13.

Lex Loci Celebrationis Recognized

subject to Exceptions and Recognition
of
Foreign Divorce (Art. 26)
Case 1. VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO
and RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen
of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They
were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot
two children. The parties were divorced in
Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then remarried also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against
Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alices
business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that Alice
be ordered to render an accounting of that
business, and that Richard be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property.
Alice moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that
he and petitioner had no community
property as of June 11, 1982. The Court
below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied
the MTD in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located
in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case. The denial is now
the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines?
RULING:

Petition is granted, and respondent

Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint
For the resolution of this case, it is
not necessary to determine whether the
property relations between Alice and Richard,
after their marriage, were upon absolute or
relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other
regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which
decreed
the
divorce,
had
obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of
the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over
private respondent who authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither
community
property
nor
community
obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of
Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm
of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the
divorce proceedings:
xxx xxxxxx
You are hereby authorized to accept
service of Summons, to file an Answer,
appear on my behalf and do all things
necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on
the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of
property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community
obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxxxxxxxx
There can be no question as to the
validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the

States of the United States. The decree is

binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and
binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law,
private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

Case 2. REPUBLIC vs. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review by
the RP represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General on certiorari praying for the
reversal of the decision of the CA dated July
30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC
declaring the marriage of Crasus L.
Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and
void based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy

and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they
had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US,
in the same year she sent letters to Crasus
asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985,
Crasus learned that Fely married an
American and had a child. Fely went back to
the Philippines on several occasions, during
one she attended the marriage of one of her
children in which she used her husbands last
name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity alleging
that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor
to
the
family
and
were
manifestations
of
her
psychological
incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony,
the certification of the recording of their
marriage contract, and the invitation where
Fely used her new husbands last name as
evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted
that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had
no job, and that since 1988 she was already
an American citizen and not covered by our
laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient
and granted the decree; it was affirmed in
the CA.
ISSUE:
Does abandonment
infidelity per se constitute
incapacity?

and sexual
psychological

RULING:
The evidences presented by the
respondent fail to establish psychological
incapacity.
Furthermore,
Article
36
contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations; not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse.

Irreconcilable
differences,
conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do
not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under the said Article.

permanent monthly support for their

daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.

Finally, Article 36 is not to be

confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to

dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094
and set aside RTC's incidental orders.
According the the CA, RTC ought to have
granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since
the marriage between the spouses is already
dissolved when the divorce decree was
granted since Rebecca was an American
citizen when she applied for the decree.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a

Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and that the petition is barred
by the prior judgment of divorce.

The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued

by the Dominican Republic court properly
adjudicated
the
ex-couple's
property
relations.
The Court said, in order that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, the divorce
decree must be proven as a fact and as valid
under the national law of the alien spouse.
The fact that Rebecca was clearly an
American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient.

ISSUE:
Case 3. BAYOT vs. CA
G.R. No. 155635/163979, November 7, 2008,
570 SCRA 472
FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino,
and Rebecca, an American, were married in
Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix,
born in November 27, 1982 in California.
In February 22, 1996, Rebecca
initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican
Republic, which was docketed as Civil Decree
No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the
marriage. The same court also issued Civil
Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's
conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4,
1997.
She then filed a declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of
Vicente's
alleged
psychological
incapacity,docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094.
She sought dissolution of the
conjugal
partnerships of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. She
also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a

Whether or not the divorce decree

obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic
is valid.
RULING:
Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and
406/97 are valid.
Rebecca at that time she applied and
obtained her divorce was an American citizen
and remains to be one, being born to
American parents in Guam, an American
territory which follows the principle of jus soli
granting American citizenship to those who
are born there. She was, and still may be, a
holder of American passport.
She had consistently professed,
asserted and represented herself as an
American citizen, as shown in her marriage
certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she
secured divorce in Dominican Republic.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca
was bound by the national laws of the United
States of America, a country which allows
divorce.

Thus the foreign decrees rendered

and issued by the Dominican Republic court
are valid, and consequently, bind both
Rebecca and Vicente.
The fact that Rebecca may have
been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by
force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by the
DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau
Order of Recognition will not, stand alone,
work to nullify or invalidate the foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca as an American
citizen in 1996. In determining whether or
not a divorce is secured abroad would come
within the pale of the country's policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.

OTHER REFERENCE FOR Case 3. BAYOT

vs. CA
G.R. No. 155635/163979, November 7, 2008,
570 SCRA 472
Art. 26. x xxxWhere a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry, the

Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
G.R. No. 155635
MARIA
REBECCA
MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA
REBECCA
MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT,
Petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, Respondent.
FACTS:
Vicente and Rebecca were married
on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the
Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then
26 years old, to be an American citizen born
in Agaa, Guam, USA. On November 27,
1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca
gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or
Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's
marital relationship seemed to have soured
as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated
divorce proceedings in the Dominican
Republic. Before the Court of the First
Instance of the Judicial District of Santo
Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared,
while Vicente was duly represented by
counsel.
DECISION OF COURTS:
(1) Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic - ordering the dissolution
of the couple's marriage and "leaving them
to remarry after completing the legal
requirements," but giving them joint custody
and guardianship over Alix. On March 21,
2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this
time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on
the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological

incapacity. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a

Motion to dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds
of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce.
(2) RTC: denying Vicente's motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting
Rebecca's application for support pendente
lite. Following the denial of his motion for
reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001
RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a
petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
(3) CA: issued the desired TRO.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and
(2) Whether the judgment of divorce
is valid and, if so, what are its consequent
legal effects?
RULING:
(1) Rebecca an American Citizen in
the Purview of This Case. When divorce was
granted, Rebecca was not a Filipino Citizen
and was not yet recognized as one. From the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that
Rebecca did not have that status of, or at
least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino
citizen when she secured the February 22,
1996 judgment of divorce from the
Dominican Republic.
(2) The divorce is valid. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer
husband and wife to each other. As the
divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat
the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M.
BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is

hereby dissolved x xx leaving them free to

remarry
after
completing
the
legal
requirements. "The Court has taken stock of
the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, provided the
divorce decree is proven as a fact and as
valid under the national law of the alien
spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that
Rebecca was clearly an American citizen
when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of
the States of the Union, the presentation of a
copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient.The fact
that Rebecca may have been duly recognized
as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8,
2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice
Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order
of Recognition will not, standing alone, work
to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca as an American citizen
on February 22, 1996.In determining whether
or not a divorce secured abroad would come
within the pale of the country's policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.
One thing is clear from a perusal of
Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC,
Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's
opposition thereof, with the documentary
evidence attached therein: The petitioner
lacks a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes
the existence of a marriage.

Conflict of Laws
Case 4. MINORI FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ
GALENA MARINAY
G.R. No. 196049, 2013 case
MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner,
vs.

MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI

MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a
Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz GalelaMarinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage
did not sit well with petitioners parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.In 2008, Marinay met
another
Japanese,
Shinichi
Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.Fujiki
and Marinay met in Japan and they were able
to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from
a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC
entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage).
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)"
based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file
the petition.
ISSUES & RULING:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute

Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. Moreover, in JulianoLlave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule
in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy,
as bigamous marriages are declared void
from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki
can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment in accordance with
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a
prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states:Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any
person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register,
may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court
of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)There
is no doubt that the prior spouse has a
personal and material interest in maintaining

the integrity of the marriage he contracted

and the property relations arising from it.

Void
marriages
collaterally.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court

can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.

(4) Whether the petition for declaration for

nullity of marriage has prescribed.

be

attacked

The lower court ruled:

Ratification of Marital Cohabitation

Yes. There is neither circumvention of

the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law.In the
recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine
courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under
foreign law. They cannot decide on the
family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited
to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage involving a citizen of
a foreign country, Philippine courts only
decide whether to extend its effect to the
Filipino party, under the rule of lexnationalii
expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.For
this purpose, Philippine courts will only
determine (1) whether the foreign judgment
is inconsistent with an overriding public
policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e.
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with
public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by
default, recognize the foreign judgment as
part of the comity of nations.

cannot

Case 5. ENGRACE NINAL et. Al. vs.

BADAYOG
G.R. No. 133778
FACT:
Pepito married his second wife Norma a year
and eight months after his first wife
Teodulfas death. Pepito and Norma got
married without any marriage license
because they lived together for 5 years and
thus exempt from marriage license. Some
years after, Pepito died in a car accident.
The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in
successional rights (succession only occurs
after the death of an ascendant) due to the
second marriage, filed a petition for
declaration for nullity of marriage (a.k.a.
declaration of nullity of void marriages)
between Pepito (deceased) and Norma using
the absence of a marriage license as a legal
basis.
ISSUES:
The lower
because:

court

dismissed

the

petition

(1) The Family Code is silent whether the

petition has a cause of action. Can there be
such a petition when the heirs parent is
deceased?
(2) Are the heirs a proper party?
(3) Determination whether the second
marriage is void ab initio (from the
beginning) is a must but is a different matter.

(1) Petitioners should have filed an action to

declare null and void their fathers marriage
before the latters death.
(2) The prescription period and the proper
party in an annulment proceeding were used
as a basis to dismiss petitioners case.
Petitioners disagree with the decision and
petitions for a review.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that:
(1) The applicable law, for the
determination of marriage, is the Civil Code
and not the Family Code. (In determining the
validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the
law in force at the time the marriage was
contracted.)
(2) There is no second marriage. The
absence of a marriage license renders
marriage void ab initio. The exemption for a
marriage license, the cohabitation, was not
the one described by the Civil Code. It is not
the one described by the Civil Code because
the cohabitation, after the first marriage, was
only twenty months whereas the law requires
five years. If the respondent took into
consideration the other years and months
before the second marriage, then the
cohabitation would include the period of the
first marriage. This is in violation of the law.
(3) Separation in fact (not the legal
separation) by the first marriage does not
count cohabitation.

This 5-year period should be the

years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that
is unbroken.
(4) The judges ruling (lower court),
where void and voidable marriages are made
identical is erroneous. Void and voidable
marriages are not identical.
A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken
place.
A voidable can be generally ratified
or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while a void marriage can never
be ratified.
A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally.
Void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.
The action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void
marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the

properties of the alleged spouses, regarding

co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution, and its effect on the
children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment is
legitimate.
(5) The Supreme Court requires a
judicial decree of nullity of second marriage
before determining succession rights.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code
states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage.
However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

Case 6. REPUBLIC vs. DAYOT

G.R. No. 175581
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at
the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986.
In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a
sworn affidavit that they had lived together
for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose
contracted
marriage
with
a
certain
RufinaPascual. They were both employees of
the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an
administrative complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose
filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
where he contended that his marriage with
Felisa was a sham and his consent was
secured through fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joses marriage with
Felisa is valid considering that they executed
a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage
license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose
and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June
1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage on November
1986.
Findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore,
the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and

Felisas cohabitation, which would have

qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to
a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by
the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and
Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court
also ruled that an action for nullity of
marriage is imprescriptible.
The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and may
be raised any time.

the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and

Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board. The
Ombudsman found Jose administratively
liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct
ans suspended him for one year without
emolument. The RTC ruled against Jose
claiming that his story is impossible. RTC
cited Article 87 of the New Civil Code which
requires that the action for annulment of
marriage must be commenced by the injured
party within four years after the discovery of
the fraud.

OTHER
REFERENCE
REPUBLIC vs. DAYOT
G.R. No. 175581

ISSUE:

FOR

Case

6.

W/N the issue of validity of marriage

due to fraud is prescriptible

FACTS:
Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986.
He later came to live as a boarder in Felisas
house, the latter being his landlady. Later,
Felisa requested him to accompany her to
the Pasay City Hall, so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from
Saudi. There, a man bearing three folded
pieces of paper approached them.
They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers
so that the package could be released to
Felisa.
He initially refused to do so.
However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him
that his refusal could get both of them killed
by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. He signed the papers and gave
them to the man. It was in February 1987
when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. When he confronted
Felisa, she said she does not know of such.
Jose claimed that their marriage was
contracted with fraud. Felisa denied Joses
allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter
contracted
marriage
with
a
certain
RufinaPascual on August 31, 1990. On 3 June
1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy
against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with

RULING:
SC held that an action for nullifying a
marriage is imprescriptible. It may be raised
anytime. Jose and Felisas marriage was
celebrated without a marriage license. No
other conclusion can be reached except that
it is void ab initio.

Case
7.
OFFICE
OF
THE
COURT
ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE ANTONIO
NECESSARIO
Al A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
Due to an administrative case filed
on July 6, 2007, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) formed a judicial audit
team that investigated on irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages in several MTCs
and RTCs in Cebu. The head of the audit
team created went undercover with another
lawyer to see if the allegations were true that
there were fixers or facilitators offering
package fees to parties who would like to
apply for marriage. After their interviews and
investigation, the OCA recommended the
dismissal of the following judges and court

employees generally for gross neglect of

duty due to the following circumstances:
Judge Necessario - solemnized marriages
with questionable documents even where
one of the contracting parties (foreigner)
submitted an affidavit instead of a certificate
of legal capacity from his embassy; and
under Art. 34 (one of the contracting parties
was a minor during cohabitation)
Judge Acosta failed to make sure that
solemnization fee has been paid and also
solemnized a marriage under Art. 34
Judge Rosales failed to make sure the
solemnization fee has been paid and
solemnized marriage between foreigner who
only submitted an affidavit; also solemnized
a marriage without the marriage license
Judge Tormis solemnized marriages with
questionable documents; failed to make sure
solemnization fee has been paid; solemnized
marriage between foreigner who only
submitted an affidavit; solemnized marriage
with expired marriage license.
Helen Monggaya violated Sec. 2, Canon 1
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
prohibition from soliciting any gifts and for
giving false information for the purpose of
perpetrating an irregular marriage
Rhona Rodriguez violated Sec. 2, Canon 1
by participating in the collection of an agreed
upon additional fee to process
the
documents, and in one case, received 4,000
pesos to facilitate an irregular marriage
Desiderio Aranas and Rebecca Alesna
provided couples who are to be married
under Art. 34 with the required affidavit of
cohabitation even if one or both of them
were minors during cohabitation
Celeste Retuya, Emma Valencia, Rebecca
Alesna violated Sec. 2 (b), Canon 3 of the
Code of Conduct of Court Personnel because
they received tips in assisting parties
engaged in the transactions with the
Judiciary. Also, they effectively screened all
documents before submitting them to the
judges.
However, OCA recommended the
dismissal of complaints against Judge Econg,

Corazon Retuya and Marilou Cabaez for lack

of merit.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary
for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judges and
personnel of Cebu MTCC and RTC are guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of
duty, or gross inefficiency and gross
misconduct.
RULING:
YES. Judges Necessario, Acosta,
Romis and Rosales are guilty of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty.
Neglect of duty, as defined in Rodrigo-Ebron
vs. Adolfo, is the failure to give ones
attention to a task expected of him and it is
gross when, from the gravity of the offense
or the frequency of instances, the offense is
so serious in its character as to endanger or
threaten public welfare.
This is reflected in the evidence
submitted: Documents showed evidences of
tampering, absence of receipts to show that
solemnization fees were paid, documents
submitted
by
the
parties
showed
irregularities,
testimonies
were
made
regarding solemnization of marriages without
licenses, among others.
It was held that the actions of the judges
have raised a very alarming issue regarding
the
validity
of
the
marriages
they
solemnized as, for instance, absence of a
marriage license would render a marriage
void pursuant to Art. 4 of the Family Code.
SC dismissed the argument of the
respondents that it was beyond the scope of
duty of the solemnizing officer to check the

validity of the marriage pursuant to People

vs. Jansen.
Court finds respondents guilty, orders the
dismissal of the judges and employees from
service.
The SC through Navarro vs. Domagtoy,
established that: The judiciary should be
composed of persons who, if not experts are
at least proficient in the law they are sworn
to apply, more than the ordinary layman.
Employees are also held liable as established
in Villaceran vs. Rosete, which said Court
personnel, from the lowliest employee, are
involved in the dispensation of justice
these court personnel serve as sentinels of
justice and any act of impropriety on their
part immeasurable affect the honor and
dignity of the Judiciary.

Case 8. MALLION vs. ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 141528
FACTS:
First, the case was filed by Oscar
Mallon at RTC of San Pablo City against his
wife Editha Alcantara seeking the declaration
of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacitated under Article 36
of the Family Code. However, his petition was
denied for lack of merits. The petitioner failed
to adduce preponderance of evidence to
warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking.
He appealed, filed at the Court of
Appeals, likewise, it was dismissed for failure
of the petitioner to pay the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglamentary period.
On the other hand, after the decision
in Civil Case attained finality, Oscar Mallion
filed another petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground that their
marriage was celebrated without a valid
marriage license, again at RTC San Pablo
City.

Respondent filed an answer with

motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata (it is a concept as a bar by prior
judgment obtains in the present case) and
forum
shopping.
The
RTC
granted
respondent's motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
RULING:
No. Sec.47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court pertains as "bar by prior judgment"
or "estoppels by verdict" which is the effect
of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of
the second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action.
In Sec.47(c) of the same rule, it
pertains to res judicata in it concept as
"conclusiveness of judgment" or the rule of
auter action pendant which ordains that
issues actually and directly resolved in a
former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action.
Therefore, having expressly and
impliedly concealed the validity of their
marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein.
The Court finds the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of lack of marriage license is barred.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Bigamous or Polygamous Marriages

Case 9. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.,
vs. ATTY. LEO J. PALMA
A.C. No. 2474, June 30, 2005
FACTS:

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed a

complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J.
Palma,
alleging
as
grounds
deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct in office,
violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly
immoral conduct.
Respondent Palma [from ACCRA Law
Office] was employed by petitioner as his
personal counsel. Respondent's excellence in
managing petitioner's legal affairs, prompted
petitioner to introduced respondent to his
family. Since respondent gained the trust of
petitioner and his family, their relationship
became intimate. Respondent then was
allowed to tutor the 22 year old daughter of
Petitioner.
However, when his concern was
supposed to be complainants legal affairs
only, he sneaked at the latters back and
courted his daughter.
Like the proverbial
thief in the night, he attacked when nobody
was
looking.
He
succeeded
in
misrepresenting himself to Hong Kong
officials as a bachelor and successfully
married petitioner's daughter, eventhough he
is legally married.
Respondent argued that, he cannot
be punished since there is no allegation that
he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of
skill or ignorance of the law in serving
complainants interest. Anent the charge of
grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he
married complainants daughter with utmost
sincerity and good faith and that it is
contrary to the natural course of things for an
immoral man to marry the woman he
sincerely loves.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's acts
constitutes gross immoral conduct so as to
warrant his disbarment from the legal
profession.
RULING:

Yes, the Court ruled respondent's

action constitutes gross immoral conduct. A
gross immoral conduct, the Court said, is a
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.
Thus, measured against this definition,
respondents act is manifestly immoral.
First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three
children.
Second, he lured an innocent
young woman into marrying him. And third,
he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so
he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
In particular, adds the Court, "he
made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.
His act of contracting a second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality." Moreover, the
circumstances here speak of a clear case of
betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It
was
respondents
closeness
to
the
complainants family as well as the latters
complete trust in him that made possible his
intimate relationship with Lisa. When his
concern was supposed to be complainants
legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latters
back and courted his daughter.
Like the
proverbial thief in the night, he attacked
when nobody was looking.
Moreover, he
availed of complainants resources by
securing a plane ticket from complainants
office in order to marry the latters daughter
in
Hongkong.
He
did
this
without
complainants knowledge.
The Court stressed again the
principle that law profession does not
prescribe a dichotomy of standards among
its members. There is no distinction as to
whether the transgression is committed in
the lawyers professional capacity or in his
private life. This is because a lawyer may
not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. Thus, not only his professional

activities but even his private life, insofar as

the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the
good name and prestige of the profession
and the courts, may at any time be the
subject of inquiry on the part of the proper
authorities.
Respondent
cannot
rely
on
complainant's admission that he is a good
lawyer, because professional competency
alone does not make a lawyer a worthy
member of the Bar. Good moral character is
always an indispensable requirement.
In
sum,
respondent
committed
grossly immoral conduct and violation of his
oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year
suspension recommended by the IBP is not
commensurate to the gravity of his offense.
The bulk of jurisprudence supports the
imposition of the extreme penalty of
disbarment.

Psychological Incapacity of Any Party

(Art. 36)
Case 10. CHI MING TSOI vs CA
G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA
324
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi were
married in 1988. After the celebration of
their wedding, they proceed to the house of
defendants mother. There was no sexual
intercourse between them during their first
night and same thing happened until their
fourth night.
In an effort to have their
honeymoon in a private place, they went to
Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them.
Again, there was no sexual intercourse since
the defendant avoided by taking a long walk
during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at
the living room. Since May 1988 until March
1989 they slept together in the same bed but
no attempt of sexual intercourse between

them.
Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examination to a
urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989.
The result of the physical examination of
Gina was disclosed, while that of the
husband was kept confidential even the
medicine prescribed. There were allegations
that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married
her is to maintain his residency status here in
the country. Gina does not want to reconcile
with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage
declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. On the other hand, the latter
does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her very much, he
has no defect on his part and is physically
and psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still
overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi
submitted himself to another physical
examination and the result was there is not
evidence of impotency and he is capable of
erection.
ISSUE:
Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to
have sexual intercourse with his wife
constitutes psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The
abnormal
reluctance
or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of the Supreme
Court
clearly
demonstrates
an
utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically
capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marital obligations and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is
to procreate children thus constant non-

fulfillment of this obligation will finally

destroy the integrity and wholeness of the
marriage.

OTHER REFERENCE FOR Case 10. CHI

MING TSOI vs CA
G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA
324
There are two companion cases to be
discussed, both dealing with annulment
albeit with different outcomes. Considering
the nature of the subject matter, one gets to
wonder again how these cases reached the
Supreme Court, to be part of the public
record for all to see.
In Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA, et al.(G.R. No.
119190, January 16, 1997), a distraught
wife filed for annulment of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity against
her uncaring husband. The Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in her
favor.
The parties were married in the
Manila Cathedral. From the results of the
case, the venue of a marriage, no matter
how grand, does not necessarily augur well
for a long union. After the reception, they
proceeded to the house of the husbands
mother. She alleged that during their first
night, the defendant just went to bed, slept
on one side thereof, then turned his back and
went to sleep. There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the
second, third and fourth nights.
Even during their honeymoon in
Baguio, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided
her by taking a long walk during siesta time
or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located
at the living room. They slept together in the
same room and on the same bed since May
22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during

this period, there was no attempt of sexual

intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that
she did not: even see her husband's private
parts nor did he see hers.
This even led to them to get medical
examinations from a urologist. She was found
to healthy, normal and still a virgin, while
that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor
prescribed medications for her husband
which was also kept confidential. No
treatment was given to her. For her husband,
he was asked by the doctor to return but he
never did.
In her suit, the wife claims that the
defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual
as he did not show his penis. She said, that
she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing
cream of his mother. And that, according to
her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency
status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
Defendant pointed to his wife as the
one psychologically incapacitated. But he
opposed the annulment since he still loves
her, that he is capable and that they could
still reconcile. Any defect can still be cured.
He did admit that there has been no sexual
contact between them but this was because
of her refusal. He alleges that the case was
filed because she is afraid that she will be
forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother and because of her fear of
consummation. This certainly is a novel
defense which was presented by the
defendant.
However, a physical examination to
determine whether he is impotent revealed
the following: (i) from the original size of two
(2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis
of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch

and one centimeter and (ii) defendant had

only a soft erection which is why his penis is
not in its full length xxx, still is capable of
further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual
intercourse with a woman.
Defendant went to the Supreme
Court. He contended that his spouse had the
burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint. And that since there is no
independent evidence of the alleged noncoitus between the parties, there was no
other basis other than his admission for the
courts conclusions. The Court held that the
judgment made was not merely based on the
pleadings. When the plaintiff testified under
oath
and
was
subjected
to
crossexamination, she presented evidence in the
form of testimony. It was now incumbent on
the defendant to present his side. He
admitted that they did not have intercourse
since their marriage until their separation.
In affirming the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the court quoted with favor the
formers findings, to wit:
The judgment of the trial court
which was affirmed by this Court is not based
on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether
or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation was resolved upon a review of
both the documentary and testimonial
evidence on record. Appellant admitted that
he did not have sexual relations with his wife
after almost ten months of cohabitation, and
it appears that he is not suffering from any
physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage
is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court
clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage' within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court

of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,

1995).
Defendant
further
argued
that
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of
both and that there may be other reasons
such as i.e., physical disorders, such as
aches, pains or other discomforts on why
the marriage was not consummated. The trial
court did not make a finding on who refused
contact. But the fact remains that here has
been no coitus. And since an annulment can
be filed by either party, even the one
psychologically incapacitated, the question
of who refuses to have sex with the other
becomes immaterial.
There is nothing on record to show
whether defendant tried to find out or
discover what the problem with his wife could
be. All he showed was supposed medical
proof there is no evidence of his impotency
and he is capable of erection. His claim that
the reason is not psychological but perhaps
physical disorder on the part of private
respondent was his to prove. As held by the
Court:
If a spouse, although physically
capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus,
the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered
a
sign
of
psychological
incapacity.
One of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is "[t]o
procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of

marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this

obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. It is interesting to note how the
Court cited with approval a finding of the trial
court that a husband should assert his right
to consummate:
An examination of the evidence
convinces Us that the husband's plea that
the wife did not want carnal intercourse with
him does not inspire belief. Since he was not
physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time
(from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that
he occupied the same bed with his wife,
purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he
deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right even though she balked
(Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in
I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it
were true that it is the wife who was suffering
from incapacity, the fact that defendant did
not go to court and seek the declaration of
nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal
expectations of her marriage were frustrated
by her husband's inadequacy. Considering
the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it
is hard to believe that she would expose her
private life to public scrutiny and fabricate
testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to
rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's
claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform
the sexual act, which is not psychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten
months of cohabitation, the admission that
the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he
professes to love very dearly, and who has

not posed any insurmountable resistance to

his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality
disorder
that
constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic
marital
covenants
within
the
contemplation of the Family Code.
The Court proceeded to state that
love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island; the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say
"I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which
brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures
the continuation of family relations.
Marriage, Psychological Incapacity, Void
Marriages
Case 11. REPUBLIC vs. CA and MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997; 268
SCRA 198
This is a petition for review on
certiorari by the Solicitor General assailing
the January 25, 1993 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 34858 which
affirmed the May 14, 1991 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet,
declaring the respondent RoridelOlaviano
Molina and Reynaldo Molinas marriage as
void
ab
initio,
on
the
ground
of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo
Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave
birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on
the early stages of the marriage, observed

from his tendency to spend time with his

friends and squandering his money with
them, from his dependency from his parents,
and his dishonesty on matters involving his
finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned
from her job in Manila and proceeded to
Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child
a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact
for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence
for Roridel consisted of her own testimony,
that of two of her friends, a social worker,
and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did
not present any evidence as he appeared
only during the pre-trial conference. On 14
May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and
affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence,
the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether opposing
personalities should be
psychological incapacity

or conflicting
construed as

RULING:
The Court of Appeals erred in its
opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the application of
Philippine civil laws on personal and family
rights, and holding psychological incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral
conduct on the part of one spouse indicative
of how he or she regards the marital union,
his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the
long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage; where said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends
to cause the union to self-destruct because it

defeats the very objectives of marriage,

warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in
Santos
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
where
psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity,
existing at the time the marriage is
celebrated, and that there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has
been
to
confine
the
meaning
of
psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. In the present
case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity; but appears to be more of a
difficulty, if not outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated
the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
removing any visages of it being the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The
burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2)
the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by expert, and clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven
existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
clinically
or
medically
permanent
or
incurable; (5) such illness must be grave
enough; (6) the essential marital obligation
must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code as regards husband and wife,
and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as
regards parents and their children; (7)
interpretation
made
by
the
National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal
and the Solicitor-General to appeal as
counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the
petition, and reversed and set aside the
assailed decision; concluding that the
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo
Molina subsists and remains valid.

Case 12. MARCOS vs. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
FACTS:
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married
Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five
children. Alleging that the husband failed to
provide material support to the family and
have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the
nullity of the marriage for psychological
incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage
null and void under Art. 36 which was
however reversed by CA.
ISSUES:
Whether
personal
medical
or
psychological examination of the respondent
by a physician is a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.

to the family and may have resorted to

physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
part. There is absolutely no showing that his
defects were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent
can be attributed to the fact that he had lost
his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during
this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home. Thus,
his alleged psychological illness was traced
only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court
cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage for failure of the petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized
by
gravity,
juridical
antecedence and incurabilty and for her
failure to observe the guidelines as outline in
Republic v. CA and Molina.

Case 13. REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG

G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA
425
FACTS:

Whether the totality of evidence

presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
Psychological incapacity as a ground
for declaring the nullity of a marriage may be
established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however
that the respondent be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for such declaration. Although
this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda

Matias,
16
years
old,
married
AvelinoParanganDagdag, 20 years old, at the
Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate
was issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of on October
20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two
children. The birth certificates were issued by
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on
October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding,
Avelino started leaving his family without

explanation. He would disappear for months,

suddenly re-appear for a few months, and
then disappear again. During the times when
he was with his family, he indulged in
drinking sprees with friends and would return
home drunk. He would force his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse and if she
refused, he would inflict physical injuries to
her.
On October 1993, he left his family
again and that was the last that they heard
from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime, and that he
escaped from jail and remains at large todate. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC
of Olongapo City a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Since
Avelino could not be located, summons was
served by publication in the Olongapo News,
a newspaper of general circulation. On the
date set for presentation of evidence, only
Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda
testified and presented her sister-in-law as
her only witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving
the investigating prosecutor until January 2,
1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he
would present controverting evidence, and
stating that should he fail to file said
manifestation, the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. The Investigating
Prosecutor conducted an investigation and
found that there was no collusion between
the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in
the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.
Without waiting for the investigating
prosecutors manifestation, the trial court
declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino
void under Article 36. The investigating
prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment on the ground that the decision
was prematurely rendered since he was
given until January 2, 1991 to manifest

whether he was presenting controverting

evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General
likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the decision on the ground that the same is
not in accordance with the evidence and the
law. Since the trial court denied the Motion
for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General
appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court holding that
AvelinoDagdag
is
psychologically
incapacitated not only because he failed to
perform the duties and obligations of a
married
person
but
because
he
is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, an
alcoholic, and a criminal.
ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly declare the
marriage as null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code, on the ground that the
husband
suffers
from
psychological
incapacity, as he is emotionally immature
and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a
fugitive from justice?
RULING:
Whether
or
not
psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of law, on the facts of
the case. Each case must be judged, not on
the
basis
of
a
priori
assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according
to its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on
all fours with another case. The trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible; avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA
198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in
the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family
Code.

10

Taking into consideration these

guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to
comply
with
the
above-mentioned
evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to
comply with guideline number 2 which
requires that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or
medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband.
Further, the allegation that the husband is a
fugitive from justice was not sufficiently
proven. In fact, the crime for which he was
arrested was not even alleged. The
investigating prosecutor was likewise not
given an opportunity to present controverting
evidence since the trial courts decision was
prematurely rendered.

Case 14. REPUBLIC vs. QUINTEROHAMANO

G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA
735
FACTS:
This is a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage between Lolita Quintero-Hamano
and Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
In October 1986, Lolita and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later
lived in the Philippines where Lolita gave
birth to their child. Later, she and Toshio
were married before a judge. However, one
month after their marriage, Toshio returned
to Japan. Despite his promise to return, he
did not come back. Moreover, he also
stopped giving financial support and stopped
all communication with his family.
Consequently, Lolita filed for declaration of
nullity of her marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage null and
void, holding that respondent spouse failed
to fulfill his obligations as husband of the

petitioner and father to his daughter. This

failure was considered to be a sign of
immaturity and that his behavior could be
traced to his mental incapacity and disability
of entering into marital life.

For indeed, if the totality of evidence

presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.

Upon appeal, CA affirmed, concluding that

respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family. Moreover, it ruled
that this case could not be equated with
Republic vs. CA and Molina and Santos vs.
CA, because in those cases, the spouses
were Filipinos while this case involved a
mixed marriage.

Was respondent able to successfully prove

Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his
marital responsibilities?

Republic, as represented by the SolicitorGeneral, appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent was able to prove
the psychological incapacity of Toshio
Hamano to perform his marital obligations
RULING:

The Court found that the totality of evidence

presented fell short of proving that Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due
to some kind of psychological illness. There
was no evidence to show that his behavior
was caused by a psychological order.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an
actual medical examination, it would have
greatly helped respondents case had she
presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness.
This respondent did not do.

On issue of Mixed Marriage

In proving psychological incapacity, we find
no distinction between an alien spouse and a
Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign
national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used
for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca, this Court declared that
marriage is an inviolable social institution
that the State cherishes and protects. While
we commiserate with respondent,
terminating her marriage to her husband
may not necessarily be the fitting
denouement.
Petition granted. Decision of CA reversed and
set aside.

SC ruled in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
The guidelines in the Molina case incorporate
the three basic requirements of psychological
incapacity outlined in Santos:
It must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The foregoing guidelines do not require that
a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be medically or
clinically identified. What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the partys psychological condition.

We must remember that abandonment is

also a ground for legal separation. There was
no showing that the case at bar was not just
an instance of abandonment in the context of
legal separation. We cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately
after the celebration of the marriage. AS we
ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that
he must be shown to be incapable of doing
so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.

Case 15. LEONILO ANTONIO vs. MARIE

IVONNE REYES
GR. 155880, March 10, 2006
FACTS:
The Petition for Review on Certiorari
assails the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001
and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals
had reversed the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner)
and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null
and void. After careful consideration, we
reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
In 1990, Leonilo Antonio married
Marie Ivonne Reyes, who was ten years older
than Leonilo. In 1993, Leo filed a petition to
annul their marriage due to the alleged

11

psychological incapacity of Reyes. Leonilo

claimed that Marie persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things. She would claim
that she is a psychologist but she is not.
Shed claim she is a singer with the company
Blackgold and that she is the latters number
1 money maker but shes not. Shed also
spend lavishly as opposed to her monthly
income. She fabricates things and people
only to serve her make-believe world.
Leonilo presented an expert who
testified to Reyess psychological incapacity.
Reyes denied all of Leonilos allegations and
she also presented an expert to prove her
case. The RTC ruled against Reyes and
declared their marriage void. Meanwhile, The
Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also
annulled the marriage and was even affirmed
by the Vaticans Roman Rata. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision hence
the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marie Ivonne Reyes is
psychologically incapacitated.
RULING:
Yes, Reyes was proven
psychologically incapacitated.

to

be

In this cases also, the Supreme Court

emphasized what fraud or misrepresentation
means as contemplated in Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code vis-a-vis Article 46. But first,
it must be stated: in Psychological Incapacity,
the misrepresentation done by Reyes points
to her inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations,
kindred
to
psychological
incapacity. In Article 45 (3), marriage may be
annulled if the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting
fraud under the previous article, clarifies that
no other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity

shall constitute such fraud as will give

grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage. These provisions of Article 45 (3)
and Article 46 cannot be applied in the case
at bar because the misrepresentations done
by Reyes is not considered as fraud but
rather such misrepresentations constitute her
aberrant behavior which further constitutes
Psychological
Incapacity.
Her
misrepresentations are not lies sought to
vitiate Leonilos consent to marry her. Her
misrepresentations are evidence that Marie
cannot simply distinguish fiction/fantasy from
reality which is so grave and it falls under the
fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10
August 1995, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent NULL and
VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is
REINSTATED.

Case 16. TONGOL VS. TONGOL

G.R. No.157610, October 10, 2007
FACTS
On August 27, 1967, petitioner
Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M.
Tongol were married. From their marriage
they begot four children.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Makati a
verified petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground
that she is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations.
In his petition, Orlando stated that he
and Filipinas marriage was objected by the
latters family. The continuous interference of
Filipinas parents, their attempts to break up
their union and their influence on Filipinas
made their marriage an unhappy one.
Because of the influence of Filipinas parents,
she regarded Orlando with contempt. When
Orlando started a junk shop business, he was

met with ridicule, instead of encouragement,

from his wife. Eventually, his junk shop
business flourished and became profitable
enough for Orlando to embark on a new
business
venture
by
putting
up
a
pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became
interested and began to interfere with the
operation of the business; however, the
employees of the company were aloof. She
also resented that her husband was getting
along with the employees and, as a result,
was the subject of their frequent and
continued quarrels. She even suspected
Orlando of diverting the income of his
business to his relatives. The continued
fighting persisted and affected their children.
Filipinas, in her counter-petition
claimed that the marriage was, indeed,
fruitless; however, this was the fault of
Orlandos psychological incapacity. In 1990,
Orlando decided to live separately from
Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando and
Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their
conjugal partnership gains, granted by the
Makati Regional Trial Court.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his
testimony, his sisters, his employees, and
Dr.
Cecilia
Villegas
psychological
examination of both parties. Meanwhile,
evidence for the respondent only consisted of
her testimony.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the
petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Courts decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent
psychologically incapacitated.

is

RULING;
No. First, psychological incapacity
must be more than just difficulty, refusal
or neglect. Second, the personality disorder
or psychological incapacity of the respondent
must be grave enough to bring about her

disability to assume the essential obligations

of marriage. Third, there was no evidence
that the psychological incapacity is incurable.
Fourth,
the
psychological
incapacity
considered in Article 36 must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage
like, in this case, the family business.
Marriage obligations must correspond to the
management of the household and the
provision of support for the family. Fifth,
marital obligations must not only include the
spouses obligation to the spouse but also
that to her children. No evidence was shown
that the respondent was negligent in the
rearing and care of her children as
enumerated in Article 220 of the Family
Code. Although, the respondent exhibited
Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was
no evidence to prove that, indeed, the
respondent was incapacitated or incapable of
complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
Case 17. REPUBLIC vs.
BAGUIO
G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008

CABAHUG-

FACTS:
Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
Respondent
Lynnette
Baguio
(Lynnette) and Martini Baguio (Martini), a
seaman working overseas, got married in
1997. The couple lived at Lynettes parents.
Martini stayed there only on weekends and
during weekdays, he stayed with his parents.
Because of this, Lynette suggested that they
lived with Martinis parents but the later
disagreed.
Lynette later on noticed that every
time the two of them talk, Martini would
always mention his mother and his family.
She therafter realized that Martini was a

12

mamas
boy.
On
Martinis
mother
insistence, Martinis money was equally
divided between her and Lynette. In 1999,
when Martini returned from work, he stayed
with his parents. Since then, Lynette had not
heard from Martini and stopped receiving her
share of the allotment, drawing her to inquire
from Martinis employer who told her that he
had already disembarked. Lynette soon found
out that he was in Muntinlupa.
When Lynette and Martini finally met,
he informed her that they should part ways.
The last time the two of them talked was at
the airport when Martini was about to depart
for abroad. Since then, Martini never
communicated
with
Lynnette.
On
investigation, Lynnette learned that Martini
declared in his employment records that he
is single and named his mother as principal
allottee. Hence, Lynette filed before Regional
Trial Court of Cebu a Complaint for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of Martinis psychological incapacity
to comply with essential marital duties and
obligations under Articles 68-70 of the Family
Code. The RTC found that Martinis being
mamas boy manifests his psychologically
incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, and that the
same incapacity existed at the time the
couple exchanged their marriage vows.
The Solicitor General challenged the
RTCs decision before the Court of Appeals.
The CA held that Lynettes oral deposition
and the Psychological Evaluation Report of
Dr. Gerong, a clinical psychologist, declaring
Martinis
psychological
incapacity
was
sufficient proof that indeed Martini suffers
psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in declaring
the marriage between Lynette and Martini
null and void on the ground of latters
psychological incapacity

RULING:
Article 36 of the Family Code on
which Lynnette anchors her complaint
provides that [a] marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Article
36
must
be
read
in
conjunction with the other articles in the
Family Code, specifically Articles 35, 37, 38,
and 41 which provide different grounds to
render a marriage void ab initio, as well as
Article 45 which dwell on voidable marriages,
and Article 55 on legal separation. Care must
be
observed so that these various
circumstances are not to be applied
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent
on the matter. And Article 36 should not be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest
themselves,
nor
with
legal
separation in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual
alcoholism,
sexual
infidelity,
abandonment, and the like.
Psychological incapacity has been
elucidated on as follows: The term
psychological incapacity to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. As all people may have certain
quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics
associated
with
certain
personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to

confine the meaning of psychological

incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
The root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness, and its incapacitating
nature must be fully explained the mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity nor does failure of
the parties to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons. It is essential that
the parties to a marriage must be shown to
be insensitive to or incapable of meeting
their duties and responsibilities due to some
psychological (not physical) illness, which
insensitivity or incapacity should have been
existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage even if it becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Here, Dr. Gerong found that Martinis
personality disorders including his being a
mamas boy are serious, grave, existing
already during the adolescent period and
incurable and concluded that Martini
appeared to be dependent upon his family
and unable to establish a domicile for his
family and to support his family.
The doctors findings and conclusion
were derived from his interview of Lynnette
and her sister and Lynnettes deposition.
From Lynnettes deposition, however, it is
gathered that Martinis failure to establish a
common life with her stems from his refusal,
not incapacity, to do so. It is downright
incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will,which renders a marriage
void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. In another vein, how the doctor
arrived at the conclusion, after interviewing
Lynnette and considering her deposition, that
any such personality disorders of Martini
have been existing since Martinis adolescent
years has not been explained.

Case 18. LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI vs.

CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI & REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165424 June 9, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition
to declare his marriage to respondent Chona
Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. He alleged
that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking
that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they
never lived together as husband and wife.
However, they started fighting constantly a
year later, at which point petitioner decided
to stop seeing respondent and started dating
other women. It was only upon making an
inquiry that he found out that the marriage
was not "fake."
ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to
respondent ought to be declared null and
void on the basis of his psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and
the Republic of the Philippines, this Court
reiterated that courts should interpret the
provision on psychological incapacity on a
case-to-case basis - guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decisions of
church tribunals. In Te, this Court defined
dependent personality disorder characterized
by a pattern of dependent and submissive
behavior. Such individuals usually lack selfesteem
and
frequently
belittle
their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily
hurt by others' comments.
Dependent
personality
disorder
usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals
who have this disorder may be unable to
make everyday decisions without advice or

13

reassurance from others, may allow others to

make most of their important decisions (such
as where to live), tend to agree with people
even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on
their own, volunteer to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established
that petitioner had a psychological condition
that was grave and incurable and had a
deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing,
it has been shown that petitioner is indeed
suffering from psychological incapacity that
effectively renders him unable to perform the
essential obligations of marriage and thus
the Court declared the marriage null and
void.

Case 19. REYES vs. REYES

G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro CamachoReyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the
UP Diliman, in 1972 when they were both 19
years old. Petitioner enjoyed respondents
style of courtship which included dining out,
unlike other couples their age who were
restricted by a university students budget.
At that time, respondent held a job in the
family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioners
good
impression
of
the
respondent was not diminished by the
latters habit of cutting classes, not even by
her discovery that respondent was taking
marijuana. On December 5, 1976, petitioner
and respondent got married. They lived with
Ramons parents and they were supported by
them. They had a child which made their
financial difficulties worse. All the business
ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful and
Socorro became the breadwinner of the
family. To make things worse, despite the fact

that Socorro would undergo an operation for

removal of a cyst, respondent remained
unconcerned and unattentive; and simply
read the newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany her
as she was wheeled into the operating room.
They tried to attend counseling sessions but
nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996,
petitioner confirmed that respondent was
having an extra-marital affair. RTC granted
the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
W/N
Ramon
incapacitated

is

psychologically

RULING:
Yes. Marriage is null and void. The
lack of personal examination and interview of
the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not
per se invalidate the testimonies of the
doctors.
Neither
do
their
findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would
result in their exclusion as evidence. In the
instant case, respondents pattern of
behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extramarital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed
business attempts; (5) unpaid money
obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is
not connected with the family businesses;
and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

Case 20. OCHOA vs. ALANO

G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011
FACTS:
Bonas illicit affairs with other men
started at the onset of their marriage on
October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned in
various parts of the country as an officer in
the AFP. She continued her infidelity even

when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio,

Makati City sometime in 1985, whenever Jose
was out of their living quarters.
In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in
Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged
participation of the failed coup detat. He
heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting
caught having sex with his driver, Corporal
Gagarin.
He got a military pass from his jail
warden and confronted Bona about the
rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted.
Since then they were separated, and their
foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona
in Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a
Petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between him and Bona J. Alano,
based on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations of marriage.
Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist,
one of the witnesses, testified and submitted
a psychological evaluation report on Bonas
mental state. The interviews she had with
Jose and two of his witnesses brought her to
the conclusion that respondent was suffering
from histrionic personality disorder, and it
was traceable to her family history.
On January 11, 1999, the dispositive
portion of the trial court declared the
marriage of Jose and Bona void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity of the
respondent under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The Court finds that Bonas illness
exhibited
gravity,
antecedence,
and
incurability.
OSG appealed the said ruling to the
CA, and the CA subsequently granted the
appeal and reversed the ruling of the trial
court decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bona should be
deemed psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
RULING:
No. There is inadequate credible
evidence that her defects were already
present at the inception of, or prior to, the
marriage. Bonas alleged psychological
incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential
requisite of juridical antecedence. Her
persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment
are not badges of psychological incapacity
nor cant it be traced to the inception of their
marriage.
The psychiatrists conclusion about
Bonas HPD which made her prone to
promiscuity and sexual infidelity existed
before her marriage to Jose, cannot be taken
as credible proof of antecedence since the
method by which such an inference was
reached leaves much to be desired in terms
of meeting the standard of evidence required
in determining psychological incapacity.
Dr. Rondains conclusion was based
solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of
Jose. No other witness testified to Bonas
family history or her behavior prior to or at
the beginning of their marriage. The two
witnesses only started to live with them in
1980 and 1986, respectively.
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas
psychological condition directly from the
information gathered solely from Jose and his
witnesses. These factual circumstances
evoke the possibility that the information fed
to the psychiatrists is tainted with bias for
Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient
corroboration.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the

14

marital bond at the time the causes therefore

manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. These marital obligations
are those provided under Article 68 to 71,
220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Case 21. ARABELLE MENDOZA vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES &
DOMINIC MENDOZA
G.R. No. 1576749, November 12, 2012
FACTS::
Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got
married while Arabelle was eight months
pregnant. They lived together but depended
on their parents for financial support.
Arabelle had different jobs to support the
needs of the family. When Dominic got
employed for Toyota in Bel-Air Makati in
1994, he spent his first salary celebrating
with his friends.
September of the same year,
Arabelle found out of Dominics illicit
relationship with Zaida, his co-employee.
Communication
between
them
became rare and they started sleeping in
separate rooms. In November 1995, Dominic
gave her a car as a birthday present only to
find out that he did not pay for it, forcing her
to rely on her father-in-law for the payment
of the car. Dominic eventually got fired from
his job because of he ran away with
P164,000 belonging to his employer. He was
charged with estafa. Petitioner also found out
that he swindled many of his clients some of
them threatening her and their family. On
October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the
conjugal abode because petitioner asked him
for time and space to think things over. A
month later, she refused his attempt at
reconciliation, causing him to threaten to

commit suicide. She and her family

immediately left the house to live in another
place concealed from him. On August 5,
1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition
for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage with Dominic based on his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The RTC found that all the
characteristics of psychological incapacity
which
are
gravity,
antecedence
and
incurability, were attendant, establishing
Dominics psychological incapacity. The
Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that
there was no showing that Dominics
personality
traits
either
constituted
psychological incapacity existing at the time
of the marriage or were of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family
Code; that the testimony of the expert
witness was not conclusive upon the court,
and that the real reason for the parties
separation had been their frequent quarrels
over financial matters and the criminal cases
brought against Dominic. CA reversed the
decision of RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N psychological
Dominic was established

incapacity

of

RULING:
No. Findings of Dr. Samson were onesided, because Dominic was not himself
subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation
by petitioners expert. He also did not
participate in the proceedings. And that the
findings and conclusions on his psychological
profile by her expert were solely based the
testimonies of the petitioner.

OTHER REFERENCE FOR Case 21.

ARABELLE MENDOZA vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES & DOMINIC MENDOZA
G.R. No. 1576749, November 12, 2012
FACTS:

Anabelle and Dominic met in 1989

upon his return to the country from his
employment in Papua New Guinea. After a
month of courtship, they became intimate
and their intimacy led to her pregnancy. They
got married 8 months after on June 24, 1991.
Being one with the fixed income, she
shouldered all of the familys expenses.
Ironically, he spent his first sales commission
on a celebratory bash with his friends. In
September 1994, she discovered his illicit
affair with his co-employee and they started
to sleep in separate rooms affecting their
sexual relationship. Dominic eventually got
fired from his employment and was criminally
charged with the violation of B.P. 22 and
estafa.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage null and void on the
basis of Article 36 of the Family Code?
RULING:
The appeal has no merit. The CA
correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that
the petitioner harbored against Dominic
furnished the basis to doubt the findings of
the expert witness; that such findings were
one-sided and that he did not participate in
the
proceedings.
The
findings
and
conclusions on his psychological profile were
solely based on the self-serving testimonial
descriptions of him by the petitioner and her
witnesses. The court finds the totality of
evidence
adduced
by
the
petitioner
insufficient to prove that Dominic was
psychologically unfit. Accordingly, the RTCs
findings
that
Dominics
psychological
incapacity was characterized by gravity,
antecedence and incurability could not stand
scrutiny.
His
alleged
immaturity,
deceitfulness and lack of remorse did not
necessarily
constitute
psychological
incapacity. The court denies the petition for
certiorari and affirms that decision of the
Court of Appeals.

Case 22. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. CA & EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, JR.
GR. 159594, November 12, 2012
FACTS:
On 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for
the declaration of the nullity of hismarriage
to wife Catalina, citing psychological
incapacity on the part of Catalina. Catalina
did not interpose an objection but prayed to
be given ashare in the conjugal house
and lot.
Eduardos allegations with respect to
Catalinas before are as follows: that Catalina
always left their house without his consent;
that she engaged inpetty arguments with
him; that she constantly refused to give in to
his sexual needs; that she spent most of her
time
gossiping
with neighbors
instead
of doing the household chores and caring
for their
adopted
daughter;
that
shesquandered
by
gambling
all
his
remittances as an overseas worker in
Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned
the conjugal home in 1997 to live withBobbie
Castro, her paramour.Results of the neuropsychiatric evaluation administered on
Catalina by apsychiatrist showed that she
had traits of Borderline Personality Disorder,
and
Catalinas
disorder
was
mainly
characterized by her immaturity. For her part,
Catalina
admitted
her psychological
incapacity
but denied
abandoning
the
conjugal home without Eduardos consent.
She also said that she had only one live-in
partner.
RTC and CA granted the petition. The
RTC
ruled
that Catalinas
infidelity,
her spending more time with friends rather
than with her family, and her incessant
gambling
constituted
psychological
incapacity that affected her duty to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. It
also held that theresults of the neuropsychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was
the best evidence of Catalinas psychological
incapacity. Hence, this petition.

15

ISSUE:
Whether the evidence presented is
sufficient
to
support a
conclusion
of psychological incapacity on the part of
Catalina. Two errors, among others, that were
raised in RPs petition wrt to the CAsdecision
was that abandonment of ones family is only
a ground for legal separation; also, martial
unfaithfulness of Catalina was not shown
to be a symptom of psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized
by gravity,
juridicalantecedence and incurability, and
must conform with the standards laid downin
the case of Republic v. Molina. The existence
or absence of thepsychological incapacity
must be based strictly on the facts of each
case andnot on a priori assumptions,
predilections
or
generalizations.
The
incapacityshould be established by the
totality of evidence presented during trial.
In this case, both lower courts did not
exact a compliance with the requirement
of sufficiently explaining the gravity, root
cause and incurability of Catalinas purported
psychological incapacity. Rather, they were
liberal in their appreciation of the scanty
evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish
theincapacity. Both lower courts noticeably
relied heavily on the results of theneuropsychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite
the paucity of factual foundation to support
the
claim of
Catalinas
psychological
incapacity. The report claims that Catalinas
behavior and attitude before and after the
marriage is highly indicative of a very
immature and childish person, rendering her
psychologically incapacitated to live up and
meet theresponsibilities
required
in a
commitment like marriage. However, it was
ostensibly vague about the root cause,
gravity
and incurability
of
Catalinas
supposed
psychological
incapacity.
In
other words,
the
totality

of evidencepresented
fell
short
of
the required standards. Immaturity alone did
not constitute psychological incapacity.
With respect to the allegation of
abandonment (to live with another man), the
Court held that such was established and
even admitted byCatalina in her Answer. Yet,
abandonment was not one of the grounds
for the nullity of marriage under the Family
Code. It did not also constitutepsychological
incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal
separation under Article 55(10) of the Family
Code.
On the other hand, her sexual
infidelity was not a valid ground for
the nullityof marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, considering that thereshould be
a showing that such marital infidelity was a
manifestation of adisordered personality that
made her completely unable to discharge
theessential
obligations
of
marriage.
Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce
such evidence, rendering even his claim
of her infidelity bereft of factual andlegal
basis.

Case 23. VIAS vs. VIAS

G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015
FACTS:
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary
Grace, then 25 and 23 years old,
respectively, got married in civil rites held in
Lipa City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already
pregnant then. The infant, however, died at
birth due to weakness and malnourishment.
Glenn alleged that the infants death was
caused by Mary Graces heavy drinking and
smoking during her pregnancy. The couple
lived together under one roof. Glenn worked
as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a
production engineer. Sometime in March of
2006, Mary Grace left the home which she
shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found
out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai.

At the time the instant petition was filed,

Mary Grace had not returned yet. On
February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Mary Grace. To ease their marital problems,
Glenn sought professional guidance and
submitted himself to a psychological
evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy
Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as
amply aware of his marital roles and
capable of maintaining a mature and
healthy
heterosexual
relationship.
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag
assessed Mary Graces personality through
the data she had gathered from Glenn and
his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who
knew Mary Grace way back in college.
ISSUE:
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises
before this Court the issue of whether or not
sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTCs
declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Mary Grace.
RULING:
The lack of personal examination or
assessment of the respondent by a
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily
fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage. If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to
In the present case, the respondents
stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but
it was never proven to be rooted in some
psychological illness. x x x Likewise,
the respondents act of living with another
woman four years into the marriage cannot
automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity
was a trait already existing at the inception
of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself

admitted that respondent was caring and

faithful when they were going steady and for
a time after their marriage; their problems
only came in later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v.
Navales:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations. Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will
on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like,
do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a persons
refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage and not due
to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule.31

Case 24. MALLILIN vs. JAMESOLAMIN &

THE REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
Sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not, by themselves,
constitute grounds for declaring a marriage
void based on psychological incapacity. The
petitioner must be able to establish that the
respondents
unfaithfulness
was
a
manifestation of a disordered personality,
which made her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state.
FACTS:

16

Robert and Luz were married on

1972. In 1994, Robert filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Robert disclosed
that Luz was already living in California, USA,
and had married an American. He also
revealed that when they were still engaged,
Luz continued seeing and dating another
boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also
claimed that from the outset, Luz had been
remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a
mother
as
shown
by
the
following
circumstances: (1) it was he who did the
cleaning of the room because Luz did not
know how to keep order; (2) it was her
mother who prepared their meal while her
sister was the one who washed their clothes
because she did not want her polished nails
destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took
care of their children while she spent her
time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4)
when she resumed her schooling, she dated
different men; (5) he received anonymous
letters reporting her loitering with male
students; (6) when he was not home, she
would receive male visitors; (7) a certain
Romy Padua slept in their house when he
was away; and (6) she would contract loans
without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the
testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva
(Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of
Northern Mindanao Medical Center. While the
case was pending before RTC, Robert filed a
petition for marriage annulment with the
Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal)
which was granted and, later on, affirmed by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
(NAMT). The RTC declared the marriage null
and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Luz. The State,
through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), interposed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals which, later on, reversed the RTC
decision.

ISSUE:
Did the totality of the evidence
adduced by Robert prove that Luz is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code?
RULING:
No. The Court has repeatedly
stressed
that
psychological
incapacity
contemplates
"downright
incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations," not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse. Indeed, to
be declared clinically or medically incurable
is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
perform one's duties is another. Other than
his allegations, however, no other convincing
evidence was adduced to prove that these
sexual indiscretions were considered as
nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable within the term of
psychological incapacity embodied in Article
36. To stress, Roberts testimony alone is
insufficient to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity. The psychological
report of Villanueva was insufficient to prove
the psychological incapacity of Luz. There
was nothing in the records that would
indicate that Luz had either been interviewed
or was subjected to a psychological
examination. The finding as to her
psychological incapacity was based entirely
on hearsay and the self-serving information
provided by Robert. The decision of the
Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove
the psychological incapacity of Luz. The
Court stated that interpretations given by the
NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts,
still it is subject to the law on evidence. To
consider church annulments as additional
grounds for annulment under Article 36
would be legislating from the bench.

Case 25. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga Del
Sur, Branch 23, granting respondents
petition for authority to remarry invoking par.
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. On May
24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady
Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an,
Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and
a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the
U. S. bringing along their son and after a few
years she was naturalized as an American
citizen. Sometime in 2000, respondent
Orbecido learned from his son who was
living with his wife in the States that his
wife had remarried after obtaining her
divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition
for authority to remarry with the trial court
invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15,
2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
del Sur granted the petition of the
respondent and allowed him to remarry. The
Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration
was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed
this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein
petitioner raised the issue of the applicability
of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN
REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RULING:
Respondent Orbecido who has the
burden of proof, failed to submit competent

evidence showing his allegations that his

naturalized American wife had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore,
the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of
the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur
is hereby SET ASIDE.
Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under the Philippine laws.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code
only applies to case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant
case is one where at the time the marriage
was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing
in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art.
26 does not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must
be taken into consideration and rule of
reason must be applied. The Supreme Court
ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be
construed and interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of then becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be sanction absurdity and
injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the

17

legislature, it should be construed according

to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as

necessary the letter of the law. A stature may

therefore be extended to case not within the

literal meaning of its terms, so long as they

come within its spirits or intent.

18