Response: Coloring Within and Outside

the Lines: Some Comments on Scheurich and

Young's "Coloring Epistemologies: Are Our
Research Epistemologies Racially Biased?"
STEVEN I. MILLER
Educational Researcher, Vol. 27, No. 9, pp. 23-26

n their provocative article, Scheurich and Young (1997)

are concerned with the lack of response by those in the educational research community. They believe that their argument, contending that our "research epistemologies" may
be racially biased, ought to create a forum for debate and reflection. In the remarks that follow, I would like to accept
this challenge. I do so not because I disagree with the relevancy of their concerns or its importance for the future of
educational research, but because, on my reading, their argument contains a number of serious shortcomings. If these
errors are not pointed out, then, indeed, the silence on this
issue up until now could be interpreted as agreement by the
educational community with Scheurich and Young's thesis.
To begin with, a common practice in engaging in what is
taken to be scholarly research is to have knowledge of and
to assess the credibility of larger but related domains in relation to what one is studying. Begging the question of
whether this type of activity is itself a manifestation of some
form of racially biased practice, Scheurich and Young could
have cast their intellectual nets beyond the authors they cite
as authoritative on the topic. In so doing, they would have
discovered that what they take to be a unique problem is really a variety of one that has been around in the philosophy
of science and social science for some time now. While the
details cannot be examined in this space, the issue was identified early by Quine (1960) and is generally known as the
"indeterminacy of translation" thesis. The thesis is basically
this: How is it possible for an observer to accurately translate another's culture if it is different from his or her own?
Generally, the inscrutability of translation lies in the fact that
there is no fact of the matter in deciding between alternative
translationsthat is, the meanings attributed to different
claims concerning the worldbecause they are bound to
language and not necessarily to "facts" in the sense of facts
in the natural sciences. This can result in an inability to determine which translation is the correct one, and hence, the
specter of relativism raises its unwanted head.
This issue of unwanted relativism will, then, serve as a
backdrop to investigate a number of assumptions and assertions made by Scheurich and Young. To begin, the au-

thors (p. 4) wonder if the lack of response to their claims is

the result of the "disquieting issue of race, the possibility
that their arguments are weak or irrelevant or because the
argument was not understood." I wish to concentrate on
these comments in terms of the second possibility: that their
arguments are both weak and irrelevant. What I will try to
do, then, is to show where and how their arguments contain
serious defects. While such an analysis will deal basically
with "philosophical" issues, this choice of critique is simply
based on the fact that their position is basically grounded in
philosophical concernsespecially, of course, the persistent use of "epistemology." While I will not concentrate on
how epistemological theories are identified or debated
within philosophy itself, what I intend to do is to show how
the basic idea of the termi.e., how we formulate knowledge or come to "know"is the level at which Scheurich
and Young's arguments must be assessed.
In essence, because their article is so replete with a variety of errors, it may become a central reason why the educational research community has not addressed their concerns. I do not mean this as a disparaging comment to the
authors, but what I would like to suggest is that their assumptions actually constitute a large number of errors. I
will only focus on some of these errors, but I hope they are
salient ones in showing why they are errors and where
holding onto such errors will then only produce a cumulative and negative impact on the educational research community. Let us begin.
The most serious general criticism of Scheurich and
Young's analysis is simply that it leads to a radical form of
relativism, whether of the philosophical or cultural variety.
Using only the notion of relativism in its philosophical use, if
extended to its logical conclusions, the authors' position
must result in a number of racial, ethnic, and gender "epistemologies" that are radically different not only from the

STEVEN I. MILLER is a professor in the Department of Educational

Leadership and Policy Studies, Loyola University, Mallinckrodt

Campus, 1041 Ridge Road, Wilmette, IL 60091-1591. His specialties are the philosophy of social science and education, the sociology of education, and qualitative research methods.

DECEMBER 1998

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"dominant culture's" epistemological heritage but from one

another. From the philosophical framework of relativism, the
position is inconsistent and self-defeating because, ultimately, no one outside of a context-dependent epistemology
can understand anyone else's "epistemology." Hence, if there
are no agreed-on standards of criticism and evaluation across
"epistemologies," discourse is not possible. We may, of
course, end up with descriptions of various epistemologies,
but an analysis of their individual worth is impossible. The
implications of this for educational research, however, would
be disastrous; all descriptions, ex hypothesi, are equally good
(valid) interpretations of a given group's actions or behaviors. In other words, if our "race-based" methodologies are
just that, whatever they tend to produce or reveal must be
"true"period. I'm not sure that this is what we want to advocate either as scholars or human beings.
This general framework of the negative effects of advocating a position that may result in radical relativism will
serve as a backdrop of some of the more specific, but equally
egregious, errors advanced by Scheurich and Young. One
rather minor but telling error appears in the very first sentence of the article, where the authors are suggesting that
"epistemological racism" is a new category of racism. In citing a variety of authors that presumably are sympathetic
with this concept, they state: "They have argued that our
epistemologiesnot our use of them [italics added], but the
epistemologies themselvesare racially biased ways of
knowing" (p. 4). Now, one does not "use" an epistemology,
but rather one has a set of beliefs about how knowledge is
found and its claims warranted. What the authors are doing,
however, is conflating the issue of having a particular set of
beliefs with certain modes or techniques of analysis. If my
system of beliefs concerning how knowledge is possible is
labeled "coherentist," for example, it does not entail that I
am committed to a particular methodology. An epistemology
and a methodology are related but different things.
But let us assume that epistemologies can be "used" in
the sense that the authors are suggesting. If they are "used,"
then they must be expressed methodologically in their use.
However, in this case, either the methodology must be an
outcome of the epistemology or it is separate from it. If it is
the former, the authors would actually have a stronger case
for "epistemological racism," but if it is the latter, their position is weakereven though it is exactly this position that
they are advocating throughout.
Epistemological Racism As Civilizational
By using the example just given, I am suggesting that
Scheurich and Young's analysis throughout is weakened by
the uncritical assumptions they make. The topic is certainly
one that is crucial for all of us in the educational research
community, but the importance of the topic is trivialized to
the extent that errors in reasoning go unnoticed. I will try to
show in this section and another where some of these errors
lie. In doing so, I do not wish to sound as if I am creating
some type of nit-picking litany, but rather, my intent is to
show how these assumptions, if accepted, will eventually
lead us to an acceptance of a form of relativism that would
be disastrous for the future conduct of educational research.
Here is an example.
The authors attempt to construct their case, after a useful
presentation (pp. 4-7) of different types of racismindividual, institutional, and societalby stating:
24

Our argument, then, is that epistemological racism is

drawn from the civilizational level, and, thus, it is to the
civilizational level that we must turn to engage directly
the question of whether our research epistemologies are
racially biased or not. (p. 7)
First, one may notice that if the "civilizational level" is
chosen as the most important or foundational unit of analysis, it is such an all-encompassing (and, admittedly, vague
and ambiguous) category that everything can be attributed
to it. Thus, without further detailed analysis, to say that
"epistemological racism" can be historically situated within
a civilizational level, everything can "fit" into it in one way
or another. What is more crucial, of course, is to argue that
a given civilization is the cause of, in this case, "epistemological racism." This is, I believe, Scheurich and Young's
major argument. To it, they append other factors: that any
given civilization has a "dominant culture," and in this
case, it happens to be White and, by definition, racist. Thus,
if the civilizational level is chosen as the principal unit of
analysis from which to deduce "epistemological racism,"
then a very heavy burden of proof is placed on it. That is,
if the statement, "civilization, therefore 'epistemological
racism' " turns out to be a tautology, both everything and
nothing has been said. The real burden of proof is on the authors to show that their major assumption is something
more than a truism. Indeed, if they had considered the matter more carefully, they could have made a better case by
showing that individual, institutional, and societal racism
does exist irrespective of the vague notion of "epistemological racism," especially at the civilizational level.
But the more central questions are, how does one show
that "epistemological racism" does exist, that it is created
by the dominant culture, and that the dominant culture
(implicitly or explicitly) shapes and controls a specific version of knowledge formation and verification? These are
complex questions, and they can only be touched on here.
While the questions are all interconnected, they rest on the
foundational issue of whether or not there are at least minimal standards of rationality that direct and verify our
epistemological efforts. This issue, in turn, centers on the
debates within philosophy and the sociology of science
concerning the nature of scientific activity itself (see, for instance, Fuller, 1998; Laudan, 1990). In reality, Scheurich and
Young's analysis is a tacit rejection of those norms traditionally associated with the development of scientific rationality and incorporated into research methods in the
human sciencese.g., truth, objectivity, an external reality,
generalizability, correctability, intersubjectivity, and so on.
Epistemological racism is fundamentally a rejection of the
correctness of such norms. The central question, then, becomes, what ought to replace them?
Before we come to this issue, however, it is worth noting
what type of case the authors make for their "dominant culture" thesis. The usual one (p. 8) is to drag out a list of dead,
White, male figures and claim that if not responsible, they
are at least somehow indicative of this cultural "plot" to create and impose a "dominant" ideology. When the "usual
suspects" are rounded up in this case (or, perhaps, they are
rather unusual suspects), they include Kant, Flaubert,
Churchill, Henry Ford, Weber, and Dewey. Why these, I
have no idea. It is claimed by the authors that "it is they
who have constructed the world we live innamed it, discussed it, explained it" (p. 8). They go on to say:

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Our argument, however, is not that these influential White

individuals were involved in a racial conspiracy or moral
bad faith, but that these individuals can only name and
know from within the social context available to them,
from within the social context in which they live. (p. 8)
So, in effect, we have a thesis that says we can simultaneously
blame and not blame such individuals for creating "epistemological racism." If they can only "name and know" within
their (unique) social context, then any "blame" attributed to
them is vacuous.
Other than this, the more important point the authors
miss is that, irrespective of how the cultural context shaped
these individuals, it does not follow that what they had to
say was necessarily false. This is Scheurich and Young's primary mistake: They assume that all of the ideas evolved by
the "dominant culture," by definition, have to be false.
Moreover, they fail to realize that even a "dominant culture" need not be devoid of self-adjusting, self-critical
mechanisms. That is, even a "dominant culture" may have
institutional forms, such as a democratic system of government, public education, and a common law sensitive to
principles of equity, which, overall, are intrinsically desirable to have than not to have.
I will only briefly comment on the first two points above
because of space limitations. Again, to say that something
is the product of the "dominant culture" is not to say that it
is necessarily untrue. It may be, but that is something to be
demonstrated, not assumed. To maintain otherwise, the authors would need to say (and, of course, they do but may
not be fully aware of it) that all claims of the "dominant culture" are simply false. For example, everything written by
Dewey and Kant was false. If they argue that this is or is not
what they mean, then, in either case, they are appealing to
a standard by which it is possible to judge some claims as
true and others as false. But if they claim that this is not possible within the "dominant culture" itself, they must appeal
to another standard (i.e., their own). However, making this
move blocks them from criticizing the (supposed) falseness
of the "dominant culture's" claims because their standard,
by definition, must be different. This, again, is relativism
with a vengeance.
To the second point: The "dominant culture" that they
criticize is the one that has been capable (not perfectly, but
to a greater degree than where their position would lead
them) of creating and supporting norms of criticism directed at its own assumptions and practices. At a very basic
level, the very existence of discovering, developing, and
using the idea of "logical thought" and "rational argument"
argues against their thesis. If it is assumed that even "logic"
is not unique to the "dominant culture" but is the result of
ancient Greek and (later) Muslim influences, then, of
course, this move would argue against the "dominance" of
the "dominant culture." More important, however, there are
norms of criticism that are rather unique to the "dominant
culture" and ought not be quickly dismissed. And in an important sense, mentioned previously, these norms are
grounded in what can be broadly called the "scientific attitude." For instance, it is possibleand one ought to be
given the freedom to do soto subject the ideas of Kant,
Dewey, et cetera to some form of critical, rational assessment. In other words, the "dominant culture" is able to subject (and then have the freedom to accept or reject) the ideas,
beliefs, and knowledge claims to a "test," as I have been try-

ing to show here, even if such a "test" may only be one of

logical consistency. What Scheurich and Young's views
about "epistemological racism" show are that they are not
only inconsistent, but that they also do not allow for an adequate notion of "testing." This point will be analyzed
briefly below.
''Epistemological Racism" and Testability
Epistemological racism claims that the dominant culture's
epistemological frameworks are not only racist but largely
irrelevant to understanding the life histories of other groups
and subcultures that are non-White, nondominant. To show
this, Scheurich and Young present a series of examples that
illustrate this position. I will only mention some of the more
prominent ones. They mention (p. 10) the work of Patricia
Hill Collins as an advocate of an Afrocentric-feminist epistemology. This "epistemology" has four "contours": (a) having concrete experience as a criterion of meaning, (b) using
dialogue to assess knowledge claims, (c) developing an
ethic of caring, and (d) developing an ethic of personal accountability. The authors further quote Collins as saying
that she, "searched my own experience and those of
African-American women I know for themes we thought
were important" relying "on the voices of Black women
from all walks of life" (p. 10). And finally, defending her
epistemology: "like all specialized thought [such as positivism to postmodernisms], reflects the interests and standpoint of its creators" (p. 10). Because I do not have Collins's
work, I will base my comments on the accuracy and representativeness of Scheurich and Young's quotes.
The "contours" mentioned by Collins may be a type of research methodology, but how they are is difficult to say. The
difficulty lies in the lack of concrete directives as to how
such contours are to be assessed, either within their own
context or externally. The quote where Collins attributes her
epistemology as being on par with positivism because each
reflects "interests" and "standpoints" of its creators is, on
one level, accurate but on another, much oversimplified.
One principal differenceand one that is important as
being characteristic of racial epistemologies not havingis
that positivism, for instance, was a well-developed theoretical system open to criticism. It was eventually correctly
criticized on such issues as the impossibility of producing a
neutral "observation" language, but its potential for criticism as a general epistemological system was always there.
By contrast, so-called "racial epistemologies" appear to be
closed off, by definition, from such criticism. Specifically,
they cannot be critiqued externally because any such critiques, being a product of the "dominant culture," are irrelevant, and they cannot be critiqued internally because there
are seldom (if ever) clearly articulated standards for assessing their claims. I believe broadly similar considerations
could be applied to the analysis of "Afrocentric emancipatory methodology" and others claiming to have a special
epistemological status.
Conclusions
The analysis presented by Scheurich and Young has been
valuable, I believe, not so much in articulating an alternative methodological position but in (unintentionally) providing support to standard descriptions of what it means to
"know." Their major error has been to commit a "category
mistake," whereby two different issues are conflated. Here

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is how it works. Assume a doctoral student, say, from a

nondominant group wants to do her dissertation on a relevant research question emerging from her experience as a
member of that group. Now, as her adviser, if I tell her I will
not consider her topic because it stems from a particular
cultural context, then I could be legitimately accused of exhibiting any or all of the "racisms" described by the authors. If I reject her research question because it is "trivial"
from the standpoint of the field, area, or discipline in which
she is working, then we are at a standstill. Here, if I am
being fair (and I hope I would be), I would state my reasons
for my belief and she for hers. Even though the "dialogue"
might be imbalanced because she is, after all, the "student"
and I am the "professor," if I am behaving ethically, I am
under some obligation to give my reasons truthfully and
openly, and she hers.
It is here that a true "dialogue" should ensue. If, however,
she claims that I cannot say anything about the substance of
her research questions because I am not a member of her
group, then there is certainly no point in going on. Alternatively, if we both agree on the topic, but she argues that my
general methodological concerns of validity, reliability, sampling, and relevant intersubjective standards of assessment
do not apply because, again, such methods simply are irrelevant to "knowing" her group-based reality, then, once
more, there is an impasse. If her methodological claims can
be articulated and open to critique, then there is a possibility that she can persuade me to her methodological commitment, or I can reject it for the reasons I give. But here,
there is at least the possibility for real dialogue and assessment of what it means to be "rational"; such concerns are at
the heart of what "epistemology" means. Of course, if I am

accused of "epistemological racism" to begin with, then

there is nowhere to go other than name calling.
Scheurich and Young's position is undesirable and, worse,
self-defeating because carried out to its logical conclusion, it
must lead to a radical form of relativism, both philosophical
and cultural. We do not need this as members of the educational research community. Finally, to once more illustrate
where such a position leads, consider the following: By their
own admission, the authors belong to the dominant culture.
As such, they are those who, by definition, engage in "epistemological racism." But if this is so, then they cannot even
comment on the possibility of other "epistemologies"let
alone their appropriateness. Hence, they must either reject
their own analysis or declare that they were lying about
being a part of the dominant culture! And given my analysis here, I would also like the readership of Educational Researcher to guess my particular group membershipgiven
the possibility that I may have been adopted.

References

Fuller, S. (1988). Social epistemology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Laudan, L. (1990). Science and relativism: Some key controversies in the philosophy of science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Scheurich, J. J., & Young, M. D. (1997). Coloring epistemologies: Are
our research epistemologies racially biased? Educational Researcher,
26(4), 4-16.
Manuscript received September 30, 1997
Revisions received March 26, 1998, and April 21, 1998
Accepted April 27, 1998

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