1. Patricio Tan Vs. Comelec, GR No.

73155
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the
Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are
residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and
municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a
case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents
Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which,
pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled
for January 3, 1986. Said law provides:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador
Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the
province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the
territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east,
comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.
SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the
areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act.
After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the
votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the Philippines shall appoint the first officials of
the province.
SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein
provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.
SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval

Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional

and it is not in complete accord with the Local Government Code as in Article
XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected.
Respondent> They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not
infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government
Code have been complied with. Furthermore, they submit that this case has
now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new Province
of Negros del Norte.
Issues:
Whether or not the law creating negros del norte is valid?
Whether the term unit or units affected include the original or mother
province in the vote?
Ruling:
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision
makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of
votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is
created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the
existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially
altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be
created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple
logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The
first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three
cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of
Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4

square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose

boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to
realize that the consequent effects cf the division of the parent province
necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros
Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of
the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably
affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either
or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the
unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which
must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
Territory has met minimum requirement and their contention of
including then marginal sea is incorrect. It would be rather preposterous to
maintain that a province with a small land area but which has a long, narrow,
extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can be said to have a larger
territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land
area manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned.
2. Grino vs. Comelec, 213 SCRA 672
Facts:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails
the act of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) of disallowing the
voters of the sub-province of Guimaras, to vote for the governor, vicegovernor of the province of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in the second district of the province, in the recently conducted
May 11, 1992 local and national elections.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
This petition was filed by the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a
duly registered and accredited political party, through its Iloilo Provincial
Chairman, co-petitioner, Simplicio Grio. Grio was also the official candidate
of the party for the position of governor of Iloilo. The other co-petitioner,
Arturo Gadian, claimed to be a registered voter of the municipality of
Buenavista, sub-province of Guimaras, Iloilo.
Issues:
Whether or nor there was failure of election of election
Ruling:
The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that
under the LGC of 1991, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a
regular province is ratified by the people in plebiscite, the President will
appoint provincial officials. However, the voters favored for the conversion of
Guimaras into a regular province so there was need to undo what COMELEC
has done in plebiscite. There ballots in Guimaras should have contained
spaces for Gov and Vice Gov. etc. but SC has now considered the case moot
and academic since majority voted in the affirmative for the conversion of
Guimaras.
3. Abbas vs. Comelec, GR No. 89651
Facts:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for
November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734,
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao."
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite
and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to

the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional.
The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the
government of the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and
Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie
Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the
Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took
effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of
Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines"
and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of
autonomy."
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli
Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding international
agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is
neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic
of the Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified according to the
provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding
international agreement.
Issues:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement
Ruling:
Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the
provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining
the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of
argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international
agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as
internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of
the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as
the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974),
citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2
Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of
the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination
by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would
result in the granting of the reliefs sought.
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is
made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on
the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso
underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution
was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could
have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the
ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple
majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent
units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
4. Ordillo vs Comelec, 192 SCRA 100
Facts:

On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain

Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the
plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority
of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected
by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void
COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice,
the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160,
and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from
implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose and (2)
declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board
and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and
effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been
enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the
constituent units. We treat the Comments of the respondents as an answer
and decide the case.
Issues:
Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which
voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can,
alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
Ruling:
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent
unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more
provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into
which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of
contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was
made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a
province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of
their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case.Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and
Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial
governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of the
Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the private sector. Only one
body, ifugao.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of
the areas enumerated in Article I.
Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman
and are (6) members coming from different provinces and cities in the
Region.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole
province of Ifugao constituting the Region.:-cr
5. Bagabuyo vs. Comelec, GR No. 176970

Nature of the case:

The petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,1 with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the
ground that Republic Act No. 93712 - the law that Resolution No. 7837
implements - is unconstitutional.
Facts:
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman
Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act
Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of
Cagayan De Oro."3 This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9371.4 It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For
the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place
of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod.
The petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No.
9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the
conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion
of a local government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing
the respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution
No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of
the Solicitor General, argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the
hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with
concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality of a statute;
2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City
in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3) the criteria established
under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is
a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government
unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required.
Issues:
The core issues, based on the petition and the parties' memoranda,
can be limited to the following contentious points:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so,
should the instant petition be dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative
reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division
and conversion of a local government unit?
Ruling:
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the
determination of the number of representatives which a State, county
or other subdivision may send to a legislative body.17It is the
allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population;
the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and

voting power among the districts.18 Reapportionment, on the other

hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political
representation and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently
represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above
stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population
and voting power among districts."23 Hence, emphasis is given to the
number of people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be
observed among the representative districts; and accessibility and
commonality of interests in terms of each district being, as far as
practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In terms of the
people represented, every city with at least 250,000 people and every
province (irrespective of population) is entitled to one representative.
No plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision.
Equality of presentation.
The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the
number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of
registered voters therein.
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the
actual population of Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial
notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics Office which
shows thatbarangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a
total population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322
residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population
sizes of the districts.45 The Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging
equality of representation.46 In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have
one representative,"
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner
6.

City of Pasig vs Comelec, GR No. 125646

Nature of the case:

Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the
suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of
boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.
Facts of the case:
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R.
No. 128663 involves the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims
these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta
claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own
jurisdiction/territory.
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village
that they be segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela
Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct
barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig
passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay

Karangalan in Pasig City.[1] Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was

thereafter set for June 22, 1996.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued
Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City.
[2]
Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.
According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve
areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence,
the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the
said case shall have been finally decided by the court.

Issue:
whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays
Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the
pending boundary dispute between the two local governments.

Petitioners Argument:
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the
same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play
where both cases are civil, as in the instant case.

Respondent argument
Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending
civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the
territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in
futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires
acts of such barangays.

Ruling:
We agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006
involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the
City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The
boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these
limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise
of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare.
Not moot and academic, Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally
born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality
attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the
very excuse for perpetration of such wrong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The
COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of
Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after
the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-300.

7. Mariano vs Comelec, GR No. 118755

Nature of the case:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Makati."

Facts of the case:

The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections
2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

Issue:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law
(the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within
three (3) years following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title
of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000.

Ruling:
1. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized.
The requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as
tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an
end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city
may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case,
then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the
law has been sufficiently served. The deliberations of Congress
will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of
the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the
consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between
the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was
under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to coequal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
2. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said
elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose
a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
3. If favor the petitioner, it would create an inequitable situation
where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new
city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must
be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit No costs.

8. Sema vs Comelec and Didagen Dilangalen, GR No. 177597

Nature of the case:

These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No.
7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative
district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

Facts:
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of
Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists ofCotabato
City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under
its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended
by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4] Although under the
Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first
legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII,
having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite
held in November 1989.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional

Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5]enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the
first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation
in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato
City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to
clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of
the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under
MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with
Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative
District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407,

Issues:

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the

ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such new province.

Ruling:
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan?
First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation
must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there
must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district
because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as
well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the
power to create a legislative district and not like in ARMM.

9. Mun. of Jimenez vs. Baz, GR No. 105746

Nature of the case:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 4, 1992 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Oroquieta City,[1] affirming
the legal existence of the Municipality of Sinacaban in Misamis
Occidental and ordering the relocation of its boundary for the
purpose of determining whether certain areas claimed by it belong
to it.
Facts:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, and
pursuant to the provisions of Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, there is hereby created, in the Province of
Misamis Occidental, a municipality to be known as the municipality
of Sinacaban, which shall consist of the southern portion of the
municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, signed bu Pres,
Quirino in an EO.
The municipality of Jimenez shall have its present territory, minus
the portion thereof included in the municipality of Sinacaban.

Issue :
Whether Sinacaban is a valid municipality as contemplated by law

Petitioners argument:
the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative and
consequently Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order,
had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim
vis--vis Jimenez, of which it remains part.Jimenez prayed that
Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming control and supervision over
the disputed barrios; that the Provincial Board be enjoined from
assuming jurisdiction over the claim of Sinacaban; that E.O. No. 258
be declared null and void;
Respondents argument:
We have since held that where a municipality created as such by
executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are
accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
(1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of
the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that
following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to
question the validity of the executive order creating such
municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later
classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a
municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative
district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House
of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt
there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality
must be deemed to have been put to rest by the local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. no. 7160), 442 (d) of which
provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 is AFFIRMED.

10. Navarro vs. Executive Sec. Ermita, GR No. 180050

Nature of the case:
Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20,
2010 filed by Movant-Intervenors[1] dated and filed on October
29, 2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of
judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of
the July 20, 2010 Resolution.
Facts:

On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into

law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province
of Dinagat Islands).[2] OnDecember 3, 2006, the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for
the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local
Government Code (LGC).[3] The plebiscite yielded 69,943
affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.[4] With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of
Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the
President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who
took their oath of office on January 26, 2007.Later, during the
May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected
their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July
1, 2007.
Issue:
Whether or not Dinagat Island qualifies to be province based on
the minimum requirement by law
Ruling;
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government
units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and
minimum land area requirements for prospective local
government units should be liberally construed in order to
achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by
the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counterproductive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical.
Picture an intended province that consists of several
municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also
consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities
which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land
area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442,
respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to
comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square
kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would
mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive
preference to create a province with contiguous land area over
one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of
development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and
the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This
preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome
if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered
because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as
compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on
the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose
of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the
Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read
together with territorial contiguity.
Dinagat has income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity

of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it
behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the
presumption of constitutionality of statutes.

11. MMDA vs. Bel Air Village Association, Inc., GR No. 135962
Nature of the case:
Facts of the case:
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village,
a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the
registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air
Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner,
through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995
requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.
Trial denied Preliminary injunction, they resorted to CA and got
it.
MMDA raised it to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether or not MMDA has police powers?
Ruling:
There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike
the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,
"development authority." 30 It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations,
non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature.
It is not a legislative body.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The
power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila
Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in
the implementation of the MMDA's functions.
The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision"
requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected." 56 R. A. No.

7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a

plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected
by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and
privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to
perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the
President, 57 whereas in local government units, the President
merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the
administrative character of the MMDA.