Reliability Studies of Decay Heat Removal System

Avinash J. Gaikwad, M. Hari Prasad, Rajesh Kumar, A. Srivastava and A D Contractor

V. V. S. Sanyasi Rao, H. G. Lele and K. K. Vaze
Reactor Safety Division,
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai, India.
avinashg@barc.gov.in

Abstract

Passive systems are characterized by their full reliance upon

natural laws (e.g. gravity, natural circulation) to accomplish their
designated safety function and dispenses with active
components. The reliability of passive systems refers to the
ability of the system to carry out its safety function under the
prevailing conditions when required.

Passive systems have been implemented in most of the advanced

reactors in order to improve the availability of the plant. In this
paper the methodology used for performing the passive system
reliability analysis has been discussed. A case study on passive
decay heat removal system of large sized PHWRs has also been
discussed. Based on the thermal hydraulic analysis failure points
have been generated and the failure surface has been developed.

A passive system should be theoretically more reliable than the

active one. Nevertheless the passive system may fail to fulfill its
mission not only because of a consequence of classical
mechanical failure of component (passive or active) of the
passive system, but also due to the deviation from expected
behavior due to physical phenomena mainly related to thermal
hydraulic or due to different boundary or initial conditions.
There is always a nonzero likelihood of occurrence of physical
phenomena leading to pertinent failure modes, once the system
enters into operation. In fact, the deviations of natural forces or
physical principles, upon which they rely, from the expected
conditions can impair the performance of the system itself.

Finally by using the Monte Carlo simulation technique failure

probability has been estimated.

Keywords- Passive system, Reliability, Response surface, Monte

Carlo simulation.

I. INTRODUCTION
Innovative nuclear power plants largely implement passive
systems, aimed at both substantial simplification and improved
safety, in order to reduce human error, in particular, and active
component malfunctions. It is very much essential to evolve a
systematic procedure for assessment of reliability of such
passive systems. The passive systems play an important role on
various innovative reactor safety systems and can result in
substantial economic benefits, transparency and simplicity in
operation over the active systems. As per IAEA definition, a
passive component is a component, which does not need any
external input to operate, and a passive system is either a system,
which is composed entirely of passive components, or a system,
which uses active ones in a very limited way to initiate
subsequent passive operation. IAEA TECDOC classifies (table
I) passive systems in four categories (A, B, C, D).

Following natural thermo-physical phenomenon are adopted in

the design of Innovative Nuclear Reactors to fulfill the safety
functions.

Natural circulation due to thermosyphon phenomenon.

Stored internal energy (gravity or pressurized water
storage, battery, spring force)
Siphon phenomenon (establishment of vacuum)
Natural draft (pressure gradient establishment)

TABLE 1. IAEACATEGORIZATION OF PASSIVE SYSTEMS

Parameter\Category
Input Signal

A
No

No

No

Yes

Functionality of these passive phenomena depends on its usage

in serving the safety functions. The safety function like passive
heat removal by natural circulation may have to fulfill the
function over an integral mission time (the system must reject at
least a mean value of thermal power all along the system
intervention). In this paper reliability analysis of passive decay
heat removal system (PDHRS) of large sized PHWRs has been
discussed.

External Power Sources

Forces
Moving Mechanical Parts

No No Yes Yes

Moving Working Fluid

No

978-1-4244-8343-3/10/$26.00 2010 IEEE

Yes N/A N/A

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2010 r'International Conference on Reliability, Safety & Hazard (ICRESH-201O)

II.

PASSIVE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM

One of the new design features of large sized PHWRs is

inclusion of a passive decay heat removal system (PDHRS).
During normal shutdown, initially the decay heat is removed
from PHTS in steam generators. The steam produced on the
secondary side of the SGs is dumped to condenser or to
atmosphere through atmospheric steam discharge valves
(ASDVs) under overpressure condition. If class-IV power is not
available then the steam from SG can go out only though
ASDVs. This lead to gradual loss, of secondary inventory, which
also signifies partial loss of secondary heat sink.

stlineeam@
Steamor
Generat
PDHR

F""'1+-

-*'"--1

:::calandrla
Moderator
Moderator

Feed water make up to steam generators is by main (on class IV

power supply) or auxiliary (class III) boiler feed water pumps.
Further cool down of PHTS to room temperature is by shutdown
cooling system. Station Blackout (SBO) in Indian Pressurized
Heavy water Reactors (PHWRs) is characterized by
simultaneous failure of class IV and class III power supplies.
Under this condition, Primary Heat Transport (PHT) Primary
Circulating Pump (PCPS) and main boiler feed pumps (BFPs)
which work on Class IV power will trip. Auxiliary boiler feed
pumps (ABFPs) will also be not available due to unavailability
of Class III power supply. The normal heat removal through the
steam generators (SGs) initially, and by shutdown cooling
system later are affected during SBO condition. Crash cool down
is resorted in the 220 & 540 MWe PHWRs during SBO which
lead to depletion of secondary coolant inventory. To avoid this
condition in the future large sized PHWR in case of station
blackout, the available heat sink is the PDHRS. The PDHRs
recirculate the SG inventory in a closed loop through the U-tube
condenser inside PDHRS tanks. In this paper the reliability
analysis of PDHRS that has been carried out is presented. The
primary function of the Passive Decay Heat Removal System
(PDHRS) in the large sized PHWR is to ensure continued
availability and recirculation of the inventory on the secondary
side of the Steam Generators in the event of SBO and in the
process ensure continued removal of decay heat from the core.
This involves thermo-siphoning in PHT system, secondary
system (SG shell side, PDHRS tube side) and heat rejection to
the atmosphere by boiling in PHDR tank (fig 1). The Passive
Decay Heat Removal System considered here comprises four
PDHRS tanks of 121 T capacity each containing horizontal U
tube condenser bundles connected to their respective steam
generators through take-off lines from main steam line and
condensate line joining the steam generator shell just above the
tube sheet.

Pump

I--a-t\"

fIof---

HX

Figure I. Generic PHT, SG & PDHR schematic for the large PHWR modeled.

III. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

A flow chart showing the steps involved in performing the
reliability analysis of passive system is shown in the Fig. 2.

Passive System to be analy<ed

System Operating
Mechanism

+
Setting up of
Failure Criterion

l
Key Parameters that affect
the system operation
Finding out the range of Key
Parameters

Development of Fault Trees

\
y

l
Assigning of distributions
for the key parameters that
takes care of the uncertainty
in the parameters

Generation of sets based on the

distributions of key parameters:
for conducting the experiments

Get the OUlput of each

experiment
Fit the polynomial for the

Generation of Response
surface as

function of key

parameters

OUlput and the key parameters

Estimation of Reliability
based on simulation

Figure 2. Procedure for estimating the passive system reliability

The steps are explained with the system described above in the
following steps.
Step 1: Passive System to Analyze
As a first and foremost step the system to be analyzed for

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20l0:r International Conference on Reliability, Safety & Hazard (ICRESH-201O)

the possible values of that key parameter. A probability density

function can be used to describe the probability distribution of a
continuous random variable. In finding out the distributions for
the key parameters the range of the parameters is identified as a
first step. The ranges for these parameters have been assigned
based on the expected deviations in the values of these
parameters in normal operating conditions. The ranges of the key
parameters that are identified are shown in the Table II. Once the
ranges for key parameters are identified next step is to assign a
proper distribution. Each of these key parameter deviation has
been analyzed for identifying the probability distribution. The
different key parameters ranges and their distributions are shown
in the Table II. The thermal hydraulic part is explained in the next
section.

reliability estimation should be identified. In this paper passive

decay heat removal system has been considered for the passive
system reliability analysis. Here all the three heat transport loops
(PHT, SG, PDHRs) are modeled in a coupled unsteady state
manner to evaluate the effect on the clad surface temperature for
the specified period designated by the failure criteria following a
SBO incident.
Step 2: System Operating Mechanism
The objective of providing PDHRS is to enhance reactor safety
during the station blackout event by ensuring continuance of
thermosyphon cooling of the reactor fuel through steam
generators in the absence of makeup to the Steam Generator
(SG). This can be accomplished by recirculating the steam
through the PDHRS condensers provided along with each of the
SGs. In this process heat is transferred to the water pool outside
the tubes contained in the PDHRS tanks.

TABLE ll. KEY PARAMETERS RANGE AND THEiR DISTRIBlITIONS

S.No.

Step 3: Setting up of Failure Criterion

Since failure of natural circulation in any of the three systems
affects the natural circulation in Primary Heat Transport (PHT)
system during station blackout condition, the failure of natural
circulation in PHT system has been considered as the failure
criterion. This is characterized by increase in clad surface
temperature above 400C. The clad temperature has to remain
below 400C for the specified period (6 hours considered here)
following a SBO. Here for the SBO no makeup in the PDHRs &
the SGs were considered. The failure criterion signifies
reduction in natural circulation flows (in PHT & SGs) for decay
heat removal. In all the cases analyzed the clad surface
temperature goes beyond the failure criteria due to the no
makeup assumptions.

PHT inventory

SG inventory

PDHR Tank Inventory

Decay heat

Non condensable gases in PHT

Non condensable gases in PDHR tube

PIIT Inventory(tons)

PDHR tank level(m)

4
5
6

Decay heat

SGLevel(m)

(%)

Non condensables in PIIT

Non condensable gases in
SG secondary side

(%)

(%)

Range

Distribution

o to -15

Normal

11.4-16.4
2- 3
0-20
0-7.5
0-5

Normal
Normal
Normal
Normal
Normal

The variation in the PHT & SG initial inventories is almost

within the control band. The variation in PDHR inventory is
attibuted to unmonitored PDHR level and leakges. Decay heat
variation of 20% and the percentages of the non-condensibles in
the PHT & SGs is on a conservative side. The RELAP5/mod3.2
handleing of the non-condensibles can be further improved by
modification in the sourcs code.
Iv. GENERIC MODEL

OF A LARGE PRESSURISED REAVY

WATER REACTOR

Step 4: Key Parameters that affect the system operation

More than 20 parameters that affect the system operation of all
the three systems and in effect cause the failure of the system
have been identified. Out of these parameters few key
parameters have been identified based on the sensitivity studies
[1] which will have more impact on the failure of the system and
are listed below.

Key P arameters

1
2

A generic model for the Large Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors

was developed with system code RELAP5/mod3.2. The model
consists of 2 loop model of the Primary Heat Transport (PHT)
systems in a figure of eight configuration with clubbed channel
modeling of the reactor core, inlet and outlet headers, steam
generators, primary circulation pumps, Pressuriser etc. Several
RELAP5 heat structures were used representing the fuel,
pressure tube, steam generator heat structures etc. The majority
of the system components being common to most of the Large
PHWRs, this model could be adopted to Indian 540 & 700 MWe
PHWR as well as for Canadian CANDU 6 with certain
modifications. A typical case for the normal values of all the six
parameters considered is given here.

Step 5: Assigning of probability distributions for the key

parameters.
The probability distribution of a random variable (key
parameter) is a description of the probabilities associated with

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2010 r'International Conference on Reliability, Safety & Hazard (ICRESH-201O)

increasing trend again following depletion of shell side

inventory in the PDHRs (Fig. 6). It comes down to about 43 ton
from 121 ton. At t
47000 seconds, it falls to 11 ton, and
thereafter it remains almost constant as the liquid level in the
PDHRS falls below the tube bundle.
=

117

-1

Statim Blad<rut IfIith PD1R

t
I

112

10

10

100

Prurisrr Isolated on
Low Leve of 1. 7m

lSOOIOOOO(P)
!02010000(p)
122010000 (P)
-_-llOOIOOOO(p)
-- 114010000(P)

--

--

Figure 3. RELAP5 nodalosation for one of PHT loops

------

Single
Junction

\
\
/
I
------""
She11888

06
Pipe Vol
002

Time (5)

05
04
03
02
01

01
02
03
04

Figure 5. PHT system pressure for SBO with no makeup

Pipe Vol
444

05

All the four SGs are connected through the steam lines. Any
PHDR through the steam lines can draw the steam from all the
four SGs, but it sends back condensate only to the SG to which it
is connected on the downstream return line to the SG
downcomer. Though the difference between the four SG
pressures is very small, the SG with maximum SG pressure
sends more steam to the other PDHRs in addition to the PDHR to
which it is directly connected. The return flow to this SG is only
equal to the steam flow which was going to the corresponding
PDHR (directly connected), the steam flow to other PDHRs
sends the condensate to those other SGs. This initiates an
inventory transfer, beyond t 1800 seconds, due to low-driving
forces encountered during natural circulation at low pressure in
the PHTs, SGs, and PDHR, it is observed that the SG level (Fig.
7) in two SGs goes down and the other two SGs, it shows an
increasing trend. Inventory transfer through steam lines is
observed but the total SGs inventory remains constant. Another
initiation cause (for difference in the four SG pressures) is the
difference in the PHT flow through all the four SGs during
natural circulation. The PHT system core exit quality (Fig. 8)
remains low up to 15000 seconds, then it shows lot of oscillation
(also observed in the core flow), it even reaches values up to 50%
and above, up to 30000 seconds, then it comes back to lower
values 2%). In this case, the clad surface temperature response
(Fig. 9) was found to be in the acceptable zone with the
maximum value of 4000C at - 17.5 hr.

06

TDJ

Figure 4. Nodalisation for one of PDHRs

STATION BLACKOUT ANALYSIS

Station blackout was initiated by tripping all the PCPs, PPPs, and
the boiler feed pumps (BFPs) at t 0 second. The reactor trip on
no PCP available signal was delayed by one second. The actual
reactor power reduction was further delayed by one second
considering the delays for rod insertions on conservative side.
Hot shutdown condition was maintained for initial six minutes
with the help of atmospheric steam discharge valves (ASDVs)
mounted on the SG steam lines, after this all the four PDHRs
valves were opened to condense the steam from SGs, that is, at t
361 seconds. Once the PCPs are tripped, the differential
pressure across the headers/channel decreases, and all header
pressures start falling together. Following the reactor trip and the
valving in of the PDHR, the PHT system pressure (Fig. 5) starts
falling (80 bar at t 508 seconds), and the pressuriser level falls
below 1.7 m, which leads to isolation of the Pressuriser. After
this, the PHT system pressure falls rapidly to 8 bar at t 7000
seconds, then it remains around this value approximately up to
27000 seconds. Later on the PHT system pressure shows an
=

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2010 r'International Conference on Reliability, Safety & Hazard (ICRESH-201O)

75 "
,j j j i I I L I I
70 n
Station Blackout with 4 PDH RI
65 "
60 n
-- 1 00001005 (httemp) LOOP1
55 0
-- 600001005 (httemp) LOOP2
2! 50 0
:::lI
-- 112001005 (httemp) LOOP1
'!45 0
-- 612001005 (httemp) LOOP2
O "
E
35 n
"
1pO
I! -
! ,:Iii) ,.... ,,,.
,
025 n
"'E!'
% r;f!
20 n II\ ....'" ..
--.
l'
cll
-10"

15 "
1
1U
H ;S 14 111

-71f.---tlRffi--j

-- 288 (cntrlvar)
188 (cntrlvar)
388 (cntrlvar)
-"i-- 488 (cntrlvar)

jbtffi-- -+

4IHI---+

:rb

TIrre(s)
Figure 6. PDHR inventory following SHO with no makeup

,II

II

!
"

II

Time

(hrs)

II

Figure 9. Clad temperature following SHO with no makeup

V. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT

It has been reported in recent literature that RELAPS/MOD3.2 is

capable of simulating natural circulation phenomena [2-9]. The
control system modeling philosophies were based on DynnaS40
and Dyna220 codes which were developed in house [9-12].
Thermal hydraulic analysis have been carried out by using
RELAPS/MOD3.2 code to generate the failure surface (from
various ranges of identified key parameter values), keeping the
criterion as clad surface temperature exceeding 400C. From the
analysis different failure points have been generated and failure
surface has been developed by using non linear regression
analysis. Polynomial used for fitting the data is given as follows:
Time (hrs)

T=++++++
b 2
2
2
2
2
2
+ 1 + a2x2 + a3x3 + a4x4 + a5x5 + a6x6

Figure 7. SG level following SHO without any makeup.

(1)

The regression coefficients obtained from the analysis has been

shown in the Table III. Once the response surface has been
generated, next step is to apply the simulation methods to
identify the failure probability. In this case Monte Carlo
simulation technique has been used. For the preliminary analysis
the estimated failure probability obtained is 2.302x10-3

602010000 (quale)
--0--100100000 (quale)

1121000oo(quale)
--ot/'- 600100000 (quale)
--0- 612100000 (quale)

Time fhrsl
Figure 8. Core exit quality following SHO with no makeup.

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20l0:r International Conference on Reliability, Safety & Hazard (ICRESH-201O)

TABLE Ill. REGRESSOR COEFFICIENTS OF 1lIE POLYNOMIAL

Coefficient
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
bl
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6

REFERENCES

Value
-5960.3416
-13.953464
842.27824
127.302479
-6.3074330
-46.790452
67.0521461
8.5671719
-28.324671
-64.843651
0.9771568
6.5101249
-8.5379061

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VI. CONCLUSIONS
simulation model which includes all the three heat transport
systems has been used for the assessment of passive reliability of
the reactor for decay heat removal. Sensitivity studies were
carried out to obtain the critical process parameters affecting the
decay heat removal. General methodology for performing
reliability analysis of passive system has been developed. A case
study on Passive decay heat removal system also has been
presented. Based on the thermal hydraulic analysis failure
points have been generated and the failure surface has been
developed. Finally by using the Monte Carlo simulation
technique failure probability has been estimated. The clad
temperature has to remain below 400C for the specified period
(6 hours considered here) following a SBO. In the present study
for the SBO analysis no makeup in the PDHRs & the SGs were
considered. The failure criterion signifies reduction in natural
circulation flows (in PHT & SGs) for decay heat removal. In all
the cases analyzed the clad surface temperature ultimately goes
beyond the failure criteria due to the no-makeup assumptions.
Taking into account the failure criteria of 6 hours with no
makeup assumption the reliability number can be considered as
acceptable with adequate margin.
A

[10] A. J. Gaikwad, Rajesh Kumar, S. F. Vhora, G. Chakraborty and V. Venkat

Raj, "Transient analysis Following Tripping of a Primary Circu1ating
Pump for 500 MWe PHWR Power plant ", IEEE Trans. Nucl Sci., Vol. 50,
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Raj, "Logic Modification to Avoid ECCS Lineup in the PHT System
During Thermal Shrinkage Transients of 220 MWe PHWR Nuclear Power
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[12] A.J. Gaikwad, Rajesh Kumar, S. F. Vhora, G. Chakraborty and V. Venkat
Raj, "Selection of a Steam generator Pressure Control Program for a 500
MWe PHWR Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor Power plant through
Transient Analysis ", Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical
Engineers, Part A: Journal of Power and Energy, Vol. 217, No A6 ISSN
0957-6509,pp.631-642,2003.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors are thankful for shri S. F. Vhora, and shri A. K.

Maurya of NPCIL for suggestions and insights from time to
time.

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