People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw (G.R. No.

17958, February 27, 1922)

A boat (under Dutch possession) between Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) was surrounded
by 6 vintas with 24 armed Moros who asked for food, then attacked (killed and raped), sparing only two young women,
who were able to escape at Maruro. Involved in the outbreak were Lol-lo and Saraw, which returned to Sulu, and were
then arrested for piracy. They contended that they are not under the Philippine jurisdiction, and facts did not constitute an
offense in PH law, but still, CFI rendered them guilty, sentencing them to life imprisonment
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy (Article 153 to 156)*** are still in force.
2. Whether the trial courts in the Philippines have jurisdiction over Lol-lo and Saraw ( eto yung connected sa lesson)
RULING
1. Yes. The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a
transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent
with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in
force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in
the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are
altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its
universal conception under the law of nations. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United
States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that
wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands***
2. Yes. All the elements of the crime of piracy were present. Piracy* is a crime, not only against a state but of all
mankind.** It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried, as it has no territorial limits. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.
In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant
Saraw is affirmed (not unanimous), and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo (unanimous), who is found
guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.
CONNECTION TO OUR LESSON:
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations
NOTES
* Piracy - robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility.
** hostes humani generis
***ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain,
shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the
penalty of presidio mayor.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects
of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to
cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be
punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

VELEZ

FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas a 25-year old whho was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was
confined by the petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. She
cohabited with the petitioner against her will and always had the intention of escaping. She died of
heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence on Aug. 28, 1988. Petitioner claimed
the legal custody of her body as her common law husband. Unaware of her death, her brothers and
sisters filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental
(a month after Vitaliana's death). The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused
to surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to
habeas corpus proceedings. According to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the
USEC of health authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian
Missionary, Inc which petitioner was Supreme President and Founder. Petitioner then filed for a
motion to dismiss the habeas corpus, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of
action.
A special proceeding for habeas corpus is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.
Sec. 19.
jurisdiction:

Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original

(1)

In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(5)

In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6)
In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
Respondents claim that Eugenio which is not related in any way to Vitaliana was wrongfully
interfering on their duties to bury her. (Art. 305 and 308 of the civil code). Vargases contended that
they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can claim custody of the deceased and if RTC has jurisdiction over
proceedings over custody/possession/authority/to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.
HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was valid and legal to the surviving
brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial- The immediate duty if burying the body of a deceased person,
regardless of the ultimate liability expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below
specified:

Petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law
does not recognize common law marriages where a man and a woman not legally married who

cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions in the Philippines. In addition, it requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him for even legally marrying
Vitaliana.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
After about three and a half years of marriage, respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of
the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally
and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage
was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair
with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner.The complaints were filed before two branches of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, the case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia."
Petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed.
A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already
been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the
entire records of both cases to his office for review.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in petition filed by James
Chua.

On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in the case of Pilapil
and William Chia. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said case until after the resolution of the
petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. A motion to quash was also filed in
the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied by the respondent
judge.The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such
refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her
counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty.
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide
the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the
purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint."
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the
aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Case "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia." Subsequently, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued
a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner.
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. In
other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action
therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through
the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the
present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his
power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity
must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring
the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but

did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
ISSUE:
WON it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of
the action by the former against the latter
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another
one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Case "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
William Chia" for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October
21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
In our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We
are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he
is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband.
(ARTICLE 15 ito yung point ng case)
Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer
be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would
there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons
for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of.
IMPORTANT NOTES:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this
rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a

sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, (Petitioner) vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding
Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioner to set aside the Orders
issued by respondent Judge which denied her Motion to Dismiss and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order in in Civil Case No. 1075-P.
The petitioner is a Philippines citizen and respondent is a citizen of the United States who
were married in Hongkong in 1972. The couple then resided in the Philippines and after
having 2 children, parties decided to have a divorce in Nevada, US. The petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the
Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared
with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent
had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,
1982.
The Court denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce proceedings made by both parties before the Nevada, Court in
the United States have effect on their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines
Ruling:
The Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Although the respondent contends that Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy;
Respondent is subject to his countrys national law, therefore, no question about the
validity of the divorce.

While it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law being an American
Citizen,
SC held that it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between
petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties which obtained jurisdiction of
both parties who then declared their incompatibility and that there is no community
of property or obligations.
Finally since pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court.
REPUBLIC VS IYOY

Crasus was married to Fely on 1961 in Cebu City. They have five children. After some time, Crasus discovered
that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. Fely then left for US, leaving all of their five children, to the care
of respondent. After a year, Crasus received and disregarded a letter requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers. In
1985, Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely returned to the Philippines several
times: once with her American fam, for the wedding of their eldest child, for the brain operation of their fourth child and
sometimes for unknown reasons. She continued to live with her US fam, and openly using the surname of her American
husband.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines. In her defense, Fely asserted that she was already an American citizen. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because the law of her present nationality shall govern her status.
RTC declared the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio (from the beginning) on the
ground that it finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with
her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support.

Whether Fely is psychologically incapacitated

Whether Art 26, par 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable to the case (related to lesson)
Whether the Solicitor General is authorized to intervene in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages

Evidence insufficient to prove psychological incapacity. ---Art 36 The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. The root cause must be medically or clinically identified, alleged

in the complaint, proved by experts and clearly explained. It must be proved to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, incurable and grave enough. The Court finds that evidence presented by
Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, so no basis for
declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36.

Article 26,* paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar. It
refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a
foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time
Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages. Respondent argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of
the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and
sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment,
sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this
Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless
marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual
problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals - REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
NOTES
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
*According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
***Article 48 provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

LLORENTE v CA
FACTS:
Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from Mar 10, 1927 to Sep 30, 1957. On Feb 22,
1937 he was married to Paula Llorente in a Roman Catholic Church in Nabua, Cam Sur. Lorenzo
became an American citizen by virtue of the United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization
no. 5579816.
Lorenzo went back to the Philippines to visit his wife and discovered that his wife was already
pregnant and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Paula gave birth to
a boy registered in the office of registrar of Nabua Llorente with the certificate stating the child was
illegitimate and the line for the father's name was left blank. Lorenzo then refused to give support to
Paula and had a written agreement to the effect that
1 - all the family allowances allotted by the US Navy as part of Lorenzo's salary and all other
obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended
2 - they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings
3 - they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal propery acquired during their
marital life
4 - Lorenzo would not persecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her faul
and agreed to separate to Lorenzo peacefully
Eventually, Lorenzo filed a divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California when he returned
to the US and the decree took in effect on Dec. 4, 1952. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and
married Alicia on Jan. 16, 1958 and they had 3 children. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed his
Last Will and Testament. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children.
In 1983, Lorenzo went to court for the will's probate and to have Alicia as the administratix of his
property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorezno died. Paula then filed
letters for administration over the property in her favor contending:
1 - she was Lorenzo's surviving spouse
2 - the various property were acquired during their marriage
3 - lorenzo's will disposed all of his property in favor of Alicia and her children, enroaching on her
legitimate and 1/2 share in the conjugal property
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorces should be recognized and the National Laws applied
HELD:
Lorenzo was already an American Citizen when he divorced Paula and also on the time that he
married Alicia and filed his last will. As stated on the Art 15 of the Civil Code:
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Since Lorenzo was already an American citizen and no longer a Filipino, Philippine laws relating to
family rights, duties and status are no longer applicable to him. The divorce he obtained is valid
because the laws that govern him are already National Laws
Validity of the will

Art17: The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter.
Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that
his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live in California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it
was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.
Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

ISSUE:
WON given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law (Art 26 Family Code)
RULING:
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its
duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The
issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a

foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to
its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. (Article 17 ito applicable I think although not
explicitly stated sa case)
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file
either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and
tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
IMPORTANT NOTES:
RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
--The Report of the Public Hearings on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines
(CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose
foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can remarry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation.