive behavior. These efforts
have special meaning for our relations with China. ... It is in the interest of both our
nations for China to continue its economic liberalization while respecting the human
rights of its people and international norms regarding weapons sales. That is why
we conditionally extended China's trading advantages, sanctioned its missile
exports and proposed creation of Radio Free Asia. We seek a stronger relationship
with China that reflects both our values and our interests.16
On balance, Lake's position on China appeared to focus on the negative and to
place the onus for improving bilateral relations on Beijing. His advocacy of
"enlarging" democracy throughout the world must have had a chilling effect on
Beijing, reinforcing the growing negative perspective of hard-liners in the regime
about the future of bilateral ties. Unlike engagement, enlargement (kuoda) was
clearly understood and was synonymous with expansionism.
The third manner in which the term engagement has been used is in the sense of a
general dialogue between high-level U.S. and Chinese officials. This usage of the
term is not entirely distinct from the second usage; originally, engagement in the
second, or strategic, sense of the word was believed to encompass dialogue as an
incentive to be offered to the Chinese. However, as U.S.-Chinese relations
progressed, this dialogue came to represent the engagement itself. The prominence
of dialogue on its own is in large part a reflection of dissatisfaction that developed
within the U.S. governmentparticularly among senior officials in the Departments
of State and Defenseover the general direction of U.S. policy toward China, which
they saw as being in a potentially dangerous downward spiral. These officials, who
included Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord,
believed that the restrictions placed on high-level contacts and dialogue between
the United States and China after Tiananmen posed both a practical and a
psychological burden on the relationship. Engaging with senior policy officials in
China meant seeking to communicate more effectively with them so as to promote
better understanding of U.S. policies and positions. Proponents believed that
enhanced communication also would enable the United States to bring more
effective pressure on Beijing to adjust some of its troubling policies, particularly in
nonproliferation. The opposite of this concept of engagement could best be
described as shunning, or sinophobia, which had prevented substantive high-level
meetings from taking place since 1989. Implicit in this notion of engagement was
the premise that linkages should not be made between issue areas (such as human
rights and trade). Specific issue areas should be dealt with on their own merits, and
problems in one area should not impede progress in other areas.
No consensus over the meaning of engagement with China

Jia, 1 - Professor and Associate Dean of the School of International Studies of
Peking University (Qingguo, Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese perceptions of the
engagement policy debate in the United States Journal of Contemporary China
(2001), 10(27), 321330, ebsco)
From the very beginning, the engagement policy never obtained true domestic
consensus in the United States. While most Americans interested in USPRC
relations paid lip service to the word engagement, different people had different
things in mind. Some Americans interpreted engagement policy as one of promoting
mutually beneficial relations with China.3 Others believed that it was another
means of changing China peacefully according to US values.4 Still others viewed it
as a euphemism for subjecting China to inferiority if not backwardness and, if that
cannot be achieved, confrontation.5 As a result, as soon as the policy was
announced, it became a victim of US partisan and interest-group politics. Different
parties vied to impose their interpretation of engagement on USPRC policy while
the Clinton Administration spent much time and effort to de ne and defend it with
barely little energy to put it into practice.
AT: Haass and OSullivan

Haass and OSullivans definition is too broad
complete)

the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the
analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means
are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive
sanction could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain
Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally
nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of
non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's
objectives."(n16)
AT: Litwak
Litwaks definition is too broad
complete)

objectives."(n16)
AT: Johnston and Ross

Johnston and Ross definition of engagement is too broad
complete)

objectives."(n16)
Johnston and Rosss definition is contradictory and incoherent

Drifte, 3 - Reinhard Drifte has held the Chair of Japanese Studies at the University
of Newcastle upon Tyne since 1989 (Japans Security Relations with China since
1989, http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781134406678_sample_827162.pdf
The following definition of engagement by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross
probably describes best the dualistic character of this policy: The use of noncoercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising powers
behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are
consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order. The authors explicitly
state that amelioration of the rising powers behaviour does not seek to limit,
constrain or delay the newcomers power, nor to prevent the development of
influence commensurate with its greater power.10 They attach four conditions that
will make a policy of engagement effective:
1 the new rising power has only limited revisionist aims and there are no
irreconcilable conflicts of interests with the established powers;
2 the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible
threats, i.e. a sticks and carrots policy;
3 engagement is a complement and not an alternative to balancing;
4 the established powers must live by the same principles they demand of the new
rising power11
When we look carefully at this statement it becomes clear that, for the rising power,
coercive means must still be considered in its calculation of the established powers
despite their goal of the non-use of coercive methods. Not only is this
related to the established powers Realist objectives (i.e. balancing and hedging)
vis--vis conceivable intentions of a rising power, but it is also, in the first instance,
due to the simple fact that all the established powers, including Japan, maintain
considerable military forces and are involved in military alliances to cater for a
whole range of challenges to their security. The crucial issue for a correct
understanding of Japans engagement policy (and this would apply to the
engagement policy of any other country) is to clarify the emphasis and the
robustness with which some rather than other goals associated with engagement
are pursued, as well as the mix of policy tools used; one needs to consider issues
such as no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial
disputes, respect for national sovereignty, transparency of military forces,
cooperative solutions for transnational problems or respect for basic human
rights.12
AT: Cha
Chas definition is too broad
complete)

objectives."(n16)
AT Reasonability
1. Reasonability is bad
A. Neutrality abuse and reasonability standards are subjective and
encourage judge intervention which is shitty for both teams debaters should
decide debates
B. Infinitely regressive the combination of all reasonable interpretations is
insanely broad accepting one reasonable interpretation forces the negative to
be prepared for the intersection of all of them. This destroys pre-round
preparation pre-requisite to education because it ensures clash.
C. Competing interpretations is inevitable comparisons are needed to
determine if an interpretation is reasonable. Reasonability is indistinguishable
from any other comparison of competing arguments except it introduces AN
ADDITIONAL UNNECCESSARY level of judge intervention and unpredictability.
2. We still win their interpretation is unreasonable. Limits proves. Even in a
world of reasonability, our interpretation is still better, means you vote neg
anyways. They havent even explained what it means to be reasonably topical
anyways you should assume that they arent. And,
3. Vote on topicality before anything else. Topicality is crucial to
ensure fair debates. If there is no fairness in debate it will collapse. If we cant
research all the affirmatives sufficiently, the neg will always get their ass kicked
on a new unpredictable aff mechanism that doesnt have to have solvency
evidence like a plan that just funds alternative energy development to solve oil
dependence. People will quit because of the side bias and debate is destroyed.
Even if people stick around its not educational anymore anyways which is the
reason debate matters in the first place.

Resolution

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Resolution

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Resolution

Uses of this violation

Sample affirmative plan and 2ac

PLAN The United States should establish guaranteed annual military-to-military

1. We Meet the plan makes a diplomatic push to have China

2. We meet military-to-military contacts occur as a summit

3. counter-interpretation Engagement must be the

with target or isolation of the target country as undesirable.

We meet that interpretation we make mil-mil contacts

4. Their interpretation destroys the heart of the topic most of

5. Diplomatic engagement includes the military

increasingly militarized foreign policy

6. Topicality should be evaluated in terms of what is

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Its a voting issue

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a

1nc categories short version

Its a voting issue

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a

Link arms sales / military training

Similarly, limited forms of military engagement are almost always helpful in

Economic and diplomatic engagement are conceptually distinct

Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives.

Link funding NGOs / remittances / student

Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives.

AT: Diplomatic includes military

Economic engagement covers a wide range of programs. Financial incentives are an

Theres a distinct diplomatic engagement budget and it

Specific Programs: In addition to its routine activities, the Department undertakes

diplomatic engagement. Foreign assistance programs are designed to achieve a

A budget-based definition creates a clear bright-line

The budget includes clear categories the affirmative doesnt

Commissions ($125.9 million) appropriations. Diplomatic Engagement also included

AT: Military is core of topic

The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) focuses on

AT: We meet effects

DEFINING ENGAGEMENT TOO NARROWLY

Allowing effects topicality is a limits disaster on this topic

Determining topicality based on effect ruins precision and

economic statecraft is defined in terms of means, alternative concepts

Destler offers a definition of foreign economic policy in terms of the actual

International Economic Policy

three common meanings of the term economic sanctions may be identified .

Uses of this violation

Sample plan and 2ac

We meet the plan is conditional on China saying yes if

Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic

How increased economic integration at

or contract its interaction with the international community, contribute or detract

Engagement means positive inducements qpqs are punitive

protracted period. The term engagement is rightly associated with a classified

No ground loss they can read a condition CP against every

point on the continuum represents a one-sided American accommodation of Chinas

Prefer reasonability competing interpretations are arbitrary

Aff at: appeasement

By broadly characterizing appeasement as concessions, Ripsman and Levy fail to

(e.g., conditionally or unconditionally, single-shot or iterated series of

academic, and educational exchanges.16 In each of these cases, however, even as

Its not appeasement because China isnt aggressive

A strategy of appeasement is to retreat repeatedly (i.e., being accommodating or

Violation the plan is an unconditional offer it happens

liberals came to view dtente as having more ambitious, overarching goalsas