Agra Cases, 04 August 2016

Mago v. Barbin, GR 173923, October 12, 2009

Briefed by Bang-asan, Hagen
Facts:
Respondent is an owner of an irrigated riceland while the Petitioner were the tenants of said
landholding. Respondent then filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Camarines Norte an action for cancellation of Emancipation Patents, Disqualification of Tenant
Beneficiary, Repossession and Damages on the ground that the Petitioners violated the terms of
their leasehold contracts when the latter failed to pay lease rentals for more than two years,
which is a ground for their dispossession of the landholding.
Petitioners alleged that said landholding was placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27), claiming that the title of Respondent
was cancelled and the landholding was transferred to the Petitioner who were issued
Emancipation Patents by the DAR. Transfer Certificate of Title and the EP were issued and
registered in the Registry of Deeds. Prior to such issuance of the EP, the Petitioners claim that
they paid said lease rentals to Respondents. After said issuance of EP, the landholding ceased to
be covered by any leasehold contract
PARAD Ruling: Denied the petition for lack of merit, subject landholding is covered by the OLT
under Letter of Instruction No. 474 (LOI 474) since under the OLT, said cover landholdings were
all tenanted rice /corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who
own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate
income to support themselves and their families
DAR Circular No. 6 of 1978 Payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by OLT shall
terminate on the date the value of the land is established, stating that the Respondent should
filed a claim for just compensation
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Ruling: Reversed ruling of
PARAD, Ordering the cancellation of the EP of Petitioners and directing MARO to reallocate the
lands to qualified beneficiaries.
Said landholding was placed under the OLT, the tenancy relationship ceased and the tenants
were no longer required to pay lease rentals to the land owner. Petitioners then entered into an
agreement with Respondent for a direct payment scheme, embodied in the Deed of Transfer of
which the Petitioner obligated themselves to pay amortizations to Respondent. Failure of which to
pay is a ground for cancellation of EP when the latter failed to pay said amortizations. Denied
Petitioners MR
CA Ruling: Affirmed ruling of DARAB, denied Petitioners MR. Issuance of EP to a beneficiary is
not absolute and can be attacked anytime upon showing of any irregularity in its issuance or
non-compliance with the conditions attached. Said non-compliance is a ground for cancellation
under DAR Order No. 2 of 1994. Petitioners failed to comply with said condition of which paying
the amortization to the Respondent.
Issue/s:
(1) W/N the Petitioners are liable in violation of DAR Order No. 2 of 1994,
(2) W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of DARAB,
(3)W/N the CA erred in not considering the payment of amortization by the Petitioner
Ruling:
(1) Mere issuance of EP does not put the ownership to the Petitioner and still can be attacked
under the conditions of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. DAR Order No. 2 of 1994
enumerates the grounds for cancellations of EP or CLOA
(2) The CA did not erred in affirming the decision of DARAB since the condition imposed by the
Respondent to the Petitioner (Payment of Amortizations) were not complied and said noncompliance is a ground for cancellation of EP
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(3) The CA did not err in not considering the payment of amortization by the Petitioners since
the CA considered both past payments and current non-payment of obligations of the
Petitioners to the Respondent and one of the grounds for cancellation of EP is nonpayment of amortization
Grounds for Cancellation of EP or CLOAs may include but not limited to :
1. Misuse or diversion of financial and support services extended to the ARB [Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries]; (Section 37 of R.A. No. 6657)
2. Misuse of the land; (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657)
3. Material misrepresentation of the ARB's basic qualifications as provided under
Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws;
4. Illegal conversion by the ARB; (Cf. Section 73, Paragraphs C and E of R.A. No. 6657)
5. Sale, transfer, lease or other forms of conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to
use or any other usufructuary right over the land acquired by virtue of being a
beneficiary, in order to circumvent the provisions of Section 73 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D.
No. 27, and other agrarian laws. However, if the land has been acquired under P.D.
No. 27/E.O. No. 228, ownership may be transferred after full payment of
amortization by the beneficiary; (Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 228)
6. Default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three (3) consecutive
amortizations in case of voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme,
except in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure;
7. Failure of the ARBs to pay for at least three (3) annual amortizations to the LBP,
except in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure; (Section 26 of RA 6657)
8. Neglect or abandonment of the awarded land continuously for a period of two (2)
calendar years as determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative;
(Section 22 of RA 6657)

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Agra Cases, 04 August 2016

Padua vs. CA, GR 153456, March 02, 2007

Briefed by Santos, Raymond

Facts:

Dolores Ongsiako Estate in Anao, Tarlac donated Lot Nos. 68 and 90 to the municipality.
Mayor Cruz had distributed Lot No. 68 to Flor Labagnoy (Labagnoy) and Lot No. 90 to
Edwin Cruz (Cruz) who were each issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT).
The tenent Pepito Dela Cruz, et al. filed a petition to cancel the CLT in which the DAR
secretary Condrado Estrella
granted the petition.
Flor Labagnoy & Edwin Cruz appealed to the Office of the President(OP) which was denied.
During the pendency of the appeal before the OP, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Waiver
over his interest in Lot No. 90
Office III issued an Order dated December 7, 1987 cancelling the CLT of Cruz and declaring
Lot No. 90 open for disposition.
On November 7, 1989, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago issued an Order
awarding Lot No. 90 to herein petitioner Roberto Padua (Padua). who had been occupying
said property and paying the amortization thereon to the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP).
Pepito Dela Cruz filed with the DAR Secretary a LetterPetition for Cancellation
(LetterPetition) of the
December 7, 1987 DAR Regional Office III Order and the November 7, 1989 DAR Order.
DAR Secretary Garilao granted the LetterPetition (Garilao Order).
Upon being informed of the Garilao Order, Padua filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment
of a Final and Executory Order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.
Padua claims that the DAR under Sec. 50 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
cannot take cognizance of the petition for cancellation because the matter involved is a
civil law issue relating to the validity of a contract of sale executed by LBP and petitioner,
not an agrarian reform matter; that cancellation can only be ordered by a court of justice,
not by an administrative agency exercising only quasijudicial powers.
Padua claims that he is not a mere potential agrarian reform farmerbeneficiary but a civil
law vendor dealing directly with the LBP.
The petition was thereby denied by the CA, hence, this petition.

Issue/s:

WON Sec. 50 of CARL was correctly applied by the DAR

WON Roberto Padua is not a mere potential agrarian reform farmerbeneficiary but a civil
law vendor dealing directly with the LBP in the payment of amortizations on the property.

Ruling:

Yes. Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 vests in DAR the following quasijudicial power: (kindly
refer to Sec. 50 of RA 6657)

On August 30, 2000, DAR adopted Administrative Order No. 0600[34] or the Rules of
Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. Section 2 thereof states:

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o Section 2. Cases Covered. These Rules shall govern cases falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall include the following:

(a) Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), including protests or
opposition thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage;

(b) Identification,
beneficiaries;

(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP;

(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) and

CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of
Presidential Decreee No. 816, including the issuance, recall or cancellation of
Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs)
not yet registered with the Register of Deeds;

qualification

or

disqualification

of

potential

farmer

No. That view is incorrect. The statutory mechanism for the acquisition of land through
agrarian reform requires full payment of amortization before a farmerbeneficiary may be
issued a CLOA or EP, which, in turn, can become the basis for issuance in his name of an
original or a transfer certificate of title.[37] As Padua himself admitted that he is still
paying amortization on Lot No. 90 to LBP, his status in relation to said property remains
that of a mere potential farmerbeneficiary whose eligibilities DAR may either confirm or
reject. In fact, under Section 2 (d) of Administrative Order No. 0600, DAR has authority to
issue, recall, or cancel a CLT, CBC, EP, or CLOA issued to potential farmerbeneficiaries but
not yet registered with the Register of Deeds.

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Agra Cases, 04 August 2016

Sps. Pasco vs. Pison-Arceo Agri. Dev. Corp., GR 165501, March 28, 2006
Briefed by Cainday, John Kelly
Facts:
Pison Arceo owns a land more than 100 hectares;

Spouses Pasco are among other workers who used to work for Pison Arceo until 1987;
They built their house in Pison Arceos land (actually repaired due to typhoon) at their own
expense and their stay was tolerated; they had paid rentals thru salary deductions;

Pison Arceo asked the workers to vacate but they refused hence unlawful detainer
was filed;

Pasco contended that they were only asked to leave their houses and their refusal is
justified because they were the owners and possessors;

MTCC Talisay favored Pison Arceo: (1) vacate the premises; remove whatever
improvement they introduced; (2) Pay P50/month as rental from the filing of the complaint
until they vacate; (3) P5,000 attorneys fees;

Later , the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) sent a Notice of Coverage and
Field Investigation;

Pasco appealed to RTC the MTCCs decision arguing that Pison Arceos hacienda is covered
by CARL and they (Pasco) are qualified beneficiaries; RTC affirmed MTCCs decision: (1)
vacate premises; remove the house they constructed; (2) Pay P50/month as rental from
the filing of the complaint until they vacate; (3) P5,000 attorneys fees;

Pasco moved to reconsider the RTC decision. That MTCC had no jurisdiction on the unlawful
detainer because there was an agrarian dispute; RTC denied the motion; Pasco then
elevated to CA;

MARO issued a certification that Pasco is a potential CARP beneficiary;

CA denied Pascos petition: xxx the only issue in ejectment cases is the physical
possession of the premises, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties xxx .
Persons who occupy the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will
vacate upon demand.

Issue/s:

May identified potential agrarian reform beneficiary be ejected from land covered by
CARP?

(Nonagra) Could they raise for the first time new issues on appeal?

Ruling:

The issuance during the pendency of the case of a Notice of Coverage does not
automatically make the ejectment case an agrarian dispute for the DARABs
jurisdiction; this is only a preliminary step for the State to acquire the land and it
does not automatically vest tile or transfer the ownership of the land to the
government. It does not ipso facto render the land subject thereof a land reform area.
o

The field investigation is for the purpose of identifying the landholding and
determining its suitability or agriculture and its productivity

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CARP beneficiaries are included in the list of those who may be awarded land under CARP;
nothing in the records show award in favor of Pasco, hence they have yet no right over the
land occupied;

Sec. 24. Award to Beneficiaries The rights and responsibilities of the

beneficiary shall commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the land to
him xxx. Xxx evidenced by a CLOA xxx

The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiaries will begin from their
receipt of a duly registered CLOA and their actual physical possession of
the awarded land. (Ungos 2015, p. 71) [mga ganito hinahanap nya kasi cited sa
book]

Moral (copied en toto): To allow petitioners to continue to stay in respondents land on the
ground that they are potential CARP beneficiaries would give them preferential treatment
over the other potential CARP reform beneficiaries who are not occupying the premises
and still awaiting the award to be made by the DAR in their favor worse, to further tolerate
petitioners occupancy of respondents land might give other potential CARP beneficiaries
the wrong signal that they too can occupy the land which may be awarded to them even
before they are chosen or before an award is made in their favor.

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Estribillo vs. DAR, GR 159674, June 30, 2006

Briefed by Ringor, Val Charles
Estribilio VS DAR G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006
A Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the Reversal of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 27
January 2003 and August 2003, respectively
Emancipation Patents were given to the petitioners with the exception of two. The parcels of land
awarded are located at Barangay Anga, Sta Josefa, Agusan del Sur. Two other petitioners are
surviving spouses named Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patino and their lot which has a measure of
4.1 and 3.0 hectares respectively, is the subject matter in this Petition. Hacienda Maria, Inc.
(HMI) operated logging on a forested area and caused deforestation of the land. Because of the
event, the petitioners tilled together with other persons and occupied the land believing that it was
a public Land. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation
of the land.
HMI acquired the area in 1956 the title covered three parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308
hectares. PD 27 was declared and the entire 527.83 hectares of land was requested to be covered
by it. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping and approved the
Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings in 1976.
HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the
determination of the Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land
Production, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA),
covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
in 1977.
HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners and the annotation in the
OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment and a
final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved in 1982.
In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the
corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners,
among other persons.
In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator and 17 petitions
seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008
hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. The 17 petitions, which were
later consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares
which had been awarded to petitioners. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either
rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid.
HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27
despite claiming that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.
When the petitioners failed to submit a petition Position Paper, RARAD rendered a decision
declaring the TCTs and EP awarded to them as void because the land covered was not devoted to rice and
corn. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied triggering an appeal to the Department of
Agrarian reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) but still to no avail.
Petitioners proceeded to C.A. for Motion for Reconsideration but it was dismissed because of violation of
Section 5, Rule 7 of Civil Procedure, as amended and again they filed a motion but it was still denied. The
Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman
that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules.
Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper
authorization from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby
rendering the petition fatally defective
Petitioners now file the present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are
ordinary titles which become unannullable one year after their registration.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition should be accepted.
2. Whether or not DARAB erred in affirming the decision of RARAD regarding its declaration in the TCTs and
EP awarded to the petitioner. (Relevant to the Agra)

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The court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice
involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably
and completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we must stress that
technical rule of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be
detrimental to the working woman.
The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume that there was violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and a relaxation of such rule would be justified for two compelling reasons: social
justice considerations and the merit of the Petition.
The DARAB is grossly mistaken.
Certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of
title issued in judicial proceedings. A certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding
pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued
under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public
land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law. If the title to the land grant in favor of the
homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the
Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would arise
uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the governments system of distributing public agricultural lands
pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State.
The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is
the same as that in the Public Land Act. Silence should be construed and interpreted in favor
of the homesteader who comes into the possession of his homestead after complying with the
requirements thereof.
As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr.:
Where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent
therefore is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is
automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the
grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other
words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become
IRREVOCABLE AND INDEFEASIBLE like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.
EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration
proceedings.
Wherefore, the Resolutions of the Court of the CA are REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. EPs and the
corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are hereby declared VALID and
SUBSISTING.

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Panlilio vs. Dizon, GR 148777, Octiber 18, 2007

Briefed by Lobo, Aaron Paolo

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Agra Cases, 04 August 2016

Caballes vs. DAR, GR 78214, December 05, 1988

Briefed by Villar, Jacquie
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the public
respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform , now the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through
its then Minister, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship
between the herein petitioner and the private respondent .
Facts:
The landholding subject of this case consists of only sixty (60) square meters (3 x 20 meters)
property acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the petitioner
herein, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes. This
landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters,
situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C was subsequently sold to the
said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of the Millenes family, thus
consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in favor of the petitioner.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to
the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the
land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis. From 19751977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn
but continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for
the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and
persuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding.
Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was
not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they
needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave.
RTC: ordered the referral of the case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a
preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties, which issued a certification,
and stated that the respondent is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining
witness.
DAR: In the summary investigation conducted by the DAR, the former landowner, Andrea
Millenes, testified that Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land
under his cultivation. The grandson of Andrea Millenes, Roger Millenes, corroborated the
testimony of the former, stating that he received said share from Abajon. Roger Millenes further
testified that the present owners received in his presence a bunch of bananas from the accused
representing or 50% of the two bunches of bananas gathered after Caballes had acquired the
property. 4
DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes, the former owner, who had testified
that she shared the produce of the land with Abajon as tiller thereof. 5 Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of
RA 3844, as amended, which provides that "The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code
shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by
the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding"; and that "In case the
agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR ruled that 'the new owners are legally bound to
respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim that the portion tilled by Abajon was small,
consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60)
square meters." 6
Issue/s:
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W/N respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse of power and
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that private respondent Abajon is an
agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a
commercial lot of the petitioner.

Ruling:
YES. DAR erred in ruling that the respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant.
The court disagreed that the finding of DAR that the private respondent shared the produce of
the land with the former owner, Andrea Millenes, led or misled, the public respondents to
conclude that a tenancy relationship existed between the petitioner and the private respondent
because, the public respondents continue, by operation of Sec. 10 of R.A. 3844, as amended, the
petitioner new owner is subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
supposed agricultural lessor (the former owner).
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
Essential requisites of tenancy relationship:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

The subject is agricultural land;
There is consent;
The purpose is agricultural production;
There is personal cultivation; and
There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties.
The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a
planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status
as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. 10
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that
the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently,
Sec. 10 of RA of 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not
a tenant of the herein petitioner.
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly,
it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who
plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim,
a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically
make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500,
square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone
at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case
indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the
owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some
sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion.

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Gelos vs. CA, GR 86186, May 08, 1992

Briefed by Salamanca, Janavi
Facts:
The Private Respondent owned the subject land of 25,000 square meters in Laguna. The
Landowner then entered in to a contract with the petitioner and employed him to be laborer on
the land with the wage of 5.00 peso a day. The Petitioner first went the Court of Agrarian Relation
and then went to Ministry of Agrarian reform and asked the court to fix the agricultural lease
rental of the land and his request was granted.
The private respondent then filed a complaint of illegal detainer against the petitioner that was
that was dismissed by the Ministry of Agrarian reform for the existence of Tenancy relations
between the parties. The Private respondents appealed to the office of the President alleging that
there was no tenancy relation between the parties.
RTC= dismissed the complaint, there was a tenancy relation
CA= reversed
Issue/s:
W/N there was a tenancy relation between parties
Ruling:
NONE.
It was clear that the petitioner were not intended to be tenant but a mere employee of the
private respondent as showed in the contract. The petitioner was paid for specific kind of work.
The court stressed many cases that:
According to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy relationship is distinguished from
farm employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the
lease is one of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm
employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and
the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm employer
and for his labor he receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit.
On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest."
The private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in the produce of the
land, paid the petitioner lump sums for specific kinds of work on the subject lot or gave
him vales, or advance payment of his wages as laborer thereon. The petitioner's wife claims that
Alzona made her husband sign the invoices all at one time because he allegedly needed them to
reduce his income taxes. Even assuming this to be true, we do not think that made the said
payments fictitious, especially so since the petitioner never denied having received them.

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Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, GR 27797, August 26, 1974

Briefed by Lim, Victor

Facts:
During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29, 1972, Atty. Virgilio M.
Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, gave notice to this Court that said appellant
died on April 3, 1964, and was survived by his children, who are his legal heirs, namely: Salvador
Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan, Mariano Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and Pilar Pangilinan de
Avante. For the purposes of this case the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, therefore, is substituted
by his heirs herein named.
Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with this Court advising
that appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967, and was survived by her heirs and
successorsininterest, namely: Corazon O. Gabriel, married to Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O.
Gabriel; Ester O. Gabriel, married to Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel
and Pablo O. Gabriel, and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted by her heirs
herein named. By order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the prayer for substitution was
granted.
Facts: Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint against Eusebio Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of
a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly
rental (P 1,200) was entered between them. Defendant was notified that the contract would be
terminated, but upon request was extended for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial court had no
jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an
agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the
motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was originally verbally leased to
him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted, subject to the
condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and that which was already a
fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his
heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he could continue leasing as
long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take
cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and such,
personally with the aid of helpers since he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar
Pangilinan, took over who said that she helps her father in administering the leased property,
conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is residing near the fishpond,
defendants other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in
Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.
Arguments:
1. Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed
by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844,
and the present case is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations.
2. Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members
of his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy
relationship between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil
lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court:

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The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy relationship exists
between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with
jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.
Issue/s:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a civil
lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction,
the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
Ruling:
Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold
tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban
property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally
attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally
cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is
devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful
pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas
leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy
Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the
consideration for the use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an agricultural land does not
necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4 of Republic Act No. 1199.
He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied
with.
The court doesnt want to decide on the second requisite since it wasnt raised. For the third
requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond
personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's
immediate farm household work the land. Only the members of the family of the tenant and such
other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support
and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate
farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the
land. A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from
his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work
the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the
cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant
within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status,
rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the
appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under
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Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil
Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

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Agra Cases, 04 August 2016

Hacienda Luisita vs. Pres. Agra. Reform Council,

GR 171101, July 05,

2011
Briefed by Lastrollo, Andrew
Facts:
The petitioners present for resolution several issues concerning the 2011 Decision were the Court
ordered, among others, that the lands subject of Hacienda Luisita Incorporated (HLI) stock
distribution plan (SDP) be placed under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition
scheme of the CARP and declared that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker beneficiaries
(FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the Court properly determined the coverage of compulsory acquisition.
Whether or not the subject agricultural lands may be sold to third parties though they
have not been fully paid.
Whether or not the ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain
as stockholders of HLI is valid.

Ruling:

No. ARM argues that this Court ignored certain material facts when it limited
the maximum area to be covered to 4,915.75 hectares, whereas the area
that should, at the least, be covered is 6,443 hectares, which is the
agricultural land allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac
Development Corporation (Tadeco). But what is put in issue before the Court is the
propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of
agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then We are constrained to rule only as regards
the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.

In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, We stated that "HLI shall be paid just
compensation for the remaining agricultural land that will be transferred to
DAR for land distribution to the FWBs." We also ruled that the date of the "taking"
is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-122.
We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC
approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the
time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in
Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform
coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP,
that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage
ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.

HLI violated provisions under the SDP. Contrary to the assertions of AMBALA and FARM,
nowhere in the SDP, RA 6657 and DAO 10 can it be inferred that improving the
economic status of the FWBs is among the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP or is
an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10, a violation of which would justify
discarding the stock distribution option.
We realize that the FWBs will never have control over these agricultural lands for as
long as they remain as stockholders of HLI. In line with Our finding that control over
agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, We reconsider our ruling
that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control given the present proportion
of shareholdings in HLI.
Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will
no longer be operating under SDP and will only be treated as an ordinary private
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corporation; the FWBs who remain as stockholders of HLI will be treated as ordinary
stockholders and will no longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657.
In addition to the foregoing, in view of the operative fact doctrine, all the benefits and
homelots received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or
return them, since, as We have mentioned in our July 5, 2011 Decision, "the benefits x
x x were received by the FWBs as farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and
other fringe benefits were granted to them pursuant to the existing collective
bargaining agreement with Tadeco.

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