Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9308 December 23, 1914
JUAN BERNARDO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
M. B. LEGASPI, defendant-appellee.
Roman de Jesus for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing
the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by
plaintiff's automobile by reason of defendant's negligence in causing a collision between his
automobile and that of plaintiff. The court in its judgment also dismissed a cross-complaint filed
by the defendant, praying for damages against the plaintiff on the ground that the injuries
sustained by the defendant's automobile in the collision referred to, as well as those to plaintiff's
machine, were caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in handling his automobile.
The court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in
handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the
part of both as to prevent either from recovering.1awphil.net
Upon the facts, as they appear of record, the judgment must be affirmed, as the evidence clearly
supports the decision of the trial court. The law applicable to the facts also requires an affirmance
of the judgment appealed from. Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own
carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the
determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. This is equally true of the defendant; and as both
of them, by their negligent acts, contributed to the determining cause of the accident, neither can
recover.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.itc-alf
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

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DIGEST

Facts:
Plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a collission of plaintiff's automobile and that
of the defendant. Defendant filed a cross-complaint against the plaintiff claiming that the
collission was due to plaintiff's negligence. The trial court found both drivers negligence.
Issue:
WON the plaintiff is negligent in handling his automobile.
Ruling:
Complaint Dismissed.
Ratio:
Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions collide on turning a street corner, and it
appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally
negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof,
neither can recover of the other for the damages suffered.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA
ESTEBAN, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted in the former Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental 1 by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained in the evening
of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.
The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which
was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs.
As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms,
legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut
lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. 2
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent
spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held
responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor
which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit system. 3 Accordingly, PLDT
filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their agreement,
PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the
negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. 4 In answer thereto, Barte claimed
that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it
had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and
appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of the
excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of
the presence of excavations. 5
On October 1, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, the
decretal part of which reads:

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IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations the defendant Philippine Long

Distance Telephone Company is hereby ordered (A) to pay the plaintiff Gloria
Esteban the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 exemplary
damages; to plaintiff Antonio Esteban the sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages
and P500.00 as exemplary damages, with legal rate of interest from the date of the
filing of the complaint until fully paid. The defendant is hereby ordered to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(B) The third-party defendant is hereby ordered to reimburse whatever amount the
defendant-third party plaintiff has paid to the plaintiff. With costs against the
defendant. 6
From this decision both PLDT and private respondents appealed, the latter appealing only as to
the amount of damages. Third-party defendant Barte did not appeal.
On September 25, 1979, the Special Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
in said appealed case, with Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava as ponente, reversing the decision of
the lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It held that respondent
Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for
damages. 7 A copy of this decision was received by private respondents on October 10,
1979. 8 On October 25, 1979, said respondents filed a motion for reconsideration dated October
24, 1979. 9 On January 24, 1980, the Special Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals denied said
motion for reconsideration.10 This resolution was received by respondent spouses on February
22, 1980. 11
On February 29, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals received private respondents' motion for
leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration, dated February 27, 1980. 12 On March
11, 1980, respondent court, in a resolution likewise penned by Justice Agrava, allowed
respondents to file a second motion for reconsideration, within ten (10) days from notice
thereof. 13 Said resolution was received by private respondents on April 1, 1980 but prior thereto,
private respondents had already filed their second motion for reconsideration on March 7,
1980. 14
On April 30,1980 petitioner PLDT filed an opposition to and/or motion to dismiss said second
motion for reconsideration. 15 The Court of Appeals, in view of the divergent opinions on the
resolution of the second motion for reconsideration, designated two additional justices to form a
division of five. 16 On September 3, 1980, said division of five promulgated its resolution, penned
by Justice Mariano A. Zosa, setting aside the decision dated September 25, 1979, as well as the
resolution dated, January 24,1980, and affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. 17
On September 19, 1980, petitioner PLDT filed a motion to set aside and/or for reconsideration of
the resolution of September 3, 1980, contending that the second motion for reconsideration of
private respondent spouses was filed out of time and that the decision of September 25, 1979
penned by Justice Agrava was already final. It further submitted therein that the relationship of
Barte and petitioner PLDT should be viewed in the light of the contract between them and, under
the independent contractor rule, PLDT is not liable for the acts of an independent
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contractor. 18 On May 11, 1981, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its resolution denying
said motion to set aside and/or for reconsideration and affirming in toto the decision of the lower
court dated October 1, 1974. 19
Coming to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assigns the following
errors:
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not denying private respondents' second motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the decision of the Special Second Division, dated September
25, 1979, and the resolution of the Special Ninth Division, dated January 24, 1980, are already
final, and on the additional ground that said second motion for reconsideration is pro forma.
2. Respondent court erred in reversing the aforesaid decision and resolution and in misapplying
the independent contractor rule in holding PLDT liable to respondent Esteban spouses.
A convenient resume of the relevant proceedings in the respondent court, as shown by the
records and admitted by both parties, may be graphically presented as follows:
(a) September 25, 1979, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals with
Justice Agrava asponente;
(b) October 10, 1979, a copy of said decision was received by private
respondents;
(c) October 25, 1979, a motion for reconsideration was filed by private
respondents;
(d) January 24, 1980, a resolution was issued denying said motion for
reconsideration;
(e) February 22, 1980, a copy of said denial resolution was received by private
respondents;
(f) February 29, 1980, a motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration was filed by private respondents
(g) March 7, 1980, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by private
respondents;
(h) March 11, 1980, a resolution was issued allowing respondents to file a second
motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt; and
(i) September 3, 1980, a resolution was issued, penned by Justice Zosa, reversing
the original decision dated September 25, 1979 and setting aside the resolution
dated January 24, 1980.

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From the foregoing chronology, we are convinced that both the motion for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration and, consequently, said second motion for reconsideration itself were
filed out of time.
Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, which had procedural governance at the time, provided
that a second motion for reconsideration may be presented within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion has been pending. 20 Private
respondents having filed their first motion for reconsideration on the last day of the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so, they had only one (1) day from receipt of the
order denying said motion to file, with leave of court, a second motion for reconsideration. 21 In
the present case, after their receipt on February 22, 1980 of the resolution denying their first
motion for reconsideration, private respondents had two remedial options. On February 23, 1980,
the remaining one (1) day of the aforesaid reglementary period, they could have filed a motion
for leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration, conceivably with a prayer for the
extension of the period within which to do so. On the other hand, they could have appealed
through a petition for review on certiorari to this Court within fifteen (15) days from February
23, 1980. 22 Instead, they filed a motion for leave to file a second motion 'for reconsideration on
February 29, 1980, and said second motion for reconsideration on March 7, 1980, both of which
motions were by then time-barred.
Consequently, after the expiration on February 24, 1980 of the original fifteen (15) day period,
the running of which was suspended during the pendency of the first motion for reconsideration,
the Court of Appeals could no longer validly take further proceedings on the merits of the case,
much less to alter, modify or reconsider its aforesaid decision and/or resolution. The filing of the
motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration by herein respondents on February
29, 1980 and the subsequent filing of the motion itself on March 7, 1980, after the expiration of
the reglementary period to file the same, produced no legal effects. Only a motion for re-hearing
or reconsideration filed in time shall stay the final order or judgment sought to be re-examined. 23
The consequential result is that the resolution of respondent court of March 11, 1980 granting
private respondents' aforesaid motion for leave and, giving them an extension of ten (10) days to
file a second motion for reconsideration, is null and void. The period for filing a second motion
for reconsideration had already expired when private respondents sought leave to file the same,
and respondent court no longer had the power to entertain or grant the said motion. The aforesaid
extension of ten (10) days for private respondents to file their second motion for reconsideration
was of no legal consequence since it was given when there was no more period to extend. It is an
elementary rule that an application for extension of time must be filed prior to the expiration of
the period sought to be extended. 24 Necessarily, the discretion of respondent court to grant said
extension for filing a second motion for reconsideration is conditioned upon the timeliness of the
motion seeking the same.
No appeal having been taken seasonably, the respondent court's decision, dated September 25,
1979, became final and executory on March 9, 1980. The subsequent resolutions of respondent
court, dated March 11, 1980 and September 3, 1980, allowing private respondents to file a
second motion for reconsideration and reversing the original decision are null and void and
cannot disturb the finality of the judgment nor restore jurisdiction to respondent court. This is but
6 | Page

in line with the accepted rule that once a decision has become final and executory it is removed
from the power and jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend, much
less revoke it. 25 The decision rendered anew is null and void. 26 The court's inherent power to
correct its own errors should be exercised before the finality of the decision or order sought to be
corrected, otherwise litigation will be endless and no question could be considered finally settled.
Although the granting or denial of a motion for reconsideration involves the exercise of
discretion, 27 the same should not be exercised whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, but
prudently in conformity with law, justice, reason and equity. 28
Prescinding from the aforesaid procedural lapses into the substantive merits of the case, we find
no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident which
befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and
was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. Such findings were
reached after an exhaustive assessment and evaluation of the evidence on record, as evidenced
by the respondent court's resolution of January 24, 1980 which we quote with approval:
First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had
remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND.
Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by
the jeep swerving from the left that is, swerving from the inside lane. What caused
the swerving is not disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident, defendant cannot
be made liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs. The accident was not due to
the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep
from the inside lane. That may explain plaintiff-husband's insistence that he did
not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran into it.
Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the
ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson
Street to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND.
It has been stated that the ditches along Lacson Street had already been covered
except the 3 or 4 meters where the ACCIDENT MOUND was located. Exhibit B1 shows that the ditches on Lacson Street north of the ACCIDENT MOUND had
already been covered, but not in such a way as to allow the outer lane to be freely
and conveniently passable to vehicles. The situation could have been worse to the
south of the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason no picture of the
ACCIDENT MOUND facing south was taken.
Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiffhusband claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it
struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the
ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the tiremarks in Exhibit B. The
jeep must have been running quite fast. If the jeep had been braked at 25
kilometers an hour, plaintiff's would not have been thrown against the windshield
and they would not have suffered their injuries.
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Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on
the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right
and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the
drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular
lights which should have made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he
was running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour, even on dim lights, his
failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car was negligence
on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and visible, being 2 to 3
feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time,
he would not have seen any warning sign either. He knew of the existence and
location of the ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it many previous times. With
ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep on the night of the accident so
as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND. 29
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of
the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages. 30 The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private
respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could
have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some
alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the
site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the
lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the
excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the
accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing
of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the
doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. 31 It is basic that private
respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and
reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should
exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio
Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street
almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was
his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the
consequences of his imprudence.
Moreover, we also sustain the findings of respondent Court of Appeals in its original decision
that there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. We have for
consideration only the self-serving testimony of respondent Antonio Esteban and the unverified
photograph of merely a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report of the
incident and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where private respondents
were allegedly treated have not even been satisfactorily explained.
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As aptly observed by respondent court in its aforecited extended resolution of January 24, 1980

(a) There was no third party eyewitness of the accident. As to how the accident
occurred, the Court can only rely on the testimonial evidence of plaintiffs
themselves, and such evidence should be very carefully evaluated, with
defendant, as the party being charged, being given the benefit of any doubt.
Definitely without ascribing the same motivation to plaintiffs, another person
could have deliberately engineered a similar accident in the hope and expectation
that the Court can grant him substantial moral and exemplary damages from the
big corporation that defendant is. The statement is made only to stress the
disadvantageous position of defendant which would have extreme difficulty in
contesting such person's claim. If there were no witness or record available from
the police department of Bacolod, defendant would not be able to determine for
itself which of the conflicting testimonies of plaintiffs is correct as to the report or
non-report of the accident to the police department. 32
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence
of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence. 33 Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause
of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested,
otherwise his action must fail.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals, dated March 11, 1980 and
September 3,1980, are hereby SET ASIDE. Its original decision, promulgated on September
25,1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento JJ., concur.

DIGEST
Facts: On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban had their jeep ran over a sand of earth and
fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. Respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which
was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of warning light or signs.
Respondent spouses suffered physical injuries and their jeeps windshield was shattered. PLDT
alleged that the respondents were negligent and that it should be the independent contractor L.R.
Barte and Company which undertook said conduit system to be the one liable.The latter claimed
to have complied with its contract and had installed necessary barricades.
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Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
Ruling: Private Respondents negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very cause
of the accident, hence he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he and his wife
suffered. Private respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT
considering that he had the last clear chance, to avoid the injury. One who claims damages for
the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show existence of such fault or negligence
causative thereof.

10 | P a g e

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own
behalf and as guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS,
CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and
the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division),Respondents.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Pealoza, his
stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a media agua said to be in a
leaking condition. The media agua was just below the window of the third story. Standing on
said media agua, Magno received from his son thru that window a 3 X 6 galvanized iron
sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet
came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the
Company) strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his
death by electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the company.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor P10,000 as compensatory
damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP784 as actual damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000
as moral and exemplary damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand P3,000 as attorneys fees, with
costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight
modification by reducing the attorneys fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. The electric
company has appealed said decision to us.
The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are conclusive are stated in the
following portions of its decision which we reproduce below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles
on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before
Pealozas house was constructed. The record shows that during the construction of said house a
similar incident took place, although fortunate]y with much less tragic consequences. A piece of
wood which a carpenter was holding happened to come in contact with the same wire, producing
some sparks. The owner of the house forthwith complained to Defendant about the danger which
the wire presented, and as a result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house
by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.
At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered by the trial court, the
distance from the electric wire to the edge of the media agua on which the deceased was
making repairs was only 30 inches or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that
all wires be kept three feet from the building. Appellant contends that in applying said
regulations to the case at bar the reckoning should not be from the edge of the media agua but
from the side of the house and that, thus measured, the distance was almost 7 feet, or more then
the minimum prescribed. This contention is manifestly groundless, for not only is a media agua
an integral part of the building to which it is attached but to exclude it in measuring the distance
11 | P a g e

would defeat the purpose of the regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless, that even
assuming that the distance, within the meaning of the city regulations, should be measured from
the edge of the media agua, the fact that in the case of the house involved herein such distance
was actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the owner of said house, because the city
authorities gave him a permit to construct a media agua only one meter or 39 1/2 inches wide,
but instead he built one having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the width
permitted by the authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the electric wire to less than the
prescribed minimum of 3 feet.
It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in the permit given to him by the
city authorities for the construction of the media agua, and that if he had not done
so Appellantswire would have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than the required distance of three feet
from the edge of the media agua. It is also a fact, however, that after the media agua was
constructed the owner was given a final permit of occupancy of the house cralaw .
cralaw The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of 3,600 volts. There was,
according to Appellant, no insulation that could have rendered it safe, first, because there is no
insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
secondly, because the only insulation material that may be effective is still in the experimental
stage of development and, anyway, its costs would be prohibitive
The theory followed by the appellate court in finding for the Plaintiff is that although the owner
of the house in constructing the media agua in question exceeded the limits fixed in the permit,
still, after making that media agua, its construction though illegal, was finally approved
because he was given a final permit to occupy the house; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat it was
the company that was at fault and was guilty of negligence because although the electric wire in
question had been installed long before the construction of the house and in accordance with the
ordinance fixing a minimum of 3 feet, mere compliance with the regulations does not satisfy the
requirement of due diligence nor avoid the need for adopting such other precautionary measures
as may be warranted; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat negligence cannot be determined by a
simple matter of inches; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat all that the city did was to prescribe
certain minimum conditions and that just because the ordinance required that primary electric
wires should be not less than 3 feet from any house, the obligation of due diligence is not
fulfilled by placing such wires at a distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardless of other factors.
The appellate court, however, refrained from stating or suggesting what other precautionary
measures could and should have been adopted.
After a careful study and discussion of the case and the circumstances surrounding the same, we
are inclined to agree to the contention of Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was
primarily caused by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the
media agua or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of
the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of
the media agua. We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as
lacking in due diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires
from any building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the
side of the house of Pealoza. Even considering said regulation distance of 3 feet as referring not
to the side of a building, but to any projecting part thereof, such as a media agua, had the house
owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his media
agua, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide, the distance from the wires to the edge of said
12 | P a g e

media agua would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing said one meter width for the
media agua the city authorities must have wanted to preserve the distance of at least 3 feet
between the wires and any portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner
disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving
only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the Media agua as illegally constructed and the electric
wires. And added to this violation of the permit by the house owner, was its approval by the city
through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city
ordinance and permit at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or
regulation. The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal
construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and after
finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its
wires so as to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty,
to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners
and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the present case, the
violation of the permit for the construction of the media agua was not the direct cause of the
accident. It merely contributed to it. Had said media agua been only one meter wide as allowed
by the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side
of the house in order to keep a safe margin between the edge of the media agua and the
yawning 2-story distance or height from the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the
fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires.
We realize that the presence of the wires in question quite close to the house or its media agua
was always a source of danger considering their high voltage and uninsulated as they were, but
the claim of the company and the reasons given by it for not insulating said wires were unrefuted
as we gather from the findings of the Court of Appeals, and so we have to accept them as
satisfactory. Consequently, we may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in
due diligence in failing to insulate said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is to be
supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city
such as its electrician or engineer. Of course, a greater distance of say 6 feet or 12 feet would
have increased the margin of safety but other factors had to be considered such as that the wires
could not be strung or the posts supporting them could not be located too far toward the middle
of the street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of
Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the
third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do
so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he
could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But
unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he
was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without
looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his
arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
In support of its theory and holding that Defendant-Appellant was liable for damages the Court
of Appeals cites the case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 427. We do not think the
case is exactly applicable. There, the premises involved was that elevated portion or top of the
walls of Intramuros, Manila, just above the Sta. Lucia Gate. In the words of the Court, it was a
public place where persons come to stroll, to rest and to enjoy themselves. The electric
company was clearly negligent in placing its wires so near the place that without much difficulty
or exertion, a person by stretching his hand out could touch them. A boy named Astudillo,
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placing one foot on a projection, reached out and actually grasped the electric wire and was
electrocuted. The person electrocuted in said case was a boy who was in no position to realize
the danger. In the present case, however, the wires were well high over the street where there was
no possible danger to pedestrians. The only possible danger was to persons standing on the
media agua, but a media agua can hardly be considered a public place where persons usually
gather. Moreover, a person standing on the media agua could not have reached the wires with
his hands alone. It was necessary as was done by Magno to hold something long enough to reach
the wire. Furthermore, Magno was not a boy or a person immature but the father of a family,
supposedly a tinsmith trained and experienced in the repair of galvanized iron roofs and media
agua. Moreover, in that very case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, the court said that
although it is a well- established rule that the liability of electric companies for damages or
personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not
insurers of the safety of the public.
But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present case the Defendant electric
company could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires so close to the house and
media agua in question, and in failing to properly insulate those wires (although according to
the unrefuted claim of said company it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of
wire), nevertheless to hold the Defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such
supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the
accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
with his hands was the proximate and principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not
recover. Such was the holding of this Court in the case of Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Company, 16 Phil., 8. In that case, the electric company was found negligent in leaving
scattered on its premises fulminating caps which Taylor, a 15- year old boy found and carried
home. In the course of experimenting with said fulminating caps, he opened one of them, held it
out with his hands while another boy applied a lighted match to it, causing it to explode and
injure one of his eyes eventually causing blindness in said eye. Said this Tribunal in denying
recovery for the injury:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
negligent act of the Defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless Plaintiffs own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric
wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking
back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latters length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause
with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
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because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause. (45 C.J. pp. 931-332.).
We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600 volts), uninsulated and so close
to houses is a constant source of danger, even death, especially to persons who having occasion
to be near said wires, do not adopt the necessary precautions. But may be, the City of Manila
authorities and the electric company could get together and devise means of minimizing this
danger to the public. Just as the establishment of pedestrian lanes in city thoroughfares may
greatly minimize danger to pedestrians because drivers of motor vehicles may expect danger and
slow down or even stop and take other necessary precaution upon approaching said lanes, so, a
similar way may possibly be found. Since these high voltage wires cannot be properly insulated
and at reasonable cost, they might perhaps be strung only up to the outskirts of the city where
there are few houses and few pedestrians and there step-down to a voltage where the wires
carrying the same to the city could be properly insulated for the better protection of the public.
In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and
the complaint filed against the Company is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

DIGEST
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw
making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the
electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the media agua
and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages
brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs
of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the
electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company
did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.
Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occassion.

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