THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND

MYSTICISM IN AVICENNA (IBN SINA.)

THOMAS E. GASKILL

The relationship of Avicenna to Neoplatonism has been the subject of

considerable disagreement and remains largely unresolved. Hypotheses
have ranged from those who have seen Avicenna's work, as much of
Islamicate philosophy, as derivative of Greek and, especially, Neoplatonic thought to a very great degree, 1 through those who have sought to
portray a more complex relationship,2 to those who have denied some or
all Neoplatonic influences on Avicenna's thought. 3 What has emerged
clearly from these debates is the fact that Avicenna was not a slavish interpreter within any tradition and that independent evaluation, assessment
and adaptation of available resources was exceedingly important to
Avicenna. 4 Before we can resolve, then, the relationship of Avicenna to
Neoplatonic traditions, we shall first need to understand Avicenna's own
expressions of his key concerns.
In the hope of contributing to such an understanding, I will examine
here the relationship between reason and mysticism. Reason and
mysticism are not infrequently thought to be incompatible. I will argue,
however, that reason and mysticism can be (in proper circumstances) not
1. See, e.g., Richard Walzer, Greek illto Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962) and Abdurrahman Badawi, I.e transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde arabe (Paris: J. Vrin, 1968). Most clearly within this tradition of
interpretation is Peters, who described Avicenna as 'conservative Neoplatonic'. See F.E.
Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam (New Yark: New York
University Press, 1968).
2. For example, Gutas' Avicenna is primarily Aristotelian, with some inspiration from
the pseudo-Aristotelian Theology (actually Plotinus, Emleads 6-9). See Dimitri Gutas,
Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), e.g. 130-40.
3. For an interesting and provocative examination of the possible limits of the influence
of the Liber de Causis on Islamic thought in general, see Richard Taylor, "The Kaldm PI
Mahd Al-Khair (Liber de Causis) in the Islamic Philosophical Milieu," in Jill Kraye, W.F.
Ryan, and C.B. Schmitt, editors, Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages: The Theology and
Other Texts (London: Warburg Institute, University of London, 1986), 37ff An even
more provocative reading of Avicenna is by Gunter Luling, "Ein anderer Avicenna:
Kritik seiner Autobiographie und ihrer bisherigen Behandlung," Zeitschriji der Deutschen
Morgenliindischen Gesselschaft, supplement 3 (1977), pp. 496-513.
4. An excellent discussion of this is in Gutas (1988), pp. 187-93.

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THOMAS E. GASKILL

only compatible but complementary. I will argue further that Avicenna's

work in logic and ildhiyyat (sometimes, somewhat misleadingly, translated as 'metaphysics') is an exemplar of such complementarity. For
brevity, I will limit my discussion to three key points: the importance of
logic; the proper starting-point of inquiry; and the goal ofinquiry. 5
I. The Importance of Logic

Avicenna furnished an argument concerning the function oflogic which

must, on first examination, seem quite extraordinary to a modern reader:
The science of logic is the science of scales. Other sciences are
[sciences] of profit and loss. The salvation of man is in the purity
of[his] soul, and purity of the soul is bound by the form of Being
within him, and in making haste away from polluted natures. The
path to these two is by knowledge. Any knowledge which is not
[made] firm by logic is not sure. Hence, that is not, in true reality
[bahaqlqat], knowledge. Therefore, there is no remedy but to
teach the science oflogic. 6

If we examine this argument carefully, we find that Avicenna's

conclusion about the role oflogic is that the study oflogic is necessary for
human salvation (or deliverance; rastagdrf).
The initial claim - that the science of logic is the science of scales, by
which we measure the validity of arguments - is unlikely to raise controversy. However, we are immediately thrust into the ultimate issue of
human salvation. Salvation is attained by binding the form of Being
within the soul and by avoiding polluted natures. Sciences other than
logic are sciences of profit and loss, and they are concerned with those
things which have determinate natures - i.e., they are concerned with
those very things away from which we ought to make haste. This leaves
5. Also for purposes of brevity, I limit my discussion to Avicenna's Danishnama-i (AMi
(hereafter referred to as the DN) a text which has the virtue of being compact, direct and
comprehensive, and the composition of which rests squarely within the middle (1027-29
C.E.) of Avicenna's philosophical career. Tracing the threads of Avicenna's project in the
DN through his other works is certainly a project worth pursuing, but it would take us
far afield from the purpose of the present study. The Tehran edition of the DN (in three
volumes, edited by Muhammad Mishkat and Muhammad Mucan, KitabfurUshi-i
Dikhhuda, 1352 A.H.) will be used throughout. Translations are my own, unless
otherwise noted.
6. DN, Mantiq, 10.

THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND MYSTICISM IN AVICENNA

445

the science of logic as the only science which has any hope of fastening
Being within our souls.
This, indeed, must be the case for Avicenna, since the path to the dual
source ofhuman salvation is by knowledge. That which may masquerade
as knowledge but which is not made sure by the tests oflogic is not, in its
true reality, knowledge at all. Hence, in order to attain knowledge, and
thence to attain salvation, in our present condition, "there is no remedy
but to teach the science oflogic."
To at least the following extent, Avicenna was clearly consonant with
Peripatetic traditions: that which is truly knowledge can be only of that
which is universal (kullf), not particular. Although we may say that we
have knowledge of particulars, we have mere opinion and call it
'knowledge' only quite loosely. Toward the end of attaining real
knowledge, Avicenna provided a list of the types of premises and a
7
discussion of which of those are suitable for use in syllogisms. Of
thirteen types of premises, all but five are eliminated altogether. Of the
remaining five (first principle, perceptual, experimental, testimonial, and
implicative premises), only one will be able to provide us with the proper
starting-point of inquiry.
Implicative premises do not contribute to new, positive knowledge,
since they are merely implications of an opponent's argument, for use in
reductio ad absurdum. Testimonial premises are subject to more or less
doubt (depending on the amount of testimony), and hence do not
provide certainty. Perceptual premises are very much like Humean
'constant conjunctions' ("the moon rises and sets"). Even though they
are premises apprehended by the senses, they are not of particulars.
Nevertheless, because their subject-matter is necessarily united to determinate natures, we can only attain knowledge through them by
abstracting from sense-information. Experimental premises, too, begin
with sense-experience, but what we abstract in this case is the cause of the
perceived phenomena.
In the cases of both perceptual and experimental premises, abstraction
from sense-experience is necessary, but Avicenna is not an empiricist.
Sense-experience is filtered through a complex series of faculties, and
much of what we abstract from experience is the form of those faculties,
rather than the reality of the external world. (Geometry, for example, is
the study of the abstract forms which imagination [guman or takhayyu~
imposes on our external experience.) Hence, even when we abstract well
7. DN, Mantiq, 28.

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THOMAS E. GASKILL

THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND MYSTICISM IN AVICENNA

and understand clearly the relations among these abstractions, we are

moving to levels of intentionality which are farther and farther from the
initial experience, and doubt can arise as to whether we are discovering
something about the world, or merely about our experience of the
world.
Hence, in Avicenna's division of the sciences,s the lowest sciences are
considered practical science (Cilm-i camal0, and deal with the generallytrue and with particulars. The higher sciences are considered 'speculative' or 'theoretical' science (Cilm-i nazar0. 9 Within these, the lowest is
'natural' science (Cilm-i tabC0, which is inferior (zMn) because its subjectmatter is necessarily united with determinate natures. Syntax and mathematics are higher than 'natural' science, since they consider that which
can be understood abstractly by the imagination. Perceptual and experimental premises cannot rise above these lower two 'speculative' sciences.
The highest of the 'speculative' sciences, though, is 'first' or 'prior' or
'upper' science (Cilm-i bann).

in the investigation of the subject, and the principles are the means for
investigation of the problems.
The subject-matter of philosophy, however, is not a particular
(juz'0 thing; rather, it is absolute being (hast-i mutlaq), and thus
first philosophy is absolute. Its problems result from those conditions whose being arises out of itself and has essence, as was
discussed under the doctrine of demonstration (burhan). The
"whichness" (kuddm-t) of these states is determined by those
states (hal-ha) in which being an existent (maujuC) and having
being are not due to (qiba0 quantity nor to movement (haraka).
All in all, the subject-matter (mauduC) of this one science .. .is
different from the subject-matter of the other two sciences since
its subject-matter is that aspect of being which is being-quabeing. 12
So far, this may not seem significantly different from Aristotle's project in
the Metaphysics. Indeed, Avicenna argues in the name of the 'first teacher' ,
Aristotle. The key difference - and one which will lead Avicenna directly
into mysticism - is that this absolute science, because it is the science of
hastf-i mutlaq (not ousia) , must begin with the one remaining kind of
premise which we have yet to consider: first principle premises.

There is, then, a science that investigates the nature of entities

which are not in a constant state of dependency (niyzmand) on
matter and movement. Thus, it is possible that there is (buwad)
among the subjects one kind that is never united (paiwand) with
matter, such as intelligence and truth (Caql wa haqq) , as shall be
known. There are entities which may be mixed (dzimish) with
matter and movement, but their nature is not necessarily related
to matter and movement. An example of these subjects is causality
(Cillat0 which can be either in a body or be a property of an intelligence. That science having such a subject matter is first
'l
h y. 10
P h 10S0P

II. The Proper Starting-Point of Inquiry

The proper starting-point of inquiry in ildhiyyat is that which is most
general: Being-as-such (wujud 13 or hast0. The science of logic has
provided us with the principles for our inquiry, and the first two sections
of ildhiyyat have clarified the relative roles of the sundry sciences. At the
beginning of the third section of ildhiyyat, we are ready to begin the
inquiry proper which will lead to our salvation. The first premise of that
inquiry is as follows: "Being (hast0 is recognized (bashinasad) by reason
itself (khirad khwud) without the aid of definition (hadd) or description

This science will avoid the difficulties inherent in the study of that which
is 'related to matter and movement'.
Every science must, according to Avicenna, have a proper subject,
essence and principles. 11 The essence is that set of problems which arise
8. DN, Ildhiyyat, 1.
9. I have not found an adequate English equivalent for cilm-i nazar!. Nazar (Arabic, 'to
see') is used uniformly by the translators for theoria in the Arabic translations of Aristotle's
Aletaphysics. Hence, cilm-i fUlzar! is equivalent to the Aristotelian he theoretike episteme. See
Soheil Afnan, Philosophical TennirlOlogy ill Arabic and PerSial1, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964),65.
10. DN, Ildhiyyat, 2, Morewedge's translation (The "Metaphysica" ofAvicerma, translated
by Parviz Morewedge [New York: Columbia University Press, 1973]), 12-13.
11. DN, Mantiq, 30-32.

(rasm)."14
A few moments of reflection, though, show this to be quite a peculiar
premise. It cannot be categorical, since Being" ... has no definition, it has

I
I

I
~

12. DN, Ildhiyyat, 2, Morewedge's translation, 13-14.

13. For an extensive discussion of wufud, see Fadlou Shehadi, Metaphysics in Islamic
Philosophy (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1982).
14. DN, Ildhiyyat, 3, Morewedge's translation, 15.

!I

I'

Iii
II

i'

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THOMAS E. GASKILL

THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND MYSTICISM IN AVICENNA

neither genus (fins) nor species (fasD because nothing is more general
(Cammtar) than it." Furthermore, 'Being' cannot be a denotative term of
any sort, since "Being does not have a description since nothing is better
known (macruj) than it."IS The 'recognition' ofBeing must, therefore, be
of a different kind than one would find in other premises. 16
Since nothing is more macruf (known or celebrated), there can be no
marks or differentia ofBeing. Hence, Avicenna continued,

exist (i.e., that we partICipate in Being), we have a primary, preconceptual understanding of Being which can only be indicated by
language.
This is not, I should add, a primary understanding of substance, but
rather is of Being as such. Avicenna argued vociferously against the more
traditionally peripatetic philosophers of Baghdad who began inquiry
with substance (fauhar, ousia).2o

It is possible that one can recognize its name in one language by

means of another language. Thus, by some means it is possible to
acquaint someone with what is meant by a term like being. For
example, if being appears in Arabic, it can be explained in Persian,
and one can indicate (ishdrat) that it is that from which all other

. d . 17
t h mgs
are d enve

Those whose observations are not subtle believe that the word
'Being' applies to (lit.: falls above) the ten [categories] by homonymous naming, such that all ten [categories] have one name, and
the meaning of that name is not univocal [yak]o This is not
correct, because if such were [the case], [then] our discourse
about substance and its being would be such that [we would say]
"substance exists," and the meaning of the being of substance
would not be other than the meaning of substance. In the same
way, ifbeing were applied to quality, the meaning would not be
other than quality. Hence, if someone were to say, "a quality
exists," that would be the same as saying, "a quality, a quality."
And that would be like saying, "a substance exists," which would
be like saying, "a substance, a substance." It would not be correct
that every thing either exists or does not exist, because 'being'
would not have one meaning but would have ten meanings.
'Non-being' also would not have one meaning but would have
ten meanings. Hence, the division [i.e., between being and nonbeing] would not be into two - but this reasoning would not itself
have any meaning. All the wise know that every time we say that
a substance exists and an accident exists, we know one meaning
by 'being'. Likewise, there is one meaning of 'non-being'.
Indeed, when being is applied to a particular, in that instance
'being' is of every other thing, just as the substance of a particular
is the substance of every other thing. 21

Being cannot be captured in language by definition, which must fence in

a tenn by that which is more general, nor does it have identifYing marks.
We reach it by ishdrat, by indication. Certainly 'Being' is a single
expression, but it cannot be an individual expression, because Being is
not an individual, and it cannot be a universal single expression, because
there is not more than one 'thing' called 'Being' to which it might apply,
nor could there possibly be. 18 The name ofBeing is only an indication of
Being. From this apeiron which can only be indicated, everything is
derived. 19
This first premise, the starting-point of inquiry is indicative of that
which must already be understood. It is, thus, a first principle premise,
i.e., it brings to light that which already (one might even wax Heideggerian and say 'always already') understood. By the mere fact that we
] 5. Ibid.
16. That recognition is bashinasad, which is derived from a collection of verbs for 'make
known', from shanakhtan (to know, to be acquainted with as with a friend, to discern) by
way of its causative, shinasanidan (to make known, to tell about), and it stands in marked
contrast to the danish complex which will be used for, e.g., Necessary Existence's
knowledge/wisdom. Khirad is wisdom, reasoning or reflection generally and does not
presume a special faculty, e.g., caql.
]7. Ibid.
18. For a discussion of the kinds of expressions, see Shams C. Inati, "Ibn Sina on Single
Expressions," in Michael MarnlUra, ed., Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor
ofCeorge F. Hourani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 148-59.
19. Avicenna was not unaware of the crisis which indicative language of Being creates
for the principles oflogic. In the Mantiq of the Kitab al-Isharat wa'l- Tanbihat (his last major
philosophical work, written circa 1035 C.E.), he expanded his list of quantifiers to include
the 'absolute' quantifier, which is neither individual nor universal, and which has only
one possible application.

449

'Being', then, is not substance (or the being of a being), but is Being
considered absolutely (Being haplos or simpliciter). It is what is meant by
the verb 'to be' absolutely, not when applied to a specific thing, and that
is something which can only be indicated. 22 For the moment, though, let

f
20. See his "Letter to Kiya" translated in Gutas, op. cit., 60.
21. DN, Ilahiyyat, 11.

450

THOMAS

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US leave the problem of indication aside, for we shall have to return to it

after a consideration of the structure of that inquiry which is to lead to
our salvation.
The inquiry into Being as such can be divided into four parts, ofwhich
h
h ere. 23 F'Irst24IS t h e ,umversa
.
lsCIence,
'
, w h'IC h
we sh aII conSI'der tree
considers universality and particularity, potentiality and actuality,
necessity and contingency, cause and effect, ground and consequent, and
other 'things' (chzlhaD "which may be mixed (azimish) with matter and
movement, but their nature is not necessarily related to matter and
movement. ,,25 In each of these, we find that there must be a First (awwaD
in a series. There must, for example, be a first in the series of causes and,
since Avicenna prioritizes the Aristotelian four causes, that First Cause
must be the final (not efficient) cause of all things. There must be a
Necessary Being which provides the grounding of the existence of all
contingent beings. There must be that which is fully actual in which the
potential may participate, and so on.
The conclusion of each section of the 'universal science' leads us to a
First. The second part 26 of the inquiry, then, demonstrates the existence
of that First, which must be, according to Avicenna, Necessary Existence
(wajib al-wujud). An orderly inquiry into Being-as-such thus leads us in an
orderly and necessary way to contemplation of Necessary Existence
(wajib al-wujud) or Pure Being (hast-i mahz). In this second part, we are
presented with arguments, for example, that there can be only one
Necessary Existence, that Its essence can only be Being, that all things
must emanate (in some way) from It, and so forth.
But can we give any content to what we mean by 'Necessary
Existence'? In the third part of the inquiry,27 Avicenna explored what are
traditionally considered to be the 'attributes of God'. He resisted
strongly, though, the common urge to anthropomorphize the Divine. As
he argued in another venue,
22. The ontological poverty of English makes this point an especially difficult one to
communicate, since Being is indicated and a being is denoted by the same English word.
There is no such confusion in Arabic and Persian, though, in which Being is wujud or
hastl and a being isjauhar (substance) or maujud (the existent).
23. The fourth section (DN, Ildhiyyat 38-57) considers some problems about the causal
agency of Necessary Existence and is propadeutic to Tabfiyyat.
24. DN, Ildhiyyat, 3-18.
25. DN, lldhiyyat, 2, supra.
26. DN, Ildhiyyat, 29-37.
27. Ibid.

THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND MYSTICISM IN AVICENNA

451

As for religious law, one principle is to be admitted, viz. that

religions and religious laws, promulgated through a prophet, aim
at addressing the masses as a whole. Now, it is obvious that the
deeper truths concerning the real Unity (of God), viz. that there is
one Maker (of the Universe) who is exalted above quantity,
quality, place, time, position and change, which leads to the belief
that God is one without anyone to share His species, nor is he
made of parts - quantitative or conceptual - that neither is He
transcendent nor immanent, nor can He be pointed to as being
anywhere - it is obvious that these deeper truths cannot be
communicated to the multitude. 28
Rather than anthropomorphize the Divine attributes, Avicenna
reduced all of them to the (teleologically) complete(d) wisdom (danish-i
tamam) of Necessary Existence. That wisdom, though, is not like our
wisdom, and yet orderly inquiry beginning with the proper startingpoint leads us to that wisdom and, as we shall see, its role in our salvation.

III. The Goal of Inquiry

When we reach the reduction of the Divine Attributes (and, hence, of
what there is) to the wisdom of Necessary Existence, we reach the limits
of language and of logic, and we actualize ourselves only through pure
contemplation of Necessary Existence. In 37 of the IZahiyyat of the
Danishnama, Avicenna directly addressed the means of that actualization:
"The Most Delightful Happiness and the Greatest Bliss and Felicity Are
in Union (paiwand) with Necessary Existence, although Most People
Imagine that Other Things Are More Pleasant."
First, we must know what pleasure and pain are. We say that:
whatever is not perceptible is neither pleasure nor pain. Hence, it
must first be perceptible. Our perceptions are of two kinds: first is
that belonging to the external senses, and, second, that which is
imaginative (wahmD or intelligible (CaqlD, which is internal to us ....
The prudent consider the pleasures of the internal faculties to be
superior, while the small-souled and vile people and the ignoble
regard superficial pleasures as superior. ...He is of base inclination
whose inner faculties within him are dead, and he does not have
28. Risalat al-adhawiyya, translated in Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1958) 43-44.

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knowledge of the acts of his inner faculties, like children whose

inner faculties are not yet completely actual. 29
Hence, our greatest pleasure will require the actualization (i.e., bringing
into being) of our internal faculties.
This must be so, because the pleasure derived from contemplation of
an object will be of the same kind as the object. We are to flee from
things with mixed natures, as Avicenna proposed at the beginning of the
Mantiq, because their pleasures bind us to the transitory and unsatisfactory, whereas contemplation of Being itself fully actualizes our
internal faculties:
That thing is more pleasant which produces and possesses less
deficiency and less inclination toward evil. That thing is more
painful which produces and possesses more deficiency and inclination toward evil because there is vileness in the thing. Hence,
how can there be a comparison made between the fonn which is
perceived by the senses to be sweet, or between other ideas which
resemble sweetness in sense perception because they are in
perception vile things, and the fonn which is from Necessary
Existence in intellect (CaqD, which is the most excellent fonn and
which actualizes our faculty of intellect?
However, if we consider the faculty, rather than its object, then
the faculty of sensation is vile and weak, as will become evident
[later in this section], for it shares in a vile existence and it arises
from a corporeal organ. Whenever there is a powerful perception
of pleasure in it, [the faculty] is diminished. For example, illumination is pleasant to sight, and darkness is unpleasant [to it]' and
yet a powerful light blinds it. In summary, strong sensations
destroy the faculties of sensation, and powerful intelligibles
improve the intellect and make it more powerful. The intellectual
(Caq10 faculties subsist in themselves and are not susceptible to
change, as will be demonstrated. Their being is near the being of
Necessary Existence, as shall also be demonstrated [see TabfCiyyat
43 and 48-50]. Hence, the faculty of sensation is not related to
the intellectual faculty.30

29. DN, Ilahiyyat, 37.

30. Ibid.

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THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND MYSTICISM IN AVICENNA

453

Ifwe are concerned with the salvation of the soul, then we wish to avoid
that which is transitory and attain that which is unchangeable. When we
actualize the internal faculties, we actualize that which is 'not susceptible
to change'.
In order to do so, we must actualize that which receives that which is
not susceptible to rectilinear motion or to generation and corruption:
Furthermore, intellectual perception and sense perception are
different in several aspects ... .Intellect perceives the thing without
a veil (or disjoined; mujarrad) as it is, or it does not perceive it in
any manner at all. Sense perception perceives vile and changeable
accidents, and intellect perceives unchanging substances and
attributes (sifatha0 and that thing from which goodness and order
(nizdm) and happiness all arise. Hence, of what kind is the state
(haD of happiness in which intellect is found when it receives the
First Truth (haqq awwaD, that from which all beauty and order and
splendor proceed, and how can such happiness be compared to
the pleasures of the senses?31
Supposing that Avicenna is correct here, we would certainly want to
receive that First Truth, which is accomplished through contemplation
of Necessary Existence or Pure Being. But, then, how is it that so many
of us are so often led astray from this ultimate bliss?
... [W]e may also be inattentive to perceiving the pleasures of the
intelligibles (maCquldt), for example, when we are distracted from
them and the faculty of intellect is weakened from the first action
and completely, when we are embodied and are accustomed to
and familiar with sensible things. It is often the case that pleasant
things are unpleasant for these causes, and it is often the case that
one has awareness neither of pleasure nor of unpleasantness, such
as someone whose body has become numb, who does not know
pleasure or unpleasantness when it is received, and when the
numbness dissipates, one is able to perceive painful things which
have happened, such as a burn or a wound. And it is often the
case that a faculty has in it a thing either bad or pleasant , and it
does not perceive it because of a disease. For example, in the
disease which the physicians call boulimia, the entire body is
starving and [yet] hunger becomes diminished, but the stomach is
unaware, because of this sickness, that it is ill from weakness or
from moisture. When the cause of the illness is removed, misery
arises from the lack of food.
31. Ibid.

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The state (han of our soul (ncifs) in this world is just the same, for it
is in a state of hunger. In one in whom there is not the perfect
intelligible, there is misery [see TabfCiyyat 43]. One possesses
perfection who possesses happiness or to whose very self it is
bound. However, when one is embodied, one is distracted from
[true] happiness and pain, and when one is separated [from the
body], one perceives them. 32

Reason, then, does not contradict the demands of mysticism. Rather,

the hold of the sensibles over us is so strong that we can only break free of
that hold through the operation of reason. Logic begins with the unicity
of Being, and it returns us to that unicity, in a firm and orderly manner.
Itsjob is not to provide us with propositional answers about the nature of
the Divine, but rather is to turn us toward contemplation of the Divine
and way from the realm of mixed natures. Thus, logic is the science
which leads to the salvation of the soul, because only logic will turn us
from the sensible realm toward Pure Being.

Weare now in a position to understand the complementarity of reason

and mysticism for Avicenna. We have a primary understanding of Being
in us. That primary understanding is present in two aspects (ruy).
Following Aristotle, Avicenna argues that the principle of non-contradiction is a manner of understanding Being-as-such. 33 The rest oflogic is
derivable from the principle of non-contradiction. Proper use of logic,
though, turns us toward the proper starting-point ofinquiry, which must
be that which is primary. Considered under this aspect, the primary
understanding ofBeing is that which is best known to us.
By following the demands of logical inquiry into Being-as-such, we
are led inevitably to the need for a first in every series, and this leads us
inevitably to demonstration of the existence of Necessary Existence and
thence to contemplation of Necessary Existence (or, Pure Being). But
this leads us to an understanding that all of the 'attributes' of Necessary
Existence are reduced to the wisdom of Necessary Existence. The
wisdom ofNecessary Existence, though, is an atemporal, unified wisdom
in which we can participate only by actualizing our internal faculty
which receives the light ofBeing. 34
This wisdom, then, is not propositional knowledge. We have arrived
at this understanding, furthermore, through logical argument which
began with a first-principle premise which also was not propositional
knowledge. Our inevitable arrival at the unicity of the wisdom of
Necessary Existence, a unicity participation in which actualizes our
unchangeable internal faculty, is one ofprovenance from a non-propositional Truth in an orderly manner by means of logic to a return to that
same Truth. The union which we seek is essentially a mystical one, but
we arrive at it only through the operation of reason (motivated by the
primary understanding of Being within us) which serves to distract us
from our attention and attachment to the merely sensible.

32. Ihid.
33. See DN, Manfiq, 2.

Thus, Necessary Existence is the most magnificent knower of the

most magnificent in knowledge, which is Itself, the most
complete, eternal knowledge, having the greatest splendor and
grandeur and station (manzilat). Hence, the state (han of highest
happiness is the state It is in Itself, for It has no need of anything
external to give It perfection and grandeur. Those beings which,
34. See DN, Ilahiyyaf, 32: "But in what way can it [Necessary Existence's knowledge]
be? It can be in such a manner that it is universal (jeullD, not particular. What kind of
universal is it? It is in the following manner, for example. An astronomer knows that a
certain star is at rest here, later it goes there, and after so many hours will be in
conjunction with a certain star, and at some time later, for example, will be in eclipse,
and for some hours will remain in eclipse, and later will reappear. [He knows] how [all
this] is without knowledge (danish) of the present moment, for that [temporal] knowledge
does not remain the same in him, and another knowledge will [come to] be, from the
time that he knows (which is how it is now) to another time, and [such temporal
knowledge] can be changeable. If that [knowledge] is in the manner of universal
knowledge, it is always one knowledge, [that]: after a certain place [the star] is at [another]
place, and after that movement will be that [other] movement. Before that movement
and during that movement and after that movement, the knowledge film) is one and is
not subject to change, so that whether [the movement is] in the future or in the present
or in the past, [the knowledge] is entirely perfect, that a certain star after its conjunction
with [another] star for some hours would be in conjunction with [yet another] star. This
[knowledge] is true (rast) if [the conjunction] is in the past and it is true if [the
conjunction] is in the future and it is true if the conjunction is in the present.
But, if one says that the star is in conjunction with a certain star right now, tomorrow
it will be in conjunction with another star, when tomorrow arrives, [so] it cannot be that
he says that very thing [tomorrow] and that it is true. [It is] exactly so in knowledge
(danish) so that it is known that, if right now it is in conjunction and tomorrow it will be
in conjunction with another, [and] if tomorrow the very same knowledge [as today] is
known [it will bel false.
Thus, the difference is clear between knowledge of things which is changeable and
particular [and] completely temporal, and the completely universal. Necessary Existence
knows all things completely universally, so that everything, small and great, does not
escape from Its knowledge (Cilm), as has become clear from our discussion."

I
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456

THOMAS

E. GASKILL

in the first creation, were found complete, and which are pure
intellect (CaqI mahz), and which are not like US, having no need of
external things, and are not attached to lower things, are occupied
with their own perfection, which is intelligible to them, and in
that which they contemplate of the perfection and splendor of
Necessary Existence, which illuminates them in the mirror of
their substance. Their ultimate happiness and delight is the
happiness in which they are in contemplation of Necessary
Existence, in addition to the happiness which they have in the
perception of their own perfection. They are occupied with the
highest happiness and delight, because, eternally, they do not turn
from the highest to the lower aspect [of what is]. Their whole
selves (khwudi khwish) are consecrated to the contemplation of
grandeur, that is, the regal presence, and to receiving the greatest
happiness.

THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND MYSTICISM IN AVICENNA

457

happiness, complete in Its own self (banafi khwisht). Perhaps such a

state should not be called happiness, but there is no word among
known words which better conveys this meaning. 35
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, USA

There is no sadness for them, for the cause of our sadness is

another diversion, either an instrument (aIat) of pain or an evil
instrument. In summary, there must be matter which is receptive
to change, and moreover sadness does not occur without a cause,
and whatever is subject to a cause which it receives is mutable.
Fortunate is the man who seeks that state for his own life (jan),
when it becomes separated from the body, in which he finds
happiness. If he seeks to acquire the opposite state, he has, rather
than happiness, pain, although he has, at present, no idea of the
form of that pain, as when one has not experienced the pain of a
burn from a fire, but knows of it by hearsay. How well has spoken
the leader of the wise, and the guide and teacher of the philosophers, Aristotle, on this matter, i.e., that happiness which
Necessary Existence has in Itself, and all things issue from It. He
said:
If the First of all things perpetually has from Itself the same
amount of happiness which we receive from It, at any given time
when we contemplate It and meditate upon Its grandeur and
present to ourselves a truth (haqqD which speaks of It, there is a
great magnificence within It. This amount which our understanding conceives and which our state (ha0 necessitates is not at
all comparable to that which It has in Itself, which is more
magnificent and wonderful. Still more, the First Being is
35. DN, Ildhiyyat, 37.

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

DE WULF-MANSION CENTRE

Series I

THE PERENNIAL TRADITION

XXIV

OF NEOPLATONISM

edited by

]OHN]. CLEARY

The De Wulf-Mansion Centre deals with research in Ancient and Medieval

Philosophy at the Philosophy lnstitute of the Catholic University of Louvain
(K.U. Leuven), 2, Kardinaal Mercierplein, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium).

Leuven
University Press
1997

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface

.. __

vii

John J. Cleary

Introduction

_. _

.ix

John J. Cleary
CHAPTER

NEOPLATONIC THEOLOGY

Dieu est-il tout-puissant? Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Origene Ie chretien,

P~tin . . . . . . . . . . _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. 3
Jean Pepin

b
r ! "-'"'1
-t"

v,

_ .. 1

Theology in Otigen and Plotinus

Padraig O'Cleirigh

_. . . . . . . . . . . 19

Porphyry and Pagan Religious Practice

Andrew Smith
~

.",

CHAPTER

29

PLATO AND PLOTINUS

37

_ .. _

Immortal and Necessary Being in Plato and in Plotinus . __

Denis O'Brien

39

L' exegese Plotinienne des MEn;;TA TENH du Sophiste de Platon . . . . . . 105

Maria Isabel Santa Cruz

Plotinus Meets the Third Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

David P. Hunt
CHAPTER

1997 Universitaire Pers Leuven/Leuven University Press/Presses Universitaires de

Louvain, Blijde-Inkomststraat 5 - B 3000 Leuven/Louvain, Belgium

133

Individual Consciousness in Neoplatonism

Gerard Verbeke

135

Introspection, Self-Reflexivity, and the Essence of Thinking

according to Plotinus .. _
__
Lloyd P. Gerson
CHAPTER

Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd en/of openbaar gemaakt
door middel van druk, fotokopie, microfilm of op welke andere wijze ook
zander voorafgaande schrifteIijke toestemming van de uitgever.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint,
microfilm or any other means without written permission from the publisher.
ISBN 90 6186 847 5
D/1997/1869/62

PLOTINIAN Nous

_. 153

PLOTINIAN MYSTICISM

Mysticism and Individuality: A Plotinian Paradox __

Gabriela Roxana Carone
The Mystical Journeys of Plotinus and Gregory of Nyssa
Deirdre Carabine

175
_.. _ 177
_. _. _. 188

Vl

VB

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER

PLOTINIAN EUDAIMONISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

ARABIC AND JEWISH NEOPLATONISM

Plotinus and Aristotle on the Good Life . . . . . . . . ,

Frederic M. Schroeder

Divine and Human Knowledge in the Plotiniana Arabica

Cristina D' Ancona

Plotinus and the Alienation of the Soul

Gary Gurtler, SJ.

207

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

10
417
. 419

The Complementarity of Reason and Mysticism in Avicenna (Ibn Sina)

Thomas E. Gaskill

443

Maimonides and Neo-Platonism

Kenneth Seeskin

458

THE NEOPLATONIC SCHOOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

The Circle Simile in the Platonic Curriculum of Albinus

Burkhard Reis

237

THE RENAISSANCE OF NEOPLATONISM

The Psychology of Plotinus and Later Platonism

Henry J. Blumenthal

269

CHAPTER 6

CHAPTER 7

CHAPTER

11

Francis Bacon's Instauratio and Renaissance Neoplatonism

Stephen A. McKnight

. 471
. 486

LATE NEOPLATONIC EPISTEMOLOGY

291

Neoplatonism and the Origin of the Older Modern Philosophy

James A. Doull

Breathing Thought: Proclus on the Innate Knowledge of the Soul

Carlos Steel

293

CHAPTER

The School of Ammonius on Logoi in The Human Intellect

Elias Tempelis

310

CHAPTER

LATE ACADEMIC NEOPLATONISM

329

On Proclus' Comparison of Aristotelian and Parmenidean Logic

Dino Buzzetti

331

Aristotle's Fourteenth Aporia and the Three Dimensions

in Later Neoplatonism
Frans AJ. de Haas
Damascius on Procession and Return
John Dillon

347
369

CHAPTER 9
PATRISTIC AND MEDIEVAL NEOPLATONISM

381

Does Augustinian Memoria depend on Plotinus?

James McEvoy

383

The Mysticism of Number in the Medieval Period before Eriugena ..... 397
Thomas O'Loughlin

469

12

MODERN NEOPLATONISTS

517

Emerson's Mystical Empiricism

Russell B. Goodman

519

The Christian Platonism of A.H. Armstrong and Synesius of Cyrene .. , 536

Jay Bregman
Index locorum
551
Index of authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Index of subjects
570