ART.

III BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 8:

1. Right of Association

[G.R. No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.]

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,
FLORENCIO PADRIGANO, RUFINO, ROXAS, MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents.
L. S. Osorio & P. B. Castillon and J . C . Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J p:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter
referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union. composed of the employees of the
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino,
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses
of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M.
to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4
P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the
parties
parties

"3.
That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacanang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM) workers as well
as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM)
in the morning of March 4, 1969;
"4.
That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr.
Arthus L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de
Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
"5.
That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected
mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu
who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration
and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has
already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management;
"6.
That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company.
For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for
work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure
is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;
"7.
That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked.
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of:
Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this
afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the
PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the Malacanang
demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be
excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize
the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the
CBA, particularly Article XXIV: 'NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not
follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the
Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of
the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to

change their plans inasmuch as the Malacanang demonstration will be held the
following morning; and
"8.
That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company which was received 9.50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are
as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.'" (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.).
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with
the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift
workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on M[arch 4, 1969, respondent Company filed on March 4, 1969,
with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation
to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the
CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'" (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The
charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de
Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was
filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting
Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.).
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate
the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the
mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a
valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses
of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration
of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 3134, rec.).
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties,
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein
petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for
perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered
to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp.
42-56, rec.).
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid
order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September
28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order
dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the
evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments

pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G",
pp. 57-60, rec.).
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.),
respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22,
1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under
Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein
petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969,
within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion
for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed,
invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of
the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed
before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments
dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I",
pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent Court en banc dismissed the
motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed
beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.),
which herein petitioners received on October 28, 1969 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released
on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.),
appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within
five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the
decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition
for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to
file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and
honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office
clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk
(Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme
Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the
issues posed by the case at bar.

(1)
In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth
of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of
our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person." 2
(2)
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and
security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour,
the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have
no patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights
is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property,
to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the wellbeing of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His
interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3)
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition
are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the
rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate
more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the
minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6
And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of
all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4)
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens
can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through
their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he
can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public
officers and employees.
(5)
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate
and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the
Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be
an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential
and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact
that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law
and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor
oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been
stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added
that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black
and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech
and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed,"
15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief
Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge
Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the
danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted
act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining
agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Set against
and tested by the foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such a
conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4,
1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstration was
purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of
their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before
the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police

officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and political rights for
their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses. As a
matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein
petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was
to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to
take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was
it securing peace for itself at the expense of its workers? Was it also intimidated by
the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its
failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its
laborers vis-a-vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have been all the more
emboldened thereby to subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the
employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their
very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for
the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage
would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or
its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused,
harassed and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their
right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit can never be fully evaluated in monetary
terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day,
even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights
has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon
at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the
all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom
and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can
produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining

agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is
"a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the
employees, according to the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in effect
imposes on the workers the "duty . . . to observe regular working hours." The
strained construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that such stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage a mass demonstration against
police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and
life of the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom
should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have
been legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon
the freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal
picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar
concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the
same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and
the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to
participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the
first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss
or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua
non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete
unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site
in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also
immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with
jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of
the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third,
then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is
diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be
regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate
their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the
company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses
it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in
this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who
will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in
their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969,
the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human

understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the
Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration
held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on
the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the
refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to
join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent
separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
freedom to petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
875 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concerted activities for . . .
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the
workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and
protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or
restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such a common action to better
shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part
of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shifts should
not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as
heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection, deserves at least
equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter
complaint charging a bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism and
discrimination in the appointment and promotion of bank employees. 23 We further
ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come
within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic Act
No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the
furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of
respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly
acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union
guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company"

and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of
dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration.
However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more
important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the
demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to
them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of
the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he
has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping
that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses.
But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of
their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand
from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the
local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly
be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their
complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local
police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the
demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant
company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as
to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can
only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present
evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase
orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose
orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders
were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials
ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a
sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water
and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for
unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of
its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as
well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the

dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of
social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees.
Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people,"
which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of
the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor . . ." Respondent
Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all
times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of
the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a
lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court
of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the
causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining
and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most
unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed
to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed
by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the
court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers
no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the
finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of
an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which
violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the
right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due
process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for twentytwo years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon
these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to
such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed
they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic
human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of
jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices
including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and
enjoyment of which must not be nullified by a mere procedural rule promulgated by
the Court of Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegated legislative power,
when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of
these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of these freedoms. The

right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of
one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity, to be
invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise, these
guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a rule on procedure prescribing
the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in
such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses
because he cannot employ the best and dedicated counsel who can defend his
interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial
resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that a motion for reconsideration of
its order or writ should be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the
arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date
of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these
rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to
a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days
from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two
(2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969,
but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late
defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely,
does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal
in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited
cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution
is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does
violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of
necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in
this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights
affected, but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment
thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable
and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A
period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to

meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the
motion for re hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1,
Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a
Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial
Relations rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27,
1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in
accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise
prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 11 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G",
pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein
petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10 day
period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing
of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28,
1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary
period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed
out of time, or where the arguments in support of such motion are filed beyond the
10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules,
the order or decision subject of reconsideration becomes final and unappealable.
29a But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly
and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently
available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause
of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision
of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final
and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional
right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a
creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by
herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged
against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by
the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of
Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30a

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to
"suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever
the purposes of justice require." 30b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in
Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo 30c reiterated this principle and added that:
"Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do
justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat
an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts
are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We
can then and there render the appropriate judgment. It is within the contemplation
of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to
strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with
grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the ambit of its authority, in
appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceeding any error of judgment of a
court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flow of jurisdiction. If there
can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court
has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdictional
nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose
to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere
mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid
the unnecessary return of this case to the lower courts for the sole purpose of
pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal." (Italics supplied.) 30d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court of Industrial Relations rule in
this particular case at bar would be an unreasoning adherence to "procedural
niceties," which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms,
including the right to survive, must be accorded supremacy over the property rights
of their employer firm, which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially
when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has been demonstrated as
having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the
Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule that clashes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be
stressed that the application in the instant case of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm, is unreasonable and
therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights
of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and
circumstances revealed by the record.

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations

rules with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial
Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms . . ."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr.
Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs.
Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30e thus:
"As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for
new trial is not 'newly discovered,' as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon
the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103,
'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its. rules or procedure and shall have
such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That
in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and
in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.' By this provision, the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of
the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to
the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling
any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R., No.
46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For
these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the
respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners
constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning
of newly discovered evidence. . . . (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v.
Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578)." (italics supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in
the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert
and competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of the human freedoms
secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel
erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23,
1969, instead of September 22, 1969 filed his motion for reconsideration on
September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late, considering that
September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedural technicalities when they ceased to
be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised.

Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a
unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30f stated:
"As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315
[1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil.
Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958]
and Uy v. Uy, L-14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910,
'technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.' (Ibid.,
p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in
Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the
interpretation of procedural rule should never 'sacrifice the ends of justice.' While
'procedural laws are no other than technicalities' to view them in their entirety,
'they were adopted not as ends in themselves for the compliance with which courts
have been organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization of the
administration of the law and of justice. (Ibid., p. 128). We have remained
steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language of Justice Felix, to 'a sacrifice
of substantial rights of a litigant in the altar of sophisticated technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of justice.' (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104
Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they 'should give way
to the realities of the situation.' (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point, promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, L24288, 1968, 23 SCRA 837 citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3
SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador
that rules of procedure 'are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense'; but
are intended 'to help secure substantial justice.' (Ibid., p. 843) . . ." 30g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given
effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8)
leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent
Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who
participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon
the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers,
were not dismissed, and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were
specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against
them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 2030, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so
employees participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and
its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge
(p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and
regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the
firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.

The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been
simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to
dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as
aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as
well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to
unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty
tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
"The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously
seek to destroy our system of government, but from men of goodwill good men
who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to
accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
". . . The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A
suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be a reformer or
an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant alertness of the
infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender
of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender.
The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
". . . The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
". . . In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
". . . But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel
secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in
all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of goodwill or good intention, but a complete
lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they
are being subjected to indignities by the local police. It was more expedient for the
firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for
their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers.
This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the
respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was
pure and simple selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where
the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published
"a patently libelous letter . . . to the Bank president demanding his resignation on
the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as

discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro,
We ruled:
"It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents.
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the
letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act . . .).
This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the
joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in
furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the
Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air
their grievances.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the
right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause
(Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960)
is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right
of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. it is directed solely
against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self
organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 [1941]). . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

"In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization, or as a
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial
Peace Act." (Italics supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism
in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and
integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free
speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and
more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against
the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1)
setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2)
directing the reinstatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back
pay from the date of their separation from the service until reinstated, minus one
day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources
during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., dissents.
Antonio, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.

[G.R. No. L-38354. June 30, 1989.]

BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIRGILIO V. DIONISIO,
defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; ANNOTATION THEREON;
PURCHASER BOUND BY THE ANNOTATION FOUND AT THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE. Purchasers of a registered land are bound by the annotations found at
the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. (Tanchoco v.
Aquino, 154 SCRA 1 [1987])
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the
subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all
encumbrances except notations at the back of the certificate of title, among them,
that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the
obligations of a member of the respondent association is to pay certain amounts for
the operation and activities of the association which is being collected by the Board
of Governors. The dues collected are intended for garbage collection, salary of
security guards, cleaning and maintenance of streets and street lights and
establishments of parks. The amount to be paid by each lot owner is computed on
the basis of the area per square meter of the lot owned by every member.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SHARES IN THE COMMON EXPENSE FOR NECESSARY
SERVICES, NOT A PROPERTY TAX. The mode of payment as well as the purposes
for which the dues are intended clearly indicate that the dues are not in the concept
of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common
expenses for necessary services. A property tax is assessed according to the value
of the property (Philippine Transit Association v. Treasurer of the City of Manila, et al.
83 Phil. 722[1949]) but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot.
The basis appears reasonable. The dues are fees which a member of the respondent
association is required to pay as his contribution to the expenses incurred by the
respondent association in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets,
street lights and other community projects for the benefit of all residents within the

Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary, valid, and reasonable for the
particular community involved.
4.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION; DOES
NOT APPLY TO A PRIVATE TRANSACTION SUCH AS SALE WITH CONDITIONS VALIDLY
IMPOSED BY THE VENDOR. The contention that the lien collides with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association is not tenable. The transaction
between the defendants and the original seller (defendant's immediate
predecessor) of the land covered by TCT No. 81136 is a sale and the conditions
have been validly imposed by the said vendor/the same not being contrary to law,
morals and good customs and public policy. The fact that it has been approved by
the Land Registration Commission did not make it a governmental act subject to the
constitutional restriction against infringement of the right of association. The
constitutional proscription that no person can be compelled to be a member of an
association against his will applies only to government acts and not to private
transactions like the one in question.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 31 of the
Judiciary Act on the ground that only questions of law are involved.
The antecedent facts are summarized in the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Seventh Judicial District, Branch 20, Pasig, Rizal in Civil Case No.
16980 to wit:
"On January 22, 1972, plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in the
municipal court of Makati, Rizal, for the collection of the amount of P2,100 plus
penalty of 12% per annum and P751.30 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation. The sum of P2,100 represents the association dues assessed on the lot
owned by the defendant as member of the plaintiff association. On February 16,
1972, defendant filed an answer traversing all the material allegations of the
complaint and set up the following special defenses; 1) That there is no privity of
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant; 2) that the collection of alleged
dues from its members is in reality an unlawful exercise of the power of taxation
which is beyond the corporate power of the plaintiff, 3) that the amount sought to
be collected is unreasonable and oppressive, 4) that the assessment of the dues
upon the defendant in so far as he has not voluntarily affiliated with plaintiff is
illegal, immoral, contrary to law and public policy, and 5) that the acts of plaintiff in
compelling the defendant to be a member is unconstitutional and outside the scope
of its corporate power. Defendant therefore sets up the counterclaim of P2,000 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. On May 19, 1972, the parties submitted
the following stipulation of facts and prayed for judgment to be rendered therein in
accordance with said stipulation of facts:

STIPULATION OF FACTS
"COME NOW the undersigned attorneys for the plaintiff and the defendant in the
above-entitled case, and to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following
stipulation of facts:
1.
That plaintiff was incorporated as corporation way back in August 25, 1957
for the purposes stated in its Articles of Incorporation, copy of which as amended is
attached hereto as Annex 'A';
2.
That the By-laws of the association, copy of which as amended is attached
hereto as Annex 'B', provides for automatic membership in the association for every
owner and purchaser of lots located inside the Bel Air Village as defined and
bounded in the Articles of Incorporation;
3.
That without applying for membership in plaintiff association, defendant in
this case, like the other members, automatically became a member because he is
the registered owner of a lot located inside the Bel Air Village;
4.
That in accordance with the By-Laws of the plaintiff, the association is run
and managed by a Board of Governors who (sic) exercises, among other things, the
power to assess and collect against every owner of the lot inside the Bel Air Village,
certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association;
5.
That pursuant to the powers granted under the By-laws, the Board of
Governors have assessed the owners of the lots inside the Bel Air Village, a sum to
be paid either quarterly, semi-annually or annually, computed on the basis of the
area per square meter of the lot owned by every member as follows:
a.
During the period from 1962-1964, the basis of the assessment is P0.30 for
every square meter of lot owned by the members inside the Bel Air Village
compound;
b.
From 1965-1968, the assessment was increased to P0.35 for every square
meter;
c.
From 1969-1971, the assessment was further increased to P0.40 for every
square meter;
d.
Starting 1972, the assessment was changed to P0.50 for every square meter
of the lot owned by the members;.
6.
That under the By-laws, the foregoing assessments if not paid when due,
constitute a lien on the lots of the owners inside the Bel Air Village;
7.
That defendant is the owner of a lot located inside the Bel Air Village with an
area of 525 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal;

8.
That pursuant to the powers granted under the By-laws of the association,
the Board of Governors has made the following assessment on defendant's property
on the basis of the area per square meter of the lot owned by him as follows:
1962 525 sq. meters x P0.30 P 157.50
1963 525 sq. meters x P0.30 P 157.50
1964 525 sq. meters x P0.30 P 157.50
1965 525 sq. meters x P0.35 P 183.75
1966 525 sq. meters x P0.35 P 183.75
1967 525 sq. meters x P0.35 P 183.75
1968 525 sq. meters x P0.35 P 183.75
1969 525 sq. meters x P0.40 P 210.00
1970 525 sq. meters x P0.40 P 210.00
1971 525 sq. meters x P0.40 P 210.00
1972 525 sq. meters x P0.50 P 262.50
TOTALP2,100.00

9.
That the total amount of P2,100 alleged in paragraph 4 of the complaint
represents the assessments of the plaintiff on the defendant in accordance with the
computation stated in paragraph 8 above;
10.
That defendant protested the above assessments and refused to pay the
same inspite of repeated demands;
11.
That as per Resolution No. 2-65 of the Board of Governors, copy hereof is
attached as Annex 'C', all annual association dues not paid on or before September
30 are considered delinquent and imposed an interest of 12% per annum until fully
paid;
12.
That they are attaching to this stipulation as Annex 'D', the brochure of the
association which embodies the deed of restriction and rules & regulations
governing the lot owners inside the Bel Air Village.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance with
the foregoing stipulation of facts.
Manila for Makati, Rizal

May 18th, 1972

(SGD.) FRANCISCO S. DIZON

(SGD.) F. R. ARGUELLES, JR.

Counsel for Defendant

Counsel for Plaintiff

Suite 311 ABC Building

517 Federation Center

Bldg. Escolta, Manila

Binondo, Manila

The parties submitted an addendum to stipulation of facts as follows:

ADDENDUM TO STIPULATION OF FACTS
DATED MAY 18, 1972
COME NOW the undersigned attorneys for plaintiff and defendant in the aboveentitled case, and to this Honorable Court hereby respectfully submit the following
additional stipulation by incorporating to the Stipulation of Facts, dated May 18,
1972, the Bel Air Village Association, Inc. 1971 Annual Report, to be marked as
Annex 'E' and made an integral part thereof.
Manila for Makati, Rizal
June 3, 1972
(SGD.) FRANCISCO DIZON (SGD.) F. R. ARGUELLES. JR.
Counsel for Defendant

Counsel for Plaintiff

Suite 311 ABC Building

517 Federation Center Bldg.

Escolta, Manila

Dasmarias cor. Muelle de

Binondo, Manila
The parties having filed their respective memoranda, the inferior court rendered its
decision dated July 31, 1972 in favor of the plaintiff pertinent portion of which reads
as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the

principal amount of P2,100.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% annually
from the year 1962 until the aforesaid amount is fully paid and to pay plaintiff the
amount of P300.00 as and for attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suite.
SO ORDERED.
Appeal was perfected pursuant to Republic Act No. 6031.

This Court after examining the pleadings doubted its appellate jurisdiction because
issues not capable for pecuniary estimation were raised and decided in said inferior
court. Upon suggestion of the Court the parties on May 30, 1973 agreed in a joint
manifestation for this Court to decide the case in its original jurisdiction in order to
cure the defect. They likewise agreed to submit the case for decision based on the
stipulation of facts, heretofore quoted and the memoranda filed in the inferior court.
Upon suggestion of the Court the plaintiff filed its supplemental memorandum on
June 20, 1973." (At pp. 31-37, Rollo)
The decision of the Municipal Court of Makati was affirmed.
Defendant Dionisio then filed a petition for review of the Court of First Instance
decision with the Court of Appeals. As stated earlier, the appellate court elevated
the case to us the issues raised being purely questions of law.
The resolution of the petition hinges on whether or not the respondent association
can lawfully collect the questioned dues from the petitioner.
The petitioner insists that he is not liable to pay the dues on the following grounds:
1)
The questioned assessment is a property tax outside the corporate power of
respondent association to impose.
2)
Respondent association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the
assessment for lack of privity of contract.
3)
The questioned assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable,
arbitrary, oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory.
4)
Respondent association is exercising governmental powers which should not
be sanctioned.
There is no dispute that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 covering the subject
parcel of land issued in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the
effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air
Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the
Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the
community. It is likewise not disputed that the provision on automatic membership
was expressly annotated on the petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title and on the
title of his predecessor-in-interest.
The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not the petitioner is bound by
such annotation.
Section 39 of Act 496 (The Land Registration Act) states:
"Sec. 39.
Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a

certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrances except those noted on said certificate . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in the case of Tanchoco v. Aquino, (154 SCRA 1[1987]), we ruled that
purchasers of a registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of
the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. We stated:
". . . that when petitioners purchased on April 6, 1964 from Rafael Viola an
undivided (1/2) portion of Lot 314 and then on January 5, 1965 a 6/7 portion of the
other half of Lot 314 there was at the back of TCT No. 11682 covering Lot 314 an
annotation of a notice of lis pendens in favor of Donato Lajom, under Entry No.
19553/T-14707 (Rollo, p. 23), as follows:
'Entry No. 19553/T-14707; Kind Lis pendens in favor of Donato Lajom;
Conditions 1/2 of the properties described in thus title is the object of a complaint
filed in Civil Case No. 8077 of the C.F.I. of N.E.; date of instrument Dec. 16, 1949;
Date of Inscription Jan. 11, 1950 at 2:00 p.m.' "
Petitioner Pastor Tanchoco who holds office as Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija
(Rollo, p. 30) could not have missed the import of such annotation. It was an
announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warming that one who acquires an interest over said property does so
at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
Since petitioners herein bought the land in question with the knowledge of the
existing encumbrances thereon, they cannot invoke the right of purchasers in good
faith, and they cannot likewise have acquired better rights than those of their
predecessors in interest (Constantino v. Espiritu, 45 SCRA 557 [1972])"
In effect, the petitioner's contention that he has no privity of contract with the
respondent association is not persuasive. When the petitioner voluntarily bought
the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all
encumbrances except notations at the back of the certificate of title, among them,
that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association.
One of the obligations of a member of the respondent association is to pay certain
amounts for the operation and activities of the association which is being collected
by the Board of Governors. The dues collected are intended for garbage collection,
salary of security guards, cleaning and maintenance of streets and street lights and
establishments of parks. The amount to be paid by each lot owner is computed on
the basis of the area per square meter of the lot owned by every member.
The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended
clearly indicate that the dues are not in the concept of a property tax as claimed by
the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary services. A
property tax is assessed according to the value of the property (Philippine Transit
Association v. Treasurer of the City of Manila, et al. 83 Phil. 722[1949]) but the basis

of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The basis appears reasonable. The
dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required to pay as
his contribution to the expenses incurred by the respondent association in hiring
security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, street lights and other
community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These
expenses are necessary, valid, and reasonable for the particular community
involved.
The petitioner also objects to the assessment on the ground that it is unreasonable,
arbitrary, discriminatory, oppressive and confiscatory. According to him the
assessment is oppressive because the amount assessed is not based on benefits
but on the size of the area of the lot, discriminatory and unreasonable because only
the owners of the lots are required to pay the questioned assessment and not the
residents who are only renting inside the village; and confiscatory because under
the by-Laws of the respondent association, the latter holds a lien on the property
assessed if the amount is not paid.
We agree with the lower court's findings, to wit:
"The limitations upon the ownership of the defendant as clearly imposed in the
annotations of TCT No. 81136 do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. Since these limitations have been imposed
upon the contract of sale as admitted in the stipulation of facts, it is obvious that
the annotation of said lien and encumbrance that the defendant automatically
becomes a member of the plaintiff association and subject to its rules, regulations
or resolutions is valid, binding and enforceable.
"The contention that this lien collides with the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of association is not tenable. The transaction between the defendants and the
original seller (defendant's immediate predecessor) of the land covered by TCT No.
81136 is a sale and the conditions have been validly imposed by the said
vendor/the same not being contrary to law, morals and good customs and public
policy. The fact that it has been approved by the Land Registration Commission did
not make it a governmental act subject to the constitutional restriction against
infringement of the right of association. The constitutional proscription that no
person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his will applies
only to government acts and not to private transactions like the one in question.
"The defendant cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the
association against his will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of
property. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question he
can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free
himself from the burden of becoming a member of the plaintiff association. After all,
it is not imposed upon him personally but upon his ownership of the property. The

limitation and restriction is a limitation that follows the land whoever is its owner. It
does not inhere in the person of the defendant.
"The Court therefore holds that the lien or encumbrance or limitation imposed upon
TCT No. 81136 is valid.
"The second question has reference to the reasonableness of the resolution
assessing the monthly dues in question upon the defendant. The exhibits annexed
to the stipulation of facts describe the purpose or goals for which these monthly
dues assessed upon the members of the plaintiff including the defendant are to be
disbursed. They are intended for garbage collection, salary of security guards,
cleaning and maintenance of streets, establishment of parks, etc. Living in this
modern, complex society has raised complex problems of security, sanitation,
communitarian comfort and convenience and it is now a recognized necessity that
members of the community must organize themselves for the successful solution of
these problems. Goals intended for the promotion of their safety and security,
peace, comfort, and general welfare cannot be categorized as unreasonable.
Indeed, the essence of community life is association and cooperation for without
these such broader welfare goals cannot be attained. It is for these reasons that
modern subdivisions are imposing encumbrance upon titles of prospective lot
buyers a limitation upon ownership of the said buyers that they automatically
become members of homeowners' association living within the community of the
subdivision.
"Even assuming that defendant's ownership and enjoyment of the lot covered by
TCT No. 81136 is limited because of the burden of being a member of plaintiff
association the goals and objectives of the association are far greater because they
apply to and affect the community at large. It can be justified on legal grounds that
a person's enjoyment of ownership may be restricted and limited if to do so the
welfare of the community of which he is a member is promoted and attained. These
benefits in which the defendant participates more than offset the burden and
inconvenience that he may suffer.
It is contended that the dues are assessed not only upon owners who have
residences and houses on their lots but even upon those owners whose lots are
vacant or are being leased to others. It is therefore argued that this is
discriminatory. The Court disagrees. When the defendant bought the lot in question,
it is assumed that he is going to reside in this place. The limitation or encumbrance
assailed in the case at bar is for the assurance that the buyer of the lot will build his
house and live in the Bel Air Village. Otherwise, the defendant can just speculate
and sell his lot a higher price and defeat the very purposes for which the
encumbrance is imposed.
"The Court holds that the limitation or lien imposed upon TCT No. 81136 is
reasonable." (pp. 38-42, Rollo)

The lower court states that the defendant has occupied the lot for ten years up to
the time of the rendition of judgment. On grounds of equity alone, he should
contribute his share in the community expenses for security, street lights,
maintenance of streets, and other services.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
questioned decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., took no part.

[G.R. No. 75037. April 30, 1987.]

TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, LAMBERTO SANTOS, PEDRO ESTERAL, ROMAN CHICO, JOSELITO
ESTANISLAO, JOSE DELGADO, JUANITO ARGUELLES, RICARDO CAJOLES, and
JOSEFINO PAGUYO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 75055. April 30, 1987.]
TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), LAMBERTO SANTOS, PEDRO ESTERAL, ROMAN CHICO,
JOSELITO ESTANISLAO, JOSE DELGADO, JUANITO ARGUELLES, RICARDO CAJOLES,
and JOSEFINO PAGUYO, respondents.
Jaime G. de Leon for petitioner in G.R. No. 75037.
Pacifico de Ocampo and Benjamin C. Gascon for petitioner in G.R. No. 75055.
Estevan Mendoza for private respondents in both cases.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
These consolidated petitions for certiorari seek the review and setting aside of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission's decision in NLRC Case No. AB-611685-81 dated May 26, 1986, affirming the October 12, 1984 decision of the Labor
Arbiter, and of the NLRC resolution dated June 26, 1986, which denied the motion
for reconsideration of the petitioners.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI) and
members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized and
registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of the petitioner company.
On March 11, 1980, a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), was executed
between TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in
TDI including herein private respondents, and a copy was filed with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE) on October 29, 1980 for certification. The CBA had a
term of three (3) years from July 1, 1979 to June 30, 1982. It also contained a union
security clause, which provides:
"All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this Contract, become
members of the Union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall as a
condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good standing in
the Union for the duration of the agreement."

On or about the early part of October 1980, while the CBA was in effect and within
the contract bar period, the private respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan
Ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in TDI, with
private respondents Pedro Esteral and Lamberto Santos being elected President and
Vice-President, respectively.
On November 7, 1980, KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election to determine
union representation in TDI, which development compelled TDI to file a grievance
with TDLU on November 7, 1980 pursuant to Article XV of the CBA.
Acting on the grievance of TDI, TDLU wrote the private respondents on December
23, 1980 requiring them to explain why TDLU should not take disciplinary action
against them for, among other things "Disloyalty to the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (T.D.L.U.) by forming and joining
another union with a complete takeover intent as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all rank and file employees at TDI." (p. 16, Rollo)
TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members in accordance with its
by-laws which are not disputed by the private respondents. Except for Josefino
Paguyo who, despite due notice, was absent during the investigation conducted on
January 2, 1981, all the private respondents were present and given a chance to
explain their side. Thereafter, in a resolution dated January 9, 1981, TDLU, through
the Investigating Committee and approved by TDLU's Board of Directors, expelled
the private respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the Union effective January 16,
1981. By letter dated January 10, 1981, TDLU notified TDI that private respondents
had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that TDI terminate the employment of
private respondents because they had lost their membership with TDLU.
Acting on the demand of TDLU, TDI, in a Memorandum dated January 13, 1981,
notified "that effective January 16, 1981, we shall file the usual application for
clearance (with preventive suspension to take effect on the same day) to terminate
your services on the basis of the union security clause of our CBA.
Accordingly, TDI filed with the MOLE on January 14, 1981 its application for
clearance to terminate the employment of private respondents. This application
docketed as Case No. NCR-AC-1-435-81 specifically stated that the action applied
for was preventive suspension which will result in termination of employment, . . .
due to (T)hreat to (P)roduction traceable to rival (U)nion activity. The private
respondents then filed with the MOLE a complaint for illegal dismissal against TDI
and Benjamin Agaloos, in his capacity as President of TDLU, which complaint was
docketed as Case No. STF-1-333-91. The cases were jointly heard and tried by Labor
Arbiter Teodorico Dogelio.
However, on January 26, 1981, the Med-Arbiter granted the private respondents'
petition calling for a certification election among the rank and file employees of TDI.

The Med-Arbiter's Order stated, inter-alia that the existence of an uncertified CBA
cannot be availed of as a bar to the holding of a certification election (italics
supplied). On appeal of TDI and TDLU to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), the
order for the holding of a certification election was reversed and set aside by the
BLR on July 8, 1982, thus:
"A careful perusal of the records of the case will reveal that the uncertified CBA was
duly filed and submitted on 29 October 1980, to last until June 30, 1982. Indeed,
said CBA is certifiable for having complied with all the necessary requirements for
certification. Consistent with the intent and spirit of P.D. 1391 and its implementing
rules, the contract bar rule should have been applied in this case. The
representation issue cannot be entertained except within the last sixty (60) days of
the collective agreement." (Emphasis supplied) (p. 243, Rollo)
The last 60 days in a collective bargaining agreement is referred to as the "freedom
period" when rival union representation can be entertained during the existence of
a valid CBA. In this case, the "freedom period" was May 1 to June 30, 1982. After the
term of the CBA lapsed, KAMPIL moved for a reconsideration of the July 8, 1982
decision of the BLR on July 23, 1982 on the same ground that since the CBA then in
question was uncertified, the contract bar rule could not be made to apply. On
December 3, 1982, the BLR reversed itself, but for a different reason and held that:
"Movant union (Kampil) now seeks for the reconsideration of that Order on the
ground, among others, that the CBA in question is not certifiable and, hence, the
contract bar rule cannot properly apply in this case.
"After a more careful examination of the records, this Bureau is of the view that the
instant motion should be given due course, not necessarily for the arguments raised
by herein movant.
"It should be noted that the alleged CBA has now expired. Its expiry date being 30
June 1982. Consequently; there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a
certification election to be conducted among the rank and file of respondent. The
contract bar rule will no longer apply in view of the supervening event, that is, the
expiration of the contract." (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 244-245, Rollo)
TDLU filed a petition for review of the BLR decision with the Supreme Court,
docketed as Case No. G.R. No. 63995. TDI argued that KAMPIL did not have a cause
of action when the petition for certification was filed on November 7, 1980 because
the freedom period was not yet in effect. The fact that the BLR issued its order when
the 60-day freedom period had supervened, did not cure this defect. Moreover, the
BLR decision completely overlooked or ignored the fact that on September 21,
1982, a new CBA had been executed between the TDLU and TDI so that when the
BLR allowed a certification election in its order dated December 3, 1982, the
contract bar rule was applicable again. This Court denied TDLU's petition in a
minute resolution on November 14, 1983.

Using the foregoing as relevant and applicable to the consolidated cases for the
clearance application for termination filed by TDI and the illegal dismissal case filed
by the private respondents on October 12, 1984, Labor Arbiter Teodorico Dogelio
rendered a decision denying TDI's application to terminate the private respondents
and ordering TDI to reinstate the complainants with backwages. It should be noted
that the Labor Arbiter rendered the decision even before the petitioner company
could file its memorandum, formal offer of exhibits and its manifestation and motion
to correct tentative markings of exhibits. This decision of the arbiter was upheld by
the respondent NLRC in NLRC Case No. AB-6-11688-81 in its decision dated May 20,
1986.
TDI and TDLU moved for reconsideration of the questioned decision. In its motion,
TDI alleged, inter alia, that respondent NLRC did not rule on the validity of the CBA
as a contract, neither did it resolve squarely the validity of the enforcement of the
union security clause of the CBA. TDI stated further that respondent NLRC failed to
consider the fact that at the time the private respondents were expelled by TDLU
and consequently terminated by TDI, the union security clause of the CBA was in full
force and effect, binding TDI and TDLU.
For its part, TDLU said that the decision of the Supreme Court in the certification
case could not be used by respondent NLRC to justify its decision in the dismissal
case because the issues on the cases are entirely different and miles apart. It is for
this reason that there are two (2) cases that are involved. TDLU explained that the
Supreme Court decided to dismiss the petition for certiorari of TDI and TDLU in the
certification case because the original CBA existing at the time the private
respondents formed and joined KAMPIL had already expired. However, TDLU made it
clear that when the private respondents organized KAMPIL in TDI, the same CBA
was still in force and the disaffiliation did not take place within the freedom period.
Hence, at that point in time, the private respondents committed disloyalty against
the union.
On June 26, 1986, respondent NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
TDI and TDLU for lack of merit. In its petition, TDI alleged that:
I.
"RESPONDENT COMMISSION ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS
DISCRETION AND IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO LAW IN RENDERING ITS DECISION EN
BANC OF MAY 20, 1986 AND IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION THEREOF IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 26, 1986 BECAUSE
"1.
THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION HAS IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WERE EXPELLED BY TDLU FROM ITS MEMBERSHIP ON JANUARY 16,
1981 AND, CONSEQUENTLY, TDLU HAD DEMANDED OF THE PETITIONER OF THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE OF THE CBA, THE SAID CBA WAS

AN EXISTING AND A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND TDLU, AND
EFFECTIVE BETWEEN THE PARTIES;
"2.
IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT A UNION SECURITY CLAUSE PROVISION IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT IS BINDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE
CBA UNDER THE LAWS;
"3.
THE EXPULSION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM TDLU WAS THE
UNION'S OWN DECISION. HENCE, WHEN TDLU DEMANDED OF THE PETITIONER THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECURITY CLAUSE PROVISION OF THE CBA BY SEPARATING
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM THEIR EMPLOYMENT, FOR HAVING LOST THEIR
MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNION, THE PETITIONER WAS DUTY BOUND TO DO SO;
"4.
THE ALLUSION THAT THE CBA WAS NOT CERTIFIED BY THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS (BLR) HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS A VALID
CONTRACT BETWEEN ALL PARTIES THERETO.
II
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DID NOT
COMMIT ACTS PREJUDICIAL TO THE PETITIONER'S PRODUCTION EFFORTS TO BE
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THEIR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION AND EVENTUAL REMOVAL."
On the other hand, petitioner TDLU in essence contends that:
THE CBA IS VALID AND BINDING NOT ONLY ON TDI AND TDLU BUT LIKEWISE ON
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE RATIFIED THE SAME IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF TDLU; HENCE, THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE IS VALID
AND BINDING ON THEM; THE ACTION OF TDLU IN REQUESTING FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE OF THE CBA BETWEEN TDI AND
TDLU IS PART OF THE INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION;
TDLU CANNOT BE MADE LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES BECAUSE ALL
THAT IT DID WAS ASK FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF A CBA, WHICH CBA HAS NEVER
BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AND THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE SOUGHT TO
BE ENFORCED WAS NOT ALSO DECLARED NULL AND VOID;
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DISAFFILIATED THEMSELVES FROM TDLU BY ORGANIZING
THE LOCAL CHAPTER OF KAMPIL IN TDI IN OCTOBER 1980, BUT THE ACT OF
DISAFFILIATION WAS COMMITTED OUTSIDE THE FREEDOM PERIOD PROVIDED
UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1391 WHICH LIMIT ALL PETITIONS FOR
CERTIFICATION ELECTION, DISAFFILIATION AND INTERVENTION TO THE 60-DAY
FREEDOM PERIOD PRECEDING THE EXPIRATION OF THE CBA. HENCE, PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS COULD BE EXPELLED FROM MEMBERSHIP FOR DISLOYALTY AND
OTHER INIMICAL ACTS AGAINST THE INTEREST OF TDLU.

The private respondents admit that the root of the whole controversy in the instant
case is the organization of a Local Union Chapter of KAMPIL at TDI and the
subsequent filing of a petition for certification election with the MOLE by said local
chapter. This local chapter of KAMPIL was organized with the help of, among others,
the private respondents some of whom were elected union officers of said chapter.
They contend that their act of organizing a local chapter of KAMPIL and eventual
filing of a petition for certification election was pursuant to their constitutional right
to self-organization.
The issues to be resolved are the following: (a) whether or not TDI was justified in
terminating private respondents' employment in the company on the basis of
TDLU's demand for the enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA
between TDI and TDLU; and (b) whether or not TDI is guilty of unfair labor practice
in complying with TDLU's demand for the dismissal of private respondents.
We enforce basic principles essential to a strong and dynamic labor movement. An
established postulate in labor relations firmly rooted in this jurisdiction is that the
dismissal of an employee pursuant to a demand of the majority union in accordance
with a union security agreement following the loss of seniority rights is valid and
privileged and does not constitute an unfair labor practice.
Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes the closed
shop arrangement as a form of union security. The closed shop, the union shop, the
maintenance of membership shop, the preferential shop, the maintenance of
treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms of union security and
strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice nor are they violations of the
freedom of association clause of the Constitution. (See Pascual, Labor Relations
Law, 1986 Edition, pp. 221-225 and cases cited therein.) There is no showing in
these petitions of any arbitrariness or a violation of the safeguards enunciated in
the decisions of this Court interpreting union security arrangements brought to us
for review.
In this light, the petitioner points out that embedded at the very core and as raison
d'etre for the doctrine which enforces the closed-shop, the union shop, and other
forms of union security clauses in the collective bargaining agreement is the
principle of sanctity and inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution.
This Court speaking thru Mr. Justice Labrador, in Victorias Milling Co., Inc., v.
Victorias-Manapla Workers Organization (9 SCRA 154), ruled:
"Another reason for enforcing the closed-shop agreement is the principle of sanctity
or inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution. As a matter of principle
the provision of the Industrial Peace Act granting freedom to employees to organize
themselves and select their representative for entering into bargaining agreements,
should be subordinated to the constitutional provision protecting the sanctity of
contracts. We can not conceive how freedom to contract, which should be allowed

to be exercised without limitation may be subordinated to the freedom of laborers

to choose the organization they desire to represent them. And even if the legislature
had intended to do so and made such freedom of the laborer paramount to the
sanctity of obligation of contracts, such attempt to override the constitutional
provision would necessarily and ipso facto be null and void.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[T]he action of the respondent company in enforcing the terms of the closed-shop
agreement is a valid exercise of its rights and obligations under the contract. The
dismissal by virtue thereof cannot constitute an unfair labor practice, as it was in
pursuance of an agreement that has been found to be regular and of a closed-shop
agreement which under our laws is valid and binding.
In the instant case, the CBA in question provides for a Union Security Clause
requiring:
"(c) All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this contract, become
members of the union in accordance with its constitution and by-laws shall as a
condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good standing in
the union for the duration of the agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
Having ratified that CBA and being then members of the TDLU, the private
respondents owe fealty and are required under the Union Security Clause to
maintain their membership in good standing with it during the term thereof, a
requirement which ceases to be binding only during the 60-day freedom period
immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. When the private respondents
organized and joined the KAMPIL Chapter in TDI and filed the corresponding petition
for certification election in November 1980, there was no freedom period to speak
of yet. For under Presidential Decree No. 1391, promulgated May 29, 1978, the law
applicable in this instance provides:
"No petition for certification election for intervention, disaffiliation shall be
entertained or given due course except within the 60-day freedom period
immediately preceding the execution of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
and under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules Implementing PD 1391 ". . . pending
certification of a duly filed collective bargaining agreement, no petition for
certification election in the same bargaining unit shall be entertained or processed."
(promulgated September 19, 1978). The Labor Code further mandates that "no
certification election shall be entertained if a Collective Bargaining Agreement which
has been submitted in accordance with Article 231 of the Code exists between the
employer and a legitimate labor organization except within sixty (60) days prior to
the expiration of the life of such collective agreement" (Art. 257).

The fact, therefore, that the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) failed to certify or act
on TDLU's request for certification of the CBA in question is of no moment to the
resolution of the issues presented in this case. The BLR itself found in its order of
July 8, 1982 that "the certified CBA was duly filed and submitted on October 29,
1980, to last until June 30, 1982 is certifiable for having complied with all the
requirements for certification."
The validity of the CBA is not here assailed by private respondents. They admitted
having organized the local chapter of KAMPIL at TDI, although it is claimed that this
was done when there was no certified CBA between TDI and TDLU that would
constitute a bar to the certification election. Of significance is the ruling in Manalang
v. Artex Development Co., Inc., (21 SCRA 561, 569) decided on a factual setting
where the petitioners had affiliated themselves with another labor union, Artex Free
Workers, without first terminating their membership with Bagong Buhay Labor Union
(BBLU) and without the knowledge of the officers of the latter union, for which
reason the petitioners were expelled from the BBLU for acts of disloyalty; and the
company, upon the behest of BBLU dismissed them from employment pursuant to
the closed-shop stipulation in a Collective Bargaining Agreement. This Court ruled:
"The validity of the Collective Bargaining Agreement of March 4, 1960 is not
assailed by the petitioners. Nor do they deny that they were members of the BBLU
prior to March 4, 1960 and until they were expelled from the union. . . . .'
"The petitioners' further contention that the closed-shop provision in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement is illegal because it is unreasonable, restrictive of right of
freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution is a futile exercise in
argumentation as this Court has in a number of cases sustained closed-shop as a
valid form of union security.
"Finally, even if we assume, in gratia argumenti, that the petitioners were unaware
of the stipulations set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, since their
membership in the BBLU prior to their expulsion therefrom is undenied, there can be
no question that as long as the agreement with closed-shop provision was in force,
they were bound by it. Neither their ignorance of, nor their dissatisfaction with, its
terms and conditions would justify breach thereof or the formation by them of a
union of their own. As has been aptly said, 'a collective bargaining agreement
entered into by officers of a union, as agent of the members, and an employer,
gives rise to valid enforcible contractual relations, against the individual union
members in matters that affect the entire membership or large classes of its
members,' and 'a union member who is employed under an agreement between the
union and his employer is bound by the provisions thereof, since it is a joint and
several contract of the members of the union and entered into by the union as their
agent.' "
In an earlier case, this Court held:

"Nor can it be said that the stipulation providing that the employer may dismiss an
employee whenever the union recommends his expulsion either for disloyalty or for
any violation of its by-laws and constitution is illegal or constitutive of unfair labor
practice, for such is one of the matters on which management and labor can agree
in order to bring about harmonious relations between them and the union, and
cohesion and integrity of their organization. And as an act of loyalty a union may
certainly require its members not to affiliate with any other labor union and to
consider its infringement as a reasonable cause for separation. This is what was
done by respondent union. And the respondent employer did nothing but to put in
force their agreement when it separated the herein complainants upon the
recommendation of said union. Such a stipulation is not only necessary to maintain
loyalty and preserve the integrity of the union but is allowed by the Magna Charta of
Labor when it provided that while it is recognized that an employee shall have the
right to self-organization, it is at the same time postulated that such right shall not
injure the right of the labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership therein (Section 41(b) par. 1, Republic
Act 875). This provision is significant. It is an indirect restriction on the right of an
employee to self-organization. It is a solemn pronouncement of a policy that while
an employee is given the right to join a labor organization, such right should only be
asserted in a manner that will not spell the destruction of the same organization.
The law requires loyalty to the union on the part of its members in order to obtain to
the full extent its cohesion and integrity. We therefore, see nothing improper in the
disputed provisions of the collective bargaining agreement entered into between
the parties." (Ang Malayang Manggagawa ng Ang Tibay Enterprises, et al. v. Ang
Tibay, et al. 102 Phil. 669) (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with petitioner TDLU that the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in G.R.
No. 63995 entitled TDLU v. Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino could not be
construed as to extinguish the right of TDLU to expel private respondents for acts of
disloyalty when they organized a local chapter of KAMPIL in October 1980 in TDI.
The subject matter brought to this Court in G.R. No. 63995 was the decision of the
Bureau of Labor Relations dated December 3, 1982 requiring the holding of
certification election in TDI within twenty (20) days from receipt of said BLR's
decision which reads:
"Movant union (KAMPIL) now seeks for the reconsideration of that order on the
ground, among others, that the CBA in question is not certifiable and, hence, the
contract bar rule cannot properly apply to this case.
"After a careful examination of the records, this Bureau is of the view that the
instant motion should be given due course, not necessarily for the arguments raised
by herein movant.
"It should be noted that alleged CBA has now expired, its expiry date being 30 June
1982. Consequently, there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification

election to be conducted among the rank and file of respondent. The contract bar
rule will no longer apply in view of the supervening event that is, the expiration of
the contract. (ANNEX C, TDI's Memorandum dated November 28, 1986; emphasis
supplied).
It is clearly apparent that the BLR aforesaid Order which this Court upheld in G.R.
No. 63995 when it dismissed TDLU's petition in a minute resolution, did not pass
upon the question of legality or illegality of the dismissal of private respondents
from TDI by reason of their expulsion from TDLU for disloyalty. That question was
neither raised nor passed upon in the certification case, and was not a proper issue
therein because a petition for certification election is not a litigation but a mere
investigation of a non-adversary character to determine the bargaining unit to
represent the employees (George Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Union, 134
SCRA 82). Hence, no inference could be derived from the dismissal of said petition
that either the BLR or this Court has decided in favor of private respondents insofar
as the question of union disloyalty and their suspension and termination from
employment of TDI is concerned.
Simply put, the BLR ordered the holding of a certification election because the CBA
in question had already expired, its expiry date being June 30, 1982. Consequently,
there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification election. ". . . [T]he
contract bar rule will not apply in view of the supervening event, that is, the
expiration of the CBA."
But the fact that the CBA had expired on June 30, 1982 and the BLR, because of
such supervening event, ordered the holding of a certification election could not and
did not wipe out or cleanse private respondents from the acts of disloyalty
committed in October 1980 when they organized KAMPlL's local chapter in TDI while
still members of TDLU. The ineluctable fact is that private respondents committed
acts of disloyalty against TDLU while the CBA was in force and existing for which
they have to face the necessary sanctions lawfully imposed by TDLU.
In Villar v. Inciong (121 SCRA 444), we held that "petitioners, although entitled to
disaffiliation from their union and to form a new organization of their own, must,
however, suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the
security clause of the CBA:"
"Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is the right of
self-preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of
dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the disintegration and
destruction of the very union to which they belong; they thereby forfeit their rights
to remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy. Prudence and
equity, as well as the dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling mandate the
adoption by the labor union of such corrective and remedial measures, in keeping

with its laws and regulations, for its preservation and continued existence; lest by
its folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and fall. (Idem., p. 458).
The private respondents cannot, therefore, escape the effects of the security clause
of their own applicable collective bargaining agreement.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 26, 1986 and the resolution dated June 26,
1986 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. AB11685-81 are hereby SET ASIDE. The expulsion of private respondents from
TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION and their consequent suspension and
termination from employment with TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC., without
reinstatement and backwages, are hereby SUSTAINED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan J., took no part. My brother-in-law, Atty. Pompeyo Nolaco, is a partner of the
law firm counsel for the petitioner in G.R. No. 75055.

2. Right of Association in the 1987 text

[G.R. No. 85279. July 28, 1989.]
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIO T. BAYLON,
RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY,
SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO
RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.
SYLLABUS
1.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE; PROHIBITION TO GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES FROM STRIKING. While the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent
as to whether or not government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of 1987 of the
Civil Service Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDIES IN LIEU OF RIGHT TO STRIKE. Government
employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are
within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.
3.
ID.; CIVIL SERVICE; SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ARE PART THEREOF
AND COVERED BY MEMORANDUM PROHIBITING STRIKES. SSS employees are part
of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum
prohibiting strikes.
4.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 180; ALLOWS
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO NEGOTIATE WHERE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT AMONG THOSE FIXED BY LAW. E.O. No. 180 which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees, allows negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law.

5.
ID.; ID.; TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT ARE
GOVERNED BY LAW; EMPLOYEES SHALL NOT STRIKE TO SECURE CHANGES.
Section 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of
Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant
dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned
and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
6.
ID.; LABOR RELATIONS; STRIKES; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE
STAGED BY SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES; REASONS. An injunction may
be issued to restrain it. It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor
dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional
Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance
of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of
employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes
involving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction
over the dispute.
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN
INJUNCTION TO ENJOIN SAID STRIKE; REASON. The Public Sector LaborManagement Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of
injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and
not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the
general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is
appropriate.
8.
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NOT PROPER WHERE
COURT CANNOT BE ACCUSED OF IMPRUDENCE OR OVERZEALOUSNESS AS IT
PROCEEDED WITH CAUTION. The lower Court cannot be accused of imprudence
or zealousness, for after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the
strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the respondent judge, in
the same order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved controversies
emanating from their employer-employee relationship to the Public Sector LaborManagement Council for appropriate action.
9.
ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION; WHEN REMEDY AVAILABLE TO
PETITIONER. Petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an
injunction, but to cause the execution of the order of the Merit Systems Promotion
Board if it has already become final.
DECISION

CORTES, J p:
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court
can enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking
and order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not
employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA
staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing
non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector LaborManagement Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers
refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the
strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin
the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants
(petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared
illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of
accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment
of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts
from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination
and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-24].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending
resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the
meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed
an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp.
209-222]. On July 22, 1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion
to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a
bond, after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83-86]. As petitioners'
motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14,
1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No.
79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third

Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals on
March 9, 1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137].
Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the
Court on June 29, 1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for
being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the Court of
Appeals was also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141-143]. Hence, the instant petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6, 1989, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from
pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151152].
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental
reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined and the case submitted for
decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to
hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of
preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and
Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a
labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the
employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations,
not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the
DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may
enjoin the employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS,
are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by
the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages,
from continuing with their strike.
Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whether or
not the Court of Appeals erred is finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act
without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined
the strike are as follows:
1.

Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

2.
Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by
the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them
to return to work?
These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim.
I
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides
that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and
employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself
fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service
Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (5)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[t]he
right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution
recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether
such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we proposed
this amendment providing for self-organization of government employees, it does
not mean that because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to
strike. That is a different matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a
union. With regard to the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of
Rights, there is a provision that the right to form associations or societies whose
purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the

state is to prohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising government

functions, that could be done because the moment that is prohibited, then the union
which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried in
Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the
government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but they are prohibited
from striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice-President is unfounded. It does not
mean that because we approve this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike.
That is a different matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in
the Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to this
problem. We know that this problem exists; that the moment we allow anybody in
the government to strike, then what will happen if the members of the Armed
Forces will go on strike? What will happen to those people trying to protect us? So
that is a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the
right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the
Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by
the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the
Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but
excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
Sec. 11.
Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. The terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of
this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes
or modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may
belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to
join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to employees
employed in governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary
functions of the Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized
the right of employees of government corporations established under the
Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and those in the civil service
to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its
amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he
terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including
employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the
Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, for
such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D.
No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of
government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which

provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government

employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be
observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The
President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the
Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment
by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees . . .
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of
any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to
do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by
express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At
this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not
at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987
Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1
of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as
"government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295,
November 24, 1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor
and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1] is relevant as it
furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and
government employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and conditions
of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act,
R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in
the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their

employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum

requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his
position paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with
approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the
public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily
regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to public
employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the Government, in
contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public
service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private
labor relations could not exist in the relations between government and those whom
they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R.
No. 64313 January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172, 178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however,
relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except
those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly
recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the
settlement of labor disputes in the public sector, to wit:
SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable,
shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving
government employees. In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all
the available remedies under existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly
refer the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-Management] Council for appropriate
action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate
government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If

there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil
service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages,
like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to
Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization,
which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of
employment in the government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the
purpose of securing changes thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being
prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The
Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government
employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art.
276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor-Management
Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government
employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction
over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for
therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor-Management Council has not been
granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its
jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over
the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate. LibLex
Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in
fact it had proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining
the continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the
respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the
unresolved controversies emanating from their employer-employee relationship to
the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
III
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and
reiterated in their reply and supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS

unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due the individual petitioners and they
pray that the Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory injunction
to restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof and to compel
the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental reply, petitioners annexed an order of
the Civil Service Commission, dated May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of
the SSSEA who are not preventively suspended and who are reporting for work
pending the resolution of the administrative cases against them are entitled to their
salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and affirmed the previous order
of the Merit Systems Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our view that
petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause
the execution of the aforesaid order, if it has already become final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals,
the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate
court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners'
"Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,
1988 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 95445. August 6, 1991.]

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER, MERLIN
ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG and other teacher-members so numerous similarly
situated, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, HON. ISIDRO
CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports and the HON.
ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Manila City Schools Superintendent,
respondents-appellees.
[G.R. No. 95590. August 6, 1991.]
ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), ENRIQUE D. TORRES, RODRIGO G.
NATIVIDAD, FRANCISCO A. NECERINA, EVA V. FERIS, LUCIA R. CARRASCO, LEO R.
RAMBOYONG, ZENEIDA PEREZ, MARIA ACEJO, AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TOO NUMEROUS TO BE IMPLEADED, petitioners, vs.
HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports;
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Free Legal Assistance Group, Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity &
Nationalism and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for petitioners in G.R. No. 95590.
Gregorio Fabros for petitioner in G.R. No. 95445.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, J p:
The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called "mass
action" undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them members of
the petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17, 1990 to "dramatize
and highlight" 1 the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the
latter's attention.
The petition in G.R. No. 95590 alleges in great detail the character and origins of
those grievances as perceived by the petitioners, and the attempts to negotiate

their correction; 2 employees even these are more briefly, but quite adequately and
with no sacrifice of relevant content, set forth in the petition in G.R. No. 95445,
portions of which are quoted hereunder without necessarily affirming their objective
truth or correctness:
"3.
Together with other teachers embracing the Teachers and Employees
Consultative Council (TECC) and the Alliance of Concerned Teachers, the petitioners,
in accordance with their Constitution and By-Laws, resolved to engage in mass
concerted actions, after peaceful dialogues with the heads of the Department of the
Budget and Management, Senate and House of Representative in public hearings as
well as after exhausting all administrative remedies, to press for, among other
things, the immediate payment of due chalk, clothing allowances, 13th month pay
for 1989 arising from the implementation of the Salary Standardization Law, the
recall of DECS Orders 39 s. 1990 directing the oversizing of classes and overloading
of teachers pursuant to the cost-cutting measures of the government, the hiring of
47,000 new teachers to ease the overload of existing teachers, the return of the
additional 1% real property taxes collected by local government units to education
purposes to be administered by the Local Schools Boards, and consequent recall of
DBM Circulars Nos. 904 and 9011 and local budget circular No. 47 consistent with
RA 5447 and the new Constitution mandating that education shall enjoy the highest
budgetary priority in the national budget, and other equally important demands;
The dialogues and conferences initiated by the petitioners and other organizations
were as early as March 14, 1989, March 14, 1990, April 23, 1990, May 28, 1990,
June 5, 1990, September 3, 1990 and September 14, 1990 with the Civil Service
Commission, the Senate and House of Representatives, Department of Budget and
Management and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, but all these did
not result in the granting of the demands of the petitioners, leaving them with no
other recourse but to take direct mass action such as the one they engage in three
weeks ago. cdphil
4.
On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other teachers in other cities and
municipalities in Metro Manila, staged a protest rally at the DECS premises without
disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of
demands. No response was made by the respondent Secretary of Education, despite
the demonstration, so the petitioners began the ongoing protest mass actions on
September 17, 1990 . . ." 3
September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day. There is
no question that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct
their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition in G.R. No. 95590, 4
they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning whence they proceeded to
the National Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) for a
whole-day assembly. At about 1:00 o'clock p.m., three representatives of the group
were allowed to see the respondent Secretary of Education who ". . . brushed aside
their grievances," warned them that they would lose their jobs for going on illegal

and unauthorized mass leave. Upon leaving said respondent's presence, they were
handed an order directing all participants in the mass action to return to work in 24
hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned
to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. 5 Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions contained into
the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. In its issue of
September 19, 1990, the newspaper Manila Standard reported that the day
previous, the respondent Secretary of Education had relieved 292 teachers who did
not return to their classes. The next day, however, another daily, Newsday, reported
that the Secretary had revoked his dismissal order and instead placed 56 of the 292
teachers under preventive suspension, despite which the protesters' numbers had
swelled to 4,000. 6
On the record, what did happen was that, based on reports submitted by the
principals of the various public schools in Metro Manila, the respondent Secretary of
Education had filed motu propio administrative complaints against the teachers who
had taken part in the mass actions and defied the return-to-work order on assorted
charges like grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil
Service Law, absence without official leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day
preventive suspension. The respondents were served copies of the charge sheets
and given five (5) days to submit answer or explanation. Later, on October 8, 1990,
the respondent Secretary constituted an investigating committee of four (4) to
determine and take the appropriate course of action on the formal charges and
designated the special prosecutors on detail with the DECS to handle their
prosecution during the formal hearings. 7
On October 11, 1990, the respondent Secretary of Education rendered the first of
his now-questioned decisions on the administrative complaints. In Case No. DECS
90-002, he found twenty (20) respondent teachers guilty of the charges proffered
against them and dismissed then from office, effective immediately. 8 In the other
investigations that followed and as of December 3, 1990, 658 teachers were
dismissed, 40 were suspended for one (1) year, 33 for nine (9) months, and 122 for
six (6) months; 398 were exonerated. 9
Earlier, on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 95445 had filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, a petition 10 for prohibition, declaratory
relief and preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain the implementation of the
return-to-work order of September 17, 1990 and the suspension or dismissal of any
teacher pursuant thereto and to declare said order null and void. Issuance ex-parte
of a temporary restraining order was sought, but seeing no compelling reason
therefor, the Regional Trial Court instead set the application for hearing, and heard
the same, on September 24, 1990. Thereafter and following the submission of
memorandums by the partied, said Court rendered judgment declaring the assailed
return-to-work order valid and binding, and dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
11

Review of said judgment is sought in G.R. No. 95445.

G.R. No. 95590 is a parallel original proceeding for prohibition, mandamus and
certiorari grounded on the same state of facts instituted for substantially the same
purpose i.e., the invalidation of the return-to-work order of the respondent Secretary
of Education and all orders of suspension and/or dismissal thereafter issued by said
respondent against the teachers who had taken part in the mass actions of
September 17, 1990 and the days that followed.
Both cases were order consolidated by Resolution issued on October 25, 1990, 12
and separate comments were filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public
respondents, in G.R. No. 95445 on October 31, 1990, and in G.R. No. 95590 on
December 5, 1990. 13 On November 20, 1990 the parties were heard in oral
argument on the petitioners' united pleas for a temporary restraining
order/mandatory injunction to restore the status quo ante and enjoin the public
respondents from continuing with the issuance of suspension orders and
proceedings with the administrative cases against the teachers involved in the mass
actions.
Said pleas were denied by the Court in its Resolution of December 18, 1990, 14 and
a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 was likewise
denied.
In two separate but identically-worded motions filed on their behalf by Atty. Froilan
M. Bacungan, 15 the following person, to wit: Florita D. Guazon, Elisa G. Lazo,
Gonzala G. Sioson, Esperanza Valero, Nenita Pangilinan, Ramon David, Aurora Bosi,
Encarnita David, Socorro Sentin, Crispulo Santos, Rodriguez Bagana, Rodolfo D.
Bascal, Ruben Bersamina, Rodolfo Arroyo, Irene Gadil, Rebecca Roldan, Rosita
Samson, Priscilla Avendia, Arturo Cabuhat, Rosalinda Caoili, Angelina Corpuz,
Purisima Leria, Elsie Somera, Dedaica Jusay, Teresita Partoza, Gloria Salvador,
Catherine San Agustin, Nestor Aguirre, Lorenza Real, Celia Ronquillo, Vicente
Carranza, Jessie Villanueva, Yolanda Alura, Clara Alvarez, Danilo Llamas, Ladera
Panita, Myrna Sena, Zenaida Ligon, Daisy S. Conti, Danilo Caballes, Susan Maragat,
Roberto Manlangit and Elizabeth T. Aguirre, seek to leave to withdraw as parties in
G.R. No. 95590. These movants claim that they are such parties although not
individually so named in the petition in said case, being among those referred to in
its title as "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be
impleaded," who had been administratively charged, then preventively suspended
and/or dismissed in the wake of the mass actions of September 1990. They assert
that since this Court is not a trier of facts, they have opted to appeal the questioned
decisions or actuations of the respondent Secretary of Education to the Civil Service
Commission where they believe they will have ". . . all the opportunity to introduce
evidence on how (Secretary) Cario violated their constitutional rights to due
process of law . . . security of tenure and . . . peaceably to assembled and petition
the government for redress of grievances . . . ."

An opposition to the first motion was filed 16 which, briefly, contended that, as this
Court had already found that the petitioners had gone on an unlawful strike and that
public respondent Cario's acts were prima facie lawful, the motion was either an
attempt at forum-shopping or meant to avoid the "inevitable outcome" of issues
already pending final determination by the Court.
The Court Resolution of December 18, 1990, supra, denying the petitioners' plea for
restoration of the status quo ante and to restrain/enjoin further suspensions of, and
the initiation or continuation of, administrative proceedings against the teachers
involved, is based on the following postulates:
(1)
the undenied indeed the pleaded and admitted - fact that about 800
teachers, among them the individual petitioners and other unnamed but "similarly
situated" members of the petitioning associations in both cases, unauthorizedly
absented themselves from their classes on regular schoolday, September 17, 1990,
in order to participate in a "mass action" to dramatize their grievances concerning,
in the main, the alleged failure of the public authorities, either to implement at all or
to implement in a just and correct manner, certain laws and measures intended to
benefit them materially;
(2)
the fact, too, that in the days that followed, more mass actions for the same
purpose were undertaken, notwithstanding a return-to-work order issued by the
respondent Secretary of Education; more teachers joined the so-called "peaceful
assemblies" on September 18, 1990 and the number resting to 4,000 in September
19, 1990; 17
(3)
that from the pleaded and admitted facts, these "mass actions" were to all
intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform,
undertaken for essentially economic reasons;
(4)
that this Court had already definitely ruled that employees in the public (civil)
service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike, although
guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of
employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law;
18
(5)
that upon the foregoing premises, it was prima facie lawful and within his
statutory authority for the respondent Secretary of Education to take the actions
complained of, to wit: issue a return-to-work order, prefer administrative charges
against, and place under preventive suspension, those who failed to comply with
said order, and dismiss from the service those who failed to answer or controvert
the charges; 19

The Court has not since been presented with any consideration of law or established
fact that would impair the validity of these postulates or preclude continued reliance
thereon for the purpose of resolving the present petition on their merits.
The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioner have a right to
strike, which it is clear they do not, however justifiable their reasons, nor whether or
not there was in fact such a strike, it being equally evident from the pleadings that
there was, and there being no dispute about this. What, therefore, is brought before
the court is the question of whether or not any rights of the petitioners under the
due process clause of the Constitution as it applies to administrative proceedings
were violated in the initiation, conduct, or disposition of the investigations
complained of.
Indeed, what the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 proclaim about denial of due process
being their "paramount complaint" . . . "central to their prayer for interlocutory
relief" 20 could as well be said of the merits of their main cause as of their plea for
a restraining order pendente lite or a preliminary injunction.
There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court's taking up that issue and
resolving it in these cases. Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by this Court in the
exercise of its review jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious reason that it is one of
fact. The petitions and subsequent pleadings of the petitioners allege facts and
circumstances which, it is claimed, show denial of due process, citing as supposedly
"representative samples" 21 among others: (a) that teachers were dismissed on the
sole basis of unsworn reports of their principals and without evidence of their
alleged failure to obey the return-to-work order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to
specify the particular charges or offenses allegedly committed; (c) that some
teachers were not furnished sworn complaints, and others were suspended without
any formal charges; (d) that teachers who attempted to return within a reasonable
time after notice of the return-to-work order were both accepted back; and similar
allegations.
These are however denied and disputed by the public respondents, who set forth
their own version, initially in their separate Comments in both cases and, later and
in greater detail, in their Consolidated Memorandum of December 3, 1990, supra,
from which the following passages are quoted:
"Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and G.R. No. 95590 admit engaging in a strike
(referred by semantic interplay as "concerted activity" or "mass action") directed
against public respondent Cario beginning September 17, 1990, (MPSTA Petition,
pp. 3, 9; ACT Petition, pp. 15-16).
To avoid the disruption of classes, public respondent Cario, also on September 17,
1990, issued a return-to-work order' reminding striking worker that in law, they
cannot engage in strike and warning them that dismissal proceedings will be
instituted against them if they did not return to work within 24 hours from their

walkout (MPSTA Petition; p. 4; ACT Petition, p. 15) and a memorandum to DECS

officials instructing them to notify the striking teachers to return to work within 24
hours from their walkout and to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who
defy the return to work order as well as to hire temporary replacements (MPSTA
Petition, p. 4; ACT Petition, pp. 15-16).
The striking teachers who did not heed the return-to-work order were
administratively charged and preventively suspended for ninety days for grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, insubordination, refusal to perform official duty,
absence without leave beginning September 17, 1990 and other violations of Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations. All of striking teachers were served with the
suspension orders and the charge sheets notifying them of the charges and giving
them five (5) days from receipt of the charge sheets within which to file their
respective answers.
With the filing of the administrative complaints and the receipt of the answers of
some of the teachers involved, public respondent Cario on October 8, 1990 issued
a Memorandum forming an Investigation Committee composed of Atty. Reno
Capinpin of DECS Administrative Services as Chairman; Dr. Alberto Mendoza,
representing the Division Supervisors, Atty. Evangeline de Castro, representing the
City Superintendent of Schools of Manila, and Atty. Isaias Melegrito, representing the
National PPSTA Organization, as members. Copy of the aforesaid Memorandum is
hereto attached as Annex "1."
The committee was authorized to meet everyday, even as Special Prosecutors from
the Department of Justice on detail with the DECS were designated to handle the
prosecution during the formal hearings (Ibid.)
Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and 'G.R. No. 95590' admit having received the charge
sheets and notices of preventive suspension wherein they were given five days from
receipt of the charges within which to file their answers (MPSTA Petition, p. 4, ACT
Petition, p. 16, Annexes 'X' to 'AA').
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . Many striking teachers received their preventive suspension orders and the
charge sheets from their respective principals when they visited their schools. Many
refused to receive and sign receipt therefor; others tore up the preventive
suspension orders and charge sheets in front of their principals. Instead, they took
the occasion to belittle and insult the substitute teachers who took over their
classrooms temporarily.
The striking teachers were given a period of five days to file their Answer in line
with Sec. 8, Rule III of Rules on Administrative Disciplinary Cases in CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 46, S. 1989. The motion for extension of time to file
Answer was denied by DECS Task Fore because it was dilatory the alleged reason

being that Atty. Fabros is handling 2,000 cases of teachers. The DECS was
constrained by Sec. 38(d) of P.D. No. 807 and Sec. 8 of the Memorandum Circular
mentioned which mandate that administrative cases must be decided within 30
days from the filing of the charges. Another reason was that many refused to
receive the notice of charges. Also, to delay the resolution of the cases was to their
disadvantage.
Moreover, another reason proffered was that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
still had to act on the petition before it. However, the Motion was filed AFTER the
RTC Manila had already dismissed the Petition.
Nevertheless, answers to the administrative complaints started pouring in at the
DECS, as prepared personally by the striking teachers by their lawyers.
After initial assessments of the reports coming in from the principals of the schools
concerned and the answers of the striking teachers, the DECS Special Task Force
prepared on October 9, 1990 and submitted to respondent Secretary Cario the
Guidelines and Criteria as to the nature of the evidence to be assessed and the
corresponding penalty to be imposed against the striking teachers which was
approved by respondent Secretary Cario on the same day. A copy of the aforesaid
Guidelines and Criteria is hereto attached as Annex '2.' Thereafter, the DECS Special
Task Force proceeded with its task of investigating the cases against the striking
teachers.
Those who refused to sign the DECS return-to-work order, the preventive
suspension orders and the charge sheets, some even tearing up the documents
presented to them by their principals were considered by the DECS Special Task
Force as having waived their right to be heard; their cases had to be resolved on the
basis of the records. Nevertheless, the DECS Special Task Force summoned the
principals concerned, who then testified under oath confirming their reports on the
absences of the striking teachers. Some clarificatory questions were asked of them
on the manner of the service of the DECS orders and the situation obtaining to their
schools.
For those who answered the charge sheets, the DECS Special Task Force set the
administrative cases for hearing. Many of the striking teachers refused to appear at
the hearings but preferred to submit their case on the basis of their answers.
With regard to those who attended the hearings, each of the absent or striking
teachers was investigated and asked questions under oath on their answers and the
reasons for their absences and/or joining the teachers reiterated their answers to
the charge sheets, either giving justifiable reason for their absences on the days
mentioned or maintaining their stubborn stand that they have all right to absent
themselves from classes in the exercise of their constitutional right to join mass
action to demand from the government what are supposedly due them. Still the
DECS Special Task Force was not satisfied with their written answers and

explanation during the hearings. The principals of the teachers were summoned and
they confirmed under oath their reports of absences and/or on teachers joining the
strike.
After having conducted fully their investigations, the DECS Special Task Force
submitted in series their investigation reports and recommendation for each
category of striking teachers to respondent Secretary Cario. The investigation
reports, together with their supporting documents, submitted by the DECS Special
Task Force indicated clearly the manner and conduct of the administrative hearings,
the nature and weight of the evidence adduced, and the correspondingly penalty or
exoneration recommended.
On the bases of the investigation reports and recommendations of the DECS Special
Task Force, and after evaluating the reports and its documents attached, respondent
Secretary Cario promulgated the decisions either for exoneration, suspension or
dismissal. Copies of the DECS decisions of exoneration, suspension or dismissal
were forwarded to the striking teachers concerned. Those exonerated were allowed
to resume their duties and received their back salaries. Some of the teachers either
suspended or dismissed have already received the copies of the decisions, either
personally or through mail.
xxx

xxx

xxx" 22

This copious citation is made, not to suggest that the Court finds what is stated
therein to be true and the contrary averments of the petitions to be false, but
precisely to stress that the facts upon which the question of alleged denial of due
process would turn are still in issue, actively controverted, hence not yet
established.
It is not for the Court, which is not a trier of facts, as the petitioners who would now
withdraw correctly put it, to make the crucial determination of what in truth
transpired concerning the disputed incidents. Even if that were within its
competence, it would be at best a monumental task. At any rate, the petitioners
cannot as it seems they have done lump together into what amounts to a class
action hundreds of individual cases, each with its own peculiar set of facts, and
expect a ruling that would justly and correctly resolve each and everyone of those
cases upon little more than general allegations, frontally disputed as already
pointed out, of incidents supposedly "representative" of each case or group of
cases.
This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court,
especially when numerous parties disparately situated as far as the facts other
concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and generalization of what
should be alleged with particularity becomes unavoidable. The petitioners' obvious
remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to take
part, assert and vindicate their rights therein, see those proceedings through to

judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the Civil Service Commission; or if,
pending said proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed
necessary because the respondent Secretary or those acting under him or on his
instructions were acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, to apply, not directly to the Supreme Court, but to the Regional Trial
Court, where there would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting
corrective relief.
Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order of recourse through the
judicial hierarchy; they by-pass the rungs of the judicial ladder at the peril of their
own causes. 23 This Court is a court of last resort. Its review jurisdiction is limited to
resolving questions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or the facts have
already been determined by lower tribunals, except only in criminal actions where
capital penalties have been imposed.
WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without prejudice to any appeals, if
still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission
on the matters complained of. The motion to withdraw, supra, are merely NOTED,
this disposition rendering any express ruling thereon unnecessary. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C .J ., Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado
and Davide, Jr., JJ ., concur.

3. The Right of Association in Action: labor, subversion

[G.R. No. L-22228. February 27, 1969.]

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, ALFREDO FAJARDO AND ALL THE OTHER
MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIONPAFLU, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE DIRECTOR OF LABOR
RELATIONS, AND THE REGISTRAR OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates and Israel Bocobo for petitioners.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; INDUSTRIAL PEACE ACT; REGISTRATION OF
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS; REGISTRATION CALLED FOR BY SECTION 23, R.A. 875 IS
NOT A CURTAILMENT OF FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION. The theory
that the registration requirement on all labor organizations under the Industrial
Peace Act unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph
(b) of Section 23 of Republic Act 875 is not a limitation to the right of assembly or
association, which may be exercised with or without said registration. It is merely a
condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations,

associations or unions and the possession of the rights and privileges granted by
law to legitimate labor organizations.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS THEREOF. To be registered
pursuant to Section 23 (b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor organization, association
or union of workers must file with the Department of Labor the following: (a) a copy
of the constitution and by-laws of the organization with list of officers, their
addresses and the address of the principal office of the organization; (b) a sworn
statement of all the officers that they are not Communist Party members and (c) a
cow of its last financial report, if the applicant organization has been in existence for
one or more years.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 23(b), R.A. 875 DID NOT DELEGATE JUDICIAL POWER TO
AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY. The determination of the question whether the
requirements of paragraph (b) have been met, or whether or not the requisite
financial report or non-subversive affidavits have been filed within the period
required by the Act, is not judicial power. Indeed, all officers of the government,
including those in the executive department, are supposed to act on the basis of
facts, as they see the same. This is specially true as regards administrative
agencies given by law the power to investigate and render decisions concerning
details related to the execution of laws the enforcement of which is entrusted
thereto.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GRANTED TO LABOR UNIONS ARE
STATUTORY CREATION. The Constitution does not guarantee the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations, much less to the
personality vested in them. They are mere statutory creations to protect both labor
and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although
not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such
requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which
labor organizations, associations, and union of workers are engaged affect public
interest which should be protected.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBMISSION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT, A REASONABLE
REGULATION FOR THE BENEFITS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION. The
obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of
a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the
members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds of
membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge
amounts of money due to them or to the organization.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 23 (c) OF R.A. 875 REFERS TO PROCEEDINGS FOR
REGISTRATION. The 30-day period invoked by the petitioners is inapplicable to
the decision complained of. Said period is prescribed in paragraph (c) of Section 23,
which refers to the proceedings for the "registration" of labor organizations,

associations or unions, not to the "cancellation" of said registration, which is

governed by paragraph (d) of the same Section.
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD FOR RULE REGARDING RENDITION OF DECISION IN
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIRECTORY. We
have repeatedly held that legal provisions prescribing the period within which a
decision should be rendered are directory, not mandatory in nature in the sense
that, a judgment promulgated after the expiration of said period is not null and void,
although the officer who failed to comply with law may be dealt with
administratively, in consequence of his delay unless the intention to the contrary
is manifest. Such, however, is not the import of said paragraph (c) of Section 23 of
R.A. 875.
8.
ID.; ID.; ID.; CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE OF LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS NEED NOT BE APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF LABOR. There
is no law requiring the approval, by the Secretary of Labor, of the decision of the
Registrar decreeing the cancellation of a registration certificate. In fact, the
language of paragraph (d) of Sec. 23 suggest that, once the conditions therein
specified are present, the office concerned "shall" have no choice but to issue the
order of cancellation. Moreover, in the case at bar, there is nothing, as yet, for the
Secretary of Labor to approve or disapprove, since petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the Registrar's decision of October 23, 1963, is still pending
resolution. In fact, this circumstance shows, not only that the present action is
premature, but, also, that petitioners have failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to them. Indeed, they could ask the Secretary of Labor to
disapprove the Registrar's decision or object to its execution or enforcement, in the
absence or approval of the former, if the same were necessary, on which we need
not and do not express any opinion:
9.
ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 23 DOES NOT IMPINGE UPON THE RIGHT OF
ORGANIZATION GUARANTEED IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
Section 23 does not impinge upon the right of organization guaranteed in the
Declaration of Human Rights, or run counter to Articles 2, 4, 7 and Section 2 of
Article 8 of the ILO-Convention No. 87, which provide that "workers and
employers, .. shall have the right to establish and .. join organizations of their own
choosing, without previous authorization"; that "workers and employers
organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative
authority"; that "the acquisition of legal personality by workers' and employers'
organizations, .. shall not be made subject to conditions of such a character as to
restrict the application of the provisions" above mentioned; and that "the
guarantees provided for in" said Convention shall not be impaired by the law of the
land.
10.
ID.; ID.; ID.; R.A. NO. 875 IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. We have held that there is no incompatibility

between Republic Act No. 875 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon
the other hand, the cancellation of the SSSEA's registration certificate would not
entail a dissolution of said association or its suspension. The existence of the SSSEA
would not be affected by said cancellation, although its juridical personality and its
statutory rights and privileges as distinguished from those conferred by the
Constitution would be suspended thereby.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents, the
Secretary of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of Labor
Organizations, from enforcing an order of cancellation of the registration certificate
of the Social Security System Employees Association hereinafter referred to as
the SSSEA which is affiliated to the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
hereinafter referred to as PAFLU as well as to annul all proceedings in connection
with said cancellation and to prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 875. Petitioners, likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction
pending the final determination of this case. In their answer, respondents traversed
some allegations of fact and the legal conclusions made in the petition. No writ of
preliminary injunction pendente lite has been issued. Ro
It appears that on September 25, 1963, the Registrar of Labor Organizations
hereinafter referred to as the Registrar issued a notice of hearing, on October 17,
1963, of the matter of cancellation of the registration of the SSSEA, because of:
"1.
Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the reports on
the finances of that union duly verified by affidavits which its treasurer or treasurers
rendered to said union and its members covering the periods from September 24,
1960 to September 23, 1961 and September 24, 1961 to September 23, 1962,
inclusive, within sixty days of the 2 respective latter dates, which are the end of its
fiscal year; and
"2.
Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and nonsubversive affidavits of the officers of that union within sixty days of their election in
October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in conformity with Article IV(1) of its
constitution and by-laws."
in violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875. Counsel for the SSSEA moved to
postpone the hearing to October 21, 1963, and to submit then a memorandum, as
well as the documents specified in the notice. The motion was granted, but nobody
appeared for the SSSEA on the date mentioned. The next day, October 22, 1963,
Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of SSSEA, filed, with the Office of the
Registrar, a letter dated October 21, 1963, enclosing the following:

1.
Joint non-subversive affidavit of the officers of the SSS Employees'
Association-PAFLU;
2.
List of newly elected officers of the Association in its general elections held
on April 29, 1963; and
3.

Copy of the amended constitution and by-laws of the Association.

Holding
"1.
That the joint non-subversive affidavit and the list of officers mentioned in the
letter of Mr. Manuel Villagracia were not the documents referred to in the notice of
hearing and made the subject matter of the present proceeding; and
"2.
That there is no iota of evidence on records to show and/or warrant the
dismissal of the present proceeding."
on October 23, 1963, the Registrar rendered a decision cancelling the SSSEA's
Registration Certificate No. 1-IP-169, issued on September 30, 1960. Soon later, or
on October 28, 1963, Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a
reconsideration of said decision and prayed for time, up to November 15, within
which to submit the requisite papers and data. An opposition thereto having been
filed by one Paulino Escueta, a member of the SSSEA, upon the ground that the
latter had never submitted any financial statement to its members, said motion was
heard on November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the Registrar
issued an order declaring that the SSSEA had "failed to submit the following
requirements to wit:
"1.
Non subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza, Rodolfo
Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon Pefianco who were elected along with
others on January 30, 1962.
"2.
Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the officers who
were supposedly elected on October (1st Sunday), of its constitution and by-laws."
and granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice to comply with said requirements, as
well as meanwhile holding in abeyance the resolution of its motion for
reconsideration.
Pending such resolution, or on December 16, the PAFLU, the SSSEA, Alfredo Fajardo
"and all the officers and members" of the SSSEA commenced the present action, for
the purpose stated at the beginning of this decision, upon the ground that Section
23 of Republic Act No. 875 violates their freedom of assembly and association, and
is inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; that it unduly
delegates judicial power to an administrative agency; that said Section 23 should be
deemed repealed by ILO-Convention No. 87; that respondents have acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating, on

November 19, 1963, its decision dated October 22, 1963, beyond the 30-day period
provided in Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875; that "there is no appeal on any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"; that the
decision complained of had not been approved by the Secretary of Labor; and that
the cancellation of the SSSEA's certificate of registration would cause irreparable
injury.
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the
freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of
factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said Section 1 is not a
limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or
without said registration. 2 The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the
acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and
the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations. " The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges,
much less said personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession
and exercise of which registration is required to protect both labor and the public
against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly
accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a
valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor
organizations, associations and union of workers are engaged affect public interest,
which should be protected. 3 Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial
statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is
a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization,
considering that the same generally solicits funds or membership, as well as
oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money due to them
or to the organization. 4
For the same reasons, said Section 23 does not impinge upon the right of
organization guaranteed in the Declaration of Human Rights, or run counter to
Articles 2, 4, 7 and Section 2 of Article 8 of the ILO-Convention No. 87, which
provide that "workers and employers,. shall have the right to establish and join
organizations of their own choosing, without previous authorization"; that "workers
and employers . . . organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by
administrative authority"; that "the acquisition of legal personality by workers' and
employers' organizations, . . . shall not be made subject to conditions of such a
character as to restrict the application of the provisions" above mentioned; and that
"the guarantees provided for in" said Convention shall not be impaired by the law of
the land.
In B.S.P. v. Araos 5 , we held that there is no incompatibility between Republic Act
No. 875 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the
cancellation of the SSSEA's registration certificate would not entail a dissolution of
said association or its suspension. The existence of the SSSEA would not be affected
by said cancellation, although its juridical personality and its statutory rights and

privileges as distinguished from those conferred by the Constitution would be

suspended thereby.
To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor
organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department of Labor
the following documents:
"(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a list
of all officers of the association, their addresses and the address of the principal
office of the organization;
"(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association or
union to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they
are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and
"(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a
copy of its last annual financial report."
Moreover, paragraph (d) of said Section ordains that:
"The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be cancelled by
the Department of Labor, if the Department has reason to believe that the labor
organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements of paragraph (b)
above; or fails to file with the Department of Labor either its financial report within
the sixty days of the end of its fiscal year or the names of its new officers along with
their non-subversive affidavits as outlined in paragraph (b) above within sixty days
of their election; however, the Department of Labor shall not order the cancellation
of the registration and permit without due notice and hearing, as provided under
paragraph (c) above, and the affected labor organization shall have the same right
of appeal to the courts as previously provided." 6
The determination of the question whether the requirements of paragraph (b) have
been met, or whether or not the requisite financial report or non-subversive
affidavits have been filed within the period above stated, is not judicial power.
Indeed, all officers of the government, including those in the executive department,
are supposed to act on the basis of facts, as they see the same. This is specially
true as regards administrative agencies given by law the power to investigate and
render decisions concerning details related to the execution of laws and
enforcement of which is entrusted thereto. Hence, speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) had occasion to say:
"The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056,
not only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works
but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be noted that
the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized

obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private

person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is
public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession
(Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).
"It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily
involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the
stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to
clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and
authorities are clear that they are validly conferable upon executive officials
provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly
required by Republic Act No. 2056, Section 2." 7
It should be noted, also, that, admittedly, the SSSEA had not filed the nonsubversive affidavits of some of its officers "Messrs. Sison, Tolentino, Atienza,
Zalameda, Sabino and Pefianca" although said organization avers that these
persons "were either resigned or out on leave as directors or officers of the union,"
without specifying who had resigned and who were on leave. This averment is,
moreover, controverted by respondents herein.
Again, the 30-day invoked by the petitioners is inapplicable to the decision
complained of. Said period is prescribed in paragraph (c) 8 of Section 23, which
refers to the proceedings for the "registration" of labor organizations, associations
or unions, not to the "cancellation" of said registration, which is governed by the
above-quoted paragraph (d) of the same Section.
Independently of the foregoing, we have repeatedly held that legal provisions
prescribing the period within which a decision should be rendered are directory, not
mandatory in nature in the sense that, a judgment promulgated after the
expiration of said period is not null and void, although the officer who failed to
comply with law may be dealt with administratively, in consequence of his delay 9
unless the intention to the contrary is manifest. Such, however, is not the import
of said paragraph (c). In the language of Black:
"When a statute specifies the time at or within which an act is to be done by a
public officer or body, it is generally held to be directory only as to the time, and not
mandatory, unless time is of the essence of the thing to be done, or the language of
the statute contains negative words, or shows that the designation of the time was
intended as a limitation of power, authority or right." 10
Then, again, there is no law requiring the approval, by the Secretary of Labor, of the
decision of the Registrar decreeing the cancellation of a registration certificate. In
fact, the language of paragraph (d) of Section 23 suggests that, once the conditions
therein specified are present, the office concerned "shall" have no choice but to
issue the order of cancellation. Moreover, in the case at bar, there is nothing, as yet,

for the Secretary of Labor to approve or disapprove, since petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the Registrar's decision of October 23, 1963, is still pending
resolution. In fact, this circumstance shows, not only that the present action is
premature 11 , but, also, that petitioners have failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to them. 12 Indeed, they could ask the Secretary of Labor to
disapprove the Registrar's decision or object to its execution or enforcement, in the
absence of approval of the former, if the same were necessary, on which we need
not and do not express any opinion. pred
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition herein should be, as it is hereby
dismissed, and the writs prayed for denied, with costs against the petitioners. It is
so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando,
Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ ., concur.

[G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
Jose P. Laurel, Claudio Teehankee, Enrique Fernando, Vicente A. Rafael, Manuel O.
Chan and Juan T. David for appellant A. V. Hernandez.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1.
CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ELEMENTS OF: PENALTY. According to Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code, one of the means by which rebellion may be
committed is by "engaging in war against the forces of the government" and
"committing serious violence" in the prosecution of said war". These expressions
imply everything that war connotes, namely: resort to arms, requisition of property
and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damages to
property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness
that war leaves in its wake. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and
"committing serious violence", said act of resorting to arms, with the resulting
impairment or destruction of life and property when, as alleged in the
information, performed "as a necessary means to commit rebellion, in connection
therewith and in furtherance thereof" and "so as to facilitate the accomplishment of
the . . . purpose" of the rebellion constitutes neither two or more offenses, nor a

complex crime, but one crime that of rebellion plain and simply, punishable with
one single penalty, namely, that prescribed in said Article 135.
2.
ID.; ID.; COMMON CRIMES PERPETRATED IN FURTHERANCE OF A POLITICAL
OFFENSE, NOT SUBJECT TO EXTRADITION. National as well as international, laws
and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
"common" offenses and assumes the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, could not be punished, under
Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
3.
ID.; ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; ARTICLE 48 APPLIES ONLY WHEN TWO CRIMES ARE
COMMITTED. The language of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes
the commission of two or more crimes, and hence, does not apply when the culprit
is guilty of only one crime.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRO REO" PRINCIPLES; LESS CRIMINAL PERVERSITY IN COMPLEX
CRIMES. If one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to
inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put
together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case,
imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code could have
had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent
spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a
single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes
through separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the
more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the
separate penalties for each offense.
5.
ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; WHEN ACCUSED ENTITLED TO BAIL.
Individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, to
be denied mere general principles and abstract considerations of public policy.
Considering that the information filed against defendant is simply rebellion, the
penalty for which cannot exceed twelve years of prision mayor and a fine of
P20,000; that defendant was sentenced by the lower court, not to the extreme
penalty, but to life imprisonment; and that the decision appealed from and the
opposition to the petition for bail do not reveal satisfactorily any concrete, positive
act of the defendant showing, sufficiently, that his provisional release, during the
pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of the State, said defendant
may be allowed bail.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, J p:

This refers to the petition for bail filed by defendant appellant Amado Hernandez on
June 26, 1954, and renewed on December 22, 1955. A similar petition, filed on
December 28, 1953, had been denied by a resolution of this court dated February 2,
1954. Although not stated in said resolution, the same was due mainly to these
circumstances: The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has
been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for
which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower
court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment. Upon the other hand, the defense
contends, among other things, that rebellion can not be complexed with murder,
arson, or robbery. Inasmuch as the issue thus raised had not been previously settled
squarely, and this court was then unable, as yet, to reach a definite conclusion
thereon, it was deemed best not to disturb, for the time being, the course of action
taken by the lower court, which denied bail to the movant. After mature
deliberation, our considered opinion on said issue is as follows:
The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this case read:
"The undersigned accuses (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias
Amado alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling
alias Cap alias G. Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes
alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A. B. S. alias A. B., (5)
Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio
alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9)
Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11)
Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue, of the
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies committed as follows:
"That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and
continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
the place which they had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities
in the different parts of the Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating,
and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants
charged in criminal cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, and 14344 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and their coconspirators, being then officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with
the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) formerly known as the Committee on
Labor Organization (CLO), an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), with central offices in Manila and
chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other 'mass organizations' in
different places in the Philippines, and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality,
fully cooperates in, and synchronizes its activities with the rebellious activities of
the 'Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby
assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the armed

rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines, as the herein defendants and their
co-conspirators have in fact synchronized the activities of the CLO with the
rebellious activities of the HMB and other agencies, organs and instrumentalities of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and have otherwise master- minded or
promoted the cooperative efforts between the CLO and HMB and other agencies,
organs, and instrumentalities of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion against
the Republic of the Philippines, and being then also high ranking officers and/or
members of, or otherwise affiliated with, the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned to be
further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which party
the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB), otherwise or formerly known as the
'Hukbalahaps' (Huks), is the armed force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the
'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB) or the 'Hukbalahaps' (Huks) to rise publicly
and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in
such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the
Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the
said 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' or 'Hukbalahaps' have risen publicly and
taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties
and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments as well
as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in
connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed
acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private
and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to
facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows, to wit:
"Then follows a description of the murders, arsons and robberies allegedly
perpetrated by the accused "as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof."
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
"When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same presupposes the
commission of two (2) or more crimes, and, hence, does not apply when the culprit
is guilty of only one crime.
Article 134 of said code reads:
"The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking
arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to
said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part

thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives."
Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code "any person, merely participating or
executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period."
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for "any
person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while
holding any public office or employment, takes part therein":
1.

"engaging in war against the forces of the government",

2.

"destroying property", or

3.

"committing serious violence",

4.

"exacting contributions or"

5.
"diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been
appropriated".
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute
only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000. Thus for instance, a public officer
who assists the rebels by turning over to them, for use in financing the uprising, the
public funds entrusted to his custody, could neither be prosecuted for malversation
of such funds, apart from rebellion, nor accused and convicted of the complex crime
of rebellion with malversation of public funds. The reason is that such malversation
is inherent in the crime of rebellion committed by him. In fact, he would not be
guilty of rebellion had he not so misappropriated said funds. In the imposition, upon
said public officer, of the penalty for rebellion it would even be improper to consider
the aggravating circumstance of advantage taken by the offender of his public
position, this being an essential element of the crime he had perpetrated. Now,
then, if the office held by said offender and the nature of the funds malversed by
him cannot aggravate the penalty for his offense, it is clear that neither may it
worsen the very crime committed by the culprit by giving rise, either to an
independent crime, or to a complex crime. Needless to say, a mere participant in
the rebellion, who is not a public officer, should not be placed at a more
disadvantageous position than the promoters, maintainers or leaders of the
movement, or the public officers who join the same, insofar as the application of
Article 48 is concerned.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article
135, is by "engaging in war against the forces of the government" and "committing
serious violence" in the prosecution of said "war". These expressions imply

everything that war connotes, namely; resort to arms, requisition of property and
services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to
property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness
that war leaves in its wake except that, very often, it is worse than war in the
international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a
bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between
strangers. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and "committing serious
violence", said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life
and property, constitutes not two or more offense, but only one crime that of
rebellion plain and simple. Thus, for instance, it has been held that "the crime of
treason may be committed 'by executing either a single or similar intentional overt
acts, different or similar but distinct, and for that reason, it may be considered one
single continuous offense. (Guinto vs. Veluz, 77 Phil., 801, 44 Off. Gaz., 909.)"
(People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we repeat, one single
crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of
Article 48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence,
this court has never in the past, convicted any person of the "complex crime of
rebellion with murder". What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of
rebellion published in the Philippine Reports, the defendants were convicted of
simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons, sometimes peace officers
(U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 472; U. S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil., 509, U. S. vs. Ayala, 6
Phil., 151; League vs. People, 73 Phil., 155).
Following a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent cases of treason,
resulting from collaboration with the Japanese during the war in the Pacific. In fact,
said cases went further than the aforementioned cases of rebellion, in that the
theory of the prosecution to the effect that the accused in said treason cases were
guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder and other crimes was expressly
and repeatedly rejected therein. Thus, commenting on the decision of the People's
Court finding the accused in People vs. Prieto (80 Phil., 138, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329)
"guilty of . . . the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries" and
sentencing him to death, and on the contention of the Solicitor General that Prieto
had committed the "complex crime of treason with homicide", this court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Tuason, said:
"The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the
infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason.
Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution defining
treason, after which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence to
the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make
treason.

"In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by
some kind of action. Its very nature partakes, of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute
or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it
becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. . . . Where murder or
physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason . . . they can not be regarded
separately under their general denomination." (Italics supplied.)
Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple treason and sentenced him to life
imprisonment.
In People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159, we used the
following language:
"The lower court found appellant guilty not only of treason, but of murder, for the
killing of Tomas Abella, and, following the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code sentenced him to death, the maximum penalty provided by article 114.
"The lower court erred in finding appellant guilty of the murder of Tomas Abella. The
arrest and killing of Tomas Abella for being a guerilla, is alleged in count 3 of the
information, as one of the elements of the crime of treason for which appellant is
prosecuted. Such element constitute a part of the legal basis upon which appellant
stands convicted of the crime of treason. The killing of Tomas Abella cannot be
considered as legal ground for convicting appellant of any crime other than treason.
The essential elements of a given crime cannot be disintegrated in different parts,
each one stand as a separate ground to convict the accused of a different crime or
criminal offense. The elements constituting a given crime are integral and
inseparable parts of a whole. In the contemplation of the law, they cannot be used
for double or multiple purposes. They can only be used for the sole purpose of
showing the commission of the crime of which they form part. The factual
complexity of the crime of treason does not endow it with the functional ability of
worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction. Otherwise, the accused will have to
face as many prosecutions and convictions as there are elements in the crime of
treason, in open violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy."
(Italics supplied.)

The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Alibotod 82 Phil., 164, 46 Off. Gaz.,
1005, despite the direct participation of the defendant therein in the maltreatment
and killing of several persons.
In People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off. Gaz., 2517, we held:
"The People's Court, however, erred in classifying the crime as treason with murder.
The killing of Amado Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an element of treason,
and it therefore becomes identified with the latter crime, and cannot be the subject
of a separate punishment or used in combination with treason to increase the
penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides." (People vs. Prieto, L-399,
45 Off. Gaz. 3329. See, also People vs. Labra, L-886, 46 Off. Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1],
159.)" (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83 Phil., 1, 46 Off. Gaz.,
4207. We stated therein:
"The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of
treason with murders, with the result that the penalty provided for the most serious
offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the
standpoint of modifying circumstances, the court believed that the same result
obtained. It opined that the killings were murders qualified by treachery and
aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation, superior strength,
cruelty, and an armed band.
"We think this is error. The tortures and murders set forth in the information are
merged in and formed part of the treason. They were in this case the overt acts
which, besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime." (Italics
supplied.)
The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 Phil., 9, 46 Off. Gaz., 4213, had been
convicted by the People's Court of "the crime of treason complexed with the crime
of murder" and sentenced to the extreme penalty. In our decision, penned by Mr.
Justice Montemayor, we expressed ourselves as follows:
The appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His adherence to the Japanese
forces of occupation and giving them aid and comfort by acting as their spy,
undercover man, investigator, and even killer when necessary to cow and compel
the inhabitants to surrender their firearms and disclose information about the
guerrillas has been fully established. His manner of investigation and maltreatment
of some of his victims like Tereso Sanchez and Patricio Suico, was so cruel, brutal
and inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that a Filipino can commit and practice
such atrocities especially on his own countrymen. But, evidently, war, confusion and
opportunism can and do produce characters and monster unknown during peace
and normal times.

"The People's Court found the appellant guilty of treason complexed with murder.
The Solicitor General, however, maintains that the offense committed is simple
treason, citing the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of People vs. Prieto,
(L-399, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) but accompanied by the aggravating circumstance under
Article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, and not compensated by any
mitigating circumstance, and he recommends the imposition of the penalty of
death. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the basis of the ruling of this
court in the case of People vs. Prieto, supra, the appellant may be convicted only a
treason, and that the killing and infliction of physical injuries committed by him may
not be separated from the crime of treason but should be regarded as acts
performed in the commission of treason, although, as stated in said case, the
brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as
an aggravating circumstance." (Italics supplied.)
and reduced the penalty from death to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.
Identical were the pertinent features of the case of People vs. Adlawan, 83 Phil.,
194, 46 Off. Gaz., 4299, in which, through Mr. Justice Reyes (A), we declared:
". . . we find merit in the contention that appellant should have not been convicted
of the so called 'Complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape.' The
killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as
specific offenses but as mere elements of the crime of treason for which the
accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the general
charged they can not be used in combination with the treason to increase the
penalty under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto, L-399,
January 29, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of
treason only." (Italics supplied.)
In People vs. Suralta, 85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz., 4595, the language used was:
". . . But the People's Court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the complex
crime of treason with murder, because murder was an ingredient of the crime of
treason, as we have heretofore held in several cases. (Italics supplied.)
This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 Phil., 1, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p.
252:
"The Solicitor General recommends that the appellant be sentenced for the complex
crime of treason with murder. We have already ruled, however, that where, as in the
present case, the killing is charged as an element of treason, it 'becomes identified
with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides." (Italics supplied.)

The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of Crisologo vs. People and
Villalobos (94 Phil., 477), decided on February 26, 1954. The facts and the rule
therein laid down are set forth in our unanimous decision in said case, from which
we quote:
"The petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world war
and at the time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant colonel in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under Article
114 of the Revised Penal Code in an information filed in the People's Court. But
before the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on
January 13, 1947, indicted for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise
known as the Articles of War, before a military court created by authority of the
Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of which, the first
and third, were those of treason consisting in giving information and aid to the
enemy leaving to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons with
anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to surrender and
cooperate with the enemy, while the second was that of having certain civilians
filled in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third charges but guilty of the
second, he was on May, 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to life
imprisonment.
"With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the People's
Court, the criminal case in that court against the petitioner was, pursuant to the
provisions of said Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and
there the charges of treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the
amended information, petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging the
jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of his previous
sentence in the military court. But the court denied the motion and, after petitioner
had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from
proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.
"It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court different from
that charged in the civil court and that even granting that the offense was identical
the military court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the
People's Court had previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that
the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first point, it is urged
that the amended information filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
contains overt acts distinct from those charged in the military court. But we note
that while certain overt acts specified in the amended information in the
Zamboanga court were not specified in the indictment in the court martial, they all
are embraced in the general charge of treason, which is a continuous offense and
one who commits it is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there are overt
acts, because all overt act 'he has done or might have done for that purpose
constitute but a single offense.' (Guinto vs. Veluz, 44. Off. Gaz., 909; People vs.

Pacheco, L-4750, promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense
charged in the amended information in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is
treason, the fact that the said information contains an enumeration of additional
ovart acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment before the military court is
immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in themselves constitute a new
and distinct offense from that of treason, and this court has repeatedly held that a
person cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty of overt
acts specified in the information for treason even if those overt acts, considered
separately, are punishable by law, for the simple reason that those overt acts are
not separate offenses distinct from that of treason but constitute ingredients
thereof." (Italics supplied.)
Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on the question
whether said crime may be complexed with murder, when the former was
committed through the latter, and it is so alleged in the information, had positively
and clearly crystalized itself in the negative as early as January 29, 1948.
We have not overlooked the decision in People vs. Labra (L-1240, decided on May
12, 1949), the dispositive part of which partly reads:
"Wherefore, the verdict of guilty must be affirmed. Articles 48, 114 and 248 of the
Revised Penal Code are applicable to the offense of treason with murder. However
for lack of sufficient votes to impose the extreme penalty, the appellant will be
sentenced to life imprisonment. . . .."
Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code and "the offense
of treason with murder," it should be noted that we affirmed therein the action of
the People's Court, which, according to the opening statement of our decision,
convicted Labra of "treason aggravated with murder". Besides, the applicability of
said articles was not discussed in said decision. It is obvious, from a mere perusal
thereof, that this court had no intention of passing upon such question. Otherwise, it
would have explained why it did not follow the rule laid down in the previous cases
of Prieto, Labra (August 10, 1948), Alibotod, Vilo, Roble, Delgado and Adlawan
(supra), in which the issue was explicitly examined and decided in the negative. Our
continued adherence to this view in the subsequent cases of Suralta, Navea,
Pacheco and Crisologo, without even a passing reference to the second Labra case,
shows that we did not consider the same as reflecting the opinion of the court on
said question. At any rate, insofar as it suggests otherwise, the position taken in the
second Labra case must be deemed reversed by our decisions in said cases of
Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo.
It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and different from each other. This
does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part
and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal

Code. Besides there is more reason to apply said rule in the crime of rebellion than
in that of treason, for the law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code)
specifically mentions the act of engaging in war and committing serious violence
among its essential elements thus clearly indicating that everything done in the
prosecution of said war, as a means necessary therefor, is embraced therein
unlike the provision on treason (Article 114, Revised Penal Code) which is less
explicit thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority or an agent of a
person in authority may be committed with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9
Phil., 162), homicide (People vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and murder (U. S. vs.
Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171; U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), and rape may be
perpetrated with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690), then rebellion
may, similarly, be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The conclusion does
not follow, for engaging in war, serious violence, physical injuries and destruction of
life and property are inherent in rebellion, but not in assault upon persons in
authority or agents of persons in authority or in rape. The word "rebellion" evokes,
not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but, also, civil war, on a
bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it, whereas, neither rape nor
assault upon persons in authority connotes necessarily, or even generally, either
physical injuries, or murder. 1
In support of the theory that a rebel who kills in furtherance of the insurrection is
guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, our attention has been called
to Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, reading:
"Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de
ellas, seran castigados respectivamente segun las disposiciones de este Codigo.
"Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores seran penados como tales los jefes
principales de la rebelion o sedicion."
and to the following observations of Cuello Calon (Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 110), in
relation thereto:
"Se establece aqui que el en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, comete
otros delitos (v.g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera responsable de estos ademas de los
delitos de rebelion o sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los
accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion de los delitos independientes de estas, y como
las leyes no contienen en este punto precepto alguno aplicable, su solucion ha
quedado encomendada a los tribunales. La jurisprudencia que estos han sentado
considera como accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion cuya criminalidad queda
embedida en la de estos delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente los
hechos de escasa gravedad (v.g., atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos graves);
por el contrario, las infracciones graves, como el asesinato o las lesiones graves, se
consideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o de la sedicion."

It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the
Philippines has not been included in our Revised Penal Code. If the applicability of
Article 48 to rebellion was determined by the existence of said Article 244, then the
elimination of the latter would be indicative of the contrary.
Besides, the crime of rebellion, referred to by Cuello Calon, was that punished in the
Spanish Penal Code, Article 243 of which provides:
"Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y en abierta hostilidad contra
el Gobierno para cualquiera de los objetos siguientes:
1.
"Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o privarles de su
libertad personal u obligarles a ejecutar un acto contrario a su voluntad.
2.
"Impedir la celebracion dc las elecciones para Diputados a Cortes o
Senadores en todo el Reino, o la reunion legitima de las mismas.
3.
"Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los Cuerpos
Colegisladores o arrancarles alguna resolucion.
4.

"Ejecutar cualquiera de los delitos previstos en el articulo 165.

5.
"Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de tropa de tierra o de mar, o
cualquiera otra clase de fuerza armada, de la obediencia del Supremo Gobierno.
6.
"Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de sus
facultades constitucionales, o impedirles o coartarles su libre ejercicio. (Articulo
167, Codigo Penal de 1850. Veanse las demas concordancias del articulo 181.)"
Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that rebellion includes the
act of engaging in war against the forces of the Government and of using serious
violence for the purposes stated in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. In view of
this express statutory inclusion of the acts of war and serious violence among the
ingredients of rebellion in the Philippines, it is clear that the distinction made by
Cuello Calon between grave and less grave offenses committed in the course of an
insurrection cannot be accepted in this jurisdiction. Again, if both classes of offenses
are part and parcel of a rebellion, or means necessary therefor, neither law nor logic
justifies the exclusion of the one and the inclusion of the other. In fact, Cuello Calon
admits that "the difficulty lies in separating the accidents of rebellion or sedition
from the offenses independent therefrom." Ergo, offenses that are not independent
therefrom, but constituting an integral part thereof committed, precisely, to carry
out the uprising to its successful conclusion are beyond the purview of Article
244. Indeed, the above quoted statement of Cuello Calon to the effect that grave
felonies committed in the course of an insurrection are independent therefrom
was based upon a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 5, 1872,
which we find reported in the Codigo Penal de Filipinas, by Jose Perez Rubio, as
follows:

"El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de 5 de Febrero de 1872, tiene

declarado: Que segun los articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y 259 del
reformado (1870), los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion o
con motivo de ellas se castigan respectivamente segun las disposiciones de los
mismos Codigos; y con arreglo al decreto de amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876 estan
solo comprendidos en aquella gracia las personas sentenciadas, procesadas o
sujatas a responsabilidad por delitos politicos de cualquiera especie -cometidos
desde el 29 de Septiembre de 1868; Que el asesinato del Gobernador Civil de
Burgos no fue resultado de movimiento alguno politico, sino de un mero tumulto
que imprimio el fanatismo, y cuya unica aparente tendencia era impedir que aquel
funcionario inventariase ciertos objetos artisticos que se decian existentes en la
Catedral: Que esto lo demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte proferidas por los
asesinos contra la persona del Gobernador; sin que al ejecutar en el mismo recinto
del templo los horrorosos hechos que aparecen en la causa, alzasen bandera
politica alguna ni dieran otro grito que el, en aquel momento sacrilego e impio, de
'Viva la religion:' Que la apreciar la Sala sentenciadora los hechos referentes al
Gobernador Civil de delito de asesinato, penarlo con arreglo al Codigo y declarar
inaplicable el citado Decreto de Amnistia, no ha cometido el error de derecho
sealado en los casos 1. 3. del articulo 4. de la ley sobre establecimiento de la
casacion criminal, ni infringido los articulos 250 y 259 del Codigo Penal de 1870."
(Page 239; Italics supplied.) (See, also, "El Codigo Penal", by Hidalgo Garcia, Vol. I,
p. 623.)'
It is apparent that said case is not in point. There was no issue therein on whether
murder may be complexed with rebellion or sedition. The question for determination
was whether the killers of the victim were guilty of the common crime of murder, or
should have been convicted only of rebellion or sedition. The court adopted the first
alternative, not because of the gravity of the acts performed by the accused, but
because they had no political motivation. Moreover, the footnote to said quotation
from Cuello Calon reads:
"Los atentados desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad u otros delitos contra el orden
publico cometidos en la sedicion o con motivo de ella, no son delitos distintos de la
sedicion, 3 octubre 1903, 19 noviembre 1906; la resistencia o acometimiento a la
fuerza publica por los sediciosos es accidente de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.
"El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un tumulto debe penarse
como un delito comun de asesinato, 5 febrero 1872. Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia,
tratandose de ciertos delitos, es vacilante; asi, v. g., el acometimiento al teniente de
alcalde se ha declarado en un fallo independiente de la perturbacion tumultuaria
promovida para impedir al alcalde el cumplimiento de sus providencias, 16 marzo
1885, mientras que un hecho analogo se ha considerado en otra sentenda ya citada
como accidente de la rebelion, 3 Octubre 1903. El acometimiento de los sediciosos
a la fuerza publica es accidente de la sedicion y no uno de los delitos particulares a
que se refiere este articulo, 23 de mayo 1890. Entre estos delitos a que alude el

precepto se hallan las lesiones que puedan causar los sediciosos, 19 noviembre
1906." (Footnote 21, II Cuelo Calon, Derecho Penal, pp. 110-111.) (Italics supplied.)
Thus in a decision, dated May 2, 1934, the Supreme Court of Spain held:
"Considerando que la nota deferencial entre los delitos de rebelion y sedicion, de
una parte, y el de atentado, esta constituida por la circunstancia de alzamiento
publico que caracteriza a los primeros, los cuales, por su indole generica, absorben
a los de atentado y demas infracciones que durante su comision y con su motivo se
cometan, y afirmandose como hecho en la sentencia recurrida que el procesado
Mariano Esteban Martinez realizo, en union de otros, el atendado que se le imputa
sin alzarse publicamente, cae por su base el recurso fundado en supuesto distinto."
(Jurisprudencia Criminal, Tomo 130, p. 551.) (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect are, likewise, the following:
"La provocacion y el ataque a la Guardia Civil por paisanos alzadoz
tumultuariamente para impedir al Delegado de un Gobernador civil el cumplimiento
de sus providencias, no pueden estimarse constitutivos de un delito distinto del de
sedicion, ni ser, por tanto, perseguidos y penados separadamente.
"La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la fuerza publica constituye,
en su caso, una circunstancia o accidente de la sedicion y no es delito de los que el
Codigo Penal en este articulo (formerly Article 244, now Article 227) supone que
pueden cometerse en ella o con su motivo, los cuales denomina delitos particulares,
y manda que se penen conforme a las disposiciones del propio Codigo. (S. 23-5-890;
G. 23-6-890; t. 44; pagina 671)" (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, p. 2411.)
(Italics supplied.)
"La Audiencia condeno como autores de atentado a dos de los amotinados que
agredieron al alcalde, e interpuesto recurso de casacion contra la sentencia, el
Tribunal Supremo la casa y anula, teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 250
(numero 3.) del Codigo Penal;
'Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por el grupo constituye una verdadera
sedicion, sin que sea licito el dividir este hecho y calificarlo de atentado respecto a
las personas que agredieron a dicho alcalde, porque el acometimiento fue un
accidente de la sedicion, de la cual eran todos responsables, ya se efectuara por los
agrupados en conjunto o por uno solo, por ser comun el objeto que se proponian y
no individual; y al calificar y penar este hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de
atentado . . ., ha incurrido en error de derecho e infringido los articulos 250 y
siguientes del Codigo Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el 263, numero 2., en
relacion con el 264, numeros 1. y 3., por su aplicacion . . ." (Sent. 3 octubre 1903.
Gac. 12 Diciembre) (Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, Tomo xxviii p. 250).

These cases are in accord with the text of said Article 244, which refers, not to all
offenses committed in the course of a rebellion or on the occasion thereof, but only
to "delitos particulares" or common crimes. Now, what are "delitos particulares" as
the phrase is used in said article 244? We quote from Viada:
"Las disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede ser mas justa; con
arreglo a ella, los delitos particulares o comunes cometidos en una rebelion er
sedicion no deberan reputarse como accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como
delitos especiales, a dicha rebelion y sedicion ajenos, los que deberan ser
respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este Codigo se las sealan. Pero,
que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes, y cuales como constitutivos de la
propia rebelion o sedicion? En cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece esta cuestion
dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no este comprendido en uno y otro de los
objetos especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243 sera extrao a la
rebelion, y si se hallare definido en algun otro articulo del Codigo, con arreglo a este
debera ser castigado como delito particular. Pero tratandose de la sedicion,
comprendiendose como objetos de la misma, en los numeros 3., 4. y 5. del
articulo 250, hechos que constituyen otros tantos ataques a las personas o a la
propiedad, cuales se consideran como accidentes inherentes a la propria sedicion, y
cuales deberan reputarse como delitos particulares o comunes? En cuanto a los
casos de los numeros 4. y 5., estimanos que el objeto politico y social que se
requiera para la realizacion de los actos en aquellos comprendidos es el que debe
servirnos de norma y guia para distinguir lo inherente a la sedicion de lo que es
ajeno o extrao a ella. Cuando no exista ese objeto politico y social, el acto de odio
o venganza ejercido contra los particulares o cualquiera clase del Estado, y el
atentado contra las propiedades de los ciudadanos o corporaciones mentados en el
numero 5. del articulo 250, no seran constitutivos del delito de sedicion, sino que
deberan ser apreciados y castigados como delitos comunes, segun las disposiciones
respectivas de este Codigo y por lo que toca a los actos de odio o venganza
ejercidos en la persona o bienes de alguna Autoridad o sus agentes, estimamos que
deberan reputarse como delitos comunes todos aquellos hechos innecesarios 2 para
la consecucion del fin particular que se propusieran los sediciosos y como
esenciales, constitutivos de la propia sedicion todos aquellos actos de odio o
venganza que sean medio racionalmente necesario para el logro del objeto especial
a que se encaminaran los esfuerzos de los sublevados. Asi, en el caso de la
Cuestion 1 expuesta en el comentario del articulo 258, es evidente que el fin que se
propusieron los sediciosos fue no pagar el impuesto a cuya cobranza iba a proceder
el comisionado; pero para lograr este objeto, como lo lograron, fue preciso hacer
salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este efecto, lo amenazaron, lo persiguieron y
llegaron hasta lesionarle. Esas amenazas y lesiones no pudieron apreciarse, ni las
aprecio tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como delito comun, sino como accidente
inherente a la misma sedicion, por cuanto fueron un medio racionalmente necesario
para la consecucion del fin determinado que se propusieron los culpables.

"Pero cuando tal necesidad desaparece, cuando se hiere por herir, cuando se mata
por matar, el hecho ya, no puede ser considerado como un accidente propio de la
sedicion, sino como un delito especial, al que debe aplicarse la pena al mismo
correspondiente." (III Viada, pp. 311-312.) (Italics supplied.)
Cuello Calon is even more illuminating. He says:
"La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos como infracciones de
un caracter especial distintas de los denominados delitos comunes. De esta
apreciacion ha nacido la division de los delitos, desde el punto de vista de su
naturaleza intrinseca, en delitos politicos y delitos comunes o de derecho comun.
"Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que lesionan bienes juridicos individuales (v.
gr., los delitos contra la vida, contra la honestidad, contra la propiedad, etc.)
"La nocion del delito politico no parece tan clara. Desde luego revisten este caracter
los que atentan contra el orden politico del Estado, contra su orden externo
(independencia de la nacion, integridad del territorio, etc.), o contra el interno
(delitos contra el Jefe del Estado, contra la forma de Gobierno, etc.). Pero tambien
pueden ser considerados como politicos todos los delitos, cualesquiera que sean
incluso los de derecho comun, cuando fueron cometidos por moviles politicos.
Deben, por tanto, estimarse como infracciones de esta clase, no solo las que
objetivamente tengan tal caracter por el interes politico que lesionan, sino tambien
las que, apreciadas subjetivamente, manifiestan una motivacion de caracter
politico.
"Asi podria formulares esta definicion: es delito politico el cometido contra el orden
politico del Estado, asi como todo delito de cualquiera otra clase determinado por
moviles politicos." (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I, pp. 247-249.)
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well
as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the
Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof," then said
offense becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and
parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the
latter.
Conformably with the foregoing, the case of murder against the defendant in U. S.
vs. Lardizabal (1 Phil., 729) an insurgent who killed a prisoner of war because he
was too weak to march with the retreating rebel forces, and could not be left behind
without endangering the safety of the latter was dismissed upon the ground that
the execution of said prisoner of war formed part of, and was included in, the crime
of sedition, which, in turn, was covered by an amnesty, to the benefits of which said
defendant was entitled.

True, in U. S. vs. Alfont (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an unorganized group of

insurgents was, pursuant to Article 244 of our old Penal Code, convicted of homicide
for having shot and killed a woman who was driving a vehicle. But the complex
crime of rebellion with homicide was not considered in that case. Apart from this,
the accused failed to established the relation between her death and the
insurrection. What is more, it was neither proved nor alleged that he had been
prompted by political reasons. In other words, his offense was independent from the
rebellion. The latter was merely the occasion for the commission of the former.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned decisions of this court and the Supreme
Court of Spain in cases of treason, rebellion and sedition, are in line with the trend
in other countries, as well as in the field of international relations. Referring to the
question as to what offenses are political in nature, it was said in In re Ezeta (62
Fed. Rep., 972):
"What constitutes an offense of a political character has not yet been determined by
judicial authority. Sir James Stephens, in his work, History of the Criminal Law of
England (Volume 2, p. 71), thinks that it should be 'interpreted to mean that fugitive
criminals are not to be surrendered for extradition crimes if those crimes were
incidental to and formed a part of political disturbances.' Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the
house of commons, in 1866, while discussing an amendment to the act of
'extradition, on which the treaty between England and France was founded, gave
this definition: Any offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war,
insurrection, or political commotion.' Hansard's Debates Vol. 184, p. 2115. In the
Castioni Case, supra, decided in 1891, the question was discussed by the most
eminent counsel at the English bar, and considered by distinguished judges, without
a definition being framed that would draw a fixed and certain line between a
municipal or common crime and one of political character. 'I do not think,' said
Denman, J., 'it is necessary or desirable that we should attempt to put into
language, in the shape of an exhaustive definition, exactly the whole state of things,
or every state of things, which might bring a particular case within the description
of an offense of a political character.' In that case, Castioni was charged with the
murder of one Rossi, by shooting him with a revolver, in the town of Bellinzona, in
the canton of Ticino, in Switzerland. The deceased, Rossi, was a member of the
state council of the canton of Ticino. Castioni was a citizen of the same canton. For
some time previous to the murder, much dissatisfaction had been felt and
expressed by a large number of inhabitants of Ticino at the mode in which the
political party then in power were conducting the government of the canton. A
request was presented to the government for a revision of the constitution of the
canton and, the government having declined to take a popular vote on that
question, a number of the citizens of Bellinzona, among whom was Castioni, seized
the arsenal of the town, from which they took rifles and ammunition, disarmed the
gendarmes, arrested and bound or handcuffed several persons connected with the
government, and forced them to march in front of the armed crowd to the municipal

palace. Admission to the palace was demanded in the name of the people, and was
refused by Rossi and another member of the government, who were in the palace.
The crowd then broke open the outer gate of the palace, and rushed in, pushing
before them the government officials whom they had arrested and bound. Castioni,
who was armed with a revolver, was among the first to enter. A second door, which
was locked, was broken open, and at this time, or immediately after, Rossi, who was
in the passage, was shot through the body with a revolver, and died, very soon
afterwards. Some other shots were fired, but no one else was injured. Castioni fled
to England. His extradition was requested by the federal council of Switzerland. He
was arrested and taken before a police magistrate, as provided by the statute, who
held him for extradition. Application was made by the accused to the high court of
justice of England for a writ of habeas corpus. He was represented by Sir Charles
Russell, now lord chief justice. The attorney general, Sir Richard Webster, appeared
for the crown, and the solicitor general, Sir Edward Clarke, and Robert Woodfal, for
the federal council of Switzerland. This array of distinguished counsel, and the high
character of the court, commends the case as one of the highest authority. It
appeared from an admission by one of the parties engaged in the disturbances 'that
the death of Rossi was a misfortune, and not necessary for the rising.' The opinions
of the judges as to the political character of the crime charged against Castioni,
upon the facts stated, is exceedingly interesting, but I need only refer to the
following passages. Judge Denman says:
"The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting
as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political character
with a political object, and as part of the political movement and rising in which he
was taking part.'
"Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the character of political offenses, said:
'I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there are many acts of a political
character done without reason, done against all reason; but at the same time one
cannot look too hardly, and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in their
political excitement. We know that in heat, and in heated blood, men often do
things which are against and contrary to reason; but none the less an act of this
description may be done for the purpose of furthering and in furtherance of a
political rising, even though it is an act which may be deplored and lamented, as
even cruel and against all reason, by those who can calmly reflect upon it after the
battle is over.'
"Sir James Stephens, whose definition as an author has already been cited, was one
of the judges, and joined in the views taken as to the political character of the crime
charged against Castioni. The prisoner was discharged. Applying, by analogy, the
action of the English court in that case to the four cases now before me, under
consideration, the conclusion follows that the crimes charged here, associated as
they are with the actual conflict of armed forces, are of a political character.

"The draft of a treaty on International Penal Law, adopted by the congress of

Montevideo in 1888, and recommended by the International American Conference
to the governments of the Latin-American nations in 1890, contains the following
provisions (Article 23):
'Political offenses, offenses subversive of the internal and external safety of a state
or common offenses connected with these, shall not warrant extradition. The
determination of the character of the offense is incumbent upon the nations upon
which the demand for extradition is made; and its decision shall be made under and
according to the provisions of the law which shall prove to be most favorable to the
accused:'
"I am not aware that any part of this Code has been made the basis of treaty
stipulations between any of the American nations, but the article cited may be at
least accepted as expressing the wisdom of leading jurists and diplomats. The
article is important with respect to two of its features: (1) provides that a fugitive
shall not be extradited for an offense connected with a political offense, or with an
offense subversive of the internal or external safety of the state; and (2) the
decision as to the character of the offense shall be made under and according to the
provisions of the law which shall prove most favorable to the accused. The first
provision is sanctioned by Calvo, who, speaking of the exemption from extradition of
persons charged with political offenses, says:
'The exemption even extends to acts connected with political crimes or offenses,
and it is enough, as says Mr. Fuastin Helio; that a common crime be connected with
a political act, that it be the outcome of or be in the outcome of or be in the
execution of such, to be covered by the privilege which protects the latter' Calvo,
Droit Int. (3me ed.) p. 413, section 1262.
"The second provision of the article is founded on the broad principles of humanity
found everywhere in the criminal law, distinguishing its administration with respect
to even the worst features of our civilization from the cruelties of barbarism. When
this article was under discussion in the international American conference in
Washington, Mr. Silva, of Colombia, submitted some observations upon the difficulty
of drawing a line between an offense of a political character and a common crime,
and incidentally referred to the crime of robbery, in terms worthy of some
consideration here. He said:
'In the revolutions, as we conduct them in our countries, the common offenses are
necessarily mixed up with the political in many cases. A colleague General Caamao
(of Ecuador) knows how we carry on wars. A revolutionist needs horses for moving,
beef to feed his troops, etc.; and since he does not go into the public markets to
purchase these horses and that beef, nor the arms and saddles to mount and equip
his forces, he takes them from the first pasture or shop he find at hand. This is
called robbery everywhere, and is a common offense in time of peace, but in time of

war it is a circumstance closely allied to the manner of waging it.' International

American Conference, Vol. 2, p. 615." (Italics supplied.)
We quote the following from footnote (23) on pages 249-250, Vol. I, of Cuello Calon's
aforesaid work on "Derecho Penal."
"En algunos Codigo y leyes de fecha proxima ya se halla una definicion de estos
delitos. El Codigo penal ruso, en el articulo 58, define como 'delitos contra
revolucionarios' los hechos encaminados a derrocar o debilitar el poder de los
Consejos de trabajadores y campesinos y de los gobiernos de la Union de
Republicas socialistas sovieticas, a destruir o debilitar la seguridad exterior de la
Union de Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas economicas, politicas y nacionales
fundamentales de la revolucion proletaria.' El Codigo Penal italiano de 1930
considera en eu articulo 8. como delito politico 'todo delito que ofenda un interes
politico del Estado o un derecho politico del ciudadano.' Tambien se reputa politico
el delito comun deteminado, en todo o en parte por motivos politicos. En la ley
alemana de extradicion de 25 diciembre 1929 se definen asi: 'Son delitos politicos
los atentados punibles directamente ejecutados contra la existencia o la seguridad
del Estado, contra el jefe o contra un miembro del gobierno del Estado como tal,
contra una corporacion constitucional, contra los derechos politicos las buenas
relaciones con el extranjero.' parrafo 3., 2.
"La 6a. Conferencia para la Unificacion del Derecho penal (Copenhagen, 31 agosto
3 septiembre 1935) adopto la siguiente nocion del delito politico:
"1.
Por delitos politicos se entienden los dirigidos contra la organizacion y
funcionamiento del Estado o contra los derechos que de esta organizacion y
funcionamiento provienen para el culpable.
"2.
Tambien se consideran como delitos politicos los delitos de derecho comun
que constituyen hechos conexos con la ejecucion de los delitos previstos en seccion
1.: como los hechos dirigidos a favorecer la ejecucion de un delito politico o a
permitir al autor de este delito sustraerse a la aplicacion de la ley penal.
"3.
No se consideraran delitos politicos aquellos a los que su autor sea inducido
por un motivo egoista y vil.
"4.
No se consideraran delitos los que creen un peligro para la comunidad o un
estado de terror." (Italics supplied.)
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly
favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of our
Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the word
of Rodriguez Navarro:
"La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia
este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro
reo." (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espaa, p. 2168.) 3
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and
then in 1932, reading:
"Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo
hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario
para cometer el otro.
"En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su
grado maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma de las que pudieran
imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
"Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos
por separado." (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrino Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p.
2163.)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said
amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its
maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties
imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said
limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no
reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said

offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such
case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each
offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is
readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the
offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate
and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the
other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for
each offense.
Did the framers of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing therein with an
offense which is a means necessary for the commission of another? To begin with,
the culprit can not, then, be considered as displaying a greater degree of malice
than when the two offenses are independent of each other. On the contrary, since
one offense is a necessary means for the commission of the other, the evil intent is
one, which, at least, quantitatively, is lesser than when the two offenses are
unrelated to each other, because, in such event, he is twice guilty of having
harbored criminal designs and of carrying the same into execution. Furthermore, it
must be presumed that the object of Article 48, in its entirety, is only one. We
cannot assume that the purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of the single
sentence of which said article consists, was to favor the accused, and that, before
the sentence ended, the former had a change of heart and turned about face
against the latter. If the second part of Article 48 had been meant to be unfavorable
to the accused and, hence, the exact opposite of the first part each would
have been placed in, separate provisions, instead of in one single article. If the first
part sought to impose, upon the culprit, a penalty less grave than that which he
would deserve if the two or more offenses resulting from his single act were
punished separately, then this, also, must be the purpose of the second part, in
dealing with an offense which is a necessary means for the commission of another.
The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since 1850, when the
counterpart of our Article 48 was inserted in the Penal Code of Spain, or for over a
century, it does not appear to have been applied by the Supreme Court thereof to
crimes of murder committed in furtherance of an insurrection.
Incidentally, we cannot accept the explanation that crimes committed as a means
necessary for the success of a rebellion had to be prosecuted separately under the
provisions of Article 259 of the Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart of
Article 244 of our old Penal Code. To begin with, these articles are part of a
substantive law. They do not govern the manner or method of prosecution of the
culprits. Then again, said precepts ordain that common crimes committed during a
rebellion or sedition, or on the occasion thereof, "shall be respectively punished
according to the provisions of this Code." Among such provisions was Article 90
(later Article 71, then Article 75) of the Spanish Penal Code, and Article 89 of our old

Penal Code, of which Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is a
substantial reproduction. Hence, had the Supreme Court of Spain or the Philippines
believed that murders committed as a means necessary to attain the aims of an
uprising were "common" crimes, the same would have been complexed with the
rebellion or sedition, as the case may be.
The cases of People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64) and People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 82)
have not escaped our attention. Those cases involved members of the constabulary
who rose publicly, for the purpose of performing acts of hate and vengeance upon
the police force of Manila, and in an encounter with the latter, killed some members
thereof. Charged with and convicted of sedition in the first case, they were accused
of murder in the second case. They pleaded double jeopardy in the second case,
upon the ground that the facts alleged in the information were those set forth in the
charge in the first case, in which they had been convicted. This plea was rejected
upon the ground that the organic law prohibited double jeopardy for the same
offense, and that the offense of sedition is distinct and different from that of
murder, although both were the result of the same act.
The question whether one offense was inherent in, or identified with, the other was
not discussed or even considered in said cases. Besides, the lower court applied, in
the murder case Article 89 of the old Penal Code which is the counterpart of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code but this Court refused to do so. Again, simply
because one act may constitute two or more offenses, it does not follow necessarily
that a person may be prosecuted for one after conviction for the other, without
violating the injunction against double jeopardy. For instance, if a man fires a
shotgun at another, who suffers thereby several injuries, one of which produced his
death, may he, after conviction for murder or homicide, based upon said fatal injury,
be accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the non-fatal injuries sustained by
the victim? Or may the former be convicted of the complex crime of murder or
homicide with serious and/or less serious physical injuries? The mere formulation of
these questions suffices to show that the limitation of the rule on double jeopardy to
a subsequent prosecution for the same offense does not constitute a license for the
separate prosecution of two offenses resulting from the same act, if one offense is
an essential element of the other. At any rate, as regards this phase of the issue,
which was not touched in the Cabrera cases, the rule therein laid down must
necessarily be considered modified by our decision in the cases of People vs. Labra
(46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159) and Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (supra),
insofar as inconsistent therewith.
The main argument in support of the theory seeking to complex rebellion with
murder and other offenses is that "war" within the purview of the laws on
rebellion and sedition may be "waged" or "levied" without killing. This premise
does not warrant, however, the conclusion drawn therefrom that any killing
done in furtherance of a rebellion or sedition is independent therefrom, and may be
complexed therewith, upon the ground that destruction of human life is not

indispensable to the waging or levying of war. A person may kill another without
inflicting physical injuries upon the latter, such, for instance, as by poisoning,
drowning, suffocation or shock. Yet it is admitted that he who fatally stabs another
cannot be convicted of homicide with physical injuries. So too, it is undeniable that
treason may be committed without torturing or murdering anybody. Yet, it is wellsettled that a citizen who gives aid and comfort to the enemy by taking direct part
in the maltreatment and assassination of his (citizen's) countrymen, in furtherance
of the wishes of said enemy, is guilty of plain treason, not complexed with murder or
physical injuries, the later being as charged and proven mere ingredients of
the former. Now then, if homicide may be an ingredient of treason, why can it not be
an ingredient of rebellion? The proponents of the idea of rebellion complexed with
homicide,. etc., have not even tried to answer this question. Neither have they
assailed the wisdom of our aforementioned decisions in treason cases.
The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the considerable efforts
exerted, by the Executive Department in the apprehension and prosecution of those
believed to be guilty of crimes against public order, of the lives lost, and the time
and money spent in connection therewith, as well as of the possible implications or
repercussions in the security of the State. The careful consideration given to said
policy of a coordinate and co-equal branch of the Government is reflected in the
time consumed, the extensive and intensive research work undertaken, and the
many meetings held by the members of the court for the purpose of elucidating on
the question under discussion and of settling the same.
The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is, however, clear to
settle justiceable controversies by the application of the law. And the latter must be
enforced as it is with all its flaws and defects, not affecting its validity not as
the judges would have it. In other words, the courts must apply the policy of the
State as set forth in its laws, regardless of the wisdom thereof.
It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider all acts
committed in furtherance thereof as specified in Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised: Penal Code as constituting only one crime, punishable with one single
penalty namely, that prescribed in said Article 135. It is interesting to note, in this
connection, that the penalties provided in our old Penal Code (Articles 230 to 232)
were much stiffer, namely:
1.
Life imprisonment to death for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of
the rebellion, and, also, for subordinate officers who held positions of authority,
either civil or ecclesiastical, if the purpose of the movement was to proclaim the
independence of any portion of the Philippine territory;
2.
Reclusion temporal in its maximum period for said promoters, maintainers
and leaders of the insurrection, and for its subordinate officers, if the purpose of the

rebellion was any of those enumerated in Article 229, except that mentioned in the
preceding paragraph;
3.
Reclusion temporal: (a) for subordinate officers other than those already
adverted to; and (b) for mere participants in the rebellion falling under the first
paragraph of No. 2 of Article 174; and
4.
Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period for participants not falling under No. 3.
After the cession of the Philippines to the United States, the rigors of the old Penal
Code were tempered. Its aforementioned provisions were superseded by section 3
of Act No. 292, which reduced the penalty to imprisonment for not more than ten
(10) years and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or P20,000, for "every person who
incites, sets on foot, assists or engages in any rebellion or insurrection . . . or who
gives aid and comfort to any one so engaging in such rebellion or insurrection."
Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the authors of the Revised Penal Code. The
penalties therein are substantially identical to those prescribed in Act 292. Although
the Revised Penal Code increased slightly the penalty of imprisonment for the
promoters, maintainers and leaders of the uprising, as well as for public officers
joining the same, to a maximum not exceeding twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
it reduced the penalty of imprisonment for mere participants to not more than eight
(8) years of prision mayor, and eliminated the fine.
This benign mood of the Revised Penal Code becomes more significant when we
bear in mind it was approved on December 8, 1930 and became effective on
January 1, 1932. At that time the communists in the Philippines had already given
ample proof of their widespread activities and of their designs and potentialities.
Prior thereto, they had been under surveillance by the agents of the law, who
gathered evidence of their subversive movements, culminating in the prosecution of
Evangelista, Manahan (57 Phil., 354; 57 Phil., 372), Capadocia (57 Phil., 364), Feleo
(57 Phil., 451), Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and others. In fact, the first information
against the first two alleged that they committed the crime of inciting to sedition
"on and during the month of November, 1930, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto."
As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in 1935, incorporated a
formal and solemn declaration (Article II, section 5) committing the Commonwealth,
and, then the Republic of the Philippines, to the "promotion of social justice". Soon
later, Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the Court of Industrial Relations, was
passed. Then followed a number of other statutes implementing said constitutional
mandate. It is not necessary to go into the details of said legislative enactments.
Suffice it to say that the same are predicated upon a recognition of the fact that a
good many of the problems confronting the State are due to social and economic

evils, and that, unless the latter are removed or, least minimized, the former will
keep on harassing the community and affecting the well-being of its members.
Thus, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century,
has been one of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws enforce during the
Spanish regime. Such policy has not suffered the slightest alteration. Although the
Government has, for the past five or six years, adopted a more vigorous course of
action in the apprehension of violators of said law and in their prosecution the
established policy of the State, as regards the punishment of the culprits has
remained unchanged since 1932. It is not for us to consider the merits and demerits
of such policy. This falls within the province of the policy-making branch of the
government the Congress of the Philippines. However, the following quotation from
Cuello Calon indicates the schools of thought on this subject and the reason that
may have influenced our lawmakers in making their choice:
"Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente cercanos, se reputaban los
hechos que hoy llamamos delitos politicos como mas graves y peligrosos que los
crimenes comunes. Se consideraba que mientras estos solo causan un dao
individual, aquellos producen profundas perturbaciones en la vida collectiva
llegando a poner en peligro la misma vida del Estado. En consonancia con estas
ideas fueron reprimidos con extraordinaria severidad y designados con la
denominacion romana de delitos de lesa majestad se catalogaron en las leyes
penales como los crimenes mas temibles.
"Pero desde hace poco mas de un siglo se ha realizado en este punto una
transformacion profunda merced a la cual la delincuencia politica dejo de apreciarse
con los severos criterios de antao quedando sometida a un regimen penal, por
regla general suave y benevolo.
"El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy difundida, a la revolucion
que tuvo lugar en Francia en el ao 1830. El gobierno de Luis Felipe establecio una
honda separacion entre los delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo estos sometidos
a una penalidad mas suave y sus autores exceptuados de la extradicion. Irradiando
a otros paises tuvieron estas tan gran difusion que en casi todos los de regimen
liberal-individualista se ha llegado a crear un tratamiento desprovisto de severidad
para la represion de estos hechos. No solo las penas con que se conminaron
perdieron gran parte de su antigua dureza, sino qua en algunos paises se creo un
regimen penal mas suave para estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio para ellos la
pena de muerte. Tan profundo contraste entre el antiguo y el actual tratamiento de
la criminalidad politica en la mayoria de los paises solo puede ser explicado por las
ideas nacidas y difundidas bajo los regimenes politicos liberales acerca de estos
delitos y delincuentes. Por una parte se ha afirmado que la criminalidad da estos
hechos no contiene la misma inmoralidad que la delincuencia comun, que es tan
solo relativa, qua depende del tiempo, del lugar, da las circunstancias, de las
instituciones del pais. Otros invocan la elevacion de los moviles y sentimientos

determinantes de estos hechos, el amor a la patria, la adhesion ferviente a

determinadas ideas o principios, el espiritu de sacrificio por el triunfo de un ideal.
"Contra su trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han beneficiado peligrosos
malhechores, se ha iniciado hace algun tiempo una fuerte reaccion (vease Cap. XV,
3., b), que llego a alcanzar considerable severidad en las legislaciones de tipo
autoritario, y que tambien ha hallado eco, en forma mas suave, en las de otros
paises de constitucion democratica en los que, especialmente en los ultimos aos,
la frecuencia de agitaciones politicas y sociales ha originado la publicacion de
numerosas leyes encaminadas a la proteccion penal del Estado." (Cuello Calon,
Derecho Penal, Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.)
Such evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the law punishing the
offense to dovetail with the policy of the law enforcing agencies in the apprehension
and prosecution of the offenders are matters which may be brought to the attention
of the departments concerned. The judicial branch can not amend the former in
order to suit the latter. The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without
violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the
foundation of our republican system. In, short, we cannot accept the theory of the
prosecution without causing much bigger harm than that which would allegedly
result from the adoption of the opposite view.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information
against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and
robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" 4 for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended
information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under
such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of
P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.
It is urged that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court should deny the motion
under consideration, because the security of the State so requires, and because the
judgment of conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Amado
V. Hernandez is strong. However, as held in a resolution of this court, dated January
29, 1953, in the case of Montano vs. Ocampo (G.R. L-6352):
". . . to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also
appear that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability would probably
call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before this Court has
been made."
In fact, in the case at bar, defendant Amado V. Hernandez was sentenced by the
lower court, not to the extreme penalty, but to life imprisonment. Furthermore,

individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state,
like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of
public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of
our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very
first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution
devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
(18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom.
Thus, in line with the letter and spirit of the fundamental law, we said in the
aforementioned case of Montano vs. Ocampo:
"Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute
right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has been
toward a fair and liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in the
determination of the degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant
a deprivation of that right."
xxx

xxx

xxx

"In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important
factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of confining accused in jail before
conviction, it has been observed, is to secure his presence at the trial. In other
words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the
proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than
face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to be
bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of
prosecution.
"The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's official and
social standing and his other personal circumstances, seem remote if not nil."
This view applies fully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the particularity that there is an
additional circumstance in his favor he has been detained since January 1951, or
for more than five (5) years, and it may still take some time to dispose of the case,
for the same has not been, and is not in a position to be, included, as yet, in our
calendar, inasmuch as the briefs for some appellants other than Hernandez as
well as the brief for the Government, are pending submission. It should be noted,
also, that the decision appealed from the opposition to the motion in question do
not reveal satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the accused showing,
sufficiently, that his provincial release, during the pendency of the appeal, would
jeopardize the security of the State.
Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez is hereby granted and, upon the filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties,
in the sum of P30,000, and its approval by the court, let said defendant-appellant be
provisionally released. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo and Reyes. J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.

[G.R. Nos. L-32613-14. December 27, 1972.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. SIMEON N. FERRER (in his capacity
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias
LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba,"
respondents.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio for petitioner.
Amelito R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
DECISION
CASTRO, J p:
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act,
1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive
associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other
similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the AntiSubversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary
investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government
prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
"That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of
the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed
to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and
domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University,
the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said
Communist Party of the Philippines.
"That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating
circumstances are present, to wit:
"(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public
authorities;
"(b)

That the crime was committed by a band; and

"(c)

With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity."

Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same
court, charging the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After
preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as amended,
reads:
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated
by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac,
pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S.
Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE,
ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY
and several JOHN DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation of
REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed
as follows:
"That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the
Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in
the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
organized, joined and/or remained as officers and/or ranking leaders, of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No.
1700; that BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts joined and/or remained as a member and became an
officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but
also of the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the
Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking
leaders of the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously
commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the
people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against the
government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the
government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion
and/or other illegal means among which are the following:
"1.
On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted
meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating
and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal
means; and toward this end, the said accused organized, among others a chapter of
the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed
purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or
seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to

discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to
establish in the Philippines a Communist regime.
"2.
The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with
FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive
and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New
People's Army, and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite
for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
through armed revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means, and
establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.
"That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft,
fraud, or disguise was employed."
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the
grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than
one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal
protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of
September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of
attainder and that it is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the informations
against the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal
as a special civil action for certiorari.
II.

Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?

Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex
post facto law shall be enacted." 2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. 3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a
judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder
serves to implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining
legislatures to rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the
judicial function. 7 History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to
suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that
the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the
imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute
as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act Was condemned by the court a quo as a
bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the
Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its
existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.' "By
means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge,"
and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any of

the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the
only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and
voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created
a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."
1.
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not
specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the
prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization.
The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines
but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors."
Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12
was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504
provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
"(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party . . . shall
serve
"(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar
governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than
as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor
organization . . .
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist
Party . . .
"(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both."
This statute specifies the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on
its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a
person from becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor
organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:
"Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly
possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep
from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of such
positions to bring about political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has
exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth

a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or
possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view,
make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves
to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified
acts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no
uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore
cannot hold union office without incurring criminal liability members of the
Communist Party.
"Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625,
81 S CT 1357, lends support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from
an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a
'Communist-action organization,' under the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 731 et seq. (1958 ed), The definition of 'Communistaction organization' which the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
"'[A]ny organization in the United States . . . which (i) is substantially directed,
dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization
controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and
(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist
movement..' 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
"A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder,
reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the
deprivations set forth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general
definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party
was a 'Communist-action organization,' the Court found the statutory definition not
to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it:
"In this proceeding the Board has found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its
conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtue of the activities in which it now
engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at any time choose
to abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act
provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 137, 6 L ed 2d at 683)".
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would
suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has
to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the
accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined
the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its
basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and
other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a
foreign power.

As to the claim that under the statute organizational guilt is nonetheless imputed
despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to
say that that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a
"dragnet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable.
The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere
membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party.
13 But the statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing or active,
with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section
4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have
been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific
intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15
This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty
knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's
unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.
2.
Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities,
this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting
partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or
employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons
mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to
the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a
statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least
twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such
society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even
if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18
requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union
officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that
they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by
this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground
that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against
the Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or
from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further
compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had
engaged in subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been
invalidated as bills of attainder.

But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to

be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules,
and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law
requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to
register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a
society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its
operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against
the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other
secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of
Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the
nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
"The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and
reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between
the two classes of associations shown by experience, and that the difference
consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy
surrounding its purposes and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to
personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the
part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku
Klux Klan, the principal association in the included class: 'It is a matter of common
knowledge that this organization functions largely at night, its members disguised
by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of
the people;' and later said of the other class: 'These organizations and their
purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence for many gears.
Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint against them
regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others.' Another of
the courts said: 'It is a matter of common knowledge that the association or
organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises activities
tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the
legislation is not confined to this society;' and later said of the other class: 'Labor
unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the
Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been
granted special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them beneficial
rather than harmful agencies.' The third court, after recognizing 'the potentialities of
evil in secret societies,' and observing that 'the danger of certain organizations has
been judicially demonstrated,' meaning in that state, said: 'Benevolent orders,
labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not
immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."
"We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily
available, including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the
House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes
and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised putting aside controverted

evidence that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with
additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other
periods; that its membership was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites;
that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for
all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of
its members an oath to shield and preserve 'white supremacy;' and in still another
declared any person actively opposing its principles to be 'a dangerous ingredient in
the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth;' that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and
Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving
for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of
local, state and national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands
the punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes." 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of
continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the
Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective
of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle
and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that
of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we
noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of
Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan
(KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the
evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a
sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government
and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines."
3.
Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it
may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also
necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement
follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As
Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was.. doubly
objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the historic explanation
for uniting the two mischiefs in one clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
law shall be passed.' . . . Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex
post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it
is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
". . . [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or
employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department
thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the

effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after this
section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any group,
society, association, organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches or
has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow
by force or violence of the Government of the United States of America or of the
State of California."
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to
the petitioner therein, thus:
". . . Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision
insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective
date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is
valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who,
subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent
overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing
so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to
protect the municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty
to the State and the United States.
". . . Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were
removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively
operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by
its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensation to named individuals or
employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background,
the statute was held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial."
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby assumes
judicial magistracy, then it must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a
bill of attainder reaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposes are
inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed with respect to the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950:
"Nor is the statute made an act of 'outlawry' or of attainder by the fact that the
conduct which it regulates is described with such particularity that, in probability,
few organizations will come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act to curb
behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare, whether that conduct
is found to be engaged in by many persons or by one. So long as the incidence of
legislation is such that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct, be they
many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering the course of their own
present activities, there can be no complaint of an attainder." 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, be said of the Anti-Subversion Act. Section 4
thereof expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed
"After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain members of the Communist Party

of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association" after June
20, 1957, are punished. Those who were members of the Party or of any other
subversive association at the time of the enactment of the law, were given the
opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under
oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such
renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability. 34 The
penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable.
III.

The Act and the Requirements of Due Process

1.
As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the
Communist Party of the Philippines is an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government is intended not to provide the basis for a legislative finding of guilt
of the members of the Party but rather to justify the proscription spelled out in
section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are so fundamental
that they are thought by some to occupy a "preferred position" in the hierarchy of
constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise must be
justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This is the reason why before
enacting the statute in question Congress conducted careful investigations and then
stated its findings in the preamble, thus:
". . . [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines although purportedly a political party,
is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian
regime subject to alien domination and control;
". . . [T]he continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the
Philippines;
. . . [I]n the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in
scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope with
this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country."
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be open to question if, instead of
making these findings in enacting the statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the
trial court failed to take proper account of the distinction between legislative fact
and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidates the crucial distinction, thus:
". . . A law forbidding the sale of beverages containing more than 3.2 per cent of
alcohol would raise a question of legislative fact, i.e., whether this standard has a
reasonable relation to public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. A law

forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming it is not so vague as to

require supplementation by rule-making) would raise a question of adjudicative fact,
i.e., whether this or that beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the statute
and the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what
we mean by fact in each case is itself an ultimate conclusion founded on underlying
facts and on criteria of judgment for weighing them.
"A conventional formulation is that legislative facts those facts which are relevant
to the legislative judgment will not be canvassed save to determine whether
there is a rational basis for believing that they exist, while adjudicative facts
those which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant are to be demonstrated
and found according to the ordinary standards prevailing for judicial trials." 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. New York, 37 and adopted by this Court in
Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that "if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements this
test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findings in the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations"
are controlled by the foreign government controlling the world Communist
movement and that they operate primarily to "advance the objectives of such world
Communist movement"), the U.S. Supreme Court said:
"It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of these legislative findings and
reject them . . . They are the product of extensive investigation by Committees of
Congress over more than a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502,
516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfounded irrational imaginings . . .
And if we accept them, as we must, as a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress
of the threat which Communist organizations pose not only to existing government
in the United States, but to the United States as a Sovereign, independent
Nation . . . we must recognize that the power of Congress to regulate Communist
organizations of this nature is extensive." 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of the legislative findings articulated
in the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a proposition
too plain to require elaboration. Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society.
It surpasses and transcends every other value, "for if a society cannot protect its
very structure from armed internal attack, . . . no subordinate value can be
protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41

"Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that there is a 'right' to
rebellion against dictatorial governments is without force where the existing
structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We reject any
principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution,
which principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy. No one could
conceive that it is not within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to
overthrow the government by force and violence."
2.
By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described
in section 4 thereof), Congress reaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership, as
distinguished from nominal membership, has been held as a sufficient basis for
penalizing membership in a subversive organization. 43 For, as has been stated:
"Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the
organization; and when membership is accepted or retained with knowledge that
the organization is engaged in an unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining
membership with such knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawful enterprise
in which it is engaged." 44
3.
The argument that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad because section 2
merely speaks of "overthrow" of the Government and overthrow may be achieved
by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the phrase "knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the
definitions of and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribed are
stated in section 4 which requires that membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear that the overthrow
contemplated is "overthrow not only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversion and other illegal means." The absence of this qualification in section 2
appears to be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberate omission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow" sufficiently connotes the use of violent and other
illegal means. Only in a metaphorical sense may one speak of peaceful overthrow of
governments, and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors. In the case of the
Anti-Subversion Act, the use of the word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is
hardly consistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow," namely,
"establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place [sic] the Government
under the control and domination of an alien power." What this Court once said in a
prosecution for sedition is apropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly
imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should be interpreted
in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood.
The word 'overthrow' could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary

change by the exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the whip [which the
accused exhorted his audience to use against the Constabulary], an instrument
designed to leave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistent with the mild
interpretation which the appellant would have us impute to the language." 45
IV.

The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression

As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the
Government by force, violence or other illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom
of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so
insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding
considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions in
this country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Act is similar in many respects to
the membership provision of the Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliated with, any such society, group or assembly of persons,
knowing the purpose thereof
"Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department
or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction, . . ." 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the Court said in Scales vs. United,
States: 47
"It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we are here concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and it was further established that a combination
to promote such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a political
party, is not such association as is protected by the first Amendment. We can
discern no reason why membership, when it constitutes a purposeful form of
complicity in a group engaging in this same forbidden advocacy, should receive any
greater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment."
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problems of accommodating the
exigencies of self-preservation and the values of liberty are as complex and intricate
as in the situation described in the legislative findings stated in the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, the legislative judgment as to how that
threat may best be met consistently with the safeguards of personal freedoms is not
to be set aside merely because the judgment of judges would, in the first instance,
have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains

freedom to hire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromise between the

claims of the social order and individual freedom, and when the legislative
compromise in either case is brought to the judicial test the court stands one step
removed from the conflict and its resolution through law." 49
V.

The Act and its Title

The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional command that "no bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in the title of the Act is the last
proviso of section 4 which reads:
"And provided, finally, That one who conspires with any other person to overthrow
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or the government of any of its
political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means, for the
purpose of placing such Government or political subdivision under the control and
domination of any lien power, shall be punished by prision correccional to prision
mayor with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code."
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes not only membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines or similar associations, but as well "any
conspiracy by two persons to overthrow the national or any local government by
illegal means, even if their intent is not to establish a totalitarian regime, but a
democratic regime, even if their purpose is not to place the nation under an alien
communist power, but under an alien democratic power like the United States or
England or Malaysia or even an anti-communist power like Spain, Japan, Thailand or
Taiwan or Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the
Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and for Other
Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 provides that "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act." Together with the main title, the short title of the statute
unequivocally indicates that the subject-matter is subversion in general which has
for its fundamental purpose the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place
of the existing Government and not merely subversion by Communist conspiracies.
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not
recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear
terms the nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
52 A narrow or technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read
fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. We hold that the
Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI.

Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act, we cannot

overemphasize the need for prudence and circumspection in its enforcement,
operating as it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expression and belief.
Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution
under the Act. The Government, in addition to proving such circumstances as may
affect liability, must establish the following elements of the crime of joining the
Communist Party of the Philippines or any other subversive association:
(1)
In the case of subversive organizations other than the Communist Party of
the Philippines, (a) that the purpose of the organization is to overthrow the present
Government of the Philippines and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime
under the domination of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined such
organization; and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; and(2) In
the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the CPP continues to
pursue the objectives which led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegal means for the purpose of
placing the country under the control of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined
the CPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and by overt acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to the crime of remaining a member
of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any other subversive association; we
leave this matter to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September 15, 1970 is set aside, and
these two cases are hereby remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Fernando, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Makasiar, J. & Antonio, J., took no part.