Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 848
15 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1248
Between February 26, 1986, and June 11, 1986, the medical staff at VCCW
apparently did not see or evaluate Gwendolyn. On June 11, 1986, Gwendolyn
reported to the VCCW clinic complaining of chest pain, dizziness, weakness,
and headaches, and was told to return to her dormitory. See J.A. at 670.
Gwendolyn returned to the clinic on June 15, 1986, with similar complaints.
The nurse on duty ordered Gwendolyn back to the dormitory with instruction to
rest and relax. On June 16, 1986, at 8:55 AM, Gwendolyn, this time assisted by
two inmates, returned to the clinic complaining of severe chest pain and pain in
her arms. The clinic nurses checked Gwendolyn's vital signs and phoned Dr.
Beorn at 10:00 AM to advise him of Gwendolyn's complaints and condition.
Dr. Beorn prescribed a tranquilizer and ordered Gwendolyn to be placed under
observation until Dr. Dixon arrived that evening. At 4:00 PM, Gwendolyn,
having suffered an acute heart attack due to coronary artery thrombosis and
arteriosclerosis, was found lying dead on the floor next to her bed in the clinic.
II
6
Dixon, Fry, and Beorn. In granting the defendant physicians' respective motions
for summary judgment, the district court held that, although the individual
actors may indeed have been negligent, none of their acts rose to the level of
deliberate indifference required to make out an eighth amendment violation
under Estelle. The district court reasoned that, although interrogatories reflected
that Miltier's medical expert, Dr. Simpson, was prepared to testify that each of
the defendant physicians had breached the standard of care owed Gwendolyn
Miltier, in no interrogatory or deposition was Dr. Simpson expressly asked, nor
did he expressly state, that Gwendolyn's maltreatment constituted more than
mere negligence. The district court, based upon the following dictum in Rogers
v. Evans, 792 F.2d at 1058, held Dr. Simpson's omission fatal to Miltier's
claim: "Whether an instance of medical misdiagnosis resulted from deliberate
indifference or negligence is a factual question requiring exploration by expert
witnesses." Id. Dr. Simpson's failure expressly to testify that the defendant
physicians' conduct was "grossly negligent" obviated Miltier's claim.*
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Sec. 1983. Moreover, once a plaintiff "has named a witness to support her
claim, summary judgment should not be granted without ... somehow showing
that the named witness' possible testimony raises no genuine issue of material
fact." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d
265 (1986) (White J., concurring). At no time did Dr. Simpson limit his
testimony to the negligence of the treating physicians and it was error for the
trial court to infer such a limitation. See Ditkof v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 114
F.R.D. 104, 106 (E.D.Mich.1987) ("plaintiff has identified a witness; the parties
simply dispute the probable content of his testimony. Such a dispute raises a
genuine fact issue for trial....").
11
Even aside from the Simpson affidavit, the record evidence taken in the light
most favorable to Miltier would support an inference that each of the three
treating physicians was deliberately indifferent to Gwendolyn's serious medical
need. Dr. Dixon, who was apparently most familiar with Gwendolyn's
condition, was obviously well aware that her symptoms were cardiac-related.
This is evidenced by Dixon's recommendation, as early as 1985, that
Gwendolyn be referred to the MCV cardiac unit. This was over a year before
Gwendolyn died. The evidence suggests that Dixon made no effort to follow up
on his recommendation even though he saw Gwendolyn for the same chest and
arm pains on numerous occasions following his recommendation. Failure to
provide the level of care that a treating physician himself believes is necessary
could be found conduct which "surpass[es] negligence and constitute[s]
deliberate indifference." Ancata v. Prison Health Serv., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704
(11th Cir.1985) ("Intentional failure to provide service acknowledged to be
necessary is the deliberate indifference proscribed by the Constitution.").
12
Similarly, the evidence of record would support a finding that Dr. Fry, after
approving the recommendation for referral to MCV, did nothing to follow up.
Moreover, as with Dr. Dixon, Dr. Fry was aware of Gwendolyn's continued
complaints after referral to the MCV cardiology unit. Fry claims that Dr. Pears,
an MCV physician, purportedly did not believe a cardiac evaluation was
warranted based upon Dr. Fry's recitation of Gwendolyn's symptoms. Dr. Pears,
although he could not recall the substance of the conversation with Fry, stated
that, based upon Gwendolyn's symptoms, he certainly would have
recommended an evaluation. Clearly, this presents a triable jury question on the
issue of Fry's deliberate indifference to Gwendolyn's medical needs. See
Ancata, 769 F.2d at 704.
13
Finally, even Beorn concedes that the tests he conducted did not allow him to
rule out arteriosclerotic heart disease in Gwendolyn's case. See Appellee's Br.
at 6. Even when all of Gwendolyn's test results returned normal, indicating that
there was no non-cardiac explanation for her symptoms, Dr. Beorn continued to
treat her symptoms as non-cardiac-related and failed to order a cardiac
evaluation. When coupled with Dr. Simpson's testimony, it is clear that a
reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference. See id.
14
Viewing the treating physicians' failure to act and Dr. Simpson's expert
testimony in the light most favorable to Miltier, we conclude that the district
court erroneously dismissed Miltier's claim on summary judgment.
2
15
We turn next to Miltier's claim against Nurses Spencer and Barker. Failure to
respond to an inmate's known medical needs raises an inference that there was
deliberate indifference to those needs. See Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179,
182 (4th Cir.1986). Adrena Taylor, Gwendolyn's co-inmate at VCCW's Clinic
Hall, testified in deposition that on more than one occasion Gwendolyn lost
consciousness, fell, and was left unattended by Nurses Barker and Spencer. See
J.A. at 764-65. Additionally, Miltier offered the affidavits of VCCW inmates
Carlotta Grandi and Wanda Benton. Benton's affidavit states that Nurse
Spencer told Grandi that Gwendolyn was fabricating her complaints and that
her problems were all in her mind. See J.A. at 771-72. Grandi's affidavit made
similar averments concerning Nurse Spencer. See J.A. at 769-70.
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III
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In Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d at 953, we stated that where the plaintiffinmate's complaint nowhere indicated that supervisory defendants neglected his
needs, and where the prison physician promptly saw the plaintiff and engaged
in a course of treatment, the supervisory defendants were "beyond any doubt
not liable to the plaintiff under any conceivable state of facts." Id. Here, Miltier
has failed to meet the heavy burden of proof in supervisory liability cases.
Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373. Miltier's complaint is directed at the prison physicians
who actually performed the treatment, while the wardens are parties, not for
having failed to provide treatment, but on a theory of respondeat superior. In
short, there is simply no evidence to support a finding that the wardens tacitly
authorized their subordinate health care providers to employ grossly
incompetent medical procedure. Cf. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348,
106 S.Ct. 668, 670, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1985) (failure of prison officials to
respond to inmate's note alleging threat by fellow inmate did not constitute
abusive or oppressive employment of governmental power such as to render
supervisory personnel liable under the due process clause for inmate's beating).
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IV
23
Wardens Downes and Burton cross appeal the district court's denial, without
explanation, of their motion for sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1927. Downes and Burton request this court to vacate and remand this
portion of the district court's opinion for further proceedings. Our review is for
abuse of discretion. See Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce in New Orleans,
841 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir.1988).
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Miltier's claim, as we understand it, was that Wardens Downes and Burton were
indifferent to the prison physicians' grossly incompetent course of treatment. As
noted above, it is undisputed that the wardens granted Miltier unfettered access
to the prison's extant medical facilities. Their only error, if any, was in relying
on their subordinates' competence--competence upon which they were entitled
to rely under these circumstances. We therefore cannot say that the
circumstances and the record clearly reflect the reasons for the district court's
denial of Downes' and Burton's Rule 11 motion. Accordingly, we remand for
consideration (or reconsideration) the motions of Downes and Burton for Rule
11 sanctions. In doing so we express no opinion on the merits of the motion.
The reasons for the district court's action on the motion should be at least
briefly set forth.
26
Because we find that Simpson's deposition testimony coupled with the record
evidence of the physicians' treatment creates a triable jury issue, we need not
address the district court's refusal to grant Miltier's motion to incorporate an
affidavit filed in response to the defendant's reply brief raising for the first time
this interpretation of Rogers. The affidavit stated that, in Simpson's opinion,
each of the physicians acted with gross negligence