Islamist Insurgents on the Defensive: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in 2016 a Small Wars Journal Anthology

Copyright © 2018 by Small Wars Foundation.

ISBN:   Softcover    978-1-5434-7882-2

             eBook        978-1-5434-7883-9

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.

Any people depicted in stock imagery provided by Thinkstock are models, and such images are being used for illustrative purposes only.

Certain stock imagery © Thinkstock.

Rev. date: 02/23/2018

Xlibris

1-888-795-4274

www.Xlibris.com

773502

Contents

Acronyms

Foreword: Islamist Insurgent Macro-Themes

Paul Kamolnick

Introduction: Islamist Insurgents on the Defensive

Robert J. Bunker and Dave Dilegge

Islamist Insurgents on the Defensive

Chapter 1: On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim’s December 2015 Speech: Further Evidence for Critical Vulnerabilities in the Crumbling Caliphate

Paul Kamolnick

Chapter 2: Whence Islam?

G. Murphy Donovan

Chapter 3: The Mysterious Case of the Islamic State Organization (ISO) Smiling Martyr—Solved

Paul Kamolnick

Chapter 4: The Country Club Jihad: A Study of North American Radicalization

Alex Reese

Chapter 5: Vetting, Assimilation and Terrorism

Virginia Byers

Chapter 6: A View from Afghanistan: Interview with Kate Clark of the Afghanistan Analysts Network

Jérôme Diaz

Chapter 7: The West’s Freedom Problem and the Root of Islamic Militancy

Mbaye Lo

Chapter 8: The Improvised Explosive Device Threat To The Homeland: Americans Are Not Prepared

Robert C. Hodges

Chapter 9: Iran: al-Qaeda’s Main Artery for Funds, Personnel and Communication. The Recently Released Osama bin Laden Letters

Alma Keshavarz

Chapter 10: The DAESH Health System: An Open Source Intel Report

John Bedolla and Miguel Bedolla

Chapter 11: Understanding the Wilaya AlForat: Heart of Daesh’s Homeland

Waleed al-Rawi and Sterling Jensen

Chapter 12: On ISIS: The Reality of the 21st Century Battlefield

M.G. Petranick

Chapter 13: Western Jihadist Threats to the Military

Sam Mullins

Chapter 14: The Inghamasi: ISIL’s New Way of War

John Rowley

Chapter 15: ISIS Will Not Get Far in Asia

Namrata Goswami

Chapter 16: ISIS: State or Terror Group?

Jessica Anderson

Chapter 17: Potential Terrorist Activity During Ramadan 2016 and Beyond

James Emery

Chapter 18: Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s May 21, 2016 Speech

Paul Kamolnick

Chapter 19: Now is the Time to Stop the Spread of the Islamic State in Libya

Robert C. Hodges

Chapter 20: ISIS’s Identity Crisis

Nicholas T. Williams

Chapter 21: Combating Domestic Terrorism: Observations from Brussels and San Bernardino

Peter Forster and Thomas Hader

Chapter 22: Al-Shabaab and Market-Based Development: When Social Protection and Service Provision Go Awry

Drew Calcagno

Chapter 23: Pragmatic Takfiris: Organizational Prioritization Along Islamic State’s Ideological Threshold

Craig Noyes

Chapter 24: Red Teaming the Taliban

Vince Tumminello

Chapter 25: An Embassy Bombing: Dar Es Salaam, August 7, 1998

Dante Paradiso

Chapter 26: Reassessing the Threat of Homegrown Violent Extremism in the United States: Overstated or Underestimated?

Taylor Applegate

Chapter 27: Why Kunduz Fell

Daniel Fisher and Christopher Mercado

Chapter 28: Untangling the Arab-Kurdish Web in Post-ISIL Northern Iraq

Matthew Cancian

Chapter 29: ISIS: An Adaptive Hybrid Threat in Transition

Scott Jasper and Scott Moreland

Chapter 30: ISIS: A Revolutionary Group, Fighting a Textbook Insurgency

Octavian Manea

Chapter 31: Book Review: The Dust of Kandahar

Jeff Goodson

Chapter 32: The Iraqi Military, The US-led Coalition and the Mosul Operation: The Risk of Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory

Norman Ricklefs

U.S.-Allied Policy and Counter-Insurgent Strategies

Chapter 33: Time for a Comprehensive Strategy Against Islamic Terrorism in 2016

Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol E. B. Choksy

Chapter 34: Airpower: Just Part of the Counterinsurgency Equation

Christopher A. Lawrence

Chapter 35: The Convoluted Coalition Against ISIS

James Emery

Chapter 36: Targeting American Terrorists with Drones: Efficient, But Legal?

Jan Schwarzenberg

Chapter 37: To Beat ISIS, We Ought to Try Robotskrieg

Gary Anderson

Chapter 38: On Winning Hearts and Minds: Key Conditions for Population-Centric COIN

Gregory D. Miller

Chapter 39: Weighing the Strategic Impact of Killing Civilians in Counter-Militancy

Andrew Kenealy

Chapter 40: Stability Operations: Lessons from Afghanistan

Charles T. Barham

Chapter 41: Could Iran and the US Overcome Their Mutual Animosity to Eradicate Daesh?

Ehsan Ahrari

Chapter 42: The Boko Haram Insurgency: Applying the FID Model?

Daniel E. Ward

Chapter 43: Stability Operations: Current Options for Engaging IS

Charles T. Barham

Chapter 44: What’s in a Name: A Strategic Analysis of The Islamic State

Dean Shumate

Chapter 45: No COIN Left In Afghanistan—Or The Elephant In The Room That No One Is Talking About

Franz J. Marty

Chapter 46: History of Regionalism and Tribalism in the Current Political Struggle for Libya: Key Reflections and Recommendations

Aleksandra Nesic and Kamal Showaia

Chapter 47: Time to Bring Counterinsurgency to Molenbeek

Gary Anderson

Chapter 48: More Lessons from a Long War

Joseph J. Collins

Chapter 49: Time to Bring Strategy to Molenbeek: No Need for Counterinsurgency

Marno de Boer

Chapter 50: The Lessons of the Envoy in an Age of Small Wars

Octavian Manea

Chapter 51: Beyond Half—Measures: Influencing Syria’s Political Order through Non-State Proxies

Steve Ferenzi

Chapter 52: Rethinking Communication Within the Global War On Terrorism

Greg Simons

Chapter 53: Staying Small to Stay Feasible: SOF Support in Countering Boko Haram

Rick Chersicla

Chapter 54: Countering the Boko Haram Group in Nigeria: The Relevance of Hybrid Doctrine

Adewunmi James Falode

Chapter 55: Countering the Narrative: Understanding Terrorist’s Influence and Tactics, Analyzing Opportunities for Intervention, and Delegitimizing the Attraction to Extremism

Jordan Isham and Lorand Bodo

Chapter 56: Treating Islamic Violent Extremism as a Pandemic Super-infection

Thomas Doherty

Chapter 57: The Need to Outsource Information Operations: Gramsci and the Ideological Defeat of Islamic Terrorism

William M. Darley

Chapter 58: ISIS and Mosul: Keeping Pandora’s Box Closed

James Howcroft

Chapter 59: Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield: An Exemplar of Joint Combined Arms Maneuver

Jeff Jager

Chapter 60: Special Interest Aliens: Achieving an Integrated Approach

Adam MacAllister, Dan Spengler, Kyle Larish and Nam-young Kim

Postscript: ISIS in 2016—‘The World Turned Upside Down’

James Brian McNabb

Notes

Notes on Contributors

ABOUT SMALL WARS JOURNAL AND FOUNDATION

Small Wars Journal facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field. We hope this, in turn, advances the practice and effectiveness of those forces prosecuting Small Wars in the interest of self-determination, freedom, and prosperity for the population in the area of operations.

We believe that Small Wars are an enduring feature of modern politics. We do not believe that true effectiveness in Small Wars is a ‘lesser included capability’ of a force tailored for major theater war. And we never believed that ‘bypass built-up areas’ was a tenable position warranting the doctrinal primacy it has held for too long—this site is an evolution of the MOUT Homepage, Urban Operations Journal, and urbanoperations.com, all formerly run by the Small Wars Journal’s Editor-in-Chief.

The characteristics of Small Wars have evolved since the Banana Wars and Gunboat Diplomacy. War is never purely military, but today’s Small Wars are even less pure with the greater inter-connectedness of the 21st century. Their conduct typically involves the projection and employment of the full spectrum of national and coalition power by a broad community of practitioners. The military is still generally the biggest part of the pack, but there a lot of other wolves. The strength of the pack is the wolf, and the strength of the wolf is the pack.

The Small Wars Journal’s founders come from the Marine Corps. Like Marines deserve to be, we are very proud of this; we are also conscious and cautious of it. This site seeks to transcend any viewpoint that is single service, and any that is purely military or naively U.S.-centric. We pursue a comprehensive approach to Small Wars, integrating the full joint, allied, and coalition military with their governments’ federal or national agencies, non-governmental agencies, and private organizations. Small Wars are big undertakings, demanding a coordinated effort from a huge community of interest.

We thank our contributors for sharing their knowledge and experience, and hope you will continue to join us as we build a resource for our community of interest to engage in a professional dialog on this painfully relevant topic. Share your thoughts, ideas, successes, and mistakes; make us all stronger.

…I know it when I see it.

Small Wars is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and global thermonuclear war. The Small Wars Journal embraces that imperfection.

Just as friendly fire isn’t, there isn’t necessarily anything small about a Small War.

The term Small War either encompasses or overlaps with a number of familiar terms such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, support and stability operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and many flavors of intervention. Operations such as noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance will often either be a part of a Small War, or have a Small Wars feel to them. Small Wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from their practitioners. The Small Wars Manual (a wonderful resource, unfortunately more ofte referred to than read) notes that:

Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.

The three block war construct employed by General Krulak is exceptionally useful in describing the tactical and operational challenges of a Small War and of many urban operations. Its only shortcoming is that is so useful that it is often mistaken as a definition or as a type of operation.

***

Small Wars Journal is NOT a government, official, or big corporate site. It is run by Small Wars Foundation, a 501 (c)(3) non-profit corporation, for the benefit of the Small Wars community of interest. The site principals are Dave Dilegge (Editor-in-Chief), Bill Nagle (Publisher), Robert Haddick (Managing Editor) and Peter Muson (Editor). Dilegge, Nagle and Haeddick, along with Daniel Kelly, serve as the Small Wars Foundation Board of Directors.

The views expressed in this anthology are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, or the U.S. Government, or any other U.S. armed service, intelligence or law enforcement agency, or local or state government.

Acronyms

Foreword

Islamist Insurgent Macro-Themes

Paul Kamolnick

Johnson City, TN

November 2017

It will take decades to arrive at a reasonable historical account of this so-called fourth terrorist wave, one whose predecessors—Anarchist, Ethno-nationalist, and Communist—deployed a terrorist modus operandi in pursuit of sociocultural/sociopolitical objectives. When terrorist methods are tactically deployed as a component of a far broader and generally commendable objective; when they are connected to a broad-based genuinely indigenous movement; when they are connected to a guerrilla or insurgent force with the potential for or actuality of mass appeal; and when viewed as an excusable though reprehensible tactic of last resort owing to the absence of any other political spaces for legitimate opposition; then, and only then, are we likely to witness the successful birth of new state entities—or the reshaping of existing entities—in which the partial midwife was tactical terrorism. In these cases, an inexorable transformation places the counterinsurgent in the position of attempting to prevent a historic inevitability. That is the new entity more than likely earning a seat in the United Nations as the latest nation-state to be won in a struggle for a new sovereign on new principles.

The Al Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) have never been able to lay claim to the type of historic movements described above. They are splinters off splinters within an isolated corner of militant Islamist imaginaries who have wreaked havoc for sure but, because of their extreme marginalization and therefore implosive dynamics, have only been sustained by the mastery of spectacular media-borne images of violent bloodshed, unsuccessfully leashed (owing to a dearth of actual evidence) alongside a bogus grievance narrative alleging Western hatred of and warfare against Islam as Islam. These groups have never been a genuine threat to US national security and, particularly at this moment in a world awash in newly discovered and exploited natural gas reserves, to US energy security. Murder, mayhem, dread, fear, assassination, and all that terrorism as tactic seeks to provoke, i.e. overreaction, retaliation, repression and suspicion, yes these are to be expected. And it is only by the counterinsurgent fighting back in the wrong way, that these terrorist adversaries even continue to survive. All the instruments of national power have and should be brought to bear on these terrorist entities—diplomatic, informational, cyber, economic, financial, intelligence, legal, and military—but, in most respects, the military instrument is a blunt instrument of last resort. There are better and smarter ways to preserve our blood and treasure as we disrupt, degrade, defeat, and destroy—through intelligent counterinsurgent use of all instruments of national power to deny access to the material, media, recruits, money, training, and territory (cyber-virtual and terrestrial-real estate) required to sustain terrorist activities.

There are three macro-themes that I believe will occupy future historians more than the last few decades of terrorist mayhem committed in the name of Sunni Islam unleashed by these two marginal entities whose treachery and barbarism shall ensure their eventual extinction:

• The first is the problem of fragile, failing, failed, and unrepresentative states. These are seedbeds of insurgency and vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. It is imperative that we stand back and conceptualize the broader question of contemporary states and their present vulnerabilities rather than swat at terrorist flies that shall feed on the detritus of failed promises and repressive and exclusive rulership. To take the most obvious example—the Islamic State Organization and its vicious will to power would have gained no traction had former Prime Minister Maliki’s Shi’a led government created a new social compact ensuring Sunni security, representation, and welfare. Additionally, other causes must also be factored in that facilitated an essentially punitive Shi’a state: the US decapitation of former Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein, the retributive de-Baathification policies unleashed by the Sunni-hating Ahmad Chalabi, and the cashiering of the entire existing Iraqi national security apparatus that unleashed an insurgency later exploited by post-9/11 Islamist armed elements fleeing Afghanistan.

• The second theme is the future of Sunni-Shia sectarian warfare. This conflict is inevitable owing to fourteen centuries of two irreconcilable conceptions of legitimate successorship from the Prophet Muhammad and their accompanying and distinct theological and juridical evolution. This conflict is also ensured by the post-1979 rise of the revolutionary Shi’a state in Iran. Unless American citizens are prepared to take sides in the historic equivalent of militant Roman Catholic-militant versus Protestant sectarian warfare, wisdom, prudence, and self-interest counsel that we remain largely on the sidelines. Each is God and the Devil to the other; and there is no worse bloodshed than that unleashed on ‘heretics’ and ‘apostates’ from the ‘one true faith.’

• The last theme is that this era of terror in the name of Islam will give way to centuries of non-violent competition between Islam and its major universal-historic arch-rival Christianity. Other faiths, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, will also face this challenge but it is Christiandom and Western socio-legal and sociopolitical conceptions that are most pertinent to the readership of this volume. The future for which we should prepare is what I call 3D—Demography, Democracy, Da’wa (preaching). Higher relative Islamic fertility rates will create far greater pressure on sociopolitical orders to democratize and take into account the aspirations, welfare, safety, and security of their respective Muslim populaces. Democracy can be interpreted in ways that ensure any human rights are derived from an ultimate Sovereign—Allah (God)—but Islam (similar to historic Judaism) also is a law-governed faith, and very significant debates over rights, duties, and religion and state, will govern intra-civilizational and inter-civilizational relations. These needn’t be clashes within or between civilizations, but are genuine conflicts and challenges. Two dimensions—a vertical dimension between government and governed and a horizontal dimension among the governed—will be subject to great debates, conflicts, but not inevitably by any means violent let alone terroristic clashes. Da’wa, or Islamic preaching of the Call to Allah, to submit before the Ultimate Sovereign, shall prevail as the predominant means for the existence and spread of Islam. This battle of creeds—Jesus is Lord versus There is No God but God, and Muhammad is His Prophet—is now fifteen centuries old. We should not approach this as Islamophobic ignorant Crusaders but as intelligent students of ancient Near Eastern salvation religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

As chronicled in this volume for the year 2016 CE, analytic acumen brought to bear on understanding terrorist adversaries and formulating smart counterinsurgent and counterterrorist strategies is a worthy endeavor. Much can be learned from reading these pages about understanding and successfully combating terrorism committed in the name of Sunni Islam. But let us see the broader Islamic and global forest—the long-run and the big picture—and not only the bloody spectacles that terrorist outliers have foisted on the world.

Introduction

Islamist Insurgents on the Defensive

Robert J. Bunker and Dave Dilegge

Claremont, CA and Largo, FL

November 2017

The Small Wars Journal (SWJ) anthology, Islamist Insurgents on the Defensive, represents the fourth in a series of works focused on the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and their affiliate groups. It covers the journal’s professional writings on this topical area for 2016 with an emphasis on the Islamic State itself and the ‘Caliphate territories’ it is defending against a large, yet byzantine, coalition of forces—Iraqi, American, Kurdish, Free Syrian Army, Turkish, Shia, Assad regime, Iranian, Hezbollah, Russian, et.al.—besieging it on all sides in Iraq and Syria. This odd coalition of interests has been operating under the old adage that the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ or at least, they can be worked with until my enemy is destroyed. In 2016, this group held itself together relatively well due to the threat ISIS still represented in the region and the fact that terrorist quasi-state was still a long way from being defeated. The anthology also has secondary areas of emphases concerning Jihadist threats to the U.S. homeland and Europe as well as threat concerns related to Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al-Shabab, and other entities.

The work was preceded by Jihadi Terrorism, Insurgency, and the Islamic State covering SWJ writings on this topical area for 2015 as well as the companion works Global Radical Islamist Insurgency: Al Qaeda and Islamic State Networks Focus covering the 2012-2014 time span and Global Radical Islamist Insurgency: Al Qaeda Network Focus covering the 2007-2011 time span, totaling together over 2,200 pages of primarily U.S. professional defense community scholarship.

This new 900 page work is composed of an acronyms listing, a foreword, this introduction, sixty chapters of articles, a postscript, notes, and information on contributors to the anthology. The foreword written by Dr. Paul Kamolnick—a recent author of a comprehensive monograph comparing Al Qaeda and the Islamic State who is with East Tennessee State University—provides a perspective on Islamist insurgent macro-themes related to fragile and insolvent states, the future of Sunni-Shia sectarian warfare, and the projected shift away from terror in the name of Islam to non-violent competition between Islam and Christianity.[1]

The postscript penned by Dr. James Brian McNabb—a Middle East security expert and the author of A Military History of the Modern Middle East (Praeger, 2017) who is with Troy University—discusses Islamic State activities in 2016 and the symbolic contrasts it represents to an earlier historical event—the Surrender at Yorktown—in which the British tune The World Turned Upside Down was played.

The chapters, in turn, are divided into two thematic sections. The first section, titled Insurgents on the Defensive, is compose of 32 articles and focuses on the context and activities of various radical Islamist groups and their members. It begins with the contribution by Paul Kamolnick in Chapter 1 titled On Self-Declared Calipah Ibrahim’s December 2015 Speech. In that piece, the author discusses and analyzes a 24-minute speech of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s related to the apocalyptic world view held by the Islamic State and the vulnerabilities this may allow the U.S. to exploit. Another article of great interest is the essay On ISIS: The Reality of the 21st Century Battlefield (Chapter 12) by M.G. Petranick, a Public Policy and Administration program doctoral candidate. In that long essay, he discusses asymmetric and fourth generation warfare utilized by the Islamic State and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Also, of special importance, is the article written by John Rowley—a U.S. Army Captain—in Chapter 14 titled The Inghamasi: ISIL’s New Way of War. This tactically and operationally focused work provides a fascinating read related to plunging-fighters who operate as shock troops with the capability of martyring themselves as required in battle. While not mentioned in the article, these troops are in some ways reminiscent of the Mangudai cavalry of the 13th and 14th century Mongol Empire which also broke up enemy troop formations—although as a modern armed and armored Jihadist suicide bomber variant. The work by Dr. Peter Forster and Thomas Hader—both from Penn State—in Chapter 21 titled Combating Domestic Terrorism: Observations from Brussels and San Bernardino should also be mentioned. It discusses the bombing attacks on the Brussels airport and Maalbeek metro station in March 2016 and the active shooter attack on the San Bernardino County employee’s holiday party in December 2015 as well as the lessons learned related to countering similar future incidents perpetrated by Islamic State operatives and homegrown radicals. The section ends with Chapter 32 by Norman Ricklets—President and CEO of the Iraq Advisory Group—titled The Iraqi Military, The US-led Coalition and the Mosul Operation. The work discusses U.S. training efforts provided to the Iraqi military, their performance in the Mosul operation, and the reaction of the local population to the liberating forces—specifically, the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). He ultimately argues that the U.S. must continue to provide material assistance to the Iraqi Army and CTS post-liberation of Mosul as a counterbalance to the increasing influence of pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs).

The second section, titled U.S.-Allied Policy and Counter-Insurgent Strategies, is composed of 28 articles addressing various approaches to combating the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and other assorted radical non-state Islamist groups in the Middle East, North America and Europe, and globally. The lead section article, Chapter 33, is written by Dr. Jamsheed K. Choksy and Dr. Carol E.B. Choksy—both at Indiana University—and is titled Time for a Comprehensive Strategy Against Islamic Terrorism in 2016. In that article, the authors take a ‘stopping epidemics’ approach with eight solutions provided including a more inclusive target set of radical Islamists to engage, a greater focus on their illicit revenues, and a strategy to address the religious dimensions underlying Islamic terrorism. Chapter 44, contributed by Dr. Dean Shumate, U.S. Department of Energy, should be mentioned as one of particular interest as well. In that article, titled What’s in a Name: A Strategic Analysis of The Islamic State, the author discusses the Zarqawi years and the current state of affairs of this group as well as a suggested COIN focused campaign broken down into political, military, social, and economic components. Two interesting essays of note are also those written by Gary Anderson—George Washington University—and Marno de Boer—with the Dutch newspaper Trouw—found in Chapters 47 and 49, respectively, titled Time to Bring Counterinsurgency to Molenbeek and Time to Bring Strategy to Molenbeek: No Need for Counterinsurgency. These linked articles represent differing and dissenting views on whether a military-like counterinsurgency approach should be applied against Islamist extremists in Belgium or if a different approach that focuses on alienated ethnic groups and the broader Europe integration problem should be focused upon. The Jordan Isham—a U.S. Military Academy student—and Lorand Bodo—a graduate student at the University of Bamberg—article found in Chapter 55 and titled Countering the Narrative should also be spotlighted. In that article, the authors take a psychological approach to Islamic radicalization motivators and suggest developing a tailored counter-narrative to combat it on the internet and within social media. The final article in the section, Chapter 60, written by Adam MacAllister (a U.S. Army Major with SOUTHCOM) et.al. is titled Special Interest Aliens. The theme of the contribution is advocating DHS as the lead federal agency for creating and integrating an all-of-government Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) strategy in order to better minimize Islamic State directed and inspired SIA linked attacks within the U.S.

To initially place the anthology writings in context, as was done with the preceding year’s work, a 2016 timeline of major Islamic State activities are provided below. The initial activities highlighted from January though July 18 specifically utilize the timeline created by Cameron Glenn—a Senior Program Assistant, Iran & Middle East Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace—in cooperation with the Wilson Center:

January 12: A suicide bomber with links to ISIS kills 10 people and injured 15 others— many of them German tourists—in Istanbul’s Sultanahmet Square.

January 14: ISIS claims responsibility for an attack in Jakarta, Indonesia, that killed at least two people and injured 19 others.

March 18: Salah Abdeslam, the most wanted suspect in the Paris attacks, is arrested in Brussels.

March 19: A suicide bomber kills five people and injures dozens of others in Istanbul. The Turkish Interior Ministry announces that the perpetrator had links to ISIS.

March 22: Three explosions at the Zaventem airport and a metro station in Brussels kill at least 30 people and injure dozens of others. ISIS claims responsibility for the attacks.

April 11: Iraqi forces seize the town of Hit, which had been under ISIS control since October 2014. The same day, ISIS recaptured Rai, a Syrian town on the Turkish border, from the Free Syrian Army.

May 5: ISIS captures the Shaer gas field near Palmyra.

May 12: ISIS claims responsibility for a series of bombings in Baghdad on May 11 that killed more than 100 people.

May 19: Iraqi forces retake the western town of Rutbah.

May 23: Iraqi forces, aided by U.S. and coalition airstrikes, advance on Fallujah, which ISIS has held since 2014.

May 24: Kurdish forces backed by U.S. airstrikes launch an offensive on territory north of Raqqa, Syria.

June 12: A gunman attacks a popular gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, killing more than four dozen people and injuring at least 53. The attacker, identified as Omar Mateen, reportedly called police during the attack and pledged allegiance to ISIS, who later claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 26: The Iraqi army retakes Fallujah from ISIS.

June 27: ISIS claims responsibility for a suicide car bombing in Mukalla, Yemen that killed at least 42 people.

June 28: Three suicide bombers kill at least 40 people at the Ataturk airport in Istanbul. The Turkish government suspected that ISIS was behind the attack.

July 1: ISIS militants kill more than 20 people at a restaurant in Dhaka, Bangladesh, most of whom were foreigners.

July 3: ISIS militants carry out a suicide bombing that kills more than 200 people on a busy shopping street in Baghdad. The attack, which occurred during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, was ISIS’s deadliest bomb attack on civilians to date.

July 4: Suicide bombers attack three locations in Saudi Arabia, including the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, a Shiite mosque in Qatif, and near the U.S. consulate in Jeddah. The attack in Medina killed at least four people and injured five others. The attackers were suspected of having links to ISIS.

July 14: A 31-year-old Tunisian man drives a truck through a crowd in Nice, France, and kills 84 people. ISIS claims credit for the attack, though it is not clear whether the attacker had any formal ties to the group.

July 18: An Afghan teenager carries an axe onto a German commuter train and injures at least five people. He was reportedly inspired by ISIS.[2]

The timeline provided below spanning mid-July through the end of December 2016 is assembled from a collection of news sources and reports:

July 26: Two armed men stormed a Normandy Church and slit the throat of a priest. They also took 4 people hostage, severely injuring one of them. The French police subsequently shot the attackers dead. After the incident, ISIS released a video of the attackers in which they pledged allegiance (Bayʿah) to the Caliphate.

August 13: Kurdish and free Syrian forces, backed by U.S. airstrikes, retook the city of Manbij, Syria from ISIS. The loss of Manbij represents a significant set back for ISIS because the city sits on a key supply route from the Turkish border down to Raqqa the ISIS capital.

August 21: ISIS conducted a suicide bombing at a wedding in Turkey killing 54 individuals 22 of which were children.

August 30: The ISIS official Taha Subhi Falaha, second in command of the group and a Syrian-born member, was killed in Aleppo Governorate by a U.S. airstrike.

September 2: A night club bombing linked to ISIS took place in Davo City, Philippines which killed 15 and injured 70.

September 16: The ISIS official Wael Adel Salman (aka Abu Muhammad al-Furqan), replacement for Taha Subhi Falaha as the group’s chief spokesperson, was also killed in a U.S. airstrike.

September 26: An attack took place in the Sinai Peninsula in which ISIS militants killed 5 Egyptian nationals made to wear red jumpsuits and then dumped their bodies on the ground.

October 9: According to a BBC news report, ISIS has lost 25% of its holdings in Iraq and Syria from when it held its greatest territory in January 2015.

October 16: Rebels supported by Turkish troops retook the ISIS held town of Dabiq, Syria. The town represented a component of ISIS’ apocalyptic eschatology with its online magazine Dabiq forced to be discontinued prior to the town’s recapture by Turkish-linked Syrian fighters.

October 17: Haider al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, announced the start of the mission to retake Mosul from ISIS. Over 100,000 coalition troops—including 54,000 Iraqi Security Force members, 40,000 Kurdish Pershmerga fighters, and 500 U.S. advisors—are opposed by roughly 5,000 ISIS personnel defending the city.

October 24: Suicide bombers attacked a police training academy in Pakistan, killing 61 sleeping cadets and injuring 117 more. While ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, it is unclear if Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—a group closely linked to the Taliban and Al Qaeda—was the actual perpetrators of this attack.

October 26: ISIS executed 42 civilians in Hammam al-Alil and 190 former Iraqi Security Forces personnel at the Al Ghazlani base for refusing to fight for them. Additionally, ISIS seized tens-of-thousands of civilians—including children—to be used as human shields in defense of Mosul.

November 7: Iraqi forces discovered the bodies of 100 civilians decapitated by ISIS in the town of Hamam al-Alil, south of Mosul, after its liberation.

November 17: Shia militia forces supported by Iraqi government units captured Tal Afar airport from ISIS after intense fighting took place.

November 19: A vehicular overrun took place at a Berlin Christmas Market in which the lorry driver Anis Amri—a radicalized Islamist Tunisian national—killed 12 people and injured more than 60. The perpetrator had ISIS affinity and recruitment links and can be considered a SoA (Soldier of Allah) engaging in a lone wolf attack for that terrorist organization.

December 3: The initial use of IED laden quadcopters by ISIS fighters in the defense of Mosul begins to take place. The use of such weaponized UAS would continue to increase into December and into the early months of the next year with hundreds of attacks taking place.

December 19: The Russian Ambassador to Turkey, Andrei Karlov, was assassinated at an art exhibit in Ankara by Mevlüt Altıntaş, a Turkish policeman who held radical Islamist views. While ISIS adherents praised the attack, the Al Nusra Front—an Al Qaeda affiliate—claimed responsibility for it.

December 31: At least 25 individuals are killed and 50 injured in the Al Sinak market attack in Baghdad in which 2 ISIS suicide bombers detonated themselves at the entrance to the market and inside of it.[3]

During the year, these major Islamic State events and incidents signify that the Caliphate increasingly was placed on the defensive in Syria and Iraq. Of most significance is the strategic shift taking place with the expansion of the Caliphate stalled at the beginning of the year and the contraction of peripheral Islamic State lands ever more evident by the end of 2016, especially as it relates to the large scale Iraqi-U.S. offensive against Mosul beginning in mid-October of that year. This ‘Islamic insurgents on the defensive’ theme can also be seen with the further shift away from Hijrah (immigration to the Caliphate and its expansion)—and a concurrent drop in Western and other foreign national recruits making their way to Syria and Iraq—as well an increasing emphasis on terrorist attacks being called for by IS adherents against targets in Europe and North America and other specific regions of the globe. This latter phenomenon also saw the publication of a new Islamic State online magazine—Rumiyah (Rome)—in multiple languages, including English, in September 2016. This magazine signified a shift from the earlier Dabiq publication, discontinued a few months before, with an increased emphasis on direct attacks against the West vis-à-vis the earlier Caliphate eschatology-focused mindset in which the forces of light—the Islamic State—defeat those of darkness. The increased call for attacks on the West can be seen in the June mass shooting in Orlando, Florida; in the July vehicular overrun in Nice, France; in the July axe on the train attack in Germany; in the July knife attack in the Normandy Church, France; and in the November vehicular overrun incident at the Berlin Christmas Market.

To further facilitate reader understanding of the time period covered in the anthology, two Institute for the Study of War (ISW) ISIS sanctuary maps have been provided in this introduction, courtesy of that organization. The initial map was created by Harleen Gambhir—then a Counterterrorism Analyst at ISW—and provides an overview of Islamic State control, attack, and support zones as they existed at the end of January 2016. At the beginning of 2016, the Islamic State was under military pressure on multiple fronts in Syria and Iraq although it retained its centralized areas and interior lines of control providing it with a relatively safe defensive position. An analysis by Gambhir of limited IS offensive operations in an attempt to support its defensive posture into the new year is as follows:

ISIS continues to launch attacks in western Syria and eastern Iraq despite its overall defensive posture. The organization resurged in parts of Iraq’s Salah ah-Din Province in early January, attacking north and west of the ISF and Shi’a militia-held city of Samarra. ISIS also launched new attacks on the Alas and Ajil oil fields east of Tikrit on January 14. The attacks demonstrate that ISIS has maintained sustained capabilities in eastern Iraq despite ISF and militia clearing operations in Salah ad-Din and Diyala Provinces. Meanwhile ISIS is also launching attacks in the eastern Qalamoun Mountains, reflecting intent to push westwards from Palmyra to the Damascus-Homs highway. ISIS will likely continue to launch attacks outside its core areas of control in Iraq and Syria in order to divert Iraqi security forces and to set conditions for greater involvement in the Syrian Civil War, respectively.[4]

Courtesy of the Institute for the Study of War [5]

The second map, created by Alexandra Gutowski who is presently a Counterterrorism Analyst at ISW, provides similar information to that of the initial map by also highlighting Islamic State control, attack, and support zones although, in this instance, as it existed at the beginning of December 2016. The fortunes of war and conflict had shifted against the Islamic State by the end of 2016 with their limited areas of control in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Hit, Iraq lost as well as their corridor of control between Hawija and Mosul in Iraq for the most part eliminated. They still retained defensive bastions in Hawija and Mosul as well as the Ana Haditha through Qaim corridor towards Syria and a small swath near Sinjar in northeastern Iraq. In Syria, the Caliphate is faring better with much of its centralized core still intact although it has lost its territories between Ayn al-Arab and Aleppo as well as the lands extending northwest from Raqqa. Additionally, some of its holdings southwest and south of Hasaka have been lost as well as part of the corridor extending southwest from Palmyra towards Damascus. Gains have been minimal with some smallholdings acquired west of Deraa as well in the Sha’er Gas Fields region of Syria although numerous infiltration attacks east of Mosul and throughout the Baghdad region in an attempt to throw Iraqi forces off balance from their focused assault on Mosul have been noted.

Courtesy of the Institute for the Study of War [6]

With the publication of Islamist Insurgents on the Defensive, the ongoing Small Wars Journal anthology series related to radical Sunni Islamic terrorist and insurgent groups is now up to date. This has represented a multi year effort of bringing together diverse SWJ professional writings and scholarship on this topical area into focused works now published in a yearly update form. It is hoped that this specific anthology will be as well received as the earlier ones by the small wars community of interest have been and will provide a good contextual foundation for what will likely be a fascinating 2017 volume addressing the twilight of the Islamic State—at least as it has recently existed in Syria and Iraq—as well as an increasingly resurgent Al Qaeda network. With these thoughts in mind, we would like to gratefully thank the many contributors to this anthology, both those with chapters showcased within it and those providing new front and back essays to it to help thematically ground it and provide additional context for the valuable chapter essays contained within this work.

Islamist Insurgents on the Defensive

Chapter 1

On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim’s December 2015 Speech: Further Evidence for Critical Vulnerabilities in the Crumbling Caliphate

Paul Kamolnick

First Published 2 January 2016

Introduction

On December 26, 2015 a 24-minute audio message was released by the Islamic State Organization’s (ISO) official media arm al-Furqan.[1]

This is only the third message by Ibrahim bin Awwad Ibrahim Ali Muhammad al-Badri al-Samarrai (aka: Caliph Ibrahim; Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) delivered in the past 13 months: previous audio messages were uploaded November 14, 2014,[2] and most recently, May 14, 2015.[3]

This latest message, like his May 2015 message, again supplies telling evidence that the ISO is doomed to suffer a self-inflicted extinction event. Key motifs and critical vulnerabilities earlier identified by the present author[4] reappear here, as is evidence of Al-Baghdadi’s apocalyptic worldview. Let us now examine select critical vulnerabilities, and in conclusion, offer select pointers for United States government (USG) strategy.

The Caliph’s ‘Islam’ Problem—Again

Like his May 2015 address, al-Baghdadi again illogically and illicitly reduces the entirety of Islam as a religious faith to a single act-fighting. While fighting, defensive and offensive, are indeed obligatory,[5] he is completely silent on the essential conditions and restrictions Islam places on legalized military jihad, but also, he utters not a single reference to other equally core fundamental Islamic religious obligations such as prayer, alms, fasting, and pilgrimage, let alone the chief virtues of character deemed essential to righteousness such as honesty, charity, forgiveness, sincerity, and compassion. Al-Baghdadi’s unconditional, ultra-jihadism is warranted, he believes, by the barest citation of select decontextualized verses (ayat) from the Qur’an. These appear immediately after the introductory invocation.

O Muslims, indeed we fight in obedience to Allah and as a means of coming closer to Him. We fight because He—the Glorified—commanded us with fighting, encouraged us towards it, and made it the best means of coming closer to Him. We praise Allah for commanding us with fighting and promising us one of the two good ends, for He has not made us responsible for victory. Allah (the Exalted) said, And he who fights in the cause of Allah and is killed or achieves victory—We will bestow upon him a great reward, [4:74]. So it is only upon us to fight and be patient, and upon Allah is the victory. For this reason, we should not let the mobilization of the nations of kufr against us alarm us, frighten us, or break our resolve, for we will be the victors in any case, with Allah’s power and strength. Allah (the Exalted) said, Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur’ān. And who is truer to his covenant than Allah? So rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that which is the great attainment, [9:111]. And Allah (the Exalted) said, And [He promises] other [victories] that you were [so far] unable to [realize] which Allah has already encompassed. And ever is Allah, over all things, competent. And if those who disbelieve had fought you, they would have turned their backs [in flight]. Then they would not find a protector or a helper. [This is] the established way of Allah which has occurred before. And never will you find in the way of Allah any change, [48: 21-23].

It is one thing to proclaim fighting obligatory. It is one thing to proclaim fighting a superlative means of displaying loyalty to Allah’s cause and Word. It is quite another to illogically and illicitly reduce the entirety of one’s means of achieving the Divine purpose to this singular act. Baghdadi’s reduction of Islam to fighting is essential not to attain Divine purposes, but because the ISO has in fact proclaimed itself at war with virtually the entirety of existing humanity, all existing Islamic societies and governments included, and al-Baghdadi’s ISO stands or falls on this claim that not only is fighting the exclusive means of serving Allah, but that this fighting has been forced on Allah’s beloved and exclusively chosen soldiers. We shall return to this theme in a subsequent section. Let us now examine a chief device by which al-Baghdadi attempts to persuade those he has determined must die for his ISO that it is absolutely guaranteed, whether victorious or defeated, that one has in fact triumphed mightily.

Baghdadi, Unfalsifiability, and ‘Begging the Question’: In Victory, and Affliction, is Proof of Allah’s Favor!

Baghdadi’s sleight of hand here is a presumption without proof that no matter what his ISO does—no matter what, how, or why—his mission has been especially selected by Allah as the singular vehicle for realizing Allah’s will. That Allah has definitely chosen the ISO as His chosen vehicle must be presumed, of course, for this to hold, since without that assurance one can instead interpret ISO defeats as caused by Allah’s abandonment of an evil, immoral, irreligious, marauding terrorist army that inflicts unspeakable carnage on Allah’s Creation. This latter possibility is excluded, however, by the presumptive fallacy at the heart of al-Baghdadi’s argument, i.e. that he merely presupposes but does not prove that ISO is without question that vehicle for the realization of Allah’s Will on earth. So, now convinced of al-Baghdadi’s presumptive fallacy we now ‘know’ that winning is winning, losing is winning, glorious victory is winning, and inglorious defeat is winning. All is winning, by definition, by prejudgement, therefore all must follow al-Baghdadi into the fight he claims has been imposed by the entire unbelieving world, on the believing elect ISO.

So if we persist in the face of the world and fight all its armies with all their capabilities and then triumph, it will be of no surprise. It is Allah’s promise to us. And [you will obtain] another [favor] that you love—victory from Allah and an imminent conquest [61:13]. And if we are afflicted with killing, and our wounds become many, and the storms rage against us, and our adversities become great, then it would also be of no surprise. It is Allah’s promise to us. Rather, affliction is an inevitable decree. Allah (the Exalted) said, Or do you think that you will enter Paradise while such [trial] has not yet come to you as came to those who passed on before you? They were touched by poverty and hardship and were shaken until [their] messenger and those who believed with him said, ‘When is the help of Allah?’ Unquestionably, the help of Allah is near [2:214].

The World Mobilizes Against the True and Final Victorious Group (al-taifa al-mansura) versus a Fanatical Terrorist Army Wages War on the Islamic World

A rational, empirical, factual history would conclude that the present mobilization against the ISO is the logical consequence of the ISO’s ultra-sectarian violent takfiri terrorist modus operandi that has placed the entire world, including the Muslim world, in its crosshairs. A rational, reasonable mind would conclude that violent confrontation, intra-salafi jihadi warfare, and a violent will to subdue all persons, groups, organizations, and tendencies outside its self-proclaimed right to monopolize the path to Allah’s promised salvation, are signature elements of the ISO from its Zarqawist origins to the present. The ISO is and has always been at war with the world. This war is premised in its belief that it and it alone is the destined victorious group (al-taifa al-mansura) that will fight until the Day of Final Judgment. Added to this belief in destined victory for the ISO, is a presumption that it is only through the crucible of war and annihilation of all weakness, moderation, vacillation, trepidation, and hypocrisy, that the final ISO-based übermenschen shall emerge.

O Muslims, do not be amazed at the gathering of the nations and religions of disbelief against the Islamic State, for this is the condition of the victorious group in every era. This gathering will continue and the trials and tribulations will intensify until the two camps are completed, such that there does not remain in this camp hypocrisy, and there does not remain in that camp faith. Furthermore, have certainty that Allah will aid His believing slaves. And rejoice and be at ease, for your state continues to do well. And the more the nations increase in their frenzied mobilization against it, the more it increases in its certainty of Allah’s victory and that it is upon the straight path, and the more severe its tribulations become, the more it casts out the enemies and hypocrites and the more pure, firm, and steadfast its ranks become. … The test must be severe and the trials must be great, until hypocrisy surfaces and faith takes root, in order for victory to descend. And truly, Allah (the Blessed and Exalted) supported us over these ten years. The day we announced the establishment of the Islamic State, the trials increased and the ordeals became great, to the point that the Islamic State left many of the areas that it had conquered and taken control of. The earth became constricted for us despite its expanse, such that the enemies of the Islamic State thought they had eliminated it, and such that the hypocrites and the sick-hearted said, ’Allah and His Messenger did not promise us except delusion’ [33:12], and the believing, patient mujāhidīn said, ’When is the help of Allah?’ [2:214]. Then as they stood firm and persevered, and Allah made the hypocrites manifest and the believers evident, Allah‟s support came nearer and faster than the believers had expected. The State returned—by Allah’s grace—much stronger than ever before.

The ISO versus the Actually Existing Sunni Muslim World: This is Your War Against Unbelief! Why Do You Not Fight for Your Caliphate! For Your Religion!

Al-Baghdadi’s message was uploaded December 26, 2015, and it makes reference to the December 14, 2016 announcement by Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) Deputy Crown Prince (and defense minister) Mohammad bin Salman of a supposed 34-nation Islamic military alliance.[6] On December 28, 2015, a mere two days after al-Baghdadi’s speech, the black flag of the ISO was lowered and the official Iraqi government flag raised in Ramadi, the provincial capital city of Sunni-majority Anbar province. This recovery of Ramadi, first seized by the ISO nearly seven months ago, follows a string of important tactical reversals for the ISO, for example, having in recent months also lost Tikrit, Baiji, Hawija, the logistically-key Tishrin Dam, and Sinjar, amounting to a loss of approximately 30-40% of ISO’s previously conquered terroritories.[7]

What is really outstanding here is al-Baghdadi’s repeated pleading, requesting, admonishing, lecturing, commanding, and demanding that Sunnis mobilize en masse to defend the ISO’s self-declared ‘State’ of Islam. Whether explicit, or implicit, this is the ultimate reason—if judged by the quantity of verbiage dedicated to this theme—for this reclusive leader’s latest communique. This theme was also dominant throughout the May 2015 communique. It speaks to the failure of the ISO—a grand strategic failure—to anchor their violent terrorist state and army in the actual lives and aspirations of the Sunnis they claim to represent. But again, as in the first ‘Sahwah’ or Awakening led by Sunnis and US Special Forces, the tide has most certainly turned. The violent imposition of alien customs; the liquidation of and terror meted out to tribal opponents; forced marriages of daughters to so-called mujahidin; the alien ultra-sectarian hatred; all of this—along with enduring governmental reforms that must be enacted to create a genuine security and new social compact for Sunnis—ensures the ISO will again, sooner rather than later, be eliminated from Iraqi and eventually Syrian soil. Let us now however listen to the Caliph admonish his wayward Sunnis.

O Muslims, indeed the battle today is no longer merely a crusader campaign. It is but the war of the nations of disbelief altogether against the Ummah of Islam, and it has not occurred before in the history of our Ummah that the entire world gathered against it in one battle as is occurring today. Indeed, it is the battle of the disbelievers altogether against the Muslims altogether, and indeed every Muslim is intended by this war. And he is obliged to execute Allah’s command to him by carrying out the obligation of jihād for the cause of Allah. So if he obeys, then for him is good, salvation, success, nearness to Allah, and the attainment of His pleasure, and if he disobeys, then for him is destruction, loss, and the attainment of Allah’s anger and wrath. Indeed, every Muslim is intended by this war. And he is obliged to defend the religion of Allah and His Sharī’ah and to support the oppressed men, women, and children, for this war is every Muslim’s war. Indeed, it is upon him to engage himself in it in order to defend his religion, defend himself, defend his wealth, and defend his honor and dignity. . .

So prepare yourselves for your war, O Muslims everywhere. Prepare yourselves while being confident of Allah’s victory. Prepare yourselves, and do not weaken and do not grieve. Indeed, your Lord (the Mighty and Sublime) has said to you about the disbelievers, "You [believers] are more fearful within their breasts than Allah. That is because they are a people who do not understand. They will not fight you all except within fortified cities or from behind walls. Their violence among themselves is severe. You