Case No.

S
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN M. GAGGERO,
Plaintiffand Appellant,
vs.
KNAPP,PETERSEN & CLARKE; STEVEN RAY GARCIA;
STEPHEN M. HARRIS and ANDRE JARDINI,
Defendants and Respondents;
PACIFIC COAST MANAGEMENT,INC.; 511 OFW LP;
GINGERBREAD COURT LP; MALIBU BROAD BEACH LP; MARINA
GLENCOE LP; BLU HOUSE LLC; BOARDWALK SUNSET LLC; and
JOSEPH PRASKE as Trustee of
THE GIGANIN TRUST,THE ARENZANO TRUST,
and THE AQUASANTE FOUNDATION
Additional Judgment Debtors and Appellants

After a Decision by the

COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION EIGHT
Case No. B243062

PETITION FOR REVIEW

DAVID BLAKE CHATFIELD,Bar No. 88991

EDWARD A. HOFFMAN,Bar No. 167240
WESTLAKE LAW GROUP
LAW OFFICES OF EDWARD A. HOFFMAN
TOWNSGATE RD., SUITE 330
2625
BOULEVARD,
SUITE
1250
11755 WILSHIRE
WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CA 91361
LOS ANGELES,CALIFORNIA 90025

(310)442-3600

(805) 267-1220

eah@hoffmanlaw.com

davidblakec@yahoo.com

AttorneyfoY Additional Judgment

DebtoNs, and Appellants
Pacific Coast Management, Inc., et al.

Attorneyfor Plaintiff
and Appellant
Stephen M. Gaggero

ISSUES PRESENTED
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2), petitioners respectfully
ask this Court to grant review in the present matter and hold it pending the final
disposition in the related case 5222843.
WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED
Petitioners respectfully ask this Court to grant review in the present matter and
hold it pending the final disposition in the related case 5222843, which seeks review
of the decision in Gaggero v. Knapp Peterson & ClaYke et al., 2nd Dist. No. B241675.
That appeal and this one both arose from the same Superior Court case and were
decided concurrently after being consolidated for purposes of oral argument.
Case B241675 challenged an order adding ten additional debtors to an existing
judgment. The present appeal challenges a subsequent amended judgment in the same
matter imposing an award of attorney fees and costs against the original and additional
judgment debtors. That amended judgment will have to be summarily reversed if
appellants ultimately prevail in B241675. But if the Court grants review in that case
and not in this one, the judgment in this case could become final while the lead case is
still pending. Petitioners seek agrant-and-hold order pursuant to California Rules of
Court, rule 8.512(d)(2) to prevent that from happening.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 29, 2012, the trial court amended a prior judgement against petitioner
Stephen M. Gaggero to add ten new debtors. They were petitioners Pacific Coast
Management,Inc., 511 OFW LP, Gingerbread Court LP, Malibu Broad Beach LP,
Marina Glencoe LP, Blu House LLC,and Boardwalk Sunset LLC. and Joseph Praske
as Trustee ofthe Giganin Trust, the Arenzano Trust, and the Aquasante Foundation.
(Collectively the "AJDs".) They all appealed that order in 2nd Dist. No. B241675.
They later appealed an August 6, 2012 amended judgment in the same case.
That appeal is the present matter, 2nd Dist. No. B243062.(CT2 319-320.)In yet
another appeal, 2nd Dist. No. B245114, they challenged further orders in the same
case appointing a receiver and assigning various rights.

The appeals were briefed separately, but the Court of Appeal consolidated them
solely for the purposes of oral argument. It affirmed all three sets of underlying orders
in full on November 7, 2014.
Petitioners have filed a substantive petition for review of the decision in
B241675. That petition is Sup. Ct. No. 5222843.t~ In order to prevent the other two
appellate decisions from becoming final while 5222843 is pending, petitioners ask the
Court to grant review in each pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)
and hold them pending the outcome of S222843.
If petitioners ultimately prevail in B241675,they will be entitled to summary
reversals in B243062 and B245114. Judgments and orders made in furtherance of
prior judgments necessarily fall if the prior judgment falls (see Purdy v. Johnson
(1929) 100 Cal.App. 416, 420-421; Gillan v. City ofSan Marino (2007) 147
Ca1.App.4th 1033, 1053) unless they become final first. That is why they have
brought this petition.
The AJDs argued in the present appeal, inter alia, that they had been denied due
process because respondents failed to serve them with the underlying costs
memorandum and fee motion, which had been filed before they were added to the
judgment.(AJD AOB 16-19.) They also noted that the motion and memorandum had
sought relief only against Gaggero, so that even if they'd seen it they would not have
been on notice that their interests were at stake.(AJD AOB 18-19.) They and Gaggero
each challenged various aspects ofthe fee and costs award.(AJD AOB 21-35;
Gaggero AOB 11-19.) And they all explained that they would be entitled to a full
reversal if they prevailed in appeal B241675.(AJD AOB 14-15; Gaggero AOB 8-11.)
The Court of Appeal rejected all of these arguments. It held that the AJDs had

-`~It already has a case number because the Court of Appeal denied a
third-party publication request and forwarded it to this Court. There were no
such requests in B243062 or B245114, so they do not yet have case numbers
in this Court.
2

no due process right to be served with the papers because they were Gaggero's alter
egos, so that serving him amounted to serving them as well.(Opn. 9-10.) For similar
reasons, it said they had not been prejudiced by the fact that the fee motion and costs
memo had named only Gaggero.(Opn. 9-10.) The court rejected their other arguments
as well.(Opn. 4-8.) It subsequently denied their petition for rehearing.
CONCLUSION
Although Petitioners are not asking the Court to review the merits ofthe
decision in this appeal, they respectfully ask it to grant review and hold the case so
that they will not lose any of their rights if the Court ultimately rules in their favor in
S222843.

Dated: December 17, 2014

Respectfully submitted,

LAW OFFICES OF EDWARD A. HOFFMAN

Edward A. Hof n
Attorneys for Petitioners Pacific Coast
Management, Inc. 511 OFW L.P., Gingerbread
Court L.P., Malibu Broadbeach, L.P., Marina
Glencoe L.P., Blu House L.L.C., Boardwalk Sunset
L.L.C., Joseph Praske as Trustee for Giganin Trust,
Arenzano Trust, and Aquasante Foundation

WESTLA.KE LAW GROUP

DaLid~~lake Chatfield
for Petitioner Stephen M. Gaggero

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(d)(1))
The text of this Brief consists of 800 words as counted by the Corel
WordPerfect version 16 (also known as WordPerfect X6) word-processing software
with which it was written.
DATED: December 17, 2014

Respectfully submitted,

Edward A. Hoffinan
Law Offices ofEdward A. offinan
Attorney for Petitioners Pacific Coast
Management, Inc., 511 OFW L.P.,
Gingerbread Court L.P., Malibu
Broadbeach, L.P., Marina Glencoe L.P., Blu
House L.L.C., Boardwalk Sunset L.L.C.,
Joseph Praske as Trustee for Giganin Trust,
Arenzano Trust, and Aquasante Foundation

EXHIBIT A

Filed 11/7/14

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except asspecied by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion Fias not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND DIST.

DIVISION EIGHT

Nov 07, 2014

JOSEPH A. LANE, Clerk

STEPHEN M. GAGGERO et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

B243062

Sinn Lui

Deputy Clerk

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC286925)

v.
KNAPP,PETERSEN & CLARKE et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order ofthe Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles.
Robert L. Hess, Judge. Affirmed.
Westlake Law Group and David Blake Chatfield for Plaintiff and Appellant
Stephen M. Gaggero.
Law Offices ofEdward A. Hoffman and Edward A. Hoffman for Appellants
Pacific Coast Management, Inc.; 511 OFW LP; Gingerbread Court LP; Malibu Broad
Beach LP; Marina Glencoe LP; Blu House LLC; Boardwalk Sunset LLC; and Joseph
Praske, as Trustee ofthe Aquasante Foundation, the Arenzano Trust and the Giganin
Trust.
Miller, Randall A. Miller and Steven S. Wang for Defendants and Respondents.

SUMMARY
Plaintiff Stephen Gaggero and 10 additional judgment debtors appeal from an
order granting a motion for postjudgment enforcement costs and accrued interest filed by
defendants Knapp, Petersen &Clarke and several of its principals, and denying plaintiffs
motion to tax costs. This order was incorporated in a third amended judgment in favor of
defendants.
Plaintiff contends the trial court erroneously awarded fees and costs that were not
recoverable because they allegedly were not related to enforcement of the judgment.
Additional judgment debtors make similar arguments, and in addition contend that the
third amended judgment violated their due process rights and violated a stay order; that
there is insufficient evidence to support large portions ofthe award; and that defendants
are estopped from claiming interest and enforcement costs against them.
We affirm the orders.
FACTS
In May 2010, we affirmed a judgment against plaintiff in a malpractice lawsuit he
brought against defendants. The judgment included an attorney fee award of more than
$1.2 million. (Gaggero v. Knapp, Petersen &Clarke(May 6, 2010, 8207567)[nonpub.
opn.](Gaggero I or the malpractice case).) In two unpublished opinions filed today, we
have affirmed an order granting defendants' motion to add seven entities and the trustee
of three trusts as additional judgment debtors to the judgment(Gaggero v. Knapp,
Petersen &Clarke (Nov. 7, 2014, B241675)(Gaggero II or the alter ego case)), and we

have affirmed later orders appointing a receiver and assigning financial rights of
additional judgment debtors to defendants. (Gaggero v. Knapp, Petersen & ClaYke
(Nov. 7, 2014, B245114)(Gaggero III.)
This appeal challenges the postjudgment enforcement costs and accrued interest
awarded to defendants in the third amended judgment entered on August 6, 2012. That
judgment added $87,722.25 in postjudgment enforcement costs and $569,569.96 in
accrued postjudgment interest to the principal balance of$1,520,943.30 from the
previous judgment. The procedural chronology is this:
2

On May 19, 2008, the trial court entered the judgment against plaintiff.
On May 6, 2010, we affirmed the judgment.
On December 28, 2010, the judgment was amended to include attorney fees and
costs on appeal and postjudgment interest.
On April 10, 2012, after unsuccessful efforts to enforce the judgment against
plaintiff, defendants moved to add additionaljudgment debtors to the judgment.
On May 15, 2012, defendants filed the motion for postjudgment enforcement costs
and accrued interest that is at issue in this appeal.
On May 29, 2012, the trial court found additional judgment debtors were
plaintiffs alter egos and added them to the judgment.
On May 31, 2012, plaintiff moved to tax the postjudgment enforcement costs.
On June 29, 2012, plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion for postjudgment
enforcement costs.
On July 6, 2012, defendants filed a reply in support of their motion for
postjudgment enforcement costs, serving it on plaintiff and additional judgment debtors.
On July 13, 2012, the trial court granted defendants' motion for enforcement costs
and interest in the amount sought, and denied plaintiffs motion to tax costs.
On August 3, 2012, plaintiff's attorney filed a notice of appeal from the July 13,
2012 order on behalf of plaintiff and additional judgment debtors.
On August 6, 2012, the trial court entered the third amended judgment
incorporating the postjudgment enforcement costs and accrued interest. On the same day,
in response to a supersedeas petition additional judgment debtors filed in the alter ego
case, this court issued a stay of proceedings in the trial court to enforce the judgment
against additional judgment debtors. The stay was lifted on August 30, 2012.
Additional relevant facts will appear in our discussion ofthe legal issues, and
other details ofthe litigation also appear in Gaggero II and Gaggero III, filed
simultaneously with this opinion. For our purposes here, it suffices to say that plaintiff
apparently is loath to pay his creditors, and long ago devised an "estate plan" under
which he transferred his personal assets, then amounting to some $35 or $40 million, to
3

limited partnerships and limited liability companies, and then transferred his ownership
ofthose entities to several trusts, with estate lawyer Joseph Praske as trustee. In

Gaggero II, we affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Praske was plaintiff's
"rubber stamp" and the entities in plaintiff's estate plan Mr. Praske as trustee ofthe
three trusts and seven other entities that comprised the trust assets were plaintiff's alter
egos and liable for the judgment against him. Now he and they object to the award of
postjudgment enforcement costs defendants incurred in efforts to satisfy the judgment.
DISCUSSION
A judgment creditor "is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing
a judgment." (Code Civ. Proc., 685.040.) (All statutory citations are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.) Attorney fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included in
collectible costs ifthe underlying judgment included an award of attorney fees as costs

(ibid.), as was the case here.

Under section 685.070, a judgment creditor may claim, by filing a memorandum
of costs, specified statutory fees and costs; costs incurred in connection with enforcement
proceedings that have been approved by the judge or referee conducting the proceeding;
and the attorney fees allowed by section 685.040. ( 685.070, subds.(a)&(b).)
Section 685.080 allows the judgment creditor to claim costs authorized by section
685.040 by noticed motion. ( 685.080, subd.(a).) The costs claimed under section
685.080 "may include, but are not limited to, costs that may be claimed under Section
685.070 and costs incurred but not approved by the court or referee" in other enforcement
proceedings. (Ibid.) "The court shall make an order allowing or disallowing the costs to
the extent justified under the circumstances ofthe case." ( 685.080, subd.(c).)
"The usual standard ofreview for an award of attorney fees is abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] But whether the trial court had the authority to award attorney fees is a legal
issue which we review de novo." (Globalist Internet Technologies, Inc. v. Reda(2008)
167 Ca1.App.4th 1267, 1273; see Chinese Yellow Pages Co. v. Chinese Overseas

Marketing Service Corp.(2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 868, 886 [questions as to whether fees

and costs incurred to enforce a judgment were "reasonable and necessary in whole or in
part" are left "in the good hands of the trial court"].)
Defendants filed both a memorandum of costs and a noticed motion, seeking
$87,722.25 for judgment enforcement efforts since December 2010, consisting of
$86,247.70 in attorney fees and $1,474.55 in costs. A declaration from their counsel
described the postjudgment discovery defendants conducted in their attempts to enforce
the judgment; plaintiff's failure to cooperate in responding to discovery; counsel's "time
consuming and arduous" task of obtaining information on the structure of plaintiff's
"estate plan" and its associated entities; the compilation of evidence to support its motion
to add alter ego entities to the judgment; and so on. Counsel's invoices for fees incurred
in the judgment collection efforts and other documents were included with defendants'
motion.
We conclude the trial court did not err in finding the fees and costs awarded were
"reasonable and necessary costs" of enforcing the judgment, and none ofthe claims to the
contrary has merit.
1.

Contentions that Costs Were Not Incurred to Enforce the Judgment

Plaintiff contends that only $28,103 ofthe $86,247.70 in attorney fees were

incurred enforcing the judgment against him, and the rest ofthe award cannot stand.
First, he asserts that he cannot be made to pay fees connected with defendants'
alter ego motion,"because they were not incurred to enforce the judgment against him."
He cites no authority that supports his contention and, in light of our conclusion in
Gaggero II that he and additional judgment debtors are alter egos and that he controlled
them to serve his own ends, the claim is plainly without merit. Plaintiff's further claim
that defendants' alter ego motions were not "reasonable and necessary" cannot withstand
scrutiny; plaintiff testified at his debtor exam that he has never had the resources to pay
the judgment against him. Additional judgment debtors' similar claim, that defendants'
alter ego motion was an effort "to change the judgment, not to enforce it," is equally
specious. The motion was plainly an effort to collect the unpaid judgment, and the costs
of bringing it are recoverable under section 685.040. (Cf. Cardinale v. Miller(2014)222
5

Ca1.App.4th 1020, 1025, 1026 [an award of fees as costs against third parties who
conspired to help a judgment debtor evade efforts to enforce a judgment was authorized
under section 685.040].)
Second, plaintiff contends that attorney fees for activities such as preparing status
reports to defendants and their insurance carriers "had nothing to do with enforcing the
judgment" and cannot be recovered. He cites no authority for this proposition, legal or
practical, and we reject it. Such activities are a necessary aspect ofthe attorney services
performed to enforce the judgment.
Third, plaintiff contends several entries on the legal bills were for work on other
cases. He cites several pages of defendants' invoices that contain entries referring to the
"Sulpher Mountain" and "Bungee" cases (apparently referring to such entries as "Assess
additional information about underlying Sulphur Mountain case for revisions to report").
But plaintiff makes no showing that any ofthese entries(which he does not specifically
quote) were for work on those other cases; the "information," for all we know, was
pertinent to this case. And, since plaintiff says he brought these entries to the trial court's
attention, we must assume the trial court concluded the work was pertinent to this case.
Plaintiff offers no basis for this court to conclude otherwise.
Fourth, plaintiff contends the fee award included "hundreds of dollars" for seeking
an award of fees and costs related to plaintiff's appeal from the original judgment in the
malpractice case. His first record citation is mistaken, and he does not identify the
objectionable entry or entries in his other record citation, or tell us the exact amount to
which he objects. Plaintiff cites no relevant authority, simply stating that "[d]efending
the propriety of a judgment is not the same thing as enforcing it." In view of plaintiff's
lack of specificity and the lack of cited authority for plaintiff's proposition, we can find
no error in the inclusion ofthese fees in the award.
Fifth, plaintiff contends the trial court should not have awarded "thousands of
dollars in fees for dozens of billing entries" related to plaintiff's appeal from a trial court
order compelling him to respond to postjudgment discovery. This was an appeal plaintiff
filed from an October 5, 2011 order granting defendants' motion to compel and imposing
D

monetary sanctions of$2,000 on plaintiff and his counsel. On October 3, 2012, this court
dismissed that appeal(case No. B236834) on the court's own motion as having been
taken from a nonappealable order. Plaintiff contends defendants' fees for work opposing
that appeal are not recoverable as costs of enforcement, because appellate attorney fees
"must be claimed after an appeal has been resolved," and his appeal ofthe order was still
pending when the trial court awarded the fees as costs of enforcement on July 13, 2012.
Again, plaintiff does not specify the precise amount ofthe fees to which he objects or
identify specific time entries, and cites no authority for the proposition that such fees can
never be recovered under section 685.040. They were clearly incurred in opposing
plaintiff's continued resistance to payment ofthe judgment. Under the circumstances, we
have no difficulty concluding that defendants may recover, as costs of enforcement, fees
related to work opposing the appeal of a postjudgment discovery order that was not
appealable in the first place.
Sixth, plaintiff asserts the trial court erred by awarding fees based on billing
entries that were "heavily redacted." (Defendants made the redactions to prevent plaintiff
from learning their enforcement strategy.) Plaintiff says "there was no way to tell what
they were for." We have examined the redacted entries, and do not share plaintiff's
difficulty in telling whether the entries were connected to the present case. And we do
not doubt that the trial court, being intimately familiar with the case, could review those
entries and determine they reflected fees for work that was reasonable and necessary for
enforcement ofthe judgment. Plaintiff has shown no abuse of discretion.
Finally, plaintiff objects to $137.40 in costs as nonrecoverable: $84 in filing fees
(a $44 filing fee for the alter ego motion, and a $40 filing fee for an ex parte application
to correct a minute order), and $53.40 for "unexplained photocopying charges." Plaintiff
gives no explanation for why the filing fees should not be recovered. The trial court
allowed them, and we are presented with no reason to disagree.
That leaves $53.40 in photocopying costs. Plaintiff says these costs are not
recoverable, citing Ripley v. Pappadopoulos(1994)23 Ca1.App.4th 1616, 1628, and says,
without explanation, that they were not related to enforcement ofthe judgment. Ripley
7

said that photocopying costs (like expert witness costs)"are expressly disallowed as costs
unless expressly permitted by law" under section 1033.5. (Ripley, at pp. 1627-1628,
citing 1033.5, subd.(b)(3)["photocopying charges, except for e~ibits" are "not
allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by law"]; but see the muchcriticized Bussey v. Affleck(1990)225 Ca1.App.3d 1162, 1165, 1167 [permitting recovery
of counsel's out-of-pocket costs where the parties have contracted for payment of fees
and costs]; see also 685.080, subd.(c)["[t]he court shall make an order allowing or
disallowing the costs [claimed for enforcing a judgment] to the extent justified under the
circumstances of the case"].) In this case, for all we know (plaintiff has provided no
transcript of the hearing), the photocopying costs were for e~ibits ofsome sort. Given
the de minimis nature of this cost $53.40 we decline to consider further whether there
was any error by the trial court.
2.

Other Claims by Additional Judgment Debtors

In addition to echoing plaintiff's contentions, additional judgment debtors offer

several other reasons for reversing the trial court's rulings.

They contend the trial court should not have awarded the $1,474.55 in costs
defendants sought. They claim there was no breakdown of the costs in the costs
memorandum to show the amounts of various statutory costs, and contend other costs
were not described sufficiently to determine whether they were "reasonable and
necessary." But all this information appears in the evidence accompanying defendants'
noticed motion, filed simultaneously with the costs memorandum. All costs were
specifically listed in defendants' invoices, and documentation ofthe costs was attached to
the invoices. We see no reason why the trial court should not have found the
documentation satisfactory, and the costs claimed reasonable and necessary.
In the same vein, additional judgment debtors claim the attorney fees should be
reduced by $20,550, for work performed by six individuals, because "there is no
declaration stating that any ofthem are attorneys." This is a frivolous claim. The claim
refers, for example, to time entries for Kamran Khajavi-Nouri, who the record shows
appeared in court for defendants on October 5, 2011, as well as to time entries for other

lawyers described in the billing as "partner" or "counsel," some of whom had billing
rates higher than the associate who did most ofthe work. And,the associate's
declaration states that, in addition to her,"several other Miller LLP attorneys worked on
judgment enforcement efforts since December 2010." The trial court was in a good
position to know whether these fees were appropriate.
Additional judgment debtors also make several procedural claims.
First, they say that the third amended judgment they challenge in this appeal
violated their due process rights, because defendants did not serve them with the fee
motion and memorandum of costs. (They also complain that the motion sought no relief
against them, so even if they had been served, the papers "would have failed to put them
on notice that their rights were at stake or that they had reason to attend the July 13
hearing [on the postjudgment enforcement costs].") These complaints are meritless.

defendants filed their motion for postjudgment enforcement costs and accrued

interest two weeks

befoYe

ante),

There was no due process violation. As the chronology of events shows(see p. 3,

the hearing on their alter ego motion. At that time, there was

no reason to serve additional judgment debtors because they were not yet additional
judgment debtors. After they were added to the judgment on May 29, defendants served
them with (1)their June 29, 2012 opposition to plaintiff's motion to tax costs, and (2)
their July 6, 2012 reply in support of their motion for postjudgment enforcement costs.

plaintiff

(We note that, although the trial court added them to the judgment on May 29, 2012,
did not serve additional judgment debtors with his May 31, 2012 motion to tax
costs, or his July 6, 2012 reply to defendants' opposition, or his June 29, 2012 opposition
to the motion for postjudgment enforcement costs, which reveals the farce behind this
particular argument.) The assertion that additional judgment debtors had no notice of or
opportunity to be heard at the July 13, 2012 hearing, and "no notice their interests would
be at stake" at that hearing, is simply untrue. They had been added to the judgment, and
they had actual notice ofthe July 13 hearing through defendants' service of their
opposition and reply papers. And if this were not enough, additional judgment debtors
ignore the fact that they were found to be alter egos of plaintiff, who controlled trustee
E

Praske and the rest ofthe additional judgment debtors to serve plaintiff's ends, a
conclusion we have affirmed today in Gaggero II. As a practical matter, there can be no
doubt additional judgment debtors were fully apprised of all developments in this
litigation.
Next, additional judgment debtors contend the third amended judgment, entered
on August 6, 2012, is "void" because it was entered on the same day as this court's stay
order, which "trump[s]" the trial court's amended judgment. This is another frivolous
contention. As additional judgment debtors acknowledge, trial courts retain jurisdiction
to amend judgments to add fees and costs while an appellate stay is in place.
Finally, additional judgment debtors contend that defendants are estopped to claim
accrued interest and enforcement costs against them, because defendants should have
added them to the judgment years ago, rather than waiting unti12012. As we have found
in Gaggero II, there is no basis for their claim ofimproper delay in adding them to the
judgment. Their claim in this appeal that we should nevertheless "at least hold that the
delay barred [defendants'] claim for interest and for the costs of enforcing the judgment
in the interim" because ifthey had been named in the original May 19, 2008 judgment,
"they could have paid it before any significant amount of interest had accrued" is
patently groundless.
3.

A Final Note on Motions Filed During this Appeal

In their respondents' brief, defendants point out that neither plaintiff nor additional

judgment debtors provided a reporter's transcript ofthe July 13, 2012 hearing at which
the trial court decided the motions at issue in this appeal. Defendants argue this failure
resulted in an inadequate record on appeal, precluding additional judgment debtors from
claiming the trial court abused its discretion in determining the costs were reasonable and
necessary, and from claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the award.
Defendants also argue, in response to additional judgment debtors' claim they had no
notice ofthe July 13 hearing, that the record was inadequate to show that additional
judgment debtors were not actually represented by counsel for plaintiff(David Chatfield)
at that hearing.
10

We have not considered the merits ofthese arguments in resolving this appeal.
Defendants' arguments did, however, precipitate both a request from additional judgment
debtors to file an oversized reply brief and a blizzard of further motions from additional
judgment debtors. These were(1) a motion to correct the record on appeal (to show that
the transcript ofthe alter ego hearing on May 29, 2012, erroneously showed that
plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Chatfield, said "I represent the trustee," when in fact the speaker
was David Esquibias, counsel for additional judgment debtors);(2)a motion to augment
the record on appeal(to prove that Mr. Esquibias was their counsel for all purposes
before and after the July 13 hearing); and (3)a motion to take evidence so they can
attempt to prove that plaintiff's failure to provide a reporter's transcript was really
defendants' fault(by "denying them notice ofthe July 13 hearing").
We deny all these motions. Additional judgment debtors are correct when they
say it was really Mr. Esquibias who said that he represented the trustee, but all ofthe ink
spilled on this and the other points is entirely unnecessary to our disposition ofthe
appeal. We understand that Mr. Esquibias represented the additional judgment debtors,
and our resolution ofthe appeal does not depend on whether he was or was not at the July
13 hearing, or on whether plaintiff's counsel did or did not also represent additional
judgment debtors at that hearing. As we have already concluded, additional judgment
debtors had actual notice ofthe hearing, and their failure to attend may not be laid at
defendants' door.
As for the absence of a transcript ofthe hearing, little need be said. In their reply
briefs, plaintiff and additional judgment debtors all say their appeal raises no questions
requiring a transcript. In any event, it was plaintiff's responsibility to procure a reporter,
if he wished to have a transcript on appeal, and, as we have concluded in Gaggero II,
plaintiff has controlled this litigation from its inception. To the extent, if at all, the
absence of a transcript has prevented plaintiff or additional judgment debtors from
showing that the trial court was wrong on any point and they say it has not that
absence was plaintiff's own doing. And it is settled that an order ofthe trial court is
presumed correct: "`All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
11

matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.'
[Citation.]" (Denham v. SuperioY Court(1970)2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) None was shown
here.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.

GRIMES,J.
We concur:
RUBIN, Acting P.J.

FLIER, J.

12

EXHIBIT B

1N THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION 8

STEPHEN M. GAGGERO et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
KNAPP PETERSEN & CLARKE,
Defendant and Respondent.
B243062
Los Angeles County No. BC286925

THE COURT:
Appellants' petition for rehearing is denied.

cc:

David Blake Chatfield

Edward A. Hoffman
David A. Esquibias
Randall A. Miller
Steven Seawhan Wang
File

December 8, 2014

PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Edward A. Hoffinan, declare as follows:
I am over eighteen (18) years of age and not a party to the within action. My
business address is 11755 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1250, Los Angeles, California
90025. On December 17, 2014, I served the within
PETITION FOR REVIEW
on each ofthe following, by placing a true copy thereof in a sealed envelope with
postage fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California, addressed
as follows:
Randall A. Miller
Steven Wang
Attorneys
Miller LLP
515 South Flower Street, Suite 2150
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2201

Office ofthe Clerk

Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Eight
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90013

Clerk of Court Civil

Los Angeles Superior Court
111 North Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012

David Blake Chatfield

Attorney
Westlake Law Group
2625 Townsgate Rd., Suite 330
Westlake Village, CA 91361

Clerk, Department 24
Los Angeles Superior Court
111 North Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(Courtesy copy for Delivery to the Hon.
Robert L. Hess)
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that
I signed this declaration on December 17, 2014 at Los Angeles, California.

Edward A. Hoffinan