Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166208. June 29, 2007.]
KING OF KINGS TRANSPORT, INC., CLAIRE DELA
FUENTE, and MELISSA LIM, petitioners, vs. SANTIAGO
O. MAMAC, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J :
p
The Facts
Petitioner KKTI is a corporation engaged in public transportation and
managed by Claire Dela Fuente and Melissa Lim.
Respondent Mamac was hired as bus conductor of Don Mariano Transit
Corporation (DMTC) on April 29, 1999. The DMTC employees including
respondent formed the Damayan ng mga Manggagawa, Tsuper at
Conductor-Transport Workers Union and registered it with the
Department of Labor and Employment. Pending the holding of a
certification election in DMTC, petitioner KKTI was incorporated with
the Securities and Exchange Commission which acquired new buses.
Many DMTC employees were subsequently transferred to KKTI and
excluded from the election.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and
conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be
given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the
charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses;
and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the
management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are
given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance
of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this
conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity
to come to an amicable settlement.
In the instant case, KKTI admits that it had failed to provide respondent
with a "charge sheet." 16 However, it maintains that it had substantially
complied with the rules, claiming that "respondent would not have
issued a written explanation had he not been informed of the charges
against him." 17
We are not convinced.
First, respondent was not issued a written notice charging him of
committing an infraction. The law is clear on the matter. A verbal
appraisal of the charges against an employee does not comply with the
first notice requirement. In Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC, 18 the Court
held that consultations or conferences are not a substitute for the
actual observance of notice and hearing. Also, in Loadstar Shipping
Co., Inc. v. Mesano, 19 the Court, sanctioning the employer for
disregarding the due process requirements, held that the employee's
written explanation did not excuse the fact that there was a complete
absence of the first notice.
Second, even assuming that petitioner KKTI was able to furnish
respondent an Irregularity Report notifying him of his offense, such
would not comply with the requirements of the law. We observe from
the irregularity reports against respondent for his other offenses that
such contained merely a general description of the charges against
him. The reports did not even state a company rule or policy that the
employee had allegedly violated. Likewise, there is no mention of any
of the grounds for termination of employment under Art. 282 of the
Labor Code. Thus, KKTI's "standard" charge sheet is not sufficient
notice to the employee.
Third, no hearing was conducted. Regardless of respondent's written
explanation, a hearing was still necessary in order for him to clarify and
present evidence in support of his defense. Moreover, respondent
made the letter merely to explain the circumstances relating to the
irregularity in his October 28, 2001 Conductor's Trip Report. He was
unaware that a dismissal proceeding was already being effected. Thus,
he was surprised to receive the November 26, 2001 termination letter
indicating as grounds, not only his October 28, 2001 infraction, but
also his previous infractions.
EHTIDA
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 157680. October 8, 2008.]
EQUIPMENT TECHNICAL SERVICES or JOSEPH JAMES
DEQUITO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALEX
ALBINO, REY ALBINO, JULIUS ABANES, MIGUEL
ALINAB, CHRISTOPHER BIOL, NELSON CATONG,
RENATO DULOT, FLORO PACUNDO, MARCELITO
GAMAS, REYNALDO LIMA, SAMMY MESAGAL,
ERNESTO PADILLA, and CONRADO SULIBAGA,
respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J :
p
This petition for review under Rule 45 assails and seeks the reversal of
the Amended Decision and Resolution dated March 3, 2003 and March
24, 2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
67568. The assailed amended decision and resolution effectively set
aside and reversed the consolidated resolutions dated July 30, 2001
and September 24, 2001 rendered by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and reinstated the July 24, 2000 Decision of Labor
Arbiter Ermita T. Abrasaldo-Cuyuca in NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-0100571-99, 00-02-01429-99, and 00-02-01615-99.
aHATDI
ETS appealed from the above labor arbiter's decision. On July 30, 2001,
the NLRC rendered a resolution which, while reversing the labor
arbiter's holding with respect to the nature of private respondents'
employment and the illegality of their dismissal, nevertheless upheld
the validity of the monetary award extended by the labor arbiter, part
of which included the award of backwages. The pertinent portion of the
modificatory resolution reads as follows:
HcISTE
The Court can allow that, in the instant case, private respondents may
have initially been hired for specific projects or undertaking of
petitioner ETS and, hence, may be classified as project employees.
Their repeated rehiring to perform tasks necessary to the usual trade
or business of ETS changed the legal situation altogether, for in the
later instance, their continuous rehiring took them out from the scope
of workers coterminus with specific projects and had made them
regular employees. We said as much in Phesco, Inc. v. NLRC that
"where the employment of project employees is extended long after
the supposed project had been finished, the employees are removed
from the scope of project employees and they shall be considered
regular employees." 15
Parenthetically, petitioners' assertion that there can be no illegal
dismissal of project employees inasmuch as they are not entitled to
security of tenure is inaccurate. The constitutionally-protected right of
labor to security of tenure covers both regular and project workers. 16
Their termination must be for lawful cause and must be done in a way
which affords them proper notice and hearing. 17
In termination disputes, the burden of proving that an employee had
been dismissed for a lawful cause or that the exacting procedural
requirements under the Labor Code had been complied with lies with
the employer. 18 Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal
cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a
matter of illegal dismissal. 19
CcAHEI
Based on the foregoing criteria, the factual findings of the labor arbiter
on the regular nature of private respondents' employment, juxtaposed
with ETS' failure to support its "project-workers theory", impel us to
dismiss the instant petition. This is as it should be for, to paraphrase
Asuncion v. NLRC, if doubt exists between the evidence of the
employers and the employees, the scales of justice must be tilted in
favor of the latter the employers must adequately show rationally
adequate evidence that their case is preponderantly superior. 20
As did the CA, the Court holds that private respondents are regular
employees whose services were terminated without lawful cause and
effected without the requisite notice and hearing.
In view of the illegality of the dismissal, the fallo of the Decision of
Labor Arbiter Abrasaldo-Cuyuca, as reinstated by the CA in its assailed
Amended Decision, has to be modified in the sense that private
respondents are entitled to reinstatement to their previous positions as
pipe fitters or threaders, as the case may be, without loss of rank and
seniority rights and with full backwages.
At this juncture, the Court wishes to state that it is taking judicial
notice of the fact that no corporation is registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the name "Equipment Technical
Services". It is thus but fair that both petitioners' liability under this
Decision be joint and several.
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision dated March 3, 2003 of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 67568, reinstating the July 24, 2000 Decision of Labor
Arbiter Abrasaldo-Cuyuca, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
petitioners are jointly and severally ordered to reinstate private
respondents to their former positions, without loss of rank and seniority
rights, with backwages from the date of dismissal until reinstated. As
modified, the fallo of the labor arbiter's Decision shall read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
dismissal of private respondents illegal.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129486. July 4, 2008.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GLORIA BARTOLOME, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J :
p
For Estafa
That on or about the period from July to September 1988 or for
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Indang, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
with deliberate intent to defraud with grave abuse of trust and
confidence reposed on them, with false manifestation and
misrepresentation pretending themselves that they possessed
power and influence to recruit workers for employment abroad,
obligated themselves to seek and facilitate employment abroad
of Fe Rollon as saleslady in Bahrain and pursuant to said
obligation received from Fe Rollon the total amount of
P16,500.00, given them in Indang, Cavite and Makati, Metro
Manila on different dates but accused upon receipt and
possession of the aforementioned amount of P16,500.00 and
far from complying with their obligation, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate
and convert the aforesaid amount of P16,500.00 to their own
use and benefits and despite repeated demands made to make
good of their promise and/or return the amount taken and/or
received from the said victim, accused failed and refused to do
so, thereby resulting to the damage and prejudice of said Fe
Rollon in the aforesaid amount of P16,500.00.
TIEHSA
CONTRARY TO LAW.
genuineness of their offer, later gave the two a sum of money to cover
medical, processing, and passport fees. And very much later, Buhay
paid accused-appellant and Capawan, in Makati City, PhP13,000 as
placement fee for which she was handed a pre-signed receipt. Buhay
was given a photocopied plane ticket purportedly for a flight to
Bahrain, but the promised job abroad never materialized.
CacEID
Dimatulac, on the other hand, testified that he was given a run around
about his departure for Bahrain. According to him, after signifying,
when so asked, his desire to work in Bahrain as janitor, accusedappellant and Capawan told him to fill out a bio-data form and to pay
the usual processing and placement fees which he did. Dimatulac was
not able to leave and failed to get his money back, prompting him, like
Buhay, to file a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA).
With slight variations, complaining witnesses Fe and Reynaldo gave
parallel accounts about their dealings with the reneging accusedappellant and Capawan, particularly with respect to personally meeting
the latter two who offered overseas job placements in Bahrain, being
asked to pay and paying the processing and placement fees, and being
given a photocopy of a plane ticket.
Accused-appellant denied the accusations against her and disclaimed
ever pretending to possess power and influence to recruit and secure
overseas employment for private complainants. She claimed that the
private complainants were only out to blackmail her because the wife
of her brother-in-law is related to Capawan, who actually did the
recruiting; and that her husband and her brother-in-law were
themselves victims of Capawan's recruitment activities.
DHETIS
Per Resolution 5 dated July 23, 1997, the Court ordered the
consolidation of G.R. No. 129486 with G.R. No. 128881. Earlier, owing
to the fact that accused-appellant was out on bail, the Court, inter alia,
ordered, pursuant to Section 7 of Administrative Circular No. 12-94, 6
the bondsman to surrender accused-appellant within 30 days from
notice to the court of origin, failing which her bond shall be forfeited
and an order shall then issue for her arrest. The details of what then
followed are not of crucial materiality to these proceedings, but the
bottom line is that the Court declared accused-appellant as having
jumped bail and is now at large. 7 Her withdrawing counsel and the
new collaborating counsel are at a loss as to her whereabouts; 8 her
bondsman, having failed to secure her surrender, had paid her bail
bond; and both the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) had, after several attempts, been
unable to serve the corresponding warrants and alias warrants for the
arrest of accused-appellant.
By Resolution dated October 22, 1997, the Court dismissed accusedappellant's petition for review in G.R. No. 128881 for, among other
grounds, non-compliance with the requirements on making a deposit to
answer for cost. The dismissal became final and executory with the
issuance of the entry of judgment 9 for G.R. No. 128881. For all intents
and purposes, the RTC's decision convicting accused-appellant for
estafa is deemed affirmed with finality.
2005jur
This brings us to G.R. No. 129486, the case certified to the Court in
view of the modified penalty of life imprisonment the CA imposed on,
but did not enter against, accused-appellant for her conviction on the
illegal recruitment in the large scale charge. It is over 10 years since
accused-appellant jumped bail. The deferred judicial review of the
certified case may now proceed without awaiting for her arrest.
Accused-appellant's underlying position is set forth in her "PETITION"
10 urging this Court to acquit her of the crimes of illegal recruitment
and estafa. In it, she alleges that the CA erred "in affirming the
decision of the lower court finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of four (4) counts of illegal recruitment and four (4) counts of estafa
under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code".
In fine, accused-appellant assails the credibility of the four (4) private
complainants and the adequacy of the plaintiff-appellee's evidence.
Even as she denies making representation about having the authority
and capacity to recruit and deploy workers abroad, accused-appellant
insists that Capawan, confederating with a Thai national, was the
illegal recruiter.
cDTHIE
SHaIDE
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated July 24, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01390 which upheld the
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116 in Pasay City in
Criminal Case No. 97-9851. The RTC convicted Lourdes Valenciano of
the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
CHATEa
The Facts
In May 1996, Lourdes Valenciano, claiming to be an employee of Middle
East International Manpower Resources, Inc., went with one Susie
Caraeg to the house of Agapito De Luna, and told him he could apply
for a job in Taiwan. A week later, De Luna went to Valenciano's house,
there to be told to undergo a medical examination, with the assurance
that if there were a job order abroad, he would be able to leave. He
was also told that the placement fee for his employment as a factory
worker in Taiwan was PhP70,000.
After passing the medical examination, De Luna paid Valenciano at the
latter's residence the following amounts: PhP20,000 on June 21, 1996;
PhP20,000 on July 12, 1996; and PhP30,000 on August 21, 1996. The
first and last payments were turned over by Valenciano to Teresita
Imperial, who issued the corresponding receipts, and the second
payment was turned over by Valenciano to Rodante Imperial, who also
issued a receipt.
Also in May 1996, Valenciano visited the house of Allan De Villa,
accompanied by Euziel N. Dela Cuesta, Eusebio T. Candelaria, and De
Luna, to recruit De Villa as a factory worker in Taiwan. De Villa was also
asked for PhP70,000 as placement fee. He paid Valenciano the
following amounts: PhP20,000 on May 16, 1996 at Valenciano's
they could leave for Taiwan within one month from the filing of their
applications. During the period material, they have not yet found
employment as factory workers in Taiwan.
Valenciano, Rodante, Teresita, and Rommel were charged with the
offense of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined under Article 13
(b) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as amended, in relation to Art. 38 (a), and
penalized under Art. 39 (c) of the Code, as amended by PD 1920 and
PD 2018. The Information reads as follows:
That sometime in May, 1996 to August, 1996, or thereabout, in
the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
representing to have the capacity, authority or license to
contract, enlist and deploy or transport workers for overseas
employment, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping
each other, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally recruit and promise to deploy the herein
complainants, namely, Agapito R. De Luna, Allan Ilagan De Villa,
Euziel N. Dela Cuesta and Eusebio T. Candelaria, as factory
workers in Taiwan, in exchange for placement, processing and
other fees ranging from P62,000.00 to P70,000.00 or a total of
P271,000.00, without first obtaining the required license and/or
authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Accused-appellant Valenciano pleaded not guilty and waived the pretrial. The other three accused remained at large.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty, the dispositive portion of the
decision reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused Lourdes Valenciano y Dacuba is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal
recruitment in large scale as charged in the aforequoted
Information; and she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
She is also ordered to indemnify complainants Agapito R. de
Luna, Allan Ilagan de Villa, Euziel N. dela Cuesta and Eusebio T.
Candelaria the amounts of P70,000.00, P70,000.00, P62,000.00
SO ORDERED. 4
Art. 39 (a) provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
PhP100,000 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage as defined above.
The claim of accused-appellant that she was a mere employee of her
other co-accused does not relieve her of liability. An employee of a
company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held
liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that the
employee actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. 6
As testified to by the complainants, accused-appellant was among
those who met and transacted with them regarding the job placement
offers. In some instances, she made the effort to go to their houses to
recruit them. She even gave assurances that they would be able to find
employment abroad and leave for Taiwan after the filing of their
applications. Accused-appellant was clearly engaged in recruitment
activities, notwithstanding her gratuitous protestation that her actions
were merely done in the course of her employment as a clerk.
This is an appeal to the Court under Rule 45 of the December 14, 2001
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62583,
affirming the Resolutions of the Office of the President (OP) in OP Case
No. 96-116582, and exempting respondents' 53-hectare land from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage. Also
challenged is the CA's February 26, 2002 Resolution 2 rejecting
petitioner's plea for reconsideration of the CA Decision now under
review.
The Facts
Petitioner Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya (Samahan) is an
association of farmer-beneficiaries duly recognized by the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Petitioner alleged that its members had
been cultivating the disputed land of the case for many years prior to
the effectivity of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6657, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law" (CARL). 3 Respondents Wilfredo
G. Mosquera, Rosario R. Roman, Danilo M. Relucio, and Edgardo V.
Guevarra, on the other hand, are the registered owners of three
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-267409, T267410, and T-267411, which have an aggregate area of 53.1164
hectares located in Macabud, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal. 4
The disputed land was previously owned by Philippine Suburban
Development Corporation which planned to develop it as a residential
subdivision. In 1979, it was sold to Vinebel Realties, Inc. through an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Petitioner alleged that in 1994, the
On appeal to the OP, Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres set aside the
DAR Secretary's Orders and exempted the property from the CARL
coverage through his June 25, 1997 Resolution. 10 Petitioner and the
DAR subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In the meantime,
the Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Soil and
Water Management, sent two missions to conduct fieldwork and
validate the actual development in the disputed land. The findings of
these missions were allegedly contained in a report transmitted by
Secretary Salvador Escudero III (Escudero Report) to Pres. Fidel V.
Ramos. In sum, the Escudero Report recommended that the disputed
land be exempted from conversion since the general area of the land,
including areas with 18% slope, was physically occupied and actively
used for intensive and diversified farming.
aAHISE
3) holding that the disputed land has more than 18% slope
on the basis of a certification issued by a personnel
from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, who was neither authorized nor
competent to make such determination;
4) disregarding the certification of the MARO of Rodriguez,
Rizal that the landholding was highly agricultural and
suitable for cultivation for permanent and seasonal
crops; and
5) relying on the certifications of the Municipal
Development Coordinator, Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, Provincial Irrigation Office, and the
Municipal Assessor as bases for granting the
exemption applied for, which are irrelevant for
purposes of determining agricultural development
and suitabiliy under Sec. 10 of R.A. 6657. 13
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the petitioner was not a real party-in-interest and
had no legal standing to sue. The appellate court held, thus:
Applying the foregoing standards in the case at bar, there is no
question petitioner lacks the legal standing to raise the instant
appeal. This conclusion finds support in the later case of
Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624 [1998] . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Having resolved that the petitioner, not being actual grantee of
the land but mere qualified beneficiary, has no legal standing to
sue and is not the real party in interest. Neither will it be
directly affected by the assailed resolutions rendered by the
Office of the President. Consequently, petitioner has no
personality to file the instant appeal. Besides, petitioner is not a
juridical person and apropos not equipped with legal
personality to sue or be sued. As a consequence, the authority
of Elvira M. Baladad in filing this case for the petitioner will
likewise be baseless. 14
issue in the CA; and that they could not be expected to raise the issue
in the OP since they obtained a favorable judgment. On the exemption
of the land from CARL, the CA found that the OP's Resolution was
supported by substantial evidence; hence, the CA did not substitute
the OP's findings of fact. 15
Petitioner's January 17, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration was then
denied by the CA in its February 26, 2002 Resolution.
cDEHIC
The Issues
The parties submit the following issues for our resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE REAL PARTIES-ININTEREST IN THIS CASE
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING MAY BE
EXEMPTED FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
AGRARIAN REFORM
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION RAISES ONLY QUESTIONS OF
FACT
Petitioner argues that the foregoing rule, when read in conjunction with
Article 562 of the Civil Code, gives them a right over the land which
can be injured by a judgment of exemption from CARP. It claims that
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) were already generated
in the Macabud farmers' names by the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer of Rizal, but were not issued to them in view of the instant case.
Also, petitioner contends that respondents are now estopped from
raising the issue of legal standing in view of their failure to question
the same issue at the earliest opportunity, that is, before the OP. 17
Lastly, since petitioner relies on the findings of the DA regarding the
suitability of the land for agriculture for the purpose of the CARP, it
then imputes error on the CA for holding that the DA had no authority
to make such a determination.
AIaDcH
R.A. 6657 allows farmer leaders like Elvira Baladad to represent the
Macabud farmers or their Samahan in the proceedings before the DAR.
The law, however, should be harmonized with the provisions of the
Rules of Court. Assuming that the Macabud farmers are real parties-ininterest as defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 3, the appeal may be brought by
their representative since such is allowed by R.A. 6657. The action may
then be brought by 1) the organization represented by its authorized
representative (Sec. 1) OR 2) the representative with the beneficiaries
identified in the title of the case (Sec. 3). In the first option, the
organization should be duly registered in order to be clothed with
SO ORDERED.
(Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya v. Mosquera, G.R. No. 152430,
[March 22, 2007], 547 PHIL 560-572)
|||
4
This appeal was denied by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao in an
Order dated December 8, 1997. 5 A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated June 10, 1998. 6
The matter was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Archbishop argued that even if the lands in question are
registered in his name, he holds the lands in trust for the benefit of his
followers as cestui que trust. Archbishop further argued that the deeds
of donation by which the lands were transferred to him imposed
numerous fiduciary obligations, such that he cannot sell, exchange,
lease, transfer, encumber, or mortgage the subject lands. By this
reasoning, Archbishop concluded that he is not the "landowner"
contemplated by PD 27 and Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, the CARL of
1988. He then prayed that the assailed orders of the DAR be reversed,
or in the alternative, that the alleged beneficiaries of the trust be each
allowed to exercise rights of retention over the landholdings. 7
The petition was dismissed by the CA in its February 4, 1999 Decision.
8 Archbishop filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied in the
June 18, 1999 CA Resolution. 9
Archbishop now brings the matter before us through this petition.
The Issues
Archbishop raises issues he had raised previously, which, he contends,
the CA failed to properly address. He claims that the CA erred in
holding that he is only entitled to assert one right of retention as the
subject properties are registered in his name. He further claims that an
express trust had been created wherein he only held naked title to the
subject properties on behalf of the beneficiaries. He argues that it is
not the "landowner" contemplated by the law, but merely a trustee,
and as such is entitled to as many rights of retention on behalf of the
beneficiaries of each particular property. He then raises the question of
the applicability of the ruling in The Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. The Land Registration Commission and
the Register of Deeds of Davao City, 10 which, he cites, ruled that
properties held by the Church are held by it as a mere administrator for
the benefit of the members of that particular religion. As Archbishop
claims to be merely an administrator of the subject properties, he
argues that these subject properties should have been exempt from
the OLT.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Archbishop's arguments, while novel, must fail in the face of the law
and the dictates of the 1987 Constitution.
The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to
under what title the land is held or what rights to the land the
landowner may exercise. There is no distinction made whether the
landowner holds "naked title" only or can exercise all the rights of
ownership. Archbishop would have us read deeper into the law, to
create exceptions that are not stated in PD 27 and RA 6657, and to do
We discussed further:
The twin process of expropriation under agrarian reform and
the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale,
Archbishop's claim that he does not have jus disponendi over the
subject properties is unavailing. The very nature of the compulsory
sale under PD 27 and RA 6657 defeats such a claim. Other less
scrupulous parties may even attempt creating trusts to prevent their
lands from coming under agrarian reform, and say that the trustee has
no power to dispose of the properties. The disposition under PD 27 and
RA 6657 is of a different character than what is contemplated by jus
disponendi, wherein under these laws, voluntariness is not an issue,
and the disposition is necessary for the laws to be effective.
Under PD 27 and RA 6657, Archbishop cannot claim that the alleged
conditions of the donations would have primacy over the application of
the law. This forced sale is not even a violation of the conditions of the
donation, since it is by application of law and beyond Archbishop's
control. The application of the law cannot and should not be defeated
by the conditions laid down by the donors of the land. If such were
allowed, it would be a simple matter for other landowners to place
their lands without limit under the protection of religious organizations
or create trusts by the mere act of donation, rendering agrarian reform
but a pipe dream.
Archbishop's contention that he is merely an administrator of the
donated properties will not serve to remove these lands from the
coverage of agrarian reform. Under PD 27, the coverage is lands
devoted to rice and corn. Section 4 of RA 6657 states, "The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture." The lands in Archbishop's name are agricultural lands that
fall within the scope of the law, and do not fall under the exemptions.
The exemptions under RA 6657 form an exclusive list, as follows:
SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
(a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks,
wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and
breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt
from the coverage of this Act.
(b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for
prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage
of this Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have
not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) issued under the Agrarian Reform Program.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been
subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by
voluntary offer to sell, or commercial farms deferment or
notices of compulsory acquisition, a simple and absolute
majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must consent
to the exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this
Act. When the workers or tenants do not agree to this
exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed
collectively to the worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall
form cooperative or association to manage the same.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been
subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the
consent of the farmworkers shall no longer be necessary;
however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives
shall apply.
(c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to
be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses,
including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings
research and pilot production center, church sites and convents
appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers
appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries,
penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates,
government and private research and quarantine centers and
all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except
those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of
this Act. (As amended by R.A. 7881)
organizations to ensure that the land they own falls into the hands of
able caretakers and owners. As a religious leader, Archbishop can take
solace in the fact that his lands are going to be awarded to those who
need and can utilize them to the fullest.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the February 4, 1999
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 48282.
SO ORDERED
(Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 139285, [December 21, 2007], 565 PHIL 598-612)
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On March 21, 2000, the Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition for
certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of
Ventures. Five hundred forty two (542) signatures, 82 of which belong
to terminated Ventures employees, appeared on the basic documents
supporting the petition.
On August 21, 2000, Ventures filed a Petition 1 to cancel the Union's
certificate of registration invoking the grounds set forth in Article 239
(a) of the Labor Code. 2 Docketed as Case No. RO300-0008-CP-002 of
the same DOLE regional office, the petition alleged the following:
(1) The Union deliberately and maliciously included the names of more
or less 82 former employees no longer connected with Ventures in its
list of members who attended the organizational meeting and in the
adoption/ratification of its constitution and by-laws held on January 9,
2000 in Mariveles, Bataan; and the Union forged the signatures of
these 82 former employees to make it appear they took part in the
organizational meeting and adoption and ratification of the
constitution;
(2) The Union maliciously twice entered the signatures of three persons
namely: Mara Santos, Raymond Balangbang, and Karen Agunos;
(3) No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place; and
(4) The Union's application for registration was not supported by at
least 20% of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures, or 418 of the
total 2,197-employee complement. Since more or less 82 of the 500 3
signatures were forged or invalid, then the remaining valid signatures
would only be 418, which is very much short of the 439 minimum
(2197 total employees x 20% = 439.4) required by the Labor Code. 4
In its Answer with Motion to Dismiss, 5 the Union denied committing
the imputed acts of fraud or forgery and alleged that: (1) the
organizational meeting actually took place on January 9, 2000 at the
Shoe City basketball court in Mariveles; (2) the 82 employees adverted
to in Ventures' petition were qualified Union members for, although
they have been ordered dismissed, the one-year prescriptive period to
question their dismissal had not yet lapsed; (3) it had complied with
the 20%-member registration requirement since it had 542 members;
and (4) the "double" signatures were inadvertent human error.
In its supplemental reply memorandum 6 filed on March 20, 2001, with
attachments, Ventures cited other instances of fraud and
misrepresentation, claiming that the "affidavits" executed by 82
alleged Union members show that they were deceived into signing
paper minutes or were harassed to signing their attendance in the
organizational meeting. Ventures added that some employees signed
the "affidavits" denying having attended such meeting.
AEScHa
II.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY AND IMPRUDENTLY,
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED ITS
JURISDICTION IN IGNORING AND DISREGARDING THE BLATANT
PROCEDURAL LAPSES OF THE RESPONDENT UNION IN THE
FILING OF ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND APPEAL.
A.
BY GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE RESPONDENT UNION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED BEYOND THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
B.
BY ADMITTING THE APPEAL FILED BY ATTY. ERNESTO R.
ARELLANO AND HOLDING THAT THE SAME DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE FORUM SHOPPING UNDER SUPREME COURT
CIRCULAR NO. 28-91.
III.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY AND IMPRUDENTLY,
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED ITS
JURISDICTION IN INVOKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
SELF-ORGANIZATION AND ILO CONVENTION NO. 87 TO JUSTIFY
THE MASSIVE FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, MISSTATEMENTS
AND FORGERY COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT UNION. 13
Essentially, Ventures faults both the BLR and the CA in finding that
there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the Union
sufficient to justify cancellation of its registration. In this regard,
Ventures makes much of, first, the separate hand-written statements
of 82 employees who, in gist, alleged that they were unwilling or
harassed signatories to the attendance sheet of the organizational
meeting.
We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA, these
mostly undated written statements submitted by Ventures on March
20, 2001, or seven months after it filed its petition for cancellation of
registration, partake of the nature of withdrawal of union membership
executed after the Union's filing of a petition for certification election
on March 21, 2000. We have in precedent cases 18 said that the
employees' withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the
petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while
withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be
involuntary and does not affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal
from union membership done after a petition for certification election
has been filed does not vitiate such petition, is it not but logical to
assume that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the registration of
the union? Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the CA
that the BLR did not abuse its discretion nor gravely err when it
concluded that the affidavits of retraction of the 82 members had no
evidentiary weight.
The BLR, based on its official records, answered the poser in the
affirmative. Wrote the BLR:
It is imperative to look into the records of respondent union
with this Bureau pursuant to our role as a central registry of
union and CBA records under Article 231 of the Labor Code and
Rule XVII of the rules implementing Book V of the Labor Code,
as amended . . . .
In its union records on file with this Bureau, respondent union
submitted the names of [542] members . . . . This number
easily complied with the 20% requirement, be it 1,928 or 2,202
employees in the establishment. Even subtracting the 82
employees from 542 leaves 460 union members, still
within 440 or 20% of the maximum total of 2,202 rankand-file employees.
Whatever misgivings the petitioner may have with regard to
the 82 dismissed employees is better addressed in the
inclusion-exclusion proceedings during a pre-election
conference . . . . The issue surrounding the involvement of
the 82 employees is a matter of membership or voter
eligibility. It is not a ground to cancel union registration.
(Emphasis added.)
The bare fact that three signatures twice appeared on the list of those
who participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind,
provide a valid reason to cancel Certificate of Registration No. RO30000-02-UR-0003. As the Union tenably explained without rebuttal from
Ventures, the double entries are no more than "normal human error",
effected without malice. Even the labor arbiter who found for Ventures
sided with the Union in its explanation on the absence of malice. 22
The cancellation of a union's registration doubtless has an impairing
dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. Accordingly, we
can accord concurrence to the following apt observation of the BLR:
"[F]or fraud and misrepresentation [to be grounds for] cancellation of
union registration under Article 239 [of the Labor Code], the nature of
the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough
to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members." 23
aTcIEH
In its Comment, the Union points out that for almost seven (7) years
following the filing of its petition, no certification election has yet been
conducted among the rank-and-file employees. If this be the case, the
delay has gone far enough and can no longer be allowed to continue.
The CA is right when it said that Ventures should not interfere in the
certification election by actively and persistently opposing the
certification election of the Union. A certification election is exclusively
the concern of employees and the employer lacks the legal personality
to challenge it. 24 In fact, jurisprudence frowns on the employer's
interference in a certification election for such interference unduly
creates the impression that it intends to establish a company union. 25
Ventures' allegations on forum shopping and the procedural lapse
supposedly committed by the BLR in allowing a belatedly filed motion
for reconsideration need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that this
Court has consistently ruled that the application of technical rules of
procedure in labor cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of
substantial justice. 26 So it must be in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution
dated October 20, 2003 and January 19, 2004, respectively, of the CA
are AFFIRMED. S.S. Ventures Labor Union shall remain in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations, unless it has in the meantime lost its
legitimacy for causes set forth in the Labor Code. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED
This petition for review 1 under Rule 45 seeks to nullify and set aside
the Decision 2 dated September 30, 2003 and Resolution 3 dated
January 9, 2004, both issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 70435 which dismissed petitioner Nasipit Integrated Arrastre &
Stevedoring Services, Inc.'s (NIASSI's) petition for review of the
Decision 4 dated February 22, 2002 rendered by Voluntary Arbitrator
Jesus G. Chavez in VA Case No. 0925-XIII-08-003-01A.
The records yield the following facts:
. with office at Talisay, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. Respondent Nasipit
Employees Labor Union (Union) was and may still be the
collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of NIASSI
and is a local chapter of the Associated Labor Union.
The dispute started when, in October 1999, the Regional Tripartite
Wages and Productivity Board (Wage Board) of Caraga Region in
Northeastern Mindanao issued Wage Order No. (WO) RXIII-02 which
granted an additional PhP12 per day cost of living allowance to the
minimum wage earners in that region. Owing allegedly to NIASSI's
failure to implement the wage order, the Union filed a complaint before
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Caraga Regional
Office for the inspection of NIASSI's records and the enforcement of WO
RXIII-02. A DOLE inspection team was accordingly dispatched to
NIASSI. In its reports dated May 30, 2000 and November 28, 2000, the
inspection team stated that WO RXIII-02 was not applicable to NIASSI's
employees since they were already receiving a wage rate higher than
the prescribed minimum wage.
Upon motion by the Union, the DOLE Regional Director indorsed the
case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional
Arbitration Branch for further hearing. On May 18, 2001, Executive
Labor Arbiter Rogelio P. Legaspi, in turn, referred the case to the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for voluntary
arbitration.
The case was, accordingly, referred to the NCMB which docketed the
same as VA Case No. 0925-XIII-08-003-01A.
On February 22, 2002, Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus G. Chavez rendered a
decision granting the Union's prayer for the implementation of WO
RXIII-02 on the rationale that WO RXIII-02 did not specifically prohibit
the grant of wage increase to employees earning above the minimum
wage. On the contrary, Chavez said, the wage order specifically
enumerated those who are outside its coverage, but did not include in
the enumeration those earning above the minimum wage. He also held
that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between NIASSI and
the Union provides that wage increases granted by the company within
one year from CBA signing shall not be creditable to future legally
mandated wage increases. The voluntary arbitrator further held that
NIASSI would not incur any damage from the implementation of WO
RXIII-02 since NIASSI's petition to increase the tariff rates for all
cargoes to counter the financial burden of implementing WO RXIII-02
had been granted and had been in effect since February 16, 2000.
Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NIASSI filed with
the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to
nullify the February 22, 2002 Decision of Chavez. The petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 70435.
By a decision dated September 30, 2003, the CA found the decision of
the voluntary arbitrator and the premises holding it together to be in
order and, accordingly, dismissed NIASSI's petition for review.
NIASSI is now before the Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari,
ascribing to the CA the commission of several errors all which resolve
themselves into the question of whether or not WO RXIII-02 applies or
covers NIASSI's employees.
CaHAcT
In line with its declared policy, R.A. No. 6727 created the NWPC,
vested with the power to prescribe rules and guidelines for the
determination of appropriate minimum wage and productivity
measures at the regional, provincial or industry levels; and
authorized the RTWPB to determine and fix the minimum wage
rates applicable in their respective regions, provinces, or
industries therein and issue the corresponding wage orders,
subject to the guidelines issued by the NWPC. Pursuant to its
wage fixing authority, the RTWPB may issue wage orders which
set the daily minimum wage rates, based on the standards or
criteria set by Article 124 of the Labor Code. 7
In the same case, the Court held that a RTWPB commits ultra vires and
unreasonable act when, instead of setting a minimum wage rate, it
prescribes a wage increase cutting across all levels of employment and
wage brackets:
In the present case, the RTWPB did not determine or fix the
minimum wage rate by the "floor-wage method" or the "salaryceiling method" in issuing the Wage Order. The RTWPB did not
set a wage level nor a range to which a wage adjustment or
increase shall be added. Instead, it granted an across-the-board
wage increase of P15.00 to all employees and workers of
Region 2. In doing so, the RTWPB exceeded its authority by
extending the coverage of the Wage Orders to wage earners
receiving more than the prevailing minimum wage rate, without
a denominated salary ceiling. As correctly pointed out by the
OSG, the Wage Order granted additional benefits not
contemplated by R.A. No. 6727. 8
The Union, in a bid to bolster its case for wage increase for its
members under NIASSI's employ, invokes its CBA with the company
and invites attention to Chavez's favorable ruling. The pertinent CBA
provision reads:
Article XIX, Section 2.
All general wage increases granted by the company after one
(1) year from the signing of this CBA shall not be creditable to
any future wage increases mandated by any wage legislation
and/or issuance of the Regional Wage Board.
The Pathology Report of the MMC also showed the following: "Left
anterior thigh mass excision: Malignant fibrous histiocytoma, myxoid
type. Margins of resection negative for tumor." 12
On February 27, 2007, OSG Manila certified David's entitlement "to
sickness allowance from the company or principal equivalent to basic
salary of member." 13
On March 2, 2007, Dr. Christopher Co Pea (Dr. Pea), also of MMC,
wrote Dr. Lim, informing the latter of the etiology of soft tissue
sarcoma, viz.:
The following are the etiology of soft tissue sarcoma:
1. Ionizing radiation
2. Genetic predisposition
3. Chemical exposure Phenoxyacetic acid,
cholorophenols, thorotrast, vinyl chloride, arsenic
4. Chronic lymphedema
Whether work-related or not will depend on the exposure of
the above mentioned factors. 14
The NLRC affirmed the Decision of the LA in toto holding that the
respondents, by certifying David's Grade I disability and by paying his
sickness allowance, are estopped from impugning the work-related
nature of David's illness. 21
Undaunted, respondents elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision
dated March 11, 2011, the appellate court ruled against David's
entitlement to the benefits he claimed, and accordingly nullified the
resolutions of the NLRC. 22 The CA ratiocinated, thus:
In the case at bar, there is no question that private respondent
(David) reported to the company-designated physician for
treatment immediately upon arriving in the Philippines.
Problems arose, however, when private respondent was
diagnosed to be suffering from malignant fibrous histiocytoma
and while his condition was given a grade I disability
rating, Dr. Christopher Co Pe[]a who diagnosed private
respondent's condition opined that it is difficult to determine
whether work history would have a bearing to his illness as
etiology is multifactorial. Dr. Pe[]a was short of declaring
private respondent's illness as non-work related. It is noted,
however, that aside from the certification by the
president of petitioner OSG stating that the Marine
Medical Services, the record is bereft of the actual medical
certificate coming from the Marine Medical Services itself which
shows that indeed it issued a Grade I disability rating for private
respondent's illness.
AISHcD
In due time, David filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA's March
11, 2011 Decision. 24 Pending the resolution of his motion, David
succumbed and died on April 9, 2011 25 and was substituted in the
case by his wife and children. 26 On June 14, 2011, the CA issued a
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
TIDaCE
David showed that part of his duties as a Third Officer of the crude
tanker M/T Raphael involved "overseeing the loading, stowage,
securing and unloading of cargoes." 35 As a necessary corollary, David
was frequently exposed to the crude oil that M/T Raphael was carrying.
36 The chemical components of crude oil include, among others,
sulphur, vanadium and arsenic compounds. 37 Hydrogen sulphide and
carbon monoxide may also be encountered, 38 while benzene is a
naturally occurring chemical in crude oil. 39 It has been regarded that
these hazardous chemicals can possibly contribute to the formation of
cancerous masses. 40
In this case, David was diagnosed with MFH (now known as
undifferentiated pleomorphic sarcoma [UPS]), 41 which is a class of
soft-tissue sarcoma or an illness that account for approximately 1% of
the gravity of the ailment suffered by David but not its nature. This
hair-splitting argument presented by respondents, and accepted by the
appellate court, does not persuade. It ignores the fact that employers
do not have the business of certifying the gravity of an illness suffered
by an employee unless it is in relation to the latter's employment.
Hence, the certification issued by OSG Manila regarding the
classification/grading of David's illness can only be taken as a strong
validation of the relation between David's illness and his employment
as a seafarer with the respondents.
caHCSD
It is significant to note that OSG Manila issued the June 28, 2007
Certification after the issuance of the letters/certifications regarding
the possible etiology of David's illness, where it was tacitly suggested
by the MMC doctors that David's illness could be work-related provided
there is a documented exposure to carcinogenic chemicals. It can be
easily deduced, therefore, that the certification impliedly fills in the
information required by Dr. Pea in his last letter to the companydesignated physician regarding the nature of the work performed by
David and his exposure to chemical carcinogens that could have led to
his illness. After all, respondents, as David's employers, have
knowledge regarding the functions of a Third Officer on board a crude
tanker and the nature of the cargo transported in their vessels. Without
a doubt, the certification issued by OSG Manila encompasses not only
the gravity of David's illness but also its nature and relation to the
employment undertaken by David in their crude tankers.
This conclusion is corroborated by respondents' contemporaneous act
of extending to David sickness allowance under Sec. 20 (B) of the
POEA-SEC, since an employer is liable for the payment of sickness
allowance only "when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness
during the term of his contract." Surely, an illness that has been
recognized at the outset by the employer as work-related cannot
evolve to an illness not connected to the seafarer's employment.
The quantum of evidence required in labor cases to determine the
liability of an employer for the illness suffered by an employee under
the POEA-SEC is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but mere
substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 52 In this case, in
accordance with the foregoing disquisitions, We find that there is
substantial evidence to support the decision of the LA and the NLRC.
In this petition for review under Rule 45, Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc.
(Daikoku) assails and seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated
September 26, 2007 and Resolution 2 dated February 7, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96282, effectively dismissing
Daikoku's appeal from the resolutions dated May 31, 2006 3 and July
31, 2006, 4 respectively, of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 044001-05.
The Facts
In January 1999, Daikoku hired respondent Alberto J. Raza as company
driver, eventually assigning him to serve as personal driver to its
president, Mamuro Ono (Ono, hereafter). By arrangement, Alberto, at
the end of each working day which usually starts early morning and
ends late at night, parks the car at an assigned slot outside of Ono's
place of residence at Pacific Plaza Condominium in Makati City.
On July 21, 2003, at around 8:00 p.m., Alberto, after being let off by
Ono, took the company vehicle to his own place also in Makati City.
This incident did not go unnoticed, as Ono asked Alberto the following
morning where he parked the car the night before. In response, Alberto
said that he parked the car in the usual condominium parking area but
at the wrong slot.
On July 24, 2003, Alberto received a show-cause notice why he should
not be disciplined for dishonesty. A day after, Alberto submitted his
written explanation of the incident, owning up to the lie he told Ono
and apologizing and expressing his regret for his mistake.
CDHSac
FULL BACKWAGES
A. Basic Pay
From 8/14/03 to 1/14/05
P12,000 x 17.03
P204,360.00
17,030.00
2,838.33
P224,228.33
Less: P12,000/30 x 12 days
4,800.00
TOTAL
P219,428.33
=========
P21,942.83
=========
SO ORDERED.
The labor arbiter also determined that while some form of sanction
against Alberto was indicated, the ultimate penalty of dismissal was
not commensurate to the offense actually committed and charged.
From the labor arbiter's ruling, Daikoku appealed to the NLRC, its
recourse docketed as NLRC CA No. 044001-05.
cHDAIS
P123,060.00
10,255.55
1,709.17
TOTAL
P135,024.72
==========
for reconsideration was filed out of time; and (3) there is no compelling
reason for the relaxation of procedural rules.
Following the CA's denial on February 7, 2008 of its motion for
reconsideration, Daikoku interposed this petition.
The Issues
I.THE [CA] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT STATED THAT THE
DECISION OF THE NLRC AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS ALREADY
ATTAINED ITS FINALITY.
II.UPHOLDING THE GRANT OF BACKWAGES TO THE
RESPONDENT IS UNJUST, BASELESS AND INEQUITABLE. 5
reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 NLRC resolution on the 17th day
from its receipt of the said resolution. The motion for reconsideration
was doubtless filed out of time, as the CA determined.
before the issuance of the July 31, 2006 NLRC Resolution; and (2) while
the NLRC only mentioned Alberto's motion in the July 31, 2006
Resolution, the tenor of this issuance conveys the impression that it
was the final ruling of the entire controversy, one that puts to a final
rest the clashing interests of the parties. Consider the following NLRC
lines:
For want of grave abuse of discretion and serious error, this
Commission now write finis to this labor controversy.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of 31 May 2006 STAND
undisturbed.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)
SO ORDERED.
(Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc. v. Raza, G.R. No. 181688, [June 5,
2009], 606 PHIL 796-806)
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