Professional Documents
Culture Documents
This consultants report does not necessarily reflect the views of ADB or the Government concerned, and
ADB and the Government cannot be held liable for its contents. (For project preparatory technical
assistance: All the views expressed herein may not be incorporated into the proposed projects design.
ADB TA 7019-PHI
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCING AND BUDGET
REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FINAL REPORT
Volume One: Main Report and Appendices
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MLGOO
MOU
NEDA
NG
NGAs
NSO
NVA
PBUSS
PDF
PBGS
PHCO
PVS
RLPS
RPS
SEF
SLDR
SLGPR
SLGR
SMV
TA
TOR
UBOM
ULAP
UP-NCPAG
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VRA
WB
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
Executive Summary
I.
II.
2
2
7
8
9
9
15
22
9
9
15
22
25
25
28
29
V.
30
30
30
31
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Table 8
Table 9
Table 10
Table 11
Table 12
32
9
16
19
23
25
28
29
30
31
32
32
33
Appendix A:
Component A Outputs
Appendix B:
Component B Outputs
Appendix C:
Component C Outputs
Volume 2:
Volume 3:
Volume 4:
Volume 5:
Volume 6:
Volume 7:
Volume 8:
May 2010
Executive Summary
1.
This final report for ADB TA 7019-PHI: Local Government Financing and Budget
Reform Project summarizes the projects accomplishments from May 19, 2008-May 14, 2010
which concludes all activities for Component A, B and C, originally planned and additional
requested, and outlines the recommendations for the next steps for the concluded activities.
The contents of this final report were described in the projects consolidated fourth and fifth
quarter report submitted last October 2009 and agreed upon in the second variation
approval which was approved in November 2009.
2.
This main report is divided into six sections. The first section is the introduction and
provides a brief overview of the project as presented in the Inception Report. The second
section discusses the issues and the objectives of the project also as reported in the
Inception Report. The third section discusses the project deliverables, the rationale or
relation to the objectives of the project and their performance in the project. The fourth
section discusses the project outcomes what were the assumed to be, what actually
happened, and their implications. The fifth section provides the conclusions and the next
steps. The final section presents a report of the use of consultant and workshop/consultation
resources up to the writing of this report.
3.
Under the Inception Report, the focus of Component A is to 1) facilitate the creation
or institutionalization of the Coordinating Committee on Decentralization; 2) provide technical
support for the CCD Policy Agenda; and 3) facilitate the creation of the CCD technical
secretariat to replace the project support team. It was determined during project design and
reconfirmed during the inception period that there was a need for a coordinating body
composed of the oversight central government agencies the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG), the Department of Finance (DOF), the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) and the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)and
the local government leagues the League of Provinces of the Philippines (LPP), the
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), the League of Municipalities of the Philippines
(LMP), the Liga ng mga Barangay (LnB), and Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines
(ULAP) to address interrelated issues in fiscal decentralization, local financial management,
local expenditure management and planning, local revenue generation, and local
governance. Although under the Local Government Code of 1991, such a coordinating body
was created, it met very rarely, with last recorded meeting held in 2005, and was difficult to
organize due to the size of its membership which spanned all levels of government including
the legislature. It was determined that a smaller body composed of the abovementioned
agencies could address a majority of the local government issues and could elevate the
more difficult ones to the LGC created body or Oversight Committee on Devolution (OCD).
In order to further support this new body, technical support and assistance for the creation of
a technical secretariat was needed.
4.
The focus of Component B is to provide 1) a deeper appreciation by the DILG Local
Government Operations Officers (LGOOs) and other key actors in the extension of planning
assistance to LGUs, e.g., Provincial Planning and Development Coordinators and HLURB
field personnel at the regional and provincial levels of the concepts and principles of the
rationalized local planning system and the JMC No. 001 series of 2007;Improved
competencies of the DILG LGOOs to exercise their functions as coaches/trainors for LGUs
in the preparation of CDPs, and as collaborators/facilitators in the preparation of Codecompliant CLUPs in their respective LGUs; and improved data management system
(collection, storage, retrieval)
Page | i
May 2010
5.
The focus of Component C of TA 7019 is for improving revenue and service delivery
through an improved implementation of the Local Governance Performance Management
System (LGPMS). The LGPMS is one of the major innovations in improving local
governance in the country. The purpose of the system is to evolve a performance-based
management system and strengthen a culture of performance amongst local governments.
6.
The deliverables of Component A were calibrated to meet the three objectives: a) the
creation or institutionalization of the Coordinating Committee on Decentralization, b)
progress on selected LGFBR-related policy reforms, and c) the creation and capacitating of
the CCD technical secretariat. The achievement of the second objectives is related to the
achievement of the first since it was by jointly working at these key reforms that the
members of the CCD moved towards institutionalizing the body. The following table presents
the deliverables in the Inception Report versus the Actual Deliverables:
7.
The deliverables for main task 1 were designed to provide the DILG and CCD
members with technical assistance on both a pre-selected set of policy concerns for the
purpose of addressing these concerns as well as acclimate them to working with each other
as a body paving the way for the formalization of the CCD. As noted in the table above, only
one policy concern (i.e., NG-LGU Co-Management Issues) did not meet the interest of either
the DILG or the CCD. At the beginning of the project, ten (10) policy issues were preidentified but nine (9) were actively taken up with at one policy outputs generated for the
policy issue and twenty-four (24) additional policy outputs generated for policy issues outside
of the original ten. By this writing of this report, the number of policy outputs generated
exceeded the original count by at least 2.4 times. The additional policy outputs were either
quick-policy response memorandum requested by the DILG for urgent policy issues such as
legislative measures to decrease the local Amusement Tax and creating an additional
bureaucracy for land valuation to issues papers on LGU Access to ODA and local credit
financing and the formulation of the governments (i.e., National and Local Government)
position for the Philippine Development Forum Working Group on Decentralization and Local
Government annual workplan.
8.
The deliverables for main task 2 were designed to formalize the Coordinating
Committee on Decentralization, its membership and structure, scope of work, relation to
other agencies, and technical secretariat. After much deliberation, the legal instrument
decided upon was a Memorandum of Understanding which was signed by both the oversight
agency members (i.e., DILG, DOF, DBM, and NEDA) and the LGU Leagues (i.e., LPP, LMP,
LCP, LnB, and ULAP) last November 2009. A welcome development occurred during the
deliberations which resulted in the agreed expansion of the powers of the CCD. In earlier
deliberations, it was agreed that the role of the CCD was to address issues which did not
require the reconstitution of the much larger, multi-sectoral Oversight Committee on
Devolution (OCD). However, upon the request of the DBM, the group has decided to
become the body which would trigger the reconvening of the OCD to address policy issues
that is beyond the authority of the CCD members. An example of such policy issue is the
determination of the release of the IRA shares based on new census data. This policy issue
will be discussed in the next CCD meeting as well as an agreement on how to trigger the
recovening of the CCD possibly through a CCD resolution and a MOU with the Office of the
President.
9.
The deliverables for the third task have been completed by project end with
recommendations for further assistance to the CCD Technical Secretariat included in this
final report. However, part of this assistance is being provided in the upcoming LGFBR
Subprogram 2 TA.
10.
Page | ii
May 2010
12.
Meetings with other national government agencies are envisioned to draw out
consensus on how thematic/cross-sectoral or sectoral concerns can be mainstreamed or
integrated not only in the CDP preparation process but more importantly, in the rationalized
local planning system.
13.
Some of the agencies identified for this purpose are the National Council on the Role
of Filipino Women (NCRFW) for Gender and Development; National Disaster Coordinating
Council (NDCC) for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan; National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) for the Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and
Protection Plan (ADSDPP); Council for the Welfare of Children for the protection of children
and promotion of childrens rights; National Police Commission/National Security Council for
the Peace and Security Plan; etc.
14.
In the course of the project period, Component B conducted eleven (11) training
activities covering all regions except for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The
total number of person trained is 658 which is 54.8% higher than the 425 persons trained
committed under the Inception Report.
Page | iii
15.
May 2010
16.
As a result of the outputs of Component A, the following outcomes are being
targeted:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
17.
Three out of the five outcomes have been achieved in full by the end of the project in
May 2009. These are the creation of the CCD, the creation of the CCD Technical
Secretariat, and the development and approval of a medium-term agenda. The first two were
completed through a signed Memorandum of Understanding and the third was finalized as
the LGU Medium-Term Roadmap, 2010-2015 for submission to the next administration.
18.
Two outcomes the passage of legislation for increasing local taxes and
memorandum of agreement for further decentralization in selected national government
agencies such as Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources, Health, and Social
Welfare and Development were substantially achieved. This means that the policy reform is
in place and will continue to be pursued with a likelihood of being achieved some time after
the project has concluded and in the next administration. With respect to legislation on
improving local taxes, it was the assessment of the team that although consensus and
support was achieved among the CCD members, it could not anticipate nor compensate for
the dynamic between the LGUs and the legislature. It was reported that there exists
underlying friction and competition between some members of Congress, who are also
members of the House Committee on Local Government, and local chief executives. This
resulted in resistance on the part of the legislature to file bills that would improve local
resource generation from taxes. This resistance was strong enough to bar the draft bill in
spite of consultations with the House Committee and letters of endorsements from the DILG
Secretary and the President of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and the League of
Page | iv
May 2010
Municipalities of the Philippines. On the other hand, the CCD has not given up on the
proposed measures and will continue to pursue the filing of the bill and the advocacy of the
reform in the next administration when new congressional members will be elected.
However, this project also recommends that any pursuit of this reform in the next
administration study what incentives can motivate and be instituted in order to generate
congressional support for the reforms.
19.
A critical lesson learned from this project is the need to identify incentives on the part
of the legislature in the pursuit of policy reforms. A good example can be found in the
passing of legislation for the lowering of the local amusement tax. In spite of opposition from
the DILG, BLGF and the LGU Leagues, the legislature, both the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the measure which contravenes the intent of the Local Government
Code of 1991 to improve local revenue generation. The local amusement tax is one of the
taxing powers of the province and city. However, strong support came from both Houses of
Congress because the measure was requested by the local entertainment industry
composed of film producers, actors, and theatre owners. Since local legislators gain
electoral mileage when endorsed by film celebrities, they ensured that the bill passed quickly
into law.
20.
On the matter of further decentralization in selected national government agencies,
executive support in the form of resources for re-engineering the bureaucracy was no longer
available thereby weakening the initiative. Movement in the policy agenda was heavily
contingent on the momentum brought about by the re-engineering agenda of the National
Government. This would provide the incentive for opening up the devolution of functions and
resources to the LGUs by ensuring that redundant central government agency function and
personnel would be compensated with a adequate retirement or separation package.
However, lack of resources, partly due to the financial crises, weakened executive support
for the agenda and the flow of resources. In addition, policy reversals were also being
implemented in some agencies such as the Department of Agriculture which was moving
towards re-nationalizing the devolved functions as well as calls on the part of some
provincial LGUs to re-nationalize their hospitals since they did not have the resources to
support their operation. By the mid-term report of this project, discussions with DILG moved
towards ensuring that the LGUs would have a position paper on further devolution in
selected sectoral agencies that they could present to the next administration for discussion.
The CCD has agreed to support the dialogue and move towards greater decentralization of
the functions with the position papers as the base. As with the local tax legislation, this policy
agenda is in place and has a likelihood of being achieved but sometime after the project has
terminated.
21.
Overall, the desired ultimate outcomes of Component B are the adoption of Codecompliant CDP borne out of enhanced competencies of LGOOs to extend technical
assistance to LGUs and LPDCs in CDP and LDIP formulation within the framework of the
RPS and JMC No. 001 series of 2007; strengthened plan-to-budget linkage through the
investment program; integration of sectoral, cross-sectoral and/or thematic concerns and
plan documents mandated by law or advocated by some national government agencies in
the RPS and the CLUP and CDP.
22.
Modest outcomes are generated based on the Component C accomplishments and
deliverables. The highlights of these outcomes are the re-establishment of the LGPMS as
on-line system and the completion of the LGPMS utilization manual which provides guidance
to users in maximizing the LGPMS information in LGU planning, budgeting and capacity
development planning.
23.
The table below present the recommendations of Component A for succeeding
technical assistance.
Page | v
May 2010
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Expected Outputs
Finalization of CCD Medium-Term
Roadmap consolidating policy
concerns from other stakeholders for
presentation to next administration.
Finalization of CCD short-term policy
agenda.
Provision of policy advise on CCD
policy matters.
CCD Meetings.
24.
The table below present the recommendations of Component B for succeeding
technical assistance in the areas of local capacity building.
Table 2: Component B Next Steps: Activities and Expected Outputs
Activities
Expected Outputs
1.
a)
2.
a)
b)
c)
d)
3.
4.
Development
of
CLUP
Review
Guidelines, to be used by the Provincial
Land Use Committee (PLUC), that will
ensure harmonization and vertical
integration of the CLUP with the
Provincial Development and Physical
Framework Plan (PDPFP).
e) Development and printing of Manuals for
the preparation of a Provincial
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and a
Provincial Development Plan as
alternative guidebook for formulating two
separate plans as mandated by the Local
Government Code.
Technical
assistance
to
National
Government Agencies and LGUs in
developing
guidebooks/manuals
for
mainstreaming
sectoral/cross-sectoral/
thematic concerns in the CLUP and CDP.
Continuous dialogue with DBM re: adoption
of common definition of terms used in
investment programming
Manual Project End May 2010.
Page | vi
May 2010
25.
The fundamental steps for maximizing the LGPMS results in LGU management
functions such as in planning, budgeting and policy development are put in place in this TA
through the LGPMS Utilization Manual. The manual needs to be integrated into the other
LGPMS manuals and disseminated and popularized accordingly with the intended users.
The core DILG staff at the regional and provincial levels should start testing/using the
manual particularly its links to budgeting and capacity development planning. The link of the
LGPMS in development planning can also be put test after next years elections. Training
and coaching modules should be developed for this purpose.
26.
With regards to the systems performance, this needs to be fully tested especially
prior to the conduct of the next round of planning cycle after the 2010 elections. The current
data entry should be technically assessed to prepare the system for a wider and intensive
use in 2010.
27.
The table below outlines some of the key activities that need to be completed to
ensure a wider acceptance and utilization of the LGPMS by LGU users.
Table 3: Component C Next Steps: Activities and Expected Outputs
Activities
Expected Outputs
Integration of the LGPMS Utilization Manual with the LGPMS User Wider utilization of the LGPMS
Manual
manual
Dissemination and training
DILG expertise in facilitating the use
of LGPMS
To further strengthen capacity, improve system performance, and Improvement of the LGPMS System
operations of the system, the following activities are necessary as Design
follows:
Page | vii
I.
May 2010
1.
This final report for ADB TA 7019-PHI: Local Government Financing and Budget
Reform Project summarizes the projects accomplishments from May 19, 2008-May 14, 2010
which concludes all activities for Component A, B and C, originally planned and additional
requested, and outlines the recommendations for the next steps for the concluded activities.
The contents of this final report were described in the projects consolidated fourth and fifth
quarter report submitted last October 2009 and agreed upon in the second variation
approval which was approved in November 2009.
2.
This main report is divided into six sections. The first section is the introduction and
provides a brief overview of the project as presented in the Inception Report. The second
section discusses the issues and the objectives of the project also as reported in the
Inception Report. The third section discusses the project deliverables, the rationale or
relation to the objectives of the project and their performance in the project. The fourth
section discusses the project outcomes what were the assumed to be, what actually
happened, and their implications. The fifth section provides the conclusions and the next
steps. The final section presents a report of the use of consultant and workshop/consultation
resources up to the writing of this report. In order to avoid a voluminous report, only project
outputs completed after the consolidated fourth and fifth quarter report will be included in the
appendices. The reader is referred to the first, second, consolidated third quarter and midterm report, and consolidated fourth and fifth quarter reports for previous project outputs.
3.
An appendix providing the final outputs of Component A, B and C are included in this
report. Volume 2 contains the finalized training modules for Component B. Volume 3
contains the finalized Enhanced Guide to Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP)
Preparation. Volume 4 contain the Guide to Ecological Profiling. Volume 5 contains the
report on Rationalizing the Local Planning System. Volume 6 contains finalized Study on the
Local Planning Database Management System. Volume 7 contains the outputs of
Component C which includes the LGPMS Users Manual and sample output. Volume 8
contains the Legislative Agenda for the Comprehensive Study on the Status of
Decentralization under Component A.
4.
Under the Inception Report, the focus of Component A is to 1) facilitate the creation
or institutionalization of the Coordinating Committee on Decentralization; 2) provide technical
support for the CCD Policy Agenda; and 3) facilitate the creation of the CCD technical
secretariat to replace the project support team. It was determined during project design and
reconfirmed during the inception period that there was a need for a coordinating body
composed of the oversight central government agencies the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG), the Department of Finance (DOF), the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) and the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)and
the local government leagues the League of Provinces of the Philippines (LPP), the
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), the League of Municipalities of the Philippines
(LMP), the Liga ng mga Barangay (LnB), and Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines
(ULAP) to address interrelated issues in fiscal decentralization, local financial management,
local expenditure management and planning, local revenue generation, and local
governance. Although under the Local Government Code of 1991, such a coordinating body
was created, it met very rarely, with last recorded meeting held in 2005, and was difficult to
organize due to the size of its membership which spanned all levels of government including
the legislature. It was determined that a smaller body composed of the abovementioned
agencies could address a majority of the local government issues and could elevate the
more difficult ones to the LGC created body or Oversight Committee on Devolution (OCD).
In order to further support this new body, technical support and assistance for the creation of
a technical secretariat was needed.
Page | 1
May 2010
5.
The focus of Component B is to provide 1) a deeper appreciation by the DILG Local
Government Operations Officers (LGOOs) and other key actors in the extension of planning
assistance to LGUs, e.g., Provincial Planning and Development Coordinators and HLURB
field personnel at the regional and provincial levels of the concepts and principles of the
rationalized local planning system and the JMC No. 001 series of 2007;Improved
competencies of the DILG LGOOs to exercise their functions as coaches/trainors for LGUs
in the preparation of CDPs, and as collaborators/facilitators in the preparation of Codecompliant CLUPs in their respective LGUs; and improved data management system
(collection, storage, retrieval)
6.
The focus of Component C of TA 7019 is for improving revenue and service delivery
through an improved implementation of the Local Governance Performance Management
System (LGPMS). The LGPMS is one of the major innovations in improving local
governance in the country. The purpose of the system is to evolve a performance-based
management system and strengthen a culture of performance amongst local governments.
II.
Component A
7.
The passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 was a considered a landmark
legislation because it not only transferred the responsibility for the provision of basic services
from the central government to LGUs but also provided the resources to perform these
functions through a system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers (e.g., IRA) and increased
powers to generate own-source revenues, both tax and non-tax (e.g., economic enterprises).
Although the intent was to promote greater local autonomy based on the principle of
Subsidiarity and principles set forth in 1987 Philippine Constitution, the implementation of the
Code was far from smooth and seamless. Even after almost 17 years of the implementation
of the Code, some problems persist not only with regards to the implementation of the
Codes provisions but also with respect to relevance and validity of some provisions given
current and changing fiscal, administrative and political realities.
8.
As part of the process of designing the LGFBR program loan, the ADB team
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the fiscal issues in the LGU sector. The
following summarizes the various key issues:
a.
May 2010
government agencies operating at the same level (e.g., police, fire protection,
etc.).
b.
c.
d.
May 2010
measurement system, LFPMS. However, its use for the purpose of local
planning is still undeveloped.
e.
f.
9.
After the Code took effect in 1992, an Oversight Committee on Devolution or OCD
was formed pursuant to Section 533 of the Code. The section provides that
the President
shall convene the Oversight Committee that shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules
and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all
provisions of this Code thereby ensuring compliance with the principles for local autonomy
as defined under the Constitution. The Committee was a joint executive-legislative body
which had the Executive Secretary as the chairman, three members from the Senate, three
members of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government,
Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Budget and Management, and representatives from
the League of Province, the League of Cities, the League of Municipalities, and the Liga ng
mga Barangay. A technical staff composed of regular employees from both Congress and
Page | 4
May 2010
the Executive was formed to support the activities of the OCD. The OCD eventually faded
away as the transition problems were addressed. However, the OCD was no longer
operational when the transition problems were replaced by implementation issues.
10.
The importance of the OCD or a similar body to address LGU fiscal issues was
highlighted in the LGFBR policy matrix as noted in the previous section. The Philippine
government has committed to forming a Coordination Committee on Decentralization as a
clearinghouse for various LGU fiscal issues that have consequences on delivery of basic
public services. It is intended that through greater coordination among the national
government oversight agencies, a more effective and efficient if not timely resolution of these
issues may be achieved.
11.
Based on consultations with the DILG and the Inception Workshops, the emphasis
has shifted from the LGFBR policy matrix as the centrepiece of this Component to the
Coordination Committee for Decentralization. It was therefore decided to re-title the
Component
Decentralization and Institutionalizing the LGFBR Policy Matrix to
Pursuing
and Institutionalizing Reforms in Decentralization through the Coordination Committee on
Decentralization. It was therefore envisioned that the major policy objectives of the LGFBR
Policy Matrix would be pursued through the CCD.
12.
As a result of the consultations and the two (2) inception workshops, the objectives
have been restated as follows:
a. To facilitate the creation of an evolving body at the Executive Level that will address
issues arising from decentralization and pursue reforms embodied under the scope
of the LGFBR policy matrix. (Task 1: Facilitate the creation of the Coordination
Committee on Decentralization (CCD).
b. To facilitate the actualization of selected mature decentralization reforms and open
dialogue on other less advanced reforms in the abovementioned body. (Task 2:
Provide Technical Support for CCD Agenda)
c. To assist in the creation of a technical support group that will replace the project
team after project termination and provide continuity to the reforms. (Task 3:
Facilitate the creation of a CCD Technical Secretariat)
13. As a result, it was decided to revise the general approach from developing the CCD
early on in the project to the second semester or after 2 quarters. There was a need to
acclimate the pre-CCD members to working on reform issues before establishing a structure
around them. It is only when there is some comfort among the members on how they can
pursue these reforms can a more structured organization be proposed and institutionalized.
In order to operationalize this approach, the pre-CCD members will pursue an initial set of
reform issues which they have mutually agreed to address. The CCD members will
appreciate the need for institutionalizing the CCD or buy into it when they can see value in
the mechanism in the pursuit of the reforms they are most concerned with. In effect, it is
institutionalizing the CCD by institutionalizing the process by which the stakeholders pursue
the reforms.This approach would reduce the resistance to formalizing the body as well as
build a strong collegial relationship among the members.
14. Since the MOU on the JMC 2007-1 has established a collegial body, this
pre-CCD
group can be the basis for addressing LGU and Devolution reform issues through an
consensus agreement on what their agenda should be, what their job is, and who should
they consult to pursue these reforms.
Page | 5
May 2010
15. As part of the organizational agenda, there is also a need to look into how the CCD
will eventually address coordination with other coordinating bodies (e.g., sectoral) as well as
open dialogue on how these coordinating bodies should relate to each other. In addition,
there is also a need to look at other operational issues such as how the CCD will relate to
other bodies at the regional level. Finally, there should also be flexibility in the event that an
opportunity should arise that the CCD could eventually become and oversight body.
16.
b.
Pursue interim set of reforms (i.e., interim-CCD reforms) with the DILG and
the interim CCD and, through the DILG, concerned partners (e.g., LGU
Leagues) that have reached a state of maturity and cannot wait for the formal
CCD body also as a means of providing an
OJT-experience for the interim
CCD members on the pursuit of these reforms as a body.
c.
d.
Coordinate with ADB TA 4778 for inputs that are necessary for the CCD
agenda and the creation of the CCD technical secretariat.
e.
Network with other ADB projects (e.g., NEDA Harmonization TA Phase II) to
mitigate potential conflicts as well as other members of the Philippine
Development Forum Working Group on Local Governance and
Decentralization.
17.
To provide the interim-CCD with a selection of policy issues to address, this inception
report outlines below a set of proposed policy issues for the CCDs Medium Term Agenda:
a.
b.
Harmonization of Land Use Planning and Management LGU-NG comanagement issues. ( Non-Legislative)
c.
d.
e.
f.
Page | 6
May 2010
g.
h.
i.
j.
B.
Component B
Page | 7
on
Comprehensive
May 2010
i.
Introductory Course
Formulation; and
Development
Plan
ii.
b.
c.
C.
Component C:
22.
The use of performance measurement system as a management tool is sparingly
utilized amongst LGUs in the Philippines. Most often, performance measurement is
completed for reporting and for compliance purposes only. In recent years, there has been
increased interest on the part of LGUs, government agencies, and international
organizations in the assessment of LGU performances particularly in the areas of service
delivery and financial management. New systems were developed and improved to address
the concerns of improving LGU performance. The nature of these tools varied from LGU
self-assessment to national data collection and assessment.
23.
The Local Government Performance Measurement System (LGPMS) of the DILG is
one of the more recent systems introduced to LGUs. First implemented on a national scale
in 2004, the LGPMS is innovative in many ways. One, it was a pioneering system which
utilized the power of information technology as a means accessing the database. Two, the
development of the system involved consultative processes and mechanisms especially in
the identification of performance indicators. Third, it emphasizes on LGU self-assessment
and local teams as opposed to the traditional national data collection processes.
24.
The LGPMS performance framework covers two assessment concerns. First, the
LGPMS guides LGUs in assessing organizational performance by determining strengths
and weaknesses in the performance of their roles and responsibilities and service delivery
across 5 performance areas and 17 service areas. Second, the system also provides the
LGUs with an instrument for determining the socio-economic and environmental
development in a locality using selected outcome or development indicators.
25.
After several years of implementation, the system experienced errors in connectivity
affecting data entry and report generation capabilities. At the start of Component C, the
following issues were encountered during the re-development process:
26.
In addition, understanding the real purpose of the system was also misunderstood.
Many LGUs mistook the self-assessment intention of the system for scorecard thereby
affecting the integrity of data collection and assessment. The obvious lack of database in
many LGUs also affected the data capturing process, as LGus have no available data to
respond to the LGPMS performance indicators.
Page | 8
May 2010
The DILG, with the technical assistance of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), is currently
addressing these concerns. The LGPMS is now back as an internet database system. The
LGPMS indicators were reviewed and revised to be more user-friendly and to address the
unavailability of some indicators. Financial indicators coming from the Bureau of Local
Government Finances (BLGF) Local Governance Financial Performance Measurement
System (LGFPMS) were also incorporated as part of the performance indicators of the
LGPMS. The systems administration and management systems are also being
strengthened.
27.
The main challenge for the system, however, lies in the utilization of the LGPMS
performance reports for improving overall LGU management particularly in service delivery
and improving financial performance. Component C of ADB TA 7019 would complement
other ADB TA on LGPMS. Component C objectives are as follows:
.
III.
a.
b.
To improve the system for monitoring and analyzing overall LGU performance
through the development of a framework for analysis that links governance
with revenue performance and service delivery
c.
d.
Component A
28.
The deliverables of Component A were calibrated to meet the three objectives: a) the
creation or institutionalization of the Coordinating Committee on Decentralization, b)
progress on selected LGFBR-related policy reforms, and c) the creation and capacitating of
the CCD technical secretariat. The achievement of the second objectives is related to the
achievement of the first since it was by jointly working at these key reforms that the
members of the CCD moved towards institutionalizing the body. The following table presents
the deliverables in the Inception Report versus the Actual Deliverables:
Table 1: Component A - Summary of Project Deliverables: Actual Vs. Expected.
EXPECTED
ACTUAL
REMARKS
Main Task 1: Provide Technical Support for the interim CCD and the interim-CCD and CCD
Agenda:
1. Draft first year (1-year) CCD 1.1 Draft first year agenda for Completed on schedule.
interim agenda for approval of Interim CCD.
DILG and interim CCD.
2. Draft medium-term agenda (5- 2. LGU Medium-Term Agenda, Draft version under review by
years) for CCD.
2010-2015.
CCD. Finalization by project
end. Agenda is being prepared
for next administration and will
apply to activities within and
outside of the CCD.
3. Workshop/consultation with 3. First consultation conducted Completed
but
more
CCD members on medium-term in October 2009.
consultations will be conducted
agenda
to finalize.
Page | 9
May 2010
9.
Technical/Policy/Advocacy
Advisory Reports (TPAAR):
Implementation
of
further
devolution without legislative
action in the Department of
Agriculture,
Department
of
Environment
and
Natural
Resources,
Department
of
Health, and Department of
Social Welfare and Development
Page | 10
May 2010
Page | 11
May 2010
Page | 12
May 2010
Presentation
for
CCD
Executive Committee).
15.16 Mobilization of ODA
Support (Presentation for
CCD
Executive
Committee).
15.17 Decentralization
Experience
of
the
Philippines: Challenges and
Implications
on
Local
Government
Finance
(Working
Group
on
Decentralization and Local
Government, Government
Side Presentation for
CCD
Executive
Committee).
15.18 Policy Memorandum
10 March 2009: Comments
on
Disaster
Risk
Management
(DRM)
Program Memo.
15.19 LGFBR Issue Paper
No. 1 Towards Enhancing
the Ability of LGUs to
Generate Revenues from
Business Taxes.
15.20 Initial Future LGFBR
Recommended
Policy
Reforms
15.21 Initial LGFBR Subprogram 3 Policy Inputs
15.22 Policy Memorandum
June 1, 2009: Comments
on
NEDA
Letter
on
Imposition of the Idle Land
Tax.
15.23 Policy Memorandum
August
12,
2009:
Comments on Overseas
Farm Investments.
15.24 Proposed 2009-2010
Work Plan Final Version
(September 3, 2009).
16.
CCD
Meetings
and Completed
with
two
(2) Since project start there have
Workshops
additional
CCD
meetings been twelve (14) CCD meetings
completed by May 2010.
conducted not counting small
group
meetings
and
consultations of the technical
staff.
th
Completed during 13
CCD Policy agenda to be revised prior
17.
Consultation,
meeting.
to project termination.
reformulation and finalization of
CCD Medium-Term Roadmap
consolidating policy concerns
from ADB TA 4556, ADB TA
4778 and LGFBR-2.
Page | 13
May 2010
Completed after 13
CCD Policy agenda submitted to
19.
Consultation and
meeting.
CCD.
finalization of CCD short-term
policy agenda.
Completed in May 2010.
500 copies submitted to DILG.
20. Publication of
Decentralization Studies
completed under ADB TA 7019.
Completed in May 2010.
Three (3) copies submitted to
21. Conduct of legal study on
DILG.
recommendations of ADB TA
7019 Status of Devolution Study.
Main Task 2 Facilitate the creation of the Coordination Committee on Decentralization (CCD):
1. Draft concept paper for
expanding the agenda of the
MOUs Executive Committee.
2. Draft implementing guidelines
for JMC 2007-1 and MOU, if
necessary
3.
Discussion
paper
on
modalities for CCD structure.
4. CCD Meetings.
Completed.
Review found the IRR to be
unnecessary since agenda could
not be legally expanded under
the JMC 2007-1.
CCD Briefing material contained
the various modalities and was
subject to several iterations
before finalization.
Completed.
of
Completed
and
November 2009.
signed
of
Completed
and
November 2009.
Completed
and
November 2009.
Completed.
signed
signed
of
Completed
and
November 2009.
Completed
and
November 2009.
signed
signed
of
of
Operating
Guidelines
and
Recommendations for further
capacitation of CCD Technical
Secretariat.
Training Workshop.
Operating
Guidelines
and
Recommendations for further
capacitation of CCD Technical
Secretariat.
Page | 14
May 2010
29.
The deliverables for main task 1 were designed to provide the DILG and CCD
members with technical assistance on both a pre-selected set of policy concerns for the
purpose of addressing these concerns as well as acclimate them to working with each other
as a body paving the way for the formalization of the CCD. As noted in the table above, only
one policy concern (i.e., NG-LGU Co-Management Issues) did not meet the interest of either
the DILG or the CCD. At the beginning of the project, ten (10) policy issues were preidentified but nine (9) were actively taken up with at one policy outputs generated for the
policy issue and twenty-four (24) additional policy outputs generated for policy issues outside
of the original ten. By this writing of this report, the number of policy outputs generated
exceeded the original count by at least 2.4 times. The additional policy outputs were either
quick-policy response memorandum requested by the DILG for urgent policy issues such as
legislative measures to decrease the local Amusement Tax and creating an additional
bureaucracy for land valuation to issues papers on LGU Access to ODA and local credit
financing and the formulation of the governments (i.e., National and Local Government)
position for the Philippine Development Forum Working Group on Decentralization and Local
Government annual workplan.
30.
The deliverables for main task 2 were designed to formalize the Coordinating
Committee on Decentralization, its membership and structure, scope of work, relation to
other agencies, and technical secretariat. After much deliberation, the legal instrument
decided upon was a Memorandum of Understanding which was signed by both the oversight
agency members (i.e., DILG, DOF, DBM, and NEDA) and the LGU Leagues (i.e., LPP, LMP,
LCP, LnB, and ULAP) last November 2009. A welcome development occurred during the
deliberations which resulted in the agreed expansion of the powers of the CCD. In earlier
deliberations, it was agreed that the role of the CCD was to address issues which did not
require the reconstitution of the much larger, multi-sectoral Oversight Committee on
Devolution (OCD). However, upon the request of the DBM, the group has decided to
become the body which would trigger the reconvening of the OCD to address policy issues
that is beyond the authority of the CCD members. An example of such policy issue is the
determination of the release of the IRA shares based on new census data. This policy issue
will be discussed in the next CCD meeting as well as an agreement on how to trigger the
recovening of the CCD possibly through a CCD resolution and a MOU with the Office of the
President.
31.
The deliverables for the third task have been completed by project end with
recommendations for further assistance to the CCD Technical Secretariat included in this
final report. However, part of this assistance is being provided in the upcoming LGFBR
Subprogram 2 TA.
B.
32.
Component B
Page | 15
May 2010
34.
Meetings with other national government agencies are envisioned to draw out
consensus on how thematic/cross-sectoral or sectoral concerns can be mainstreamed or
integrated not only in the CDP preparation process but more importantly, in the rationalized
local planning system.
35.
Some of the agencies identified for this purpose are the National Council on the Role
of Filipino Women (NCRFW) for Gender and Development; National Disaster Coordinating
Council (NDCC) for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan; National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) for the Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and
Protection Plan (ADSDPP); Council for the Welfare of Children for the protection of children
and promotion of childrens rights; National Police Commission/National Security Council for
the Peace and Security Plan; etc.
1.
2.
3.
Page | 16
May 2010
Results of ConsultationDialogues/Discussion
Conferences with
Selected National
Government Agencies
With HLURB:
a)
b)
c)
Joint Memorandum
Circular to define roles
and responsibilities
between DILG and
HLURB in the local
planning process
Harmonization and
integration of the five (5)
development sectors in
the CDP and the three
(3) sectors as indicated
in the UBOM
b)
Agreement on the
definition of terms used
in local development
investment programming
enunciated in the RPS
b.
to explore the
possibility of utilizing a
common training
module for both the
CLUP and CDP
process to facilitate
such collaboration; and
c.
With DBM
a)
a)
Memorandum Circular
No. 2008-154 dated
October 16, 2008,
entitled Reconciliation
of the Five
Development Sectors
in the Comprehensive
Development Plan and
Three Sectoral
Classifications with the
Annual Investment
Program
Page | 17
May 2010
Consensus on Mainstreaming
Sectoral, Cross-Sectoral and
Thematic Concerns in the
RPS and CDP
4.
Cross-Referencing
Guide for CDP
Preparation
To avoid duplication of
efforts, the development of a
Cross-Referencing Guide
was dropped in deference to
the initiative made by GTZ in
preparing such Guide.
5.
Manual on Local
Planning Database
Draft completed.
36.
In the course of the project period, Component B conducted twelve (11) training
activities covering all regions except for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The
total number of person trained is 658 which is 54.8% higher than the 425 persons trained
committed under the Inception Report.
Page | 18
May 2010
Participants
Cluster I
21
27
Cluster I
97
Cluster II
72
Cluster III
50
Cluster IV
68
Cluster V
Reg. I, CAR
58
Cluster VI
83
Cluster VII
NCR
88
16
516
16
67
Cluster II
No. Of Pax
Total
Writeshop on Utilizing
Ecological Profile on CDP
Grand Total
27
658
Page | 19
May 2010
1.1.3
1.1.4
39.
As a result of the survey of the study LGUs, the following strategic principles have
been identified for the manual:
a.
b.
c.
May 2010
b.
c.
41.
This will result in a local database management system with the following
components:
a.
b.
ii.
iii.
iv.
May 2010
ii.2.
ii.3.
ii.4.
ii.5.
ii.6.
ii.7.
ii.8.
benchmarks and
Component C:
Page | 22
May 2010
43.
These activities were completed in the pursuit of completing the deliverables of the
component. Overall, the key component deliverables were accomplished. The following
table summarizes the actual accomplishments for Component C compared to the expected
deliverables.
Table 4: Component C - Summary of Project Deliverables: Actual Vs. Expected.
Expected Deliverables
Actual Accomplishment
Remarks
An analytical framework and The final manual LGPMS utilization Various uses of the LGPMS
manual on strengthening the manual is completed and submitted were introduced and enhanced
the
analytical in the course of the CDP
strategic links of the LGPMS incorporating
results for improving LGU framework for utilizing the various training under component B
overall
performance
in LGPMS on-line reports
service delivery and revenue
generation
The use of LGPMS data particularly Core DILG staff were trained
Promotion and advocacy on
in
comprehensive
development on
LGPMS
information
the use of the LGPMS data
planning (CDP) was introduced and utilization by linking utilizing
advocated during the CDP training. LGPMS reports to CDP
The CDP training was participated by processes and in capacity
DILG regional and provincial focal development planning
persons as well as select LGU
participants. The training were
conducted in cluster to wit:
Regions 6,7 & 8) held in Cebu
City
Regions 2 & 3 held in Clark,
Pampanga
Regions 9 & 12 held in
Zamboanga City
Regions 10, 11 & 13 held in
Davao City
Regions 1 & CAR held in Baguio
City
Regions 4a, 4b & 5 held in
Quezon City
NCR held in Quezon City
Recommendations on the
administrative mechanism/
institutional
linkages
between
LGUs,
BLGS,
regional offices and other
concerned NGAs
Recommendations on the
LGPMS
and
LGFPMS
system linkages for data
sharing
Page | 23
May 2010
Consultations
and
coaching
activities for the completion of
the LGPMS data management
plan
Recommendations on LGPMS
system
management
and
sustainability plan
Page | 24
IV.
May 2010
Component A
44.
As a result of the outputs of Component A, the following outcomes are being
targeted:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Page | 25
May 2010
legislature to work on.
On the other hand, the
bill remains in the
agenda of the CCD
which may find a better
chance of passing with
a new set of legislators.
1.2
1.3
Signed
Memorandum
of
Agreements
between
LGU Leagues and the
Department
of
Agriculture, Department
of Environment and
Natural
Resources,
Department of Social
Welfare
and
Development,
and
Department of Health
on further devolution of
functions to LGUs.
As of the mid-term
report
it
was
recommended by the
DILG that the objective
was to draft position
papers
for
further
devolution in selected
sectoral agencies which
would be endorsed by
the LGU Leagues to the
next
administration.
Drafts
have
been
completed
for
the
review of the LGU
Leagues
and
finalization in 2010.
The
probability
of
attaining MOA between
the LGUs and the
selected
sectoral
agencies
weakened
when resources for the
re-engineering of the
bureaucracy
became
scarce.
Furthermore,
policy environments in
agencies such as the
Department
of
Agriculture undertook a
reversal when senior
management
moved
toward
recentralizing
functions. The position
papers will be more
useful when a new
administration is in
place and more open to
further decentralization.
Approved
agenda
Draft completed on
LGU
Medium-Term
Roadmap, 2010-2015.
medium-term
for CCD.
Main
Task
2
2.1
Fullyfunctioning
Coordinating
Committee
on
Devolution (CCD) that
meets every month and
institutionalized through
an executive issuance.
CCD
institutionalized
through Memorandum
of
Understanding
between
oversight
agencies and LGU
Leagues.
Main
Task
3
Facilitate the creation
of a CCD Technical
Secretariat
3.1
Fullyfunctioning
CCD
Technical Secretariat.
CCD
technical
secretariat
legally
created in CCD MOU.
Capacity building to be
provided in 2010.
The
technical
secretariat will most
effective as agenda and
technical
assistance
managers given the
limited
number
of
personnel that can be
provided within the
bureaucracy.
Given
this,
continuous
technical assistance on
policy
issues
from
donors is needed to
support the technical
secretariat and the
CCD.
Page | 26
May 2010
45.
Based on the table above, 3 out of the 5 outcomes have been achieved in full by the
end of the project in May 2009. These are the creation of the CCD, the creation of the CCD
Technical Secretariat, and the development and approval of a medium-term agenda. The
first two were completed through a signed Memorandum of Understanding and the third was
finalized as the LGU Medium-Term Roadmap, 2010-2015 for submission to the next
administration.
46.
Two outcomes the passage of legislation for increasing local taxes and
memorandum of agreement for further decentralization in selected national government
agencies such as Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources, Health, and Social
Welfare and Development were substantially achieved. This means that the policy reform is
in place and will continue to be pursued with a likelihood of being achieved some time after
the project has concluded and in the next administration. With respect to legislation on
improving local taxes, it was the assessment of the team that although consensus and
support was achieved among the CCD members, it could not anticipate nor compensate for
the dynamic between the LGUs and the legislature. It was reported that there exists
underlying friction and competition between some members of Congress, who are also
members of the House Committee on Local Government, and local chief executives. This
resulted in resistance on the part of the legislature to file bills that would improve local
resource generation from taxes. This resistance was strong enough to bar the draft bill in
spite of consultations with the House Committee and letters of endorsements from the DILG
Secretary and the President of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and the League of
Municipalities of the Philippines. On the other hand, the CCD has not given up on the
proposed measures and will continue to pursue the filing of the bill and the advocacy of the
reform in the next administration when new congressional members will be elected.
However, this project also recommends that any pursuit of this reform in the next
administration study what incentives can motivate and be instituted in order to generate
congressional support for the reforms.
47.
A critical lesson learned from this project is the need to identify incentives on the part
of the legislature in the pursuit of policy reforms. A good example can be found in the
passing of legislation for the lowering of the local amusement tax. In spite of opposition from
the DILG, BLGF and the LGU Leagues, the legislature, both the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the measure which contravenes the intent of the Local Government
Code of 1991 to improve local revenue generation. The local amusement tax is one of the
taxing powers of the province and city. However, strong support came from both Houses of
Congress because the measure was requested by the local entertainment industry
composed of film producers, actors, and theatre owners. Since local legislators gain
electoral mileage when endorsed by film celebrities, they ensured that the bill passed quickly
into law.
48.
On the matter of further decentralization in selected national government agencies,
executive support in the form of resources for re-engineering the bureaucracy was no longer
available thereby weakening the initiative. Movement in the policy agenda was heavily
contingent on the momentum brought about by the re-engineering agenda of the National
Government. This would provide the incentive for opening up the devolution of functions and
resources to the LGUs by ensuring that redundant central government agency function and
personnel would be compensated with a adequate retirement or separation package.
However, lack of resources, partly due to the financial crises, weakened executive support
for the agenda and the flow of resources. In addition, policy reversals were also being
implemented in some agencies such as the Department of Agriculture which was moving
towards re-nationalizing the devolved functions as well as calls on the part of some
provincial LGUs to re-nationalize their hospitals since they did not have the resources to
support their operation. By the mid-term report of this project, discussions with DILG moved
towards ensuring that the LGUs would have a position paper on further devolution in
Page | 27
May 2010
selected sectoral agencies that they could present to the next administration for discussion.
The CCD has agreed to support the dialogue and move towards greater decentralization of
the functions with the position papers as the base. As with the local tax legislation, this policy
agenda is in place and has a likelihood of being achieved but sometime after the project has
terminated.
B.
Component B
49.
Overall, the desired ultimate outcomes of Component B are the adoption of Codecompliant CDP borne out of enhanced competencies of LGOOs to extend technical
assistance to LGUs and LPDCs in CDP and LDIP formulation within the framework of the
RPS and JMC No. 001 series of 2007; strengthened plan-to-budget linkage through the
investment program; integration of sectoral, cross-sectoral and/or thematic concerns and
plan documents mandated by law or advocated by some national government agencies in
the RPS and the CLUP and CDP.
Table 6: Component B - Deliverables, Expected Outcome, Actual Outcome and Assessment
ACTUAL OUTCOME &
DELIVERABLES
EXPECTED OUTCOME
ASSESSMENT
Training Modules and Session
Guides for the Introductory
and Intensive Courses on
RPS and CDP Preparation
b)
c)
obtained deeper
appreciation and
understanding of the
processes,
methodologies, tools
and techniques for CDP
preparation;
acquired adequate
facilitation skills for
rolling out and echoing
the course at the LGU
level; and
attained satisfactory
level of competency in
extending technical
assistance to LGUs in
the formulation of Codecompliant CDPs and
LDIPs.
Page | 28
May 2010
C.
Component C:
50.
Modest outcomes are generated based on the Component C accomplishments and
deliverables. The highlights of these outcomes are the re-establishment of the LGPMS as
on-line system and the completion of the LGPMS utilization manual which provides guidance
to users in maximizing the LGPMS information in LGU planning, budgeting and capacity
development planning.
51.
The table below summarizes the deliverables, outcomes and assessment of the
component C accomplishments.
Table 7: Component C - Deliverables, Expected Outcome, Actual Outcome and Assessment
Deliverables
Expected
Actual outcome
Assessment
Outcome
An analytical framework and Enhanced
LGPMS utilization manual The manual needs to be
manual on strengthening the analytical
completed
and properly
disseminated,
strategic links of the LGPMS framework and
demonstrates the various advocated and tested to
results for improving LGU utilization of the
uses of the LGPMS in LGUs and other users to
overall
performance
in LGPMS reports
relation to LGU basic fully appreciate the utility
service delivery and revenue
functions such as in of the tool.
generation
planning and budgeting
Promotion and advocacy on Core DILG staff Trained core DILG staff The training participants
the use of the LGPMS data
trained
on
the and selected LGU in the acquired
additional
utilization of the utilization of LGPMS in knowledge and skills in
LGPMS which is CDP
and
in
LGU demonstrating the use of
critical
in budgeting and capacity LGPMS in development
advocating the use development planning
planning and budgeting.
of the system for
Training participants have
LGU management
improved knowledge and
appreciation
of
the
purpose of the LGPMS
beyond the submission of
Page | 29
May 2010
Improved hardware
and
system The systems changes
bandwidth allocation
includes a revised data
V.
Component A
52.
The table below present the recommendations of Component A for succeeding
technical assistance.
Table 8: Component A Next Steps: Activities and Expected Outputs
Activities
Main Task 1: Provide Technical Support for
the interim CCD and the interim-CCD and
CCD Agenda:
B.
i.
Expected Outputs
Finalization of CCD Medium-Term Roadmap
consolidating policy concerns from other
stakeholders for presentation to next
administration.
ii.
iii.
iv.
CCD Meetings.
Component B
53.
The table below present the recommendations of Component B for succeeding
technical assistance in the areas of local capacity building.
Page | 30
May 2010
Expected Outputs
1.
2.
Harmonization
Guidelines
3.
of
CLUP
and
CDP
Mainstreaming
of
Sectoral/
CrossSectoral/Thematic Concerns in the CDP and
CLUP
a)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
4.
C.
Component C:
54.
The fundamental steps for maximizing the LGPMS results in LGU management
functions such as in planning, budgeting and policy development are put in place in this TA
through the LGPMS Utilization Manual. The manual needs to be integrated into the other
LGPMS manuals and disseminated and popularized accordingly with the intended users.
The core DILG staff at the regional and provincial levels should start testing/using the
manual particularly its links to budgeting and capacity development planning. The link of the
LGPMS in development planning can also be put test after next years elections. Training
and coaching modules should be developed for this purpose.
55.
With regards to the systems performance, this needs to be fully tested especially
prior to the conduct of the next round of planning cycle after the 2010 elections. The current
Page | 31
May 2010
data entry should be technically assessed to prepare the system for a wider and intensive
use in 2010.
56.
The table below outlines some of the key activities that need to be completed to
ensure a wider acceptance and utilization of the LGPMS by LGU users.
Table 10: Component C Next Steps: Activities and Expected Outputs
Activities
Expected Outputs
Integration of the LGPMS Utilization Manual with Wider utilization of the LGPMS manual
the LGPMS User Manual
Dissemination and training
DILG expertise in facilitating the use of LGPMS
To further strengthen capacity, improve system
Improvement of the LGPMS System Design
performance, and operations of the system, the
following activities are necessary as follows:
Assessment of system usage by users
Development of a data management plan
Formulation of a system security plan
Development of disaster and recovery plan
Finalization of the LGPMS operational plan
VI.
Raymund Fabre
Team Leader/ Decentralization Policy and Change
Mgmt Specialist
Sofronio Ursal
Legal Specialist
Ernesto Serrote
Local Development Specialist
Liza-Marie P. Elum
LGU Capacity Development Specialist
Erlito Pardo
LGU Budget,Revenue Mobilization, Cost Accounting
Specialist
Rizalino Barandino
LGU Performance Management Specialist
LOE
18
EXPENDED
18
%USED
100%
100%
0.4091
0.4091
100%
100%
100%
10
10
100%
0.3636
0.3636
100%
100%
100%
61.7727
61.7727
100%
Page | 32
May 2010
Table 12: Summary of Equipment and Workshop Resources Used (As of May 14, 2010)
Progress Payment
AMOUNT
BILLED
BALANCE
1200 Equipment
1300 Seminars, Conferences
Add: VO1
22,000.00
15,492.16
6,507.84
205,000.00
21,400.00
226,400.00
197,877.68
28,522.32
Page | 33
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
Accomplishments:
19May2008to30April2010
Contents
1.
Objectives
2. Deliverables:TargetedandActual
3. Assessments
4. NextStepstoProjectEnd
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
Objectives
1.
Task1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCD
andtheinterimCCDandCCDAgenda
2.
Task2:FacilitatethecreationoftheCoordination
CommitteeonDecentralization(CCD)
3.
Task3:FacilitatethecreationofaCCDTechnical
Secretariat
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterim
CCDandCCDAgenda:
1. Draft first year (1-year) CCD interim agenda for 1.1 Draft first year agenda for Interim CCD.
approval of DILG and interim CCD.
2. Draft medium-term agenda (5-years) for CCD.
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterim
CCDandCCDAgenda:
6.
Technical/Policy/Advocacy
Advisory
Reports
(TPAAR):
Harmonization of Land Use Planning LGU-NG Co-Management
Issues
7. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory Reports (TPAAR): Tax
Amendments to the Local Government Code
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterim
CCDandCCDAgenda:
9. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory Reports (TPAAR):
Implementation of further devolution without legislative action in
the Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Department of Health, and Department of
Social Welfare and Development as recommended by the LGU
Leagues.
1.
2.
3.
10. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory Reports (TPAAR): Ongoing. Awaiting final outputs of ADB TA 4778,
Review of non-tax, fiscal amendments to the Local Government
Code of 1991 IRA formula, share of LGUs in national wealth,
basis of IRA computation, LGU depository accounts in private
banks, share of LGUs in road users fund, etc.
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterim
CCDandCCDAgenda:
11. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory Reports (TPAAR): Ongoing.
Review of further devolution without legislative action in other
key national government agencies such as the Department of
Public Works and Highways,
12. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory Reports (TPAAR):
Federalism by the year 2012.
13. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory Reports (TPAAR): Ongoing. Awaiting final outputs of ADB TA 4778,
Review of the non-fiscal amendments to the Local Government
Code of 1991.
14. Draft Memorandum of Agreement between LGU Leagues Ongoing.
and Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Department of Health, and Department of
Social Welfare and Development on further devolution of
functions to LGUs.
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterim
CCDandCCDAgenda:
15. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory Reports 1. First Policy Memo on Devolution and Local
(TPAAR): Issues recommended by CCD Number of GovernmentTrustFund.
policyoutputsexceededbyatleast2.4tines.
2. Second Policy Memo on Devolution and Local
GovernmentTrustFund.
3.LocalServiceDeliveryStudyTermsofReference.
4. Policy Memorandum on House and Senate Bills on
SpecialEducationFundandtheAmusementTax.
5. Comments on House Committee on Local
Government Substitute Bill for House Bills Nos. 389,
742, 1250, 2183, 2625, 3505, and 4367 Amending the
Amusement Tax Provision in the Local Government
Codeof1991.
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterim
CCDandCCDAgenda:
15. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory
(TPAAR):IssuesrecommendedbyCCD
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterim
CCDandCCDAgenda:
15. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory
(TPAAR):IssuesrecommendedbyCCD
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterim
CCDandCCDAgenda:
15. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory
(TPAAR):IssuesrecommendedbyCCD
Reports 16.MobilizationofODASupport(PresentationforCCD
ExecutiveCommittee).
17. Decentralization Experience of the Philippines:
ChallengesandImplicationsonLocalGovernment
Finance(WorkingGrouponDecentralizationand
Local Government, Government Side
PresentationforCCDExecutiveCommittee).
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterimCCD
andCCDAgenda:
15. Technical/Policy/Advocacy Advisory
(TPAAR):IssuesrecommendedbyCCD
Reports 21.InitialLGFBRSubprogram3PolicyInputs
22.PolicyMemorandum June1,2009:Commentson
NEDALetteronImpositionoftheIdleLandTax.
23.PolicyMemorandum August12,2009:Comments
onOverseasFarmInvestments.
24. Proposed 20092010 Work Plan Final Version
(September3,2009).
16. CCD Meetings and Workshops
12 conducted. Ongoing.
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
Main Task 2 Facilitate the creation of the Coordination Committee on
Decentralization (CCD):
1. Draft concept paper for expanding the agenda of the
MOUs Executive Committee.
2. Draft implementing guidelines for JMC 2007-1 and
MOU, if necessary
3. Discussion paper on modalities for CCD structure.
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
Main Task 2 Facilitate the creation of the Coordination Committee on
Decentralization (CCD):
6. Draft operational guidelines for CCD.
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
Deliverables
Targeted
Actual
MainTask3 FacilitatethecreationofaCCDTechnicalSecretariat:
1. Draft Manual of Operations and Continuing Ongoing. Completion in March 2010.
Research Agenda for CCD Secretariat
2. Orientation Workshop for CCD Secretariat
Assessment
ExpectedOutcome
ActualOutcome
Assessment
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterimCCD
andCCDAgenda:
Legislation passed on the Executive and
LGU League-endorsed tax amendments
to the Local Government Code of 1991.
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
Assessment
ExpectedOutcome
ActualOutcome
Assessment
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterimCCD
andCCDAgenda:
Signed Memorandum of
Agreements between LGU
Leagues and the Department of
Agriculture, Department of
Environment and Natural
Resources, Department of Social
Welfare and Development, and
Department of Health on further
devolution of functions to LGUs.
Assessment
ExpectedOutcome
ActualOutcome
Assessment
MainTask1:ProvideTechnicalSupportfortheinterimCCDandtheinterimCCD
andCCDAgenda:
1.
Approved
medium-term Draft completed on LGU Medium- Draft will be finalized after additional
agenda for CCD.
Term Roadmap, 2010-2015.
inputs are included from the CCD
members.
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
Assessment
ExpectedOutcome
ActualOutcome
Assessment
MainTask2 FacilitatethecreationoftheCoordinationCommitteeon
Decentralization(CCD)
1. Fully-functioning
Coordinating Committee
on Devolution (CCD) that
meets every month and
institutionalized through
an executive issuance.
CCD
institutionalized
through
Memorandum of Understanding
between oversight agencies and
LGU Leagues.
Assessment
ExpectedOutcome
ActualOutcome
Assessment
MainTask3 FacilitatethecreationofaCCDTechnicalSecretariat
1. Fully-functioning
CCD CCD technical secretariat legally The technical secretariat will most
Technical Secretariat.
created in CCD MOU. Capacity effective as agenda and technical
building to be provided in 2010.
assistance managers given the
limited number of personnel that can
be provided within the bureaucracy.
Given this, continuous technical
assistance on policy issues from
donors is needed to support the
technical secretariat and the CCD.
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
ADB TA 7019: PHI - LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND BUDGET REFORM (LGFBR) PROJECT
FIRST EXIT WORKSHOP
ProjectEndFinalActivities
Activities
Deliverables
RaymundC.Fabre
TeamLeader
ADBTA7019
ComponentAAccomplishmentsof11
OperatingProtocols
PROTOCOLS GENERAL
1.
2.
3.
TheCCDExecutiveCommittee(CCDExecom)will
meeteverysemesterortwiceayear.ACCD
ExecutiveCommitteemeetingmaybecalledbythe
DILGUndersecretaryupontherecommendationof
theCCDPolicyDialogueGroupshouldapolicy
issueneedtobedecideduponbytheCCDExecom.
TheCCDPolicyDialogueGroup(CCDPDG)and
LGUDialoguePartnerswillmeeteveryquarteror4
timesayear.Specialmeetingsmayalsobe
organizedastheneedarises.
TheCCDTechnicalSecretariat(CCDTC)will
preparetheagendaforeachmeetingbasedonthe
recommendationsoftheCCDExecom orCCDPDG
andLGUDialoguePartners.
PROTOCOLSGENERAL
4. TheCCDTCwillberesponsiblefor
documentingtheminutesofthemeeting
includingissues,commentsandagreements
andprepareanybriefingdocumentsandinvite
anyresourcepersonsneededbytheCCD.
5. Thetechnicalsecretariatwillberesponsiblefor
providingthelogisticalsupportforallCCD
meetings.
6. TheCCDExecomwillonlybeconsideredin
quorumifalltheUndersecretariesrepresenting
theCCDECarepresent.
PROTOCOLS GENERAL
FortheCCDInorderfortheretobeaquorum,
theremustbeatleastfour(4)othermembers,
excludingtheDILG,oftheCCDpresentatany
meetingwithatleastone(1)membercoming
fromthenationalgovernmentexceptforthe
DILGandatleastone(1)memberfromtheLGU
Leagues.
8. TheDILGUndersecretaryortheBLGDDirector,
ashisdesignate,mustbepresenttochairthe
CCDPDGmeeting.
7.
PROTOCOLS GENERAL
9. Theminutesofthepreviousmeetingwillbe
reviewedandapprovedaswellasbusinessfrom
thepreviousmeetingdiscussedbeforeanynew
agendawillbetakenup.
10. Theminuteswillbeconsideredapprovedwitha
movefromanymemberoftheCCDcallingfor
theapprovalandanothermemberseconding
theapproval.
PROTOCOLS GENERAL
11. Policyissueswillbeassignedtotherelevant
agencyoragenciesorLGULeague(e.g.,revenue
generation BLGF)forthepurposeofpreparing
thepolicyagendaandbriefingdocuments.
12. EachagencyandLGULeaguewilldesignateone
(1)pointpersonandone(1)alternativefor
followupsonagendaissuesandbriefing
documentsbytheCCDTechnicalSecretariat.
13. EachagencyandLGULeaguewillbeassigned
one(1)pointpersonwithintheCCDTechnical
Secretariat.
PURPOSEOFAGENDA
1.
2.
3.
4.
InformationSharing
FollowupofPreviousBusiness
CoordinationMatters(Policy,Operational,Project,
andTechnicalAssistance)
DecisionMaking
FUNCTIONSOFTHETECHNICAL
SECRETARIAT
TECHNICAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
TECHNICAL
Supporttomeetings
a. Preparationoftheminutes
b. Agendasetting
c. Preparationoftechnicaldocumentsfortheagenda
folder
2. ImplementationofthedecisionsoftheCCD
a. Monitoring/trackingofagreementsduringmeetings
b. CoordinationandmonitoringofCCDWorkplan
1.
ADMINISTRATIVE
1. LogisticalSupport
2. Wordprocessing,filingand
telephone/faxservices
3. Preparation(compilationand
packaging)ofagendafolders
A.
B.
Definitions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
7.
Provide a forum for discussing LGU issues and policies and for sharing relevant
information;
8.
C.
D.
9.
Explore consensus and build support for policy reforms related to improving local
governance, local service delivery, and devolution;
10.
11.
Capacity-Building;
13.
14.
Local Government Fiscal Matters and Policy including but not limited to Donor
Financing, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations; and Own-Source Revenue
Generation;
15.
16.
Local Planning;
17.
18.
19.
Devolution Reforms.
The CCD Executive Committee (CCD Execom) will meet every semester or twice
a year. A CCD Executive Committee meeting may be called by the DILG
Undersecretary upon the recommendation of the CCD Policy Dialogue Group
should a policy issue need to be decided upon by the CCD Execom.
21.
The CCD Execom will only be considered in quorum if all the Undersecretaries or
their duly designated representatives are present.
22.
The CCD Policy Dialogue Group (CCD PDG) and LGU Dialogue Partners will
meet quarterly every 2nd week of the 2nd month of each quarter. Special meetings
may also be organized as the need arises.
23.
24.
The DILG Undersecretary or the designated co-chair for the year must be
present to chair the CCD meeting. The co-chairmanship shall revolve among the
other CCD oversight agencies.
E.
25.
Other policy dialogue partners may be invited during CCD meetings as resource
person, but invited resource persons shall have no voting power.
26.
All CCD members shall take turns hosting the CCD meetings.
27.
The minutes of the previous meeting will be reviewed and approved as well as
business from the previous meeting discussed before any new agenda will be
taken up.
28.
The minutes will be considered approved with a move from any member of the
CCD calling for the approval and another member seconding the approval.
The agenda items and prioritization of items for the meeting will be agreed upon
by the CCD members at the close of the previous meeting.
30.
31.
The CCD Technical Secretariat will circulate the final agenda items to all CCD
members two (2) weeks before the CCD meeting for comment. The CCD
meeting agenda will be considered final one (1) week before the CCD meeting.
Absence of a response from any CCD member to the agenda one (1) week
before the CCD meeting will be considered as acceptance of the circulated
agenda.
32.
Policy issues will be assigned to the relevant agency or LGU League (e.g.,
revenue generation BLGF). The proponent agency will provide the technical
inputs, supporting documents and recommendations for resource persons to the
CCD Technical Secretariat for the CCD meeting.
33.
Each agency and LGU League will designate one (1) point person and one (1)
alternate for follow-ups on agenda issues and briefing documents by the CCD
Technical Secretariat.
34.
Each agency and LGU League will be assigned one (1) point person within the
CCD Technical Secretariat.
35.
Proponent agencies for policy agenda items shall submit technical inputs to the
CCD Technical Secretariat no later than three (3) weeks from the CCD meeting
for the preparation of the agenda items policy brief. Proponent agencies shall
also submit supporting documents and relevant studies to the CCD Technical
Secretariat at least two (2) weeks before the CCD meeting. Proponent agencies
shall also submit to the CCD Technical Secretariat the names and contact
information of resource persons and agencies needed for the CCD meeting at
least three (3) weeks before the CCD meeting.
36.
Technical:
37.
Support to meetings
a)
b)
c)
38.
G.
C.2
Administrative:
39.
Logistical Support
40.
41.
43.
Any member agency or agencies of the CCD may raise the issue to the CCD
during a regular or special meeting for recommendation to the OCD.
44.
The member agency or agencies of the CCD that raised the issue and/or is
directly involved by virtue of its mandate will be responsible for furnishing the
CCD Technical Secretariat with technical inputs and supporting documents to
accompany the CCD recommendation to the OCD.
45.
The CCD resolution shall be forwarded to the OCD in a letter to be signed by the
CCD Chair.
46.
47.
The CCD will coordinate closely with the OCD on documentation requirements
and resource persons/agencies for the meeting and action taken by the OCD.
HIGHLIGHTSOFTHE
3 COORDINATINGCOMMITTEEONDECENTRALIZATION(CCD)MEETING
March30,2010,9:30am
AstoriaPlaza,EscrivaDrive,PasigCity
rd
MembersPresent :
1) USEC.AusterePanadero
DILG
2) JoseArnoldTan
BLGF
(representingExe.DirPresentacionMontessa)
3) JunMoises
DBMBMBG
(representingDir.CarmencitaDelantar)
4) FaisalAbdul
NEDARDCS
(representingDir.SusanRachelJose)
5) Atty.MoninaCamacho
ULAP
6) HildaCorpuz
LCP
7) RommelMartinez
LMP
LPP
8) RobertLimbago
Member/sAbsent
LnB
OthersPresent
9) ASECRolandoAcosta
DILG
10) PriscellaMejillano
DILGBLGD
11) Ma.PamelaQuizon
BLGFDOF
12) ReaAnnS.Rojo
BLGS
13) MariaConsolacionS.Buena
BLGS
14) RaymundFabre
ADBConsultant
15) JojoFlores
ADBStaff
TechnicalSecretariat
16) Asst.DirectorAnnaLizaBonagua
DILGBLGD
17) BLGDPolicyTeam
CCDSecretariat
I.
CALLTOORDERANDQUORUM
There being a quorum, the meeting was called to order at 9:30 am by DILG
UndersecretaryandCCDChairAustereA.Panadero.
APPROVALOFTHEPREVIOUSMINUTESOFTHEMEETING
Therebeingnoothercommentsormatterforcorrection,thehighlightsoftheprevious
meetingwasapproved/adopted.
III.
MATTERSARISINGFROMTHEPREVIOUSMINUTESOFTHEMEETING
UsecPanaderopresentedthemattersarisingfromtheminutesofthepreviousmeeting
lastJanuary8,2010atGatewaySuites,QuezonCity.
STATUS
AGREEMENTS
UpdatesonComputerizationforLGUs
Ms. Pam Quizon of DOF update the group that the BLGF shall convene the meeting on
LGUGuidelinesonComputerizationwasprintedout June4,2010attheHeritageHotel.
and ready for distribution to LGUs and partner
agencies.SaidguidelineswillhelpLGUsassesswhat Details shall be provided by BLGF
softwareand/orserviceprovidertoadopt.
DOFduringthenextCCDmeeting.
II.
IV.
HIGHLIGHTSOFTHEPREVIOUSMEETING
Issue(s)/
Discussion
Area(s)ofConcern
ValidationofLand
ASECRolandoAcostapresented
AreaSurveyOf2007 thehighlightsofvalidationof
asBasisofIRA
landareameasurementsdoneby
Computation
thecommitteetovalidatethe
landareasurveycomposedof
DILGBLGS,MANRIAandLMB.
Basedonthepresentation,the
committee,afterinitial
evaluationproposedthe
followingrecommendations:
1. Landareainformationof
Agreements/
Recommendations
Itwasagreedforthecommittee
onlandareasurveyvalidationto
finetunerecommendationsfor
submissiontotheOfficeofthe
Presidenttakinginto
considerationthefollowing:
1. Tocontinueusing2001land
areasurvey.
2. RegionARMMtocomeup
withestimateforthe
computationandaslongas
2001mighthavetobeused
wearenottoexceedtothe
forthenext5yearsand
totallandareaofmother
thereseemstobenologicin
LGUs.
validating2007landdata
3. NewlycreatedLGUsshould
2. UsingtheNAMRIAbasemap
knowthemaximumareaand
of30Mhas.,LMBtoproject
divideitusingestimateby
landareasofprovinces,
LMB.
citiesandmunicipalities,
4. LMBtocontinueCadastral
insteadofresortingtonever
SurveyusingtheNAMRIA
basemapof30Mhas.
endingestimations
3. Completionofprojection
usingNAMRIAbasemaps
mighttake5yearandsome
dedicatedinvestmentson
thepartofthenational
government.
However,2001landsurveydoes
notincludeinfoonnewlycreated
LGUs.DBMcomputesfortheirIRA
basedonofficiallanddata.
Memorandum
CircularEncouraging
Cities&
Municipalitiesto
ImposeIdleLandTax
AssistantDirectorAnnaBonagua
discussedthefollowingNLUC
requestforDILGActions:
1. ProposeamendmenttoLGC
toprovidemunicipalitywitha
shareoftheidlelandtax.
2. Issuanceofmemorandum
circulartoLGUstocollectidle
landtax
Onitem#1,theLGULeagues
duringtheconsultationonthe
proposedamendmenttoLGC
madeanagreementtomaintain
astatusquoontheirsharingof
taxesincludingidlelandtax.
Onitem#2,DILGisseeking
recommendationofDOFBLGFon
thepossibilityofaDILGDOF
JointIssuanceforLGUstocollect
idlelandtax.
ItwasagreedthatDILGandDOF
shall issue a joint issuance to
encourage LGUs to be efficient
andeffectiveinthecollectionof
Idle Land Tax as well as remind
LGUstoimprovecollectionofall
otherlocaltaxesandfees.
UpdatesonJMC
No.0012009:
Guidelinesonthe
Harmonizationof
CLUPandCDP
Preparation
UpdateonFMOC
DIALOGFundMeeting
TheresaneedtoconvinceLGUs
(starting from the 27 high risk
LGUs) to revisit their CLUP to
integrate disaster migitation and
climate
change
adaption
measures into their CLUPs
translated in their Zoning
Ordinance.
oftheirrespectivechapters.
FMOC adopted the Operating
Fund
Inviewofthecomingelection,itis
FMOC collapsed the ten (10)
urgenttoprioritizedsupportto
proposed activities into seven (7)
namely:
NEOProgram.
1. CapacityBuildingonNEO
Executive
LegislativeLiaison
7. Action
Plan
for
Decentralization
The project concept note
proposalonCapacityBuildingfor
NEO was submitted to World
Bank for refinement and
approval.
Threemoreconceptnoteswere
submitted
to
WB
for
consideration:
1. Review of consistency of
National Laws and Local
Regulations focusing on
Fiscal
Incentives/Tax
Exemptions being granted
byNG
2. Definition of Policy and
Legal Framework on the
Extent of LGU Corporate
Powers
3. Action Plan for Further
Decentralization
No concept notes had been
submitted on the remaining 2
otheractivities.
1. Enhancing Competency of
Treasurers
2. Review devolved function
the without corresponding
budget like DOH devolved
services. Determination of
costtodeliversuchservices
V. OTHERMATTERS
TheCommitteeagreedthattheCCDwouldconvenequarterly.Atentativescheduleof
CCDquarterlymeetingswaspresentedfortheguidanceofCCDmembers.
ScheduleofnextCCDmeetingswassetonApril26,2010.
VI. ADJOURNMENT
Themeetingadjournedat1:00intheafternoon.
PreparedbytheCCDTechnicalSecretariat
Attestedby:
AUSTEREA.PANADERO
DILGUndersecretaryandCCDChair
5.
6.
I.
A.
2
provides that the demand for government spending be matched with the available
resources. Allocative efficiency, meanwhile, asks that LGU spending be aligned with
policies and priorities by reallocating resources (i) from programs, projects and
activities (PPAs) that are of lower priority to those of higher priority, and (ii) from less
effective to more effective PPAs. Operational efficiency calls for delivering goods and
services in a manner that is efficient and economical.
Fiscal discipline helps improve the allocation of resources by allowing LGUs
to prioritize their activities based on a realistic appreciation of their budget
constraints. It creates an environment that encourages allocative and operational
efficiency, thus allowing LGUs to do more with less. Throughout the world, therefore,
fiscal rules require governments to balance their budgets or to subject certain fiscal
aggregates to very specific targets.
Local governments in the Philippines are likewise subject to some form of
balanced budget constraint, although this constraint is weaker than those in other
countries. Under this constraint, proposed and approved budget appropriations for
current operating expenditures must not exceed current revenues. The operating
fiscal balance or current fiscal balance is not allowed to be in deficit. The actual
results of budget execution must be balanced so that the total expenses is not more
than the sum of current revenues, cash at the end of the previous period, and
borrowings, provided borrowings are incurred for the sole purpose of financing capital
outlays.
B.
the cautious fiscal stance of many LGUs because they are not allowed
to incur deficits, thus making them very conservative in their income
estimates and/or very strict in their expenditure controls,
b.
the unused portion of their calamity fund which they are required to
keep intact until the end of the fiscal year unless a calamity/ disaster
does occur, and
c.
Because the surpluses are caused by these factors, experts argue that such
surpluses are illusory. They say that once LGUs actually realize a fiscal surplus at
the end of any given fiscal year, the LGUs immediately appropriate the full amount
that is available for appropriation by enacting a supplemental budget.
3
2.
Cash reserves
The growth in cash at the end of the period of all LGUs is consistent with the
movement in the overall balance. When expressed as a percentage of GDP or total
LGU income, cash reserves of all LGUs remained fairly stable at 1.2%-1.3% of GDP
and 33%-37% of total LGU income during the period.
3.
The capital outlays of all LGUs combined were fully financed by the net result
of operating activities in 2002-2003 and in 2005-2006. This trend is consistent with
the observed accumulation of fiscal surpluses by all LGUs during these years. In
2004 and 2007, however, capital outlays were financed partly by net borrowings. In
2007, capital outlays were also financed by a drawdown of accumulated surpluses.
These trends appears to support claims that elective LGU officials tend to
spend their surpluses in earlier years and then incur more debt during election years.
Some observers raise the concern that local chief executives tend to borrow more as
their terms are about to end at the expense of incoming officials who are left to pay
off such indebtedness. However, the trend in outstanding long-term liabilities of all
LGUs does not appear to strongly support these apprehensions.
4.
While the outstanding long-term debt of all LGUs did increase between 2002
and 2007, it did so only slightly. It went up from 0.14% to 0.17% of total LGU income
during the period despite the fact that the nominal level of outstanding long-term
liabilities of LGUs almost doubled.
There have been claims that a number of LGUs have incurred debt which
they cannot service without exceeding their debt cap. To cope with the problem,
these LGUs (with concurrence of the creditor banks) re-structure their debt. In 2007,
cash outflow for the amortization/retirement of old debt accounted for at least 50% of
the cash inflow from loan proceeds in 10% of provinces, 21% of cities and 5% of
municipalities. This finding provides some evidence that indeed the number of LGUs
which may be having problems servicing their debt are not as insignificant as one
would initially expect given the balanced budget rules in the Local Government Code.
C.
Improving the LGUs public expenditure management requires that (a) the
resources available for allocation be measured appropriately, and that (b) the fiscal
position be managed properly.
1.
4
Unfortunately, the amount of resources available for appropriation at the end
of the previous year cannot be read off easily from any of the existing financial
reports that LGUs are required to submit. Moreover, despite guidance in the UBOM
to the contrary, budget officers do not include an estimate of the amount of resources
available for appropriation at the end of the previous year when they prepare the
budget proposal for the incoming year. Instead, they only look at estimates of current
revenue/income vis--vis proposed spending.
The amount available for appropriation at the end of the year is equal to the
amount available for appropriation at beginning of the year plus revenues/income in
the current year less current and capital expenditures in the current year less
accounts payable less the value of continuing appropriation. During the period 20022007, this amount varied from 4% - 9% of total LGU income and was consistently
larger than the overall fiscal surplus during the period.
LGUs which have negative amount available for appropriation have
accounts payable that are significantly larger than their cash reserves. Moreover, if
the amount is negative, it is more likely that the LGU will post an overall fiscal deficit.
However, if the LGU has an overall fiscal surplus, then it is more likely that the
amount available for appropriation in the LGU is also positive.
2.
b.
Expenditure controls
Once the budget is passed, the budget enters the budget execution phase.
Good budget execution calls for: (i) ensuring that the budget will be implemented in
conformity with the budget legislation; (ii) adapting the budget to changes in the
economic environment; and (iii) managing the use of resources efficiently and
effectively. In turn, fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency and operational efficiency
require that (i) effective controls at each phase of budget execution are in place to
ensure that obligations and disbursements do not exceed appropriations; (ii) an
adequate and transparent reporting system showing all movements on appropriation/
allotment/ obligation/ cash expenditure is installed to track transactions at each
stage; and (iii) budget funds are released in a timely manner to support
implementation of government programs.
In practice, the allotment system is one way of ensuring that obligations do
not exceed authorized levels. But perhaps more importantly, the system aligns the
release of spending authority with the projected inflow of tax collections and other
revenues. The UBOM (DBM 2005) specifies the use of the Local Budget Matrix
(LBM), the Cash Program and Physical Performance Targets as the control
devices in the allotment system.
The LBM reflects the overall plan of the LGU for the release of allotments by
department/office/program/project and by object of expenditure. It also paces the
release of allotment advice by categorizing the different expenditure items in the
appropriation ordinance into those not needing clearance (NNC) and those needing
clearance (NC) prior to the release of the allotment advice. Thus, the classification
determines how easy it is to get the allotment advice for the different expenditure
items. The release of the for later release portion of the allotments for said items
depends on the results of the periodic evaluation of the physical and financial
performance of the department/ office/ project concerned.
The LBM also allows the imposition of reserves. It may set aside a certain
portion of the authorized appropriation of every department/program to cover for any
possible shortfall in revenue.
As discussed in the UBOM, the allotment system requires a system of cash
monitoring and programming through the use of periodic Cash Flow Forecast and
Cash Flow Analysis. These tools are essential to ensure that allotments are safely
covered by cash or by future collections and that cash is available when it is needed
to pay obligations.
On the other hand, the Physical Performance Targets contains the targeted
performance indicators of each department/office of the LGU. These performance
indicators serve as standards/guides for the physical and financial performance of a
department/office.
By focusing on the control of allotment releases, the allotment system forms
the first line of defense in expenditure control. However, while the UBOM outlines the
specific steps LGUs have to take and the specific forms LGUs have to use in the
preparation of the Cash Flow Forecast and Cash Flow Analysis, there is little
guidance available on the technical aspects of cash flow forecasting and cash follow
analysis.
6
D.
Recommendations1
1.
An LGU public
instituted.
Because of the balanced budget provision in the LGC, the fiscal performance
indicators in the Local Government Performance Monitoring System should include
the current fiscal balance as a measure of LGU savings and its contribution to the
pool of resources that is available for investment. Still another measure of fiscal
performance which may be included is the overall fiscal balance as a summary
measure of LGUs borrowing requirement. The overall fiscal balance allows
government to focus on the financing constraint which has traditionally been viewed
as governments most binding constraint. In addition, some debt management
indicators may also be considered, e.g., a measure that assesses the size of debt
service relative to LGU income and one that compares the amount of cash outflows
to amortize/ redeem past debt relative to amount of cash inflows from the incurrence
of new debt.
At the same time, the amount available for appropriation is another important
indicator of fiscal performance that should be monitored on a regular basis. It is also
important for LGUs to be able to arrive at good estimates of this measure in order for
them to be able to delimit how much they can legitimately subject to further
appropriation.
The monitoring of these indicators would give the oversight agencies
Department of Interior and Local Government, Department of Finance, and National
Economic Development Authority a better appreciation of the performance of LGUs
in managing their respective and collective budgets and thus institute more efficient
and effective measures of ensuring that optimal results are achieved.
2.
7
other hand, there is also a need to equip LGUs with the tools that will assist them on
the more technical aspects of budgeting.
In particular, there is a need to upgrade the technical capacity of LGUs in
formulating honest and realistic estimates of income and sources of budget finance,
including the amount available for appropriation at the end of each fiscal year. There
is also a need to build up the technical capacity of LGUs to do cash flow forecasting
and cash flow analysis. These are essential inputs to a better functioning allotment
system that will assist LGUs strike the right balance between fiscal conservatism and
the need to provide the services that local communities are in dire need of.
Simple spreadsheet models for cash flow forecasting and cash flow analysis
have been developed. To further assist LGUs, the DBM may also wish to establish
benchmarks against which LGUs can compare the results of their cash flow forecasts
and cash flow analysis to aid their decision making process as to the timing of the
release of reserves, revisiting the revenue generation strategies of the LGU, and
revising the methodology for revenue forecasting.
The DBM may also wish to consider providing guidance on what steps LGUs
need to take in the event of an impending fiscal deficit. For instance, is there need for
Sanggunian action or resolution authorizing the local chief executive to reduce
allotments without need for further consultation with the Sanggunian once it is
established that actual revenues for the fiscal year will be lower than the estimates of
income that were used in preparing the budget? Are the existing guidelines
pertaining to the allotment system not enough to address this problem?
II.
A.
The World Bank notes that, as a rule of thumb, when the expenses for
personal services (PS) of the public sector rises over 25% of total spending,
governments risk reducing their effectiveness by cutting down expenditure for nonwage costs such as those for goods and services, maintenance, and capital
expenditure. In the Philippines, PS accounted for an average of 45% of total LGU
spending in 2000-2007 while MOOE and CO accounted for 37% and 18%,
respectively. The budget share of PS was highest for municipalities (53%), followed
by provinces (46%) and cities (41%). Lower income class municipalities tend to have
higher PS spending. The situation is worse in LGUs which use job order hirees (who
are charged against MOOE) to work on tasks that would normally be assigned to
regular employees in order to avoid exceeding the PS cap. Section 325 of the Local
8
Government Code (LGC) provides that 1st to 3rd income class LGUs should not
budget more than 45% of its total annual income from regular sources in the
preceding fiscal year on PS. For 4th to 6th class LGUs, the limit is 55%.
Many LGUs fail to comply with the PS cap. Fifty-eight percent of provinces,
40% of cities and 75% of municipalities exceeded the PS cap prior to the application
of the waivers in 2007 on certain PS expenditure items from the computations to
measure compliance with the PS cap. Regardless of level of local government, the
percentage of LGUs that are not able to meet the PS cap requirement tends to be
higher for LGUs belonging to the lower income categories than for those belonging to
the higher income categories.
B.
The inability of LGUs to comply with the PS cap has been the result of factors
related to staffing and compensation levels.
1.
Staffing concerns
Issues on LGU staffing include (i) the overall size of the LGU personnel
complement, (ii) the existence of too many casuals and contractuals, and (iii) the
existence of too many unfilled regular positions. The rise in PS expenditures of LGUs
may partly be due to the expansion of the LGU organizational structure and
increases in the total number of positions in LGU plantilla as a result of the devolution
of government functions to the local level under the LGC. Other operating units have
also been created, mainly to handle local economic enterprises (LEEs). Both factors
have exacerbated the already problematic situation brought about by the need of
local chief executives (LCEs) to be the "employer of last resort by hiring large
numbers of employees/ casuals in the lowest salary grades as a response to the lack
of employment opportunities in their jurisdictions.
a.
The average number of casual employees per LGU rose from 157 in 2006 to
182 in 2008; from 207 to 215 for cities; and from 18 to 23 for municipalities. This
9
growth in the number of casuals in terms of absolute numbers appears to be minimal
and may even be consistent with the growth in population.
However, non-regular employees, consisting mostly of casual employees,
account for a significant percentage of the total number of LGU personnel. In 2007,
provinces had an average of 168 non-regular employees or 18% of total, cities had
an average of 304 or 30% of total, and municipalities had 27 or 25% of total The
compensation of non-regular employees in provinces, cities and municipalities
remains very close to the minimum wage.
The large number of casuals in LGU plantilla is partly the result of the hiring of
such personnel to pay political debts. After hiring these personnel, LCEs are then
forced to "make" or "create" work for them. Thus, some casuals are assigned to do
regular technical work, sometimes with less-then-optimal competency.
The situation is made worse by the existence of many permanent casuals
whose contracts are renewed continuously. These casuals exist because many of
them do not meet the qualification standards of plantilla positions. Some LGU
officials also prefer to retain the status of casual employees as these tend to be more
productive and efficient than their permanent counterparts because of the fear of
being fired anytime.
c.
c
d
The issues regarding LGU pay and compensation policy include the: (i) PS
cap, (ii) differentiated salary schedules, (iii) the existence of too many allowances,
(iv) Magna Carta benefits for public health workers and public social workers, (v)
grant of unanticipated extra year-end benefits, and (vi) grant of allowances/ honoraria
to NG personnel.
a.
10
Provinces which successfully adhered to the PS cap allocated 34%, 45%
and 21% of their budgets in 2007 to PS, MOOE and CO, respectively. Those that did
not allocated 50%, 41% and 10% to the same expense items. In like manner,
municipalities which comply with the PS cap allocated 42%, 46% and 12% to PS,
MOOE and CO, respectively, compared to the 54%, 35% and 10% that noncompliant municipalities provide. These figures underscore the negative impact of
non-compliance to the PS cap and provide a strong argument for sustaining the
budgetary limitations on PS spending that are now found in the LGC.
b.
There are two levels of differentiation in rates of pay for the same positions
in LGUs. One is based on the income classification of the LGU, and the other, on the
kind of city (i.e., highly urbanized cities/ independent component cities vis-a-vis
component cities), the income class of the municipality, and whether or not the said
position is in the province, city or municipality. One could argue that the first level of
differentiation is based on the principle that the LGU staffing and compensation
structures should be set at levels that are fiscally sustainable for the LGU. However,
the premise of the second level of salary differentiation is not as obvious, and should
therefore be revisited and reviewed.
d.
Because different agencies review the LGU budgets and therefore the ways
the waivers to the application of the PS cap are applied, the enforcement of the
waivers lacks consistency. Thus, there had been claims that compliance to Local
Budget Circular (LBC) 75 of 2002, which allows the waivers, is a farce.
e.
11
Under the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers (Republic Act 7305), PHWs
are granted subsistence allowance, laundry allowance, night-shift differential, hazard
pay, and longevity pay. These benefits being substantial, many LGUs have not been
giving them all and/or in full. Less than 50% of provinces, cities and municipalities
gave the subsistence and the laundry allowance at the prescribed rates in 2007. The
number of LGUs giving the hazard pay at the correct rates is even smaller.
The Magna Carta of PHW is a especially sensitive matter at the local level as
it creates conflict between the LCE and other officials, on one hand, and the PHWs,
on the other, when the Magna Carta allowances are not granted in full or not granted
at all. There are many reports of cases filed in the courts or Ombudsman against
LCEs and other officials by PHWs due to non-implementation of the Magna Carta
benefits.
iv.
The LGC allows LGUs to grant additional allowances and benefits to certain
national government officials stationed or assigned in their areas, when LGU
finances allow. Although the granting of these allowances is not required, LGUs are
put under extreme pressure to actually grant them. The grant of these allowances
imposes a heavy burden on LGU resources, especially that of poorer LGUs. It also
creates the anomalous situation where the national government personnel actually
get allowances from a number of sources (from different LGUs as well as from their
own mother unit).
C.
Of all the cost items under the PS budgets of LGUs, the Magna Carta benefits
to PHWs appears to have the smallest impact on the ability of LGUs, regardless of
level, to comply with the PS cap. In contrast, the number of non-regular employees
appears to have the biggest impact, especially in the case of cities and
municipalities. The proportion of cities which would not be able to comply with the PS
cap is estimated to go down from 40% to 16% if the PS cost of non-regular
employees is excluded from LGUs actual PS expenditures. The decrease in the
number of similar municipalities is from 75% to 66%. The impact of the adoption of
higher salary schedules is found to be also significant. The proportion of cities which
would not be able to comply with the PS cap is estimated to go down from 40% to
31% if all LGUs adopt the salary schedules that are prescribed for their own income
12
class. The decrease in number among municipalities is from 75% to 68% while that
for provinces is 58% to 52%.
D.
Recommendations
The following measures are recommended to help ensure that LGUs could
effectively control their PS expenditures while making sure that they have enough
qualified personnel to enable deliver the needed services to their constituencies and
while improving salaries and benefits to attract and retain qualified technical,
professional and managerial staff.
1.
This recommendation, which should put more pressure on LGUs to live within
hard budget constraints, is based on the premise that service delivery requires a mix
of both wage and non-wage spending. If spending is too much in favor of PS, service
delivery suffers because supplies, travel and other resources, all of which are needed
to complement personnel resources as well as to provide for local public
infrastructure needed for local economic development, are sacrificed.
2.
LGUs should be allowed to choose which among the eight alternative salary
schedules provided in Section 10 of RA 6758 it would adopt based on what they
think is best suited to their particular situation, considering, among other factors, their
fiscal capacity, and provided that they comply strictly with the PS cap. In other words,
LGUs should be given the flexibility to set their own compensation and pay policy as
long as they work within the constraints imposed by the fiscal resources that are
actually available to them.
3.
4.
The parameters that form the basis for assigning different salary
grades for higher level positions in LGUs of different income class
and different levels should be reviewed and, if warranted, amended.
5.
13
6.
7.
The model staffing patterns may indicate the minimum and maximum
numbers and the levels of positions for each LGU level and income class. Moreover,
there is a need to establish criteria and/ or benchmarks that LGUs can refer to in
deciding on the staffing pattern that is appropriate for their particular situation.
This effort could possibly lead to a more compact list of plantilla positions that
include only positions that are needed for the delivery of the core mandates of LGUs.
Fixed-term employment contracts may then be considered for personnel who are
focused on the delivery of priorities that are not part of the core mandates of the
LGU. The tenure of department heads and heads of the various offices may also
have to be reviewed, weighing the trade-off between the need for personnel who
have the full trust and confidence of the LCE, and the need to promote continuity in
public administration at the local level.
III.
A.
The LEEs has been increasing considerably over time. In addition to the
traditional LEEs like markets, slaughterhouses, and water service facilities, todays
LEEs include enterprises that produce goods and services that are usually provided
by the private sector, such as shopping malls and buildings for lease. These LEEs
involve more complex operations than the more traditional ones. Moreover, many
14
LGUs are now operating more than one LEE. On the average, cities operate more
than four; municipalities. more than three; and provinces, two.
Markets and slaughterhouses are still the most popular forms of LEEs, with at
least 90% of municipalities and cities operating markets, and at least 70% operating
slaughterhouses. However, a sizable number of LGUs also operate the more nontraditional types of LEEs, such as public transport terminals, garbage collection and
disposal facilities, and parking lots.
There are primarily three reasons why LGUs create and operate LEEs. First,
LGUs are looking for more sources of income. LEEs accounts for 11%-12% of the
total own-source revenue of all LGUs and around 4% of their total income in 20052007. Second, LGUs need to have catalytic investments, which LEEs are, to
generate greater local economic development. Third, some LGUs need to hire more
personnel without going over the personal services (PS) expenditure cap in the LGC
and to be able to grant allowances to LEE employees.
LGUs operate LEEs at a loss, with 77% of provinces, 63% of cities, and 56%
of municipalities posting net losses on their LEE operations in 2007. These losses
totaled PhP 11.8 to 13.4 billion that year. The total income from LEEs accounted for
less than a third of their total cost of operations.
All hospitals and heavy equipment motor pools operated by LGUs as LEEs
are unprofitable; so are 86% of tertiary schools and 50% of all slaughterhouses,
markets, and cemeteries. In contrast, 60% of water systems would be profitable.
A number of factors lead to net loses in LEE operations. One is the weak
institutional support, mainly in the form of policy and infrastructure, given by the
LGUs towards their LEE operations. Another factor is the weak technical capability of
the LGUs in assessing the feasibility of LEEs and later, in the setting and collection of
fees, and in the overall management of the enterprise.
B.
The LGUs management of LEEs can be made more efficient and therefore profitable
if (1) a clear policy framework for the creation and continued operation of LEEs is
established, (2) how LEEs are to be treated in budgeting is made clearer; and (3) the
LGUs' capacity to operate LEEs is strengthened.
1.
The need for a clear policy framework for the creation and
continued operation of LEEs
Setting a clear policy framework for LEEs starts with a clear definition of what
LEEs are, something which is lacking in the laws and rules and regulations
concerning these enterprises. Both the LGC and the Manual on the New
Government Accounting System (NGAS) for LGUs do not have an explicit definition
of the term economic enterprise. Meanwhile, the definition of the Updated Budget
Operations Manual or UBOM is vague and does not emphasize the need for LEEs to
earn enough for their operations.
Taking this enterprise dimension into
consideration, it is proposed that the oversight agencies (DBM, DOF/ BLGF, DILG,
and NEDA) define LEEs as local government owned economic entities that
generate the bulk of their revenues from selling goods and services.
There is also a need to clarify why these enterprises are created. The UBOM
provides that LEEs must (a) satisfy both the economic and social objectives of the
15
concerned LGU; (b) fill in service gaps not adequately provided by the private sector;
(c) operate with a lean and mean staffing complement to satisfy the income objective
of the economic enterprise/ public utility; and (d) operate like a corporate body with a
separate strategic plan and budget. These guidelines, however, seems to be biased
for LEEs being operated by LGUs and do not provide (a) guidance on what the
different alternatives to the creation of LEEs are, and (b) cautionary statement on
potential government failures that may arise with the establishment and continued
operation of LEEs.
As a result of the weaknesses in the LEE policy framework, LEEs have not
been limited to producing goods/services not being provided by the private sector
and actually compete directly with private sector enterprises. They have also not
achieved any level of cost recovery and do lose year after year. Finally, they have
not operated like a corporate body and thus failed to achieve efficiencies and
independence from political interference.
It is therefore recommended that a new policy framework be
constructed that would revolve around the following principles: (a) that LGUs need
to focus on their core functions; (b) that private sector-led development is superior to
government-led development unless a strong case can be made for government
intervention; (c) that some marketable goods/services are better delivered by the
central government rather than LGUs; and (d) that LEEs are only one of a number of
ways of delivering service.
Thus, when an LGU is confronted with the need to decide whether or not to
provide a given good/service, it should first check whether or not delivering the good
or service is aligned with its goals and core functions. Once it decides that it is, it
should assess whether or not government should be the one to deliver the good or
service. If it decides that it should be government, it should decide if it is an LGU or
the central government which should deliver the good or service.
If it is the LGU that could best deliver the good or service, it could do so either
(a) through external organizations like private sector enterprises and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) via various types of public-private partnerships
arrangements like service contracts, management contracts, leases, concessions,
and licenses or (b) directly, either through an LEE or through a regular unit or office
inside its organization. In deciding if it should take on the responsibility of providing
the service or good by itself, the LGU must strike a balance between the need to
ensure that LEEs operate efficiently and at least recover their operating costs, on one
hand, and the need to promote the public interest, on the other. It is widely believed
that LGUs, more than LEEs, can make services or goods more accessible and
affordable to the poorer segments of the community. The LGU must also consider if
it can afford doing so with its present fiscal position being what it is. If it determines it
could not, it should abandon the plan.
In engaging in public-private partnerships, LGUs must bear in mind that
public-private partnerships may be limited by (a) the availability and capacity of the
private organizations to deliver services, and (b) the capacity of the LGU to manage
the contractual and regulatory arrangements which can be both complex and costly
at times. They must also remember that, based on international experience, publicprivate partnerships tend to be successful when (a) the LGU does not assume all of
the financial risks in the partnership while being able to maintain control over the
delivery of the services; (b) the LGU is able to come up with a precise definition of
the required service delivery levels; (c) there is transparency in the regulation of the
external providers performance; and (d) the LGU has access to the technology,
16
expertise and experience that is more often available to the external provider.
However, these advantages exist only if (a) there are several providers capable of
providing the service at comparable cost and performance; (b) the LGU can properly
assess the external service provider's performance; and (c) corruption and other
ethical problems do not come into play.
The new policy framework should provide explicit guidance on the creation of
LEEs. The guidance should specify that LEEs should be established by enacting an
ordinance that specifies, in unequivocal terms, (a) the LGU policy on the degree of
cost-recovery that the LEE needs to achieve, (b) tariff rates or user charges that will
be charged for goods/ services provided by LEE, and (ci) who will be subsidized and
by how much, including the schedule of rates by income bracket of clients where
applicable.
The decision-making process for the establishment of LEEs is illustrated in
the figure below.
Figure 1. Graphical Presentation of LGU Decision Making Process Relative
to Creation of LEEs
Doestheservicecontribute
toachievementofLGU
goals?
AlternativeServiceDeliveryOptions
Privatization
Yes
No
Abandon
ServiceShedding
Divestiture
Istherealegitimateand
necessaryrolefor
governmentinthisservice?
Yes
ShouldtheLGUhaveprimary
responsibilityforthis
service?
No
PasstoNG
PublicPartnershipi.e.SharedServices
Yes
Could,orshould,thisservice
beprovidedinwholeorin
partbytheprivateor
voluntarysector?
Yes
Partner
No
Istheserviceaffordable
withinfiscalrealities?
No
Abandon
Yes
Yes
Iscorporatizationfeasible
anddesirable?
ContractingOut
Service,Management,Lease&ConcessionContracts
BuiltOperateTransfer
i.e.BT,BLT,BOT,BOO
Public/PrivatePartnerships&JointVentures
Includingwithprivatenotforprofitentities
(NGOs/CSOs)
Congress
createsGOCC
GovernmentOwnedandControlledCorporations
i.e.,LGUInc.
No
LGUcreatesLEE
LocalEconomicEnterprise
OrganicUnitinLGU
Adaptedfrom:SEQUUS.2003.DevelopingthePublicEconomicEnterpriseinthePhilippines TheLGSPWay,Draft
reportsubmittedtotheLocalGovernmentSupportProgram(LGSP),CanadianInternational
DevelopmentAgency(CIDA).
The new policy framework should likewise reiterate the importance of the
maintenance of special accounts for LEEs as prescribed by the COA under the
NGAS. The maintenance of special accounts for LEEs is essential in tracking the
17
results of LEE operations and how closely LGUs follow their intent for creating LEEs.
In addition, the framework should institutionalize the periodic review of the operation
of existing LEEs to help LGUs decide whether or not these LEEs deserve to continue
their operations.
2.
In practice, different LGUs treat LEEs in different ways when they prepare
and execute their budgets. There are LGUs that treat their LEEs just like any other
unit/office when they prepare their. The income of their LEEs is shown as part of the
income estimate for the General Fund while all expenditure proposals related to LEE
operations are shown as part of the expense items in the proposed budget.
Some other LGUs treat their LEEs off-budget so that the LEEs' income and
proposed expenditures do not form part of their total income estimates and proposed
budgets, while subsidies (if any) are shown as an expenditure item in their proposed
budget. LEE incomes are then credited to an intra-agency receivable account known
as due from operating units account while LEE operating expenditures are debited
from the same account. In this way, income derived from the operation of LEEs is
used in the payment of operating expenses without passing the usual budget
procedures.
This practice is in direct violation of the basic principle of local fiscal
administration that no money shall be paid out of the local treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriations ordinance. It is also not consistent with the one
fund principle under which the governments budget should cover all transactions
financed with public funds. It should be stressed that the one-fund principle applies
to LEE expenditures because LEEs do not have a separate legal persona as they
cannot be corporations under the existing legal framework. Instead, under the LGC,
LEEs are still part of the General Fund. However, special accounts within the
General Fund should be maintained for each LEE.
Despite these problems, it has been argued that the practice be allowed and
even encouraged since it allows LEEs to retain at least a significant portion of their
income so that they will have the incentive to improve their efficiency. To take this
concern into account, at least partially, while at the same time emphasizing
transparency and accountability, it is recommended that the LGU budget be
presented in 3 parts. Part 1 would show the income estimates and spending
proposals (including subsidy to LEE) for the General Fund Proper. Part 2 would show
the income estimate and spending proposal for the LEE. This implies that
Sanggunian authorization for LEE spending is required. Part 3 would show the
consolidation of Parts 1 and 2. This budget format is not only more transparent than
current practice, it also provides incentives for LEE managers to improve their
collections since they are better able to isolate their earnings from the rest of the
General Fund Proper.
Aside from the need to more clearly prescribe how LEE budgets are to be
treated in the budget preparation and execution of LGUs, there is also the need to
lessen, if not prevent, the abuse of the provision in the LGC that excludes the PS
expenditures of LEEs from the total PS expenditure of an LGU. This provision had
created the incentive for some LGUs to use LEEs to circumvent the current
prohibition for PS expenditures not to exceed 45% or 55% of an LGU's total annual
income, depending on the income classification of the LGU.
18
To address this concern, it is recommended that the favorable treatment
given to the PS spending of LEEs be retained but that its application be limited
to LEEs which are created by ordinance and which have a well-defined policy
on cost recovery.
3.
e.
f.
b.
market surveys;
all identified costs to be recovered, e.g., MOOE, depreciation,
amortization of capital and interest expense; and
the inherent advantage of LGUs in LEEs such as exemption
from taxation and some regulatory requirements,
best
sites/locations and security arrangements;
19
ii.
c.
In planning for new LEEs, LGUs should also adopt corporate business
practices. It should:
b.
c.
iii.
In both existing and planned LEEs, having the correct organizational structure
for their management is vital. The following structures are suggested:
IV.
a.
b.
c.
20
The SEF is not being spent where it ought to to be spent if it is to address
the most urgent problems in public education today.
A.
The Fund
The Special Education Fund (SEF) of all LGUs grew from PhP 8.5 billion in 2001
to PhP 14.2 billion in 2007, so did SEF expenditures which increased from PhP 7.8
billion to PhP 12.1 billion in the same period. While it does not seem large when
compared to either total government spending on education (7%-9%) or total
Department of Education (DepEd) spending (7%-10%), SEF expenditures are
substantial compared to what DepEd spends for non-personal services (41%-86%)
or for maintenance and operating expense or MOOE (71%-142%). Moreover, SEF
expenditures are estimated to be about 2.4 times the total DepEd allocation for
school level MOOE.
B.
These substantial resources, however, are not spent efficiently. They are not
being spent on what needs to be funded most, where they could do the most good.
1.
Despite the fact that the lack of classrooms continue to be serious, the share
of capital outlays in the total SEF declined from 30% in 2006 to 23% in 2008.
Expenditures for the building and repair of classrooms are charged against Capital
Outlays.
3.
21
Still another misalignment of SEF spending is the amount of funds allocated
to sports competition, which account for from 10% to 30% of the budget of an LSB.
This level of support persists even if RA 9155 had already transferred all functions,
programs and activities of the DepEd related to sports competition to the Philippine
Sports Commission.
4.
Finally, a number of LGUs charge against the SEF some expenses related to
the cost of SEF collections like the cost of accountable forms (e.g., receipts) and
personnel doing work related to either RPT assessment and/or collection. The
charging of these costs is in violation of the LCG.
C.
That the potential of SEF spending is not maximized is mainly the result of
three factors:
1.
of
educational
The DepEd had installed various instruments and protocols (mostly based on
the Basic Education Information System), such as the teacher deployment analysis
and the classroom shortage analysis, to measure education performance. The
results of these analyses are available and should provide good support for
evidenced-based resource allocation at the school level. Unfortunately, these
22
feedback have not be used extensively, if at all, in determining what priority areas get
SEF resources through LSB budgets.
3.
The LGC mandates that priority be given to, among other activities, sports
activities at the division, district, municipal, and barangay levels. However, RA 9155
transferred all functions, programs and activities of the DepEd related to sports
competition to the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) while retaining school sports
and physical fitness as part of the basic education curriculum. There appears to be
some confusion on where one exactly draws the line between school sports and
physical fitness and sports development/ sports competition.
Moreover, the use of the term operation and maintenance of public schools
in Section 272 of the LGC is the subject of varying interpretations. On the one hand,
the ambiguity in the use of the term operation and maintenance gives LSBs greater
flexibility to respond to actual needs at the school. On the other hand, one of the
guiding principles of good expenditure assignment in fiscal decentralization is the
need for greater clarity in the assignment of functions across levels of government.
This stems from the fact that if all levels are made responsible for the same
functions, it becomes extremely difficult to exact accountability from any one level of
government.
Related to this, there is a need to clarify expenditure assignment in the
education sub-sector across different levels of government.
D.
Recommendations
The guidelines for the use of the SEF must be strengthened by improving the
existing guidelines that govern SEF allocation, either by the rules-based or the
"market-based" approach. The former involves the joint issuance by the DBM,
DepEd and DILG of new guidelines containing either a positive list of the types of
expenditure items that may be charged against the SEF, a negative list of
expenditure items that are not allowed to be charged against the SEF, or both a
positive list and a negative list of expenditure items. In the meantime, the latter
involves the oversight agencies recalling all existing guidelines on SEF utilization and
giving LSBs full discretion in the allocation of the SEF while strengthening the
capability of the boards to plan and budget the SEF.
2.
The flow of information between the schools and the district supervisors must
be improved to allow the latter to better represent the interests of the former. Clearer
connection must be established between the various instruments and protocols in the
BEIS and the BESRA and the school improvement plan, on the one hand, and LSB
allocation process, on the other hand. In the medium term, there is a need to re-think
DepEd representation in MSBs. The need to have school level representation in the
MSBs would have to be weighed against the practicality of increasing the number of
MSB members. There is also a need to consider expanding the membership of the
LSB to include the head of the cluster of secondary schools in the district as well as
23
the local budget officer. Finally, there is a need to expand the membership of the
LSB to include NGOs, business chambers, and private schools as non-voting
members.
3.
There is a need to delineate the line that separates school sports and
physical fitness from sports development/sports competition and thus clarify the
extent of school participation that is expected in the barangay, district, division,
regional and national level of the Palarong Pambansa.
4.
Actual utilization of the SEF overlaps with DepEd expenditure items. The
following insights from experience in other countries may be considered in this effort.
5.
a.
b.
c.
d.
24
The experience of the Synergeia project sites indicates that the following
elements are key to re-inventing the LSBs:
V.
a.
b.
c.
ODA Distribution
Practically all provinces have received ODA assistance. However, of the ten
provinces with the most number of ODA projects, the majority is in Mindanao (11)
and the rest, in the Visayas (7). Meanwhile, of the seven (7) provinces with the least
number of ODA projects, the majority is located in Luzon. Except for one, the five
regions with the least number of ODA projects are all in Luzon.
Of the sectors funded by ODA accessed by LGUs, agriculture/agrarian reform
accounted for the most number of ODA projects, followed closely by infrastructure
and then health. Education and social services had the least number of projects
B.
ODA Grants
ODA grants have historically comprised at most 10% of total ODA flows and
their proceeds have accounted for less than 2% of allocations for foreign-assisted
projects, which, in turn, accounted for less than 10% of all projects for 2008 and
2009. The value and share of grant funds to total ODA have been declining, and so
25
has the number of grant projects, which decreased from 237 in 1997 to only 89 in
2007. At the same time, the number of LGUs has been growing, thus increasing the
competition for the increasingly scarce ODA grant funds. To make matters worse,
LGUs also have to compete with the large number of agencies of the NG, both line
and oversight, for ODA. Thus, the the chance of an LGU securing an ODA grant is
low compared to that of getting a locally-funded project.
C.
ODA Loans
ODA loans are a much better prospect for LGUs as sources of funds than
grants. These constitute a much larger share of ODA resources and there are many
loan projects that are meant for collaboration with LGUs. Moreover, the share of ODA
loan-financed projects with LGU participation to total ODA loan projects have been
increasing, from 16.7% in 2000 to 21.1% in 2008. However, the absolute amount of
loans with LGU participation has been declining, even without adjusting for inflation,
mainly because the Philippine Government and its major donor partners have been
moving away from project loans towards program loans. The total amount of ODA
commitments has also been declining, from US$13.3 billion in 2000 to only US$9.7
billion in 2007 and then bouncing back only slightly to US$10.0 billion in 2008. This
decline is partly due to the improving fiscal situation in the country.
1.
Number of Loans
Loan Amount
Of the total amount of ODA-sourced loans, cities account for the largest
share. These LGUs got 63% or PhP 8.2 billion of the PhP 13 billion lent by LBP and
33% or PhP 1.2 billion of the PhP 3.6 billion lent by DBP. Municipalities account for
the next largest share, getting 29% or PhP 3.8 billion of LBP's ODA-sourced loan
portfolio and 28% or PhP 1 billion of DBP's. Provinces got the smallest share, with
8% or PhP 1 billion of the LBP and 39% or PhP 1.4 billion of the DBP portfolios.
b.
26
I.
Number of Loans
First class LGUs have the largest share in the total number of ODA-sourced
loans lent by GFIs. They account for 25% and 35% of the ODA loans lent by LBP
and DBP, respectively. Fourth class LGUs have the second largest share, getting
25% of the ODA loans from LBP and 27.5% of the ODA from DBP. The third largest
share goes to 3rd class LGUs which have 25% and 19% of the LBP and DBP
portfolios, respectively. Meanwhile, 2nd class LGUs got 14% each of the same
portfolios and 5th class LGUs got 11% and 5%, respectively.
ii.
Loan Amount
By a great margin, 1st class LGUs got the largest share of the amount of
ODA-sourced loans from GFIs. These government units got 66% and 74% of the
total loan amounts lent by LBP and DBP, respectively. Fourth class LGUs got the
second largest proportion, accounting for 12% and 10% of the ODA loan portfolios of
LBP and DBP. These LGUs are followed in descending order by 3rd, 2nd, and 5th
class LGUs.
c.
Access by Region
Of the ODA-sourced loan projects funded by the LBP, the most numerous
were water systems (75), solid waste management (SWM) projects (36), public
markets (34), drainage (32) systems, and heavy equipment acquisition (20). In
terms of loan amounts, water systems accounted for PhP 2.1 billion or over 16% of
the PhP 13 billion total, followed by drainage projects with close to PhP 1.4 billion or
10.5%, public markets with PhP 1.1 billion or 8.5% and SWM projects with PhP 0.95
billion or 7.3%. Infrastructure projects totaled PhP5.755 billion or 44.2%, primarily
due to the road projects of Cebu City under the Metro Cebu Development Project.
Of those projects funded by DBP, water systems were the most numerous
(19), followed by heavy equipment acquisition (15), SWM projects (14), and public
markets (11). In terms of loan amounts, the IT park project of one 1st class province
accounts for over PhP 1 billion or 30% of the PhP 3.6 billion total. SWM projects
amounted to PhP 885 million (25%), heavy equipment to PhP 580 million (16%), and
water systems to PhP 447 million (12%).
D.
Despite the concessionary terms these resources carry,, LGUs have not been
able to avail of ODA loans and grants. As of 2006, national government agencies
had the biggest share of the ODA pie at 65%, followed by government-owned and
controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financing institutions (GFIs) which
got 22% and 13%, respectively. LGUs received less than one percent (1%).
27
E.
Three main factors contribute to the LGUs' lack of access to ODA. One is the
requirement imposed by international lending institutions that the national
government issues a sovereign guarantee on LGU loans. However, the Foreign
Borrowings Act (RA. 4860) states that the guarantee of the Philippine Government
could be issued only for loans granted to GOCCs and GFIs. There is nothing in the
provisions of the law that says that a guarantee could be provided to external
borrowings of LGUs, which is why the official legal opinion is that such a guarantee is
not allowed.
1.
Despite the dwindling of ODA resources, stories abound in the mass media of
successful implementation of various projects involving LGUs, usually funded by
bilateral aid agencies. This is mainly the result of efforts by both donors and
beneficiary LGUs to gain visibility and project a positive image for themselves.
Because of this need to gain visibility, bilateral aid agencies tend to prefer that their
projects be implemented in areas where they may have had some previous
exposure, especially in areas where previous successes had been achieved.
Moreover, they look for the following in the LGUs they prefer as venues for their
projects:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
These stringent criteria severely limits LGU access to ODA projects and
creates the situation of donor agencies converging on the few LGUs that qualify, thus
resulting in wasteful duplication of efforts.
Most of the bilateral grant projects are small and thus limited initially to a few
LGUs so that they could be more focused. Their project design often involves some
innovation in local development that, if proven to be successful, may be graduated or
scaled up to the national level, usually by the national government on its own, or with
28
assistance from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank.
Precisely because donor agencies want to have success stories to tell, many
ODA grant projects at the LGU level tend to be coddled or cared for by both the
donor and the recipient LGU to increase the chances of the projects being
successful. However, when replicated in other LGUs during the scaling up and
implementation in a larger area, the projects actual performance falls short of the
level of success achieved in the pilot LGUs. There is even the prior problem of
finding enough LGUs to participate in the scaling up. In scaled up projects,
participating LGUs are expected to put up most of the resources (in cash or in kind,
as equity or as loan) that were given by the donor partner to the pilot LGUs.
2.
LGUs are generally unable to put up the equity required for an ODA loan. A
number of LGUs have withdrawn participation in such projects due to the NG-LGU
cost sharing scheme for LGU-devolved programs.
6.
The limited technical capacity of LGUs has likewise affected LGU access to
ODA. Some LGUs have had difficulties in complying with pre-qualification
requirements, documentary requirements for clearances, and the need for detailed
engineering designs. One of these requirements is the Bureau of Local Government
Finance (BLGF) good debt service capability certification, which is needed to avail of
MDFO financing facilities.
29
7.
Compared to those imposed by other GFIs and private banks, the processes and
procedures imposed by the MDFO on LGUs for availing of ODA loans are tedious
and lengthy and thus have served either as a hindrance to the easy and fast access
of LGUs to ODA loans or as a disincentives for LGUs to seek ODA loans. The
MDFO also imposes high interest rates, primarily because of some built-in technical
assistance and capacity building for recipient LGUs.
F.
Recommendations
The ODA Act provides that ODA must be used where there are no
comparative financial instruments available. Using domestic commercial financing
would free ODA for priority sectors fo which commercial financing is not available. It
also introduces new fund sources and instruments and thus help develop sustainable
financing of LGUs.
2.
30
portfolio and pooled bond could be secured by, among other credit enhancements, a
reserve fund using its Second Generation Fund. In the meantime, the government
should strengthen MDFOs operational capacity to support LGU financing by
approving the latters organizational rationalization plan as an attached agency of the
DOF.
5.
After an initial round of bond flotations, the LGU bond market is now inactive.
The primary reason is cost. Most LGU borrowings are small and the high fixed cost
of issuing bonds means that it is cheaper to obtain a bank loan. The government
could look into modalities such as bond pooling and establishing a liquidity facility to
help bolster interest in LGU bonds.
6.
Much of the ODA for LGUs is channeled through GFIs and other government
financing institutions which act as intermediaries and on-lend these funds to eligible
LGUs. However, ODA and GFI funds are not enough to meet the potential demand
from LGUs. Private financial institutions and other forms of private capital can help to
meet additional LGU needs. IFIs should therefore be given a relevant role in the
design of projects that use ODA to bring in more domestic players and financing
instruments.
2.
There is currently no policy on the final terms for the way GFIs receive ODA
funds, with each ODA source providing funds to GFIs under different terms and
conditions. The current practice is for the GFI to retain the benefits of the low cost
and longer terms of the ODA. This system lacks transparency in the allocation of the
benefits of the loans. When the GFIs on-lend the ODA-sourced funds to LGUs at
market prices, this can result in a substantial profit for the GFIs. It is necessary for
GFIs and other government lending institutions to differentiate their use of ODA from
the use of their internal funds to minimize the possibility of ODA crowding out PFI
lending to LGUs and other sub-national entities like water districts.
31
3.
This used to be a moot issue before, when practically all donor partners,
multilateral and bilateral, refused to lend without sovereign guarantee. Lately,
however, ADB has been open to relaxing this condition.
4.
The administrative fiat directs the DILG and the DOF to implement the LGU
Financing Framework, under which first-tier LGUs, or those provinces, cities, and
municipalities whose average regular and locally-source funds for the past three
years comprise 60% of their total income, may borrow directly from multilateral
agencies ". . .without any direct or indirect National Government guarantee.
Although borrowing without any national government guarantee may add on some
1.5 percentage points to the cost of funds to the LGU as this is the current charge of
the LGU Guarantee Corporation, the LGUs are nevertheless expected to enjoy a
lower cost of funds if they are able to borrow directly from ODA sources. Moreover
and perhaps more importantly, LGUs would be able to define its own public
investment needs and priorities, without these being distorted by national priorities,
which happens when they access ODA funds through relending from NG agencies.
5.
Managers of financial institutions say that there are funds available to meet
the capital financing needs of LGUs. They believe that the constraint is the lack of
well-prepared project proposals. Many LGUs do not have a system of setting
priorities for capital investment and the capacity and/or resources to prepare project
feasibility studies. In some cases, LGUs are not too familiar with the process of
accessing ODA. Government needs to strengthen its efforts to educate LGUs on
how to access ODA. It may also wish to consider the establishment of a project
feasibility study fund and a ready pool of consultants for the use of LGUs to conduct
feasibility studies. It may likewise consider streamlining the development and
approval processes for small subprojects so that templates can be used for small
subloans, e.g., P3 million and below, instead of full-blown feasibility studies.
7.
32
sustainable mechanisms for local government access to domestic capital and should
not be focused only on short-term transfer of ODA through projects where ODA is
simply on-lent to LGUs on a one-to-one basis or goes directly into projects. The
levels of concessionality of ODA could be considered more carefully at the
programming stage so that the more concessional ODA can be directed towards the
sectors and locations that need it more. Government could also exert best efforts to
ensure that all programmed or committed funds are negotiated and converted into
loan agreements.
VI.
A.
2.
3.
borrow from financial markets, through loans, credits and other forms
of indebtedness, in advance of revenues;
4.
5.
6.
33
B.
7.
8.
enter into joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements with nongovernmental organization (NGOs) and Peoples Organization (POs)
for social and economic purposes.
The most concrete and visible signs of the LGUs' exercise of their corporate
powers are their efforts to mobilize resources. LGUs do this by operating local
economic enterprises (LEEs), which are the subject of a separate section, and by
engaging in non-traditional forms of resource mobilization. The non-traditional forms
of resource mobilization are private-private partnership (PPP), inter-LGU cooperation
schemes, and corporatizing service facilities.
1.
Public-Private Partnerships
a.
b.
It frees LGU funds for other priority development projects which may
not be eligible for credit financing, e.g., social and environmental
projects.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
There are seven possible arrangements for PPPs that could be used by
LGUs. These are (a) service contract, (b) management contract, (c) lease, (d)
concession, (e) license, (f) funding agreement, and (g) joint venure. These models
34
differ in the following areas: (a) ownership of the assets, (b) responsibility for capital
investment, (c) responsibility for operation and maintenance, (d) relationship to the
consumer/citizens, (e) regulation of user charges or tariffs, (6) receipt of operating
revenue, (f) sharing of financial risks, (g) degree of LGU subsidy, and (h) extent of
monopoly rights.
a.
Service Contracts
The LGU may contract an external organization to deliver a service. The LGU
continues to own the assets needed to deliver the service but the service contractor
is responsible for the repair and maintenance of these assets and usually for the
replacement of some equipment necessary for the delivery of the service. The
operating income is controlled by the LGU and goes to its accounts. The contractor is
simply paid for the service based on the agreed price.
b.
Management Contracts
Management contracts provide for the LGU to either share or not share with
the service provider the income from the service delivery. If there is no sharing of
income, the LGU maintains ownership of the assets and is responsible for
investments into the assets. It also sets the tariffs for the service, is directly
responsible to the citizen for the service, and assumes all financial risks. The
operation and maintenance costs are met from the income received for the service.
Any operating surplus or deficit is the responsibility of the LGU. The service
contractor, on the other hand, is simply paid a fixed fee for the service.
If the revenue received from the delivery of the service is shared between the
LGU and service contractor, the LGU has the same responsibilities and risks as in
the no-income-sharing approach. However, the service contractor usually has
discretion to charge less (but not more) than the regulated tariffs. It also receives a
fixed percentage share of the operating surplus on top of the fixed contract fee.
c.
Leasing
The LGU may lease some of the assets it owns to a service provider in
exchange for a rental price which may be a straight rental price, a percentage share
of the revenue, or both. The service provider is responsible to the consumers of the
service and thus bears all the financial risks associated with the operation of the
service. It collects the revenue from the delivery of the service through tariffs which
the LGU may set. It also meets the operating costs. It is likewise responsible for
operation, repair and maintenance, and for the replacement of short-life equipment.
It must return the assets to the LGU in good condition at the end of the lease period,
less normal wear and tear on equipment.
d.
Concessions
35
investment. The LGU get back ownership of the assets after the concession period.
A Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme is a form of concession.
e.
Licensing
A service provider may be licensed to invest in, and operate, a service on the
same conditions as a concession, except that it does not have the exclusive rights to
provide the service. It, however, retains the assets used in the delivery of the service,
after the license has expired. This arrangement is resorted to where there is
potential for competition and the service requires lower investment costs.
f.
Funding Agreement
LGUs may enter into a contract with non-profit organizations under which the
former provides the latter a grant to provide certain services, such as the
management of social, sports, recreation, or cultural activities. The organization is
responsible for all investment and operating costs, owns the assets used and bears
the financial risks.
g.
Joint Ventures
A number of LGUs (e.g., Misamis Oriental and Quezon City) have attempted
to operate their LEEs by registering their LEEs as corporations with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the Corporation Code. However, the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in an opinion dated July 22,
1997, asserts that an LGU, being a juridical person by virtue of it being a corporation
itself, cannot be an incorporator of a private corporation. This opinion is based on the
fact that Section 10 of the Corporation Code provides that: Any number of natural
persons not less than five but more than fifteen, all of legal age x x x may form a
private corporation for any lawful purpose or purposes x x x.
36
Meanwhile, the COA points out that government corporations can only be
created by Congress (Sec. 16 Art. XII of the Philippine Constitution). It also says that
the LGC does not vest in the Sangguniang Bayan the power to create corporations
(Supreme Court in Engr. Ranulfo Feliciano, Leyte Metropolitan Water District vs.
COA, GR No. 147402, dated January 14, 2004).
In the face of these difficulties, LGUs seeking to create corporations out of
LEEs ought to seek legislation which provide such corporations a separate charter as
a government-owned and controlled corporation..
C.
Efforts to harness and enhance the corporate capacities of LGUs requires the
dynamic interplay of policy support, capacity building, and sustaining actions
consisting of advocacy and technical assistance, monitoring and evaluation, as well
as funding support. It also needs to have an institutional framework for the
mobilization of stakeholder support.
1.
Policy Support
There are external factors that impact on LGUs exercise of corporate powers,
mainly related to policy and oversight support. There are a number of laws and
policies governing the LGUs exercise of corporate powers that are vague on LGUs
mandate to establish LEEs. Moreover, policies on organizational and financial
systems for LEEs are not in tune with industry standards. The policies on LGUs
exercise of corporate powers must be responsive to LGU needs and more enabling
of LGU initiatives. Furthermore, policies suffer from gaps in their interpretation and
implementation at the operational/local level. All these needs must be addressed in
order for a policy environment that supports the promotion of the exercise of LGU
corporate powers is to be created.
2.
Capacity Building
The successful exercise of LGU corporate powers would require not only the
necessary policy support but also sustained advocacy and adequate technical and
funding assistance. LGUs would need some assistance in identifying and then
accessing sources of investment. The OPDS can take the lead, in collaboration with
the DILGs Regional Offices, DTI, and the Small and Medium Enterprise
37
Development (SMED) Council, in promoting LGUs exercise of corporate powers and
in providing them the necessary technical assistance in identifying its economic
potentials, potential economic niches, needs and demands, and in managing LEEs.
These entities can likewise act as broker for LGUs in sourcing financing for its
projects and initiatives in line with LGUs exercise of corporate powers.
4.
b.
c.
d.
6.
To set the stage and create a platform for LGUs effective exercise of
corporate powers, an institutional framework is hereby envisioned where the DILG, in
collaboration with the other oversight agencies and concerned institutions such as
NEDA, DOF, DBM, DTI, DA, DOJ, ULAP and PCCI, shall establish a Coordinating
Council for LGU Corporate Powers (CCLCP). The CCLCP shall:
a.
38
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
COORDINATINGCOMMITTEE
ONDECENTRALIZATION(CCD)
RaymundC.Fabre
ADBTA7019
Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
History
HighlightsoftheMOU:LegalBasis
HighlightsoftheMOU:Purpose
HighlightsoftheMOU:Structure
HighlightsoftheMOU:Scope
HISTORY
y TheconceptofacoordinatingbodyforLGUand
decentralizationissueswithmembersfromthe
oversightagenciesisnotnew.
y Aninformalversionofthisbodywasresponsible
foreventuallydraftingandfacilitatingthe
issuanceofJointMemorandumAgreement20071.
y However,therewasalwaystheintenttoformalize
thebodyand,originally,tobecomearevivalof
theOversightCommitteeonDevolution.
HISTORY
y However,basedonarecentquicklegalreview,
theOCDwasneverdissolvednordidtheLocal
GovernmentCodeof1991provideforasunset
clause.
y TheOCDcontinuedtobeconvenedafterthe
issuanceoftheCodesIRRbutonlytoruleon
issuessuchasthemanneronhowtheIRAistobe
released.
y However,thereanumberofcoordinationand
policyissuesasidefromtheIRAwhichshouldbe
addressedbyaregularlyconvenedinteragency
body.
HISTORY
y Theseissuesincludedreformsonthelocaltaxing
powersofLGUs,LGUaccesstoofficial
developmentassistance,LGUaccesstocredit,the
implementationofJMC20071orharmonization
intheprovisionofcapacitybuildingtoLGUs,and
thegovernmentspositionsonthePhilippine
DevelopmentForum20092010workplan.
y Overtimethiscoalitionbecomecomfortablein
workingtogethertowardsaddressingtheseissues
andseekingreforms.
HISTORY
y InameetingheldlastJune22,2009,thegroup
agreedtoformalizetheirrelationshipthrougha
memorandumofagreement(MOU)whichwould
includethefouroversightagencies,theLGU
LeaguesandtheUnionofLocalAuthoritiesofthe
Philippinesassignatories.
y Afterseveralconsultations,thefinalformofthe
MOUwascirculatedamongtheCCDmembersfor
finalapprovalonOctober16,2009.
HighlightsoftheMOU:LegalBasis
AGENCY
LEGALBASIS
DepartmentoftheInteriorandLocal
Government(DILG)
Section3(3),Chapter1,TitleXIIofExecutive
Order292(AdministrativeCodeof1987);
Section533ofRA7160(LocalGovernment
Codeof1991)
NationalEconomicandDevelopment
Authority(NEDA)
ExecutiveOrder230,s.1987;Section114(b)
ofRA7160(LocalGovernmentCodeof1991)
DepartmentofBudgetandManagement
(DBM)
Section2,Chapter1,TitleXVIIofExecutive
Order292(AdministrativeCodeof1987);
Section354andSection533ofRA7160
(LocalGovernmentCodeof1991)
DepartmentofFinance(DOF)
Section1,Chapter1,TitleIIofExecutive
Order291(AdministrativeCodeof1987);
Section288andSection533ofRA7160
(LocalGovernmentCodeof1991)
HighlightsoftheMOU:LegalBasis
AGENCY
LEGALBASIS
LeagueofProvincesofthePhilippines(LPP)
Title6,Chapter1,ArticleFourandSection
533ofRA7160(LocalGovernmentCodeof
1991)
LeagueofCitiesofthePhilippines(LCP)
Title6,Chapter1,ArticleThreeandSection
114(b)ofRA7160(LocalGovernmentCode
of1991)
LeagueofMunicipalitiesofthePilippines
(LMP)
Title6,Chapter1,ArticleTwoandSection
533ofRA7160(LocalGovernmentCodeof
1991)
LigalngmgaBarangay(LnB)
Title6,Chapter1,ArticleOneandSection
533ofRA7160(LocalGovernmentCodeof
1991)
UnionofLocalAuthoritiesofthe
Philippines(ULAP)
SECRegistrationA199900861
LegalBasis
AGENCY
LEGALBASIS
Departmentofthe
InteriorandLocal
Government(DILG)
establishandprescriberules,regulationsandotherissuances
andimplementinglawsonthegeneralsupervisionofLGUs,
promotionoflocalautonomyandmonitorcompliance
NationalEconomicand
DevelopmentAuthority
(NEDA)
responsibleforcoordinatingtheformulationofcontinuingand
integratedsocioeconomicdevelopmentplans,policies,and
programs
DepartmentofBudget
andManagement(DBM)
promulgateaBudgetOperationManualforLGUstoimprove
andsystematizebudgetpreparation,authorization,execution
andaccountability
DepartmentofFinance
(DOF)
formulate,institutionalize,andadministerfiscalpoliciesand
forsupervisionofrevenueoperationsofallLGUswiththe
objectiveofmakingtheseentitieslessdependentfromthe
nationalgovernment
LegalBasis
AGENCY
LEGALBASIS
LeagueofProvincesof
ventilate,articulateandcrystallizeissuesaffectingtheir
thePhilippines(LPP),
respectiveLGU,andsecuringthroughpropermeanssolutions
LeagueofCitiesofthe
thereto
Philippines(LCP),
LeagueofMunicipalities
ofthePilippines(LMP),
andLigangmga
Barangay(LnB)
UnionofLocal
Authoritiesofthe
Philippines(ULAP)
strengthentheorganizationandpromotefellowshipand
unityamonglocalauthorities
HighlightsoftheMOU:Purpose
1.
2.
3.
Toactasanintergovernmentalbodyfor
coordinatingandharmonizingpoliciesand
operationalactivitiesrelatedtodecentralization
anddevolution.
ToactasaforumfordiscussingLGUissuesand
policiesandforsharingrelevantinformation.
Tocollectivelyformulate,implementand
advocatesolutionsandpolicyreformswithin
thepowersandauthorityofthemember
agencies.
HighlightsoftheMOU:Purpose
4.
5.
6.
Toexploreconsensusandbuildsupportfor
policyreformsrelatedtoimprovinglocal
governance,localservicedeliveryand
devolution.
Toelevateissuesandrecommendationstothe
OCDandotherappropriateagencies,bodies
andboardsforpolicydecisionandaction;and.
ToinitiatestudiesonLGUissuesforthe
purposeofidentifying,formulating,
implementingandadvocatingpolicyreforms.
PurposeoftheCCD
DILG
harmonizedpoliciesand
operationalactivities
DOF
DBM
policyreformsonlocal
governance,localservice
deliveryanddevolution
NEDA
ULAP
LnB
policyissuesand
recommendations
totheOCD
LMP
LCP
LPP
CoordinatingCommittee
onDecentralization
studiesonLGU
issues
HighlightsoftheMOU:Structure
1.
2.
TheCCDiscomposedofthreemain
components:anExecutiveCommittee
(Execom),aPolicyDialogueGroup,anda
TechnicalSecretariat.
TheExecutiveCommitteeiscomposedofthe
UndersecretariesoftheDepartmentofInterior
andLocalGovernment(DILG),theDepartment
ofFinance(DOF),theDepartmentofBudget
andManagement(DBM),andtheNational
EconomicandDevelopmentAuthority(NEDA).
TheChairmanoftheExecomwillbetheDILG
Undersecretary.
HighlightsoftheMOU:Structure
3.
4.
ThePolicyDialogueGroupiscomposedofthe
UndersecretaryoftheDILGasChairman,the
OversightAgencyTechnicalWorkingGroupand
theLocalGovernmentDialoguePartners.
TheOversightAgencyTechnicalWorkingGroupis
composedoftheDirectoroftheBureauofLocal
GovernmentDevelopment(BLGD)oftheDILG,the
ExecutiveDirectoroftheBureauofLocal
GovernmentFinanceoftheDOF,theDirectorof
BudgetandManagementBureauGoftheDBM,
andtheDirectoroftheRegionalDevelopment
CoordinationStaff(RDCS)ofNEDA.
HighlightsoftheMOU:Structure
5.
TheLocalGovernmentDialoguePartnersare
composedofExecutiveDirectorsoftheLeague
ofProvincesofthePhilippines(LPP),the
LeagueofCitiesofthePhilippines(LCP),the
LeagueofMunicipalitiesofthePhilippines
(LMP),LigangmgaBarangay(LnB),andthe
UnionofLocalAuthoritiesofthePhilippines
(ULAP).
HighlightsoftheMOU:Structure
6.
TheCCDTechnicalSecretariatistheBureauof
LocalGovernmentDevelopment(BLGD)ofthe
DILGwiththeBLGDDirectorservingas
ExecutiveSecretaryonanexofficiobasis.
CCDStructure
EXECUTIVECOMMITTEE
Undersecretariesof
DILG,DOF,DBMandNEDA
POLICYDIALOGUEGROUP
OversightAgencyTWG:
BLGD ILG,DBMROCS(DBM
G),DOFBLGF,NEDARDCS
LGDIALOGUEPARTNERS:
LPP.LCP.LMP.LnB,and
ULAP
TECHNICALSECRETARIAT
BLGDDILG
Scope
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
CapacityBuilding
LocalServiceDelivery
PerformanceMeasurement
DevolutionReforms
ExpenditureandBudgetPolicy
LocalGovernmentFinance(CreditandNon
Traditional)
LocalGovernmentFiscalPolicy
(IntergovernmentalTransfers,DonorGrants
andOwnSourceRevenues)
THANKYOU
Introduction
The Local Government Code was passed in 1991 with the goal of improving the delivery of
frontline services to citizens and communities through the decentralization of powers from the
nation-state to local governments in the Philippines. This study will examine the opportunities
and challenges in further decentralizing environmental, health, social welfare, and agricultural
services to sub-national units of governance. It will consider the new roles to be played by the
central government and local governments in the context of efforts to redraw governance borders
and deepen the decentralization process. In this regard, the key question is why further
decentralization is needed despite the transfer of significant authority to local governments for
the past 18 years.
Decentralization is not an end but a process leading to good governance. Structural and policy
reforms implemented towards decentralization are manifested through four major types
(political, administrative, market, and fiscal) and changes have resulted in terms of
improvements in local governance, delivery of services, allocation of fiscal resources, and
promoting public participation (Brillantes and Cuachon 2002). Domestic and international
pressures for democratization have led to a new emphasis on forms of governance below the
nation-state level (Angeles and Magno 2004).
A concern with local government capacity does suggest that there are two directions in which the
reform of this sector can proceed. On the one hand, it can proceed in a minimalist direction as
the reformers seek to close a capacity gap by limiting local authorities to their core business
functions and constraining their ability to undertake these functions in a fiscally irresponsible
way. On the other hand, it may be recognized that the application of avant-garde management
principles and financial disciplines at the local level may enable councils to play a more catalytic
role in the economic and social development of their communities. A more activist approach to
local government reform may seek to build on these developments to enhance the capacity and
discretion of local authorities to take on more functions, engage community participation to a
greater degree in their decision making and play a more significant role in the delivery of the
central governments domestic policy agenda (Dollery and Wallis 2001).
Elected local government is but one element of what has become known as local governance, a
term which seeks to capture the shift away from a system in which local authorities were the key
actors in their localities to one where decision-making authority and service provision is shared
among a range of agencies. Local authorities are increasingly working alongside other public,
private and voluntary sector organizations in providing services for a locality (Pratchett and
Wilson 1996).
power to control, supervise, and review many of the supposedly devolved services even as LGUs
are held responsible for them resulting in confusion, overlaps, and duplication of functions. The
accomplishments and state of decentralization in the ENR sector has been described as at best
partial and at worst miniscule and insignificant and hardly able to involve the bulk of
functions stipulated in the LGC (Leagues of Municipalities, 2006).
The effective involvement of LGUs in ENR efforts had been hampered by challenges, in human
resource, financial, organizational and political capabilities and resources. For one, the resources
and personnel transferred to LGUs were not commensurate to the cost of the devolved functions.
It is estimated that provinces absorbed 45.6 percent of the total cost of devolved functions,
municipalities 47.4 percent, cities 7.0 percent, and barangays O percent. In contrast, the shares of
LGUs in the IRA are provinces 23 percent, cities 23 percent, municipalities 34 percent, and
barangays 20 percent (Manasan 2002). Among government agencies, the DENR has the lowest
number of personnel devolved to LGUs at around 4.2 percent (ADB and World Bank, 2004).
The findings of the National Capacity Self-Assessment Project of the Government of the
Philippines, UNDP and GEF, suggested that most LGUs currently have low capacities to address
environmental matters relating to, climate change, biodiversity conservation, land degradation
,and drought (GOP, UNDP, GEF, 2005; LMP, undated). LGUs have to face both lack of
personnel and lack of technical capacity since specialized knowledge, skills, technical knowhow,
as well as experience (e.g. in cadastral survey, environmental planning) were largely lodged in
the staff bureaus at the central office (Gonzales as cited by Manasan 2002; Brilantes 2009).
Personnel transferred did not assume the inherent functions (e.g., Community Development
Officers) for the LGU. Furthermore, support mechanisms such as IEC, financial assistance, and
infrastructure & facilities are lacking. In several instances, functions supposedly devolved
already reverted back to national DENR offices. Lastly, a monitoring scheme to determine status
of devolved functions is absent.
At the institutional level, it has been observed that instead of a support role, national agencies
still intervened in the way LGUs managed implementation of devolved tasks, policies, and
programs (LMP, 2006). The lack of a clear prevailing regulatory framework permitted and
encouraged the existence of a two-track delivery system, where both national government
agencies and LGUs can initiate devolved activities (Manasan 2002). In addition to international
commitments, numerous environmental laws and issuances have engendered policy conflicts.
There was an instance where a protected area intended for mining development was at the same
time claimed as an ancestral domain (Brillantes 2009).
The good news however is despite these challenges LGUs were able to effectively absorb some
ENR functions. The DENR points out that of the eight devolved functions identified, regulation
of fishing in municipal waters and ESWM were perceived as successfully and effectively
performed by LGUs (DENR, 2008). Successful efforts to protect and sustainably use
environmental assets (like water bodies, parks, seascapes and landscapes) and natural resources
(like forests, fisheries, minerals, soils, water, and renewable energy) have been initiated by LGUs
and recognized by award bodies such as the Galing Pook Awards. Generally, the absorptive
capacities of LGUs however vary due to factors which include uneven commitment and
capacities.
The LGC mandates that LGUs receive 40 percent share of such collections. LGUs however have
experienced delays and non-release of mandated shares of local governments from natural
resources fees and taxes collected by the national government for the utilization and
development of national wealth in their jurisdiction (Manasan 2002). In the case of the
Malampaya natural gas project in Palawan, the province has not yet received its due despite the
project being in operation since 2001.
Towards Further Devolution
Recognizing that there is much to be done, LGUs, civil society, the national government, as well
as the academe is pushing towards further devolution of ENR functions in accordance with the
letter and spirit of the local government code. Enumerated are ENR functions that warrant
further devolution:
According to the League of Municipalities, the tasks of forest management, protected area
supervision, land registration, water resource management, mineral resource development, and
environmental impact assessment should be devolved to the LGUs within the next 6 years.
Within the next 12 months, local governments are expected to regulate and develop natural
forests and forestlands within the jurisdictions of the LGUs. Local forest management will cover
old-growth, residual and plantation forests and pasture lands in the public domain, in accordance
to existing regulations and standards of management prescribed by law.
The local government units can supervise protected areas by administering declared and enacted
protected areas having portions of their boundaries found within the jurisdiction of LGUs. For
protected areas that extend to more than one LGU jurisdiction, they shall be administered jointly
by all hosting LGUs.
Within the next three years, the services of land registration and mineral resources development
will be devolved. All processes and procedures to register lands shall be regulated by the LGU
within whose area and jurisdiction the land is located. The principal repository of patents and
titles shall be the LGU, but with official copies of the same deposited in the National Statistics
Office.
Under devolution, water resource management shall be subject to the principal authority and
regulatory supervision of LGUs. Subject to procedures, standards and specifications to be issued
by the national government, LGUs shall create multi-sector Water Regulatory Boards to ensure
the water security of their citizens.
The localization of mineral resource development and environmental impact assessment (EIA) is
expected within six years. In a decentralized environment, the final approval for all mineral
extraction activities at any scale shall be reposed on LGUs, subject to check-and-balance
standards and procedures to be set up by competent national authorities or by law. On the other
hand, all EIA processes and certifications shall be reposed upon LGUs (singly or jointly) where a
subject development project is to be located.
Several conditions need to be met in order to ensure that the goals of decentralization of the ENR
functions are accomplished. These include the consolidation of policy and the policy direction,
the clarification of roles and relationship of both LGU and DENR (and also among LGU levels)
in ENR matters, appropriation of adequate resources, and capacity building and development.
In terms of policy and policy direction, there is clearly a need for both the national government
and LGUs to renew their commitment to decentralization and pursue further devolution in line
with the LGC. First on the agenda should be clarification of the policy, as well as the respective
roles of NGAs and LGUs in ENR. Because the LGC was not very explicit and clear about the
delineation of roles as well as administrative matters, all the agencies, as well as local
government units involved in ENR need to sit together and finalize the direction and the manner
with which they shall proceed.
In line with reinventing government principles advanced by Osborne and Gaebler in the book
Reinventing Government, the League of Municipalities strongly advocates for a steering role
for the national government and a rowing role for LGUs. They propose that DENR should shift
from regulatory mode to a development mode and that DENR relinquish control of LGUs in the
devolved areas.
For them, the steering role of national government and DENR includes the following: (1) Policy
determination and international relations, (2) Setting of guidelines and standards, (3) Generation
of knowledge and technical information, (4) Implementation of national-level programs, (5)
Monitoring and evaluation of ENR policies, programs, (6) Resource allocation for ENR, and (7)
Accreditation and certification of LGUs and ENR personnel.
On the other hand, there is a preference for strengthening regional offices of DENR. Under the
premise that regional offices may be able to better monitor, assist, and provide the necessary
technical guidance and support to LGUs, existing Regional Offices of the DENR should be
converted into Regional Technical Centers to support and monitor LGU ENR functions within
the region. They shall derive technical guidance and assistance from DENR bureaus and perform
the following roles (LMP, 2006): (1) Technical support, (2) Oversight and monitoring, (3)
Coordination and liaison with ENR Bureaus, and (4) Personnel training.
LGUs are expected to row by translating national policies to local needs as well as managing
devolved tasks. The proposed role and functions of LGUs include: (1) Policy implementation
through adoption of national policy in local development and program/project formulation; (2)
Adoption of local policies and legislation in accordance with national policy and local priorities;
(3) Administration and regulation of devolved functional areas; (4) Generation of funds for local
ENR operations; and (5) Serve as partner in the implementation of national programs in their
jurisdiction.
Institutional arrangement
The difficulty of addressing ENR concerns with an area wide impact not divisible by local
boundaries (e.g. soil erosion, water quality deterioration) as well as the demonstrated success of
inter-LGU cooperation has led to proposals in formalizing this mechanism and coming up with
inter-LGU organizations and higher level regional bodies (Elazegui, undated ).
LGUs will benefit in the establish and strengthening of inter-local cooperation especially in
common service areas such as environmental governance, integrated area planning, information
and communications technology adoption, procurement, human resource development, and
financial management (Magno, 2009)
Of course, given the current limitations of the LGC, there is a need to set the appropriate policy
framework and guidelines for inter-local cooperation. This will guide LGUs who wish to enter
into inter-LGU arrangements as well as make inter-LGU arrangements binding and less
susceptible to sudden changes in people or priorities of sitting officials.
In order to maximize resources as well as improve coordination and overall management, there is
a need for a more rationalized organizational set-up with minimal overlap and duplication of
roles. LGUs through the LMP, is advocating for the management of ENR offices at the
provincial, city, or municipal level. Provincial Environment and Natural Resource Offices
(PENROs) as well as City Environment and Natural Resource Offices (PENROs) should be
placed under supervision of LGUs (LMP 2006). Initially, DENR personnel transferred to LGUs
be funded by the national government initially for 5 years, then absorbed by the LGU on the 10th
year (LMP 2006).
Resources
Lack of resources is often cited as the primary reason why LGUs are not able to successfully
manage devolved functions. Because budget allocation for ENR functions at the LGU is not
explicitly provided, it is not unusual for local executives to underfund it. Also, despite provisions
allowing them to charge user fees and environmental taxes, LGUs have generally been unable
(or ineffective) to generate sufficient resources to augment their IRA allotment and fund their
ENR programs.
LGUs propose cost-sharing between national and local government for ENR programs. One way
is to reactivate the NGA-LGU cost sharing arrangement adopted by the NEDA Board in 2003.
Geologue proposed formulation of a national policy prescribing local budgetary allocations for
ENR purposes (Geologue, undated). Manasan on the other hand proposes the design of a
matching grant for ENR management. In this arrangement, the national government can provide
LGUs with grants they will match and can use for a specific purpose only (Manasan 2002). They
also propose setting a minimum IRA allocation for local ENR functions.
In addition to cost-sharing, there is also a push for greater local fiscal autonomy. As the LGC
does not impose caps on fees and user charges that may be imposed by LGUs, national
government agencies should remove prescribed caps on fees that may be charged by LGUs.
NGAs should avoid as much as possible to dictate how to use local funds especially for activities
that are locally funded (e.g. DBM placed a P900/ day cap on budget for training and seminars).
LGUs also look forward to regular and automatic release of LGU shares in national wealth and
other taxes.
Capacity
Recognizing the disparity in the capacity of various LGUs to manage ENR roles and functions,
the LMP proposes a capacity-based transfer of roles. LMP proposes that a certification system
for LGUs be prepared by the DENR, DILG, and the local government through the Leagues to
assess and certify LGUs in terms of capacity to assume specific devolved functions on schedule
(LMP, 2006). Devolution of roles will be made gradually based on capacity to assume but with
the end view that all appropriate functions will eventually be devolved. Geollegue, suggest that
highly technical functions in which LGUs demonstratively lack technical capacity should be
returned to the central offices altogether (Geollegue undated).
Local fiscal autonomy also requires developing capacity of LGUs for revenue generation.
Pampanga, under the leadership of Fr. Ed Panlilio has shown the vast potential of judiciouslyapplied and well-managed environmental tax systems to contribute to local finance (Torneo
2008). Technical assistance in this area may have a significant impact on LGU financial
performance.
A complementary proposal is to utilize funds from Official Development Assistance (ODA) and
Government Financial Institutions (GFI) to catalyze public-private partnerships and effectively
assist lower-income class LGUs (Magno 2008). LGUs are also challenged to find ways to
stimulate private financing of ENR programs/projects. Lastly, LGUs can ensure that taxes
collected from a declared protected area go directly to the protected area management board.
(Elazegui, et al., 2002)
There is also a pressing need to build local capacity to take on the devolved roles (Magno 2008;
Brillantes 2009). Capacity development towards local autonomy entails the development of the
following:
Environment and Development Planning
Administrative Governance
Resource Allocation and Utilization
Resource Mobilization
Financial Accountability
Stakeholder Participation
Health
Provinces are mandated by the LGC to provide health services which include hospitals and other
tertiary health services. Municipalities are tasked to provide services which include the
implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and
communicable and non-communicable disease control services; access to secondary and tertiary
health services; purchase of medicines; medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the
services. Barangays are tasked to render health and social welfare services which include the
maintenance of barangay health center and day-care center.
Grundy, Healy and Sandig points out that the devolution of health care services (HCS) have
three main goals. The first goal is to increase the resource base for primary care, by moving
resources from the center to peripheral locations. The second goal is improving responsiveness
of authorities of local officials to local health needs and situations by broadening the decision
making space of middle and lower level managers. The third goal is to enhance the efficiency
and effectiveness of health services by bringing management closer to the recipients for prompt
action (Grundy, Healy and Sandig, 2003). The results of the devolution of HCS have been mixed
so far.
A three country study found that based on a set criteria, the Philippines demonstrate one of the
most extensive levels of decision-making in an administrative sense relative to Indonesia and
Vietnam. There is evidence however to suggest that decision-making often can be constrained by
a) politically-based priority setting of local officials, which at times are viewed by health
managers to be in conflict with priority setting based on health needs and b) low availability of
funding limits the capacity of middle-level managers to exercise decision-making powers
(Grundy, Healy and Sandig, 2003).
In terms of efficiency and effectiveness perceived results are mixed with some studies suggesting
improvements in service and others suggesting decline (). Devolution has resulted in numerous
challenges. For example, the perceived limitations to mobility (in terms of promotion) of
devolved personnel as well the decline of number of scholarships for health workers have
affected morale. Coordination and referral among health units have also suffered. Some LGUs
ride on the availability and proximity of hospitals and other health services in nearby LGUs. The
inability of some provinces to cope with the high costs of maintaining tertiary level hospitals has
led to the renationalization of several hospital facilities. Corruption, especially in the
procurement of medicines and other supplies continued in a localized setting (Liga ng mga
Barangay 2006).
Similar to the ENR sector, most often cited impediment to the effective devolution of the health
sector is budget constraint (Brillantes 2009; Magno 2001; Mankila 2006; Liga ng mga
Baranggay 2006; Ferrer, 2006). Although initially, there has been nominal increase in the
funding for health services by LGUs after they received their IRA allocations from 1995 to 1998
(Schwartz, Racelis, and Guilkey 2000), the budget allotted for devolved health services through
the IRA is not commensurate to the cost of the devolved functions (Magno 2001; Mankila 2006).
Furthermore, LGUs in general heavily depend on the IRA and have been unable to generate
enough revenues to cover operational costs. Despite LGC provisions on revenue generation,
ADB according to Mankila reports that in 2006, revenue collection accounted for less than 10
percent of total expenditures in HCS among LGUs. Some studies also suggest that there is
significant underspending by LGUs for health services as LGUs shift priorities (Magno 2001).
Financing shortfalls in some cases has resulted into the diversion of health funds to other
priorities.
The impact of resource constraints in health services is deep. For one, the limited resource base
has been cited as a major impediment in the decision-making process of local health managers
(Grundy, et. al 2003)). There are reports of short supplies of medicines, equipments, and a
perceived decline in health care in some cases. Several localized hospitals devolved to LGUs
have been renationalized. Local health workers are also complaining about low wages and not
receiving the commensurate salaries and benefits due to non-compliance of some LGUs with the
Magna Carta for Health Care Workers as well as the Barangay Health Workers Benefits and
Incentives Act.
Some LGUs fund the additional wages and benefits of health workers from savings, a practice
that does not guarantee proper compensation and is contrary to law. Scholarship programs for
health workers, which were widely available prior to decentralization, have also been scarce. As
thousands of nurses and other medical personnel leave the country, LGUs are finding it
increasingly difficult to retain health workers.
Despite challenges, there is a general push for greater devolution of health services in accordance
with the LGC. In 2006, the League of Baranggays prepared a position paper pushing for further
devolution accompanied with the corresponding resource, technical, as well as capability support
from the national government. They are proposing the following (Liga ng mga Barangay 2006):
Localization of programs such as malaria control, leprosy, filariasis and schistosomiasis
eradication within the next 6 years.
Assumption of cities and municipalities of regulatory functions such as the issuance of permits to
drug stores, dental and medical clinics should be devolved since the LGU already issues the
business permits of these establishments within 2 to 3 years.
Maintenance of a health information and surveillance system that will immediately attend to the
situation at the ground level.
The return to local control and management of renationalized hospitals, particularly those
categorized as primary and secondary hospitals (the national government, on the other hand,
should retain existing national hospitals and other training hospitals with tertiary capabilities) is a
devolution priority.
There are also demands to devolve public health service provision in terms of personnel
management, capacity building, institutional/ organizational development, financial
management, and governance and participation.
A major question however is, whether the DOH is prepared and whether LGUs are capable of
further absorbing the abovementioned functions given their current status. Many LGUs presently
face common problems. These include resource constraints in construction and improvement of
health facilities, health workers benefits; inefficiency and politicization in the management of
some resources for public health, like medicine procurement; and the general lack of local
government health personnel and facilities (Atienza, 2004).
Resources
There are several proposals brought up to address resource issues in DHS. These include
recommendations for the national government to share in the financial burden created by the
benefits and salaries (i.e. as defined the Magna Carta for Health Workers ) as well as the
implementation of, and other non-monetary benefits such as continuing education. DOH or the
national government may be requested to provide matching grants to support enhancement of
these services (Lieberman et. al., 2005).
The percentage of budget allotted to health be raised to 5 percent of both national government
and LGUs and pegging the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for health to a fixed percentage. It
is expected that setting health budget as a percentage of budget will compel both the national
government and LGUs to allocate budget for DHS and not set it aside as low priority, as have
been observed in some cases. It will also protect the budget for health services from being
subjected to politically-based diversion or non-prioritization of local officials.
The Department of Health (DOH) and the national government should provide greater fiscal
autonomy to hospitals to reduce their dependence on direct subsidies from government. One way
is to amend auditing procedures for hospitals run by LGUs in order to allow for greater
flexibility and innovation in terms of financial management. The current system follows that for
the national government which hinders innovative and efficient hospital management (8th RFA
as cited by Brillantes 2009). Provincial hospitals should be allowed to retain their income as trust
fund to enable them to sustain their operations without unduly burdening the national and
provincial governments.
The capability of LGUs to generate revenues and manage finance should be developed. So far,
the assessment is that generally, LGUs have not been able to maximize their taxing powers as
well as their authority to impose of user charges. Lieberman recommends implementing
carefully designed user charges in order to raise funds to sustain health programs and subsidize
the health needs of the poor. Pricing, billing and collection systems of devolved facilities can
also benefit greatly from technical assistance (PIDS 1998)
Of course, LGUs need to improve service quality if they are to charge higher fees.
Personnel
Other personnel issues and concerns have also surfaced after devolution. As mentioned before,
there is a lack of career path and reduction in the upward mobility (in terms of promotion) of
devolved health personnel. The reduced number of scholarships also limits the development of
health professionals and their capacity to manage health programs and services. Another issue is
a lack of health personnel and services especially in far-flung rural areas.
In order to address these, it is proposed that career paths for local health officials and personnel
be developed, possibly in cooperation with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the DOH
(Liga ng mga Barangay 2006).
More opportunities for capacity building (e.g. scholarship, training and continuing education)
need to be opened to local health professionals. It is expected that health professionals who know
more about health programs and projects at the local level should manage health services.
Acquisition of capacities to formulate coherent health plans and budgets to enable LGUs to
effectively attend to the health requirements of their people are needed (Liga ng mga Barangay
2006). Training personnel in hospital administration, public health or other fields is important in
preparing them for higher positions.
10
LGUs should fill up vacant positions for rural health practice and tap OJTs (on the job trainees)
to address inadequacies in manpower. LnB also proposes that LGUs also develop a system to
encourage doctors, nurses and midwives to continue their work even outside Metro Manila and
other urban centers. One approach is to encourage or even require medical and paramedical
students and fresh graduates to render rural or urban poor service (Liga ng mga Barangay 2006).
Funds for implementing the Magna Carta for health workers should be prioritized in the budget
of LGUs. There is also a demand for an increase in the benefits and salaries of doctors, nurses
and other health care professionals, and their exemption from the Salary Standardization Law
(Brillantes 2009).
Institutional Arrangements
Health concerns transcend political and administrative boundaries and coordination is necessary
among health units. Magno points out that devolution has aggravated the lack of coordination
between LGUs and resulted into free-riding and negative externalities (Magno 2001). LGUs
need to develop a system of collaboration and referral among the different levels of government
health-service providers to attend to the needs of their constituents. Devolution requires
redefinition of the functional relationship between regional offices and LGUs in the provision of
technical assistance and the setting of standards (Liga ng mga Barangay 2006).
Grundy, et al. found that in the Philippines the health referral system lost cohesion after
devolution. Specifically, logistics, transport, patient referral protocol, distinctions between levels
of service were all disrupted by the unclear arrangements regarding local government cooperation as well as under-financing. This is consistent with findings in other research which
show that grey areas of responsibility as well as lack of preparation, complicate efforts to come
up with a rational arrangement for health services in the process of devolution (Grundy et. al.
2003).
While there are the prospects for health service delivery devolution, the DOH still faces major
hurdles to full localization. There is difficulty in integrating of health services because of
separate administrative control. This stems from several problems such as the disconnection in
the information management between national and local units; inadequacy in distributed health
resources; gap in the referral/ networking system; non-maximization of regulatory powers; and
the absence of financial leveraging mechanisms. Government agencies are anticipated to
strengthen inter-agency cooperation on various aspects of health research (Health Intelligence
Service, PCHRD, Department of Science and Technology).
The proposals are to:
Establish and strengthen inter-local health systems and their subsystems (integrated health
planning, referral system, health information system, drug management, human resource
development, and financial management).
At the Baranggay level, some LGUs have effectively employed a clustering strategy. Galing
Pook winner, Cotabato Office of Health Services, grouped its 37 barangays into seven clusters
11
with each cluster under the supervision of a coordinator to simplify the task of supervision and
monitoring and allow them to immediately respond to the concerns of the barangays within their
jurisdiction. (PIDS 1998)
Institutionalize information/ public information units down to the barangay level to improve the
gathering of health intelligence/statistics. To incorporate and support a computer network for
health information and surveillance, referrals and logistics (Liga ng mga Barangay 2006).
Develop a policy and program to consolidate all emergency medical services in the country with
regard to disaster preparedness (Liga ng mga Barangay 2006).
Develop a system of collaboration and referral among the different levels of government healthservice providers to attend to the needs of their constituents (Liga ng mga Barangay 2006).
Redefine the functional relationship between regional offices and LGUs in the provision of
technical assistance and the setting of standards (Liga ng mga Barangay 2006). The role of the
regional health office is limited to managing the regional hospitals and assisting the national
agency in the implementation of public health programs. (Magno 2001).
Other Recommendations
According to the 7th Rapid Field Appraisal (RFA) conducted by ARD/GOLD, Local Health
Boards are not yet fully functional in many areas. Efforts should be made to assist LGUs in
activating their local boards. The mandate and functions of local boards should be reviewed and
communicated to localities through more creative information, education and communication
(RFA as cited by Brillantes 2009).
Furthermore, DOH Field Offices and the Population Commissions Provincial Offices is not yet
geared to provide technical assistance to LGUs (ARD/GOLD as cited by Brillantes 2009).
The municipalities also urge the review the National Health Insurance Act to make it more
responsive to the needs of the urban and rural poor. The LGUs also see that the impact and
effects of devolution on health services should be evaluated once every three years in a Health
Summit attended by all stakeholders. They also emphasized the importance of providing greater
power to the local health board
In reference to the lessons learned by the DOH in their devolution experience, the success of
localizing public health service provision is highly dependent on the readiness of LGUs to absorb
the management of a devolved health system. It is important to strengthen health Systems to
make devolution work.
Social Welfare
The Local Government Code devolves to provinces the implementation of social welfare
services which include programs and projects on rebel returnees and evacuees; relief operations;
and population development services. Municipalities are expected to provide social welfare
12
services which include programs and projects on child and youth welfare, family and community
welfare, womens welfare, and welfare of the elderly and disabled persons. They also manage
community-based rehabilitation programs for vagrants, beggar, street children, scavengers,
juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor projects; nutrition
services; and family planning services.
The initial outcome of the devolution process is the restatement of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) mission. The new mission statement highlighted the need to
build partnerships with local government units, non-government organizations and peoples
organizations in social welfare and development service delivery.
Devolution required the agency to restructure. Shifts of tasks from Sectoral Bureaus to
Functional Bureaus at the Central Office Level ensued. 14 Field Offices as extension units of the
Office of the Secretary with focus on field monitoring and technical assistance were also
established.
The devolution called for an increased role of LGUs in collaboration with the national office in
social welfare and development (SWD) Policy and Plan Formulation, Social Technology
Development, Standard Setting and Compliance Monitoring, Technical Assistance and Resource
Augmentation, Institutional Strengthening and Management.
Even though devolution of DSWD resulted in several restructuring of the national agency to
accommodate local needs, the Department confronts several challenges.
First, less priority is given to SWD concerns in local development plans (Magno, 2009;
Brillantes 2009). The result is that allocation of resources for SWD programs, projects, and
activities has experienced a decline since devolution. ADB and WB, found that LGU
contribution to overall SWD expenditures have declined from 11 to 10 percent despite the fact
that 60 percent of DSWD personnel were devolved (ADB and WB 2006). The gap between
actual need and funding is especially visible in low-income municipalities (Brillantes 2009).
Second, LGUs tend to prioritize infrastructure development over total human development
(increased capacity of people to participate and decide in the allocation of LGU budget). More
than fifty percent of SWD expenditures of LGUs are personnel costs of devolved SWD staff,
leaving little for SWD programs and projects (ADB and WB 2006).
Third, there is weak compliance to DSWD reports at the local level. Program reporting is not
prioritized by local workers due to heavy workload. LGUs are seen as having low appreciation
for local SWD reports as bases for effective planning and advocacy for larger share in local
resources.
Fourth, there are SWD worker issues that need to be addressed. For instance, the creation of the
Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer (MSWDO) position is not considered
mandatory under the Local Government Code. Some municipalities therefore opt not to appoint
an MSWDO. Service providers are usually overworked with very low compensation. There is
limited MOOE support which also limits access to capability building opportunities.
Fifth, Laws such as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, and
the Senior Citizens Act, among others, are seen as unfunded mandates from the national
government (Brillantes 2009). Sixth, partisan political considerations influence the selection of
13
program beneficiaries particularly during campaign periods. Lastly, there is lack of facilities and
ICT resources to accommodate the growing needs of SWD clients.
Much of the resources for programs and projects flow from foreign assisted national programs
and projects such as the Countrywide Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS), and more
recently the Pantawid sa Pamilyang Pilipino Program (or P4).
To address the post devolution challenges, DSWD has started various initiatives. The agency has
implemented the systematic assistance to local government units through the assessment of their
capacity and willingness to invest in SWD programs/ services. This serves as basis for the
formulation of DSWD Technical Assistance and Resource Augmentation Plan.
The Department has also initiated the formulation of a national policy framework for social
protection to harmonize the initiatives of intermediaries and stakeholders. They also have
continuously enhanced the Medium Term Expenditure Plan (MTEP) to secure funding (in the
General Appropriations Act) for unfunded social welfare and safety net programs emanating
from social legislations. The DSWD Policy and Planning Department also initiated an
assessment study of devolved SWD programs and services to determine LGUs degree of
compliance in the implementation (Brillantes 2009).
The DSWD has started working towards the institutionalization of an objective and transparent
targeting mechanism to identify beneficiaries of social protection programs at both household
and community levels. They have encouraged the participation of intermediaries in standards
enhancement and compliance monitoring (i.e. Area Based Standards Network).
The Department created mediums for intermediaries continuing education and learning across
regions (i.e. SWD Learning Networks). They have continuously developed training modules
based on the results of competency assessment for DSWD personnel, partners and
intermediaries. Social marketing plans in support of sectoral plans and completed social
technologies were formulated. Furthermore, the Agency has accessed internal and external
assistance to complement the available but limited resources of local government units and nongovernment organizations to implement SWD programs and services.
Agriculture
Under the Local Government Code, the devolved functions for the province include agricultural
extension and on-site research services and facilities which include the prevention and control of
plant and animal pests and diseases; dairy farms, livestock markets, animal breeding stations, and
artificial insemination centers; and assistance in the organization of farmers and fishermans
cooperatives and other collective organizations, as well the transfer of appropriate technology.
For the municipality, the devolved functions include extension and on-site research services and
facilities related to agriculture and fishery activities which include dispersal of livestock and
poultry, fingerlings, and other seeding materials for aquaculture; palay, corn, and vegetable seed
farms; medicinal plant gardens; fruit tree, coconut, and other kinds of seedlings nurseries;
demonstration farms; quality control of copra and improvement and development of local
14
15
As with the other devolved sectors, funding is cited as a major factor in the implementation of
devolved functions in the agricultural sector. Funding has not supported devolution as much as
might have been desired. In the case of DA, the central office retained the bulk of the funds
despite devolution of a large number of personnel. In 1997, only 6 percent of budget has been
appropriated for DA regional offices despite the expectation that they will absorb the bulk of
coordinative, technical and support functions under devolution (Magno 2001). LGUs receive low
technical support from these regional offices (Siamwalla 2001).
The DA makes available funding for programs supporting national programs and goals. In order
to access these funds, however, LGUs have to adjust their local plans to fit the national agenda
even when it does not necessarily match local goals (Cabanilla 2006).
Extension workers at the local level do not have the authority to provide policy, allocate
extension resources, and monitor the implementation of agricultural extension programs
(Brillantes 2009). Devolved agricultural workers are at times assigned lower salary levels
compared to employees of the national government and local government units (LGUs). In some
cases, they are displaced or assigned to other (non-agricultural) positions as the municipal
agricultural officer position (MAO) is not mandatory for cities and municipalities (HOR 2006;
Siamwalla 2001). Unsurprisingly, lack of motivation among the devolved personnel has been
observed in several occasions.
Moreover, it is seen that a number of extension workers in LGUs are slowly deteriorating
because of lack of opportunity for technical trainings, lack of scholarship grants, non-motivation
from local leaders, and the politicization of the sector at the local level (Magno 2001; Brillantes
2009; Siamwalla 2001).
Issues in funding, linkage, and personnel have negative implications on the capability of LGUs
to plan manage and address issues in agriculture and fisheries. Local government units are
required to prepare both a yearly Food Security Plan as well as a Comprehensive Land Use Plan.
In the absence of capable personnel, very few are able to make use of updated methodologies
and technology (Cabanila 2006). In cases of municipalities without a municipal agriculture
officer, the responsibility of coordinating agriculture programs may likely fall to someone
without expertise in the field.
LGUs have participated in efforts to assess and set the direction for further devolution of the
agricultural sector. Collated results of two self-administered surveys of the Committee on
Devolution of E.O. 444 and the League of Provinces of the Philippines in cooperation with the
Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), and the Economic Policy Reform and
Advocacy (EPRA) Project of the Ateneo School of Economics revealed varying levels of
compliance.
Policy
In order to steer, the DA need to formulate a National Agriculture and Fisheries Policy and
Strategic Plan in consultation with LGUs. This will specify the guidelines, technical assistance,
16
funding and monitoring and evaluation systems that shall guide LGUs in implementing and
coming up with agriculture programs and projects (League of Provinces of the Philippines 2006).
Provinces need to come up with their Provincial Agricultural Development Strategic Plan
incorporating the necessary guidelines, technical assistance, funding and monitoring and
evaluation systems for their component cities and municipalities. Municipalities/cities on the
other hand may come up with their own agricultural development strategic plan. An Annual
Performance Plan may be developed parallel to these programs (League of Provinces of the
Philippines 2006).
The DA and LGUs need to revisit and redefine their mandates. The DA, as a national agency,
should shift its focus from a commodity (production) to goals within the framework of RA
8435, or the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) of 1997. These goals include:
1)Prosperity of Farmers; 2) Competitiveness; 3) Food Security; 4) Sustainable Production
Systems (League of Provinces of the Philippines 2006).
Institutional Arrangements
Plans and programs need to be integrated at all levels from baranggay, to municipal/city,
provincial level up to the DA. Bottom-up planning, consultation and participation of the
stakeholders is needed. LGUs need to be able to coordinate, collaborate, complement, and
consolidate efforts and agree on accountability and resource sharing mechanisms. They must be
able to translate national goals and define specific roles and targets for local development
programs and projects. LGUs should be able to define their specific roles in rendering
appropriate extension service, setting their regulatory scope, formulating their research and
development niche, and contributing to information, education, and communications campaigns.
The DA needs to identify viable areas of operation (e.g. province, municipal clusters, etc.) and
coordinate accordingly. The LPP pointed out that provinces are currently the most viable areas or
units of operation and recommends that the DA should coordinate at this level.
Capacity
The DA needs to strengthen its capacity to deliver extension services, provide capabilitybuilding/technical support to LGUs, and perform effective regulatory functions and state-of-theart research and development (League of Provinces of the Philippines 2006). Focusing on
building the capability of regional level offices, which oversee and provide support to large
functional clusters may be the more practical and cost-effective approach.
Resources
LGUs need to allocate and utilize resources from their Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA) shares
and grants for national and local programs. Funds for implementation must accompany national
programs implemented through LGUs. A National Fund Transfer System (NFTS), a funding
facility, must be established. This should prioritize those who are in need and allow capable
17
LGUs to buy into grants thereby ensuring equitability of resources and incentivizing good
performance (League of Provinces of the Philippines 2006).
Other Recommendations
While the problems of devolution are ever present, the DA has identified several reform
directions. Involved are the conduct of several consultation dialogues with stakeholders;
development of the national agriculture and fisheries research and extension program; and the
transfer of the Central Office of major operating units in the different parts of the country to
ensure closer supervision, coordination, and monitoring of agricultural programs (Magno 2009).
Continuous process of communication between LGUs and national government regarding the
programs and thrusts for economic development must be facilitated. Decentralization, as
examined from the experience of the DA should have mechanisms to fully prepare the personnel
economically, socially, and emotionally.
In addressing the present challenges, the DA should strengthen partnership with LGUs and the
national government. The national agency should grant financial incentives to the DA-LGU
Centers. The Department should develop comprehensive trainings and retooling programs. It is
expected to redefine the roles of Provincial Agricultural Extension Services. Continuous
coordination between the DA and LGUs is required for the programs and thrusts of agriculture
down to the local level to achieve greater productivity (Magno 2009).
Conclusion
Although reviews are mixed, there is no denying that decentralization has accomplished much in
terms of brining government and resources closer to communities. Devolution has redefined the
roles of both national and local governments, promoted self-management and accountability, and
promoted local leadership . The Galing Pook, Gawad Pamana, Clean and Green, Lingkod Bayan,
Magsaysay Awards, Konrad Adenauer Medal of Excellence, Local Government Leadership
Award has done much to recognize successful innovations of local leaders and government units.
In order for decentralization to be successful, a number of conditions effective and sustainable
need to be present. Cistulli considers the following as among the most important requirements:
adequate financial resources to ensure the performance of the tasks under the responsibility of
the local and decentralized institutions; actual empowerment of decentralized institutions and
enough power and authority to influence the political system and development activities;
accountability mechanisms such as local elections supporting transparency and representation;
legal framework clearly specifying the powers and responsibilities of local governments to avoid
interference and overlapping with central government; and adequate capacities of local
institutions to perform the appropriate services.
Clearly, decentralization in the Philippines has not yet met all of these conditions. Several crosscutting issues are prominent in the devolution of health, environment, agriculture and social
18
welfare. First, resource allocations from the national government did not correspond to the cost
of devolved functions. While resources transferred by the IRA to LGUs were generally sufficient
only to cover personnel costs in the four areas of ENR, SWD, DHS, and Agriculture, there is
little left for the development of programs and projects. Despite provisions for revenue
generation, LGUs have generally not been able to generate sufficient revenue to cover
operational costs of devolved functions and majority are still dependent on the IRA from the
national government. The problem is further exacerbated by unfunded mandates or laws that
pose added costs but does not come with corresponding budgets.
Second, devolution has resulted in fragmentation, loss of coordinative efficiency, as well as gaps
in information dissemination and transfer among the various levels and units of the devolved
sectors. There are still plenty of grey areas and undefined jurisdictions. This is especially true in
concerns which transcend geographical and political boundaries such as health and environment.
Third, national agencies have not yet geared operations towards full devolution of functions
defined in the LGC and LGUs are not yet fully empowered to take on those roles. There is a
tendency for national agencies to maintain control of programs and field implementation units
instead of focusing on policy and standard setting, technical support, and oversight. LGUs also
tend to depend on the national agencies. Roles and responsibilities are not clear. At the present,
interference, grey areas, and overlaps in jurisdiction are observable. Accountability as well as
expectations for meeting national goals are not jointly shared with LGUs and lean towards
national agencies.
Fourth, there is a serious need to address personnel issues. Low salaries coupled with the loss of
career paths, upward vertical mobility, as well as opportunities for education and growth among
devolved personnel has lead to the demoralization and deterioration of vital human resources.
Despite these issues however, there is a consensus among stakeholders that further devolution is
necessary in order to reap the benefits of enhanced local autonomy. Various recommendations
and proposals have been forwarded by both the national agencies, LGUs though the various
leagues, as well as scholars of local governance. The specifics for health, agriculture,
environment, as well as social welfare had already been outlined in the earlier sections. Just as
there are cross-cutting issues however, there are also cross-cutting proposals and solutions put
forwards by the various stakeholders in devolution. Moves toward further devolution will benefit
from considering these proposals.
The first step towards further devolution is to clarify in as clear a language as possible policies,
lines of authority, jurisdictions, as well as sharing of accountability between and among LGUs as
well as between LGUs and national agencies. This should be followed by a corresponding
rationalization of organization as well as appropriate distribution of resources in order to
eliminate overlaps and maximize resources.
As has been clearly articulated in numerous studies, there is clearly a need to reform the IRA to
ensure in order to promote equitable distribution of resources as well as ensure that devolved
mandates are funded. LGUs will greatly benefit from cost sharing schemes with the national
government, such as that promulgated by NEDA in 2003.
19
A more long-term solution however is to temper the dependence of LGUs on IRA and focus on
building the capacity of LGUs to generate revenues using the mechanisms provided by the LGC
to support operations. The IRA was after all, originally intended only to augment LGU resources
and promotes equitability among LGUs - not fund the whole operation of LGUs as some
officials seem to think. Judicious application of taxes, fees, and user charges combined with graft
and corruption-free management of funds is necessary in order to promote local fiscal autonomy.
Revenue generation and fiscal should be prioritized in the capacity-building programs of the
DILG.
Further devolution necessitates the transfer of thousands of employees from the national
government to LGUs. There are still pending personnel issues however. Clearly, there is a need
for a personnel development plan with clear career paths and which allows lateral as well as
vertical movements for local personnel. The DILG can work this out with LGUs, employee
unions, and the CSC.
Regional offices of national agencies have a very high potential to bridge the gap between
national policies and local goals and priorities. Regional offices benefit from coverage,
economies of scale, their proximity to LGUs, and direct linkage with national offices. They may
be in the best position to perform monitoring, technical support and capacity building.
Developing regional offices to provide oversight, technical support, centers of research and
development, and serve as interface between LGUs and the national government in the sectors of
health, agriculture, social welfare, and environment might be a worthwhile strategy. There is also
a need to consolidate local development plans from the bottom up. Information parameters need
to be shared across LGUs and databases need to be linked together in order to facilitate effective
planning and implementation of programs.
20
In the Philippines, there are four tiers or layers of local governments: provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. The move to advance decentralization in the environment, health,
asocial welfare, and agricultural sectors would require identifying the local tier that would
assume the devolved functions. This would involve further research involving the application of
certain principles in determining the specific functions to be assigned to provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays.
The first principle governing the assignment of devolved functions would be the concept of
subsidiarity. This principle states that public service responsibilities must be exercised by the
lowest level of government unless a convincing case can be made for higher level assignment
(Shah and Thompson 2004). The normative rule holds that public services should be delivered at
the most local level possible so that services can be tailored to the needs and preferences of the
local population. The implicit assumption is that local populations will be able to exercise choice
in demanding and defining local service requirements. Another implicit assumption is that the
people know their preferences and priorities better than regional or national governing bodies,
which are better suited to issues of national scope, such as military and trade affairs (Lindaman
and Thurmaier 2002).
Each public service should be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum
geographic area that would internalize the benefits and costs of such provision (Oates 1972). It is
quite plausible to argue that in the matter of service deliveries as well as in local business
development, control rights in governance structures should be assigned to people who have the
requisite information and incentives and at the same time will bear responsibility for the
(political and economic) consequences of their decisions. In many situations, this insight calls for
more devolution of power to local authorities and communities. The state may have to play
certain activist roles: enabling mobilization of people in local participatory development;
neutralizing the power of local oligarchs; providing supralocal support in the form of pump
priming local finance; supplying technical and professional services toward building local
capacity; acting as a watchdog for service quality standards; evaluation and auditing; investing in
larger infrastructure; and providing some coordination in the face of externalities across localities
(Bardhan 2002).
The LGC and the 1998 Fisheries Code transfer a substantial amount of responsibility to local
governments, in particular to the coastal municipalities and cities to engage in coastal
management within a defined jurisdictional area of coastal lands and municipal waters to15 km
offshore. Municipal and city governments have both executive (Mayor, Municipal Planning and
Development Office (MPDO), Municipal Agriculture Office (MAO), and other staff) and
legislative (Vice Mayor, Municipal Council) branches of local government. Municipal and city
governments have the primary responsibility for planning and implementing ICM programs,
including establishing marine protected areas, and enacting and enforcing fishery and coastal
resource-related ordinances. Municipal and city governments receive an internal revenue
allocation from the national government-based population size, land area, and an equal sharing
factor (Lowry, Kem, Alan White, Catherine Courtney (2005).
At the city level, the acceptance and implementation of agricultural services would depend on
the level of urbanization of the area. In Angeles City, services pertaining to the dispersal of
21
livestock and poultry, palay, corn, vegetable seed farms, quality control of copra, enforcement of
fishing laws in municipal waters, dairy farms, and the livestock market are not devolved
(Legaspi and Santiago 2010).
Provincial government has both executive (Governor, Provincial Planning and Development
Office, and other staff) and legislative (Vice Governor, Provincial Council) branches of
government. While the role of provincial LGUs under both the LGC and 1998 Fisheries Code is
not well defined; many provinces are beginning to fulfill an important coastal management gap
to harmonize coastal management policy through the enactment of Provincial Environmental
Codes, developing coordinating mechanisms between municipalities, NGOs, and academic
institutions, to identify and address coastal management issues, and providing technical and
financial assistance to LGUs implementing coastal management. The provincial mandate to
directly implement ICM activities is limited and thus implementation occurs mostly through
municipal and city governments. (Lowry, Kem, Alan White, Catherine Courtney (2005).
This model also argues for service delivery based on the benefits principle of public finance,
namely, that, as much as possible, services should be funded through user fees, and basic
community services such as police and fire protection (which have significant externalities) can
be funded through local taxes. Services mandated for delivery by the central and regional
governments are properly funded through grants in the form of intergovernmental transfers
(Lindaman and Thurmaier 2002).
In contrast to central controls and extensive earmarks of local funding, decentralization should
give local officials increased authority to shift funds to improve service delivery.
Decentralization should be associated with improved service delivery. The performance of
services and the decentralization process itself should be monitored and evaluated by citizen
groups through surveys and social audits (Guess 2005). Much of the planning at the local level
is done at the provincial and municipal/city levels. It is at the barangay level where strategic,
comprehensive and area-based planning is not usually implemented, which is unfortunate
because poverty interventions are targeted at the barangay level. What is submitted as the
barangay development plan is just a listing of projects (Atinc, Ndegwa, Taliercio, MacAntony
and Mailei 2004).
Generally, the central government should be involved with overall policy, setting standards, and
auditing; state governments should have an oversight function; and local governments should be
involved in the provision of infrastructure and services. Assignment of public services to local or
regional governments can be based on factors such as economies of scale, economies of scope
(appropriate bundling of public services to improve efficiency through information and
coordination economies and enhanced accountability through voter participation and cost
recovery), cost-benefit spillovers, proximity to beneficiaries, consumer preferences, and
flexibility in budgetary choices on composition of public spending.
Assignment of
responsibilities to various local governments could be asymmetric, based on population size,
rural-urban classification, and fiscal capacity. Higher levels of government might exercise a
regulatory or policy role, while lower levels of government are responsible for service delivery
(Litvack and Seddon 1998).
22
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http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/PHCO/decentralization-report-phi.pdf.
27
For :
From :
Subject:
Date:
II. Methodology
The capacitation in preparation of Policy Briefs was carried out through 1) lectures on the
steps in the policy process and crafting policy briefs; and 2) preparation of a policy
analysis framework that will guide the Policy Group in the definition, generation of
alternatives and setting the policy agenda for the CCD and 3) critiquing of the policy
briefs prepared by the CCD Technical Secretariat.
Lecture and coaching during workshop was done on April 27, 2010 and the critiquing
was done on April 28, 2010. The level of effort allocated to the Policy Consultant is two
(2) person days.
Problem Identification
Problems confronting the
organization
Policy Testing
Is the problem defined a
strategic policy?
Step 1:
Problem Definition
Policy Review
What are the prior efforts
made to solve the policy
problem?
Policy Recommendation
Which among the alternatives
may best solve the problem?
Policy Alternatives
What are the pertinent
courses of action that maybe
taken?
Policy Stakeholders
What are roles of the
stakeholders identified in the
policy recommendation?
Step 2:
Alternatives Generation
Step 3:
Policy Agenda Setting
As a resource person, I delivered the policy process basics which include the policy
process, basic analysis and alternatives generation. I also provided workshop mechanics
and coaching during the session on policy briefs preparation.
In the presentation of the policy briefs, together with other members of the oversight
agencies, critiquing was provided in to enhance and sharpen the policy issue focus and
identification.
Task 3. Guide BLGD Policy Group in the development of draft policy briefs/outline on
selected policy issues of the CCD
A writing guide in Policy Briefs Preparation was developed to guide the DILG BLGD
Policy Group. It consists of five major sections and contents of each section with
corresponding number of paragraphs were suggested as a policy brief template. Table 1
show the template used in crafting policy briefs.
Table 1 Policy Brief Template
Major Sections
A. Background of the
Policy problem
B. Problem Statement
Number of
Paragraphs/
Pages
Suggested Contents
Describes what is the policy problem and the general scope of problem
the researcher is interested in i.e. decentralization issues in the local
government units.
This section contains the essential facts how the policy problem came
about and the decision maker needs to know about the policy problem
and situation.
2 paragraphs
2 paragraphs
What is the problem related to the theme is the researcher/ author
trying to solve? These are the issues and concerns that the local
government unit or the DILG and other concerned institution are facing
given their scope and mandate, relative to the problem.
This section contains the direct description of the problematic situation.
What are the policies or prior efforts that have been made to solve the
problem. What is the analysis of the researcher on the policies that have
been made?
3 paragraphs
This section should match the objectives and the problem statement.
What are the possible solutions to the problem, as perceived by the
researcher? What is/are the proposed solution(s) to the issue(s) and
concern(s)? Factor(s) for selecting the said solution(s) over the others?
What are the results of the study?
1 page
Who are the major actors in coming up and finalizing the solution?
What are the roles (regulation, facilitation, enabling, direct provision,
1 paragraph
2-3 pages
IV.
Three policy briefs were prepared by the CCD Secretariat on major policy issues on
Utilization of the Special Education Funds, Defining Corporate Powers of the LGUs and
Operation and Management of Local Economic Enterprises.
Policy Brief 1
Improved Utilization of the Special Education Fund (SEF)
Background of the Problem
Section 100 provides that the annual school board budget shall give priority to
the following: Construction, repair, and maintenance of school buildings and
other facilities of public elementary and secondary schools; Establishment and
maintenance of extension classes where necessary; Sports activities at the
division, district, municipal and barangays levels
Further, Section 272 provides that the proceeds[of the SEF] shall be allocated for the
operation and maintenance of public schools, construction and repair of school buildings,
facilities and equipment, educational research, purchase of books and periodicals, and
sports development as determined and approved by the Local School Board
Republic Act 5447- An Act Creating a Special Education Fund to be Constituted from
the Proceeds of an Additional Real Property Tax and a certain Portion of the Taxes on
Virginia-type cigarettes and duties on imported Leaf Tobacco Defining the Activities to
be Financed, Creating School Boards for the Purpose and Appropriating Funds there
from which took effect in 1969.
Republic Act 9155- Basic Education governance Act of 2001- envisions a different
kind of decentralization in the basic education sub-sector. It calls for the empowerment of
schools in making decisions that improve quality of learning and for the establishment of
school and community networks, emphasizing the need for the greater participation of
parents, teachers and the community itself in the governance of the schools.
Alternatives
The following three (3) alternatives shall be included in the proposed amendments of
Sections 100 and 272 of the LG Code.
Alternative 1- Rules Based Approach
Rules-based approach- involves the joint issuance by the DBM, DepEd and
DILG of new guidelines containing either a positive list type of expenditure items
that may be charged against SEF or a negative list of expenditure items that are
not allowed to be charge against the SEF. Alternatively, the new guidelines may
contain both positive and negative list of expenditure items.
Alternative 2: Market-based Approach
Market-based approach LSBs as the primary entity responsible for determining
annual supplementary budget, may be given full discretion in the allocation of SEF
while support mechanism that enhance planning
and budgeting of the SEF is strengthened. These will promotes greater flexibility of
the LSBs to address the varying needs of the schools at any point in time.
Alternative 3: Harmonization of Legislated Laws
Harmonization of RA 7160 and RA 9155 on the utilization of SEF -key to improving
the utilization of the SEF and better alignment of the provision for the LGC on the
membership in the LSB and the allocation of the SEF
Stakeholders
Parents, teachers and students to participate in policy and decision-making
process
DBM approved LGUs proposed budget on education
DILG and CCD- to formulate and push the implementation of the new guidelines
on the utilization of the SEF
Local School Boards (LSBs) shall be responsible for determining the annual
supplementary budgetary requirements of the public schools in their locality
Department of Education (DepED)- through its regional offices shall see to it that
the LSBs are furnished with copies of the individual schools allocation for the
year from the national budget including programmed school buildings and other
capital outlays
Policy Brief 2
DEFINITION AND EXTENT OF LGU CORPORATE POWER
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM:
The Local Government Code of 1991 (RA7160) provides reference on the
nature, scope and origins of the corporate powers of LGUs e.g. Section 14 sets
the beginning of LGU corporate existence and Section 22 outlines the scope of
the LGUs corporate power. The Code, however, did not explicitly include a clear
definition of what a corporate power is. It merely enumerates an example of
fundamental powers that constitute the exercise of corporate power.
There is no study yet that clearly define corporate powers. What abounds
are case studies of best practices mostly pertaining to extent of LGU borrowing,
revenue generation, management of local economic enterprises, collaborative
undertakings with private sectors among others.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
While the Code set the policy environment necessary for the LGU to
exercise their corporate powers, there is a need to clearly define corporate powers
and the extent of exercising the same to enable the LGU craft strategic policy
directions for implementation of its programs and activities towards attaining
economic development in the context of local autonomy.
This would also allow national agencies concerned to have a clear focus in
assessing the needs of the LGUs and identify necessary and appropriate technical
assistance to enhance the capacity of the LGUs in providing services, leadership
and innovation in the community for economic development.
REVIEW OF PRE-EXISTING POLICIES
Several studies (Pardo and Zipagan, December 2008) on the current trends
of LGU exercise of corporate power had been observed and documented. These
studies dwelt on policies issued by BLGF-DOF regarding LGU borrowing from
government financing institution, bond flotation, and financial performance of
local economic enterprises. Case studies on the emerging models of LGUs
exercise of corporate powers, such as, Inter-Local Cooperation (Partido
development Authority in Cam. Sur created by an act of Congress providing legal
framework for inter-LGU cooperation; Corporatization of Basic Services (La
Union Medical Center an act of Congress corporatizing La Union Provincial
Hospital); Corporatization of Public Utility ( Corporatization of Misamis
Oriental Telephone System (MISORTEL) as initiated by Misamis Oriental
Province to ensure efficiency & viability of MISORTEL. The corporation has
goods (i.e. good and services which are normally provided by the private sector) like
shopping malls, buildings for lease, hotels and recreational facilities.
Manasan and Castel, 2009 identifies three reasons for LGU operation of LEEs. First,
LGUs are looking for more diversified sources of local revenues. Second, LEEs are
desirable because of the need for LGU to have (catalytic investments) in order to generate
greater local economic development. Third, some LGUs operate certain activities because
they have difficulty complying with the Personal Services (PS) expenditure cap in the
local government code.
II.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
LEEs run by LGUs incur losses due to a number of factors: weak institutional support e
LEEs and technical capability, low tariffs, poor collection efficiency. Given the issues
surrounding (1) what policy framework is needed for the effective and efficient
operation and management of LEEs? (2) How can the LGU capacity in operating and
management of LEEs be enhanced to be efficient?
III.
REVIEW OF PRE-EXISTING POLICIES
The DBM UBOM elaborates the rationale and criteria for the establishment and
operation of LEEs: (1) LEE satisfies both the economic and social objectives of the
concerned LGU; (2) It fills in service gaps not adequately provided by the private sector;
(3) It shall operate with a lean and mean staffing complement to satisfy the income
objective of the LEE; (4) It shall operate like a corporate body with a separate strategic
plan and budget.
The LG Code of 1991, the NGAs and the UBOM is generally consistent with World
Banks definition of a state-owned enterprise which refers to government-owned or
government controlled economic entities that generate the weight of their revenues from
selling goods and services (Jones, 1982, World Bank 1998). The definition emphasizes
two distinct characteristics of LEEs namely: public dimension which relates to
government ownership, control and/or management and enterprise dimension which
limits the application of the term to entities that produce marketable outputs such as
goods and services for which prices /fees may be charged.
The LGC of 1991 provides that total appropriations whether annual or
supplemental, for personal services of an LGU shall have a 45%-55% cap. The
appropriations for the PS of such LEEs shall be charged to their respective budgets (Sec
325-a). The preferential treatment given to PS expenditures of LEEs by exempting the
same in the computation of compliance with the PS cap has encourage abuse of the
provision as a cover- up to exceeding the cap.
Enterprise Development
9
9
9
Management System
Improvement
9 Establishing a LED Office
Development /evaluation
of FS specially forecasting 9 Provide a clear and legal
regulatory framework for
of demand
LEEs
Supporting PPP
9 Adopt a system of
Considering
forecasting and pricing.
Alternative Methods for
Charges must be based on
Delivering Public
Full Cost Recovery.
Services
9 Tariff setting
Re-defining LEEs in the 9 Collection procedure and
System
context of LED
9 Evaluating alternative
organizational structure
Defining role of the
for the management and
provinces as steward for
monitoring of LEEs
LED
9 Institutionalize a system
for performance
monitoring and evaluation
including organizational
management performance
evaluation and feed
backing
Entrepreneurial Leadership
9
9
9
V.
CONCERNED STAKEHOLDERS
The primary stakeholders are 1) LGUs since they are the direct beneficiaries of the
propose policy, 2)NGAs(DOF, DBM, COA, CSC,DILG) since they are the ones who will
provide the policy guidance on improving LEEs operations and management by LGUs.
ICTForum
Discussion
ObjectivesoftheForum
Creationofaninteragencycommitteetotakeon
coordination,knowledgesharing,efficiencyintax
administrationandotherrelevantLGUITappliedtax
relatedfunction;andprovidemoreinputsandcontinuously
improvetheLGUGuideonComputerization;
FormalcreationoftheTWGfortheadoptionofauniform
ICTPoliciesandStandardsfortheNGAsandLGUstoensure
properICTassetmanagementundersecureenvironment;
FutureofapplyingICTinLGUTaxrelatedFunctions.
Approach
PanelDiscussion
BreakoutGroups
PresentationofTopics
SuggestedConvenersandParticipants
Conveners:
DOFBLG
DILG
CICTNCC
Participants:
CCDmembers:DILG,DBM,DOFBLGF,
NEDA,Leagues
DonorAgencies:CIDA,GTZ,ADB,AusAID,
JICA,WB,etc.
OtherNGAs
SuggestedResourceTopicsduringthe
Forum(PresentationProgram)
DiscussionandpromotionoftheLGUGuideto
Computerization BLGF
CICTInitiatives CICT
PhilippineICTRoadMap2010 2015 CICT
ICTResearchorCooperationwithvariousrelated
sector UNorEU
SuggestedResourceTopicsduringthe
Forum(PresentationProgram)
InformationSecurity(CreationofaPolicyon
InformationSecurityinGovernment) NBI
InformationManagement LandSector
DevelopmentparticularlyonValuationandTaxation
LAMP2
Gettingreadyfortheinternetprotocolversion6
NCC
FundingfacilityforLGUTaxRelatedICTInitiatives
ADB,GTZ,CIDA,JICA,WB,etc
MajorPolicyQuestions:
1.Istheresufficientpolicyframeworktoenable
NGAsandLGUstoeffectivelyimplementICT
initiativesinTaxRelatedFunctions?
2.Dowehavesufficientimplementingrulesand
regulationtoguideNGAsandLGUstosupport
thepolicyframework?
IssuesinLGUComputerizationofTax
RelatedFunction
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
CoordinationofInitiatives
KnowledgeSharing
StandardsandBestPractices
TechnicalAssistance
TechnicalSupport
CodeofConductofITProfessionalsin
Government(andinPrivate)
7. ProfessionalizationofITpractitionersin
Government,etc.
8. NoDataExchangeStandardtosupportlinkages
betweenLGUtoLGU,LGUBLGF,BIR,etc.
9. Datastandardsnotmonitoredandenforced
10.Lowprivatesectorcooperation
11.InsufficientAnalysisToolstosupportfiscalpolicy
reformsinLGUs
12.Nostandarddatasetsorreportformattosupport
managementlevelanalysis
13. NationalLGURealPropertyInformationDatabasefor
broadreviewstosupportpolicyreforms
14. NationalLGUfinancialinformationdatabasefor
broadreviewstosupportpolicyreforms
15. Determinedatasets/statisticalinformationrelevant
toinvestor
16. Informationnotavailabletoinvestorslocallyandin
nationallevel
17. InsufficientinformationtosupportGovernment/LGU
Decision
18. ICTsolutioninLGUtaxrelatedfunctionareunder
utilized
19. NostandardrelevantspatialdatarequiredforLGUtax
relatedfunction
20. Lowfocusonlandvaluationandassessment
21. Bestpracticesormethodstoimprovetaxcollection
efficiencyinLGUs
22. Enhancecooperationwithprivatesectorandprovide
reliableframeworkreferencefortheirplanningand
investmentstrategies
23. Establishorproviderelevantstatisticalinformationfor
specificandbroadinvestmentopportunities
24. Develophumancapitaltoensureproactive,sustainable
andcontinuousimprovementinICTinitiativesinLGUTax
relatedfunctionadvancement
25. ComprehensiveLGUpropertyandfinancialinformation
notavailabletobothgovernmentandpublic.i.e.property
inventory,economicenterpriseinventory,etc.
26. GuidetoLGUsonequitablerevenuepotentialsand
opportunities
27. LowrevenuegenerationeventoLGUswithcomputerized
systems
28. ErroneouspropertyinformationinLGUdatabasesbeing
maintained
29. Nostandardprocedureindealingwithpeculiarproperty
record/situation.i.e.mixeduse,multipleactualuse
30. ICTassets,design,proceduresnotwelldocumented
31.InsufficientDisasterRecoveryPoliciesand
Procedures
32.ServiceslimitedtoPhysicalAccess.Encourage
onlinetransactions
33.Levelofservicesinconsistentacrossagencies
34.Excessiveproceduresintransactions
35.LimitedhighlevelICTexpertiseinLGUs
36.TechnicalresolutionsonICTandTaxrelated
issuesandconcern
ClarificationPointsinreferencetothe3rd CCDMeeting
ontheLGUGuidetoComputerization
1. ThepurposeoftheGuidebookistoprovideinformationand
advicetotheLGUscontemplatingtheprocurement,
developmentorupgradingoftaxrelatedsystems.
2. NCCisamemberoftheTWGoftheguide.Seekingtheinput
ofCICTisalsohighlyrecommended.
3. Thebenchmarkdescribedintheguideisintendedtoensure
thatcriticaldataelementandprocessingthereofwillsupport
BLGFandLGUfunctionalandoutputrequirement.Theguide
doesnotendorseanyproductnorrestrictanyrightsofany
entity,therefore,shouldnotbesubjectedtoanyriskof
criticismorlegalaction.
4. Participationoftheprivatesectorprovidersand
donoragenciesishighlyrecommendedto
ensurewiderparticipationintheadvancement
ofISsolutionsforLGUs.
5. Governmentagenciesareprohibitedfrom
endorsinganyproductorservicesolutionsfrom
anyprivateentitywhetheritisFREEornot.Any
forumshouldencouragecooperationamong
andwithintheindustryandpromotefreetrade
andfaircompetition.
6.Setofminimumstandardshowevercanbeset
byBLGFandCICToranyrelatedagencyonTax
relatedfunctionsofLGUs
7. Thesuggestionofadoptingamiddleware may
notbefeasibleatthistime.Thismayrequire
resources,resolutionondevelopment,
custodiananddataprivacyissues.Whatthe
forumneedshoweverissetdataexchange
standardstoensurethereisacommonkey
acrossallagenciesforpurposeofinformation
exchangeandlinkages.
DiscussionpointsinreferencetotheIssues,Challengesand
NextStepsdiscussedintheTaxForumorganizedbyGTZlast
May27,2008
1. TheconcernsraisedintheTaxForumonthelackof
relevantinformationtoguidetheminadoptingIT
systemsintaxrelatedfunctionsisverymuchvalidandit
isevidentinvariousLGUcomputerizationinthe
country.Thisissuehowever,hadbeengiven
appropriateattentionbytheBLGF.TheLGUguideon
computerizationclearlydiscussestheconsiderationsin
computerization,approaches,featuresand
functionalitiesrequired,theITreadinessassessment
toolandguideonhowtoachievethatreadiness.
2. Thoughtheideaofcreatingorrevivinganinteragency
committeeasavehicleforcoordinatinginitiatives,
knowledgeandresourcesharingisanotherkeyfactorfor
LGUsinefficienttaxadministration.Thishasbeenprovenin
thepastthatsuchinitiativerequiresmorethanwillingness,
commitmentandschedulingofmeetings.Forthisinter
agencycommitteetobesustainable,oneagencythathas
theclearmandatetoaddressthisconcernshouldownthe
functionofregularlycollectinginformation,distributingthe
informationandconductregularmeetingsorforumto
discussvariousissuesofthesubjectmatter.
3.
4.
5.
EnsuringsustainabilityisalreadydiscussedintheLGUguideon
computerization.Thoughitisalsotruethatresourcesharing,
LGUITprofessionalnetworkoranysimilarbigbrotherapproach
fortechnicalsupportisamajorconcern,thissolutionmaynotbe
reliableorensuresquality.
AclearandsuccessfulfactortoensuresustainabilityisforLGUsto
preparetheirISSPsandhaveitapproved,providesufficient
MOOEsforITrequirementsandfollowtheLGUguide.
ITstudentscanbeconsideredhoweverforpurposeofhardware
troubleshootingsupportonly.Studentscannotbeheld
accountableforanypotentiallossordamagetodataorproperty
ofLGUsarisingoutofthatpublicserviceact.ITProfessorscanbe
resortedtobutnothingisfree.
Page 1 of 11
SHORT TO MEDIUM-TERM SCENARIO
A.
Economic:
Slow economic recovery due to uncertain pace of world recovery and fragile
fiscal condition preventing a more vigorous government stimulus program to
push economic growth:
o
o
o
o
B.
Social
Increasing pressure for social services but NG resources for welfare and
expansionary expenditures are limited
Page 2 of 11
Assumptions
and Risks
Performance
Targets and/or
Indicators
Impact
Social Welfare and
Poverty Reduction at the
Local Level is improved.
Assumptions
Delivery of Central Government
Goods and Services are
improved.
Risks
Another financial crisis occurs in
the next 5 years.
Bad weather may cause
reduction in agricultural growth.
(Note: Outcome + Assumptions
and Risks contribute to Impact)
Outcome
Delivery of Public Goods
and Services at the Local
Level is enhanced.
Assumptions
Oversight agencies and LGUs
through LGU Leagues are
supportive of the reform agenda
and monitor carefully reform
progress.
Majority of LGUs are open to
having their performance
monitored.
NG provides incentives for good
fiscal and expenditure
performance.
Risks
Incentives for good behavior
insufficient to encourage LGUs
due to lack of available
resources at the national level.
(Note: Outputs + Assumptions
and Risks = Outcome)
Page 3 of 11
municipalities for
economic services by
2016.
Outputs/SubOutputs
1.
Increased resources
and access to
financing for Local
Government Units.
1.1 Efficient, timely,
complete, and
transparent release
of
intergovernmental
fiscal transfers
IRA, Special
Shares, PDF, and
Grants.
1.2 Improved revenues
from local taxes
and user charges.
1.3 Increased revenues
from economic
enterprises and
other non-tax
sources.
1.4 Improved access to
credit financing.
1.5 Improved access to
non-traditional
credit financing.
1.6 Improved access to
grants and ODA.
2.
Executive Issuances
Departmental issuances.
Appropriate Legislation
(Republic Act)
___%increase in business
tax revenues in all
provinces, cities and
municipalities by 2016.
____%increase in real
property tax revenues in
all provinces, cities and
municipalities by 2016.
___%increase in revenues
from economic enterprises
in all provinces, cities, and
municipalities by 2016.
___% increase in the
number of provinces,
cities and municipalities
accessing credit and nontraditional credit financing
by 2016.
__%increase in the
number of provinces and
municipalities with access
to grants and ODA by
2016.
Executive Issuances,
Departmental issuances.
Appropriate Legislation.
___% decrease in COA
cases by 2016.
___% of provinces, cities
and municipalities
submitting CDP and
CLUP consistent local
plans by 2016.
___% of all provinces,
cities, and municipalities
planning, budgets and
expenditures consistent
by 2016.
____% of all provinces,
cities and municipalities
submitting regular data to
the LGPMS for at least 3
Assumptions
Roll-out of capacity building is
timely provided by oversight
agencies.
Resources are available for
capacity building.
Executive and Legislature is
supportive of policy reforms.
Risks
Legislature may not prioritize
LGU reform agenda.
Localized calamities and/or
disasters may place undue
burden on available resources
for rescue and rehabilitation.
(Note: Inputs/Activities +
Assumptions and Risks =
Outputs)
Page 4 of 11
years by 2016.
___% of all provinces,
cities and municipalities
with actively maintained
local database
management systems for
planning and performance
monitoring.
___% of all provinces,
cities and municipalities
with CBMS by 2016.
___% of all provinces,
cities and municipalities
conducting annual service
delivery performance
surveys at the barangaylevel by 2016.
Executive Issuances,
Departmental issuances.
Appropriate Legislation.
3.1. Efficient,
capacitated,
incentivized and
professionalized
local bureaucracy.
3.2. Efficient, timely,
transparent,
responsive,
business-friendly
and performancemeasurable
bureaucratic
processes.
Executive Issuances,
Departmental issuances.
Appropriate Legislation.
Studies completed.
Multi-sectoral
consultations conducted
and agreements reached
and documented.
___ LGUs pilot-tested for
phased decentralization
by 2016.
Page 5 of 11
levels.
4.3 Accurate monitoring
and measurement
of the impact and
performance of
devolving functions
and resources.
Inputs/Activities
1.1.1. Drafting and issuance of IRRs and Joint Memorandum Circulars between
DBM and concerned agencies for the LGUs special shares harmonizing and
streamlining the procedures and schedules for the submission of information
for the computation and release of the LGUs special shares. (PC/PR)
1.1.2. Reconsider the target date for the submission of the estimates (i.e., between
March 15 and May 15) and adopt a common date as suited within the DBM
budget preparation timeframe.(PC)
1.1.3. Review and revise policy to allow barangays where the income for the
special share is being generated a portion of the mother LGUs share and
include these barangays in the DILG Master List. (PR/PC)
1.1.4. Widely disseminate, especially to central government sub-units, the basic
data and information used in the computation of the shares, besides the
DILG Master List of LGUs, the NSO Census of Population adopted under a
Proclamation Order and the LMB Certified Master List of Land Area. If
necessary, issue a memorandum of understanding to institutionalize this
arrangement. (PC)
1.1.5. Disallow the use of unofficial sources for the computation of the special
shares. (PR/PC)
1.1.6. Provide in the annual National Expenditure Program an amount under the
Allocation to Local Government Units based on the robust estimates
submitted by the revenue collecting agencies for the particular special
share: BIR, for mining taxes; DOE, for energy resources production; DENR,
for forest charges; and MGB, for royalties from mineral products for the
share from the utilization and development of national wealth; and other
collecting agencies concerned, for the Tobacco Excise Tax, Ecozones, VAT,
Franchise Tax, as well as taxes from mini-hydroelectric power developers.
(PC)
1.1.7. Avoid giving preliminary or unofficial information to the, as there is always
the possibility that the advance information given to the LGUs would not
match the figures finally released. (PC)
1.1.8. Coordinate with the LGUs and other key agencies (e.g., BIR) for the
information needed to compute problematic special shares such as the
incremental VAT. (PC)
1.1.9. Apply the policy on the programming of funds for the release of LGU shares
to the shares from this tax in order to avoid the additional step of getting a
referral from the OP. (PC)
1.1.10. Provide or disseminate information on the established policy for the
prioritization of the arrearages (aging, type of special share) before the
releases were made , including to LGUs with claims for the years
immediately after the issuance of the LGC or for those years before the
issuance of the pertinent implementing guidelines. (PC)
1.1.11. Clarify the role of the Regional Offices in processing of the release
documents. DBM ROCS shall continue consolidating and integrating the
regional dimensions of the special shares for prioritizing/programming
purposes. It shall be responsible for preparing the instruments in seeking
clearance/approval for the release where needed. It should not, however,
involve itself, and by extension the DBM ROs, in the computation of the
shares, but rather leave this to the collecting agencies as their full
responsibility. (PC)
1.1.12. Determine the shortest time it would be able to process the release of the
shares to the LGUs. As an alternative, a schedule could be agreed upon
among the agencies concerned, as to when all of the needed documentation
can be submitted to DBM for a one time processing and release. (PC)
1.2.1.
1.3.1. Adoption of the oversight agencies (DBM, DOF/ BLGF, DILG, NEDA) of a
Responsible
Agencies/Resources
DBM, BIR, DILG, DENR, MGB,
DA, DOE.
DBM
DILG
DBM
DBM
DBM
DBM, OP
DBM
DBM
DBM
1.3.2.
1.3.3.
1.3.4.
1.3.5.
1.3.6.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Page 6 of 11
DILG
DILG
1.3.7.
1.4.1.
1.4.2.
1.4.3.
Study why LGUs in some regions have much fewer loans. Is it a matter of
preference or need (demand factors) or lack of access or accessibility
(supply limitations)? (PW)
Simplify loan eligibility requirements and streamline loan approval process
and develop templates for on-lending facilities of the GFIs to reduce project
development costs. (PR)
Clarify NG policy on the role of private sector financing for LGUs. (PW/PR)
DOF
Page 7 of 11
Conduct programs that would develop capacity at the LGU level to prepare
and operate projects that would be suitable for ODA and for commercial
financing. (PW)
1.4.5. Strengthen MDFOs operational capacity to support LGU financing by
approving the proposal to make it an Attached Agency of DOF and
approving its rationalization plan. (PW/PR)
1.4.6. Set up an MDFO website for greater transparency and to widen the reach of
the facility. (PW)
1.4.7. Evaluate the NG-LGU cost sharing policy, pilot-test the performance-based
incentive policy and finalize design of the performance-based grant system
which should include third-party assessments of performance and
creditworthiness of the LGU borrower. (PR)
1.4.8. Enjoin MDFO to continue initiatives for mobilizing private capital for LGU
projects. (PC)
1.4.9. Require BLGF and DILG to enhance initiatives for disseminating
information about LGUs creditworthiness and achievements. (PW)
1.4.10. Simplify loan eligibility requirements and streamline loan approval process
and develop templates for on-lending facilities of the MDFO to reduce
project development costs. (PC)
1.4.11. Facilitate the availability of a pool of consultants who can assist LGUs in
preparing application requirements for MDFO project loans. (PW)
BLGF, DILG
1.5.1.
DOF
1.5.2.
1.5.3.
1.5.4.
1.6.1.
Review the pricing of ODA funds provided to GFIs including whether GFIs
should bear the foreign exchange risk. (PR)
1.6.2. Finance income-generating projects of LGUs with the internal funds of the
GFIs and even by the PFIs and study whether donor funds should still be
used for these projects. (PR)
1.6.3. Clarify government policy on the use of ODA for LGUs towards
complementing NG and private sector resources instead of competing. (PR)
1.6.4. Develop and implement a policy where concessional ODA is directed
towards the sectors that need it most. (PR)
1.6.5. Ask the donors to design and program projects that would leverage ODA
funds destined for LGUs with domestic commercial financing. (PR)
1.6.6. Issue and implement a policy where for projects requiring longer term
financing, where PFIs or other commercial finance is potentially available
(perhaps with the support of MDFO or LGUGC), GFIs and other government
lending institutions should not use ODA funds to compete with these private
funding. (PR)
1.6.7. Issue and implement a policy which would require that ODA funds will not be
used for projects that require financing for ten (10) years of less in order not
DOF
MDFO
DOF, NEDA,
NEDA
DBM,
MDFO
BLGF, DILG
MDFO
MDFO
DOF
DOF, BLGF, MDFO, DILG
DOF, NEDA
DOF
DOF, NEDA
DOF, NEDA
DOF, NEDA, DILG
DOF
DOF, NEDA
DILG,
1.6.8.
1.6.9.
1.6.10.
1.6.11.
1.6.12.
1.6.13.
1.6.14.
2.1.1.
2.1.2.
2.1.3.
2.2.1. Divide the budget into three parts. Part 1 will show the income estimates
and spending proposals (including subsidy to LEE) for the General Fund
Proper. Part 2 will show the income estimate and spending proposal for the
LEE. This implies that Sanggunian authorization for LEE spending is
required. Part 3 will show the consolidation of Parts 1 and 2. This budget
format is not only more transparent than current practice, it also provides
incentives for LEE managers to improve their collections since they are
better able to isolate their earnings from the rest of the General Fund
Proper. (PR)
2.2.2. Implement simple spreadsheet models for cash flow forecasting and cash
flow analysis have been developed by Manasan (2006). Two, establish
benchmarks against which LGUs can compare the results of their cash flow
forecasts and cash flow analysis to aid their decision making process as to
the timing of the release of reserves, revisiting the revenue generation
strategies of the LGU, and revising the methodology for revenue forecasting.
Three, provide guidance on what steps LGUs need to take in the event of an
impending fiscal deficit. For example, is there need for Sanggunian action or
resolution authorizing the local chief executive to reduce allotments without
need for further consultation with the Sanggunian once it is established that
actual revenues for the fiscal year will be lower than the estimates of income
that were used in preparing the budget? Are the existing guidelines
pertaining to the allotment system not enough to address this problem?
(PW)
2.2.3. Develop and implement approaches to forecasting the amount available for
appropriation in the current year so that this estimate can be included in the
preparation of the budget for the incoming year. These approaches would
involve the close monitoring of cash flows and utilization/ obligation of
appropriations and allotments which are prescribed in the UBOM and the
Page 8 of 11
DOF, NEDA
DOF, NEDA
BLGF, DILG
BLGF
BLGF, DILG
BLGF, DILG
DBM
DBM
DBM
2.2.4.
2.2.5.
2.3.1.
2.3.2.
2.3.3.
2.3.4.
2.3.5.
2.3.6.
NGAS even now. Implement simple spreadsheet models for cash flow
forecasting and cash flow analysis have been developed by Manasan
(2006). (PW)
Establish benchmarks against which LGUs can compare the results of their
cash flow forecasts and cash flow analysis to aid their decision making
process as to the timing of the release of reserves, revisiting the revenue
generation strategies of the LGU, and revising the methodology for revenue
forecasting. Three, provide guidance on what steps LGUs need to take in
the event of an impending fiscal deficit. For example, is there need for
Sanggunian action or resolution authorizing the local chief executive to
reduce allotments without need for further consultation with the Sanggunian
once it is established that actual revenues for the fiscal year will be lower
than the estimates of income that were used in preparing the budget? Are
the existing guidelines pertaining to the allotment system not enough to
address this problem? (PC)
Develop and disseminate a handbook to complement the UBOM. The
handbook should aim (i) to communicate a policy framework for LGU
budgeting that is anchored on the basic principles of public expenditure
management, and (ii) to provide LGUs with tools and techniques that will
help them incorporate these tenets in their budget processes. (PW)
Page 9 of 11
DBM
DBM
DBM
BLGS
DBM
DBM, DepEd
DBM, DepEd
DBM, DepEd
DBM, DILG
2.3.7.
2.4.1.
2.4.2.
BLGD
Page 10 of 11
3.1.1. Review and define model organizational structures for LGUs with
corresponding staffing pattern (by level and by income class) with the
amended model organization structures should be indicative rather than
prescriptive. The model staffing patterns may indicate minimum and
maximum number and level of positions for each LGU level and income
class. There is also a need to establish criteria and/ or benchmarks that
LGUs can refer to in deciding on the staffing pattern that is appropriate for
their particular situation. Fixed-term employment contracts may then be
considered for personnel who are focused on the delivery of the priorities of
the current administration but which are not part of the core mandates of the
LGU. The tenure of department heads and heads of the various offices may
also have to be revisited, weighing the trade-off between the need for
personnel who have the full trust and confidence of the LCE, on the one
hand, and the need to promote continuity in public administration at the local
level, on the other hand. (PW)
3.1.2. Provide a wage that will be commensurate to the work required and
motivating for a public servant. (PR)
3.1.3. Retain the PS cap. This recommendation is anchored on the premise that
service delivery requires a mix of both wage and non-wage spending. If
spending is too skewed in favor of personal services, service delivery suffers
because of the squeeze on supplies, travel and other resources that are
needed to complement personnel resources as well as local public
infrastructure needed for local economic development. (PR)
3.1.4. Allow the LGUs the discretion to choose any which one of the eight
alternative salary schedules which is provided in Section 10 of RA 6758 and
what they think is best suited to their particular situation guided by their
fiscal capacity and subject to their complying strictly with the PS cap. In line
with this, it is also recommend that most if not all of the waivers to the
application of the PS cap be eliminated. The presence of these waivers
seriously undermines fiscal discipline. (PR)
3.1.5. Revisit the parameters that form the basis for assigning different salary
grades for higher level positions in LGUs of different income class and
different levels. (PW)
3.1.6. Coordinate the implementation of benefits under various Magna Carta
legislations with implementation of the overall compensation structure of
government, especially under SSL3. Congress should revisit the desirability
of grant of Magna Carta-type MC benefits to all government employees
instead of special groups only. The desire to provide higher pay to public
health workers, particularly doctors and nurses, who are deemed to be
underpaid relative to the demand for their services in the local as well as
foreign labor markets is understandable. This concern might be addressed
better by adjusting the salary grades that currently assigned to these
positions instead of providing blanket salary top-ups to all PHWs. Moreover,
the experience with the implementation Magna Carta of PHWs shows that
legislation of this type can be counterproductive. (PW)
3.1.7. Discontinue the practice of granting additional/ extra year-end benefits
subject to the availability of funds at the level of the operating unit as the
budget year is about to come to a close in order to improve public
expenditure management at the local level. (PR)
3.1.8. Amend the pertinent section of the LGC to disallow the grant of additional
allowances and benefits to national government officials. This provision puts
undue pressure on LGUs to provide such allowances at the expense of local
service delivery. (PR)
3.1.9. Conduct programs that would develop capacity at the LGU level to prepare
and operate projects that would be suitable for ODA and for commercial
financing. (PW)
3.1.10. Forge a partnership between the DILGs Local Government Academy and
other training institutions to ensure accessibility of training services. (PW)
DBM
DBM
DILG, BLGF
LGA, DILG
3.2.1.
4.1.1.
4.2.1.
4.3.1.
Notes:
PC
PR
PW
Procedural Changes
Policy Reform
Preparatory Work
BIR
BLGD
BLGF
BLGS
DA
DBM
DENR
DepEd
DILG
DOE
DOF
DOJ
DTI
COA
CSC
LnB
LCP
LGA
LMB
LMP
LPP
MDFO
MGB
NEDA
NSCB
NSO
PCCI
TESDA
ULAP
LGU Leagues -
Page 11 of 11
PolicyBriefPreparation
CoordinatingCommitteeonDecentralization
AserB.Javier,PhD
WhatisaPolicyBrief?
Apolicybrief isawrittendocumentanda
positionpaperthatclearlystatetheposition
oropinionofanorganization(oracoalitionof
organizations)aboutaparticularissue.
Source: William Dunn, Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction
PublicPolicyAnalysisFramework
ProblemIdentification
Problemsconfronting
theorganization
PolicyTesting
Istheproblemdefineda
astrategicpolicy?
Step1:
ProblemDefinition
PolicyReview
Whatarethepriorefforts
madetosolvethepolicy
problem
PolicyRecommendation
Whichamongthe
alternativesmaybestsolve
theproblem?
PolicyAlternatives
Whatarethepertinent
coursesofactionthat
maybetaken?
PolicyStakeholders
Whatarerolesofthe
stakeholdersidentifiedin
thepolicy
recommendation?
Step2:
AlternativesGeneration
Step3:
PolicyAgendaSetting
PolicyIdentification
Source:AnadaptationfromtheLocalGovernmentResourceHandbook,October2000
How broad
of an
impact will
these
the office? issues
have on
1.Immediat
the office?
e
2.next year
3.three
years from
now?
1.Entire
DILG
2.Division/Bur
eau
3. Single unit,
What
impact will
this issue
have on
the
offices
financial
resources
? 1.Major,
How
sensitive
is the
policy
issue
relative
to the
environm
ent?
Will
solution
require
improve
ments in
staff
compete
ncy?
2.Moderate,
3.Minor
1.Major,
2.Moderate
, 3.Minor
2.No
1.Yes
Will
solution
require
major
facility
constructi
on/
renovatio
n?
1.Yes
2.No
What level
of
manag
ement
can
the
issue
be
resolv
ed?
1.Secretary
2.Director
3.Chief
PreExistingPolicy
Reviewstheexistingpoliciesthatwasintendedto
solvethepolicyproblem
Summarizeswhathasbeendonebytheothersand
theclientorganizationtosolvethepolicyproblem
PolicyAlternatives
Source:AnadaptationfromtheLocalGovernmentResourceHandbook,October2000
1. Whatarethepracticalalternativestheorganization
mightpursuetoaddressthispolicyissue?
2. Whatarethebarrierstotherealizationofthese
policyalternatives?
3. Whatarethemajorproposalstoachievethe
alternativesorovercomethebarriers?
StepsinIdentifyingPolicyAlternatives
1.Itisthedevelopmentofpertinentand
acceptableproposedcoursesofactionsfor
dealingwithpublicproblems.
2.Itaskstwomajorquestions:(1)whatshould
bedoneaboutaproblem?(2)Howshould
theactivities,proposedcoursesofaction
agreeduponprinciplesorstatements
drafted?
ElementsofaPolicyBrief
Source:AnadaptationfromProf.Tsai,2005andW.Dunn,PublicPolicyAnalysis:AnIntroduction
Elementsofa
PolicyBrief
Content
1.Background 1.Containsthe
ofthe
descriptionofthe
Problem
problematic
situation,the
outcomesofprior
effortstoresolve
theproblem.
2.Containsessential
factsadecision
makerneedsto
know.
GuideQuestions
1.Arethedimensions
ofthe
problematic
situation
described?
2.Haveoutcomesof
prior
efforts/policyto
resolvethe
problems
described?
Elementsofa Content
PolicyBrief
2.Problem/
Issue
Statement
Problemstatementsrefer
toa"problem"tobe
solved.
1. Aconcisestatementof
thequestionthatyour
policytackles;
2. Justification,bydirect
referencetothe
previoussection,that
yourquestionis
previouslyunanswered
GuideQuestions
1.Istheproblem
clearlystated?
2.Aregoalsclearly
specified?
4.Areallmajor
stakeholders
identified
5.Istheproblematic
situations
analyzed?
Elementsofa Content
GuideQuestions
PolicyBrief
3.Preexisting 1. Summarizeswhat
1.Whatarethe
Policies
hasbeendonebythe
interventions
othersandtheclient
madeandwhat
organization.
aretheactions
pursued?
2. Theobjectiveisto
informthereaders
thatpolicyoptions
havealreadybeen
pursued,ifany.
Elementsofa
PolicyBrief
Content
GuideQuestions
4.Policy
Alternatives
1.Arealternativepolicy
1.Thispartofthepolicy
solutionsdescribed
paperistoconvince
andspecified?
thedecisionmakers
thatyouansweredor 2.Areallrelevant
solvedtheproblem.
constraintstaken
2.Thispartdelineatesthe
intoaccount?
possiblecoursesof
3.Arepossible
actiontheclient
consequencestaken
organizationmaytake.
intoaccount?
4.Arestrategieslaidout
tosolvethe
problem?
Elementsofa
PolicyBrief
Content
GuideQuestions
5.
Stakeholders
1.Thispartcontainsthe
identificationofthe
stakeholderstobe
affectedbyyour
policy
1.
Whoarethe
affectedparties
ofyourpolicy?
A. Background of the
Policy problem
B. Problem
Statement
Suggested Contents
Describes what is the policy problem and the general scope of problem the
researcher is interested in i.e. decentralization issues in the local government
units. This section contains the essential facts how the policy problem came
about and the decision maker needs to know about the policy problem and
situation.
What is the problem related to the theme is the researcher/ author trying to solve?
These are the issues and concerns that the local government unit or the DILG
and other concerned institution are facing given their scope and mandate,
relative to the problem. This section contains the direct description of the
problematic situation.
What are the policies or prior efforts that have been made to solve the problem.
What is the analysis of the researcher on the policies that have been made?
This section should match the objectives and the problem statement.
D. Policy Alternatives
What are the possible solutions to the problem, as perceived by the researcher?
What is/are the proposed solution(s) to the issue(s) and concern(s)? Factor(s)
for selecting the said solution(s) over the others? What are the results of the
study? This section should ANSWER the objectives and the problem
statement.
E. Concerned
Stakeholders
Who are the major actors in coming up and finalizing the solution? What are the
roles (regulation, facilitation, enabling, direct provision, etc) of these actors?
This section describes the stakeholders roles and their point of integration
relative to the LGUs and the researchers viewpoint?
Number of
Pages
2 paragraphs
2 paragraphs
3 paragraphs
1 page
1 paragraph
9 Functions of a Secretariat
9 Preparing Minutes of the
Meeting
9 Agenda Setting
Functions of a Secretariat
Technical
Administrative
Functions of a Secretariat
Technical
Support to meetings
Preparation of the minutes
Agenda setting
Preparation of technical documents for the agenda
folder
Functions of a Secretariat
Technical
Functions of a Secretariat
Administrative
Logistical Support
Word processing, filing and telephone/fax
services
Preparation (compilation and packaging) of
agenda folders
Agenda Setting
How do you go about identifying the list of
items for the agenda for the CCD meetings?
Minutes of the meeting
CCD Workplan
Policy dialogue group specifically the
oversight agency technical working
group and the local government
dialogue partners
Directions from the Chairman
PROPOSEDLGUMEDIUM
TERMLOGFRAME,20102016
ADBTA7019PHI
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
LOGFRAMESTRUCUTURE
IMPACT
Assumption
s
Risks
OUTCOME
Assumptions
Risks
OUTPUTS
Assumption
s
Risks
INPUTS/
ACTIVITIES
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
SHORTTOMEDIUMTERMSCENARIO
Economic:
A.
y
y
Sloweconomicrecoveryduetouncertainpaceofworldrecoveryand
fragilefiscalconditionpreventingamorevigorousgovernmentstimulus
programtopusheconomicgrowth:
Protectionisttendenciesinindustrialcountrieswithslowemploymentrecovery
Highcostofinternationalfinance
Verycompetitiveconditions
Waitandseeattitudeofinvestorsin2010
y
y
Mixedprospectsforregions
y
Exportdependentregionsandprovinces(e.g.NCR,Regions3,4Aand7)onthe
recoverytrack
AgriculturedependentareasplaguedbydroughtandpossiblyLaNina;faceissues
relatedtoAFTAimplementationandsluggishdemandforsugar
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
SHORTTOMEDIUMTERMSCENARIO
B. Social
y Worseningpovertyduetopooragricultureperformance
y IncreasingpressureforsocialservicesbutNGresourcesforwelfare
andexpansionaryexpendituresarelimited
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
IMPACT
y SocialWelfareandReducedPovertyattheLocal
Levelisimproved.
Assumptions
DeliveryofCentralGovernmentGoodsandServicesare
improved.
Nomajornationalcalamitiesornaturaldisastersinthenext
fiveyears.
Risks
Anotherfinancialcrisisoccursinthenext5years.
Badweathermaycausereductioninagriculturalgrowth.
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
IMPACT:PROPOSEDINDICATORS
__%declineinpovertyincidenceby2016.
___%increaseinaveragelifeexpectancyby2016.
___%decreaseininfantmortalityby2016.
___%increaseintheHumanDevelopmentIndex
by2016.
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTCOME
y DeliveryofPublicGoodsandServicesattheLocal
Levelisenhanced.
Assumptions
OversightagenciesandLGUsthroughLGULeaguesare
supportiveofthereformagendaandmonitorcarefullyreform
progress.
MajorityofLGUsareopentohavingtheirperformance
monitored.
NGprovidesincentivesforgoodfiscalandexpenditure
performance.
Risks
IncentivesforgoodbehaviorinsufficienttoencourageLGUs
duetolackofavailableresourcesatthenationallevel.
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTCOME:PROPOSED
INDICATORS
___%increaseinlocalspendingInhealthservicesin70%ofall
provinces,citiesandmunicipalitiesby2016.
____%increaseinlocalspendinginroadinfrastructurein70%
ofallprovinces,citiesandmunicipalitiesby2016.
___%increaseinlocalspendingforotherpublicinfrastructure
in70%ofallprovinces,citiesandmunicipalitiesby2016.
____%increaseinlocaleducationspendinginallprovinces,
cities,andmunicipalitiesby2016.
___%increaseinlocalspendinginallprovinces,citiesand
municipalitiesforenvironmentalprojectsby2016.
___provinces,citiesandmunicipalitiespassingenvironmental
measuresby2016.
___%increaseinspendinginallprovinces,citiesand
municipalitiesforeconomicservicesby2016.
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTPUTS/SUBOUTPUTS
Increasedresourcesandaccesstofinancingfor
LocalGovernmentUnits.
1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Efficient,timely,complete,andtransparentreleaseof
intergovernmentalfiscaltransfers IRA,SpecialShares,
PDF,andGrants.
Improvedrevenuesfromlocaltaxesandusercharges.
Increasedrevenuesfromeconomicenterprisesand
othernontaxsources.
Improvedaccesstocreditfinancing.
Improvedaccesstonontraditionalcreditfinancing.
ImprovedaccesstograntsandODA.
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTPUT1:PROPOSED
INDICATORS
ExecutiveIssuances
Departmentalissuances.
AppropriateLegislation(RepublicAct)
___%increaseinbusinesstaxrevenuesinallprovinces,cities
andmunicipalitiesby2016.
____%increaseinrealpropertytaxrevenuesinallprovinces,
citiesandmunicipalitiesby2016.
___%increaseinrevenuesfromeconomicenterprisesinall
provinces,cities,andmunicipalitiesby2016.
___%increaseinthenumberofprovinces,citiesand
municipalitiesaccessingcreditandnontraditionalcredit
financingby2016.
__%increaseinthenumberofprovincesandmunicipalities
withaccesstograntsandODAby2016.
10
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTPUTS/SUBOUTPUTS
2. Efficient,effectiveandtransparentplanning,
financial,budgetandexpendituremanagement
Efficientandtransparentfinancialmanagement
andreporting
b. Effective,responsive,transparentandrationalized
planningandbudgeting.
c. Efficientandtransparentexpendituremanagement.
d. Effectiveandtransparentlocalperformance
managementandmonitoring.
a.
11
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTPUT2:PROPOSED
INDICATORS
ExecutiveIssuances,
Departmentalissuances.
AppropriateLegislation.
___%decreaseinCOAcasesby2016.
___%ofallprovinces,citiesandmunicipalitiessubmittingCDPandCLUP
consistentlocalplansby2016.
___%ofallprovinces,cities,andmunicipalitiesplanning,budgetsand
expendituresconsistentby2016.
____%ofallprovinces,citiesandmunicipalitiessubmittingregulardatatothe
LGPMSforatleast3yearsby2016.
___%ofallprovinces,citiesandmunicipalitieswithactivelymaintainedlocal
databasemanagementsystemsforplanningandperformancemonitoring.
___%ofallprovinces,citiesandmunicipalitieswithCBMSby2016.
___%ofallprovinces,citiesandmunicipalitiesconductingannualservice
deliveryperformancesurveysatthebarangaylevelby2016.
12
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTPUTS/SUBOUTPUTS
3. Efficient,responsiveandaccountablelocal
administration.
Efficient,capacitated,incentivizedand
professionalizedlocalbureaucracy.
b. Efficient,timely,transparent,responsiveand
performancemeasurablebureaucraticprocesses.
a.
13
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTPUT3:PROPOSED
INDICATORS
ExecutiveIssuances,
Departmentalissuances.
AppropriateLegislation.
___%decreaseincasesfiledbytheOmbudsmanforlocal
executives.
___%ofalltreasurerspassingBLGFcompetencyexamsby
2016.
Assessorsin___%ofprovinces,citiesandmunicipalities
passedaccreditationexamsby2016.
___provinces,citiesandmunicipalitiesimplementingbusiness
friendlymeasures.
___provinces,citiesandmunicipalitiesutilizingservice
deliverycontractsandcustomerservicesurveysby2106.
14
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTPUTS/SUBOUTPUTS
4. Rationalizedandtimeboundprocessoffiscal
decentralization.
Rationalizedprocessofdevolvingfunctionsand
adequateresourcesandrevenuegeneratingpowers
basedonlocalcapacities.
b. Realistictimetablefordevolvingfunctionsand
resourcestoappropriateLGUlevels.
c. Accuratemonitoringandmeasurementofthe
impactandperformanceofdevolvingfunctions
andresources.
a.
15
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTPUT4:PROPOSED
INDICATORS
ExecutiveIssuances,
Departmentalissuances.
AppropriateLegislation.
Studiescompleted.
Multisectoralconsultationsconductedandagreements
reachedanddocumented.
__LGUspilottestedforphaseddecentralizationby2016.
16
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
OUTPUTS
Assumptions
Rolloutofcapacitybuildingistimelyprovidedbyoversight
agencies.
Resourcesareavailableforcapacitybuilding.
ExecutiveandLegislatureissupportiveofpolicyreforms.
Risks
LegislaturemaynotprioritizeLGUreformagenda.
Localizedcalamitiesand/ordisastersmayplaceundueburden
onavailableresourcesforrescueandrehabilitation.
17
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
INPUTS/ACTIVITIES
y SeeLGULOGFRAMESummaryMatrixfor
detailedinputs/activities.
y TheLOGFRAMEonlyincludespolicy
recommendationsfromthesix(6)ADBTA4778
studiesandthetwo(2)ADBstudiesonLGU
creditfinancingandLGUaccesstoODA.
18
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
NEXTSTEPS
y DiscusswithCCDmembersforfurthercomments.
y ReviseLOGFRAMEtoincluderecommendationsfrom:
Otherrecentstudies
CCDinitiatives e.g.,AmendmentstotaxprovisionsoftheLocal
GovernmentCodeof1991
InitiativesfromOversightAgencies
InitiativesfromLGULeagues
LGFBR2PolicyMatrix
y Conductconsultationswithotherstakeholdersforcomments
andotherinputs.
y IncludeinnewMTPDPand/orendorsementofCCDtonext
administration.
y LaunchpolicyagendaduringCodes19thAnniversaryasa
preludeto20th Anniversaryin2011.
19
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
THANKYOU
RaymundC.Fabre 3March2010
20
REVISEDVERSION:30MARCH2010
MATRIX OF ISSUES-CONCERNS/DISCUSSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONSAGREEMENTS
The following matrix provides the observations, issues, discussions and agreements/ recommendations on
the island group presentations made on the outputs of Workshop 1 (Identifying Core Problems and Most
Significant Opportunity) as well as the process and outputs for Workshop 2b (Identification of Gaps and
Overlaps of TAs provided by all CAs).
AREA OF CONCERN
DISCUSSIONS
AGREEMENTS/
RECOMMENDATIONS
Saranganni's FP supply
requirements
In case of Saranganni's FP
supply requirements,
forecasting demand would aid
in ensuring the availability of
needed supplies.
AREA OF CONCERN
DISCUSSIONS
AGREEMENTS/
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to time constraints,
indicators and LGU input
areas were pre assigned in
workshop 1. However, in the
succeeding workshops, these
would not be limited to just the
assigned LGU input area.
Furthermore, the participants
were reminded that the
workshop does not preclude
further discussions on all input
areas among the various CAs.
Workshop 2b. Identifying Gaps and Overlaps Among the TAs provided by all CAs
Quality Assurance
LAPM
Strategic Planning
Compostela Valley
Compostela Valley
PHIC accreditation
MNCHN
PIPH
CSR+ planning,
implementation and policy
formulation
SDIR
ICV
SDExH
AREA OF CONCERN
DISCUSSIONS
AGREEMENTS/
RECOMMENDATIONS
Mass Media
LEC Training
Marawi City
CSR+ planning,
implementation and policy
formulation
TA on advocacy on TB
Development of local health
policy/ordinance
DOH-ARMM HNIP (MOA and
Manual of Operation)
AIPH/AOP (EBF)
Strengthening FHSIS (EBF)
Establishment of advisory
bodies (EBF)
Sarangani
ACSM
Generating resources for
PIPH
CSR+ planning,
implementation and policy
formulation
MNCHN Strategy
Capacity Building
South Cotabato
MNCHN
PIPH
Provision of FP commodities
Changing health seeking
behavior of IP communities
TA on addressing CDR/CR
AREA OF CONCERN
DISCUSSIONS
AGREEMENTS/
RECOMMENDATIONS
perspective of PHO and CHD
was raised. This is to ensure
that overlapping TAs and
areas for collaboration may
further be identified.
No overlapping TAs.
Despite the inclusion of necessary
infrastructure and personnel in the
PIPH, these were still identified as
gaps in the province.
Maguindanao
Maguindanao
Marawi City
Duplication of TAs are more on
demand generation in terms of
advocacy and community
mobilization.
Gaps identified were on facilities
and equipments, commodities and
supply for MCH and FP.
Sarangani
No duplication of TAs. TAs on
human resource and demand
generation may seem to overlap
but it should be noted that TAs
provided by CAs such as PRISM2,
HealthPro and HealthGov have
different target groups.
South Cotabato
There is no TA overlap in the
province. It is a convergence site
for the TA efforts of PRISM 2,
AREA OF CONCERN
DISCUSSIONS
HealthGov, HealthPro and A2Z.
AGREEMENTS/
RECOMMENDATIONS
Preliminaries
1
Call to Order
Attendance
II
III
IV
Highlights of Discussion
Issue(s)/
Area(s) of Concern
Other Matters
VI
Adjournment
Discussion
Agreements/
Recommendations
05.14.10
Background:
TheTAsupportsawiderangeofcapacitybuilding
interventionstocoverinstitutional,technical,
operational,andfinancialtoenablea
comprehensivereformconsistentwithDRRM
Capacitiesaredefinedtocover(a)RIAM,(b)RR,(c)
RFT,(d)EPR;and(e)SR
Background:
Translations of the five pillars will cut
across the four components1) local
structures, 2) local planning process and
outputs, 3) authority levers or tools to
implement the plans and 4) community
mobilization
Implementation Period: June 2010- June
2011
GeneralObjective:
To expand and scale up governments
efforts by focusing on the identification
and implementation of mainstreaming
tools and instruments, following the DILG
frameworkofinterventions
(Tobesystematicallyrolledoutamongthe
localgovernmentsinthecountry)
SpecificObjectives:
To integrate DRRM into physical and multi-sectoral
planning (CLUP and CDP), policy and decisionmaking, prioritization, investment programming and
budgeting, enforcement , monitoring and evaluation;
To support the formulation of a risk finance strategy
that seeks to reduce the financial burden of the
government arising from natural disasters.
DILG:MAINSTREAMINGDRM/DRR/CCAINLOCALGOVERNANCE
LocalPlanning
LGU Authority
LocalPlanningProcessandOutputs Levers
Structure
CLUP
Political
Component
Long term
goals
ofphysical
Development
LDC
Deliberates
Laysdown
policies
Takes
decisions
Technical
Component
Sectoraland
Functional
Committees
(Section112,
LGCof1991)
Locational
Principles&
Land/Water
UsePolicies
Vision
Statement
Analysisof
ThePlanning
Environment
CBDRM
Sectoral
Goals
Sectoral
Objectives
&Targets
PPAs
CDP
Monitoringand
Evaluation
(Outputs,Outcomes,
Impacts)
Zoning
Ordinance,
Devt
Regulations
LDIP/
AIP/
Budget
New
Legislation
s
EWS
LGU Equipage
EnvironmentalMgt.
Disaster
Contingency/
ManagementPlan
CLUP/CDP
MITIGATION/
PREVENTION
SafeBuilding
Construction
Livelihood
Housing
Lifelines
Education
Infrastructures
EarlyWarning
Systems
RECOVER/
REHABILITATION
RESPONSE
Searchand
Rescue
Relief
Temporary
Shelter
Establishment
Enhancing Compliance/Enforcement of
Updates
The project was launched through an orientationbriefing (April 30)
DILG program on Climate Change Capacity
Development and Administrative Oversight will
be factored into the processes.
LGUs are required to submit their specific
requests for assistance following the DILG
mainstreaming framework and strategies
Updates
Commitment setting with pilot LGUs in June
Work planning with LGUs (through DILG regions
and provinces) to start in June
Zambales
Mainstreaming DRM/DRR/CCA in
Comprehensive Plans
CLUP
CDP
REGULATORY
MEASURES
Zoning
Other Local
Ordinances
Adm.
Issuance
National Laws
InterJurisdictional
Assessments
Implementation Plan
ELA/LDIP/AIP/CapDev
PROGRAMS
/ PROJECTS
NON-PROJECTS /
SERVICES
LGU Funded
NGA Funded
Joint Funding
Private Sector
Investments
Thank You