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STEPHEN L. MUDD,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 04-1416
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Joshua Paul Waldman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. James E. Hutchins, Mathews, Virginia, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General,
MUDD v. BARNHART
OPINION
MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:
After the Social Security benefits claimant in this case lost at the
administrative level, the district court awarded him benefits and
awarded his lawyer the agreed-upon contingent fee (twenty-five percent of past-due benefits). The Commissioner of Social Security
appeals only the district courts denial of her motion to alter or amend
the fee order. Under the governing statute, 42 U.S.C. 406(b), a district court may award fees to a successful claimants lawyer for his
representation before the court. The Commissioner argues that the
district court erred when it considered the time spent and work done
by the lawyer in representing the claimant at the administrative stage
as one factor in determining that the contingent-fee agreement was
reasonable. We conclude that the courts consideration of the lawyers
agency-related work was appropriate because it assisted the court in
reaching a better understanding of factors such as the overall complexity of the case, the lawyering skills required, and the significance
of the result achieved. Inasmuch as the district court approved a fee
for court-related work only, we affirm.
I.
Stephen L. Mudd filed an application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. He alleged that by late 1997 hepatitis C and severe depression rendered him disabled for all forms of
substantial gainful employment. The Social Security Administration
(the agency) denied Mudds claims at the initial consideration and
reconsideration stages, and he then proceeded to an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge. The ALJ found that Mudd
"retains sufficient functional capacity for several specific light work
roles existing in significant number in the national economy." J.A. 10.
The ALJ thus concluded that Mudd is not disabled and not entitled
MUDD v. BARNHART
MUDD v. BARNHART
MUDD v. BARNHART
MUDD v. BARNHART