Navarro v.

Ermita
2011 April 12
URGENT MOTION TO RECALL Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010.

b.

3 Dec 1996: COMELEC conducts mandatory plebiscite for ratification of creation of

province.1 People from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the
Dinagat Islands voted.

It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of
local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents, and the criteria
prescribed by the Local Government Code (LGC), i.e., income, population and
land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress,
in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these
three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential
consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local
government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the
clear intent of the framers of the LGC.

Affirmative Votes: 69,943

2.

Decision on 2010 case declared Final and Executory on 18 May 2010

Petitioner:

3.

This Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment
of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the
original parties.

4.

COMELEC Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was declared
final and executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its former status as a nonprovince. Consequently, the results of the May 2010 elections would have to be
nullified, and a special election would have to be conducted for various positions
(Governor, Vice-Governor, etc) for Surigao del Norte.

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA

Taxpayers and Residents of Surigao del Norte
(Vice Gov, and Members of Provincial Board)

Respondent:

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

representing the President of the Philippines
Senate of the Philippines
represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT
House of Representatives
represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS
representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN
representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands

Movants-Intervenors:

elections

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T.

MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON.
SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D.
GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON.
CESAR M. BAGUNDOL
Elected officials of Surigao de Norte province in the May 2010

Facts:
1.

Brief Recap
a. 2 Oct 1996:
law
i.
ii.
iii.

President approves RA 9355 creating Province of Dinagat Islands into

Income
Population
Land Area

:
:
:

82.69M/year
106,951
802.12 sq. km

Negative Votes:

63,502

c.
d.

President appoints interim set of provincial officials

1 Jun 2007: New set of provincial officials elected and assume office

e.

10 Feb 2010: RA 9355 declared unconstitutional. (failed to meet min land area
requirements)

Hence the intervenors became real parties in interest with the declaration finality of
the 2010 case decision. (Cong Matugas etal had petitioned to intervene before, but
were declared to have no standing since at that time, they were still candidates in the
May 2010 elections.)
Other Pertinent laws:
LGC. Sec 386. Barangay - no min land area requirement
LCG. Sec 442. Municipality - 50 sq km BUT
(b)The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
LGC-IRR:ARTICLE 13.Municipalities.(a) Requisites for CreationA municipality shall
not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(iii) Land areawhich must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed
municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a

1 LGC, SECTION.10.Plebiscite Requirement.No creation, division, merger, abolition, or

substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly
affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action,
unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.

2.
LCG. Sec 450. City: 100 sq km BUT

With respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces,

the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e.,
income, population, and land area, are provided for.

(b)The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes

and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need
not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

But it must be pointed out that when the LGU to be created consists of one (1) or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided
in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities.(a) Requisites for creationA city shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:

This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

" The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is
composed of one (1) or more islands. "

It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component
cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in
Section 461 of the LGCand to reflect the true legislative intent.

LGC. Sec 461 Province 2000sq km BUT

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE9.Provinces.(a) Requisites for creationA province shall not be
created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:

Please see pertinent laws

3.

" The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. "

Operative Fact Doctrine not really discussed. It does not apply in this case.
General Rule: An unconstitutional law produces no rights, imposes no duties and
affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation,
inoperative as if it has not been passed

Dispositive: Petition granted. RA 9355 and LGC-IRR Art 9 is constitutional.

Petitioners
1. Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (did not meet requirements)
Respondents
1. Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (met requirements)
Movants-Intervenors
1. The passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section
461 of the LGC
2. The exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of
two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum
land area requirement
3. The Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case - matter of equity
and fair play, undue burden on those who have relied on the inoperative law.
Issue: WON a territory composed of more than 1 island is exempt from the minimum land
area requirement?
Held: Yes
SC:

1.

Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island
Province of Dinagat. The acts of Congress, in passing RA 9355, definitively show
the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the
land area requirement

Excerpt: Debates in congress regarding plebiscite and land area requirements

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. ". The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if
we hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just
leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case we would like
to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng
set ng minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the
Local Government Code? Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have
its own idea how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas.
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot
make a generalization."

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an
independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of
Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that

practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a

been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of

component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of

any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.

provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper
Case Digest: Mariano v. Commission on Elections
Posted: August 16, 2010 in Case Digests
Tags: case, comelec, congress, constitution, digest, law, legislative, Philippines, p
olitical
0

plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely
reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component
city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

G.R. No. 118627

alteration of boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of

Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the

07 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

FACTS:
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over

Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers,

said petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of

assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati

which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is

into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which

unconstitutional.

contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a
senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political

ISSUES:

units directly affected is mandatory.

Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the

1.

mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3

of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying

other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be

metes and bounds with technical descriptions

heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC.
Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the

Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city

2.

law as unconstitutional.

Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X
and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a
new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one

two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has

3.

Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as

the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law

HELD/RULING:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than

1.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly

which he was elected.

urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which
shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in

xxx xxx xxx

Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three

southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of

years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of

Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

June next following their election.

Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive

change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as

must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in

an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on

1.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between

the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not

the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out

happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual

of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that

case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig

the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

1.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may
be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality

provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from

of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers

increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the

and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall

law.

have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new
corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed
by the city government of the City of Makati.

Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Padilla vs. COMELEC

Governor (P) vs. COMELEC (D)
GR 103328, October 19,1992 (214 SCRA 735)

[T]

economically dislocated by the separation thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.
Summary: A plebiscite for a newly created municipality was conducted and the voters

What is contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of

rejected its creation. The governor questioned the result and challenged the inclusion of

political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in

the voters of the mother municipality in the plebiscite.

such political areas are the inhabitants of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as
well as those living in the the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

Rule of Law: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affectedSection
10, Article X, 1987 Constitution.

Cawaling vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001
Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001
Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite
conducted pursuant thereto.

Facts: Republic Act No. 7155 created the new municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the
Province of Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law, the COMELEC (D) conducted a
plebiscite for its approval. In its resolution for the conduct of the plebiscite, the COMELEC
(D) included all the voters of the Municipality of Labothe parent unit of the new

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No.
8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And
Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a
plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for
ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.

municipality.

The result of the plebiscite showed that the majority rejected the creation of the new

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present
petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:

Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor, Hon. Roy Padilla, Jr. (P), petitioned the court to
set aside the result arguing that the phrase "political units directly affected" in Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution does not include the parent political unitthe

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period
from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and

Municipality of Labo.

Issues: Is the result of the plebiscite valid?

Ruling: Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political
units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day
extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before
conducting the plebiscite.

Petitioner instituted another petition

unconstitutional ,contending, in essence, that:

declaring

enjoin

R.A.

No.

8806

1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution)
which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city"; and

2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon
and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the
"one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may
be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging
two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.

Held:
Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous.
The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section
10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a
province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the
Code. the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger
of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such
merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are
not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that
"the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may
not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or
impractical.

3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and
distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical,
natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks
to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon

(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution

(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The
theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has
passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court,
however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has
shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable
doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.