G.R. No.

130644, October 27, 1997

THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRANAGA, REPRESENTED IN THIS
SUIT BY HIS MOTHER MARGARITA G.
LARRANAGA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS
FACTS:
On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction seeking to annul the
information for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan
Larranagga alias Paco, filed in the RTC of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest issued as a
consequence thereof. Petitioner as an alternative remedy prays for the annulment of the order of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu denying Larranaggas motion for a regular preliminary
investigation and that it be conducted by a panel of prosecutors from the office of the State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice. On October 6, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition
praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to relieve her son from his alleged illegal
confinement or to grant him bail.
It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center for Culinary
Arts located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan
Larranaga. Larranaga, thru his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit remonstrated against the warrantless
arrest. The, police did not carry out the arrest on the assurance that Larranaga would be brought to
Cebu City by his lawyer on September 17, 1997 for perlominary investigation.

On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a regular
preliminary investigation. He also requested for copies of all affidavits and documents in support of
the complaint against his client and that he be granted a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days
from their receipt to file the defense affidavit. The motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the
ground that Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest
investigation. Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in person. He was warned that his
failure would be treated as waiver of his clients right to a preliminary investigation and he would be
proceeded against pursuant to section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armivits verbal
motion for reconsideration was denied by the city prosecutor.

On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals assailing the
actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
However, Larranagas effort to stop the filing of a criminal information against him failed. It turned
out that on September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed an information with the RTC of Cebu
charging Larranaga with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no
bail. On September 22, 1997, counsel filed a Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals
impleading the RTC of Cebu City to prevent petitioners arrest. The move again proved fruitless as
Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22, 1997 by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscila Agana. A second
Supplemental Petition was filed by Larranagas counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing to its
attention the arrest of Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the Court of Appeals dismissed
Larranagas petitions, hence, the case at bar.

RULING:

Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary investigation.
Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioners inquest investigation. Said section
clearly provides that when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court, the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the
affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested. For one, the petitioner was not
arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that he would instead
be presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997.
For another, the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the
petitioner for a crime committed some two (2) months before.
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly
shot Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected when (the shooting had) in fact just been committed within the meaning of
Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the

police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one
stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunmans cars
plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioners wifes name. That information did
not, however, constitute personal knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that section 7 of Rule 112 is not applicable. x x x
When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should
have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable
cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguna. Instead, as noted earlier, the
Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that section 7 of the Rule 112 was applicable
and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a
condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was
entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also
entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital offense case
should have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. In Webb vs. de Leon, we emphasized that
attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary
investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted
by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court
of Appeals, the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for
trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a
mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. A preliminary investigation should therefore
be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be
protected from any material damage.