G.R. No.

213847

August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait
until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.
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It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes.
[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in
his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds
presence at trial.
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23

2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court , as follows:
24

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time
of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.
25

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall
be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is
placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the
guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
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27

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right
because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or
life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
28

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
29

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned

Citizens v. Elma , "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. The
indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :
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x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is
charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the
motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it
turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint
and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever
the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie
determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime
was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution
submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of
the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the
accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice,
and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It
is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where
the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should
primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this
purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.
33

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the
guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
34

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless
of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.
35

Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion
to Fix Bail has only argued that
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is
only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that
the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution
deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of
mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accuseds favor.
36

Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the presence of
the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being
punishable with reclusion perpetua , simply because the determination, being primarily factual in
context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
37

Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines responsibility in
the international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The

Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
38

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.
39

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We
also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he
was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
40

The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health
and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in
Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court:
46

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle
the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the
issue of bail whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of
judicial notice that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without
awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of
49

the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for
him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure
the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of
the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the
writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon
posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate
release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.
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January 12, 2015

CONCHITA S. BAHALA, Complainant,
vs.
CIRILO DUCA, SHERIFF III, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 1,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, Respondent.
Ruling
As an agent of the law, a sheriff must discharge his duties with due care and utmost diligence. He
cannot afford to err while serving the courts writs and processes without affecting the integrity of his
office and the efficient administration of justice. He is not given any discretion on the
implementation of a writ of execution; hence, he must strictly abide by the prescribed procedure to
avoid liability.
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Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires a sheriff implementing a writ of execution (1) to
make and submit a return to the court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the judgment;
and (2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied infull, to make a report to the court within 30 days after his
receipt of the writ and state why full satisfaction could not be made. He shall continue making the
report every 30 days in the proceedings undertaken by him until the judgment is fully satisfied in
order to apprise the court on the status of the execution and to take necessary steps to ensure
speedy execution of decisions.
17

Although Sheriff Duca thrice served the writ on Bahala, he filed his return only on October 7, 2003
after her property had been levied and sold on public auction. His excuses for his omission, that his
"job was not yet finished," and that he had informedthe plaintiff on the status of its implementation,
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did not exculpate him from administrative liability, because there is no question that the failure to file
a return on the writ constituted "simple neglect of duty," defined as the failure of an employee to
give his attention to the task expected of him, signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference.
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21

In this regard, the OCA correctly observed:

As deputy sheriff, respondent could not be unaware of Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure x x x
xxxx
Based on the foregoing, it is mandatory for a sheriff to make a return of the writ of execution to the
court issuing it. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the
writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason or reasons therefore. The court officer is
likewise tasked to make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon
until the judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. The raison d etrebehind this requirement
is to update the court on the status of the execution and to take necessary steps to ensurethe
speedy execution of decision.
A careful perusal of the records show that the writ of execution was issued on August 1, 2002.
However, it was only more than a year later or on October 7, 2003 when respondent sheriff was able
to file his return of the writ. In his testimony before the investigating judge on March 7, 2005, he was
not even sure on when he first served the writ of execution upon complainant but admitted of having
served the same at least three (3) times yet he failed to timely make a sheriffs return as required
under Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent though belatedly submitted
his sheriffs return and furnished a copy thereof to the complainant only on October 7, 2003.
Due to respondents failure to makea timely return and periodic progress report of the writ, the court
was obviously unaware of the auction sale of defendants property conducted by respondent-sheriff
on March 3, 2003 that in its Order dated May 5, 2003, it enjoined respondent sheriff from proceeding
with the auction sale of defendants property and directed him to execute the parties agreement
regarding ejectment and removal of defendants buildings/structures from the leased property of the
plaintiff. By then, subject property was already auctioned and awarded to plaintiff, being the highest
bidder and defendants agents already ejected from subject property per his Sheriffs Return of
Service dated October 7, 2003.
Clearly, respondent sheriff is derelict in his submission of the returns thereof. His explanation that
"his job was not yet finished and talked to the plaintiff regarding the same"is utterly wanting. A
finding that he was remiss in the performance of his duty is thus proper under the attendant
circumstances. For such nonfeasance, respondent is guilty of dereliction or simple neglect of his
dutyas a sheriff, because he failed to submit his Report of Service within thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof and make periodic reports to the court until the judgment was fully satisfied. In fine, the
gravamen of respondents shortcoming is in his failure to observe Sec. 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
22

Without doubt, Sheriff Duca played an indispensable part in the administration of justice. His duties
as a sheriff included the prompt enforcement of judgments and the efficient implementation of orders
and writs issued by the court. Any move or actuation in the discharge of his duties that denoted
complacency, or reflected inefficiency, or constituted impropriety would equate to the disregard of the
office he held. Thus, his lapses in complying with Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
constituted sufficient ground to order his dismissal, suspension from office or payment of a fine.
1wphi1

23

Sheriff Ducas liability was not limited to his failure to file the return on the writ. The OCA
recommended that he be found liable also for simple misconduct because he was guilty of the
irregularity of relying on the computation of the plaintiff in charging Bahala for the arrears in rentals
amounting to P210,000.00, thus:
Respondents reliance on the computation of plaintiff for the rental-in-arrears amounting
to P210,000.00 contained in the Sheriffs Notice of Auction Sale is likewise irregular. He should not
have put undue reliance on the computation made by a private individual not duly deputized by the
court. It must be borne in mind that respondent sheriff has, as an officer of the court, the duty to
compute the amount due from the judgment debtor. (Bagano v. Paninsoro, 246 SCRA 146) For such
actuation, respondent committed simple misconduct.
24

Compounding this liability was his admission of not inquiring whether Bahala had paid her rentals or
not to the plaintiff.
25

To be sure, the amount of P210,000.00 stated in the notice of levy did not conform with the writ of
execution that stated the following amounts to be due to the plaintiff from Bahala, viz:
WRIT OF EXECUTION
xxxx
Whereas, Judgment on compromise agreement issued in this case by the Regional Trial Court
Branch 40, dated 10 November 1999, quoted as follows:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
COME NOW the parties hereto, assisted by their respective counsels, and unto this Honorable Court
hereby submit the following Compromise Agreement, to wit:
xxxx
3) That the parties hereto are desirous of settling their dispute by compromise agreement and have
voluntarily agreed the following:
a) THAT defendant shall pay the sum of P17,900.00 upon signing of this Compromise
Agreement, P15,500.00 of which shall be taken from the amount deposited with the Clerk of
Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City to be applied in the manner as
follows:

P5,900.00 -- for payment of arrears in rentals as of December 30, 1999;

10,000.00 -- as attorneys fees (part) per decision in Civil Case No. 98-Jul-817
2,000.00 -- for reimbursement of expenses of litigation
b) THAT the period of lease is extended to two (2) years commencing on January 1, 2000
and termination January 30, 2002.
c) THAT the monthly rental shall be five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) payable to the office of
the plaintiff within the first (5) days of each and every month without need of any demand.
xxxx

26

It was Sheriff Ducas duty as court sheriff to know the computation of the amount due in accordance
with the writ of execution. He should have ensured that only those ordained or decreed in the
judgment would be the subject of execution. To accomplish this, he must himself compute the correct
amount due from the judgment obligor or garnishee based strictly on the terms of the executory
judgment, and, if necessary, he must verify the amount from the court itself; in other words, he could
not rely on the computations submitted by private individuals not duly authorized to do so by the
issuing court. He could not delegate the official duty to compute or reckon the amounts to be realize
through execution to such individuals. In adopting the computations submitted by the plaintiff
without himself determining whether the computations conformed to the terms of the judgment and
the writ, he was guilty of simple misconduct, an act that related to any unlawful conduct prejudicial to
the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause.
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30

Sheriff Duca should discharge his duties as a court sheriff with utmost care and diligence,
particularly that which pertained to the implementation of orders and processes of the court. In the
discharge of his duties, he acted as an agent of the court, such that any lack of care and diligence
he displayed would inevitably cause the erosion of the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
31

Anent the charge of violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Bahala did
not adduce substantial evidence to establish that Sheriff Duca had demanded and received
monetary consideration to delay the implementation of the writ of execution. The charge is dismissed
for being without merit.
We modify the recommended penalty of suspension from office without pay for six months and one
day. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of
duty and simple misconduct are less grave offenses punishable by suspension from office of one
month and one day to six months for the first offense. The offense charged being Sheriff Duca's first
violation, he is appropriately punished with suspension from office without pay for three months, with
a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent CIRILO DUCA, Sheriff III of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, in Cagayan de Oro City, GUILTY of SIMPLE
MISCONDUCT and SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY, and, accordingly, SUSPENDS him from office for

three months without pay, with a stem warning that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
G.R. No. 166357

January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look
into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported
by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not
both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital
obligation.
3

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage
that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the
term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family
Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code
Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the
provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its
application." Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family
Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited
the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from
the Canon Law.
4

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as
used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently of "but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:6

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:
8

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must

be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence whatis decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification

within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article
36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some
resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
10

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
11

II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a partys
psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of
the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous. In every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the
facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting
its own judgment. It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and
substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code
regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only
relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio,
because such a marriage has no legal existence.
12

13

14

15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and
promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is
thereby made all the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in
the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.
16

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr.
Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely
based on the petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert
opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts
sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not
anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual
premises.
17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioners testimony, as well as on
her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would
seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that
basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records,
including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the
respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the
nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having
the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."

18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly
determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner).
Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with
personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The
Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos that there is no requirement for one to bedeclared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important
is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence,
"if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."
19

20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation. Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The experts findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. This is so, considering that any
ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias
should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties
upbringing and psychodynamics. In that context, Dr. Gates expertopinion should be considered not
in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.
21

22

23

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto
compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondents own witness, and
those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive
and dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the
respondents psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
24

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways.
Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her
relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult
for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To
others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions
contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less
conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely,
placed an enormous value on having significant others would depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She
became relationship-dependent.
25

It is notable that Dr. Dayans findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to
the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with
AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or
opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve
as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded. Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
witnesses vis--vis the other evidence available.
29

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila
Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee.
Regarding Father Healys expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars
of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience. It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted
under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.
30

Father Healy tendered his opinion confirming respondents level of immaturity and irresponsibility
with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity.
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healys opinions and findings
commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial

determination of the parties psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could
thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage,
and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric
to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and
findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the
cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:
32

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional opinions about
a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition
of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the allimportant connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to
that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to

establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a
week and always withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home.
The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in
their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that
two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents
mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven. (Emphasis supplied)
36

The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of
the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious
failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her
marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted
on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures
made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw the parties eldest son in his deposition, whereby the son
confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:
37

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and mental development.
This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly
defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to
the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and
thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so
without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her answer, whereby she averred that it
was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.
39

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband
because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the
respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of
them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed
null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have
already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in
the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only
to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice
should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children to
endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her
erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
41

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but
I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one
like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wifes psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. In this case,
the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with
psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not
hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society
does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November
4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.