Concerns Over Pakistans Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality

Concerns over Pakistans Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality
Introduction
It is a fact that consequent to the overt nuclearization of India, Pakistan had no choice but to
follow to redress the strategic balance on which peace and security in South Asia depends. It is
also an indisputable fact that Pakistans nuclear capability, assisted by the conventional
capability, has been the main factor for limiting crises with India from spiraling to unwanted
levels. A key example was that the Indian coercive arms buildup on Pak-India borders in
2000-2001 neither achieved its aims, nor led to an outbreak of all-out war.
At the same time, the very possession of nuclear weapons carries with it an overriding national
and international responsibility that these weapons, assets, materials, and technologies on
which they are based, are under strong and failsafe custodial and operational control, that their
purpose is meant to deter and that they would only be used in an in extremis necessity. In
essence, every nuclear state has to credibly demonstrate and project that it is a responsible
nuclear state.
On this particular premise, Pakistans nuclear program has been the focus of discussion in
national and international media, think tanks, and officials of global powers. More often than not,
foreign state and non-state organizations and agencies raise certain questions and concerns, in
one way or another, over the safety and security of Pakistans nuclear assets, fissile material,
and technological knowledge, as well as Pakistans role in the international fora, such as
Conference on Disarmament (CD). Similarly, Pakistani media, analysts and officials also raise
their voices over the differential treatment of some powerful capitals vis--vis India.
In this context, it is important to track down the global and domestic concerns, analyze those
concerns in the backdrop of Pakistans institutional and legislative structure of forfeiting its
nuclear assets, and examine Pakistans concerns over the conduct of international community
towards its nuclear program vis--vis India, and evaluate Pakistans position and role in the CD
in comparison with the role and position of other powers over the years. This analytical expos
would be helpful in understanding whether the concerns over Pakistans nuclear program hold
substantial grounds, whether the international community really needs to pay heed to the
ominous scenarios coming out in international media every now and then, or whether Pakistan
is genuinely a victim of global politics and world powers as Pakistani analysts and officials
believe.
1 / 28
Global Concerns
An important global concern about nuclear weapons and nuclear capabilities in general revolves
around the potential threat of nuclear terrorism. The extent of such a threat, its use to enforce
controlsboth national and plurilateraland also as a pressure point may be debated.
However, the concern is real and has to be appreciated and met.
The IAEA in the context of potential nuclear terrorism has highlighted four key areas:
Theft of a nuclear weapon

Theft of material to make an improvised nuclear explosive device
Theft of other radioactive material for an RDD
Sabotage of a facility or transport
In the context of Pakistan, there have been concerns regarding the nuclear security of Pakistan
in general, based on a number of assumptions. The perceived threats to Pakistans nuclear
assets, which have been highlighted by the western media and academics, revolve around four
main scenarios.
1. Extremist government in Power

2. Radicals take over
3. Terrorist attacks on nuclear installations
4. The insider dimension
The scenarios of an extremist government gaining power in Pakistan, or of a takeover by radical

elements, were mainly projected as the gravest threat to global security in international media
before the elections of 2008 in Pakistan. Furthermore, terrorist attacks and incidents within
Pakistan, coupled with extremist movements and tendencies, have continuously been used as
grounds for portraying the vulnerability of nuclear assets in Pakistans hands.
2 / 28
Besides the issue of security and safety of nuclear assets, concerns have also been shown
regarding the proliferation of nuclear material, technology and knowledge of nuclear weapons
development. The country was particularly slandered in the aftermath of the discovery of an
underground nuclear proliferation network, which was, in fact, incorrectly labeled after the
architect of Pakistans nuclear program.
Pakistan has also been projected as the only country that is halting the progress on Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which, whether true or
not, is deemed essential for ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
On the face of it, all these concerns and projections could seem genuine if one accepts the
questionable presumption that Pakistan, being a developing country and beset by incessant
incidents of terrorism and extremism, might not have the capability to put up a credible
command and control system, or the aptitude to understand the importance of nuclear free
world, or the resources to build credible deterrence against a fast growing adversary.
Considering these global concerns, it is extremely important to delve deeper into the matter and
bring the realities of Pakistans nuclear weapons program, its structure, and command and
control system into the limelight.
Pakistans Nuclear Safety and Security System
An examination of the evolution of nuclear safety and security system in Pakistan shows that
the country is not standing still on what it has achieved in the field of safeguarding its assets
and capabilities. There is a constant process of reviewing all aspects of controls with a view of
improving them continually.
Institutional Framework: Pakistan has put in place a comprehensive institutional framework with
the National Command Authority (NCA) at the apex for policy formulation, employment and
development of strategic systems. The Prime Minister is the Chairman while the Strategic Plans
Directorate (SPD) is the Secretariat to the NCA. This structure makes it clear that the final
authority on the use of nuclear weapons rests with the civilian chief executive and that any such
decision would require detailed consideration in the NCA set up for this purpose.
3 / 28
The Security Division of SPD has also been significantly expanded since its inception, to
maintain a close watch on all aspects and organizations of the nuclear program, with a special
security emphasis on sites, activities, material management, material inventory, personnel
reliability and counter intelligence. It also controls a significant armed security forcea
specialized armed forcewhich has only recently been further augmented for physical security.
There is also a training academy to impart specialized training and skills.
Then there are the Services Strategic Forces of all the three Armed Forces of the Army, Navy
and Air Force. While technical, training & administrative control rests with the respective
services, operational control is vested in the NCA.
There are two Committees: the Employment Control Committee and the Development Control
Committee. The former, with the Foreign Minister as its Deputy Chairman, includes Minister for
Defense, Minister for Interior, Minister for Finance, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee
(JCSC), Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) and Chief of Air Staff (CAS) as
its members. Others, if required, can attend by invitation. Its Secretary is the Director General of
the SPD. Chairman JCSC is also the Deputy Chairman of the latter, and the COAS, the CNS,
the CAS, and the Scientists who head the Strategic Organizations are its members. DG SPD is
the Secretary of this Committee as well.
Legislative Framework: There is also now the NCA Act which replaces the former NCA
Ordinance, thereby continuing to give legislative cover to the administrative and executive order
which set up the NCA in 2000, which in turn formalized at that time the structure put in place in
1998. The purpose of this legislation is to give cover to the NCA for complete command and
control over research, development, production and use of nuclear and space technologies and
other related applications in various fields, and to provide for the safety and security of all
personnel, facilities, information, installations or organizations and other activities or matters
connected therewith or ancillary thereto.
In effect, the Act entrusting upon the NCA with three major areas of responsibility; (i) effective
command and control of the strategic programs (ii) safety and security of strategic programs
and (iii) maintenance of a system of personnel reliability. The Act has a very wide scope
extending to the whole of Pakistan and applies to any person who commits an offence under
the Ordinance. The application of the Ordinance is, therefore, not limited to the employees of
the strategic organization only. It empowers the NCA to bring charges against any citizen of
Pakistan as well as foreign nationals.
4 / 28
Initiatives for WMD Non-Proliferation: In the process of improving and institutionalizing the
export control system, which was built on a number of longstanding ordinances, rules and
practices, there have been frequent interaction with friendly countries to learn and to benefit
from best practices elsewhere in export controls against WMD proliferation.
Under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, national export controls against WMD proliferation
are enjoined and reports have to be submitted. These were being studied for implementation
much before the 1540 process in which Pakistan actively participated being a member of the
Security Council when the resolution was negotiated and adopted. The second required
national report from Pakistan had an extensive matrix requiring detailed information. Pakistans
response to this matrix, in its second report, may be said to be a model in this respect.
The Government of Pakistan, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Missions abroad, in
interactions within the UN, in the IAEA, bilaterally, in academic conferences, and with the media,
has constantly projected a strong national commitment against proliferation of WMD, through
command, control and custodial systems, export controls, and the institutional basis on which
they rest. The SPD has also given briefings in this regard.
There are a variety of legislations which deal with the safety, security and export control in the
strategic field, and these have been legislatively brought under the overarching centralized
control of the NCA.
Pakistan claims its export controls being amongst the best in the world. The export controls
legal framework is governed by the following legal and administrative instruments:
I. The Import and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 Act No. XXXIX of 1950: This Act authorizes the
Federal Government to prohibit, restrict or control the import or export of goods and regulate all
practices and procedures connected therewith. Section 5(1) of the Act provides for penalty of an
individual, without prejudice to any confiscation to which he may be liable under the provisions
of the Customs Act 1969-(IV 0f 1969), as applied by sub-section (3) of this Act, as punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or both.
II. Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (PNSRP) Ordinance of 1984 and
Regulation of 1990 which contains provisions for control of import/export of nuclear substances
5 / 28
and radioactive materials, extending to the whole of Pakistan, has been further strengthened
with Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2001.
III. Pakistans Trade Policy 2004-05: This encompasses Import Policy Order and Export Policy
Order to regulate trade on all items. These orders take into account all previous Statutory
Regulation Orders (SROs) and Ordinances issued by the Government of Pakistan from time to
time and regulate import and export of sensitive materials.
IV. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance 2000, Ordinance No. LIV of
2000: This law enables the full implementation and enforcement of the provisions of the
Chemical Weapons Convention and fulfills Pakistans obligations under Article VII of the
Convention mandating national implementing measures. This legislative framework regulates
and controls the import and export of chemicals in accordance with the CWC and provides for
criminal penalties in case of violations. Para 12 of the EPO 2000 pertains to export control of
chemicals as required under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The National Authority
established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the focal point for the implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of the Ordinance. These measures constitute fulfillment of the
requirements of UNSC Resolution 1540 in the context of CWC.
V. Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance (PNRA), 2001, Ordinance No. III of 2001:
Under this Ordinance, PNRA issues the required no objection certificate (NOC) for all imports
and exports of any radioactive materials or radiation sources. The PNRA is responsible for
controlling, regulating and supervising all matters related to nuclear safety and radiation
protection measures in Pakistan. Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of sections
19, 20, 21, 22 or 23 of the Ordinance shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to 7 years, or with a fine which may extend to one million rupees, or both.
Notification SRO III (1) 2004 as amended on 16 February 2004; Nuclear Substances,
Radioactive Materials and any other substance or item covered by PNRA Ordinance, 2001 (III
0f 2001); and Equipment used for production, use, or application of nuclear energy or activity,
including generation of electricity and spares, are subject to NOC from PNRA as per procedure
notified by the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA).
In September 2004, new legislation namely, Act No. V of 2004, was enacted to provide export
control on goods, technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear and biological
weapons and their delivery systems. The Act entered into force on September23, 2004.
6 / 28
Salient elements of the new Export Control Act include:
- Controls over export, re-export, transshipment and transit of goods, technologies, material
and equipment covered. Prohibition of diversion of controlled goods and technologies.
- Wide jurisdiction (also includes Pakistanis visiting or working abroad).
- Provides for an authority to administer rules and regulations framed under this legislation.
Also provides for the establishment of an Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of this
legislation.
- Comprehensive control lists and catch all provisions.
- Licensing and record keeping provisions.
- Penal provisions: Up to 14 years imprisonment and Rs.5 million fine or both, and on
conviction, offenders property and assets, wherever they may be, shall be forfeited by the
Federal Government. Right of appeal provided for.
For the purposes of the Export Control Act, the authority rests with the Federal Government
and the Federal Government, as and when necessary, may a) make such rules and regulations as are necessary for implementation of this Act;
b) delegate authority to administer all activities under this Act to such Ministries, Division,
Departments and Agencies as it may deem appropriate;
c) establish a government Authority to administer export controls established under this Act;
d) designate the agency or agencies authorized to enforce this Act;
e) establish an Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of this Act; and
f) require licenses for exports from Pakistan of goods and technology, and the re-export of
goods and technology that originated in Pakistan.
Moreover, officials of the designated agency or agencies are authorized to inspect

consignments declared for export and review, acquire or confiscate records or withholding an
export license under this Act. The Federal Government may vest any investigatory powers and
powers of arrest authorized by law in officials of the customs administration or other appropriate
agencies.
It should also be noted that the Act provides for catch-all controls, and covers intangible
transfers. Section 5(3): An exporter is under legal obligation to notify to the competent authority
if the exporter is aware or suspects that the goods or technology are intended, in their entirety
or in part, for use in connection with nuclear or biological weapons or missiles capable of
delivering such weapons.
7 / 28
Under the Act, the definition of technology includes: on-the-job training, expert advice and
services attached therewith. The definition of services includes: training and technical
assistance including intangible transfer such as disclosure of technical data relating to the
purposes of the Act.
Under this Act in October 2005, under a Statutory Notification, the GoP notified comprehensive
control lists of goods, technologies, material and equipment. These fully cover the control lists of
the NSG, MTCR and the Australia Group, which are the world class gold standard in this
respect.
Under the Act in 2007, the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) was set up in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, as the authority to implement the 2004 Act. SECDIV is staffed by officials
from various departments and Ministries dealing with all aspects of this important task. SECDIV
includes officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan
Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Ministry of
Commerce, and Pakistan Customs and Customs Intelligence.
An Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of the Export Control on Goods,

Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their
Delivery Systems Act No. V of 2004, and also the setting up and functioning of SECDIV, has
also been set up in 2007. It has 11 members, 10 of whom are government officials in their
ex-officio capacity. It is headed by the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Director
General SECDIV is a member and acts as the Secretary to the Oversight Board. The other
Members of the Board are the Additional Secretary (UN&EC) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Additional Secretary (CS&M), Cabinet Division, Additional Secretary (III), Ministry of
Defense, Additional Secretary (I), Ministry of Interior, Member Exports, Central Board of
Revenue, Director General Security Division, National Command Authority(NCA), Director Arms
Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Executive Member, Pakistan
Nuclear Regulatory Authority(PNRA), and a Pakistani Expert, with experience in export controls,
serving in an honorary capacity.
Terrorist or Terrorism Threat: The holding of free and fair elections, in which the previous
government was voted out of power, and replaced by major political parties at the federal and
provincial level should take care of the apprehension that Pakistans nuclear assets may fall into
the hands of radical elements.
8 / 28
The analysis of the command and control, custodial and export control systems shows that it is,
indeed, second to none in the world. It is also not fully appreciated that unlike some of the other
nuclear states, apart from technical controls and safeguards, despite being a developing
country and perhaps for that reason, Pakistan can and does afford maximizing specialized
personnel and troops dedicated for safeguarding its assets against internal and external threats.
Therefore, the threat of any terrorist attack on nuclear facilities to try to seize any of the assets
or fissile material, in reality, does not exist. Multiple physical and personnel reliability systems,
as well as inventory controls and checks, rule out any insider-outsider threats.
Pakistan has also interacted with other countries, including Japan, UK, US and the EU. While it
is true that Pakistan does not need a security clearance from any quarter, it is prudent to meet
international concerns, and this is the policy of every nuclear state. It is for this reason that when
media hype was at its high water mark, those foreign officials and academics who were best
informed, including for that matter the official spokesman of the U.S government, expressed full
confidence on the safety and security of our nuclear assets.
As political stability increases, and terrorism and extremism are brought under control, such
apprehensions and projections will abate. At the same time, Pakistan also needs to recognize
that strengthening the democratic process and the attainment of long-term political stability are
vital elements for its credibility as a responsible nuclear state.
Why this Focus on Pakistans Nuclear Program? The above discussion would make it easier to
challenge the assumptions behind which international concern is being focused on Pakistan.
The question can be asked why there is focus only on Pakistan, despite the fact that political
uncertainty is largely over after the elections, and the strong safety, security and export systems
are in place. Those quarters which raise concern about Pakistan in the nuclear field, do not
make comparisons with the security of nuclear weapons, fissile material and nuclear facilities in
other nuclear weapons states, including Russia and India, while incidents have also taken place
in the United States of America.
In Russia, the threat has been much greater. It necessitated the American, Nunn-Lugar
legislation for assistance for safeguarding Russian facilities and fissile material after the breakup
of the Soviet Union. Russian nuclear and other WMD production facilities deteriorated and some
Russian scientists went abroad. There has been some leakage of fissile material. One of
Russias leading military commanders stated that some of Russias suitcase nuclear bombs,
9 / 28
designed for their Special Forces operations, had gone missing. While this was refuted by the
Russian government, there are causes of concern across the spectrum. However, international
attention is muted on it.
In the context of India, fissile material and nuclear weapons are arguably in greater danger.
Unlike as in Pakistan, many Indian facilities are under the supervision of civilian security. There
are seventeen ongoing insurgencies, which are potential terrorist threats. India has also
displayed an unwillingness to engage with other countries on security practices.
Furthermore, most of the Indian power reactors were outside IAEA safeguards. Even after the
US-India nuclear deal, eight of the existing reactors remain outside safeguards, with India
having the discretion of placing future reactors within or without IAEA safeguards. Since the
majority of the Indian reactors have been outside safeguards, it is difficult for the international
community to assess the status of past and present safety of the spent fuel generated by these
reactors. Indias ambitious thirteen breeder reactors program also remains outside safeguards.
Indian scientists working in Iran have been sanctioned by the US. There have been some media
reports of trans-border leakage of some fissile material, and some reports of problems in Indian
reactors during their operation cycles. Information is limited due to fact that the reactors are not
under IAEA safeguards, and because India ratified the Convention on Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM) only relatively recently.
In the field of countering WMD proliferation, Pakistan took firm steps to deal with an instance,
which came to light by quickly reacting to completely shut down the entire network as it
pertained to Pakistan. This was only part of a much wider network or networks, which in fact
have existed in one way or another since the dawn of the nuclear age. However, the same firm
and decisive action has not been taken by other countries. Many key individuals belonging to
such networks have have not been sanctioned by the countries to which they belong or in
which they operate.
In December 2002, the then Iraqi government presented to the Security Council the full
disclosure of its WMD program, in an effort to avoid serious consequences with which it had
been threatened. This some over 12,600-page documentation contained details and names of
the foreign suppliers and companies, which had significantly contributed to Iraqs nuclear
weapons, missiles, chemical and biological weapons programs. However, the western members
of the UN Security Council directed that all names and identifications of the individuals and
10 / 28
companies which had supplied materials, weapons and technologies for Iraqs WMD program
should be blacked out. This extensive list of about 283 individuals and companies has never
been made public. The IAEA and the UN inspection teams have yet to publish the voluminous
material available to them, which includes details of the contracts entered into by Iraq with
foreign companies and individuals of various networks.
A few years ago an Iraqi scientist, responsible for Iraqs centrifuge program, has published a
book which details how Iraq obtained the schematics and plans for advanced URENCO
centrifuges from representatives of the MAN Company of Germany. While only a few of this
Companys representatives were responsible for such proliferation, the company itself has gone
on to thrive and according to media reports, some years ago, it was purchased by the SCANIA
Companys transport Division for around $5 billion.
From the above discussion, it would be fair to conclude that either the global concerns are due
to unrealistic fears of what can happen in Pakistan, or due to a deliberate campaign. Whatever
the rationale, these concerns have generated suspicion that such a campaign is part of a plan
to try to destabilize Pakistan and to try to neutralize Pakistans strategic assets and nuclear
deterrent capability.
Domestic Concerns
At the national level, following important concerns come up from time to time:
Internal public concerns on the prioritization of scarce resources to the defense sector at a
time of rising food and energy prices, inadequate delivery of Government services in education,
health and civic services, as well as inflation.
A more specialized critique that the countrys nuclear capability should lead to less spending
on conventional forces and defense.
11 / 28
A minority view that the nuclear capability is not required to deter India, and the alternative
view that it is inadequate to deter India and will remain inadequate.
Some critics, probably inspired by western and Indian strategists, postulate that Indias
nuclear weapons capabilities and stockpiles will grow to outmatch Pakistans, thereby offsetting
countrys deterrence. They also try to make the point that due to the lack of territorial depth,
Pakistan would lack an effective second strike capability in any hypothetical nuclear exchange.
This, they hold, would make the country vulnerable to limited strikes, particularly in AJK and
Southern Pakistan, as well as to proxy irregular low intensity conflict. The Indian Cold Start or
Proactive doctrine is viewed by some as Indian credible ability to inflict territorial and political
damage to Pakistan while remaining under the nuclear threshold.
Other critics have maintained that the nuclear strategy, posture and doctrine are less
transparent and need public articulation.
While it is true that the civil society in Pakistan is extremely patriotic, it is also a fact that
systemic problems, which have accentuated over time, particularly weak economic planning and
implementation, emerging food and energy crises, which due to rising global prices for food
crops and energy supplies continue to strain the already fragile economy, requirements for
improving public education, observance of the rule of law, infrastructure, internal security and
the delivery service of the government, making it harder for the people in general and civil
society in particular to keep track of the strategic compulsions, developments in the region,
changing threat perception and analysis, and pressures of global powers and international
politics. The following discussion is an effort to underscore these compulsions, constraints, and
needs under which Pakistans nuclear program is working, and to help develop a balanced
opinion on the issue at hand.
Issue of Resources and their Allocation: Regarding the debate of nuclear program and national
resources, following points need to be kept in focus. Firstly, the nuclear program is not the
cause of scarce or depleting resources. It rather lies in the lack of proper economic planning,
issues of governance and poor allocation of resources. In fact, the nuclear program itself falls
victim to these issues and at times faces inadequate resources for its plans and activities. It is
only by fixing the real fundamental causes, the issue of resources can be addressed.
Secondly, a strong civil nuclear power infrastructure is increasingly becoming inevitable for the
economic growth and energy security due to the limited fossil fuel reserves and increasing
12 / 28
energy prices worldwide. There is no doubt that if Pakistan had funds to outright purchase civil
nuclear power stations, the attitude of major suppliers would change over time. Therefore, it is
imperative for the government to devise strategies for a fast-paced economic growth.
Thirdly, the allocation of resources is a continuing process requiring constant readjustments, by

assessing all potential threats on the eastern and now western borders. No Pakistani can forget
Indias policy and actions, which resulted in the 1971 dismemberment of Pakistan, and in
comparison, the effectiveness of the deterrent value of Pakistans strategic capability that
Pakistan exhibited in the wake of the 2000-2001 standoff with India. This shows that the country
has acquired sufficient strategic and conventional capabilities at this time to deter India, and
demonstrated the will and ability to enhance capabilities to meet future requirements. However,
given limited resources, the continuing challenge for the country is to put in place an appropriate
mix of conventional and nuclear forces for any threat that may arise.
Fourthly, it is generally held that the gearing ratio for defense purposes is usually 1:3 against
any offensive force in terms of conventional capabilities, whereas India is approximately 6 times
larger than Pakistan in terms of population and economic resources. Therefore, for defensive
objectives and to match Indias defense expenditure Pakistan needs to spend at least twice as
much per capita. This leads to the simple conclusion that the economy must grow and expand
at least as much as that of India in percentage terms to comfortably maintain a defensive
capability, lest the country will have to sacrifice more than just an economic backlash.
Fifthly, the importance of state of the art conventional forces for defense, even in the presence
of nuclear weapons, can hardly be overemphasized. A better tooth to tail ratio always remains a
prime objective. For that matter, Pakistan relies a great deal on high tech arms imports, which
require good relations with the major powers and subject to various conditionalities that hamper
the countrys freedom of action in all fields including foreign relations. Examples of the
drawbacks of such dependence in Pakistans history have continuously been witnessed, even at
this point in time. Therefore, the challenge for Pakistan in this regard is two-fold: 1) improving
indigenous conventional productionthere is still room for innovative or modified approaches in
this area, such as selective conscription, as in the case of many other countries including
Turkey, which may become necessary and provide a partial answer for a smaller standing
establishment; 2) since conventional defense also needs constant revisiting to address threats,
the economy must grow in pace to the needs of ever-changing and expanding defense needs.
Last, but by no means the least, the current pressure on the resources has been accentuated
by the ongoing war in Afghanistan and its spillover effect. During the last ten years, the country
has paid much more economic, political and social costs than it has gained in any respect.
13 / 28
Therefore, while the government is helping the international community and Afghan government
in their endeavors of reaching a plausible solution to the Afghan imbroglio, it needs to review its
policies vis--vis its role and participation in the Afghanistan related US War on Terror and to
devise policies to put its own house in order.
Doctrinal Aspect: So far, Pakistans nuclear doctrine has been based on certain high level
declaratory statements. The main elements of what has been declared are: Pakistan is a
responsible nuclear state; that Pakistan believes in a policy of restraint; that it would like to
avoid any arms race; and that Pakistans policy is to maintain a credible minimum deterrence for
defensive purposes and to maintain this capability to meet all emerging eventualities.
It is also probable that if Pakistan is faced with the ultimate scenario of unbridled aggression, its
targeting strategy will undoubtedly consist of a pragmatic mix of counter force and counter value
targets, as is the case with targeting planners in other nuclear powers. It would also be unwise
to think that theater nuclear weapons could be ruled out for Pakistan.
Furthermore, Pakistan does not subscribe to any no first use doctrine. In respect of this
strategic ambiguity, the policy is the same as that of the USA, the NATO alliance, Russia, the
U.K and France. India which has a declared no first use policy, has qualified it somewhat by
declaring that it will not apply this policy if it is subject to any biological or chemical weapons
attacks anywhere. Any declaration of no first use by Pakistan could provide India
encouragement and comfort for a conventional attack doctrine, given its larger conventional
forces. Indias Pro-active or Cold Start doctrine is based on the hypothesis of being able to
seize Pakistani territory in rapid military strikes while remaining under the nuclear threshold.
Pakistan has always countered suggestions by India implying the need for mutual policies of no
first use with a response that an agreement or treaty should be negotiated on no first use of
force policy and commitment by both sides. Pakistan should also try to revive negotiations
held earlier on a no war pact which would go much further than any no first use declaration
and make such an eventuality redundant by either side.
Having said that, Pakistan still needs to articulate its nuclear doctrine publicly and more clearly.
Apart from the already declared elements of responsibility, restraint, against an arms race, and
for a credible minimum deterrence, Pakistan should reiterate that it will never use nuclear
weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state, and that these weapons will only be used if the
existence of Pakistan and its people are at stake. This would also cover a response to any
14 / 28
attack on Pakistans nuclear facilities and assets. While the countrys capabilities have been
geared to deter threats from India, the policy should also make it clear that it is also to deter
threats from any other quarter that fields nuclear weapons.
Indian as a Factor: The Indian Pro-active or Cold Start doctrine, while representing a
continuing aggressive approach and in part motivated to try to mount psychological pressure,
cannot be discounted by Pakistani military planners. It may also represent a mechanism for
gaining increased funding and inter service claims from the Indian Armed Services.
Nevertheless, the assertion of this doctrine which is being implemented with force deployments
and armor augmentation in the formations near Pakistans border as well as by faster
mobilization plans for Indias pivot or strike forces has to be taken into account even though in
bilateral discussions Indian officials continue to state that there is no such doctrine or plan.
India has also developed, as part of its long publicized policy objective a nuclear triad, a nuclear
submarine based second strike capability. It intends to lease Russian nuclear Akula class
submarines capable of carrying nuclear tipped cruise missiles, whose nuclear reactors also
remain outside safeguards, in violation of Russias NPT obligations. Pakistan has no option but
to develop a submarine based second strike capability of its own. This will be needed not only
because of Pakistans lack of depth, but also because such a capability is relied upon by all the
nuclear powers as the only secure long term second strike capability for deterrence.
Nevertheless, it is also a fact that when faced with the possibility of initiating any chain of events
which may lead to a nuclear exchange, the political leadership of any country would not be
guided by estimated calculations of the strike capability of the other side and projection of the
ability to discount its impact. In other words, it is unlikely that any Indian Prime Minister would be
comfortable with the hypothetical assertion of any of Indias military planners that a conventional
attack against Pakistan would remain below the nuclear threshold.
Unlike India, Pakistan has been slow to develop space launch vehicle (SLV) capability, even
though it has held its own in ballistic missiles technology. SLV capability gives any country not
only immense peaceful uses options for development and communications, but also the ability
to launch and maintain observation satellites.
CBMs with India: The nuclear and conventional Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) process
has a useful linkage in the bilateral and international context. There has been some progress on
both these fronts, which stand out as substantial achievements in relation to what has been
achieved in the entire peace dialogue process. Two nuclear CBMs have been concluded and
put in place. In the first Nuclear CBM meeting in June 2004, both sides agreed that the nuclear
15 / 28
capabilities of India and Pakistan, which are based on their national security imperatives,
constitute a factor for stability. The nuclear flashpoint perception is now over for both countries.
At the same time, however, India has not been willing to discuss the longstanding proposal by
Pakistan for a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR), which would incorporate strategic restraint,
conventional balance and dispute settlement.
There has been some modest progress on conventional CBMs. The new hotline, put in place
between the two foreign secretaries during the nuclear CBM talks, serves for a direct channel of
communication for relations in general. The upgradation of the existing hotline between the
Directors Generals of Military Operations of both sides also provides a faster and more reliable
means of communication in case of need. Some other conventional CBMs are near finalization.
These include an agreement to avoid incidents at sea between Naval vessels, and measures
along the line of control.
However, now the Peace Process or Composite Dialogue with India has been resumed after it
was frozen consequent to the Mumbai incident, slow progress is to be expected. The
conventional CBMs proposed by Pakistan, which are either Kashmir related or for across the
international border, have not been accepted by India. Apart from some positive meeting of
minds on a draft Agreement to Avoid Incidents at Sea, the latest rounds of nuclear and
conventional CBMs talks with India in December 2011 were disappointing.
While India projects in these talks, as it does in its national statements, that it has no aggressive
or coercive designs against Pakistan despite its continuing military buildup, which is 95 percent
directed against Pakistan; its military doctrine continues to be dominated by aggressive
concepts, such as Cold Start doctrine and the attendant military exercises along Pakistans
borders. Much will depend on India deciding that better relations with Pakistan are in its long
term interests and that of its image and place in the region and the world.
Post Indo-US Nuclear Agreement Scenario: As mentioned earlier, maintaining the strategic
stability is essential not only for South Asia, but for international stability as well. However, as
the National Command Authority inter alia noted on 2 August 2007, the US-India Nuclear
Agreement would have implications on strategic stability as it would enable India to produce
significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear
reactors. The objective of strategic stability in South Asia and the global non-proliferation regime
would have been better served if the United States had considered a package approach for
Pakistan and India, the two non-NPT Nuclear Weapons States, with a view to preventing a
nuclear arms race in the region and promoting restraints while ensuring that the legitimate
needs of both countries for civil nuclear power generation are met.
16 / 28
Indeed, Indias growing nuclear potential would be a continuous challenge for Pakistan. The
US-India Agreement would free Indias limited uranium reserves for fissile production. Under
this agreement eight Indian CANDU reactors of 2350 MWe, which will be kept out of
safeguards. If run for weapons grade plutonium production at 60 percent capacity, they could
produce 1200 kg of weapon grade plutonium sufficient for 240 nuclear weapons annually. If run
for electricity generation, coupled with some fissile material production due to the online fueling
system of the heavy water CANDU design, these eight reactors could produce up to 500 kg of
weapons grade Pu annually, sufficient for 100 nuclear weapons. The online fueling capacity of
these natural uranium heavy water reactors makes them most suitable for fissile material
production, whether run as dedicated facilities for this purpose or combined with power
generation. Nowhere else in the world are power reactors kept outside safeguards. (See annex
on page 64 for a brief analysis of the fissile production capability of 8 Indian reactors)
The ambitious Indian breeder reactor program, aiming for 13 breeder reactors will also remain
outside safeguards. Indian government scientists have emphasized in their statements that
keeping the breeder reactor program is essential for national security. All other breeder reactor
programs in other countries have been based on Pu generated by civil power reactors utilizing
Pu from fully burnt up fuel, which is not suitable for efficient nuclear weapons design. The
penalty of higher natural uranium usage for weapons grade production is the main factor behind
such a practice, where the objective has been to extent fuel availability and usage for greater
utilization for civil power programs to surmount probable declining world uranium reserves, both
proven and potential. Therefore, there is no rational justification to keep breeder programs, their
reactors and the fissile material produced outside safeguards, except that India wants to keep
the option of enhancing potential weapons grade fissile stocks.
In the light of US-India deal and the NSG exemptions, Pakistan has no option but to maintain a
fissile production capability for the foreseeable future to meet the challenge. This strategic
compulsion also explains Pakistans position on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which is
dealt in detail in the following discussion, chiefly for two reasons: 1) to analyze whether Pakistan
is the only country that is responsible for staling negotiations on FMCT, and 2) to understand
the rationale behind Pakistans opposition to the Treaty in its current form.
FMCT and Pakistan

In the specific context of FMCT, Pakistans preference is for a Fissile Material Treaty or FMT.
The history of this endeavor should be kept in mind as well as the dual objectives of
disarmament and non-proliferation. A fissile material cutoff was initially discussed in 1946 in the
Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the international control of atomic energy and the Baruch Plan,
17 / 28
which proposed to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world supply of
uranium and thorium and to bring it under the UN Atomic Energy Commission. American
President Dwight Eisenhower stated in 1953 that the US would seek more than the mere
reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes.
President Eisenhower officially proposed a cutoff in 1956, a suggestion the Soviets opposed.
From 1978, General Assembly resolutions started calling for a ban on the production of fissile
materials for nuclear weapons. The final declaration of the First Special Session on
Disarmament (SSOD-I) incorporated the international near consensus to ban the production of
weapon-usable fissile material as part of the measures for nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation.
Only in January 1989 did President Gorbachev first support this idea. However, at that time,
President George H W Bush rejected the proposal for fear of undermining the US nuclear
deterrence. The UK, France, Russia and India also rejected it and linked it to nuclear
disarmament.
It was only in the post-Cold War period that hopes rose for general nuclear disarmament
including for the negotiation of a fissile material treaty. President Clinton in his speech to the UN
General Assembly in 1993 said: Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism for all nations. We will press for an
international agreement that would ban production of these materials for weapons forever.
Following on the suggestions of President Bill Clinton, the United Nations General Assembly
unanimously adopted resolution (48/75L) in 1993, which called for a non-discriminatory,
multi-lateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This resolution touched on
verification but was silent on the question of existing stocks.
Ambassador Gerald Shannon was made a Special Coordinator in 1994 to consult the member
states of UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a fissile material treaty. He soon realized
that one of the critical questions would be the past production as well as the future production of
fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. His recommendation was that the mandate of the Ad
Hoc Committee, to be established to negotiate a treaty, did not preclude any delegation from
raising for consideration, inter alia, the past production of fissile materials.
18 / 28
In 1995, the CD established a committee to discuss the FMCT. However, despite the
presentation of the Shannon mandate in 1995, the CD did not commence work on this issue.
The pressure to begin negotiations increased after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in
1998. Pakistan, after due consideration, agreed to participate in these negotiations at that time.
At the end of its 1998 session, the CD did establish an Ad Hoc Committee to start negotiations
on an FMT but it remained in existence for only three weeks, and held only three meetings.
Following the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the US/NATO bombing of Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade, and the US decision to deploy Anti Ballistic Missile Systems, which are also supposed
to have space based weapons, China and Russia hardened their positions in the CD. China
specifically insisted that there should be simultaneous negotiations on the Prevention of Arms
Race in Outer Space (PAROS), which would cover Anti Ballistic Missile Systems.
Furthermore, Pakistan and India, which had joined the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on FMCT
in August 1998, also demanded that FMCT talks be accompanied by negotiations on nuclear
disarmament and outer space. This was in retaliation to the General Assembly resolution, tabled
by the Western countries in October 1998, condemning both India and Pakistan for their nuclear
tests. The United States inter alia also suggested to both the countries to sign a CTBT and to
begin FMCT negotiations. Before either country could make up its mind on the CTBT, the treaty
was rejected by the US Senate at the end of 1999. This development inevitably had an impact
on the pace of discussions on any FMCT/FMT in the CD. Subsequently, there was also a
change in US position, as it withdrew its support for any negotiations on FMCT which sought to
include international verification in the Treaty.
The 2000 NPT Review Conference as part of the thirteen practical steps urged the CD to agree
on a program of work which would include the immediate commencement of the negotiations on
the basis of the Shannon mandate taking into the consideration both nuclear disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation objectives.
In July 2004, the US stated that while it still supported such a treaty, it believed that effective
verification was not achievable. The same year, US, UK, Israel and Palau expressed
reservations on a General Assembly resolution, presented by Canada, which called for
negotiations on FMCT in accordance with the Shannon mandate.
In January 2006, the non-governmental International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was
founded to address the technical challenges of securing and reducing stockpiles of fissile
material. The IPFM is composed of non-proliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and
19 / 28
non-nuclear weapons states, who are there in their personal capacity.
In May 2006, the George W. Bush administration submitted a draft FMCT at the CD that would
not contain any verification provisions; would ban new production of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons for 15 years; and would enter into force with the
ratification of the five established nuclear weapons states. As this draft treaty did not include
verification and permitted, by default, the continued production of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium for non-weapons purposes, it was not found acceptable by the majority of non-western
countries including by the NAM.
There was no progress on the FMCT negotiations in the CD till 2007. In March 2007, the six CD
Presidents for 2007 (South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland and Syria) presented
Presidential Draft Decision (PDD) (document CD/2007/L.1) in a take it or leave it manner. It
was not opened for consultations/amendments despite some delegations, including Pakistan,
having called for open-ended consultations on this document in order to make it acceptable to
all CD Member States.
In May 2009, the CD adopted a consensus program of work temporarily breaking the long
impasse in the CD. The program of work envisaged the establishment of Working Groups on
four core issues including; Nuclear Disarmament, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT),
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and Negative Security Assurances
(NSA). Since the document (CD/1863 later re-designated as CD/1864) apparently addressed
the major issue of verification and suggested negotiations on the basis of the Shannon
Mandate, it was supported by Pakistan at that point of time along with other states.
Pakistan, nevertheless, made it clear that CD/1863 was not a perfect document, which needed
to be equitably worked out in the formal document of the work program elaboration. Formal
amendments were tabled in the CD by Pakistan asking that negotiations should begin on all
four core issues on the agenda of the CD on an equal negotiating basis with all having the same
objectives to arrive at a treaty, and under the overarching principle of SSOD-I of equal security
for all. These constructive amendments on the draft CD document elaborating the work program
were rejected by the western countries.
Pakistan has maintained its position and due to the consensus rule of the CD the position
remains the same and no negotiations on any FMCT have commenced. From time to time,
some western countries have said that the FMCT may be taken outside the CD if this deadlock
20 / 28
continues but in fact they are apprehensive that if this is done, other issues of great importance,
particularly Negative Security Guarantees, and Nuclear Disarmament including Nuclear
Weapons Convention to prohibit the possession, development, stockpiling, transfer and use of
nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction, would also be taken outside the CD. The
Nuclear Weapons Convention, which would be a true disarmament measure, goes far beyond
the status quo objectives of the P-4 and India. The NAM and the G-21 in the CD, including
Pakistan, are in favor of this Convention. However, Pakistan has made it clear that the CD is the
only body in which disarmament instruments should be negotiated, and if the FMCT is taken out
of the CD, Pakistan will not participate.
While the G-21 have declared their support for all the four core issues on the CD agenda to be
given equal treatment for negotiation, many states have put forth their reservations on FMCT.
Israel opposes the Treaty, while Iran feels that it would be used as a pressure point against its
safeguarded nuclear program and as another element for regime change. China also assesses
that its reportedly smaller nuclear stockpile may be insufficient, given the additional capacity
being provided to India.
India, in a formal statement when the consensus program of work was adopted in May 2009,
specified that it would not accept an FMCT which had any adverse implication for its dedicated
military program or its civil nuclear program. The head of Indias nuclear program made it clear
in the public debate in India, leading up to the Indo-US nuclear deal, that without imports of
uranium, India would never be able to power its ambitious civil nuclear power production
program, given the small size of its proven and probable uranium reserves. However, as
supplier countries are increasingly ready to provide not only nuclear technology but uranium fuel
to India, it will be able to use its reserves of uranium for weapons production in its
unsafeguarded power reactors, apart from its dedicated weapon grade Pu making reactors and
enrichment plants.
Hence, it would be nave to think that Pakistan is the only country that opposes the opening of
negotiations on the FMCT in the CD. Many countries find it convenient to remain behind
Pakistan, letting it to do the heavy lifting and attracting the flak. Yet, it is not an option for
Pakistan to step back and hope that other countries will continue to block the FMCT. This was
made clear in 2009 when for a short time it joined the consensus.
Pakistans Fundamental Considerations: Firstly, a treaty on fissile material is tied to the

objectives of non-proliferation i.e. prevention of vertical or horizontal spread of nuclear weapons
technology, and nuclear disarmamentcuts into the existing stocks of weapons and materials.
A treaty that aims at only cutoff of the future production of fissile materials will be a
21 / 28
non-proliferation measure whereas inclusion of the past production and existing stockpiles
within the remit of the treaty will be a step towards disarmament.
Secondly, the treaty must address the question of existing stocks. The asymmetry in the
stockpiles at the global and regional levels will constitute a factor of strategic instability. A cut-off
in the manufacturing of fissile material must be accompanied by a mandatory program for the
elimination of asymmetries in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various states.
Such transfer of fissile material to safeguards should be made first by states with large
stockpiles, both in the global and regional context.
Apart from the significant weapon grade stockpile from Indias dedicated weapons making
reactors, which have been operational for decades, at least 6.8 tons of unsafeguarded
plutonium, as estimated by the IPFM in 2010, constitutes another overhang. Even if this
overhang was of reactor grade plutonium, the IPFM estimates that it is sufficient for 850 nuclear
weapons. However, a significant portion of this unsafeguarded plutonium stockpile is likely to be
weapon grade plutonium as the indigenous Indian reactors of the natural uraniumheavy water
typeare ideal for weapon grade plutonium production, given their online refueling capability
with low burn-up.
To maintain strategic deterrence in South Asia, Pakistan has to take into account existing fissile
stocks. Furthermore, the existing stockpiles, unless accounted for and monitored, could be used
for the development of additional nuclear weapons.
Thirdly, a treaty without an effective verification mechanism will have no teeth. It would be a soft
international law at best. In September 1999, the EU declared its support for an effective
verification system but subsequently dropped its reference to verification in line with the US
position.
International treaties on non-proliferation and disarmament cannot be implemented properly

unless they contain inbuilt and supportive provisions for verification. The IAEA safeguards
regime is designed to support not only the NPT but nuclear power reactors for countries
remaining outside the NPT as well. To strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime, an Additional
Protocol was brought into being. There are detail verification procedures in the CWC and CTBT.
The same logic would apply to any future FMT.
22 / 28
Fourthly, such a treaty must be non-discriminatory. A treaty that addresses stockpiles will assist
in making it non-discriminatory. Otherwise, such a flawed instrument would end up freezing
asymmetries and make such a treaty inherently discriminatory and thereby lead to instability
rather than the desired objective.
Fifthly, the CD must negotiate all the four core issues on its agenda at the same time in a
parallel process, giving equal priority and with the same objective of reaching international
treaties for all four items.
Assessment
This analysis makes it clear that there is no credible threat to Pakistans nuclear assets and that
potential threats are under control. There are similar or higher levels of threat elsewhere. This
issue should not be used by any quarter in an attempt to try to destabilize Pakistan, with the
expectation that this would neutralize or erode its strategic capability.
It can also be said that international concerns from the west are closely linked to a lack of
comfort at Pakistana Muslim statehaving nuclear capability. While the so called war on
terror with its attendant occupations of Iraq and of Afghanistan have led to many adverse
consequences and transactional costs for the Muslim world, which consequently and
unfortunately have generated perceptions of mistrust both in the Western and Muslim societies.
These dynamics have accentuated pre-existing misgivings and impacted on the nuclear issue
as well. The effect on Pakistan in terms of intensified extremist and terrorist movements,
particularly from the continuing turmoil in Afghanistan, has been immense, compounding the
task for Pakistan to counter terrorist and extremist tendencies and to evolve a multidimensional
strategy .
The US, NATO and ISAF would do a great service to both Afghanistan and Pakistan if they
support the government of Afghanistan in implementing an effective strategy for a political
settlement and a developmental package which accords with the traditional structures of the
Afghan state and society, while avoiding collateral damage in its military efforts. The objective
for the foreign forces should be to withdraw from Afghanistan in a manner contributing to a
sustainable political settlement and without leaving Afghanistan subject to cycles of instability,
fighting and chaos. Apart from Afghanistan and its long-suffering people, no other country or
people have such a great stake in the stability of Afghanistan than Pakistan.
On the nuclear concerns issue, a new approach is required. Two-way confidence should be the
23 / 28
overall objective of the international community. It should be recognized that Pakistani

authorities are not complacent and are continually upgrading their systems and vigilance.
Unreasonable suspicions and allegations would be counterproductive.
Presently, Pakistans nuclear weapons are not on alert status. However, if the campaign of
unjustly criticizing Pakistans nuclear safety and security continues, there will be voices within
Pakistan calling for keeping its nuclear weapons on high alert. This is not what Pakistan wants
with its declared policy of restraint and credible minimum deterrence. Nor would any such
change be in the interest of overall regional security and international peace and security, to
which Pakistan fully subscribes.
Regarding criticism and suspicion of Pakistans nuclear safety and security, a number of other
important and continuing objectives need to be kept in focus. First of all, addressing global
concerns is a constant process to demonstrate that Pakistan is a responsible nuclear power.
Maintaining political stability and countering extremism are important factors in this regard,
because irrespective of very strong command and control systems, and export controls, it is the
optics of these factors which fuel global concerns, motivated or otherwise. At the same time,
Pakistan needs to continue to strengthen its nuclear safety and security measures including
command and control, export controls, border controls and nuclear regulation, while interacting
with others to learn from their evolving best practices. This is in fact the policy of the
Government of Pakistan and the policy it is pursing and implementing.
Secondly, the NCA has to constantly upgrade protection of nuclear assets from any internal and
external threats. The NCA and the SPD may find it useful, as is done in other countries on
important issues, to have a B Team to assess challenges and responses to counter check
what already is being done.
Thirdly, Pakistan has to project all dimensions of this issue so that any concerns, be they from
international sources or from within Pakistan, and however limited a circle they may come from,
are responded to through dialogue and by projecting Pakistans efforts and achievements.
Fourthly, it needs to be recognized that the base of national security rests on socio-economic,
educational and technological development.
24 / 28
Fifthly, Pakistan is, no doubt, a nuclear power, and it does not need recognition or legitimization
from any quarter in this regard. As a nuclear power, it should display the self-confidence that
goes with this status.
Way Forward
In conclusion, taking into account the brief overview above I recommend that to safeguard and
to strengthen Pakistans strategic and energy security the following elements should be
projected and implemented as a matter of public policy.
1. Pakistans nuclear program is a vital element of Pakistans national security.
2. Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state with a command, control and security system
second to none, along with strong strategic export controls, all subject to internal monitoring,
review and improvement if required. The safety and security of Pakistans nuclear program and
assets, from any internal or external threat, are beyond doubt.
3. Pakistans participates in many UN, IAEA activities and international initiatives concerned
with nuclear safety and security as well as non-proliferation which further demonstrates its
commitment and ability.
Some critical international perceptions are motivated, while others due to misperceptions.
Through engagement, it should be attempted to correct misperceptions.
4. The civil power generation nuclear program, in which all the civil power reactors are under
IAEA safeguards, is essential to Pakistans energy security as a fossil fuel deficit country
dependent on energy imports for its socio-economic de
5. The power generation component of the program must be advanced to meet Pakistans
growing energy requirements. As this civil nuclear power generation program is based on IAEA
safeguarded reactors, it should not be subject to any external discriminatory technology denial
policies.
6. In view of Pakistans experience and expertise in the safe operation of nuclear reactors and
facilities, establishment of the requisite infrastructure and regulatory regimes, component
manufacturing, nuclear safety as well as export controls, Pakistan is well placed for international
partnerships in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard Pakistan should explore
avenues of cooperation with other countries planning their safeguarded civil nuclear programs.
7. Under the PAEC Pakistan has long standing academic and training programs as well as
medical and agricultural nuclear research and treatment centers and facilities.
8. Peaceful uses cooperation with other countries for their civil nuclear programs and for
agricultural and medical, research and treatment can also be explored under IAEA and OIC
auspices.
9. Pakistans strategic nuclear program based on credible minimum nuclear deterrence is
essential to maintain peace and security in this region. It is not aimed at any country and is
purely defensive and to deter any aggression or adventurism. Minimum deterrence is not static,
and without entering into an arms race, has to evolve to meet and to counter emerging threats
25 / 28
to Pakistans security.
10. It is unfortunate that rather than discussing and partnering Pakistans long standing offer
of a Strategic Restraint Regime (SSR) in South Asia based on nuclear restraint, conventional
balance and dispute resolution, India has moved in the other direction in terms of its strategic
capabilities, conventional build up and aggressive doctrines.
11. It is also unfortunate that many members of the international community rather than
supporting strategic restraint in South Asia, have bolstered Indias strategic and conventional
capabilities and assets. The US-India nuclear deal and the exemption by the NSG without
placing all of Indias power reactors, ambitious breeder reactors program and sizeable fissile
material stocks from these power reactors under safeguards, is a clear violation of these
countries NPT obligations.
12. The provision by Russian of nuclear submarines to India in the past, without any
safeguards on their reactors, and now nuclear attack submarines capable of carrying nuclear
armed cruise missiles, constitute violations of Russias NPT obligations. Russian cooperation in
the production of the Brahmos cruise missile is also a violation of Russias MTCR obligations.
13. Under the Indo-US nuclear deal, 8 Indian heavy water, natural uranium reactors, which
are ideal for weapons grade Pu production have been left outside safeguards. Their joint
capacity of 2,000 MW, running at 60 percent capacity, is adequate to produce 1,200 kg of
weapons grade Pu which can produce 240 nuclear weapons annually. There is no precedent of
keeping power reactors outside IAEA safeguards.
14. Indias ambitious breeder reactor program significantly and exponentially adds to its
weapons grade Pu capability. As the objective of breeder reactors is to extend the use of fissile
material for power production there is no justification for keeping this program outside of IAEA
safeguards.
15. The Indian Prime Minister has stated in Parliament that no facet of Indias nuclear program
which has a strategic significance would be placed under safeguards. This statement makes it
clear that important aspects of Indias nuclear program kept out of safeguards have strategic
objectives and therefore implications for the region and beyond.
16. The International Panel on Fissile Materials has stated inter alia in its 2010 publication,
Reducing and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to
Nuclear Disarmament, that, Indias current stockpile of weapon grade plutonium is estimated
as 700 kg by the IPFM, sufficient for about 140 fission weapons, and 6.8 tons of reactor-grade
plutonium, sufficient for about 850 fission weapons.
17. While not widely known, reactor grade Pu can be used for nuclear weapons. Furthermore,
a significant proportion of this unsafeguarded stockpile is likely to be weapons grade Pu, as
predicted by an official American assessment made before 1974 when it stated that from the 2
reactors under construction India would be able to produce some 50-60 nuclear weapons.
18. The United States of America and the NSG should have made it a condition for any
exemption for India that all its power and breeder reactors and its fissile material stockpile from
its power reactors should be put under safeguards before the provision of any technology,
additional nuclear power plants and uranium supplies. Equal treatment should have been given
for Pakistan. An opportunity to introduce strategic restraint into South Asia was missed. Rather
than professed non-proliferation objectives and NPT obligations, the motivation has been to
build up Indias strategic capabilities and also commercial considerations of profit.
19. Pakistan is therefore faced with: a grave asymmetry of fissile material stocks; an
aggressive Indian Pro-active or Cold Start doctrine aimed at seizing Pakistani territory;
26 / 28
development of an Indian nuclear Triad through the introduction of ballistic missile carrying
submarines; the continued induction of other new lethal weapon systems; introduction of ABMs
with cooperation from the USA, Russia and Israel; and a growing differential in terms of
conventional armaments and capabilities facilitated by countries who call for better relations
between Pakistan and India but whose actions on the ground are not in synch.
20. These developments have significant implications for Pakistans security.
21. The Seminar expresses full support for Pakistans position at multilateral disarmament
fora, and for its principled position in the Conference on Disarmament which must be
maintained.
22. In the CD Pakistan must continue to insist that:
- Only a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), which addresses existing fissile material stocks and
asymmetries to assure equal security for all, should be negotiated. That would be a true
disarmament objective and achievement, not an FMCT aimed at the expense of only Pakistan
the last entrant which was forced by the Indian nuclear tests and subsequent threats, to go
nuclear to preserve the strategic balance essential for peace and security in South Asia.
- That this should be in the context of parallel negotiations of equal status with the same
objective to reach legal instruments on the other three core issues before the CD, Nuclear
Disarmament, Negative Security Guarantee and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space.
- The Group of 21 in its statement of 11th August 2011 at the CD Plenary, which
demonstrates that Pakistan is not isolated in the CD, inter alia called for; consensus on a
comprehensive and balanced program of work taking into account the security concerns of all
states; the early commencement of negotiations, within the CD, on a phased program for the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specific period of time including a Nuclear
Weapons Convention to prohibit the possession, development, stockpiling, transfer and use of
nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction.
- Such a Convention goes far beyond any status quo FMCT proposal and the NPT nuclear
powers to fulfill their NPT vertical deproliferation obligations should agree to demonstrate their
sincerity.
23. Pakistans negotiating strategy be in the CD while continuing to press for the
commencement of negotiations towards legal instruments on the three other core issues in the
CD, it should lay out the following conditions for fissile material negotiations. First of all
normalization of Pakistans relations with the NPT on a de facto basis as done for India, NSG
exception and membership, and nuclear parity with India to allow access to safeguarded
nuclear technology and to remove existing barriers. Secondly, an FMT which must address
existing stockpiles as asymmetries at the regional and global level will be a factor for strategic
instability. Thirdly Indias unsafeguarded power reactors, breeder program and the plutonium
overhang from its power reactors be placed under safeguards. Until then Pakistan has no
alternative but to keep its powder dry.
24. Pakistan, a confident and responsible nuclear State, supports the global objectives of
27 / 28
non-proliferation and of nuclear safety and security and will continue to contribute the evolution
of nuclear safety and security based on national measures and to the strengthening and further
development of the international non-proliferation regime based on the principles of,
non-discrimination, equal and undiminished security for all states, and equal access to peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
28 / 28

Concerns Over Pakistans Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Concerns Over Pakistans Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Concerns over Pakistans Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality