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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT


SEVENTH JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 54
Hall of Justice, Lapu-Lapu City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
-versus-

CRIM. CASE

NO. R-21405
TERESITA MALINIS,
Accused.

MOTION TO DISMISS
Comes now, accused, by counsel and unto this Honorable Court, most
respectfully move for the dismissal of the above-captioned case upon the following
arguments:
1.1. In its broad sense, Article 3, Section 16 of the Constitution provides
that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. As applied in criminal proceedings,
Section 14 par (2) emphatically states that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial.xxx
1.2
It is worth noting that the complaint-affidavit was filed on March 5,
2007 and the trial of this case started on April 16, 2009. The case has been
dragging for more than eight (8) years by reason of unjustifiable postponements
(i.e., resetting of hearing due to health problems, unavailability of the prosecutor or
the court staff and the unavailability of the prosecutions witness).
1.3
Jurisprudentially well-entrenched is the rule that the right to speedy
trial is violated when there are unjustified postponements of the trial and the long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried for no justifiable
reason. In the case at hand, the above-mentioned unjustified postponements were
flat-out despotic and sufficiently oppressive so as to violate and infringe the
accuseds basic human right which has been primarily granted by no less than the
fundamental law.
1.4
Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution,
Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, was
enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first
day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court
implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been
incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 19.
Undoubtedly in this case, the threshold limiting the trial period to 180 days from the
first day of trial as fixed by the Supreme Court has been folded exponentially to the
detriment of the herein accuseds fundamental right.
1.5
From the legal standpoint, prosecutions lack of zealousness in
prosecuting this case, coupled with the inexcusable postponements, resulted in its
failure to vindicate the aforementioned constitutional principle whose wisdom has
not been diminished by the erosions of time.

1.6
Likewise, prosecutions aberration which marred the trial of this case
should tilt the scales of justice in favor of the herein accused because of the
constitutional presumption of innocence. It is an oft-quoted adage that, indeed,
justice delayed is justice denied.
WHEREFORE, accused respectfully prays that the herein case be ordered
dismissed on the ground that the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial
cannot be held hostage by the disinterest of the prosecution in discharging its duty.
Other reliefs, just and equitable, are also prayed for.
Lapu-Lapu City, Philippines, November 26, 2015.

ANA FLOURESSA Y. CABANILLA

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