Suffolk Hill

6 January 1900

From his position at the top of Coleskop it had become apparent to General French that the
capture of Grassy Hill - a koppie north-west of Colesberg - would give him command over Wagon
Bridge road, and also the bridges at Botha's Drift and Norval's Pont. This would effectively break
the Boer girdle, cut off their communication and supplies from the Orange Free State, and force
the Boers to retreat thus winning him possession of the town.

In Colesberg, Commandant Van Dam (ZARPS) was still arguing with General Schoeman about his

defence strategy, as the following translation from his report shows:

“If the enemy realized that he could not reach Colesberg, he would try to pass around
the flanks. However the right flank was covered by Plessispoort but the left flank was
open, and thus they could reach Colesberg, with the result that the Boers would have
to surrender.
But General Schoeman did not want to agree to my proposal, saying his forces were
not enough, and the Police were not strong enough. I pointed out that he was strong
enough without the police, the commando's were blocked up unnecessarily, the
enemy already stretched his line past Colesberg, and would even go further, but in
vain. The General refused”.

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On the 5th of January gun fire boomed all around Colesberg as British artillery directed steady
fire on Boer positions. A Boer gun blasting McCracken Hill from a koppie about 3,000 metres
from the British left flank, was silenced by machine guns firing from Kloof Camp. 5 men of the
10th Hussars, led by French's Aide-de Camp, Lieutenant Sir John Milbanke, were attacked, as
they were attempting to reconnoitre Grassy Hill. Sir John was wounded in the leg during this
assault. In his report to Lord Roberts, French wrote :
"On the 5th the enemy's position was shelled by our Artillery and a position known as
Grassy Hill was carefully reconnoitred with a view to gaining possession of it the next
day. Its possession would give the town of Colesberg into our hands."
But this was not to be - the attempt to take Grassy Hill (Suffolk Hill, as it is now called), on the
6th January 1900, was to have disastrous consequences.
On the morning of the 5th January 200 men, made up of Heilbronners under Rooi Frans van
Vuuren and Johannesburg and Pretoria Police (ZARPS) under Lieutenant D Maré, were
dispatched to guard the koppie that French was aiming to take. Unaware of this, Lieutenant-
Colonel A J Watson, in command of the Suffolk regiment at Kloof Camp, asked French's
permission to take `Grassy Hill', reporting that his men had reconnoitred this hill and found it to
be unoccupied. The following is an extract from the official dispatches sent by French to Lord
Roberts on the 2nd February 1900:
"I had discussed the possibility of capturing Grassy Hill with the late Colonel Watson...
He was always very confident that he could carry out this operation with his own
regiment which occupied the part of our position opposite the northwest corner of the
Colesberg position, and was therefore within 1,000 yards of Grassy Hill.
On the evening of the 5th, in reply to a message I got from Colonel Watson, I told
him I would give him a free hand to rush this position at night if he saw a favourable
chance, but he was to inform me and all the troops in his neighbourhood of his
intention to do so. I heard no more, but left Rensburg at 2 am and reached the
Colesberg position shortly before dawn".
In December Private Potter of the Suffolk regiment had written home from Arundel:
"We expect to make the general advance on the 28th December, the enemy has
taken up a strong position at Colesberg about 18 miles from here and I expect I'll be
in the thick of it before you get this letter."
Private Potter did not realise just how much "in the thick of it" his regiment would be. The letters
of the men of the 1st Suffolk regiment, who bore the brunt of the engagement, wearing soft
shoes, stumbling over the rocky terrain in the dark, dirty and tired, paint a vivid picture of their
experiences that night. Extract from letter, written by Mr. A Forbes Grant, (a teacher in Cradock),
to an unnamed Newspaper dated 23rd February 1900:
"This day a week (ago) I was talking to several of the Suffolks who had suffered at
Colesberg, you know, as they passed through Cradock on their way down to Port
Elizabeth. Two of the sergeants, who seem honest, straightforward fellows,
impressed me very favourably. I got the whole story of the night advance, the
sudden volley, and the disastrous repulse. One sergeant I spoke to was the only
sergeant of his company to get back and, as he put it, he didn't know exactly how he
got back. I asked him how the confusion arose. Well, he said:
‘We had reached the top of the hill; the Colonel had addressed the officers, and
indicated the positions he wished them to take up, when a shot was fired from a bush
close by. The Boer was instantly bayoneted; so you may judge how close he was.
Then came a volley from about 30 paces. The Colonel and about six or seven officers

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 dropped at the first fire. This must have been a small picket of no great strength for,
if it had been a heavy volley, every man on that hill would have dropped. The Boer's
don't miss at 30 paces’.”
In a letter to his mother in Risbeygate St Bury St Edmonds Private E Emms wrote:
"Just a few lines to let you know of the terrible disaster that has occurred just lately
to the regiment, but I am glad to tell you that I escaped quite safe. I was in the thick
of it that morning. We started from our camp at 12 o'clock one night, and the orders
we had was to capture the Boers position with the point of the bayonet, and take it
by surprise, the Boers being asleep. But after starting from camp we had to march
two miles before we got to this big rock. We had to put on slippers so as to make no
noise. It was a silent march and no talking was allowed, and before we got to the
top of the hill we were fired upon by 2,000 Boers. (Private Emms has added a `0' to
the number of Boers originally on the hill) We only had 4 Companies with us. They
were firing on us in the dark and we could not get under any cover whatsoever. We
were about 20 yards away when the Boers fired on us. We lost a lot of men, our
Colonel, 4 officers and 34 men, and several taken prisoner by the Boers."
The moon had set at 9.47 p.m. on that night - which means that the attack took place in pitch
darkness. In a letter to his father, dated 11th January 1900, Corporal Charles Watts wrote from
Arundel:
(Note that the Boer numbers increase once more.)
"... There were 400 of us and 5,000 Boers. It was slaughter. As soon as the first
shot was fired, a volley came, and H Company fell like dead sheep. The bullets came
over us like a hail storm. The Colonel said "Lay down men", which we did. Then he
found the fire was too much for us and he said "retire", and we did so, scattered all
over the shop. As the men came down they fell and the bayonets were running in to
one another, when we got 20 yards from the hill, men that were shot fell by the
score. If it had been light instead of dark we should have all been shot.
How I got to the camp I cannot tell anyone. The Colonel and Adjutant were both
shot through the head and killed. Bob Crick of Barton was killed. The General
originally gave the order to get the men up between 3 and 4 am. and to go to the
bottom of the hill and let us lay there till daybreak. Then the hill was to be shelled for
1 hour. Had the General got the hill he would have blown Colesberg up. The cavalry
were to be on one flank and the mounted infantry on the other. Four big guns were
to be fired in succession, which would have been a signal to charge. If this had been
done we would have got the hill."
A letter, printed in the Bury Free Press of 3rd March 1900, written by Private J Ruffles to his
home in Tayfen Rd Bury St Edmonds stated:
"I was one of the lucky ones on 6th January, which I dare say you know about.
There were about 330 of our regiment went to take a hill with 3 or 4 thousand Boers
on it. I with my Company had been laying on the hills for four days opposite the
Boers, firing at each other. We got relieved at 6 in the morning for a day's rest. At
bedtime that night orders came that we were to parade at 4.00 am in the morning to
attack the hill. We were to march up, wait a short distance from it and fix bayonets
at daybreak.
The artillery would shell the enemy position for one hour, then we were to charge the
hill and fire as much as we like, so as to take them by surprise and drive them out.

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 The cavalry were there to cut them off at the right flank and the mounted infantry at
the left. These were our orders and no doubt it would have proved a great success.
Instead we were called at midnight and paraded in our slippers. We were taken half
way to the hill and halted to fix bayonets. The section commanders and officers had
a lecture which they kept to themselves, the only thing we were told was that the
password would be the same as it was in Gibraltar, "Steady old 12th”. Off we went
again and two men of my Company were sent as points, i.e. to pass the word from
one Company to another, and I was one of them. A lot of whistling, like a bird took
place, but no notice was taken of that. We got to the top of the hill, and the Colonel
and the Scouts were up. We took a few more men up and called for the officers. But
no sooner as they got up a signal shot was fired by the enemy.
They did not forget to let us have it pretty warm. Nearly all the poor chaps and
officers who were at the front got knocked down and the Colonel was wounded. He
came back a little way and said, "Retire my men", and those in the front companies
kept knocking us down in the rear. Our chaps got stabbed with our own bayonets as
we could hardly see one another. When we got back to camp only one officer, Major
Graham, got back he was wounded in two places. A little later a fellow came in and
said our artillery was firing into our own men and did not know it. We were relieved
by the `Essex' and sent back to Naaupoort.”
This confirms oral tradition in Colesberg, which has always maintained that the British fired on
their own men.
An anonymous letter, published in a national newspaper The Daily Mail, by an unknown soldier
who took part in the attack reported:
"Four companies left Coleskop Camp at 12-30 am. Colonel Watson, who carried a
long white stick in his hand leading the way and feeling the ground as he went. The
troops marched with fixed bayonets in quarter columns with six paces intervals
between companies.
The hill is situated about a mile from Coleskop Camp (Kloof Camp). When about half
way across the veldt a light suddenly appeared and disappeared in the direction of
Colesberg, a mile and a half to the right of the column. Many took this to be a Boer
signal, and very probably it was, as soon afterwards a very good imitation of the
thrilling notes of a night bird disturbed the silent air.
Arriving at a deep ditch at the foot of the hill the column halted for a few minutes and
then commenced to climb. The hill was covered with huge boulders and the men had
to assist one another to climb up which proved very fatiguing. Every now and then
the troops halted to listen. They were nearly at the top of the hill when the invisible
`night bird' again gushed forth its dulcet tones, to be followed almost immediately by
a rifle shot fired by a Boer sentry, who was discovered standing by himself just in
front of the leading company (H) and just in front of the centre of the hill. He was
immediately bayoneted by one of our men and the column lay down among the rocks
waiting a few seconds.
The hill was ablaze with rifle fire. Mauser and explosive bullets dropping among our
men in showers. The explosive bullets as they hit the rocks throwing up a weird light
that showed objects for eight or ten yards around. Very few of our men were struck
at this stage and they were all remarkably cool and collected. Colonel Watson called
the officers towards him, and after telling Captain Brett (who was wounded on Suffolk
Hill) to take his men round the right flank, ordered the company nearest him to
‘Retire Men!' presumed to mean for them to retire a little.

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 The leading company took the order in the sense it was apparently meant, but the
word ‘Retire!' being passed to the companies in the rear was interpreted to mean
`Retire' to the bottom of the hill. Consequently while some retired, astonished at
such an order, as everyone expected the word `Charge', even though the close
formation prevented anything like an effective one. Some remained where they
were, and the company in front, after retiring a little, charged on its own account.
Two thirds were shot down in the attempt, Colonel Watson having the roof of his
head blown off by an explosive bullet.
After retiring to the foot of the hill the troops awaited orders, but there being no
officers present to direct them, were eventually ordered by some of the Sergeants to
retire to camp."
An extract from Mr. A Forbes Grant’s letter, giving his reasons for the Suffolk's defeat:
" A single Boer posted behind a rock is easily a match for two Tommies. Another
thing, each Boer is a fighting unit; now each Tommy is not. Each Boer is left to his
own resources; he takes his own position; he retreats when he thinks fit and chooses
his own line of flight. Tommy can't do that. He is part of his section or his company;
he must do as he is told, and if there is no one to tell him what to do he is in a bad
way."
From Van Dam's report on what happened that morning when the Boers in Colesberg became
aware of the attack it seems as though originally the Boers had no idea of the devastation they
had caused and were retreating down their side of the koppie:
“About three miles north west of Colesberg a ridge was held by 200 burghers. In the
morning of 6th January they were attacked by the enemy, who unnoticed, reached the
foot of the ridge during the night. When the front line gave alarm, the enemy
immediately stormed up the height under cover of a battery who started firing.
When I heard the shots, without wasting time, I and fifty of my men rushed over on
horseback. Approaching the ridge, I noticed that some of the burghers already started
to withdraw towards the end of the ridge. Halfway the police met the running
burghers, and ordered them to return. The police kept storming and they reached the
top of the hill at the same time as the British, with the running Boers in between.
Under loud cheers the police sent a volley on the enemy. They were so close that
they did not miss one shot. The enemy was stopped in their march, and had to seek
shelter behind the rocks.
In the meantime the burghers recovered and soon a hectic action developed from
both sides. The two sides were so near to each other that they did not dare to jump
up and storm. After about one and a half hours, gunfire could be heard from the left
forward flank (to the north) of the British. That appeared to be Lieutenant Maré while
returning from his position and, seeing the burghers' calamity, asked for volunteers to
help rescue them. Only fifteen men were in reach of their horses, and without saddle
or bridle, only with halter strap in the mouth of the horse they stormed over the plain,
up the rise, and tackled the enemy in the flank.
Misled by the fast fire, the British took it as a strong force, jumped up and ran back in
a bewildered order. That was the moment that my men, followed by some burghers,
and I chased them. Their artillery could not help them, because the burghers were
too short on their heels, and it was not ten minutes after the arrival of Lieutenant
Maré that the enemy surrendered.

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 With the ridge as good as conquered they stopped the enemy with no more than 75
men, drove them back and forced them to surrender with the attack of 15 men at just
the right moment. Should the British have conquered and kept this ridge, the key to
the Boers' position would have been in their hands, the whole vicinity was within the
reach of their field guns, and the road open to the wagon bridge over the Orange
River.”
The British losses were:
• 1 Officer in charge, 4 officers and 32 others dead,
• 4 officers and 48 others wounded,
• 5 officers and 94 others taken captive.
• Major Graham was shot through his right arm and lung – he somehow escaped
capture and crawled almost 2 miles (3.2186 km) back to Kloof Camp.
The Boers reported 8 killed and 17 wounded, amongst them was Lieutenant Maré.
Van Dam's translated account states:
“In Luit. Maré the Corps lost a man who they missed bitterly, a good and promising
officer, a true comrade, a man not only respected, but beloved by all who knew him.
Once again the police proved that a small group could do a lot with co-operation, and
the burghers acknowledged that the police saved them.”
In his despatch to Lord Roberts, it is apparent that the defeat of the Suffolk's was such an
embarrassment to General French that he distanced himself from it as best he could:
"At dawn we heard sharp musketry fire in the direction of Grassy Hill. I directed
Colonel Eustace to get his guns in position to assist in the attack, which I thought
Watson must be making. The artillery got into action at once against Grassy Hill
defences, but in a few minutes I received news that nearly 300 men of the Suffolk
Regiment had returned to camp, (having received an order from "someone" to retire),
which belonged to a force of four companies which Colonel Watson had led against
Grassy Hill at 12.30 on the previous night.
It was further reported to me by Major Cubbit, the second in command, who had
remained in camp, that about 120 Officers and men were killed, wounded and
prisoners in the enemy's hands. It subsequently transpired that, (so far as it was
possible to glean any reliable account) Colonel Watson made complete and adequate
arrangements to ensure success, which he would, so far as I have been able to
prove, have attained, although with some loss, had the majority of his men no been
seized with panic and retired.
Colonel Watson was a most gallant and capable Officer, and I deeply deplore his loss.
It appears the Officers all behaved with the utmost bravery, and that a gallant stand
was made by the men who remained with them ".
Ernest Murray, who was on Coleskop at that time, writes:
"You will have heard… of the blunder of the Suffolk's which, needless to say, was not
the General’s fault, though he was much cut up about it. He was up here on
Coleskop all day and regulated the artillery fire by telegraph from the top."
The diary of Maria Scholtz, wife of the NGK dominee, had the following entry:

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 "6th January: Heavy fighting at about 9 o'clock. 32 English wounded were brought
into the hospital (In the DR Church Hall) A sight never to be forgotten. Some were
severely wounded and 4 were beyond hope.
On 8th January, Mrs. Scholtz wrote in her diary that the Church Hall was full and that:
"the Kindergarten School was turned into a hospital also".
The Boers held a service for the men who died on Suffolk Hill. The Times History reports as
follows:
"The victors treated their wounded prisoners well, and were most sympathetic and
courteous to the British burial party which went out on the following morning. They
readily gave their help, and a pathetic scene took place at the open grave side. A
grey-headed burgher asked leave to make an address. In a rough, simple way, he
deprecated war and the sacrifice of human life, and prayed for the time when all men
should live at peace with one another.
Then the assembled burghers sang a psalm".
In England, The Daily Mail , reported:
"Owing to the death of officers, the Suffolk's have been ordered to Port Elizabeth to
await filling up vacancies in the officer ranks."
Private Charles Watts added this PS to his letter written to his father from Arundel, 5 days after
the Suffolks were defeated:
"PS. I don't know if they will send us to the front again, they might if they get some
officers. I hope not, roll on England."
Even after the fight things hardly improved for the regiment. Drummer J. Walden of the 1st
Suffolk's wrote to his mother:
"........We lost all our officers that fatal night, I am glad I got back safe and sound. I
fell on some chaps who were shot down in front of me. I got cut on the forehead with
a sword, but did not mind that as long as I did not get shot. They have sent us down
country because we had no officers. We are at a place called Port Elizabeth which is
very large. Things are so dear and we don't have much money so we are nearly on
the point of starvation. I have lost two stone since being out here. We get a pound
of brown bread and a little coffee, and nothing with the bread, but after the big fight
I am a lucky man to write this".
The prisoners seemed to be better off. Cpl. A Clarke wrote to his parents on 10th March 1900 and
stated:
"I expect by now you have seen in the papers I am a prisoner. I'm glad to tell you
that I am in the best of health, and to tell you we are treated well, better than I
expected to be. We have all acres of pasture land to do what we like on. All we have
to do is get our meals ready. I daresay you have read in the paper about our fight.
About half who attacked got killed or wounded and the remainder of us were ordered
to surrender, or I think we should have all been killed, I was very lucky, how I
escaped the bullets I scarcely know. I had one through my haversack and a splinter
grazed my right knee, but nothing to talk about.
I am glad Ben, (Brother in the same regiment), was not with us. Please do not worry
as I am unlikely to come to any harm."
After the Boers vacated Colesberg the British conducted a full scale military funeral for the men
who fell on Suffolk Hill.

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An undated cutting in Miss Ellie Plewman's scrap book states:
"An Honoured Grave: The thirty men who were killed, their Colonel amongst them,
found an honoured grave on the hill which they had taken only to lose again, being
buried by the Boers. On Tuesday, the 6th instant (November 1900), the beautiful
Burial service of the Anglican Church was recited over the grave.
Soon after nine a.m., the procession started. At its head marched the Drum-Major of
the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, followed by the surpliced choir of the
Colesberg Parish Church, augmented by ladies and gentlemen of the town. The Rev..
C. Usher Wilson (1898-1905), rector of Colesberg and Acting Chaplain of the Forces,
was the officiating clergyman, and walked behind the choir and in front off the firing
party of the Highlanders. Next came the pipers and the drummers, who played the
well known dirge, "The Flowers of the Forest", in a beautiful and solemn manner.
The officers and men of the Argyll and Sutherland Regiment attended, and a large
number of the citizens of Colesberg, followed in the rear of the procession. The
officers of the Suffolk Regiment present were: Major Cubbit, Captain Massey-Lloyd,
and Captain Clifford. These gentlemen had traveled from De Aar to attend.
A service of pathetic beauty ended by the singing of the National Anthem. Beautiful
wreaths and crosses covered the grave, one which was from the soldiers, and another
from the people of Colesberg.
On Friday the Chaplain performed similar rites over the graves of the Suffolk men
who died of their wounds and who were buried in the new Cemetery, Colesberg. I
understand that the officers and men of the regiment have made arrangements to
erect a handsome memorial over the graves of their Colonel and comrades-in-arms."
An advertisement, signed by Capt. H Clifford of the Suffolk Regiment, appeared in the Colesberg
Advertiser 4th May 1900 on behalf of Colonel Watson's widow, offering a reward for a heavy gold
ring engraved "Fairlie Watson" which was “removed from Watson's finger before burial." The ring
was to be returned to the Rev Cragg (the Methodist Minister in Colesberg).
Later French withdrew his statements about the men retiring in panic. An article to this effect
appears in the Colesberg Advertiser 7th July 1900 under the heading – “Honour of the Suffolk
Regiment Vindicated”:
"At the Suffolk Court of Inquiry - a wire from a correspondent to the E P Herald: I
have now ascertained an unimpeachable source, evidence tendered by the officers
concerned, clearly proved that the behaviour of the men was most creditable, and
that the late Colonel Watson indisputably ordered his men to retire no less than four
times, the order being also repeated by the company officers.
The publication coming as it does soon after the publication of General French's
despatch which attributes the failure of the attack to panic among the men, will
probably open the public's eye as to the value after all of "official dispatches". The
soldiers all along have indignantly denied that they retired before being ordered, but
officialdom took no notice of statements made by private soldiers. General French
who, as a matter of fact was not within half-a-dozen miles of Coleskop when the
affair occurred, has now informed the commanding officer of the Suffolk regiment
that "After hearing the evidence recorded at the Court of Inquiry", he will have great
pleasure in correcting his dispatch concerning the Suffolk's on the first opportunity",
and thus it aught to be added, remove a six months' most unjustifiable slur on the
good name of a famous regiment."

Page 8 of 29
Standing on Suffolk Hill looking out across the quiet peaceful Karoo plain to Coleskop it is hard to
imagine the "slaughter”, as Private Cockle calls it, that took place that night :
" .... and H Company fell like dead sheep. The bullets came over us like a hail storm.
We were close to their rifles and our men dropped down in all directions, three by the
side of me. A lump of lead went passed my ear and hit a poor fellow in front of me,
so I had to jump over him. The wounded were calling out for their mothers and
fathers. We had to run for our lives and seek shelter. One of my chums, Bridge (Pvt.
A Bridge), got shot through the head. It was all over in 10 minutes"

The monument over the grave of the English men who died that night always bring to mind the
words of Rupert Brooke's haunting poem "The Soldier" :
"If I should die, think only this of me:
That there's some corner of a foreign field
That is for ever England. There shall be
In that rich earth a richer dust concealed;
A dust whom England bore, shaped, made aware,
Gave, once her flowers to love, her ways to roam,
A body of England's, breathing English air,
Washed by the rivers, blest by the suns of home".

Suffolk Hill Memorial

(RE-INTERNED IN 1965 BY S.A.WAR GRAVES BOARD - NAME ON ORIGINAL MONUMENT STILL

ON SITE ON COLESBERG COMMONAGE) -
(The men were buried on this site 9th January 1900 and the cairn was completed July 1901 by
Messrs. Burns Brothers)

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 SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF
LIEUT. COL. ARTHUR JOHN WATSON
COMMANDING 1ST BATT. THE SUFFOLK REG.
AND
CAPT. A. W. BROWN.
CAPT. ADJT. F.A.P. WILKINS
LIEUT. S G. CAREY LIEUT C. A. WHITE
384 SERGT. J. BAKER 1504 SERGT. E. MORGAN
3594 LANCE SERG. H ARROWSMITH or 3052
5230 CORPRAL H. NIXON
4794 PRIVATE W. ANDSLEY
4812 PRIVATE C. PRIGG
2209 PRIVATE T. ARNALL
2826 PRIVATE S. PRYKE
3369 PRIVATE J. ATTWELL
2542 PRIVATE W. RADLEY
2196 PRIVATE S. BARNES
2691 PRIVATE T. RANSOM
3230 PRIVATE A. BRIDGE
3090 PRIVATE J. ROBINSON

Page 10 of 29
 2868 PRIVATE W. BALTZER
4738 PRIVATE T. SEAMONS
5118 PRIVATE A. COOPER
2299 PRIVATE S. SILLATOE
4232 PRIVATE W. CUTHBERT
2948 PRIVATE J. SKEET
3494 PRIVATE F. FORGE
4745 PRIVATE W. STOCK
3887 PRIVATE W. FULCHER
2573 PRIVATE W. STOLLERY
2064 PRIVATE G. GREENWOOD
2102 PRIVATE F. THOMPSON
4684 PRIVATE C. HACKETT
PRIVATE J. VAUGHAN
3088 PRIVATE C. KIDD
PRIVATE H. WALLACE
4121 PRIVATE J. MURTON
2276 PRIVATE T. WEBB
3067 PRIVATE F. MUSKETT
4651 PRIVATE R. NEWSON
& TWO UNKNOWN

KILLED IN ACTION NEAR THIS SPOT 6 JANUARY 1900

FAITHFUL UNTO DEATH
Ellie Plewman cut out the following list and glued it into her scrap book :
Casualties Suffolk Hill 6th January 1900:
Killed
Lieut. - Col. A.J. Watson Private A. Bridge; 2196 Private G. Prigg; 2626
Lieut. S.G. Carey Private S. Barnes; 2868 Private F. Pryke; 2691
Lieut. C.A. White Private W. Baltnor; 5118 Private T. Runson; 3090
Lieut. & Adj. F.A.P. Wilkins; 1509 Private A. Cooper; 4232 Private J. Robinson; 4738
Sergeant E. Morgan; 3052 Private W. Cuthbert; 3887 Private T. Seamons; 4745
Lance-Serg. H. Arrowsmith; 4795 Private W. Fulcher; 2064 Private W. Stock; 2299
Lance-Corporal W.Andsley; 3369 Private G. Greenwood; 3088 Private A. Sillitoe; 2102
Lance-Corporal J. Attwell; 5230 Private C. Kidd; 4121 Private F. Thompson
Lance-Corporal H. Nixon; 2230 Private T. Murton; 3067 And three men not identified
Private F. Musket; 4812

Page 11 of 29

Captain A. W. Brown; 2276
Private T Webb; 2209
Private A Arnull; 4684
Major V.W.H. Graham
Captain C.A.H. Brett
2nd Lieut. A.S. Allen
nd
2 Lieut. C.W. Butler; 1908
Colour-Serg. J. Handscombe; 494
Sergeant M. Hayward; 3546
Sergeant H. Frost; 3052
Sergeant H. Palmer; 844
Sergeant J. West; 2409
Corporal W. Gardener; 1543
Corporal J. Jude; 2639
Lance-Corp. C. Barber; 2903
Lance-Corp. R. Merrison; 4755
Died of Wounds
Private C Huckett; 2542 Private W Stollery; 2948
Private W. Radley; 3573 Private R. Skeet
Wounded
Private E. Audley; 2725 Private W. Laflin; 1993
Private A. Arbon; 3587 Private C. Lowe; 2384
Private S. Baldwin; 3191 Private A. Lucas; 5121
Private F. Bonner; 2469 Private E. Martin; 4962
Private W. Crofts; 2990 Private E Mathews; 2290
Private R. Carter; 4674 Private C. Murling; 2135
Private T. Cordon; 3336 Private J. Miller; 4651
Private C. Cooks; 2143 Private F. Newson; 4883
Private G. Clarke; 2298 Private A Osborne; 3024
Private J. Darley; 4924 Private F. Pausey; 3424
Private W. Edwards; 5067 Private H. Phipps; 4982
Private E. Griffiths; 2592 Private W. Read; 2148
Private H. Goodwin; 4796 Private S. Racher; 2838
Private R. Hester; 4734 Private B. Stearns; 4211
Private C. Humphreys; 5040 Private A. Wiles.
Private C. Ireland; 3332 Private William James Stock; 4745

The following message was received from the General, Cape Town last night :-
Cape Town 7th January (4.55 p.m.)
“No change in the situation as regards Methuen and Gatacre. Referring to my
telegram of yesterday French reports January 6 medical officer sent out to collect
all wounded to north-east of Colesberg to-day. Exact list of persons missing not
yet ascertained, probably about 70. 1st Essex Regiment has been sent to replace
1st Suffolk. Position of affairs, tactical and strategic, without alteration. Boer
medical officer admits that it was intended to go away from Colesberg. Enemy's
loss day by day from our fire heavy.”

From van Rensburg’s account. This is the striking story of a British soldier:
"We were awakened at half past twelve the morning of Jan 6th, and were put on
parade under command of Luit. Col. Watson and 10 other officers. We had orders
not to shoot, even if we were shot at but we had to go in front and be very quiet.
We marched towards Red Hill, about 1 1/2 miles from our camp. Arriving there we
were ordered to take our shoes off and continue either with tackies or bare-feet.
About half-way we had to halt and put bayonets on, and take the hill at the point
of our bayonets. As soon as we started marching forward, the call of a bird was
heard (I believe it was a watch). I also saw two lights to the right, but took no
notice.

Page 12 of 29
 Very quietly we continued - on our slippers - until about 20 yards from the top, in
closed formation Col. Watson called his officers together, and they were right in
front when a single shot fell, presumably by a Boer guard, and immediately we fell
flat. After about 2 minutes we heard people running, and thought they were our
men, but suddenly the whole top of the hill was aflame and bullets, left right and
all over. We lie down and wait for orders, nothing came, we were under barrage
for about ten minutes, then the colonel gave order to retreat, and the men on the
left flank fell back. Maj. Graham on the right flank gave order – ‘charge!’ with
disastrous results. Graham was heavily wounded, Col. Watson killed, his head
nearly cut off by the bullets, his aide-de-camp fell at his side.
Pandemonium followed in this dark morning at 4 o'clock, British shot and shot
each other. Very few of the Suffolk Regiment escaped. 152 of the British fell or
were wounded. At the side of the Burghers 8 men were killed, the British stated.
Comments were that nobody gave the order to retreat and French said that his
men panicked and acted injudiciously, he did not want a revenge attack. The
Suffolk Regiment was in such a bad state, that they temporarily drew back, and
they were sent to P.E. to obtain new officers and outfits.”

The Boers description:

"The soldiers were wearing beach shoes (tackies) slippers, and that made it
impossible for them to get very near the Boer trenches. Comdt van Vuuren did
not know that an attack was coming on his positions, but his 52 men were ready.
A cruel cross fire burst lose on the attackers but more than half of it was by
accident. Also the commander Col. Watson fell."
According to the statement of Comdt. Rooi Faans van Vuuren, Gen. Grobler was dissatisfied to
defend against such a majority as he saw it as a reckless and irresponsible act. Rooi Faans gave
him a very red-hot answer.
The full account of the encounter as recorded in “The Times History of the War in South Africa” –
Volume III, Pages 135 – 139:

“Meanwhile French was already receiving the reinforcements he had asked for.
The 1st Battalion Yorkshire Regiment, the 4th Battery, R.F.A., and a squadron of
colonial mounted infantry from Rosmead arrived on the 4th, and one and a half
squadrons of the composite regiment of Household Cavalry on the 5th. The whole
of the Suffolks were now concentrated at Kloof Camp; the Essex were moved up
to Rensburg and Porter’s Hill, setting free Porter’s brigade and the New
Zealanders for more active work; while the Yorkshires , distributed between
Rensburg, Arundel and Naauwpoort, looked after the communications. French
was now ready for another attempt on Colesberg, and a careful reconnaissance
on the 5th satisfied him that the key of the position was a large hill, known as
Grassy Hill, 3,000 yards east of Kloof Camp. This hill not only completely
commanded the Wagon Bridge road and Colesberg station, but its capture, by
taking in reverse Gibraltar and the eastern end of the Kloof Ridge, would also
render untenable all the Boer positions on the western side and immediately
compel the evacuation of Colesberg. At 6 p.m. he issued orders for the morrow’s
operations. The mounted forces and horse artillery on the left flank, together
with the 4th Battery and detachments from the Suffolks and Berkshires, were to

Page 13 of 29
start from near Kloof Camp at 5 a.m. and operate from north and west, so as to
capture Grassy Hill, while Porter demonstrated against the Boer centre as before.
The whole plan, in fact, was practically a repetition of the plan that had proved
so successful on the 1st but with this difference, that this time French assigned
the command to Colonel Eustace, R.H.A., instead of Colonel Fisher, and that,
with his troops so much nearer the enemy’s position, he considered a night
march and night attack superfluous. After the experience of the past few days,
French had every reason to expect that this comparatively easy operation would
be crowned with success, and may well have looked forward, as he returned to
his camp at Rensburg that evening, to spend his next night under a roof in
reconquered Colesberg.

At 7 p.m. Colonel Eustace brought round to the General an urgent request from
Colonel Watson, commanding the Suffolks at Kloof Camp, to be allowed to take
Grassy Hill by a night attack with half his battalion. Watson had already made the
same suggestion to French earlier in the day, when he accompanied him on his
reconnaissance, but had been refused. This time, however, French, having every
confidence in Watson, yielded to his importunity, and gave him a free hand to
carry out thus part of the operations in his own way, only directing him to inform
troops in the vicinity of the change of plan. The orders for the general turning
movement, nevertheless, still held good.

Soon after midnight, Colonel Watson marched out of camp with A, B, D and H
companies of his regiment, the men wearing soft shoes and carrying 200 rounds
of ammunition. It was not until the first halt that he explained the objective of
the march, informing his subordinates that no serious resistance was likely to be
offered, if indeed the hill was occupied at all, and laying the very greatest stress
on the necessity of all rifles being unloaded, and of the assault being delivered
with the bayonet alone – a warning which he again repeated at the next halt,
when he once more took care to explain to the officers precisely what he
intended each company to do. About 3 a.m. the little column arrived without
incident at the watercourse near the base of the hill (just below the present
memorial).

From here a gradual slope, with an occasional outcrop of shaly rock forming in
places steps of two or three feet rise, leads up for some 700 yards to the near
crest of the hill (where the photograph below was taken from) ;

Page 14 of 29
 Coleskop
Kloof Camp

Sangar

the ground then rises very gently for 200 yards to the further crest before falling
away steeply on the side towards the Wagon Bridge road.

Wagon Bridge road

It is this rear crest that the Boers held, only a few sentries being thrown out as
far as the western edge of the hill. So far from the hill being unoccupied, 200
Heilbron burghers were assigned to its defence, of whom fully half were actually
on the hill in readiness, while the newly arrived “Zarps” were camped close by.

About two-thirds of the way up the force halted in quarter column while the rise
above was reconnoitred. Then H and D companies advanced, accompanied by
the colonel. As they reached the crest a single shot was fired by a sentry. But the
men pushed straight on across the almost level summit, and were already half-
way across when suddenly a burst of firing broke out from the further edge. With
a loud cheer H company charged, but the rush died away in face of the withering
fire. Thinking the best chance of success lay in getting his men back below the

Page 15 of 29
crest and rallying them together with the rear companies for a second attempt,
Colonel Watson gave the order to “retire.” The fatal word, repeated from man to
man in the dark, broke the cohesion of the whole. More than half the men
rushed blindly down the hill and eventually returned to camp. The rest were
inextricably mixed, and though Colonel Watson and the company officers
attempted to re-form them, and gallantly led them forward in repeated bayonet
charges which almost carried home into the Boer position, their efforts proved
unavailing, more especially as the Heilbron men were now reinforced by a strong
party of police led by Lieutenant D.S. Maré. Shortly before dawn Watson himself
was killed, and most of his officers killed and disabled. The support of Eustace’s
guns, which came into action with daylight, was too late to convert failure into
success, and about 5.30 a.m. the remnant of the attacking force, now practically
surrounded at 50 yards’ range, surrendered. The failure of the Suffolks’ attack
seems to have paralyzed the whole force, and though the carrying out of
French’s original plan was still not impossible, no attempt was made to retrieve
the disaster by turning the right flank of the Boer position and renewing the
attack in broad daylight.

This unsuccessful affair, which, like Magersfontein, demonstrated the superiority

of the magazine rifle over the arme blanche, even in the dark, cost the British 11
officers and 150 men, of whom 5 officers and 32 men were killed or died of their
wounds, 4 officers and 48 men were wounded, and 2 unwounded officers and 70
men made prisoners. What was far more serious for French than the actual loss
in men was the loss of moral superiority he had so successfully won for himself,
and the loss of an opportunity that was not to present itself again; for before
French was ready to resume the attack, the reinforcements so urgently
clamoured for by Schoeman had arrived, bringing the Boer force up to fully 6,000
men. The Boer loss on January 6 was 9 killed or died of wounds, including
Lieutenant Maré, and 26 wounded. The victors treated their wounded prisoners
well, and were most sympathetic and courteous to the British burial party which
went out on the following morning. They readily gave their help, and a pathetic
scene took place at the open graveside. A grey-headed burgher asked leave to
make an address. In a rough, simple way he deprecated war and the sacrifice of
human life, and prayed for the time when all men should live at peace with each
other. Then the assembled burghers sang a psalm.

The unlucky Suffolks were now sent down to Arundel and Port Elizabeth to re-
officer, their place at Kloof Camp being taken by the Essex, whose defences were
in turn taken over by the Yorkshires. The left flank was now as strong as ever,
but for the moment French decided not to press his operations against a point
where his enemy was now strongly reinforced and on the alert. A move to the
right would both act as a diversion and prevent the Boers making a turning
movement on this side, where they had up till then been successfully held back
by the mere pretence of a force.”

Cecil Chisholm, in his autobiography “Sir John French” stated:

If ever French had cause for anger, it was over the unlucky incident of
the Suffolks, the one failure unwarrantably attributed to his ever
victorious arms. Yet he was the one officer who softened the bitterness
of that reverse to the men. He met the regiment in the Transvaal just
eight months after the disaster. His speech to the troops, as reported in

Page 16 of 29
 at least one paper, is well worthy of preservation. After referring to his
pleasure in meeting them all again, he said: ”What you did at Colesberg
is still fresh in my recollection ... but what I wish especially to recall is
the sad event of the night of January 5th and 6th, and to express my
sympathy with you on the loss of your gallant leader, Colonel Watson,
who on that night showed splendid qualities as a noble and able officer.
Now, it has come to my knowledge that there has been spread about
an idea that that event cast discredit of some sort upon this gallant
regiment. I want you all to banish any such thought from your minds as
utterly untrue. You took part ... in a night operation of extreme difficulty
on a pitch dark night, and did all in your power to make it a success. So
do not let any false idea get into your minds. Think rather that what
took place brings honour to your regiment, and add this event to the
long list of honours it has won in the past. I want you all to bear in
mind about such night operations, that they can never be a certain
success, and because they sometimes fail it does not, therefore, bring
discredit on those who attempted to carry them out. You must
remember that, if we always waited for an opportunity of certain
success, we should do nothing at all, and that in war, fighting a brave
enemy, it is absolutely impossible to be always sure of success: all we
can do is to try our very best to secure success–and that you did on the
occasion I am speaking of. I thank you for that and all the good work
you have done since, and remember above all that no slur whatever
attaches to your regiment for the result of that occasion.”

Letters and communications

from the Anglo-Boer War
Letters received from James Turner, Four Ashes Cottage, Welsham Le
Willows, Suffolk IP31 3BZ

Letters from men of the Suffolk Regiment 1899 - Jan 4th 1900

Printed in Local Papers 1899 & 1900

1. From Private H Potter 2533 of the first Suffolk's to his previous employer, Mr.
Petit, a coach builder in Bury St Edmonds, about early days in South Africa:
“Dear Sir,
At last I have the opportunity of writing a few lines to let you know how I am
getting on. We have been busy here and have not time to write before.
We set sail on the S.S. Scot from Southampton on the 12th November and reached
Cape Town on the 28th, after a fine and unadventurous voyage. One saw neither
ship nor land for 12 days after we left Madiera. I was not much struck by Cape
town what little I did see of it from our ship whilst in harbour, as it was our only
chance, for as soon as we landed we were served with 1000 rounds of
ammunition, packed into a train which was standing quite close to the quay, and
away to the front, it seemed so sudden we could hardly believe it.

Page 17 of 29
 We soon lost sight of Cape Town, and we were all wondering where we were
going to, but still we kept passing station after station till night came on, but still
we kept running on. We all fell asleep at last and the next morning when we
awoke we were still going. We found out where we were going when we reached
De Aar station (about 700 miles from Cape Town. We were heading for
Naauwport and we reached early next morning after being nearly 50 hours on the
train.
I could not help noticing the Cape colony was a desolate place. There being
scarcely any inhabitants whatsoever. Well, as soon as we disentrained, our
troubles started. The Boers were close to us and were firing on our cattle and
mules. We sent three companies out to drive them back, but they kept hanging
about making it very uncomfortable for us and so we were on outpost and piquet
duty nearly every night and the only chance we have to sleep is odd snatches
during the day.
We are in General French's column. He went out from here and engaged the
enemy about 6 miles from here and drove them back. He did not take our
regiment with him in case the Boers rushed in while he was out. There were 3 or
4 killed on our side but I don't know the enemy losses.
We expect to make the general advance on the 28th December, the enemy has
taken up a strong position at Colesberg about 18 miles from here and I expect I'll
be in the thick of it before you get this letter. We've had several severe sand and
thunderstorms here. It is fearfully hot, it will not be much like Christmas.”
2. Letter from Cpl Ellingham to a friend in Bury, dated 11th December 1899. Printed
in the Bury Free Press 13-1-1900:

“Just a few lines to let you know we have arrived quite safely at the front, and we
have captured a few Boers. We are camping at a place called Naaupoort. Three
of our companies have been sent to Rosemead to guard a bridge. We are in
General French's Brigade and we think we are soon to be ordered to march with
the division up to the Free State and clear the Boers off as we go. We are having
some hard times now and again. Sometimes we don't take our boots off for 3 or 4
days and it is hard in some places to get a wash, though as soon as we have a
wash we are as bad again owing to the dust.
We are all mad to get out here, but they will be very glad to get back. Sometimes
we get 24 hours sleep a week. It is as much as the men can do to keep their
eyes open when they are on outpost duty. We have to wash our shirts when we
get the chance and we don't shave, so you can bet we look all right".

3. A letter to his parents in Rede near Bury St Edmonds from Private C Cockle
(3053):
“Hope you have a Merry Christmas. We had a poor one here, we were on the
march on boxing day (? December) and fighting all the way. We marched to
Rensburg, stopped the night and marched to Colesberg the next day. We were
put on a big hill with bullets singing around our ears until the 6th January.”

4. Private Bridges wrote to his wife in Bury St Edmonds:

Page 18 of 29
 “I have got well up the front now. We have been under fire for three days now,
but yesterday there was a very hard fight which lasted 6 or 7 hours. The
cavalry made a gallant charge and a splendid sight. The shot and shell was
bursting all around us, but our regiment did not lose many, I think 3 killed and 6
wounded. We are very quiet today up to the present. I am writing this letter on
a very high hill on the lookout. There are 9 more men with me, the height of
the hill is 400 feet we can see for miles around.
You would look if you were to see me. I have not had a chance to wash for 3
days and we have not had our boots off for a week, so we are getting some of
the hard times. I think we shall be glad when it is all over. We have got 2000
Boers surrounded and General French is going to starve them out.”

5. Extract from a letter written by Private G Barnes to his mother in York Rd Bury St
Edmonds:
“.... My Company was fighting for 10 hours on the 4th January. We held a kopje
against about 1500 and we gave them socks. Their losses were high, we lost 2
killed and three wounded. Poor Pasha Baker was one of them, he fell next to me,
shot through the heart. It was no use to do anything he was dead as soon as he
was hit. We have been about 5 days on outpost duty without a wash and very
little sleep.”

Letters written after the Suffolk Hill defeat

6. Letter from Private E Emms to his mother in Risbeygate St., Bury St Edmonds:
“Just a few lines to let you know of the terrible disaster that has occurred just
lately to the regiment, but I am glad to tell you that I escaped quite safe. I was
in the thick of it that morning. We started from our camp at 12 o'clock one
night, and the orders we had was to capture the Boers position with the point of
the bayonet, and take it by surprise, the Boers being asleep.
But after starting from camp we had to march two miles before we got to this
big rock. We had to put on slippers so as to make no noise. It was a silent
march and no talking was allowed, and before we got to the top of the hill we
were fired upon by 2000 Boers.
We only had 4 Companies with us. They were firing on us in the dark and we
could not get under any cover whatsoever. We were about 20 yds away when
the Boers fired on us. We lost a lot of men, our Colonel, 4 officers and 34 men,
and several taken prisoner by the Boers. I am sorry to say my Company lost all
its officers - we are now coming back from the front as we have no officers. I
don't think we shall go to the front anymore until we have more officers from
home.”

7. Extract from a letter written by Private Cockle (See letter 3 for his first letter):

Page 19 of 29
 “.. our scouts passed the Boers sentry who fired a signal. We had orders to lay flat on our
faces to the ground, the bullets showered on us like a hail storm. We were close to their
rifles and our men dropped down in all directions, three by the side of me. A lump of lead
went passed my ear and hit a poor fellow in front of me, so I had to jump over him. The
wounded were calling out for their mothers and fathers. We had to run for our lives and
seek shelter. I got behind an antheap but had to retire again. One of my chums Bridge,
(Pvt. A Bridge), got shot through the head. There were 32 killed, 27 wounded and many
prisoners. It was all over in 10 minutes ..”

8. Letter from Arundel, dated 11-1-1900 from Corporal Charles Watts to his father:
“... There were 400 of us and 5000 Boers. It was slaughter. As soon as the first
shot was fired, a volley came, and H Company fell like dead sheep. The bullets
came over us like a hail storm. The Colonel said "Lay down men", which we did.
Then he found the fire was too much for us and he said "retire", and we did so,
scattered all over the shop. As the men came down they fell and the bayonets
were running in to one another, when we got 20 yards from the hill, men that
were shot fell by the score. If it had been light instead of dark we should have all
been shot. How I got to the camp I cannot tell anyone.
The Colonel and Adjutant were both shot through the head and killed. Bob Crick
of Barton was killed. The General originally gave the order to get the men up
between 3 and 4 am. and to go to the bottom of the hill and let us lay there till
daybreak. Then the hill was to be shelled for 1 hour. Had the General got the hill
he would have blown Colesberg up. The cavalry were to be on one flank and the
mounted infantry on the other. Four big guns were to be fired in succession,
which would have been a signal to charge. If this had been done we would have
got the hill.
PS I don't know if they will send us to the front again, they might if they get some
officers. I hope not, roll on England.”

9. Letter printed in the Bury Free Press 3.3.1900 written by Private J Ruffles to his
home in Tayfen Rd, Bury St Edmonds:
“I was one of the lucky ones on 6th January, which I dare say you know about.
There were about 330 of our regiment went to take a hill with 3 or 4 thousand
Boers on it. I with my Company had been laying on the hills for four days opposite
the Boers, firing at each other. We got relieved at 6 in the morning for a days
rest. At bedtime that night orders came that we were to parade at 4.00 am in the
morning to attack the hill. We were to march up, wait a short distance from it
and fix bayonets at daybreak. The artillery would shell the enemy position for one
hour, then we were to charge the hill and fire as much as we like, so as to take
them by surprise and drive them out. The cavalry were there to cut them off at
the right flank and the mounted infantry at the left. These were our orders and no
doubt it would have proved a great success.
Instead we were called at midnight and paraded in our slippers. We were taken
half way to the hill and halted to fix bayonets. The section commanders and
officers had a lecture which they kept to themselves, the only thing we were told
was that the password would be the same as it was in Gibraltar, "Steady old
12th".

Page 20 of 29
 Off we went again and two men of my Company were sent as points, i.e. to pass
the word from one Company to another, and I was one of them. A lot of whistling,
like a bird took place, but no notice was taken of that. We got to the top of the
hill, and the Colonel and the Scouts were up. We took a few more men up and
called for the officers. But no sooner as they got up a signal shot was fired by the
enemy. They did not forget to let us have it pretty warm. Nearly all the poor
chaps and officers who were at the front got knocked down and the Colonel was
wounded. He came back a little way and said "Retire my men", and those in the
front companies kept knocking us down in the rear. Our chaps got stabbed with
our own bayonets as we could hardly see one another. When we got back to
camp only one officer, Major Graham, got back he was wounded in two places. A
little later a fellow came in and said our artillery was firing into our own men and
did not know it. We were relieved by the `Essex' and sent back to Naaupoort.”
( Major Graham was shot through his right arm and lung - he somehow escaped capture and
crawled almost 2 miles back to Kloof Camp)

10. Anonymous letter published in a national newspaper `The Daily Mail' by an

unknown soldier (officer?) who took part in the attack:
“Four companies left Coleskop Camp at 12-30 am. Colonel Watson, who carried a
long white stick in his hand leading the way and feeling the ground as he went.
The troops marched with fixed bayonets in quarter columns with six paces
intervals between companies. The hill is situated about a mile from Coleskop
Camp. When about half way across the veldt a light suddenly appeared and
disappeared in the direction of Colesberg, a mile and a half to the right of the
column. Many took this to be a Boer signal, and very probably it was, as soon
afterwards a very good imitation of the thrilling notes of a night bird disturbed the
silent air.
Arriving at a deep ditch at the foot of the hill the column halted for a few minutes
and then commenced to climb. The hill was covered with huge boulders and the
men had to assist one another to climb up which proved very fatigueing. Every
now and then the troops halted to listen. They were nearly at the top of the hill
when the invisible `night bird' again gushed forth its dulcet tones, to be followed
almost immediately by a rifle shot fired by a Boer sentry, who was discovered
standing by himself just in front of the leading company (H) and just in front of
the centre of the hill. He was immediately bayoneted by one of our men and the
column lay down among the rocks waiting a few seconds.
The hill was ablaze with rifle fire. Mauser and explosive bullets dropping among
our men in showers. The explosive bullets as they hit the rocks throwing up a
weird light that showed objects for eight or ten yards around. Very few of our
men were struck at this stage and they were all remarkably cool and collected. In
fact most of them were laughing and joking as if the whole affaire was remarkably
funny.
After five minutes of this inaction, Colonel Watson called the officers towards him,
and after telling Captain Brett (Brett was wounded on Suffolk Hill) to take his men
round the right flank, ordered the company nearest him to `Retire Men'!
presumed to mean for them to retire a little. The leading company took the order
in the sense it was apparently meant, but the word `Retire'! being passed to the
companies in the rear was interpreted to mean `Retire' to the bottom of the hill.

Page 21 of 29
 Consequently while some retired, astonished at such an order, as everyone
expected the word `Charge', even though the close formation prevented anything
like an effective one. Some remained where they were, and the company in front,
after retiring a little, charged on its own account. Two thirds were shot down in
the attempt Colonel Watson having the roof of his head blown off by an explosive
bullet.
After retiring to the foot of the hill the troops awaited orders, but their being no
officers present to direct them, were eventually ordered by some of the Sergeants
to retire to camp.
Owing to the death of officers, the Suffolk have been ordered to Port Elizabeth to
await filling up vacancies in the officer ranks.”

Even after the fight things hardly improved

11. Drummer J. Walden of the 1st Suffolks to his mother:

“...We lost all our officers that fatal night, I am glad I got back safe and sound. I fell on some
chaps who were shot down in front of me. I got cut on the forehead with a sword, but did not
mind that as long as I did not get shot.
They have sent us down country because we had no officers. We are at a place called Port
Elizabeth which is very large. Things are so dear and we don't have much money so we are
nearly on the point of starvation. I have lost two stone since being out here. We get a pound of
brown bread and a little coffee, and nothing with the bread. But after the big fight I am a lucky
man to write this.

The prisoners seemed to be better off:

12. Letter from Lance Cpl A Clarke to his parents dated 10-3-1900:
"I expect by now you have seen in the papers I am a prisoner. I'm glad to tell you that I am in
the best of health, and to tell you we are treated well, better than I expected to be. We have all
acres of pasture land to do what we like on. All we have to do is get our meals ready. I daresay
you have read in the paper about our fight. About half who attacked got killed or wounded and
the remainder of us were ordered to surrender, or I think we should have all been killed, I was
very lucky, how I escaped the bullets I scarcely know. I had one through my haversack and a
splinter grazed my right knee, but nothing to talk about. I am glad Ben (Brother in the same
regiment) was not with us. Please do not worry as I am unlikely to come to any harm."
At the end of December French had advanced from his headquarters at Rensburg in the south
east as far as Coleskop, situated across an open plain on the west side of the town, was an ideal
place to observe troop movements for a great distance in the surrounding landscape. It was also
an ideal site to conduct operations via telegraph cables which would connect French with the
various camps.
French planned to immediately set up telegraph connections with Kloof Camp, Maeder's farm and
Porters Hill. The telegraph section of the 1st Field Troop RE under Lieutenant H.L. Mackworth
were alotted the task, of putting up these cables, often coming under shell fire as they worked.

Page 22 of 29
Between the 1st and the 13th of January the 1st Field troop engineers set up telegraph offices at
Rensburg, Waterhole, Porters Hill, Maeders Farm, Kloof Camp, the top of Coleskop, the bottom
of Coleskop, Slingersfontein, Hobkirks farm, McCrackens Hill, Potfontein and Kleinfontein.
13. The following letter was published in the John O'Groat Journal by E J Murray
who was stationed at Noupoort junction when the Boers marched into
Colesberg. Entitled; " At The Front - and how we spent New Year (Written at the
top of Coleskop)":
“About 4 p.m. we went and connected a telegraph line to the railway main
telegraph, after which we had our New Year's day dinner, (my two geese, taken
from Rensburg Farm). We had no forks and used our clasp knives and hands.
The geese were none the worse of the enemy's shot and shell, and they were the
main item on our menu. The following day we moved our camp. I was no sooner
done of tea (dry bread), when I got the order to leave for Coleskop, a big
mountain 1400 feet high, overlooking Colesberg and the enemy's position.
We ran a telegraph wire (insulated cable) right up and were finished 12 midday. I
slept in one blanket with another fellow who was to work an office at the bottom.
Next day we had a look round. The sight was worth the trouble. We could see
the town of Colesberg (President Kruger's birthplace), and all the Boer laagers
around it. Since then we have been gradually working round them".

Buoyed up by his first positive advance in 6 weeks of fighting French, set about completing his
plans to drive the Boers back across the Orange River as quickly as possible. Removing the Boers
from Colesberg and the surrounding kopies was easier said than done.
December, January and February are the hottest months in the Karoo, a factor which severely
hampered the heavily clad British troops. The town lay in a hollow, surrounded by an inner and
outer range of rocky, sprawling kopies, ridges and spurs which provided protection on all sides
except for a gap to the north where the road to the Wagon Bridge led to the Orange River.
By the end of December 1899 the Boers fell back from the outer circle of kopies, to take up
positions on the high inner ranges of kopies. Threatened with encirclement by the advancing
British forces, who had occupied the outer circle of kopies around Colesberg, Boer moral sank
even lower than Schoeman's leadership had already reduced it.
Even Schoeman realised the danger Colesberg was in and ordered Commandant Naude to
telegraph for reinforcements. Naude reported "the big hill", very near the town had been
captured by the enemy who had up to 35 guns and that they were being shelled from all sides.
He gives his casualties at this stage as 5 killed and 9 wounded. Gen Grobler also telegraphed
from the Colesberg Bridge for reinforcements.
14. Schoeman, himself sent the following telegram to Steyn:
" De vyand komt nu in groot getallen aan,ik schat hen soowat 3000 sterk en ook
met wagens. Zy hebben reeds 6 kanonnen in positie geplaatst en treinen zyn
reeds by Rensburg Siding aangekomen zoodat ik elk oogenblik een aanval
verwacht. Is er kans op hulp? "
(The enemy is arriving now in large numbers, I estimate about 3000 strong and
also wagons. They already have 6 field guns already in position and trains arriving
at Rensburg Siding so that I await an attack at any moment. Is there a chance of
help?)

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The reinforcements arrived promptly - De la Rey was ordered to leave for Colesberg, but before
he reached the town, the ZARPS under Van Dam crossed the Orange River on 1st January 1900.
Piet de Wet, whose appointment to Colesberg was seen as an attempt to assist and enliven
Schoeman, had arrived earlier. His headquarters were on the farm Kuilfontein which had been
abandoned by Thomas Plewman early in November 1899.
15. The following is Van Dam's account of his arrival in Colesberg:
"I crossed the Orange River at this stage, moving towards Colesberg where I
believed Schoeman was. As I advanced, I received reports from people that
Schoeman had suffered a defeat and was retreating.
I moved on to Schoemans camp on the east side of the town. I waited there and
Schoeman arrived with a large flag and escort. At the same time Luit Oosthuyzen
arrived with 400 men. He had left 200 men with his convoy. The plan was to
occupy strategic hills around the town. I set up a camp at Van Zyls farm and set
out to explore the area."

16. Van Dam clashed with Schoeman from the start, especially about strategy - after
receiving an order from Schoeman he wrote:
"I was not happy with this order because I reasoned that the position Schoeman
wanted me to hold was lower than the nek and would make me a helpless target.
I also pointed out that a day time advance would be foolish because the open
plains made any troops moving across visible from far, giving the opposition time
to set up their guns in the nek. Their infantry could then advance under cover of
these guns and the cavalry attack on the flanks around Coleskop. When the Boers
fell back under this onslaught, their only line of retreat would be towards the hill
upon which Schoeman and I were standing and there was a great possibility that
the British would be able to cut off this retreat.
Even if we climbed to our positions at night - we would still be sitting targets for
the British field-guns as soon as it was light enough to see. It would have been a
second Elandslaagte."

While the Boers remained inactive French made plans to attack. After careful reconnaissance, he
decided not to attack the strong Boer centre, but instead to embark on a series of manoeuvres in
the direction of the Colesber Wagon Bridge on Boer right wing. His main aim being to cut off
their communication and supply lines from the Orange Free which he reasoned would force them
to retreat.
Maeders farm lying to the west of Colesberg was chosen as the base from which to launch night
marches to various destinations from where a series of dawn attacks would surprise the Boers.
The main point of action being the Boer positions near the Colesberg wagon Bridge road.
Troops began moving from Rensburg to Maeders farm, in the late afternoon of the 31st
December. Colonel Porter set off from Rensburg with a cavalry brigade made up of 2 squadrons
of the Inniskillings, 1 squadron of New Zealand Mounted Rifles and two guns from "R" battery, to
add strength to the Thompson guns being used by the Carabiniers and NZMI (New Zealand
Mounted Infantry), who were already in position on a kopie about 2,000 yards from the Boer
position on Skietberg and the kopies to the south of Colesberg.
Porter's Hill, as it came to be known, not only provided cover for his troops, but also gave better
protection from an attack on the British flanks, because it commanded the open ground infront

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of a Boer position, believed to be held by a strong force of artillery, cavalry and mounted
infantry. Porter's orders were to keep the centre of the Boer position occupied, which would
cause a diversion and prevent them from sending the majority of their troops to defend the
Wagon Bridge positions. His first move was to direct heavy fire at the Boer location on the
opposite kopie.
Getting no response, Porter then directed Lieutenant Rundel and a troop of Carabiniers, the New
Zealanders under Major Robin and the New South Wales Lancers, to advance across the plain
and work up the kopie opposite the Boer position. When the troops were about 500 meters from
the crest of the kopie, the Boers opened fire. The heavy rifle fire forced the troops to return
hastily back to where their own guns could cover their retreat back to the safety of Porter's hill
with nothing gained but no lives lost. (This was the first time the New Zealanders went into
action).
To guard his right wing French sent out Major Rimington with his Guides, (about 175 strong),
from Jasfontein, and a squadron of Carabineers from Porter's brigade to work there way
eastwards around the Boer Left Flank. Their advance, which threatened Boer positions along the
railway line towards Achtertang and Norval's Pont, came under attack near Joubert's Siding. As
the attacking Boers were were only a small party from Commandant du Toit's commando,
Rimington's men succeeded in driving them off with out incident, but could advance no further.
From Maeders Farm troops began moving out, using the dark shape of Coleskop as a guide as
they headed towards the positions allotted to them by French. The first movement went well.
Colonel Fisher, in charge of the northward attack, had set off from Rensburg at 5pm on
December the 31st with the whole of his 2nd brigade division of artillery, except 2 guns from "R"
battery, four companies of Berkshires and some mounted Engineers. They reached Maeder's
farm four hours later. After a short rest they set of once more moving in a northerly direction.
As Fisher progressed, the infantry captured the nearest outlying spur of the western face of the
Boer position –about 10 kilometres from Maeder's farm. Then under cover of fire directed
towards the western face of the Boer position on the their left, the cavalry progressed towards
the Colesberg Bridge. Sheltered by spurs and kopies they advanced without incident until they
moved out onto the Colesberg Bridge road where they came under heavy fire from the Boers.
Fisher was ready for them and by bringing the 2nd Cavalry Brigade into action, succeeded in
capturing a position overlooking the Wagon Bridge road. They got no further than this as fierce
resistance stopped any further attempt to remove the Boers from their positions around the
bridge.
Major F.W.N. McCracken, commanding the 4 companies of Berkshires, began an advance in the
dark to launch an attack on a strongly held Boer position on a prominent kopie near Coleskop.
They were accompanied by French, who attached great importance to the capture of this kopie.
Hampered by darkness they advanced slowly along the south east foot of Coleskop. Their lines
were well spread out, but the stony ground and the thorny Karoo bushes caused the men to
loose contact with each other. There was no time to reform so the rear companies were soon left
behind. At 3.30 p.m., when the leading companies were close to their destination, shots rang
out to their right but nothing further. A quarter of an hour later the "A" and "B" companies
clambered up the slippery slopes to reach the top of the stony kopie without incident.
Dawn light revealed a higher kopie to the east, which concealed Colesberg from view. The kopie
they were on was connected on the south side by a transverse ridge and immediately they set
about improving their cover. The missing companies managed to catch up with them at this
stage and took up supporting positions behind the crest. At 4-30 a.m. the first Boer attack took
place on the north eastern side of the kopie. This was repelled as was another attack from
mounted Boers attempting to gallop around the right side across the plain.

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As dawn broke the Boers opened fire from a kopie to the east of the British position using a large
gun and a pom-pom. By 7 a.m. Boer fire had become so heavy that French was forced to order
the evacuation of the kopie. Before McCracken carried out this order Fisher's 10th Hussars
captured a kopie just to the north of McCrackens Hill, as it came to be known, which enabled
them to remain in this position.
In the meanwhile "R" Battery R.H.I. positioned on a kopie to the east and also on the back of
kopies south of Colesberg, steadily returned the Boer fire. They were relieved in the afternoon
by "O" Battery.
Still determined to advance closer to Colesberg, French sent Captain R.G. MacDonnell out to
asses the Boer position to the south east. He reported it to be very strong and the troops
remained where they were. They remained pinned down, as firing continued across the plain in
front and to the sides of McCracken Hill, until about 10 p.m. that night (1st January) which meant
that no water rations reached the British troops until the 2nd January. Several men were
wounded in the early hours of the battle and 2nd Lieutenant A.V. West was killed at 6 a.m. as he
stood up to observe the Boer positions through his field glasses. Three other men killed were
buried at the foot of the hill.
McCracken’s Hill became one of the key points in the British positions west of Colesberg. (It is
the first kopie on the right past Coleskop on the Philipstown Road about 2 kilometres from the
Merino Inn).
Between 2nd and 3rd January a Boer was arrested for releasing the brakes of a supply train
standing behind the British lines at Rensburg siding. The train and its loaded trucks, had rolled
back and come to a halt at Plewman siding in Boer territory. A detachment of Carabiniers and
mounted infantry, attempting to rescue the trucks, had to retire under heavy fire from the
Boer's. The New South Wales Lancers under Major Lee were detached to try and stop the Boers
from looting the trucks, but they too fell back under heavy fire as the Boers fiercely defended
their prize, which included a quantity of rum.
As the battle to capture Colesberg continued, things were not going well between van Dam and
General Schoeman. One of the many things that upset van Dam about Schoeman’s leadership
was the fact that no attempt was made to attack British troops moving freely around on the hill
slopes just across from Boer positions on the inner circle of kopies. There were also several
deserted tents full of provisions standing in the valley between the hills. Van Dam decided to do
something about this. Before dawn on the 3rd January 1900, he stationed men on the hills
opposite the British positions. Pohlman and MarŠ with 200 men were in one position Lieut
Bos‰l and Oosthuyzen with 150 men were stationed in another and an observation point was
set up to the north with 50 men under Lieutenant Robertson.
The following morning, when the British casually appeared on the slopes opposite the ZARPS,
they were fired on. Taken by surprise they hastily took cover and according to van Dam they
were not seen again. During that afternoon British maxims fired on van Dams men, but no
damage was done. That night the ZARPS fetched the tents and provisions which they regarded
as loot.
The presence of the ZARPS seemed to spur General Schoeman into action and he mounted an
attack on the British positions on McCracken Hill, west of Colesberg, which was threatening their
communications from the Wagon Bridge road. The Boer attack on McCracken Hill was launched
from Gibraltar Hill. They drove in the pickets and directed heavy fire on the Berkshires and
Suffolks position with 4 guns and pom-poms. This attack was repelled with a strong British
counter-attack. Fisher’s 10th Hussars supported by two guns on the left flank attacked them in
the rear and Captain Herbert, leading the Inniskillings (6th Dragoons) on the right flank opened
fire on their front.

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As the battle continued the British attack became so heavy that most of the Commandos
abandoned their positions. A group of about 400 mounted Boers retreated across a wide open
area towards Colesberg hotly pursued by lance wielding Hussars and Dragoons. The Boers,
braced by the presence of van Dam and the ZARPS which had greatly increased the moral of
their forces, were not easily repelled. About 200 made a firm stand, firing on the advancing
British troops from a sheltering kopie and several ridges close to Colesberg. The Bethlehem
Commando coming in to back up the Boers was cut off and Schoeman had to send men to try
and extricate them.
This checked Fisher's Hussars, who then attempted to rush the Boer position on foot. In the
skirmish that followed Major Harvey was killed. Finally, Captain de Lisle with some 200 mounted
infantry under cover from the artillery, managed to flush the Boers out of their positions.
Van Dams account of this clash :
“I was not part of this attack, but before dawn on the 4th January I went to a
position from where I could observe the whole terrain. I saw the Burghers
positioned in the hills Schoeman had indicated, but much further to the west and
behind the British left flank. I could not see the British but I could see Liut.
Pohlman firing a field-gun positioned on the Boer left flank.
The British returned the fire with 6 field-guns, forcing Pohlman to change position
several times and eventually after about 6 volleys he was forced to stop. Pohlman
later reported that it was at this stage - when the element of surprise gave the
Boers the advantage, and before the British field-guns could be brought into
action, Schoeman should have launched an attack to drive the enemy back.
Instead he did nothing which gave time for strong British infantry reinforcements
with 4 maxims to take up position. Pohlman trained one of his field-guns on this
new position and managed to hit one of the maxims. The Cavalry fell back. The
Burghers battled against the infantry for an hour making no ground. Then when
more reinforcements were sent in by the British the Boer position became
hopeless. Realising that he was going to have no assistance from Schoeman,
Pohlman made plans to cover their retreat. He asked permission to remove the
field gun to a position about 1 1/2 miles further back. The burgher front line fell
back first, followed by the rest – at first in an orderly fashion, but when the British
field gun bombardered them with shells - it became a headlong flight with
everyman looking to his own safety.
The 50 strong police group spread out in a long line and managed to keep the
cavalry at bay and cover the retreat. They suffered no loss. Within 2 hours after
the battle started the hills were deserted. The Burghers lost 6 dead, 14 wounded
and 21 captured. British losses were 22 dead and wounded."

From Colesberg General Schoeman reported heavy cannon, maxim and small-arm fire around the
surrounding kopies and bullets actually falling in the town. Later that day Van Dam an de Wet
were more successful south west of Colesberg. Van Dam retook Valkop, the prominent kopie
near the farm Kuilfontein that had been captured by the British two days earlier.
Piet de Wet launched a counter offensive at dawn on 4th January 1900, with 700 men on a vital
hill to the north west which the Suffolks had seized during an earlier assault. But the Suffolks
held firm and de Wet had to retreat.

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The British casualty list for 4th January was as follows: Killed 6 men including Major Harvey of the
10th Hussars. 15 wounded, including Major Alexander and Lieutenant Gibson of the Inniskillings.
90 Boers were reported killed and wounded and 20 Boer prisoners were taken that day.
The letters of the Suffolks show that at this stage the British troops believed they would soon
push the Boers back.
17. Extract from a letter written by Private G Barnes to his mother in York Rd Bury
St Edmonds:
".... My Company was fighting for 10 hours on the 4th January. We held a kopje
against about 1500 and we gave them socks. Their losses were high, we lost 2
killed and three wounded. We have been about 5 days on outpost duty without a
wash and very little sleep.”

18. A letter to his parents in Rede near Bury St Edmonds from Private C Cockle
(3053):
"Hope you have a Merry Christmas. We had a poor one here, we were on the
march on boxing day (26th December) and fighting all the way. We marched to
Rensburg, stopped the night and marched to Colesberg the next day. We were
put on a big hill with bullets singing around our ears until the 6th January."

19. Private Bridges wrote to his wife in Bury St Edmonds:

"I have got well up the front now. We have been under fire for three days now,
but yesterday there was a very hard fight which lasted 6 or 7 hours. The cavalry
made a gallant charge and a splendid sight. The shot and shell was bursting all
around us, but our regiment did not lose many, I think 3 killed and 6 wounded.
We are very quiet today up to the present. I am writing this letter on a very high
hill on the lookout. There are 9 more men with me, the height of the hill is 400
feet we can see for miles around. You would look if you were to see me. I have
not had a chance to wash for 3 days and we have not had our boots off for a
week, so we are getting some of the hard times. I think we shall be glad when it
is all over. We have got 2000 Boers surrounded and General French is going to
starve them out.”

Like French, Private Bridges had underestimated the Boers. Although the approximately 2000
strong Boer force was now threatened with encirclement, the inner circle of kopies around
Colesberg was still strongly held. The Transvaalers consisting of commandos from Johannesburg,
including the Johannesburg Germans, the Krugersdorpers and several guns, were entrenched at
their centre, on the southern side of the town on a kopie still known as Skietberg today. Their
left wing consisted of commandos from the southern Free State and covered the railway line,
which extended about 8 kilometres along eastern side of the town towards Norval's Pont. On the
west side of the town, the Heilbron and Bethlehem commandos held the right wing, covering the
road to Colesberg wagon bridge and extending nortwards to Bastard's Nek. This included, the
kopies south east of the town, Gibraltar Hill, the kopie east of McCrackens Hill and the Colesberg
Bridge. This also included the kopies to the east and west of the railway line, from Taaiboslaagte
to Rensburg and the re-captured Valkop.

Page 28 of 29
Laagers were positioned at the Norval's Pont and Colesberg bridges over the Orange River.
There was also a laager near the Orange River at Plessis Poort, another at Bastards Nek between
Colesberg and the Poort, and a gun west of Wagon Bridge Road.
The British positions on the outer circle of hills were as follows:
• The 1st brigade were camped at Rensburg Siding (Taaiboslaagte) - General French's
headquarters.
• 4 Companies of Suffolks under Colonel Watson relieved the 10th Hussars on the kopie they
occupied on the 1st January.
• The site, which became known as Kloof Camp, was to the west of Colesberg.
• A squadron of cavalry was positioned just north of this camp to protect their flank.
• McCrackens Hill was held by two companies of Berkshires and mounted infantry.
• The Berkshires and the Suffolks were supported by a section of Artillery camped near
Coleskop.
• Rimington's detachment, a squadren of cavalry and a company of New Zealand Mounted
Rifles were sent to hold an isolated position to the east of Colesberg on the farm Kleinfontein.
• Another other two companies of Berkshires were sent to Kloof Camp - about 2500 metres to
the north of Mccrackens Hill.

McCraken Hill came under heavy fire once again on the 5th January. The Boers were using gun
positioned on a kopie about 3000 metres from the British left flank (Gibraltar Hill). Two belts
(about 500 rounds) from the machine gun at Kloof Camp silenced the Boer fire.
20. Extract from a letter written by Private G Barnes to his mother in York Rd Bury
St Edmonds:
".... My Company was fighting for 10 hours on the 4th January. We held a kopje
against about 1500 and we gave them socks. Their losses were high, we lost 2
killed and three wounded. We have been about 5 days on outpost duty without a
wash and very little sleep.”
21. Private Bridges writes to his wife in Bury St Edmonds:

"I have got well up the front now. We have been under fire for three days now,
but yesterday there was a very hard fight which lasted 6 or 7 hours. The cavalry
made a gallant charge and a splendid sight. The shot and shell was bursting all
around us, but our regiment did not lose many, I think 3 killed and 6 wounded.
We are very quiet today up to the present. I am writing this letter on a very high
hill on the lookout. There are 9 more men with me, the height of the hill is 400
feet we can see for miles around. You would look if you were to see me. I have
not had a chance to wash for 3 days and we have not had our boots off for a
week, so we are getting some of the hard times. I think we shall be glad when it
is all over. We have got 2000 Boers surrounded and General French is going to
starve them out.”

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