Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. the
Corporate powers and the power to bind the corporation are vested exclusively in the board of
directors, except only in the instances where the law otherwise provides
Whoever (stockholder or group) is able to elect a majority of the directors would in effect control
the policies of the corporation
General rule: the extent of control would be proportional to the number of shares a stockholder
owns (the more shares one has, the greater the possibility of control)
o Exception: use of devices affecting control
It is possible for a person or a group of persons owning only a minority of the shares
in a corporation to obtain control of a corporation by successfully electing the
majority of the directors
Devices are exclusive to avoid circumvention of the law
o Some of the devices (pooling agreements, greater than majority voting requirements,
restrictiong on transfers of stocks) are the products of the special problems of the close
corporation and its desire to achieve partnership advantages
Problem common to devices
o The effect of the transfer of some or all of his stocks by one of the parties to the agreement
In close corporations, this problem is minimized by contractual restrictions on
transfer
If the control arrangement is embodied in the by-laws or AOI transferee may be
held bound by it
will not be bound if private agreement only among stockholders, unless
transferee is given notice thereof
complications arise if embodied in by-laws because these must comply with
statutory standards
stockholders may waive statutory rights in private agreements among
themselves
another problem: may the by-laws, though void because not in accordance
with statutory norm, be held valid as a private agreement among the
stockholders who approved it?
proxy device
Section 58. Proxies. Stockholders and members may vote in person or by proxy in all meetings of
stockholders or members. Proxies shall in writing, signed by the stockholder or member and filed before
the scheduled meeting with the corporate secretary. Unless otherwise provided in the proxy, it shall be
valid only for the meeting for which it is intended. No proxy shall be valid and effective for a period longer
than five (5) years at any one time.
Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
Usual practice is to send a proxy form with the notice of the annual stockholders meeting
o Prxy usually returned without the blank for proxy name being filled in
Proxy committee
o Persons suggested as proxies by the management/incumbent directors
Form
o Proxies may be appointed orally
o Written notice shall be filed with the corporate secretary before the meeting
o Failure to comply proxy void and ineffective
Effect: a vote or presence in a meeting which is counted on the basis of such a void
proxy may result in the invalidation of any action decided in such meeting
Exception: the number of shares required for quorum or voting is otherwise present
May the by-laws prohibit the use of proxies No in stock corporations
o When the rigt is given by statute, a stockholder cannot be deprived of it
o In non-stock corporations, the Code allows a waiver of such right provided this is made in
the AOI or in the by-laws
o But by-laws may impose reasonable conditions as to the form and manner of voting by proxy
Ex: notary requirement, submission of roxy form before the meeting
But a by-law which limits the appointment of a proxy to stockholders of the same
corporation has been held to be unduly restrictive of the freedom to choose ones
representative, and therefore invalid
Kinds: general and limited
o General proxy
A general proxy to attend the annual stockholders metting gives the power to vote
for directors and on all ordinary matters which may properly be taken in the meeting
Does not include power to vote for an amendment to AOI or other unusual
transactions
o Limited proxy
Restricts the authority to vote to specified matters only and may direct the vote to be
case in a certain way
Period
o Proxy may fix the period during which it may be used
o Cannot exceed 5 years
o Renewable for not more than 5 years for each renewal
o Where proxy does not fix any period, proxy expires after the meeting for which it was given;
cannot be used for subsequent meeting unless renewed
Revocability
o Ratio: special form of agency
o It is revocable even before the period fixed therein has expired and even where it expressly
provides for irrevocability
o Exception (when irrevocable): when coupled with interest
o Revocation may be made orally, in writing, or implied from the acts of the stockholder
Example of implied acts: appearance of stockholder at the meeting, death of
stockholder
Proxy is the weakest or least reliable device
o Ratio: because of the inherent revocability of the proxy coupled with the 5-year limitation on
its effectivity
Irrevocable when coupled with interest
o Where the proxy is coupled with an interest, it is irrevocable, at least for the period fixed
therein
o End of 5 years, WON with interest proxy automatically ceases to be effective
Proxy contest
o When group of stockholders feel dissatisfied with the management
Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
o
o
SEC
o
o
Each block will seek the proxies of absentee stockholders who are not identified with either
group
Management block usually in a more favorable position
Management has the right to defend its present policies, then it may use corporate
funds and facilities in its solicitation
As long as in good faith and reasonable
Conflicting view on whether the other group would be entitled to reimbursement of
even reasonable expenses in their solicitation
But strong view in favor of reimbursing reasonable expenses of an opposition
group, if they succeed in electing their candidates as directors
Given power to pass upon the validity of the issuance and use of proxies and voting trust
agreements for absent stockholders or members
The Revised Securities Act empowers the SEC to issue rules and regulations relating to
proxies issued by any broker or dealer of shares of stock belonging to others, to the end that
the interest of the investing public will be protected from negligent or fraudulent acts of
such brokers or dealers
2. Voting Trust
Section 59. Voting trusts. One or more stockholders of a stock corporation may create a voting trust for
the purpose of conferring upon a trustee or trustees the right to vote and other rights pertaining to the
shares for a period not exceeding five (5) years at any time: Provided, That in the case of a voting trust
specifically required as a condition in a loan agreement, said voting trust may be for a period exceeding
five (5) years but shall automatically expire upon full payment of the loan. A voting trust agreement must
be in writing and notarized, and shall specify the terms and conditions thereof. A certified copy of such
agreement shall be filed with the corporation and with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
otherwise, said agreement is ineffective and unenforceable. The certificate or certificates of stock covered
by the voting trust agreement shall be cancelled and new ones shall be issued in the name of the trustee
or trustees stating that they are issued pursuant to said agreement. In the books of the corporation, it shall
be noted that the transfer in the name of the trustee or trustees is made pursuant to said voting trust
agreement.
The trustee or trustees shall execute and deliver to the transferors voting trust certificates, which shall be
transferable in the same manner and with the same effect as certificates of stock.
The voting trust agreement filed with the corporation shall be subject to examination by any stockholder of
the corporation in the same manner as any other corporate book or record: Provided, That both the
transferor and the trustee or trustees may exercise the right of inspection of all corporate books and
records in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
Any other stockholder may transfer his shares to the same trustee or trustees upon the terms and
conditions stated in the voting trust agreement, and thereupon shall be bound by all the provisions of said
agreement.
No voting trust agreement shall be entered into for the purpose of circumventing the law against
monopolies and illegal combinations in restraint of trade or used for purposes of fraud.
Unless expressly renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall automatically expire at the
end of the agreed period, and the voting trust certificates as well as the certificates of stock in the name of
the trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be reissued in
the name of the transferors.
Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
The voting trustee or trustees may vote by proxy unless the agreement provides otherwise.
Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
Except for right to inspect corporate books and records (right remains with the
transferring stockholder)
trustee becomes qualified to be a director
o ratio: since he is a registered owner, he fulfills the qualification of the Code that he own at
least one share which shall stand in his name on the books of the corporation
rights other than voting rights may be transferred to the trustee
no voting trust agreement may be kept secret among the parties thereto
o a copy must be given to SEC and to the Corporation
o must be open to examination by any stockholder
o agreement cannot be exclusive
ratio: law gives the right to any other stockholder to transfer his shares to the trustee
upon the same terms and conditions in the voting trust agreement
abuses/disadvantages
o if collectively the transferring stockholders hold the controlling interest, the control of
management will pass to the voting trustee, who need not even be a stockholder and is
often a complete stranger to the corporation
o abuses/violations of agreement even before the stockholder knows about it
o suggestion: voting trust be outlawed and instead, the law should recognize irrevocable
proxies to delegate and centralize control for proper purposes
in this way, the purpose of the voting trust is achieved without a transfer of the
shares, which is the fact which gives rise to possible abuses
Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
an agreement between two or more stockholders to vote their shares the same way
o may cover a wide range of matters
o usually relate to election of directors
o may either specify the name of directors to be voted for or may simply provide that the
shares will be voted as a unit
o often provide for arbitration in case of disagreement
o example: stockholders who individually own only a minority of the share but together would
represent a majority, can obtain control of the management of the corporation
upheld as valid as long as they do not limit the discretion of the board of directors in the
management of the corporate affairs, or work any fraud against the stockholders not parties to the
contract
invalid an agreement that the directors once elected must vote for certain persons as officers
o ratio: the choice of officers is vested by law in the board of directors
difference from voting trust agreement
o voting agreement does not involve a transfer of stocks but is merely a private agreement
between two or more stockholders to vote the same way in stockholders meetings
o voting agreement is a contract its violation may give rise to liabilities for damages in
proper cases
special provision as regards close corporations (Sec. 100 Agreements by stockholders)
o paragraph 1
refers to stockholders agreements in general, including but not limited to voting and
pooling agreements
are entered into prior to incorporation, when both parties have some bargaining
power
pre-incorporation agreeements among the stockholders remain effective even after
incorporation if so intended, and even if they are not reflected in the AOI, unless the
matters involved are required to appear therein
only limitation agreements should not be inconsistent with AOI
o paragraph 3
the modern trend of giving close corporations the freedom to operate as a
partnership among the stockholders, but remaining a corporation as far as 3 rd parties
are concerned
o paragraph 4
qualifies the general rule that no voting agreement may interfere with the discretion
of the board
in this case, tha parties to th agreement assume the liabilities of directors
o paragraph 2
refers to pooling and voting agreements in particular
does this provisions necessarily imply that these agreements can be valid only in
close corporations?
No reason in denying stockholders of corporations other than close ones the
right to enter into voting or pooling agreements to protect their interest, as
long as they do not intend to commit any wrong or fraud on the other
stokholders not parties to the agreement
Close corporations limited only to those which will fall under the definition
provided in Sec. 96
o But it is entirely possible that a corporation which is in fact a close
corporation will not come withtin the definition in such case, its
stockholders should not be precluded from entering into contracts like
voting agreements if these are otherwise valid
4. Cumulative voting
Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
In an election contest, it is vital to both the majority and minority blocks to so cumulate their votes
so that they can get as many seats as possible in the board
Example: majority wants to elect all five directors so they distributed their votes equally among its
five candidates
o But the minority cumulates its votes in favor of only three candidates
o Then it is possible for the majority to lose their control to the minority
Formula
o For determining the minimum number of votes needed to elect one director (Professor Frey
formula)
Number of share required = number of votes outstanding
Number of directors to be elected
Example: there are 400 shares represented in a meeting where 5 directors are
to be elected; M needs 67 4/6 voted to be elected as director
o For determining the number of shares to elect a given number of directors (X)
Y = total number of shares represented
D = number of directors one desires to elect
D = total number of directors to be elected
X=YxD+1
D+1
Example: if M wishes to cotrol the board and aims at electing 3 directors, he
will need 201 shares to do so
Strongest argument against cumulative voting
o It would result in the election of partisans, whose roles would be inconsistent with the
function of a director to represent the corporation as a whole and not just one group of
shareholders
By-laws cannot prohibit cumulative voting
o Ratio: this right is mandated in Sec. 24
o Would it be possible however to do away with cumulative voting by a waiver in a voting
agreement? Would this kind of agreement be covered by Sec. 100, par. 1 with respect to
close corporations?
5. Classification of shares
Allowed by the Code in Sec. 6
Example: shares classified into common voting and preferred non-voting shares
o Management held by whoever owns the majority of the common voting shares, which
majority may in fact be only a minority of the total number of shares, voting and non-voting
o Control would thus depend not on the amount of investment made but on the number of
votin shares acquired
o Preference of non-voting shares over dividends or assets upon liquidation may compensate
for lack of voting rights
If non-voting shares are redeemable, compensating factor is investment may be reacquired anytime even before dissolution
o Non-voting shares may even be both preferred and redeemable
SEC usually requires that where no dividends are declared for 3 consecutive years inspite of
available profits, the preferred stocks will be given the right to vote for directors until dividends are
declared
Shares which may be deprived of the right to vote
o Redeemable
o Preferred
Example: corporation with 5 stockholders owning varying amounts of stock, each with equal voting
rights
o Same number of common stocks with full voting rights may be issued to each
o Any additional investment woule be in the form of preferred non-voting stocks
Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
1. If stock of a close corporation is issued or transferred to any person who is not entitled under any
provision of the articles of incorporation to be a holder of record of its stock, and if the certificate for such
stock conspicuously shows the qualifications of the persons entitled to be holders of record thereof, such
person is conclusively presumed to have notice of the fact of his ineligibility to be a stockholder.
2. If the articles of incorporation of a close corporation states the number of persons, not exceeding twenty
(20), who are entitled to be holders of record of its stock, and if the certificate for such stock conspicuously
states such number, and if the issuance or transfer of stock to any person would cause the stock to be held
by more than such number of persons, the person to whom such stock is issued or transferred is
conclusively presumed to have notice of this fact.
3. If a stock certificate of any close corporation conspicuously shows a restriction on transfer of stock of
the corporation, the transferee of the stock is conclusively presumed to have notice of the fact that he has
acquired stock in violation of the restriction, if such acquisition violates the restriction.
4. Whenever any person to whom stock of a close corporation has been issued or transferred has, or is
conclusively presumed under this section to have, notice either (a) that he is a person not eligible to be a
holder of stock of the corporation, or (b) that transfer of stock to him would cause the stock of the
corporation to be held by more than the number of persons permitted by its articles of incorporation to
hold stock of the corporation, or (c) that the transfer of stock is in violation of a restriction on transfer of
stock, the corporation may, at its option, refuse to register the transfer of stock in the name of the
transferee.
5. The provisions of subsection (4) shall not be applicable if the transfer of stock, though contrary to
subsections (1), (2) or (3), has been consented to by all the stockholders of the close corporation, or if the
close corporation has amended its articles of incorporation in accordance with this Title.
6. The term "transfer", as used in this section, is not limited to a transfer for value.
7. The provisions of this section shall not impair any right which the transferee may have to rescind the
transfer or to recover under any applicable warranty, express or implied.
Most common gives a first option to the other stockholders and/or the corporation to acquire the
shares of a stockholder who wishes to sell them
Device peculiar to close corporations
o Sec. 96 provides that a corporation cannot qualify for the special treatments accorded to
close corporations unless transfer of its stocks is subject to one or more of the restrictions
allowed by law
Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
One of the matters which may be provided for in the by-laws is a definition of the qualifications of
directors or trustees
Possible to prescribe certain qualifications for directors as a device to control the corporation
Valid
o by-law provision that only stockholders with a stated minimum number of shares fully paid
up may be elected as directors
o that only holders of founders shares may qualify for directorship
As long as the qualifications imposed are reasonable and not meant to unjustly or unfairly deprive
the minority of their rightful representation in the board of directors, such provisions are within the
power of the majority of the stocks to provide in the by-laws
Founders shares
o Shares which were originally owned by those who founded the corporation, and which may
be transferred to others without losing their character as founders shares
o An exception to the rule that non-voting shares shall be limited to preferred and redeemable
shares
o Privilege intended to compensate the efforts of the organizers of the corporation
May Sec. 7 be interpreted to cover a provision granting founders shares the exclusive right to
dividends for a periof of 5 years?
o 5 years may not be extended
SEC approval required
o Hence, SEC may disapprove but grounds for disapproval not specified
o Disapprove when manifestly oppressive to other stockholders
8. Management contracts
Section 44. Power to enter into management contract. No corporation shall conclude a management
contract with another corporation unless such contract shall have been approved by the board of directors
and by stockholders owning at least the majority of the outstanding capital stock, or by at least a majority
of the members in the case of a non-stock corporation, of both the managing and the managed
corporation, at a meeting duly called for the purpose: Provided, That (1) where a stockholder or
stockholders representing the same interest of both the managing and the managed corporations own or
control more than one-third (1/3) of the total outstanding capital stock entitled to vote of the managing
corporation; or (2) where a majority of the members of the board of directors of the managing corporation
also constitute a majority of the members of the board of directors of the managed corporation, then the
management contract must be approved by the stockholders of the managed corporation owning at least
two-thirds (2/3) of the total outstanding capital stock entitled to vote, or by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the
members in the case of a non-stock corporation. No management contract shall be entered into for a
period longer than five years for any one term.
The provisions of the next preceding paragraph shall apply to any contract whereby a corporation
undertakes to manage or operate all or substantially all of the business of another corporation, whether
such contracts are called service contracts, operating agreements or otherwise: Provided, however, That
such service contracts or operating agreements which relate to the exploration, development, exploitation
or utilization of natural resources may be entered into for such periods as may be provided by the
pertinent laws or regulations. (n)
Section 45. Ultra vires acts of corporations. No corporation under this Code shall possess or exercise any
corporate powers except those conferred by this Code or by its articles of incorporation and except such as
are necessary or incidental to the exercise of the powers so conferred.
A contract to manage the day-to-day affairs of the corporation just like a general manager does
The board of directors may decide to enter into a management contract with another corporation
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Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
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Corporation Law
VI. Control and Management of Corporations
The articles of incorporation may likewise provide that all officers or employees or that specified officers or
employees shall be elected or appointed by the stockholders, instead of by the board of directors.
Example where voting requirements are increasedbeyond the minimum required by law
o Increases the veto power of the minority
Legally possible in most instances where stockholders action is required
In exchange for the numerical majority in the board of directors, the minority mught bargain for a
provision in the AOI giving them a strong veto power in major corporate decisions
o Example: the AOI may require the vote of 80% of the subscribed capital stock for the
approval of an amendment to the AOI, which vote is more thatn the 2/3 requirement of Sec.
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Would it be legally possible to provide in the AOI of a close corporation that a unanimous vote od
the stockholders would be necessaey in certain instances? useless requiremeent
o It will only have the effect of maintaining the status quo
o Stockholder can merely absent himself from a meeting
o If at the outset, the parties started with their desired allocation of board seats, the unanimity
vote requirement would maintain that allocation
o If intention to replace a director, unanimityrequirement will make it possible for them to
block someone elses election
The provision in the AOI of a close corporation requiring a higher quorum or voting requirement
cannot be amended except by the vote of th stockholders representing such higher voting
requirement, whether voting or non-voting
Assuming unanious voting anf presence provisions are valid
o Deadlocks are bound to occur more often in their presence
Except in close corporations, the law did not intend to allow a unanimity requirement as this would
be inconsistent with the theory of corporate democracy
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