SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) V.

ATIENZA
G.R. No. 156052

February 13, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and

BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila, Respondent.
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS
SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Movants-Intervenors.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Movant-Intervenor.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
After we promulgated our decision in this case on March 7, 2007, Chevron
Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (collectively, the oil companies) and the Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy (DOE), filed their
respective motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the decision.
Chevron[1] is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of
petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the
business of manufacturing, refining and likewise importing, distributing and
marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines. [2] The DOE is a governmental
agency created under Republic Act (RA) No. 7638 [3] and tasked to prepare,
integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and
activities of the government relative to energy exploration, development,
utilization, distribution and conservation. [4]
The facts are restated briefly as follows:
Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon, in an original petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the
City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on November 20, 2001, [5] approved by
respondent Mayor on November 28, 2001, [6] and became effective on December
28, 2001 after publication.[7] Sections 1 and 3 thereof state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of

[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the
southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the
southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta.
Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and
F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial
I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the
operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are
hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of
this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity
of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the socalled Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) [8] with the oil companies.
They agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most
viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97.[9] In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the
MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. [10]
Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 [11]
extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the
mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the oil companies. [12]
This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of
our March 7, 2007 decision. We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty
under the Local Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city,[13] including Ordinance No. 8027. We also
held that we need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by
respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the
Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions
which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave
it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. We concluded that there was
nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the oil companies and DOE
sought to intervene and filed motions for reconsideration in intervention on
March 12, 2007 and March 21, 2007 respectively. On April 11, 2007, we
conducted the oral arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners, respondent and
movants-intervenors oil companies and DOE.
The oil companies called our attention to the fact that on April 25, 2003,
Chevron had filed a complaint against respondent and the City of Manila in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, for the annulment of Ordinance
No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction.[14] The case was docketed as civil case no. 03106377. On the same day, Shell filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
likewise assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 and with application for
writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.
[15]
This was docketed as civil case no. 03-106380. Later on, these two cases
were consolidated and the RTC of Manila, Branch 39 issued an order dated May
19, 2003 granting the applications for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction:
WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a total bond of TWO MILLION (Php
2,000,000.00) PESOS, let a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction be
issued ordering [respondent] and the City of Manila, their officers,
agents, representatives, successors, and any other persons assisting or
acting in their behalf, during the pendency of the case, to REFRAIN from
taking steps to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, and let a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] to issue [Chevron
and Shell] the necessary Business Permits to operate at the Pandacan
Terminal.[16]
Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also
attacking the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). This was
docketed as civil case no. 03-106379. In an order dated August 4, 2004, the RTC
enjoined the parties to maintain the status quo.[17]
Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also
known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of
2006.[18] This was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. [19]
Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila,
Branch 20, asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119. [20] This was
docketed as civil case no. 06-115334. Petron filed its own complaint on the same
causes of action in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41. [21] This was docketed as civil

case no. 07-116700.[22] The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron, enjoining the
City of Manila and respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8119. [23]
Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint motion to
withdraw complaint and counterclaim on February 20, 2007. [24] In an order dated
April 23, 2007, the joint motion was granted and all the claims and
counterclaims of the parties were withdrawn.[25]
Given these additional pieces of information, the following were submitted as
issues for our resolution:
1.
2.

3.

whether movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene in this

case;[26]
whether the following are impediments to the execution of our March 7,
2007 decision:
(a) Ordinance No. 8119, the enactment and existence of which were not
previously brought by the parties to the attention of the Court and
(b) writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction and status quo order issued by the RTC of Manila,
Branches 39 and 42 and
whether the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will unduly encroach
upon the DOEs powers and functions involving energy resources.

During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to this Courts power to rule on
the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027 despite the pendency of
consolidated cases involving this issue in the RTC. [27] The importance of settling
this controversy as fully and as expeditiously as possible was emphasized,
considering its impact on public interest. Thus, we will also dispose of this issue
here. The parties were after all given ample opportunity to present and argue
their respective positions. By so doing, we will do away with the delays
concomitant with litigation and completely adjudicate an issue which will most
likely reach us anyway as the final arbiter of all legal disputes.
Before we resolve these issues, a brief review of the history of the Pandacan
Terminals is called for to put our discussion in the proper context.
HISTORY OF THE PANDACAN OIL TERMINALS
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the banks
of the Pasig river. At the turn of the twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially
designated as the industrial center of Manila. The area, then largely uninhabited,
was ideal for various emerging industries as the nearby river facilitated the
transportation of goods and products. In the 1920s, it was classified as an
industrial zone.[28] Among its early industrial settlers were the oil companies.
Shell established its installation there on January 30, 1914. [29] Caltex (now

Chevron) followed suit in 1917 when the company began marketing its products
in the country.[30] In 1922, it built a warehouse depot which was later converted
into a key distribution terminal.[31] The corporate presence in the Philippines of
Esso (Petrons predecessor) became more keenly felt when it won a concession
to build and operate a refinery in Bataan in 1957. [32] It then went on to operate a
state-of-the-art lube oil blending plant in the Pandacan Terminals where it
manufactures lubes and greases.[33]
On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the
Philippine Islands. Although Manila was declared an open city, the Americans
had no interest in welcoming the Japanese. In fact, in their zealous attempt to
fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the
Pandacan Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to
deprive the advancing Japanese Army of a valuable logistics weapon. [34] The U.S.
Army burned unused petroleum, causing a frightening conflagration. Historian
Nick Joaquin recounted the events as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all army
fuel storage dumps were set on fire. The flames spread, enveloping the
City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze, endangering bridges and
all riverside buildings. For one week longer, the open city blazeda
cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of fire by night. [35]
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its
network of depots and service stations inoperative. [36]
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as Manila
rebuilt itself. The three major oil companies resumed the operation of their
depots.[37] But the district was no longer a sparsely populated industrial zone; it
had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community. Today, Pandacan has
become a densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people, majority of
whom are urban poor who call it home.[38] Aside from numerous industrial
installations, there are also small businesses, churches, restaurants, schools,
daycare centers and residences situated there.[39] Malacaang Palace, the official
residence of the President of the Philippines and the seat of governmental
power, is just two kilometers away. [40] There is a private school near the Petron
depot. Along the walls of the Shell facility are shanties of informal settlers. [41]
More than 15,000 students are enrolled in elementary and high schools situated
near these facilities.[42] A university with a student population of about 25,000 is
located directly across the depot on the banks of the Pasig river. [43]
The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies distribution
terminals and depot facilities. [44] The refineries of Chevron and Shell in Tabangao
and Bauan, both in Batangas, respectively, are connected to the Pandacan

Terminals through a 114-kilometer [45] underground pipeline system. [46] Petrons

refinery in Limay, Bataan, on the other hand, also services the depot. [47] The
terminals store fuel and other petroleum products and supply 95% of the fuel
requirements of Metro Manila,[48] 50% of Luzons consumption and 35%
nationwide.[49] Fuel can also be transported through barges along the Pasig river
or tank trucks via the South Luzon Expressway.
We now discuss the first issue: whether movants-intervenors should be allowed
to intervene in this case.
INTERVENTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES AND THE DOE SHOULD BE
ALLOWED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. [50] The
pertinent rules are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in
the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
SEC. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on
the original parties.
Thus, the following are the requisites for intervention of a non-party:
(1) Legal interest
(a) in the matter in controversy; or
(b) in the success of either of the parties; or
(c) I against both parties; or
(d) person is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof;
(2) Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights
of original parties;
(3) Intervenors rights may not be fully protected in a separate
proceeding[51] and

(4) The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.
For both the oil companies and DOE, the last requirement is definitely absent. As
a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of judgment as Section 2, Rule
19 expressly provides. Both filed their separate motions after our decision was
promulgated. In Republic of the Philippines v. Gingoyon,[52] a recently decided
case which was also an original action filed in this Court, we declared that the
appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention was before and not after
resolution of the case.[53]
The Court, however, has recognized exceptions to Section 2, Rule 19 in the
interest of substantial justice:
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to
make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice.
It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims
overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. [54]
The oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this case because the
implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will directly affect their business and
property rights.[55]
[T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between
other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not
parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would
become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable. And
this would be against the policy of the law. The words an interest in the
subject means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one
that would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged
in the complaint without the establishment of which plaintiff could not
recover.[56]
We agree that the oil companies have a direct and immediate interest in the
implementation of Ordinance No. 8027. Their claim is that they will need to
spend billions of pesos if they are compelled to relocate their oil depots out of
Manila. Considering that they admitted knowing about this case from the time of
its filing on December 4, 2002, they should have intervened long before our
March 7, 2007 decision to protect their interests. But they did not. [57] Neither did
they offer any worthy explanation to justify their late intervention.
Be that as it may, although their motion for intervention was not filed on time,
we will allow it because they raised and presented novel issues and arguments

that were not considered by the Court in its March 7, 2007 decision. After all, the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court before which the case is pending. [58] Considering the
compelling reasons favoring intervention, we do not think that this will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of the original parties. In fact, it will
be expedited since their intervention will enable us to rule on the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 instead of waiting for the RTCs decision.
The DOE, on the other hand, alleges that its interest in this case is also direct
and immediate as Ordinance No. 8027 encroaches upon its exclusive and
national authority over matters affecting the oil industry. It seeks to intervene in
order to represent the interests of the members of the public who stand to suffer
if the Pandacan Terminals operations are discontinued. We will tackle the issue
of the alleged encroachment into DOEs domain later on. Suffice it to say at this
point that, for the purpose of hearing all sides and considering the
transcendental importance of this case, we will also allow DOEs intervention.
THE INJUNCTIVE WRITS ARE NOT IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ENFORCEMENT
OF ORDINANCE NO. 8027
Under Rule 65, Section 3[59] of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may
be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station. According to the oil companies,
respondent did not unlawfully fail or neglect to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
because he was lawfully prevented from doing so by virtue of the injunctive writs
and status quo order issued by the RTC of Manila, Branches 39 and 42.
First, we note that while Chevron and Shell still have in their favor the writs of
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction, the status quo
order in favor of Petron is no longer in effect since the court granted the joint
motion of the parties to withdraw the complaint and counterclaim. [60]
Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about these injunctive
writs. Respondent (who was also impleaded as a party in the RTC cases) defends
himself by saying that he informed the court of the pendency of the civil cases
and that a TRO was issued by the RTC in the consolidated cases filed by Chevron
and Shell. It is true that had the oil companies only intervened much earlier, the
Court would not have been left in the dark about these facts. Nevertheless,
respondent should have updated the Court, by way of manifestation, on such a
relevant matter.
In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a TRO. Under
Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the RTC is effective
only for a period of 20 days. This is why, in our March 7, 2007 decision, we

presumed with certainty that this had already lapsed. [61] Respondent also
mentioned the grant of injunctive writs in his rejoinder which the Court,
however, expunged for being a prohibited pleading. The parties and their
counsels were clearly remiss in their duties to this Court.
In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by
the parties.[62] Courts, as well as magistrates presiding over them are not
omniscient. They can only act on the facts and issues presented before them in
appropriate pleadings. They may not even substitute their own personal
knowledge for evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those
expressly provided as subjects of mandatory judicial notice.
We now proceed to the issue of whether the injunctive writs are legal
impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a)

That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;

(b)

That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or

acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or

(c)

That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is

attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

There are two requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) the right
to be protected exists prima facie and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are
violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be
prevented will cause an irreparable injustice.
The act sought to be restrained here was the enforcement of Ordinance No.
8027. It is a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity
and, as such, cannot be restrained by injunction. [63] Nevertheless, when the

validity of the ordinance is assailed, the courts are not precluded from issuing an
injunctive writ against its enforcement. However, we have declared that the
issuance of said writ is proper only when:
... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of
the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of a
clear legal right to the remedy sought....[64] (Emphasis supplied)
Judge Reynaldo G. Ros, in his order dated May 19, 2003, stated his basis for
issuing the injunctive writs:
The Court, in resolving whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction should be issued, is guided by the
following requirements: (1) a clear legal right of the complainant; (2) a
violation of that right; and (3) a permanent and urgent necessity for the
Writ to prevent serious damage. The Court believes that these requisites
are present in these cases.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff/petitioners have been legitimately
operating their business in the Pandacan Terminal for many years and
they have made substantial capital investment therein. Every year they
were issued Business Permits by the City of Manila. Its operations have
not been declared illegal or contrary to law or morals. In fact, because of
its vital importance to the national economy, it was included in the
Investment Priorities Plan as mandated under the Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1988 (R.A. 8479). As a lawful business, the
plaintiff/petitioners have a right, therefore, to continue their operation in
the Pandacan Terminal and the right to protect their investments. This is
a clear and unmistakable right of the plaintiff/petitioners.
The enactment, therefore, of City Ordinance No. 8027 passed by the City
Council of Manila reclassifying the area where the Pandacan Terminal is
located from Industrial II to Commercial I and requiring the
plaintiff/petitioners to cease and desist from the operation of their
business has certainly violated the rights of the plaintiff/petitioners to
continue their legitimate business in the Pandacan Terminal and
deprived them of their huge investments they put up therein. Thus,
before the Court, therefore, determines whether the Ordinance in
question is valid or not, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and a Writ of
Mandatory Injunction be issued to prevent serious and irreparable
damage to plaintiff/petitioners.[65]
Nowhere in the judges discussion can we see that, in addition to a
showing of a clear legal right of Chevron and Shell to the remedy

sought, he was convinced that they had made out a case of

unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the
presumption of validity of the ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are
presumed valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in clear and
unequivocal terms.[66] The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement
enjoined.[67] The presumption is all in favor of validity. The reason for this is
obvious:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar
with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts
and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action.
The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the
people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under
the guise of police regulation.[68]
Xxx
...[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary[,] in the determination of
actual cases and controversies[,] must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.[69]
The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself. [70] We
see no reason to set aside the presumption. The ordinance, on its face, does not
at all appear to be unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject area from
industrial to commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the power of municipal
corporations:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into
industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized in almost all
jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police power itself and is
exercised for the protection and benefit of their inhabitants. [71]
Xxx
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its
territory into residential and industrial zones, and to prescribe that
offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be
established exclusively in the latter zone.

Xxx

xxx

xxx

Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the authority,
derived from the police power, of forbidding the appellant to continue
the manufacture of toyo in the zone where it is now situated, which has
been declared residential....[72]
Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is
unconstitutional. There is no such showing here. Therefore, the injunctive writs
issued in the Manila RTCs May 19, 2003 order had no leg to stand on.
We are aware that the issuance of these injunctive writs is not being assailed as
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. However, we are confronted with the
question of whether these writs issued by a lower court are impediments to the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 (which is the subject of the mandamus
petition). As already discussed, we rule in the negative.
ORDINANCE NO. 8027 WAS NOT SUPERSEDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 8119
The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of
Ordinance No. 8119 entitled An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the
Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto which was approved by
respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that the Court was never
informed about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress,
the rule with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included
in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.[73]
Although, Section 50 of RA 409[74] provides that:
SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall
take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang
Panglungsod].
This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of
Manila, should have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own,
relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court about it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of
municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances
that are not before it and to which it does not have access. The party asking the
court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of
the rules the party desires it to have notice of. [75] Counsel should take the

initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even
where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local ordinances. [76]
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local
ordinance is to remove any discretion a court might have in determining
whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute does not direct the
court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must
make the ordinance available to the court for it to take notice. [77]
In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 because he believed that it was different from
Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not inconsistent with each other. [78]
In the same way that we deem the intervenors late intervention in this case
unjustified, we find the failure of respondent, who was an original party here,
inexcusable.
THE RULE ON JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE AGAINST
RESPONDENT
The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No.
8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where
Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in
their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that the
issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of
[Ordinance No. 8119].[79] They contend that such admission worked as an
estoppel against the respondent.
Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was
recognizing the validity and legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had
conceded the issue of said ordinances constitutionality, opting instead to
question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119. [80] The oil companies deny this and
further argue that respondent, in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334 (where
Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119),
expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance No. 8027: [81]
... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord
with the reclassification were given six months to cease [their]
operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced
Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for
in Ordinance No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for an even
longer term, that is[,] seven years;[82] (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made

by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. (Emphasis supplied)
While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently
take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, [83] the
aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the statements
regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are
not the same as this case before us. [84] To constitute a judicial admission, the
admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered.
Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did
not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies
which should be considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance
No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its
(8119s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust
any attempt at clever positioning under one or the other on the basis of what
appears advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or
contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute[85] or ordinance.
Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.
ORDINANCE NO. 8119 DID NOT IMPLIEDLY REPEAL ORDINANCE NO. 8027
Both the oil companies and DOE argue that Ordinance No. 8119 repealed
Ordinance No. 8027. They assert that although there was no express repeal [86] of
Ordinance No. 8027, Ordinance No. 8119 impliedly repealed it.
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8119 reclassified the area
covering the Pandacan Terminals to High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone
(R-3/MXD)[87] whereas Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the same area from
Industrial II to Commercial I:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of
[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the
southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the
southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta.
Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and
F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial
I. (Emphasis supplied)

1.

all uses allowed in all zones where it is located

2.

the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones are
located shall, in all instances be complied with

3.

the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be [superseded] by the

development controls and regulations specified for each PUD as
provided for each PUD as provided for by the masterplan of
respective PUDs.[88] (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Ordinance No. 8119 provides for a phase-out of seven years:

SEC. 72. Existing Non-Conforming Uses and Buildings. - The lawful use of
any building, structure or land at the time of the adoption of this
Ordinance may be continued, although such use does not conform with
the provision of the Ordinance, provided:
xxx
2

xxx

xxx

In case the non-conforming use is an industrial use:

xxx

xxx

xxx

d. The land use classified as non-conforming shall

program the phase-out and relocation of the nonconforming use within seven (7) years from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)
This is opposed to Ordinance No. 8027 which compels affected entities to vacate
the area within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance:
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the
operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are
hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of
this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8119 also designated the Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned
Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD):
SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (OPUD). O-PUD Zones are identified specific sites in the City of Manila
wherein the project site is comprehensively planned as an entity via
unitary site plan which permits flexibility in planning/ design, building
siting, complementarily of building types and land uses, usable open
spaces and the preservation of significant natural land features,
pursuant to regulations specified for each particular PUD. Enumerated
below are identified PUD:
xxx
xxx
xxx
6.

Pandacan Oil Depot Area

xxx
xxx

Enumerated below are the allowable uses:

xxx

Respondent claims that in passing Ordinance No. 8119, the Sanggunian did not
intend to repeal Ordinance No. 8027 but meant instead to carry over 8027s
provisions to 8119 for the purpose of making Ordinance No. 8027 applicable to
the oil companies even after the passage of Ordinance No. 8119. [89] He quotes
an excerpt from the minutes of the July 27, 2004 session of the Sanggunian
during the first reading of Ordinance No. 8119:
Member GARCIA: Your Honor, iyong patungkol po roon sa oil depot doon
sa amin sa Sixth District sa Pandacan, wala pong nakalagay eith sa
ordinansa rito na taliwas o kakaiba roon sa ordinansang ipinasa noong
nakaraang Konseho, iyong Ordinance No. 8027. So kung ano po ang
nandirito sa ordinansa na ipinasa ninyo last time, iyon lang po ang ni-lift
eithe at inilagay eith. At eith eith ordinansang iyong naipasa ng huling
Konseho, niri-classify [ninyo] from Industrial II to Commercial C-1 ang
area ng Pandacan kung nasaan ang oil depot. So ini-lift lang po [eithe]
iyong definition, density, at saka po yon pong ng noong ordinansa
ninyo na siya eith naming inilagay eith, iniba lang po naming iyong title.
So wala po kaming binago na taliwas o nailagay na taliwas doon
sa ordinansang ipinasa ninyo, ni-lift lang po [eithe] from
Ordinance No. 8027.[90] (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with respondent.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date
clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect.[91]
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the
two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the latter
act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
[92]
The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and
is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. [93] The
oil companies argue that the situation here falls under the first category.

Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of
the legislators is manifest.[94] As statutes and ordinances are presumed to be
passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on
the subject, it follows that, in passing a law, the legislature did not intend to
interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter. [95] If
the intent to repeal is not clear, the later act should be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the earlier act. [96]
These standards are deeply enshrined in our jurisprudence. We disagree that, in
enacting Ordinance No. 8119, there was any indication of the legislative purpose
to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. [97] The excerpt quoted above is proof that there
was never such an intent. While it is true that both ordinances relate to the same
subject matter, i.e. classification of the land use of the area where Pandacan oil
depot is located, if there is no intent to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort
at reasonable construction must be made to reconcile the ordinances so that
both can be given effect:
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter
as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied
repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative
or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest
indication of legislative purpose to repeal.[98]
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict
between the two ordinances. There is no conflict between the two ordinances.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the Pandacan area from Industrial II to
Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, in Section 23, designated it as a Planned
Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). In its Annex C which defined the zone
boundaries,[99] the Pandacan area was shown to be within the High Density
Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD). These zone classifications in Ordinance
No. 8119 are not inconsistent with the reclassification of the Pandacan area from
Industrial to Commercial in Ordinance No. 8027. The O-PUD classification
merely made Pandacan a project site ... comprehensively planned as an entity
via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in planning/design, building siting,
complementarity of building types and land uses, usable open spaces and the
preservation of significant natural land features.... [100] Its classification as R3/MXD means that it should be used primarily for high-rise housing/dwelling
purposes and limited complementary/supplementary trade, services and
business activities.[101] There is no conflict since both ordinances actually have a
common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial (Ordinance
No. 8119).

Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent

general law does not repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it
clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the latter general act to
modify or repeal the earlier special law. Generalia specialibus non derogant (a
general law does not nullify a specific or special law). [102] This is so even if the
provisions of the general law are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was
set forth in the special act.[103] The special act and the general law must stand
together, one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the law of
general application.[104] The special law must be taken as intended to constitute
an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or provision. [105]
The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special
character, considers and makes special provisions for the particular
circumstances dealt with by the special law. This being so, the
legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to
those of the special law and without making any mention of its intention
to amend or modify such special law, cannot be deemed to have
intended an amendment, repeal or modification of the latter. [106]
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law [107] since it deals specifically with a certain
area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No.
8119 can be considered a general law[108] as it covers the entire city of Manila.
The oil companies assert that even if Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law, the
existence of an all-encompassing repealing clause in Ordinance No. 8119
evinces an intent on the part of the Sanggunian to repeal the earlier ordinance:
Sec. 84. Repealing Clause. All ordinances, rules, regulations in conflict
with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed; PROVIDED,
That the rights that are vested upon the effectivity of this Ordinance
shall not be impaired.
They cited Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City v. Department of Agrarian
Reform:[109]
The presence of such general repealing clause in a later statute clearly
indicates the legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the
subject matter, whether the prior law is a general law or a special law...
Without such a clause, a later general law will ordinarily not repeal a
prior special law on the same subject. But with such clause contained in
the subsequent general law, the prior special law will be deemed
repealed, as the clause is a clear legislative intent to bring about that
result.[110]

This ruling in not applicable here. The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119
cannot be taken to indicate the legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent
laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No. 8027, a special enactment,
since the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in the
Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the provisions of
Ordinance No. 8027.
To summarize, the conflict between the two ordinances is more apparent than
real. The two ordinances can be reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is applicable to
the area particularly described therein whereas Ordinance No. 8119 is applicable
to the entire City of Manila.

Having ruled that there is no impediment to the enforcement of Ordinance No.

8027, we now proceed to make a definitive ruling on its constitutionality and
validity.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid,
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.
[115]

MANDAMUS LIES TO
ORDINANCE NO. 8027

COMPEL

RESPONDENT

MAYOR

TO

ENFORCE

The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against respondent in
consideration of the separation of powers of the executive and judiciary. [111] This
argument is misplaced. Indeed,
[the] Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the
legislative [or executive departments] of the government in the
legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere ministerial acts
required by law to be performed by some officer thereof. [112] (Emphasis
Supplied)
since this is the function of a writ of mandamus, which is the power to compel
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from office, trust or station.[113]
They also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
compel respondent to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which was to seek relief from
the President of the Philippines through the Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the Presidents power of
supervision over local government units. Again, we disagree. A party need not
go first to the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of an ordinance. This
suggested process would be unreasonably long, tedious and consequently
injurious to the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its constituents
whose welfare is sought to be protected. Besides, petitioners resort to an
original action for mandamus before this Court is undeniably allowed by the
Constitution.[114]
ORDINANCE NO. 8027 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID

THE CITY OF MANILA HAS THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCE NO. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the
exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the
legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. [116]
This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the
welfare of the people is the supreme law). [117] While police power rests primarily
with the national legislature, such power may be delegated. [118] Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police
power to local governments:[119]
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council.
Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general welfare of the
city:

10

Section. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The

sangguniang panglungsod, as the legislative branch of the city, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code xxxx
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila:
Section 18. Legislative powers. The [City Council] shall have the
following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this chapter xxxx[120]
Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to reclassify land within the
jurisdiction of the city.[121]
THE ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCE NO. 8027 IS A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE
OF POLICE POWER
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.[122]
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare [123] of the residents
of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the
area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and
Urban Development of the City of Manila which recommended the approval of
the ordinance:

(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)

the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and
highly volatile products which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum
gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacaang Palace
and
in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread
to the neighboring communities.[124]

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of
all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. [125] The depot is
perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which
means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their
midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to
remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. According to respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which
showed that what was perceived to be impossible to happen, to the
most powerful country in the world at that, is actually possible. The
destruction of property and the loss of thousands of lives on that fateful
day became the impetus for a public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11
tragedy, the threats of terrorism continued [such] that it became
imperative for governments to take measures to combat their effects. [126]
Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what
the interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests. [127] Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the best position
to determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. [128]
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare.[129] However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect
public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the
end in view.[130]
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning
ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial
to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal
legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given
political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of
needs.[131] As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of

11

the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. The
power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is
derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and
benefit of the residents of a locality. [132] Consequently, the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be
unjust:
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its
territory into residential and industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and
unwholesome trades and occupations are to be established exclusively in the
latter zone.
The benefits to be derived by cities adopting such regulations (zoning)
may be summarized as follows: They attract a desirable and assure a
permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and attachment to the city;
they promote happiness and contentment; they stabilize the use and
value of property and promote the peace, [tranquility], and good order
of the city. We do not hesitate to say that the attainment of these
objects affords a legitimate field for the exercise of the police power. He
who owns property in such a district is not deprived of its use by such
regulations. He may use it for the purposes to which the section in which
it is located is dedicated. That he shall not be permitted to use it to the
desecration of the community constitutes no unreasonable or permanent
hardship and results in no unjust burden.
Xxx xxx xxx
The 14th Amendment protects the citizen in his right to engage in any
lawful business, but it does not prevent legislation intended to regulate
useful occupations which, because of their nature or location, may prove
injurious or offensive to the public.[133]
We entertain no doubt that Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure
because there is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method.
ORDINANCE NO. 8027 IS NOT UNFAIR, OPPRESSIVE OR CONFISCATORY
WHICH AMOUNTS TO TAKING WITHOUT COMPENSATION
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive as
it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits them from conducting
operations in the City of Manila. Respondent counters that this is not accurate
since the ordinance merely prohibits the oil companies from operating their
businesses in the Pandacan area.

Indeed, the ordinance expressly delineated in its title and in Section 1 what it
pertained to. Therefore, the oil companies contention is not supported by the
text of the ordinance. Respondent succinctly stated that:
The oil companies are not forbidden to do business in the City of Manila.
They may still very well do so, except that their oil storage facilities are
no longer allowed in the Pandacan area. Certainly, there are other places
in the City of Manila where they can conduct this specific kind of
business. Ordinance No. 8027 did not render the oil companies illegal.
The assailed ordinance affects the oil companies business only in so far
as the Pandacan area is concerned.[134]
The oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate
zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the
businesses and industries in the zones it established:
As to the contention that the power to regulate does not include the
power to prohibit, it will be seen that the ordinance copied above does
not prohibit the installation of motor engines within the municipality of
Cabanatuan but only within the zone therein fixed. If the municipal
council of Cabanatuan is authorized to establish said zone, it is also
authorized to provide what kind of engines may be installed therein. In
banning the installation in said zone of all engines not excepted in the
ordinance, the municipal council of Cabanatuan did no more than
regulate their installation by means of zonification.[135]
The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they
have invested billions of pesos in the depot. [136] Its forced closure will result in
huge losses in income and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities.
Their contention has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a
limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare which
involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only when the
states power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is
appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under
the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a
noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. [137] The
restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a
taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which
interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the
needs of the owner, but also a social function insofar as it has to provide for the
needs of the other members of society.[138] The principle is this:

12

Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the right of the community. Rights of property,
like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as
the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in
them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.[139]
In the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or
interest therein, hence there is no compensable taking. [140] In this case, the
properties of the oil companies and other businesses situated in the affected
area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be applied to
other profitable uses permitted in the commercial zone.
ORDINANCE NO. 8027 IS NOT PARTIAL AND DISCRIMINATORY
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against
and singled out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area
is congested with buildings and residences that do not comply with the National
Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code. [141]
This issue should not detain us for long. An ordinance based on reasonable
classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection
of the law.[142] The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1)
it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) it must
apply equally to all members of the same class. [143]
The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided
there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
[144]
Here, there is a reasonable classification. We reiterate that what the
ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a
terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value
terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas
would be nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in the
depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment of the
ordinance which provides for the cessation of the operations of these terminals
removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the purpose of the
ordinance. The classification is not limited to the conditions existing when the
ordinance was enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is
applicable to all businesses and industries in the area it delineated.

ORDINANCE NO. 8027 IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RA 7638 AND RA

8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is
unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992) [145] and RA
8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998). [146] They argue that
through RA 7638, the national legislature declared it a policy of the state to
ensure a continuous, adequate, and economic supply of energy [147] and created
the DOE to implement this policy. Thus, under Section 5 I, DOE is empowered to
establish and administer programs for the exploration, transportation,
marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of
energy resources. Considering that the petroleum products contained in the
Pandacan Terminals are major and critical energy resources, they conclude that
their administration, storage, distribution and transport are of national interest
and fall under DOEs primary and exclusive jurisdiction. [148]
They further assert that the terminals are necessary for the delivery of
immediate and adequate supply of oil to its recipients in the most economical
way.[149] Local legislation such as Ordinance No. 8027 (which effectively calls for
the removal of these terminals) allegedly frustrates the state policy of ensuring
a continuous, adequate, and economic supply of energy expressed in RA 7638, a
national law.[150] Likewise, the ordinance thwarts the determination of the DOE
that the terminals operations should be merely scaled down and not
discontinued.[151] They insist that this should not be allowed considering that it
has a nationwide economic impact and affects public interest transcending the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila.[152]
According to them, the DOEs supervision over the oil industry under RA 7638
was subsequently underscored by RA 8479, particularly in Section 7 thereof:
SECTION 7. Promotion of Fair Trade Practices. The Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) and DOE shall take all measures to promote fair
trade and prevent cartelization, monopolies, combinations in restraint of
trade, and any unfair competition in the Industry as defined in Article
186 of the Revised Penal Code, and Articles 168 and 169 of Republic Act
No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Rights Law.
The DOE shall continue to encourage certain practices in the
Industry which serve the public interest and are intended to
achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply
of petroleum products, and enhance environmental protection. These
practices may include borrow-and-loan agreements, rationalized depot
and manufacturing operations, hospitality agreements, joint tanker and
pipeline utilization, and joint actions on oil spill control and fire
prevention. (Emphasis supplied)

13

Respondent counters that DOEs regulatory power does not preclude LGUs from
exercising their police power.[153]
Indeed, ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by
Congress. The rationale for this was clearly explained in Magtajas vs. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc.:[154]
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents
of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest
that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from
which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by
mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life,
without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it
may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single
act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a
wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation
on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They
are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without
meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress
retains control of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power
to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still
includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn
by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still
the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it.[155]

The question now is whether Ordinance No. 8027 contravenes RA 7638 and RA
8479. It does not.
Under Section 5 I of RA 7638, DOE was given the power to establish and
administer programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution,
utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources. On the
other hand, under Section 7 of RA 8749, the DOE shall continue to encourage
certain practices in the Industry which serve the public interest and are intended
to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum
products. Nothing in these statutes prohibits the City of Manila from enacting
ordinances in the exercise of its police power.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under
the Constitution. In Article II, Section 25 thereof, the people expressly adopted
the following policy:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing
and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by
Congress to ensure the autonomy of local governments as mandated by the
Constitution:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy
of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities,
and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the
National Government to the local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not see how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped
the City of Manila of its power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police
power and to reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction. To guide us, we shall
make a brief survey of our decisions where the police power measure of the LGU
clashed with national laws.
In Tan v. Perea,[156] the Court ruled that Ordinance No. 7 enacted by the
municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu allowing the operation of three cockpits was
invalid for violating PD 449 (or the Cockfighting Law of 1974) which permitted
only one cockpit per municipality.

14

In Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [157] the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Batangas City enacted Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas CATV, Inc. a permit
to operate a cable television (CATV) system in Batangas City. The Court held that
the LGU did not have the authority to grant franchises to operate a CATV system
because it was the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) that had the
power under EO Nos. 205 and 436 to regulate CATV operations. EO 205
mandated the NTC to grant certificates of authority to CATV operators while EO
436 vested on the NTC the power to regulate and supervise the CATV industry.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,[158] we held that Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna could not be used as justification to
prohibit lotto in the municipality of San Pedro, Laguna because lotto was duly
authorized by RA 1169, as amended by BP 42. This law granted a franchise to
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and allowed it to operate lotteries.
In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,[159] the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City passed Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos in the city. We ruled that these ordinances were void for
contravening PD 1869 or the charter of the Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation which had the power to operate casinos.
The common dominator of all of these cases is that the national laws were
clearly and expressly in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The
inconsistencies were so patent that there was no room for doubt. This is not the
case here.
The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to establish and administer
programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization,
conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources and to encourage
certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest and are
intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of
petroleum products. These powers can be exercised without emasculating the
LGUs of the powers granted them. When these ambiguous powers are pitted
against the unequivocal power of the LGU to enact police power and zoning
ordinances for the general welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in
favor of the latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the
Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be resolved in favor of
the City of Manila:

government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of

the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(c)
IThe general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for
the people in the community xxxx
The least we can do to ensure genuine and meaningful local autonomy is not to
force an interpretation that negates powers explicitly granted to local
governments. To rule against the power of LGUs to reclassify areas within their
jurisdiction will subvert the principle of local autonomy guaranteed by the
Constitution.[160] As we have noted in earlier decisions, our national officials
should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but
should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are
based.[161]
THE DOE CANNOT EXERCISE THE POWER OF CONTROL OVER LGUS
Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is that Section 4 of
Article X of the Constitution confines the Presidents power over LGUs to one of
general supervision:
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Xxxx
Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the
power of control over them.[162] Control and supervision are distinguished as
follows:
[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
[163]

SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions

of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall
be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local

Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight
over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such
body.[164] It does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate. [165]

15

Here, what the DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local
officials, a power that not even its principal, the President, has. This is because:
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in
the President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials
are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control
of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from
office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In
contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people.
Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are
directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the
Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same
token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power
given them by the Constitution and the law.[166]
Thus, the President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot
interfere with the activities of local governments, so long as they act within the
scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own
discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In
local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. [167]
ORDINANCE NO. 8027 IS NOT INVALID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
RA 7924 AND EO 72
The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are required to be
submitted to the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for review
and if found to be in compliance with its metropolitan physical framework plan
and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924:[168]
SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. Metro-wide services under
the jurisdiction of the MMDA are those services which have metrowide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be
provided by the individual [LGUs] comprising Metropolitan Manila. These
services shall include:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(e) Urban renewal, zoning, and land use planning, and shelter
services which include the formulation, adoption and implementation of
policies, standards, rules and regulations, programs and projects to
rationalize and optimize urban land use and provide direction to urban
growth and expansion, the rehabilitation and development of slum and

blighted areas, the development of shelter and housing facilities and the
provision of necessary social services thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Reference was also made to Section 15 of its implementing rules:
Section 15. Linkages with HUDCC, HLURB, NHA, LGUs and Other National
Government Agencies Concerned on Urban Renewal, Zoning and Land
Use Planning and Shelter Services. Within the context of the National
Housing and Urban Development Framework, and pursuant to the
national standards, guidelines and regulations formulated by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] on land use planning
and zoning, the [MMDA] shall prepare a metropolitan physical framework
plan and regulations which shall complement and translate the socioeconomic development plan for Metro Manila into physical or spatial
terms, and provide the basis for the preparation, review, integration and
implementation of local land use plans and zoning, ordinance of cities
and municipalities in the area.
Said framework plan and regulations shall contain, among others,
planning and zoning policies and procedures that shall be observed by
local government units in the preparation of their own plans and
ordinances pursuant to Section 447 and 458 of RA 7160, as well as the
identification of sites and projects that are considered to be of national
or metropolitan significance.
Cities and municipalities shall prepare their respective land use
plans and zoning ordinances and submit the same for review
and integration by the [MMDA] and indorsement to HLURB in
accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and other pertinent
laws.
In the preparation of a Metropolitan Manila physical framework plan and
regulations, the [MMDA] shall coordinate with the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council, HLURB, the National Housing
Authority, Intramuros Administration, and all other agencies of the
national government which are concerned with land use and zoning,
urban renewal and shelter services. (Emphasis supplied)
They also claim that EO 72 [169] provides that zoning ordinances of cities and
municipalities of Metro Manila are subject to review by the HLURB to ensure
compliance with national standards and guidelines. They cite Section 1,
paragraphs I, (e), (f) and (g):
SECTION 1. Plan formulation or updating.
xxx
xxx

xxx

16

(c) Cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall continue to

formulate or update their respective comprehensive land use plans,
in accordance with the land use planning and zoning standards and
guidelines prescribed by the HLURB pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1990, and
other pertinent national policies.
Xxx
xxx
xxx
(e) Pursuant to LOI 729, S. of 1978, EO 648, S. of 1981, and RA 7279, the
comprehensive land use plans of provinces, highly urbanized cities
and independent component cities shall be reviewed and ratified by the
HLURB to ensure compliance with national standards and guidelines.
(f) Pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1999, the comprehensive land use plans
of cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall be reviewed by
the HLURB to ensure compliance with national standards and guidelines.
(g) Said review shall be completed within three (3) months upon receipt
thereof otherwise, the same shall be deemed consistent with law, and,
therefore, valid. (Emphasis supplied)
They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this review
process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed.
RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use plans and zoning
ordinances of cities and municipalities. This was only found in its implementing
rules which made a reference to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to comprehensive
land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a CLUP nor
intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific ordinance which reclassified the
land use of a defined area in order to prevent the massive effects of a possible
terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly formulated as the
Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. CLUPs are the ordinances which
should be submitted to the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan physical
framework plan and approved by the HLURB to ensure that they conform with
national guidelines and policies.
Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB ratification are
necessary, the oil companies did not present any evidence to show that these
were not complied with. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor
of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence
of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed. The
burden of proof is on the oil companies which already had notice that this Court

was inclined to dispose of all the issues in this case. Yet aside from their bare
assertion, they did not present any certification from the MMDA or the HLURB
nor did they append these to their pleadings. Clearly, they failed to rebut the
presumption of validity of Ordinance No. 8027.[170]
CONCLUSION
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege
that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on
the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys
precedence over the right to property.[171] The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police power
clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail. [172]
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its
enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the inhabitants of the
City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for
the relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own
destiny and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the
intervenors warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of economic disorder if
the ordinance is enforced.
Secondary to the legal reasons supporting the immediate implementation of
Ordinance No. 8027 are the policy considerations which drove Manilas
government to come up with such a measure:
... [The] oil companies still were not able to allay the apprehensions of
the city regarding the security threat in the area in general. No specific
action plan or security measures were presented that would prevent a
possible large-scale terrorist or malicious attack especially an attack
aimed at Malacaang. The measures that were installed were more
directed towards their internal security and did not include the
prevention of an external attack even on a bilateral level of cooperation
between these companies and the police and military.
Xxx

xxx

xxx

It is not enough for the city government to be told by these oil

companies that they have the most sophisticated fire-fighting
equipments and have invested millions of pesos for these equipments.
The city government wants to be assured that its residents are safe at
any time from these installations, and in the three public hearings and in
their position papers, not one statement has been said that indeed the

17

absolute safety of the residents from the hazards posed by these

installations is assured.[173]
We are also putting an end to the oil companies determination to prolong their
stay in Pandacan despite the objections of Manilas residents. As early as
October 2001, the oil companies signed a MOA with the DOE obliging
themselves to:
... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ... [which] shall
include the preparation of a Master Plan, whose aim is to determine the
scope and timing of the feasible location of the Pandacan oil terminals
and all associated facilities and infrastructure including government
support essential for the relocation such as the necessary transportation
infrastructure, land and right of way acquisition, resettlement of
displaced residents and environmental and social acceptability which
shall be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public. [174]
Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in the
Pandacan Terminals, they cannot feign unreadiness considering that they had
years to prepare for this eventuality.
Just the same, this Court is not about to provoke a crisis by ordering the
immediate relocation of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site. The
enforcement of a decision of this Court, specially one with far-reaching
consequences, should always be within the bounds of reason, in accordance with
a comprehensive and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame that
complies with the letter and spirit of our resolution. To this end, the oil
companies have no choice but to obey the law.
A WARNING TO PETITIONERS COUNSEL
We draw the attention of the parties to a matter of grave concern to the legal
profession.
Petitioners and their counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara, submitted a four-page
memorandum that clearly contained either substance nor research. It is
absolutely insulting to this Court.
We have always tended towards judicial leniency, temperance and compassion
to those who suffer from a wrong perception of what the majesty of the law
means. But for a member of the bar, an officer of the court, to file in this Court a
memorandum of such unacceptable quality is an entirely different matter.
It is indicative less of a personal shortcoming or contempt of this Court and more
of a lawyers sorry descent from a high sense of duty and responsibility. As a

member of the bar and as an officer of the court, a lawyer ought to be keenly
aware that the chief safeguard of the body politic is respect for the law and its
magistrates.
There is nothing more effective than the written word by which counsel can
persuade this Court of the righteousness of his cause. For if truth were selfevident, a memorandum would be completely unnecessary and superfluous.
The inability of counsel to prepare a memorandum worthy of this Courts
consideration is an ejemplo malo to the legal profession as it betrays no genuine
interest in the cause he claims to espouse. Or did counsel think he can earn his
moment of glory without the hard work and dedication called for by his petition?
A Final Word
On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing 2,000 liters of
gasoline and 14,000 liters of diesel exploded in the middle of the street a short
distance from the exit gate of the Pandacan Terminals, causing death, extensive
damage and a frightening conflagration in the vicinity of the incident. Need we
say anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated 162 to 211 million
liters[175] of petroleum products in the terminal complex which blow up?
WHEREFORE, the motions for leave to intervene of Chevron Philippines Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy, are hereby
GRANTED. Their respective motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED.
The Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39 is ORDERED to DISMISS the
consolidated cases of Civil Case No. 03-106377 and Civil Case No. 03-106380.
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and other
parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to oversee the relocation
and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.
To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of assets and
personnel, the intervenors Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall, within a non-extendible period of
ninety (90) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, the
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule which have allegedly been
prepared. The presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor the strict
enforcement of this resolution.
Atty. Samson Alcantara is hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days from
notice why he should not be disciplined for his refusal, or inability, to file a
memorandum worthy of the consideration of this Court.

18

Treble costs against petitioners counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Leonardo-De Castro,
JJ., concur.

19

LAYNESA V. SPS. UY
G.R. No. 149553

February 29, 2008

NICOLAS LAYNESA AND SANTOS LAYNESA, PETITIONERS,

VS.
PAQUITO AND PACITA UY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
In 1938, Robert Morley was the owner of a four (4)-hectare parcel of land in
Barrio Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur. Petitioner Santos Laynesa was his tenant
over two and a half (2 ) hectares of the land. In 1947, Morley sold the 4 has.
to Sixto Cuba, Sr. He maintained Santos as the tenant over the 2 -hectare
portion while instituting petitioner Nicolas Laynesa, son of Santos, as his tenant
over the remainder of the property. On May 20, 1974, Original Certificate of Title
No. 1660 on the property was issued to Cuba, Sr. [1]
On October 25, 1979, Cuba, Sr. died intestate, survived by his children, Sixto
Cuba, Jr., Carmelita Cuba Sunga, and Bienvenido Cuba. Santos and Nicolas
continued as tenants, and delivered the owners share of the produce to Cuba, Jr.
and Bienvenido.[2]
On January 13, 1993, Cuba, Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered
Land, transferring the property to respondent Pacita Uy, married to respondent
Paquito Uy, in consideration of PhP 80,000. Cuba, Jr. was named owner of the
land. Notably, the Deed was not registered with the Register of Deeds. Later,
Cuba, Jr. executed a Deed of Assignment or Transfer of Rights of the undelivered
owners share of the produce in favor of Pacita.
On July 13, 1993, Pacita demanded that the Laynesas vacate the land. She
claimed that she had purchased the land. The Laynesas asked for proof of
Pacitas acquisition, but she could not produce any.
Subsequently, Pacita returned and again demanded that the Laynesas vacate
the property, this time exhibiting the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistrered
Land signed by Cuba, Jr. Consequently, the Laynesas filed on October 13, 1993
a petition against Pacita with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case No. 730 for Legal Redemption entitled
Santos Laynesa, et al. v. Paquito Uy. The Laynesas primarily sought that they be
allowed to redeem the land from Pacita.[3]
Thereafter, on November 25, 1993, Pacita filed a complaint docketed as DARAB
Case No. 745 entitled Pacita Uy v. Santos Laynesa, et al. for Collection of Rentals
and Ejectment against the Laynesas with the DARAB.

Cuba, Jr. died intestate on December 23, 1993.[4]

On February 10, 1994, the Laynesas deposited PhP 80,000 in the form of a
Cashiers Check with the Clerk of Court of the DARAB by way of consignation of
the redemption price of the property.
Meanwhile, the heirs of Bienvenido filed a petition with the Camarines Sur
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the judicial declaration of presumptive death of
their father who had been missing since 1984.[5]
Afterwards, on June 20, 1994, the heirs of Bienvenido, with Reynoso and
Carmelita Sunga, filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. P-1963 for
Annulment of Sale of Real Estate against the spouses Uy with the Camarines Sur
RTC. They prayed that the court declare the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land executed by Cuba, Jr. in favor of the spouses Uy as null and
void, and the property returned to Cuba, Sr.s intestate estate. The DARAB
dismissed the complaint without prejudice to the two cases filed before it by the
parties.[6]
Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. P-1963 amicably settled their
dispute. In a Compromise Agreement approved by the RTC, the parties agreed
to divide the property into two portions. Two hectares of rice lands would be
transferred to the spouses Uy, and the remaining portion to Cuba, Sr.s heirs.
Thereafter, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
23276 over a portion of the property with an area of 20,000 square meters in the
names of the spouses Uy.
Meanwhile, Pacita obtained a certification from the Municipal Agricultural Office
(MAO) that the property was not prime agricultural property, and from the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) that TCT No. 23276 was not covered by
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) or by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. The
certifications were sought so the land could be reclassified as industrial land.
On May 29, 1995, the Municipal Council of Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur
approved Resolution No. 67, which embodied Ordinance No. 28 and reclassified
the land from agricultural to industrial.
On July 17, 1995, the Laynesas filed a Complaint dated July 13, 1995, docketed
as DARAB Case No. V-RC-028 and entitled Nicolas Laynesa, et al. v. Paquito Uy,
et al. for Threatened Ejectment and Redemption with a Prayer for the issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the DARAB. In the Complaint, the Laynesas
sought to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 23276 for PhP 40,000.
In their Answer dated August 15, 1995, the spouses Uy alleged that the
Laynesas had no cause of action against them, and even assuming that the

20

Laynesas had, the action was already barred by estoppel and laches, the
complaint was already moot and academic, and the DARAB had no jurisdiction
since the land had already been reclassified as industrial land.
On January 12, 1996, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Isabel E. Florin issued a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

The Issues
[T]he Honorable Court of Appeals (Fourteenth Division), seriously erred and/or
committed grave error in:
A.

Holding that at the time of the filing of the Complaint (V-RC-028-CSBranch 1) the land subject matter of the case ceases to be agricultural
by virtue of the reclassification made by Municipal Ordinance No. 28 of
Pili, Camarines Sur, so that the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
dispute involving said land and that the Decision of the DARAB is null
and void.

B.

Holding that the reclassification alone of an agricultural land by a

Municipal Ordinance from agricultural to any other uses without the
necessary conversion Order from the DAR is enough to divest the DAR of
jurisdiction to hear and determine any agrarian disputes involving the
land.[10]

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered

1.

2.
3.

4.

Granting the petition for redemption by the plaintiffs herein of the

two-hectare Riceland now titled in the name of Pacita E. Uy with TCT
No. T-23276, for Nicolas Laynesa, his .5 hectare tillage and for
Santos Laynesa, his 1.5 hectares tillage in the consolidated amount
of P60,000.00;
Ordering the conveyance of subject lots to herein plaintiffs as abovestated;
Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs temperate damages of
P15,000.00; exemplary damages of P20,000.00; Attorneys fees of
P12,000.00; and appearance fees of P2,400.00.
Declaring the injunction permanent, unless the appropriate Order
allowing conversion is thereby presented.

SO ORDERED.[7]
Thereafter, the spouses Uy filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In an Order dated
February 27, 1996,[8] the DARAB affirmed the Decision of the adjudicator, but
with the modification to set aside the award of damages.
The spouses Uy appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA ruled DARAB without jurisdiction
On May 16, 2001, the CA issued a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 59454, reversing
the Decision of the DARAB. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the DARAB, Annex
A of the Petition and its Resolution, Annex B of the Petition are set
aside and reversed. The Complaint of the Respondents and the
counterclaims of the Petitioners are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
According to the CA, the evidence on record shows that when the Laynesas filed
their action with the DARAB, the property was no longer agricultural but had
been reclassified. Thus, the DARAB had no jurisdiction.
Hence, we have this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether the reclassification of a lot by a

municipal ordinance, without the Department of Agrarian Reforms (DARs)
approval, suffices to oust the jurisdiction of the DARAB over a petition for legal
redemption filed by the tenants.
There are strict requirements for the valid reclassification of land by a
local government unit
The resolution of this case is not that simple.
There is no question that petitioners-Laynesas are the tenants of the previous
owner of the land. As such, disputes pertaining to the land tenancy were within
the jurisdiction of the DAR. However, respondents-spouses Uy posit that after
the issuance of Municipal Council Resolution No. 67, reclassifying the land on
May 29, 1995, the land ceased to be agricultural and is therefore beyond the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Previously, under Republic Act No. (RA) 3844, all agrarian disputes fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Later, the jurisdiction
over such disputes went to the RTCs. [11] When RA 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, took effect on June 15, 1988, the
adjudication of agrarian reform disputes was placed under the jurisdiction of the
DAR, thus:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and

21

shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
xxxx
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall
be immediately executory.
However, Section 56 of RA 6657 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over
controversies involving the determination of just compensation and prosecution
of all criminal offenses arising from violations of RA 6657 to RTCs designated as
Special Agrarian Courts.
From the cited legal provisions, it cannot be disputed that the DAR, through the
DARAB, shall exercise quasi-judicial functions and has exclusive original
jurisdiction over all disputes involving the enforcement and implementation of all
agrarian reform laws.
Sec. 4 of RA 6657 tells us which lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, thus:
Section 4. Scope.The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall
cover; regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation
No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, in 1991, RA 7160 or the Local Government Code was passed into law,
granting local government units the power to reclassify land. Being a later law,
RA 7160 shall govern in case of conflict between it and RA 6657, as to the issue
of reclassification. Title I, Chapter 2, Sec. 20 of RA 7160 states:
SEC. 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may, through
an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for
the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide
for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1)
when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the
land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian
concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the
following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the
passage of the ordinance:

(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen

percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten
percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%):
Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian
reform beneficiaries pursuant to [RA 6657], otherwise known as
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, shall not be
affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such
lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of
said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority,
authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits
set in the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws,
continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans
enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and
dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the
requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial
expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such
plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification,
such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a
proper and complete application for reclassification within three (3)
months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or
modifying in any manner the provisions of [RA] 6657.
Pursuant to RA 7160, then President Fidel Ramos issued Memorandum Circular
No. (MC) 54 on June 8, 1993, providing the guidelines in the implementation of
the above Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code, as follows:
SECTION 1. Scope and Limitations.(a) Cities and municipalities with
comprehensive land use plans reviewed and approved in accordance with
EO 72 (1993), may authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands into
non-agricultural uses and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition, subject to the limitations and other conditions prescribed in this
Order.

22

(b) Agricultural lands may be reclassified in the following cases:

(1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of
Agriculture (DA), in accordance with the standards and
guidelines prescribed for the purpose; or
(2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value
for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes as determined
by the sanggunian concerned, the city/municipality concerned
should notify the DA, HLRB, DTI, DOT and other concerned
agencies on the proposed reclassification of agricultural lands
furnishing them copies of the report of the local development
council including the draft ordinance on the matter for their
comments, proposals and recommendations within seven (7)
days upon receipt.
(c) However, such reclassification shall be limited to a maximum of the
percentage of the total agricultural land of a city or municipality at the
time of the passage of the ordinance as follows:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen
percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten
percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%).
(d) In addition, the following types of agricultural lands shall not be
covered by the said reclassification:
(1) Agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
subject to Section 65 of RA 6557;
(2) Agricultural lands already issued a notice of coverage or
voluntarily offered for coverage under CARP.
(3) Agricultural lands identified under AO 20, s. of 1992, as nonnegotiable for conversion as follows:
(i) All irrigated lands where water is available to support rice
and other crop production;
(ii) All irrigated lands where water is not available for rice and
other crop production but within areas programmed for
irrigation facility rehabilitation by DA and National Irrigation
Administration (NIA); and

(iii) All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with

form funding commitments at the time of the application for
land conversion or reclassification.
(e) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA), authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of
the limits set in paragraph (d) hereof. For this purpose, NEDA is hereby
directed to issue the implementing guidelines governing the authority of
cities and municipalities to reclassify lands in excess of the limits
prescribed herein.
SECTION 2. Requirements and Procedures for Reclassification.(a) The
or municipal development council (CDC/MDC) shall recommend to
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be,
reclassification of agricultural lands within its jurisdiction based on
requirements of local development.

city
the
the
the

(b) Prior to the enactment of an ordinance reclassifying agricultural

lands as provided under Sec. 1 hereof, the sanggunian concerned must
first secure the following certificates [from] the concerned national
government agencies (NGAs):
(1) A certification from DA indicating
(i) the total area of existing agricultural lands in the LGU
concerned;
(ii) that which lands are not classified as non-negotiable for
conversion or reclassification under AO 20 (1992); and
(iii) that the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound
for agricultural purposes in the case of Sec. 1 (b-1).
(2) A certification from DAR indicating that such lands are not
distributed or not covered by a notice of coverage or not
voluntarily offered for coverage under CARP.
(c) The HLRB shall serve as the coordinating agency for the issuance of
the certificates as required under the preceding paragraph. All
applications for reclassification shall, therefore, be submitted by the
concerned LGUs to the HLRB, upon receipt of such application, the HLRB
shall conduct initial review to determine if:
(1) the city or municipality concerned has an existing
comprehensive land use plan reviewed and approved in
accordance with EO 72 (1993); and

23

(2) the proposed reclassification complies with the limitations

prescribed in SECTION 1 (d) hereof.

DARAB still retains jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a tenant of the land in
question for threatened ejectment and redemption for the following reasons:

Upon determination that the above conditions have been satisfied, the
HLRB shall then consult with the concerned agencies on the required
certifications. The HLRB shall inform the concerned agencies, city or
municipality of the result of their review and consultation. If the land
being reclassified is in excess of the limit, the application shall be
submitted to NEDA.

(1) Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the

commencement of the action.[12] Likewise settled is the rule that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. [13]
DARAB Case No. V-RC-028 was filed by the tenants of an agricultural land for
threatened ejectment and its redemption from respondents. It cannot be
questioned that the averments of the DARAB case clearly pertain to an agrarian
reform matter and involve the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. Such
being the case, the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB under
Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR. It bears stressing
that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of the agrarian reform except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Primary jurisdiction
means in case of seeming conflict between the jurisdictions of the DAR and
regular courts, preference is vested with the DAR because of its expertise and
experience in agrarian reform matters. Sec. 50 is also explicit that except for
the DA and DENR, all agrarian reform matters are within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the DAR.

Failure of the HLRB and the NGAs to act on a proper and complete
application within three months from receipt of the same shall be
deemed as approved thereof.
(d) Reclassification of agricultural lands may be authorized through an
ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan, as the case may be, after conducting public hearings for the
purpose. Such ordinance shall be enacted and approved in accordance
with Articles 107 and 108 of the IRR of the LGC.
(e) Provisions of Sec. 1 (b-2) hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, the
sanggunian concerned shall seek the advice of DA prior to the
enactment of an ordinance reclassifying agricultural lands. If the DA has
failed to act on such request within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof,
the same shall be deemed to have been complied with.
Should the land subject to reclassification is found to be still
economically feasible for agriculture, the DA shall recommend to the
LGU concerned alternative areas for development purposes.
(f) Upon issuance of the certifications enumerated in Section 2
(b) hereof, the sanggunian concerned may now enact an
ordinance authorizing the reclassification of agricultural lands
and providing for the manner of their utilization or disposition.
Such ordinance shall likewise update the comprehensive land
use plans of the LGU concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is because of the authority granted to a city or municipality by Sec. 20 of RA
7160 coupled with the implementing guidelines laid down in MC 54 dated June 8,
1993 that the CA was convinced to rule that the disputed lot is no longer
agricultural but industrial land and, hence, the DARAB does not have or has lost
jurisdiction over the subject matter of DARAB Case No. V-RC-028.
This position is incorrect. Despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to
non-agricultural land by a local government unit under Sec. 20 of RA 7160, the

(2) Sec. 20(e) of RA 7160 is unequivocal that nothing in said section shall be
construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of
[RA] 6657. As such, Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on quasi-judicial powers of the DAR has
not been repealed by RA 7160. In view of the foregoing reasons, we rule that the
DARAB retains jurisdiction over disputes arising from agrarian reform matters
even though the landowner or respondent interposes the defense of
reclassification of the subject lot from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
On the issue of whether there has been a valid reclassification of the subject lot
to industrial land, we rule that respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence
to buttress their assertion that all the conditions and requirements set by RA
7160 and MC 54 have been satisfied.
Respondent Pacita only procured a MAO certification that the property was not
prime agricultural property. The MARO certified that the land was not covered
by the OLT under PD 27. These two certifications will not suffice for the following
reasons:
(1) Sec. 20 of RA 7160 requires submission of the recommendation or
certification from the DA that the land ceases to be economically feasible or

24

sound for agricultural purposes. In this case, the MAO certification attests only
that the lot is no longer prime agricultural property.
(2) Sec. 20 requires a certification from the DAR that the land has not yet been
distributed to beneficiaries under RA 6657 which took effect on June 15, 1988
nor covered by a notice of coverage. In the case at bar, the MARO certification
which pertains only to PD 27 does not suffice.
(3) Respondents have not shown any compliance with Sec. 2 of MC 54 on the
additional requirements and procedures for reclassification such as the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Boards report and recommendation, the requisite
public hearings, and the DAs report and recommendation.
Based on the foregoing reasons, respondents have failed to satisfy the
requirements prescribed in Sec. 20 of RA 7160 and MC 54 and, hence, relief
must be granted to petitioners.
Landowners must understand that while RA 7160, the Local Government Code,
granted local government units the power to reclassify agricultural land, the
stringent requirements set forth in Sec. 30 of said Code must be strictly
complied with. Such adherence to the legal prescriptions is found wanting in the
case at bar.
Be that as it may, the DARAB erred in awarding damages to petitioners.
In Saba v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the exercise of ones rights does not
make him liable for damages, thus: One who exercises his rights does no injury.
Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage results from a persons
exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.[14]
This principle was further explained by this Court in the case of Custodio v. Court
of Appeals, to wit:
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give
rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages,
there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause
of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the
injury caused by a breach or wrong.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may

maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must
first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should
be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or
omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no
legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of
action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by
the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing
damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be
damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains
actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without
sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does
not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
[15]

Thus, in Government Service Insurance System v. Labung-Deang [16] and

Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals,[17] this Court ruled that
temperate damages will only be awarded by virtue of the wrongful act of a party.
Whereas in Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Vasquez, we ruled that exemplary
damages may only be awarded if the act of the offender is attended by bad faith
or done in wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent manner.[18]
In the instant case, the RTC awarded damages to petitioners on the ground that
respondents dumped earthfill materials during the pendency of the case. It must
be pointed out that the RTC did not issue a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order (TRO) against respondents.
Contrary to this finding of the trial court, respondents did not act in bad faith or
in a wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent manner; consequently, petitioners are not
entitled to an award for damages. Respondents dumping of earth filling
materials on the subject land was but a lawful exercise of their rights as owners
of the land. It must be remembered that respondents attempted to have the
land reclassified through the Municipal Government of San Juan, Pili, Camarines
Sur by virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 67 which embodied Ordinance
No. 28. Given the disputable presumption that official duty was regularly

25

performed,[19] respondents were justified to presume that the reclassification of

the land was lawful. It was also natural for respondents to conclude that such
reclassification resulted in the dispossession of petitioners as tenants, there
being no tenants of industrial land. Thus, respondents, at the time, could lawfully
exercise their proprietary rights over the land, including the dumping of earth
filling materials thereon. Moreover, the pendency of the case before the RTC,
absent a preliminary injunction or TRO against respondents, would not preclude
respondents from exercising their rights. Although this reclassification has now
been declared to be ineffectual, for failing to comply with the provisions of RA
7160, respondents cannot be made liable for damages. Respondents exercise of
acts of ownership over the land, at a time that the reclassification had not yet
been declared as invalid and ineffectual, is a lawful exercise of their rights. And
even though this may have prejudiced or injured petitioners, respondents cannot
be made liable for it. As stated, respondents cannot be penalized for a lawful
act.
Similarly, the instant case does not fall under any of the grounds set forth in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code to justify the award for attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation. Thus, there are also no grounds for the DARABs grant of
attorneys fees and appearance fees in favor of petitioners.
Therefore, the RTCs award for exemplary and temperate damages, as well as
attorneys and appearance fees, must be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 16, 2001 CA Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 59454 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 27, 1996 DARAB
Order and January 12, 1996 Decision of DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Florin in
DARAB Case No. V-RC-028 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award
for temperate and exemplary damages and attorneys and appearance fees is
DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Acting Chairperson), Carpio Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., (Chairperson), on official leave.
TATEL V. VIRAC
G.R. No. L-40243

March 11, 1992

CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner,

vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MAYOR OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES; GAVINO V. GUERRERO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS VICE-MAYOR OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES; JOSE T. BUEBOS, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS COUNCILOR OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES; ANGELES

TABLIZO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COUNCILOR OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES;

ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COUNCILOR OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES; MARIANO ALBERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COUNCILOR OF
VIRAC, CATANDUANES; JULIA A. GARCIA, IN HER CAPACITY AS
COUNCILOR OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES; AND PEDRO A. GUERRERO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS COUNCILOR OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES, respondents.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of First
Instance of Catanduanes filed by appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman
engaged in the import and export of abaca and other products against the
Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal officials enjoining
them from enforcing Resolution No. 29 [1] of the Council, declaring the warehouse
of petitioner in barrio Sta. Elena of the said municipality a public nuisance within
the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and directing the
petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to more suitable place within
two (2) months from receipt of the said resolution.
It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the
residents of barrio Sta. Elena an March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused
by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner
which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke,
obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed
by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted
the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding
residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of
petitioner occasioned by a continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and
the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties
of the people within the neighborhood.
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on
April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a
public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. [2]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of
Virac, petitioner instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was
constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the
construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said
block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional,
contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and
null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

26

The issue then boils down on whether petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance

within the meaning of Article 694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No.
13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.
In a decision dated September 18, 1969, the court a quo ruled as follows:
"1. The warehouse in question was legally constructed under a valid
permit issued by the municipality of Virac in accordance with existing
regulations and may not be destroyed or removed from its present
location;
2. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of
police power by the Municipal Council of Virac is not (sic)
unconstitutional and void as claimed by the petitioner;
3. The storage by the petitioner of abaca and copra in the warehouse is
not only in violation of the provisions of the ordinance but poses a grave
danger to the safety of the lives and properties of the residents of the
neighborhood due to accidental fire and constitutes a public nuisance
under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and may be abated;
4. Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from the said
warehouse all abaca and copra and other inflammable articles stored
therein which are prohibited under the provisions of Ordinance No. 13,
within a period of two (2) months from the time this decision becomes
final and that henceforth, the petitioner is enjoined from storing such
prohibited articles in the warehouse. With costs against petitioner".
Seeking appellate review, petitioner raised as errors of the court a quo:
1. In holding that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of
Virac, Catanduanes, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power of
the Municipal Council, and therefore, constitutional;
2. In giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what
it provided by declaring that petitioner violated the same by using the
warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what is prohibited and
penalized by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses.
3. In refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality,
there are numerous establishments similarly situated as appellants'
warehouses but which are not prosecuted.
We find no merit in the Petition.

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac
in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of
local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. [3] Its
authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative
Code, which reads:
"The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein."[4]
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and
basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a
municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. [5] Ordinance No. 13, Series
of 1952, meets these criteria.
As to the petitioner's second assignment of error, the trial court did not give the
ordinance in question a meaning other than what it says. Ordinance No. 13
passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on December 29, 1952, [6] reads:
"AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF
WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN
POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT
LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT".
Section 1 provides:
"It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to any
person, persons, entity, corporation or merchants, wherein to keep or
store copra, hemp, gasoline, petroleum, alcohol, crude oil, oil of
turpentine and the like products or materials if not within the distance of
200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios to
avoid great losses of properties inclusive lives by fire accident."
Section 2 provides:[7]
"Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove
their said warehouses this ordinance by the Municipal Council, provided
however, that if those warehouses now in existence should no longer be
utilized as such warehouse for the above-described products in Section 1
of this ordinance after a lapse of time given for the removal of the said
warehouses now in existence, same warehouse shall be exempted from

27

the spirit of the provision of section 1 of this ordinance, provided further,

that these warehouses now in existence, shall in the future be converted
into non-inflammable products and materials warehouses."
In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is
the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where
such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses
and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss
of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of
government.
This was also the observation of the trial court:
"A casual glance of the ordinance at once reveals a manifest disregard of
the elemental rules of syntax. Experience, however, will show that this is
not uncommon in law making bodies in small towns where local
authorities and in particular the persons charged with the drafting and
preparation of municipal resolutions and ordinances lack sufficient
education and training and are not well grounded even on the basic and
fundamental elements of the English language commonly used
throughout the country in such matters. Nevertheless, if one scrutinizes
the terms of the ordinance, it is clear that what is prohibited is the
construction of warehouses by any person, entity or corporation wherein
copra, hemp, gasoline and other inflammable products mentioned in
Section 1 may be stored unless at a distance of not less than 200 meters
from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios in order to avoid
loss of property and life due to fire. Under Section 2, existing
warehouses for the storage of the prohibited articles were given one
year after the approval of the ordinance within which to remove them
but were allowed to remain in operation if they had ceased to store such
prohibited articles.
The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs from
simple error in grammatical construction but otherwise, the meaning
and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction or
maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a
distance within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the
poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid
loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the
primordial and basic obligation of any government." [8]

As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of

petitioner were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the
municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in
the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that
the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law
itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in
charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the
petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas
mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that
complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the
municipal authorities doing anything about it.
The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have
not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound
government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to
engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in
the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the
people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be
no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.
As to petitioner's contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we find no
merit in the same. The case is a simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance,
the original jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court of First Instance.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Clearly, the lower court did NOT add meaning other than or different from what
was provided in the ordinance in question. It merely stated the purpose of the
ordinance and what it intends to prohibit to accomplish its purpose.

28

DE LOS REYES V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 121215
November 13, 1997
MAYOR OSCAR DE LOS REYES, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, AND
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

THE

PEOPLE

On October 14, 1994, prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation arguing, among other things, that the Ombudsman previously
dismissed a similar complaint against him involving the same factual setting. [4]
OF

THE

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The significance of the minutes taken during the session of a local legislative
assembly is the determinant issue in this present petition.
Petitioner, along with two others, was charged with the crime of falsification of a
public document, specifically Resolution No. 57-S-92 dated July 27, 1992 of the
Municipal Council of Mariveles, Bataan. The complaint [1] alleged that the
resolution, appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for the payment of the
terminal leave of two municipal employees, was anomalous for not having been
approved by the said Council, as the minutes of the proceedings therein made
no reference to the supposed approval thereof. It contended that its seeming
passage was carried out by petitioner in connivance with Sangguniang Bayan
(SB) Member Jesse Concepcion and SB Secretary Antonio Zurita.
After preliminary investigation, the deputized prosecutor of Balanga, Bataan
recommended the filing of an information [2] for Falsification of Public Document
against petitioner and Concepcion, excluding Zurita who died during the
pendency hereof.
On September 21, 1994, the information filed before the Sandiganbayan reads
as follows:
That on or about July 27, 1992 or sometimes (sic) prior or subsequent
thereto, in Mariveles, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, OSCAR DELOS REYES and JESSE CONCEPCION,
both public officers, being Municipal Mayor of Mariveles, Bataan and
Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles, Bataan, passed and
approved the said resolution appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for
payment of the terminal leave of two (2) employees of the municipality,
when in truth and in fact as both accused knew well the same is false
and incorrect as the said resolution was not approved by the aforesaid
Sangguniang Bayan for which both accused has the obligation to
disclose the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Likewise adduced in the motion is the joint affidavit of the other members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles attesting to the actual passage and approval of
Resolution No. 57-S-92.
In a resolution dated December 29, 1994, respondent Sandiganbayan denied the
Motion for Reinvestigation, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Acting on accused Mayor Oscar delos Reyes Motion for Reinvestigation
and accused Jesse Concepcions Manifestation, the same are hereby
DENIED, being without merit and the prosecution having vigorously
opposed the Motion. The allegations of fact and the arguments of
counsel are best taken up in the trial on the merits. As found by the
prosecution, a prima facie case exists.
Consequently, let the arraignment of the above entitled case be set on
March 03, 1995, at 8:30 A.M.[5]
After the motion for reconsideration was denied on May 24, 1995, petitioner filed
this instant petition for certiorari. On September 18, 1995, the Court resolved to
issue the temporary restraining order prayed for by petitioner.
The order of respondent Sandiganbayan must be sustained.
In an effort to exonerate himself from the charge, petitioner argues that the
deliberations undertaken and the consequent passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92
are legislative in nature. He adds that as local chief executive, he has neither the
official custody of nor the duty to prepare said resolution; hence, he could not
have taken advantage of his official position in committing the crime of
falsification as defined and punished under Article 171 [6] of the Revised Penal
Code.
Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the final step in the
approval of an ordinance or resolution, where the local chief executive affixes his
signature, is purely a ministerial act. This view is erroneous. Article 109(b) of the
Local Government Code outlines the veto power of the Local Chief Executive
which provides:
Article 109 (b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay
shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local
development plan and public investment program or an ordinance

29

directing the payment of money or creating liability. x x x.

(Underscoring supplied)
Contrary to petitioners belief, the grant of the veto power confers authority
beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a
requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local chief executive the
discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it
and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to
reconsider the same. The Sanggunian concerned, however, may override the
veto by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance
or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is clear, therefore,
that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance
or resolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of
judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.
Petitioners other contention that the Ombudsman should have dismissed the
present case in view of a previous dismissal of a similar complaint involving the
same factual context is likewise misplaced.
As explained by Deputy Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo in his comment,
the other case relied upon by petitioner has no relation whatsoever with the one
in question. Notably, the former case was subject of a separate complaint and
preliminary investigation, hence, the findings and records therein could not be
made part of the case under consideration.[7]
It must be stressed that the Ombudsman correctly relied on the minutes taken
during the session of the Sangguniang Bayan held last July 27, 1992, which
petitioner regards as inconclusive evidence of what actually transpired therein.
In a long line of cases, the Court, in resolving conflicting assertions of the
protagonists in a case, has placed reliance on the minutes or the transcribed
stenographic notes to ascertain the truth of the proceedings therein.
The following cases illustrate the importance of the minutes:
It was held that contrary to petitioners claim, what the minutes only
show is that on August 12, 1994 the Sanggunian took a vote on the
administrative case of respondent Mayor and not that it then rendered a
decision as required by Section 66(a) of the Local Government Code. [8]
With the same factual context as in the case at bar, petitioners herein
were accused of having falsified or caused the falsification of the
excerpts of the minutes of the regular sessions of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Quirino province on August 15, 1988 and September 19,
1988. x x x.[9]

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written

notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that
were sent to interested parties as required by Article 276(b) of the
Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of
the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Article 276(a). No minutes
were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been
held.[10]
It appears from the minutes of the board meeting of February 28, 1958
that the names of the members present as well those who were absent
have been recorded, and that all those present took active part in the
debates and deliberations. At the end of the session, when the presiding
officer asked the members if there were any objections to the approval
of the proposed budget, only one councilor raised an objection. The
minutes, therefore, could readily show who of the members present in
the deliberations voted pro and who voted con.[11]
The certification of the election registrar relied upon by the petitioner is
correct as far as it goes. Only 80 votes appear to have voted according
to the precinct book in the sense that only 80 voters affixed their
signatures thereon after voting. But this does not necessarily mean that
no other voters cast their ballots in the questioned precinct: there were
279 in all, according to the minutes of voting, although only 80 of them
signed the precinct book.[12]
As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the meeting of the
Sangguniang Bayan do not mention the execution of any deed to perfect
the agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the old abandoned
road, but this act does not in any manner convey title over the
abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguishes their
ownership over the land traversed by the new provincial highway. [13]
In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal that petitioner attended the
session of the Sangguniang Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that
petitioner approved the subject resolution knowing fully well that the subject
matter treated therein was neither taken up and discussed nor passed upon by
the Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative session. [14]
Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository
of what actually transpires in every proceeding. It has happened that the
minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding, thus
giving the Court more reason to accord them great weight for such subsequent
corrections, if any, are made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records.

30

In light of the conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court,
without resorting to the minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving the dispute
at hand.
With regard to the joint affidavit of some members of the Sangguniang Bayan
attesting to the actual passage and approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92, the
Court finds the same to have been belatedly submitted as a last minute attempt
to bolster petitioners position, and, therefore, could not in any way aid the
latters cause.
Indeed, the arguments raised by petitioners counsel are best taken up in the
trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated December 29, 1994, and May
24, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on September 18, 1995, is hereby LIFTED.
The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 21073 for
arraignment and trial.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.

31

MODAY V. CA
G.R. No. 107916

February 20, 1997

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (DECEASED) AND LEONORA MODAY,

petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF
BUNAWAN, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate
private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of
Appeals decision and resolution, promulgated on July 15, 1992 and October 22,
1992 respectively[1], and a declaration that Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 of the
Bunawan Sangguniang Bayan is null and void.
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in
Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to
Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No.
6138-Pls-4 along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of
Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities."[2]
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor
Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its
approval. On September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved
said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is
unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
establishment of the government center."[3]
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a
Petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the
Regional Trial Court at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. [4] The complaint was later
amended to include the registered owners, Percival Moday's parents, Zotico and
Leonora Moday, as party defendants.
On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter
Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already
deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the
government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take
possession of the property.

Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the Regional
Trial Court granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the
land. The lower court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare
the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that the duty of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (l) of B.P. Blg. 337, old
Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of
the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.[5] The dispositive portion of the lower court's Order
dated July 2, 1991 reads:
"WHEREFORE, it appearing that the amount of P632.39 had been
deposited as per Official Receipt No. 5379647 on December 12, 1989
which this Court now determines as the provisional value of the land, the
Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of the Property filed by
petitioner through counsel is hereby GRANTED. The Sheriff of this Court
is ordered to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property
involved.
Let the hearing be set on August 9, 1991 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning
for the purpose of ascertaining the just compensation or fair market
value of the property sought to be taken, with notice to all the parties
concerned.
SO ORDERED."[6]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on October
31, 1991.
Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court, but the same was dismissed by
respondent appellate court on July 15, 1992. [7] The Court of Appeals held that the
public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that
since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare
Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could
proceed.
Respondent appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
on October 22, 1992.[8]
Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the
subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal
Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium,
which is made of concrete.

32

In the instant petition for review filed on November 23, 1992, petitioner seeks
the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and a
declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and
void.
On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
and restraining public respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her
July 2, 1991 Order and respondent municipality from using and occupying all the
buildings constructed and from further constructing any building on the land
subject of this petition.[9]
Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining Order and
for Contempt, the Court issued a Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent
municipal mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine
and to demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the
restraining order.[10]
Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the
May 8, 1995 election.[11] The incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed a
Manifestation, Motion to Resolve "Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the
Temporary Restraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the
Municipality of Bunawan.[12]
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the legality of
the condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality. According to
petitioners, the expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89
was correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there being other
municipal properties available for the purpose. Petitioners also pray that the
former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo be ordered to pay damages for insisting on the
enforcement of a void municipal resolution.
The Court of Appeals declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for
disapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it failed to point out
which and where are 'those available lots.' Respondent court also concluded
that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's
resolution as invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. [13]
The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.
[14]
It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to
the State, private property for public use or purpose.[15] Inherently possessed

by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly

delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities.[16] For
the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be
for public use and there must be just compensation. [17]
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is
not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the
Local Government Code[18] in force at the time expropriation proceedings were
initiated. Section 9 of said law states:
"Section 9. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through
its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise
the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for
public use or purpose."
What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise
this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
"Sec. 153.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. (1) Within thirty days
after receiving copies of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive
orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, the sangguniang
panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the
provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall
examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in
writing of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and
make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to him
proper.
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal
ordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred
upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such
ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part,
entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal
authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the
ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part.
The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.
xxx xxx xxx." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is
an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as
expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is

33

beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although
pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then
obtaining, the Court's pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, [19] where we cited
significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar.
"The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any
municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution,
ordinance, or order is 'beyond the powers conferred upon the council or
president making the same.' Absolutely no other ground is recognized by
the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its
consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The
provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order
must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution,
ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by
law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative
functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been the
consistent course of executive authority."[20]
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove
Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the
power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9
of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding
and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of
petitioners' property.

After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary
support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan
does not conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent
to petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the
questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that the pleadings
and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's
"other available properties available for the same purpose.[25] " The accusations
of political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence.
Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former
municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the case of "Percival Moday, et al. v.
Municipality of Bunawan, et al." (CA G.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on December 8, 1993 is
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival

Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to
support the latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim
that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by
expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging to the
municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the
municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land,
evidenced by a sketch plan.[21]
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public,
compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. [22] The
Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of
compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or the
purpose of the taking[23], has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent
domain must be genuine and of a public character. [24] Government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken.

34

MALONZO V. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 137718

such a common practice may be carried out within the bounds of law,
considering the fact that public funds are at stake, is, we believe, an
issue that is not only one of first impression, but likewise of considerable
significance as a guide to local governance . x x x

January 28, 2000

REYNALDO O. MALONZO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF

CALOOCAN CITY, OSCAR MALAPITAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS VICE-MAYOR
OF CALOOCAN CITY, CHITO ABEL, BENJAMIN MANLAPIG, EDGAR ERICE,
DENNIS PADILLA, ZALDY DOLATRE, LUIS TITO VARELA, SUSANA
PUNZALAN, HENRY CAMAYO, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF CALOOCAN CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND EDUARDO TIBOR, respondents.
RESOLUTION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
On March 15, 1999, the Office of the President (OP) through Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, rendered a Decision[1] the dispositive portion of which reads,
viz.:
"WHEREFORE, herein respondents Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo, Vice-Mayor
Oscar G. Malapitan and Councilors Chito Abel, Benjamin Manlapig, Edgar
Erice, Dennis Padilla, Zaldy Dolatre, Susana Punzalan, Henry Cammayo,
and Luis Tito Varela, all of Caloocan city are hereby adjudged guilty of
misconduct and each is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from office
for a period of three (3) months without pay to commence upon receipt
of this Decision. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED."
On March 22, 1999, petitioners Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo, Vice-Mayor Oscar G.
Malapitan and councilors Chito Abel, Benjamin Manlapig, Edgar Erice Dennis
Padilla, Zaldy Dolatre, Luis tito Varela, Susana Punzalan, and Henry Cammayo,
all of the City of Caloocan, filed a petition assailing the OP decision.
On July 27, 1999, We granted the petition and accordingly annulled and set aside
the OP decision for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion and/or
excess of jurisdiction. We held:
"x x x [T]he instant petition has been properly brought before us in the
light of the importance of the subject matter and the transcendental
nature of the issues raised. Realignment of [items in the annual budget]
is a common practice borne of necessity and sanctioned by law. Just how

"x x x The OP found petitioners guilty of misconduct on the ground that x

xx
"x x x the P39,352,047.75 appropriated in Ordinance 0254 to
fund the expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate was merely
a portion of the P50 million included and appropriated in the
1998 Annual Budget for expropriation purpose and x x x the
judicial action for expropriation x x x is still pending with the
court. This being so, the amount allocated for the expropriation
cannot be reverted to or be deemed as savings to serve as funds
actually available for the supplemental budget. x x x
"We cannot, however, agree x x x.
"The OPs premise, in our opinion, rests upon an erroneous appreciation
of facts on record. The OP seems to have been confused as to the
figures and amounts actually involved. A meticulous analysis of the
records would show that there really is no basis to support the OPs
contention that the amount of P39,352,047.75 was appropriated under
Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998, since in truth and in fact, what was
appropriated in said ordinance was the amount of P39,343,028.00. The
allocation of P39,352,047.75 is to be found in the earlier Ordinance no.
0246,S.1997 which is a separate and distinct ordinance. x x x "x x x
"Section 322 of the Code upon which the OP anchored its opinion that
petitioners breached a statutory mandate provides:
"SEC. 322. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations,
Continuing
Appropriations

Unexpended
balances
of
appropriations authorized in the annual appropriations ordinance
shall revert to the unappropriated surplus of the general funds at
the end of the fiscal year and shall not thereafter be available for
expenditure except by subsequent enactment. However,
appropriations for capital outlays shall continue and remain valid
until fully spent, reverted or the project is completed. Reversions
of continuing appropriations shall not be allowed unless
obligations therefor have been fully paid or settled."
"Based on the above provision, the OP reached the determination that
Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 could not have lawfully realigned the

35

amount of P39,352,047.75 which was previously appropriated for the

expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate since such appropriation
was in the nature of a capital outlay until fully spent, reverted, or the
project for which it is earmarked is completed.
"The question, however, is not whether the appropriation of
P39,352,047.75 could fall under the definitions of continuing
appropriation and capital outlays, considering that such amount was not
the subject of realignment made by Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998.
Rather, the issue is whether petitioners are liable for their actions in
regard to said ordinance which actually realigned a position of the P50
million which was simply denominated in a general manner as
"Expropriation of Properties" and classified under "Current Operating
Expenditures" in the 1998 Annual Budget of Caloocan City. Clearly, these
are two distinct amounts separate from each other. x x x [T]he P50
million was NOT appropriated for the purpose of purchasing Lot 26 of
the Maysilo Estate but rather for expenses incidental to expropriation
such as relocation of squatters, appraisal fee, expenses for publication,
mobilization fees and expenses for preliminary studies. x x x The
appropriation of P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246, S. 1997 is,
we believe, still a subsisting appropriation that has never been lumped
together with other funds to arrive at the sum of P50 million allocated in
the 1998 budget. To be sure, denomination of the P50 million amount as
"Expropriation of Properties left much to be desired and would have
been confused with the appropriation for expropriation under Ordinance
No. 0246, S. 1997, but had respondents probed deeper into the actual
intention for which said amount was allocated then they would have
reached an accurate characterization of the P50 million.
Bearing in mind, therefore, the fact that it is the P50 million which is now
being realigned, the next logical question to ask is whether such amount
is capable of being lawfully realigned. To this we answer in the
affirmative.
"x x x [R]espondents x x x argued x x x that realignment shall not be
allowed when what is involved are continuing appropriations or capital
outlays. But this argument becomes clearly inapplicable in view of our
disquisition above x x x. The realignment x x x pertained to the P50
million which was classified as "Current Operating Expenditures" x x x
"x x x [W]hat is being realigned is the P50 million appropriation which is
classified, neither as a capital outlay nor a continuing appropriation x x x

As to the alleged violation of Sections 50 and 52 of the Code requiring

the adoption of house rules and the organization of the council, we
believe that the same hardly merits even cursory consideration. We
cannot infer x x x that no other business [like the enactment of the
ordinance] may be transacted on the first regular session except to the
take up the matter of adopting or updating rules.
"The foregoing explanation leads us to the ineluctable conclusion that,
indeed, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. Not only [is]
their reasoning flawed bit [it is] likewise lacking in factual and legal
support. Misconduct, being a grave administrative offense for which
petitioners stood charged, cannot be treated cavalierly. There must be
clear and convincing proof on record that petitioners were motivated by
wrongful intent, committed unlawful behavior in relation to their offices,
or transgressed some established and definite rules of action. But, as we
have stressed above, petitioners were acting within legal bounds."
The dispositive portion of Our Decision of March 22, 1999, reads, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the office of the president in O.P. Case No. 98-H-8520 dated
March 15, 1999 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of
jurisdiction. Consequently, respondents, their subordinates, agents,
representatives, and successors-in-interest are permanently enjoined
from enforcing or causing the execution in any manner of the aforesaid
decision against petitioners."
On August 12, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[2] contending that:
I.

The OP did not err in its appreciation of facts;

II.

Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was passed without funds actually
available;

III.

Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was also enacted without sufficient
compliance with Section 50, Chapter 3, Title II of the Local Government
Code of 1991;

IV.

Petitioners failure to observe the stricture in the enactment of the

Supplemental Budget Ordinance constitutes misconduct; and

36

V.

Assuming arguendo that the OP did err in its appreciation of the facts on
record, still this does not constitute grave abuse of discretion which can
be reviewed by this Court through a special civil action for certiorari.

On October 20, 1999, petitioners filed their Comment and/or Opposition to

Motion for Reconsideration.[3]
These issues have already been discussed in Our Decision of July 27, 1999. As
respondents persist in their stance, we must also thus restate our position to
dispel any and all doubts on the matter.
First. Respondents aver that in their Consolidated Answer which petitioners filed
before the OP[4], petitioners admitted that the sum of P39,352,047.75 under
Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997 was included in the P50,000,000.00
denominated in a general manner as "Expropriation of Properties" and classified
under "Current Operating Expenditures" in the 1998 Budget of Caloocan City.
Petitioners however allegedly only took a different position in their pleadings on
appeal and during the oral argument before the Court as they clarified that the
sum of P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246 Series of 1997 is separate and
distinct from and not part of the sum of P50,000,000.00 categorized as "Current
Operating Expenditures" in the 1998 Budget of Caloocan City. Respondents insist
that petitioners may not change their theory for the first time on appeal since
their admissions before the OP bind them, and to do so would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play and justice.
We disagree.
There is nothing in the records to indicate that the sum of P39,352,047.75
appropriated under Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997 is actually part of the
P50,000,000.00 allotted for "Expropriation of Properties," under the "Current
Operating Expenditures" of the 1998 Annual Budget of Caloocan City.
Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997 [5] appropriated P39,352,047.75 for the
expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. It is, however, not this but the sum
of P39,343,028.00 appropriated under Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 [6]
which was sourced from the P50,000,000,00 allotted for "Current Operating
Expenditures". It should be noted that the P50,000,000.00 under "Current
Operating Expenditures" of the 1998 Annual Budget was denominated as for
"Expropriation of Properties" but the particular properties subject of
expropriation were not specified. In fact, petitioners, in the same consolidated
answer cited by respondents, have unequivocally stated that "as will be noted
from the budget, the expropriation of properties does not refer to any particular
property."[7] Thus, it can be said that petitioners, as early as when the case was
pending before the OP, were already arguing about the character of the
P50,000,000.00 as proper subject of realignment.

The source of confusion lies in the denomination of P50,000,000.00 as money for

"Expropriation of Properties" under "Current Operating Expenditures". As such, it
was to be spent for the expropriation of various properties, including incidental
expenses for expropriation. What was exclusively appropriated for the
expropriation of the Maysilo Lot was the P39, 352,047.75 under Ordinance No.
0246, Series of 1997. It is significant to note that this is a 1997 ordinance while
the P39,343,028.00 which was originally intended for incidental expenses for
expropriation of the Maysilo Lot was under a 1998 ordinance.
That what was being realigned was the P50,000,000.00 under "Current
Operating Expenditures" to fund the P39,343,028.00 expense under Ordinance
No. 0254, Series of 1998, and not the P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No.
0247, Series of 1997, was further clarified by petitioners during their oral
argument before this Court on April 20, 1999.[8]
Second. Respondents insist that Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was passed
without funds actually available. In support of their contention, they cite the
dissenting opinion of Justice Kapunan that "there was no "unavoidable
discontinuance" or an "abandonment of the work or activity" as contemplated
under Section 321 of the Local Government Code since the records do not
indicate that the expropriation case before the Regional Trial Court was actually
withdrawn, suspended, discontinued or abandoned by the City of Caloocan.
This argument however is wrongfully premised as it presupposes the identity,
which does not however exist, between the P39,352,047.75 appropriated under
Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997, and the P39,343,028.00 appropriated under
Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998. The former which was a 1997 appropriation
was never touched for the expropriation of the Maysilo Lot and did not
materialize, while the latter was sourced from the 1998 Annual Budget under
"Current Operating Expenditures" by realigning the allocation of P50,000,000.00
therefrom to fund the items in Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998. Since the
P50,000,000.00 appropriation is classified neither as capital outlay nor as a
continuing appropriation[9] but as "Current Operating Expenditures," it could be a
valid subject of realignment.
Third. Respondents maintain that Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was
enacted without sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 50 of the
Local Government Code requiring that house rules be adopted or updated.
The records satisfactorily show, however, that the Sanggunnian took up the
matter of adopting a set of house rules in its general meeting entitled, "Katitikan
ng Karaniwang Pulong ng Sangguniang Panlungsod na ginanap noong ika2 ng
Hulyo 1998 sa Bagong Gusali ng Pamahalaang Lungsod ng Caloocan." [10] During

37

said meeting, the Sanggunian created an Ad Hoc Committee composed of seven

(7) members to study the existing house rules. Thereafter, it enacted Ordinance
No. 0254, Series of 1998.
As we have held in our Decision dated July 27, 1999, such succession of events
is legally permissible. The law does not require the completion of the updating or
adoption of the internal rules of procedure before the Sanggunian could act on
any other matter like the enactment of an ordinance. It simply requires that the
matter of adopting or updating the internal rules of procedure be taken up
during the first day of session. It would be inequitable to read something more
into the requirement of the law and use it as a basis for finding petitioners guilty
of misconduct, especially when the charge is serious enough to warrant a
penalty of suspension from office for three (3) months without pay.
Fourth. Respondents maintain that assuming that the Sanggunian can legally
take up matters pertaining to the supplemental budget even before the adoption
or updating of its existing rules of procedure, the circumstances that preceded
the enactment of the supplemental budget were irregular since there was undue
haste in conducting the three readings of Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998, in
one session day.

findings, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to an act done in

excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the respondents motion for reconsideration is DENIED with
FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., no part as he did not take part in the decision.
Kapunan, J., maintained and reiterated his dissenting opinion in the main
decision.
Pardo, J., see dissenting opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Pardo.

There is nothing in the law, however, which prohibits that the three readings of a
proposed ordinance be held in just one session day. Respondents themselves are
aware of this. And it certainly is not the function of this Court to speculate that
the councilors were not given ample time for reflection and circumspection
before the passage of the proposed ordinance by conducting the three readings
in just one day considering that it was a certain Eduardo Tibor, by himself as
taxpayer, and not the councilors themselves, who raised such complaint. It
might not be amiss to point out that the salaries of the city employees were to
be funded by the said ordinance which embodied the supplemental budget for
1998, hence, the urgency for its passage. Even the five (5) councilors [11] who
abstained from voting for the passage of Ordinance 0254, Series of 1998 took
advantage of its benefits by submitting to the office of petitioner Malonzo the
names of the employees assigned to their respective offices for salary and
accounting purposes.[12]
Finally. Respondents assert that assuming that the OP erred in its appreciation
of the facts on record, no grave abuse of discretion correctible by a special civil
action for certiorari may be attributed thereto.
But there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the OP. Its findings are
totally devoid of support in the record. Hence, the Decision of respondent
Executive Secretary, suspending the petitioners, on the basis of the said

38

LINA JR. V. PANO

G.R. No. 129093

August 30, 2001

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA,

AND HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO AND TONY CALVENTO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision[1] dated February 10, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing
Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
and its subsequent Order[2] dated April 21, 1997 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the
operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro,
Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor
Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995. The
ordinance reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING"
LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya
lalo't higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYA'T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico
at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C.
Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa
pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang
ano mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalo't higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang
pinuno ng Philippine National Police (PNP) Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na

pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong

lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na ang "Jueteng".[3]
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional
Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to
refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an
order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business
permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring
as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated
his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution
or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants, their agents and
representatives are hereby enjoined from implementing or enforcing
resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan ng Laguna prohibiting the operation of the lotto in the
province of Laguna.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in
an Order dated April 21, 1997, which reads:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D.
Lina, Jr. and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, thru counsel, with
the opposition filed by plaintiff's counsel and the comment thereto filed
by counsel for the defendants which were duly noted, the Court hereby
denies the motion for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors
were committed by the respondent trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING
KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508, T. 1995 OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
LAGUNA PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTO IN THE PROVINCE OF
LAGUNA.

39

II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE
PETITIONERS THAT BEFORE ANY GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR PROGRAM MAY BE
IMPLEMENTED BY THE NATIONAL AGENCIES OR OFFICES, PRIOR CONSULTATION
AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER
CONCERNED SECTORS IS REQUIRED.
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of
the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation
of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial
government's police power under the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. [6] They also
maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior
consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was
implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A.
7160.[7]
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in
effect, a curtailment of the power of the state since in this case the national
legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and permitted its operations
around the country.[8] As for the allegation that no prior consultations and
approval were sought from the sangguniang panlalawigan of Laguna,
respondent Calvento contends this is not mandatory since such a requirement is
merely stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of the
Local Government Code of 1991. [9] He also states that his operation of the lotto
system is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn
had been granted a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress. [10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the
Provincial Government of Laguna has no power to prohibit a form of gambling
which has been authorized by the national government. [11] He argues that this is
based on the principle that ordinances should not contravene statutes as
municipal governments are merely agents of the national government. The local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred
on them by Congress. This being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be permitted is
for Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since
Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to
conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the province's
Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by
preventing something already allowed by Congress.

The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a
mayor's permit based thereon are valid; and (2) whether prior consultations and
approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be
operated in a given local government unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a
mayor's permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent.
According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance,
however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but
a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not selfexecuting. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the
lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much when
they stated in their petition that:
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and
clear. The Resolution is a policy declaration of the Provincial
Government of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection to
the operation of and/or all forms of gambling including the Lotto
operation in the Province of Laguna.[12]
As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto,
such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government's autonomy to air
its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. However,
this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments
may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not
be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national
government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and
allows it to operate the lotteries. The pertinent provision reads:
Section 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.- The Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be
the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for
health programs, medical assistance and services and charities of
national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred
in section thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fiftynine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other
similar activities, in such frequency and manner, as shall be determined,

40

and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the

Board of Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the
national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a
resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise,
what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial
board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate
and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from
Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,[13] ordinances should not contravene an
existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as
elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.[14]
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the
first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life,
without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it
may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single
act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a
wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation
on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They
are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing
Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy
dictates a different conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without
meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress
retains control of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power

to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still
includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution),
which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. [15]
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any
form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and
confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the
state or an "imperium in imperio".[16]
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro,
cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of
Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is
nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Board's
enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the
national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections
2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the
country. These provisions state:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. x x x
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies
and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and
other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program
is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained; Provided, that
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not
be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to
national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular
local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national

41

government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the

national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the
contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof. [17]
Section 26 reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the
Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance

of Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty of every national agency or
government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in
the planning and implementation of any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources,
loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or
plant species, to consult with the local government units,
nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and
explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact
upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or
ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent
or minimize the adverse effects thereof.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted

to mean projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in
Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring
about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources;
(4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate
certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects
or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing
in the locality where these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects
will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is
clearly an afterthought on their part. There is no indication in the letter of Mayor
Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his refusal to issue a permit. That
refusal was predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions of Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz
from enforcing or implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely a policy
statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding legal force
nor requires any act of implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for
respondent mayor's refusal to issue the permit sought by private respondent in
connection with a legitimate business activity authorized by a law passed by
Congress.

42

WHITE LIGHT CORP. V. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 122846

January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION AND STA. MESA

TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district
as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between
government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension
between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[1] the Court affirmed the nullification of a city
ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other
establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a
similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments
from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for
such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against
our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of
law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.
This Petition[2] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which
seeks the reversal of the Decision[3] in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of
Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and
Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance.[4] The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the
City Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the
morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance"
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic],
wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited
in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean
admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at
any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any
other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said
establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same
meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any
provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by
a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period
of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the
president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation
thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent
conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party
shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not
consistent with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are
hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon
approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today,
November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC)
filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO)[5] with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City
of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.[6] MTDC prayed that the
Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as
owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as
well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.

43

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium

Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC)
filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention [7] on
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. [8] The three companies are
components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several
hotels and motels in Metro Manila.[9]
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.
The RTC
also notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as
plaintiff.[11]
[10]

On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. [12] The RTC
issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from
enforcing the Ordinance.[13] The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993
alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. [14]
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the
city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance. [15] A month later, on March
8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is
constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the
case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question. [16] On
October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and
void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected

through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.[20]
The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated
January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.[21]
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government
Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports.[22]
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City
under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months
imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.
[23]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the

City of Manila is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution." [18] Reference was made
to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply
paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[19] where the legitimate purpose of

Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it

violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference
in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance. [24] First, it held that the Ordinance did not
violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the
owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time
stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by
having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of
the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its

44

constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators

Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.[25] In
their petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions
they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed
Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners' standing. Petitioners allege
that as owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is
being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also
allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered
with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have
the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection
rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court
sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support
that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing
is built on the principle of separation of powers, [26] sparing as it does
unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions
rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived
directly from the Constitution.[27] The constitutional component of standing
doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise
definition.[28] In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest"
presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's
standing.[29] In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and
elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of
injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.[30]
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as
the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in
the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance. [31]
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an
exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,[32] the
United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of
litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important
criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an `injury-in-fact,' thus
giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must

exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own
interests."[33] Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers
for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement
of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special
interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the
United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.
[34]

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were

allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal
protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,[35] the United States Supreme Court held that
physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would
penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections
available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or
adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving
those who have this kind of confidential relation to them." [36]
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,[37] wherein the
United States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing
to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory
scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females
under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained that the vendors
had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek
access to their market or function."[38]
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons
for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes
into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect
permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes
infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a
statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. [39] In this
case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into
the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in
the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional
rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time
frame.
III.

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To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the
recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. [40] Ermita-Malate
concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form
stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address
and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging
house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled
ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and
similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality
of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes
beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances.
All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals
including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could
be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels
and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely
restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State
can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general
and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. [41]
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is
evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as
the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions
warrant.[42] Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and
its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. [43] Police power has been
used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range

from the regulation of dance halls, [44] movie theaters,[45] gas stations[46] and
cockpits.[47] The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact
that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation's legal system, its use
has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These
goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of
the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify
any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the
people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of
Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his
cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of
due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a
due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their
political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative
actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the
same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political
decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary
is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and
good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters
of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the
development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the
courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions
of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as
guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a
precise definition.[48] The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals.
The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty
insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two
related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and
"substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that
the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property.[49] Procedural due process concerns itself with government action

46

adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of
a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise
absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities
are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by
the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. [50]
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law,
has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded
acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it
may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be
upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been
predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal
result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the
prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency
because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the
proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process
grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down
by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.[51] Footnote 4 of the
Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the
legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular"
minority or infringement of a "fundamental right." [52] Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis
standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on
gender[53] and legitimacy.[54] Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Craig,[55] after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.[56]
While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has
in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as
well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of
equal protection challenges.[57] Using the rational basis examination, laws or
ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental

interest.[58] Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively

examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. [59]
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means
for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the
standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest
brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. [60] Strict scrutiny is
used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection.[61] The United States Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as
suffrage,[62] judicial access[63] and interstate travel.[64]
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly
as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only
restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury
to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the
application of the most deferential standard - the rational basis test. Yet as
earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons - those persons who would be deprived of
availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in
question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers
were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly,
these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the
people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas
alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms - which the people
reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
constitutional consequence - that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed
by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the
Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or
what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people
do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each
other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as
inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty
which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most
primordial of rights, thus:

47

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice

Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he
has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare."[ [65]] In accordance with this case,
the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways;
to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the
concept of liberty.[[66]]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought
to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . .
. guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . .
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a
Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
"liberty" must be broad indeed.[67] [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the
curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the
subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of `prostitution,
adultery and fornications' in Manila since they `provide the necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the `ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.'"[68] Whether or not this depiction of a
mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual
behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected[69] will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of
Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to
privacy and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v.
Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His
separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so

fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are
built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are,
broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of
that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he
surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be
a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of
himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in
Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state
interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. [70]
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would
proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the
room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the
time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In
transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate
purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups
of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with
purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to
staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of
a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. [71] It
must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not
be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.[72]
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the
exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property

48

is affected.[73] However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the
vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of
validity.[74]
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising
space to candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument. [75] The
Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged
in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents
legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A
plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of
places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and
subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate
area, its longtime home,[76] and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our
capital city - the Pearl of the Orient - as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for
the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur
of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have
its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a
common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world.
The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses
from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering
incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of
individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited
and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive
measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their
clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and
even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance
may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the

establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the

operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of
their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash
rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves
the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not
trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. [77] The notion that the promotion of
public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle. [78] The
advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not delegitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which
particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively
little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the
pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation
of different interests.[79]
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate
morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by
Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to
legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes
about right and wrong.[80] Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral
traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right
and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the
acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental
liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is
distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on
our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the
individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the
State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to
uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their
expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because
they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.[81]
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable
complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the
face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be
left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the
constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to
promote morality.

49

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio
Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, and Leonardo-De Castro,
JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., on official leave.
Brion, J., on official leave.
Peralta, J., on leave.

50

LA CARLOTA CITY V. ROJO

G.R. No. 181367

April 24, 2012

LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR,

HON. JEFFREY P. FERRER,* AND THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF LA
CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, REPRESENTED BY ITS VICEMAYOR, HON. DEMIE JOHN C. HONRADO,** petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. REX G. ROJO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This petition for review assails the 14 September 2007 Decision [1] and the 18
January 2008 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01377.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Resolution Nos. 0506543 [3] and 051646[4] of the
Civil Service Commission, which affirmed the Decision dated 20 September 2004
of the Civil Service Commission Regional Office (CSCRO) No. VI, Iloilo City,
approving the appointment of respondent Atty. Rex G. Rojo (respondent) as
Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary under a permanent status.
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
On March 18, 2004, [the] then Vice-Mayor Rex R. Jalandoon of La Carlota City,
Negros Occidental appointed Atty. Rex G. Rojo (or Rojo) who had just tendered
his resignation as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod the day preceding
such appointment, as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary. The status of the
appointment was permanent. The next day, March 19, 2004, the Vice-Mayor
submitted Rojos appointment papers to the Civil Service Commission Negros
Occidental Field Office (CSCFO-Negros Occidental) for attestation. In a Letter
dated March 24, 2004, the said CSCFO wrote Jalandoon to inform him of the
infirmities the office found on the appointment documents, i.e. the Chairman of
the Personnel Selection Board and the Human Resource Management Officer did
not sign the certifications, the latter relative to the completeness of the
documents as well as to the publication requirement. In view of the failure of the
appointing authority to comply with the directive, the said CSCFO considered the
appointment of Rojo permanently recalled or withdrawn, in a subsequent Letter
to Jalandoon dated April 14, 2004.
Jalandoon deemed the recall a disapproval of the appointment, hence, he
brought the matter to the CSC Regional Office No. 6 in Iloilo City, by way of an
appeal. He averred that the Human Resource Management Officer of La Carlota
City refused to affix his signature on Rojos appointment documents but

nonetheless transmitted them to the CSCFO. Such transmittal, according to

Jalandoon, should be construed that the appointment was complete and regular
and that it complied with the pertinent requirements of a valid appointment.
Before the said CSC Regional Office No. 6 [could resolve the appeal], the City of
La Carlota represented by the newly elected mayor, Hon. Jeffrey P. Ferrer and the
Sangguniang Panlungsod represented by the newly elected Vice-Mayor, Hon.
Demie John C. Honrado, collectively, the petitioners herein, intervened. They
argued that Jalandoon is not the real party in interest in the appeal but Rojo who,
by his inaction, should be considered to have waived his right to appeal from the
disapproval of his appointment; that the appointment was made within the
period of the election ban prior to the May 14, 2004 national and local elections,
and finally, that the resignation of Rojo as member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is ineffective having not complied with the provision on quorum
under Section 82(d) of R.A. No. 7160.
In a Decision dated September 20, 2004, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 reversed
and set aside the CSCFOs earlier ruling. On the argument of the intervenors that
the former Vice-Mayor lacked legal personality to elevate the case on appeal,
the regional office cited settled jurisprudence that the disapproval of an
appointment affects the discretionary authority of the appointing authority.
Hence, he alone may request for reconsideration of or appeal the disapproval of
an appointment. The regional office likewise ruled that Rojos appointment on
March 18, 2004 was made outside the period of the election ban from March 26
to May 9, 2004, and that his resignation from the Sangguniang Panlungsod was
valid having been tendered with the majority of the council members in
attendance (seven (7) out of the thirteen councilors were present). Considering
that the appointment of Rojo sufficiently complied with the publication
requirement, deliberation by the Personnel Selection Board, certification that it
was issued in accordance with the limitations provided for under Section 325 of
R.A. 7160 and that appropriations or funds are available for said position, the
regional office approved the same. x x x[5]
Mayor Ferrer and Vice-Mayor Honrado appealed the foregoing Decision of the
CSC Regional Office No. 6 to the Civil Service Commission (or Commission). On
May 17, 2005, the Commission dismissed said appeal on the ground that the
appellants were not the appointing authority and were therefore improper
parties to the appeal. Despite its ruling of dismissal, the Commission went on to
reiterate CSC Regional Offices discussion on the appointing authoritys
compliance with the certification and deliberation requirements, as well as the
validity of appointees tender of resignation. x x x
It likewise denied the motion for reconsideration thereafter filed by the
petitioners in a Resolution dated November 8, 2005.[5]

51

Petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 14 September
2007, the Court of Appeals denied the petition, and affirmed Resolution Nos.
050654 and 051646 of the Civil Service Commission, dated 17 May 2005 and 8
November 2005, respectively. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 18 January 2008.

The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1.

WHETHER THE APPOINTMENT OF RESPONDENT AS SANGGUNIANG

PANLUNGSOD
SECRETARY
VIOLATED
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROSCRIPTION AGAINST ELIGIBILITY OF AN ELECTIVE OFFICIAL FOR
APPOINTMENT DURING HIS TENURE; and

2.

WHETHER
RESPONDENTS
APPOINTMENT
AS
SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD SECRETARY WAS ISSUED CONTRARY TO EXISTING CIVIL
SERVICE RULES AND REGULATIONS.[10]

Hence, this petition for review.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Section 9(h), Article V of Presidential Decree No. 807 [6] or the Civil Service
Decree, the Court of Appeals held that in the attestation of an appointment
made by a head of agency, the duty of the Civil Service Commission does not go
beyond ascertaining whether the appointee possesses the appropriate civil
service eligibility and the minimum statutory qualifications. [7] In this case, the
Court of Appeals found that respondent met the minimum qualifications for the
position of Secretary of the Sanggunian, as enumerated under Section 469(b),
Article I, Title V of the Local Government Code. [8] In fact, the Court of Appeals
held that respondent is more than qualified for the position considering that
respondent is a lawyer and an active member of the bar. Furthermore, the
requirements for the appointment of respondent have been substantially
complied with: (a) publication; (b) Personnel Selection Board deliberation; and
(c) certification from the appropriate offices that appropriations or funds are
available for the position. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no
sufficient reason for the Commission to disapprove respondents appointment.
On the issue of the lack of signature of the Human Resource Management Officer
of La Carlota City on respondents appointment papers, the Court of Appeals
held that such refusal of the officer to affix his signature should not affect the
validity of the appointment. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to putting the
appointing power under the mercy of a department head who may without
reason refuse to perform a ministerial function, as what happened in the instant
case.[9]
The Court of Appeals also found that the appointment of respondent on 18
March 2004 did not violate the election ban period which was from 26 March to 9
May 2004. Furthermore, there was no substantial evidence to show that the
appointment was a midnight appointment.
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that since respondent possessed the
minimum qualifications for the position of Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary,
and the appointing authority has adequately complied with the other
requirements for a valid appointment, then the Civil Service Commissions
approval of the appointment was only proper.

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioners allege that respondents appointment as Sangguniang Panlungsod
Secretary is void. Petitioners maintain that respondents irrevocable resignation
as a Sangguniang Panlungsod member was not deemed accepted when it was
presented on 17 March 2004 during the scheduled regular session of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental for lack of
quorum. Consequently, respondent was still an incumbent regular Sangguniang
Panlungsod member when then Vice Mayor Jalandoon appointed him as
Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary on 18 March 2004, which contravenes
Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution.[11]
The resolution of this case requires the application and interpretation of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 82. Resignation of Elective Local Officials. (a) Resignations by
elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon
acceptance by the following authorities:
(1) The President, in the case of governors, vice-governors, and
mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of municipal mayors, municipal vicemayors, city mayors and city vice-mayors of component cities;
(3) The sanggunian concerned, in case of sanggunian
members; and
(4) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of barangay officials.
(b) Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials, together
with the action taken by the aforesaid authorities, shall be furnished
the Department of Interior and Local Government.

52

(c) The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the
authority concerned within fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof.
(d) Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be
deemed accepted upon presentation before an open session
of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its records:
Provided, however, That this subsection does not apply to
sanggunian members who are subject to recall elections or to cases
where existing laws prescribe the manner of acting upon such
resignations.
Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding
officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan; the city vice-mayor, of the
sangguniang panlungsod; the municipal vice-mayor, of the
sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the sangguniang
barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside
at a sanggunian session, the members present and consisting a
quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding
officer. He shall certify within ten (10) days from the passage of
ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in
the session over which he temporarily presided.
Section 52. Sessions. (a) On the first day of the session immediately
following the election of its members, the sanggunian shall, by
resolution, fix the day, time, and place of its regular sessions. The
minimum number of regular sessions shall be once a week for the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang
bayan, and twice a month for the sangguniang barangay.
(b) When public interest so demands, special session may be called by
the local chief executive or by a majority of the members of the
sanggunian.
(c) All sanggunian sessions shall be open to the public unless a closeddoor session is ordered by an affirmative vote of a majority of the
members present, there being a quorum, in the public interest or for
reasons of security, decency, or morality. No two (2) sessions,
regular or special, may be held in a single day.
(d) In the case of special sessions of the sanggunian, a written notice to
the members shall be served personally at the members usual place
of residence at least twenty-four (24) hours before the special
session is held. Unless otherwise concurred in by two-thirds (2/3)
vote of the sanggunian members present, there being a quorum, no

other matters may be considered at a special session except those

stated in the notice.
(e) Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its proceedings
which may be published upon resolution of the sanggunian
concerned.
Section 53. Quorum. (a) A majority of all the members of the
sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute
a quorum to transact official business. Should a question of quorum
be raised during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately
proceed to call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the
results.
(b) Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare a recess
until such time as a quorum is constituted, or a majority of the
members present may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
immediate attendance of any member absent without justifiable
cause by designating a member of the sanggunian, to be assisted by
a member or members of the police force assigned in the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, to arrest the
absent member and present him at the session.
(c) If there is still no quorum despite the enforcement of the
immediately preceding subsection, no business shall be transacted.
The presiding officer, upon proper motion duly approved by the
members present, shall then declare the session adjourned for lack
of quorum.
Section 457. Composition. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, the
legislative body of the city, shall be composed of the city vicemayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the
president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the
president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as
members.
(b) In addition thereto, there shall be three (3) sectoral representatives:
one (1) from the women; and as shall be determined by the
sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days prior to the holding of
the local elections, one (1) from the agricultural or industrial
workers; and one (1) from the other sectors, including the urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, or disabled persons.
(c) The regular members of the sangguniang panlungsod and the
sectoral representatives shall be elected in the manner as may be
provided for by law. (Boldfacing supplied)

53

Petitioners insist that the vice-mayor, as presiding officer of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod, should not be counted in determining whether a quorum exists.
Excluding the vice-mayor, there were only six (6) out of the twelve (12)
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod who were present on 17 March 2004.
Since the required majority of seven (7) was not reached to constitute a quorum,
then no business could have validly been transacted on that day including the
acceptance of respondents irrevocable resignation.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that in this case, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod consists of the presiding officer, ten (10) regular members, and two
(2) ex-officio members, or a total of thirteen (13) members. Citing the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Opinion No. 28, s. 2000, [12]
dated 17 April 2000, respondent asserts that the vice-mayor, as presiding
officer, should be included in determining the existence of a quorum. Thus, since
there were six (6) members plus the presiding officer, or a total of seven (7) who
were present on the 17 March 2004 regular session of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum such that the irrevocable resignation of
respondent was validly accepted.
The 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code
which provides, among others, the powers, functions and duties of local officials
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
government units. Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Local Government Code shall x x x provide for the x x x powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. In short, whether a vice-mayor
has the power, function or duty of a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is determined by the Local Government Code.
On 10 October 1991, the Congress approved RA 7160 or the Local Government
Code. Under RA 7160, the city vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, thus:

Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding
officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan; the city vice-mayor, of the
sangguniang panlungsod; the municipal vice-mayor, of the
sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the sangguniang
barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside
at a sanggunian session, the members present and consisting a quorum
shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. He
shall certify within ten (10) days from the passage of ordinances enacted
and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the session over which he
temporarily presided.
Section 457. Composition. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, the
legislative body of the city, shall be composed of the city vicemayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members,
the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay,
the president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as
members.
(b) In addition thereto, there shall be three (3) sectoral representatives:
one (1) from the women; and as shall be determined by the sanggunian
concerned within ninety (90) days prior to the holding of the local
elections, one (1) from the agricultural or industrial workers; and one (1)
from the other sectors, including the urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, or disabled persons.
(c) The regular members of the sangguniang panlungsod and the
sectoral representatives shall be elected in the manner as may be
provided for by law. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
RA 7160 clearly states that the Sangguniang Panlungsod shall be composed
of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian
members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the
president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and
the sectoral representatives, as members. Blacks Law Dictionary defines
composed of as formed of or consisting of. As the presiding officer, the
vice-mayor can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding officer votes
when it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in the votes. Clearly, the
vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
considering that he is mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a
tie. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and absurd situation

54

where the presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session
is not considered a member of the Sanggunian.

Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, respectively, are

members of their respective sanggunian.

The Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 155 (Local Government Code) show
the intent of the Legislature to treat the vice-mayor not only as the presiding
officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod but also as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. The pertinent portions of the deliberations read:

In the 2004 case of Zamora v. Governor Caballero,[14] the Court interpreted

Section 53 of RA 7160 to mean that the entire membership must be taken into
account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan. The Court
held:

Senator Pimentel. Before Senator Rasul and Senator Lina take the floor,
Mr. President, may I reiterate this observation, that changes in the
presiding officership of the local sanggunians are embodied for the
municipality where the vice-mayor will now be the presiding officer of
the sanggunian and the province where the vice-governor will now be
the presiding officer. We did not make any change in the city because
the city vice-mayor is already the presiding officer.

Quorum is defined as that number of members of a body which, when

legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact
its proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives
it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. Majority,
when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total. In fine, the entire membership must
be taken into account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, for while the constitution merely states that majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum, Section 53 of the LGC is more
exacting as it requires that the majority of all members of the
sanggunian . . . elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum.

The President. All right.

Senator Rasul, Senator Lina, and Senator Gonzales.
Senator Gonzales. May I just add something to that statement of Senator
Pimentel?
The President. All right.
Senator Gonzales. Reading this bill, there is also a fundamental
change in the sense that the provincial governor, the city mayor,
the municipal mayor, as well as, the punong barangay are no
longer members of their respective sanggunian; they are no
longer members. Unlike before, when they were members of
their respective sanggunian, now they are not only the
presiding officers also, they are not members of their respective
sanggunian.
Senator Pimentel. May I thank Senator Gonzales for that observation.
(Boldfacing supplied)
During the deliberations, Senator Pimentel, the principal author of the the Local
Government Code of 1991, clearly agrees with Senator Gonzales that the
provincial governor, the city mayor, and the municipal mayor who were
previously the presiding officers of their respective sanggunian are no longer the
presiding officers under the proposed Local Government Code, and thus, they
ceased to be members of their respective sanggunian.[13] In the same manner
that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the vice-governor, the city vicemayor, and the municipal vice-mayor, as presiding officers of the Sangguniang

The trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence
of a quorum on the total number of members of the Sanggunian without
regard to the filing of a leave of absence by Board Member Sotto. The
fear that a majority may, for reasons of political affiliation, file leaves of
absence in order to cripple the functioning of the sanggunian is already
addressed by the grant of coercive power to a mere majority of
sanggunian members present when there is no quorum.
A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal
function and duty of the sanggunian, requires the participation of all its
members so that they may not only represent the interests of their
respective constituents but also help in the making of decisions by
voting upon every question put upon the body. The acts of only a part of
the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions
aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable and are, more
importantly, null and void. And all such acts cannot be given binding
force and effect for they are considered unofficial acts done during an
unauthorized session.[15]
In stating that there were fourteen (14) members of the Sanggunian,[16] the
Court in Zamora clearly included the Vice-Governor, as presiding officer, as part
of the entire membership of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which must be taken
into account in computing the quorum.

55

DILG Opinions, which directly ruled on the issue of whether the presiding officer
should be included to determine the quorum of the sanggunian, have
consistently conformed to the Courts ruling in Zamora.
In DILG Opinion No. 46, s. 2007, the Undersecretary for Local Government
clearly stated that the vice-mayor is included in the determination of a quorum
in the sanggunian. The DILG Opinion reads:
DILG Opinion No. 46, s. 2007
02 July 2007
MESSRS. JAMES L. ENGLE,
FEDERICO O. DIMPAS, JR.,
MARIFE G. RONDINA,
PORFERIO D. DELA CRUZ, and
WINSTON B. MENZON
Sangguniang Bayan Membership
Babatngon, Leyte
Dear Gentlemen and Lady:
This has reference to your earlier letter asking our opinion on several
issues, which we quoted herein in toto:
(1) What is the number that would determine the quorum of
our sanggunian that has a total membership of eleven (11)
including the vice-mayor?
(2) Are the resolutions adopted by a sanggunian without quorum
valid?
In reply to your first query, may we invite your attention to Section 446
(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) which provides and
we quote:
SECTION 446. Composition. (a) The Sangguniang bayan, the
legislative body of the municipality, shall be composed of the
municipal vice-mayor as the presiding officer, the regular
sangguniang members, the president of the municipal chapter
of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the pambayang
pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral
representatives, as members.
Based on the aforequoted provision, the Sangguniang Bayan is
composed of eight (8) regular members, the Liga ng mga
Barangay President, the SK Federation President, the ViceMayor as Presiding Officer and the sectoral representatives.

Under the old Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.

337), the Presiding Officer then of the sanggunian was the
Mayor. Thus, there was a dilemma as to whether or not the ViceMayor, as Presiding Officer, is to be included in the
determination of quorum in the Sangguniang Bayan. This issue
was, however, resolved with the advent of the new Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) providing the aforequoted
provision.
Hence,
the
vice-mayor
is
included
in the
determination of a quorum in the sanggunian.
Based on the aforequoted provision, sectoral representatives are also
included in the determination of quorum in the sangguniang bayan. Let
it be noted however that sectoral representatives in the local
sanggunian are, pursuant to Section 41 (c) of RA 7160 and Section 10
(b) of RA 9264, to be elected in a manner as may be provided for by
law. Meantime however, Congress has yet to enact a law providing for
the manner of electing sectoral representatives at the local sanggunians.
Such being the case, sectoral representatives are not, in the meantime,
included in the determination of quorum in the local sanggunians.
In view of the foregoing, the Sangguniang Bayan is composed of
the 8 regular members, the Liga ng mga Barangay President and
the SK Federation President as ex-officio members, and the
Vice-Mayor as Presiding Officer. The total membership in that
sanggunian, therefore, is eleven (11). Relative thereto, Section 53
of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that a majority of all the
members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall
constitute a quorum to transact official business. Majority has been
defined in Santiago vs. Guingona, et al. (G.R. No. 134577, 18 November
1998) as that which is greater than half of the membership of the body.
Following the said ruling, since the total membership of the sanggunian
being 11, 11 divided by 2 will give us a quotient of 5.5. Let it be noted
however that a fraction cannot be considered as one whole vote, since it
is physically and legally impossible to divide a person or even his vote
into a fractional part. Accordingly, we have to go up to the next whole
number which is 6. In this regard, 6 is more than 5.5 and therefore, more
than one-half of the total membership of the sangguniang bayan in
conformity with the jurisprudential definition of the term majority. Thus,
the presence of 6 members shall already constitute a quorum in the
sangguniang bayan for it to conduct official sessions.
xxxx

56

Very truly yours,

(signed)
AUSTERE A. PANADERO
OIC, OUSLG[17]

3) Whether or not the board member who signed the Committee

Report endorsing the 2010 Proposed Annual Performance Budget
may withdraw without just and valid cause his signature thereon
and vote against the approval thereof?

In another DILG Opinion dated 9 February 2010, the Undersecretary for Local
Government opined that the Vice-Governor, as a Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is a composite member thereof and is included in
the determination of the quorum. DILG Opinion No. 13, s. 2010 reads:

4) In the event that the Province operates under a re-enacted

budget, what are those expenditures included in the term
essential operating expenses that may be incurred by the
Province?

DILG Opinion No. 13, s. 2010

09 February 2010
GOVERNOR JESUS N. SACDALAN
VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL F. PIOL
Provincial Capitol Building
Province of Cotabato
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your earlier separate letters, which we herein
consolidated, considering that they both pertain to one subject matter.
Per your letters, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular session
on 12 January 2010 where the August Body embarked upon the approval
of the Annual Budget. According to you, all fourteen (14) members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan attended said session, namely: ten (10)
regular Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, three (3) ex-officio
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and the Vice-Governor as the
Presiding Officer. You further represented that when said approval of the
Annual Budget was submitted for votation of said August Body, the
result was: seven (7) members voted for the approval of the Annual
Budget and six (6) voted against.
Specifically, you want us to shed light on the following issues:
1) Whether or not the august body has reached the required
majority of all the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided for in Sections 53 and 54 of the Local Government
Code and in relation to Article 107 (g) of its Implementing Rules
and Regulations?
2) Whether or not the vice governor as the presiding
officer is included in the count in determining the
majority of all the members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan to validly pass an appropriation ordinance.

xxxx
For the sanggunian to officially transact business, there should be a
quorum. A quorum is defined by Section 53 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 as referring to the presence of the majority of all the
members of the sanggunian who have been duly elected and qualified.
Relative thereto, generally, ordinary measures require for its enactment
only the approval of a simple majority of the sanggunian members
present, there being a quorum. These pertain to the normal transactions
of the sanggunian which are approved by the sanggunian through a vote
of simple majority of those present. On the other hand, there are certain
measures where the Local Government Code requires for its approval
the vote of majority of all the members who were duly elected and
qualified. This is what we call approval by the qualified majority of the
sanggunian. In this case, the approval is to be voted not just by the
majority of those present in a session there being a quorum but by the
majority of all the members of the sanggunian duly elected and qualified
regardless of whether all of them were present or not in a particular
session, there being a quorum.
xxxx
In determining a quorum, Section 53 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 provides that a majority of all the members of the
sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute
a quorum. Along this line, it bears to emphasize that per Section
467 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is a composite body where the Vice-Governor as
Presiding Officer is a composite member thereof. As a composite
member in the sangguniang panlalawigan, he is therefore
included in the determination of a quorum.
Majority has been defined by the Supreme Court in Santiago vs.
Guingona, et al. (G.R. No. 134577, 18 November 1998) as that which is

57

greater than half of the membership of the body or that number which is
50% + 1 of the entire membership. We note, however, that using either
formula will give us the same result. To illustrate, using the 50% +1
formula, the 50% of a sanggunian composed of 14 members is 7. Hence
7 + 1 will give us a sum of 8. On the other hand, if we use the second
formula which is that number greater than half, then 8, in relation to 7, is
definitely greater than the latter. The simple majority of the sangguniang
panlalawigan with fourteen (14) members where all of them were
present in that particular session is therefore 8.
xxxx
Very truly yours,
(signed)
AUSTERE A. PANADERO
Undersecretary[18]
In the same manner, a quorum of the Sangguniang Panlungsod should be
computed based on the total composition of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In
this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental is
composed of the presiding officer, ten (10) regular members, and two (2) exofficio members, or a total of thirteen (13) members. A majority of the 13
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or at least seven (7) members, is
needed to constitute a quorum to transact official business. Since seven (7)
members (including the presiding officer) were present on the 17 March 2004
regular session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum
such that the irrevocable resignation of respondent was validly accepted.
The Perez[19] case cited in the Dissenting Opinion was decided in 1969 prior to
the 1987 Constitution, and prior to the enactment of RA 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991. In fact, the Perez case was decided even prior to the
old Local Government Code which was enacted in 1983. In ruling that the vicemayor is not a constituent member of the municipal board, the Court in the
Perez case relied mainly on the provisions of Republic Act No. 305 (RA 305)
creating the City of Naga and the amendatory provisions of Republic Act No.
2259[20] (RA 2259) making the vice-mayor the presiding officer of the municipal
board. Under RA 2259, the vice-mayor was the presiding officer of the City
Council or Municipal Board in chartered cities. However, RA 305 and 2259
were silent on whether as presiding officer the vice-mayor could vote.
Thus, the applicable laws in Perez are no longer the applicable laws in the
present case.
On the other hand, the 2004 case of Zamora v. Governor Caballero,[21] in which
the Court interpreted Section 53[22] of RA 7160 to mean that the entire
membership must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, was decided under the 1987 Constitution and after

the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991. In stating that there were
fourteen (14) members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley,
[23]
the Court in Zamora clearly included the Vice- Governor, as presiding officer,
as part of the entire membership of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which must
be taken into account in computing the quorum.
On the issue that respondents appointment was issued during the effectivity of
the election ban, the Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals and
the Civil Service Commission that since the respondents appointment was
validly issued on 18 March 2004, then the appointment did not violate the
election ban period which was from 26 March to 9 May 2004. Indeed, the Civil
Service Commission found that despite the lack of signature and certification of
the Human Resource Management Officer of La Carlota City on respondents
appointment papers, respondents appointment is deemed effective as of 18
March 2004 considering that there was substantial compliance with the
appointment requirements, thus:
Records show that Atty. Rojos appointment was transmitted to the CSC
Negros Occidental Field Office on March 19, 2004 by the office of
Gelongo without his certification and signature at the back of the
appointment. Nonetheless, records show that the position to which Atty.
Rojo was appointed was published on January 6, 2004. The qualifications
of Atty. Rojo were deliberated upon by the Personnel Selection Board on
March 5, 2004, attended by Vice Mayor Jalandoon as Chairman and Jose
Leofric F. De Paola, SP member and Sonia P. Delgado, Records Officer, as
members. Records likewise show that a certification was issued by Vice
Mayor Jalandoon, as appointing authority, that the appointment was
issued in accordance with the limitations provided for under Section 325
of RA 7160 and the said appointment was reviewed and found in order
pursuant to Section 5, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Executive Order No. 292. Further, certifications were issued by the City
Budget Officer, Acting City Accountant, City Treasurer and City Vice
Mayor that appropriations or funds are available for said position.
Apparently, all the requirements prescribed in Section 1, Rule VIII in CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999, were complied with. [24]
Clearly, the appointment of respondent on 18 March 2004 was validly issued
considering that: (1) he was considered resigned as Sangguniang Panlungsod
member effective 17 March 2004; (2) he was fully qualified for the position of
Sanggunian Secretary; and (3) there was substantial compliance with the
appointment requirements.

58

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 14 September 2007

Decision and the 18 January 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01377.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,
Sereno, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Corona, C.J., Abad, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., joins in the dissent of J. Del Castillo.
Brion, J., concur in the result.: see separate opinion.
Del Castillo, J., see dissenting opinion.

59

CONCURRING OPINION
(In the Result)
BRION, J.:
The constitutional issue before us is whether Atty. Rex Rojos (Rojo) appointment
violated the constitutional ban on appointment. [1] The answer to this question
depends on the resolution of the prior and underlying question of whether
petitioner Rojo effectively resigned from his post as sanggunian member before
he was appointed as sanggunian secretary. This question, in turn, hinges on the
much prior issue of the number of sanggunian members needed to validly act on
Rojos tender of resignation.
While I concur with the conclusion reached by the ponencia, I wish to emphasize
that the Vice-Mayor as presiding officer is considered a member of the
sanggunian for purposes of quorum determination only. In particular, the
majoritys ruling should by no means be interpreted as including the Vice-Mayor
(as presiding officer) as sanggunian member, where the Local Government Code
(LGC) itself prescribes a specific voting requirement that makes quorum
determination irrelevant.
Brief Factual Antecedents
On March 10, 1994, Rojo, a member of the Sanggunian Panlungsod (SP) of La
Carlota City, applied for the vacant position of SP Secretary. On the March 17,
2004 session of the SP, Rojo tendered his irrevocable resignation as SP Member.
At that time, Vice-Mayor Rex Jalandoon (Jalandoon), as presiding officer, and six
members of a twelve-member sanggunian were present.
On March 18, 2004, Jalandoon appointed Rojo as SP Secretary and the latter
immediately took his oath of office. On March 26, 2004, the appointment ban for
the May 2004 elections took effect. On April 27, 2004, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Field-Office disapproved Rojos appointment due to
incomplete requirements. Jalandoon appealed the disapproval to the CSC
Regional Office.
The 2004 elections resulted in changes in the La Carlota local government. The
newly elected Mayor and Vice-Mayor of La Carlota City sought to affirm the
disapproval of Rojos appointment, alleging that there had been no quorum
when Rojo tendered his resignation before the SP. Since Rojos resignation could
not have been validly accepted for lack of quorum, it was argued that Rojo
continued to be an elective official who was ineligible for appointment to a public
office under the Constitution.[2]

Core Issue
I submit that the quorum issue in this case can be decided by approaching the
problem from the point of the question: to whom does the LGC vests the power
to accept the resignation of a member of the sanggunian?
My Position
Article 82 of the LGC reads:
Section 82. Resignation of Elective Officials. (a) Resignations by
elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance
by the following authorities:
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
xxxx

The President, in case of governors, vice-governors, and

mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities:
The governor, in case of municipal mayors, municipal vicemayors, city mayors and city vice-mayors of component
cities:
The sanggunian concerned, in the case of sanggunian
members; and
The city or municipal mayor, in case of barangay officials.

(d) Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed

accepted upon presentation before an open session of the sanggunian
concerned and duly entered in its records: Provided, however, that this
subsection does not apply to sanggunian members who are subject to
recall elections or to cases where existing laws prescribe the manner of
acting upon such resignations.
This Article lays down the rule on resignations and identifies the authorities with
the power to accept the resignation of particular local government officials. In
the case of sanggunian members, that authority is the local legislative body
the sanggunian concerned of which the resignee is a member.
Before determining what the law exactly means in making reference to the
sanggunian concerned, Section 53 of the LGC prescribes a quorum
requirement before the sanggunian can validly transact its regular official
business.
Section 53. Quorum. (a
)

A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have

been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to

60

transact official business. Should a question of quorum be raised

during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately proceed
to call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the
results.
xxxx
On the other hand, Article 457 of the LGC identifies the composition of the
sanggunian for the purpose of determining the sanggunian concerned
authorized to accept the resignation of its member. Article 457 reads:
Section 457. Composition. (a) The Sanggunian Panlungsod, the
legislative body of the City shall be composed of the city vice-mayor
as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president
of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the
panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the
sectoral representatives as members.
Based on these provisions, I believe that it is absurd not to include the presiding
officer in determining whether a quorum exists since (i) the law includes him as
part of the body authorized to accept an elective local officials resignation and
(ii) this body - the sanggunian concerned - can validly act only if there is a
quorum.
Moreover, while the Vice-Mayor as presiding officer cannot vote except in case of
tie,[3] the determination of the quorum for purpose of accepting a resignation of
a sanggunian member does not require an active participation on the part of
any member of the sanggunian.
Under the LGC, the only express prohibition against the resignation of an
elective local official is when he is the subject of an on-going recall process. [4]
Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a public officer who is the subject
of a pending investigation (administrative or criminal) or prosecution [5] is likewise
prohibited from resigning. This prohibition, however, is for the sole purpose of
preventing him from frustrating the ongoing investigation or prosecution, i.e., in
order to be consistent with an individuals constitutional right against
involuntary servitude,[6] a public official may resign from the service but his act
will not cause the dismissal of the on-going proceeding against him. [7] In other
words, in accepting a resignation, the sanggunian, as a body, simply takes a
passive stance on a matter that relates to the administrative duties of the ViceMayor himself.
The dichotomy (i.e., the counting of the Presiding Officer for purpose of quorum
but without giving him the right to vote except in case of a tie) can be better
appreciated if it is considered that, unlike in the old LGC, the presiding officer is
empowered, as a rule, to appoint all officials and employees of the sanggunian.

In the present case, at issue is petitioner Rojos resignation as a sanggunian

member for the express purpose of applying for the position of sanggunian
secretary whom the Vice-Mayor can appoint. In other words, woven into the
question of resignation is the function of appointment that the law expressly
assigned to the Vice-Mayor. These circumstances add to the reasons justifying
the conclusion that the Vice-Mayors presence in accepting the resignation is
material.
[8]

Refutation of the dissents reliance on Perez

Justice Del Castillos Dissent relies on the 1969 case of Perez v. Hon. Dela Cruz.
[9]
The use of the Perez ruling, in my view, is misplaced.
In Perez, the Naga Vice-mayor Virginia Perez wanted to vote in the selection
of (i) the secretary of the municipal board of Naga and (ii) the chairmen of the
boards various standing committees. The Court held that Perez does not
possess any voting right considering that she was not a member of the
municipal board.
In order to fully appreciate Perez, proper consideration of its legal setting is
critical. The pertinent laws then were:
a.

Republic Act (RA) 305 (the Charter of Naga). This law did not provide for
the position of Vice-Mayor; and

b.

RA No. 2259 (An Act Making Effective the Offices of Mayor, Vice-Mayor
and Councilors in Chartered Cities xxx). This law created the position of
vice-mayor in Naga, among others. Section 3 of this law, however,
simply provides that the Vice-Mayor shall be the presiding officer of the
City Council or Municipal Board in all chartered cities.

Based on these laws, Perez noted that [RA 2259] does not decree that the vicemayor is a member of the city council or municipal board. Necessarily, not
being a member, she could not have any direct and active participation in filling
the local appointive positions in Naga.
First, RA No. 2259, the applicable law at that time, did not provide for a similar
provision under the LGC on the composition of the sanggunian, aside from
stating that the Vice-Mayor shall be the presiding officer of the city council or
municipal board of chartered cities. In fact, under RA No. 2259, the powers of
the Vice-Mayor clearly show that aside from being the presiding officer of the
city council he was merely a spare tire [10] who could assume the powers of
the Mayor only in case of the latters inability:[11]
Section 3. x x x

61

The Vice-Mayor shall perform the duties and exercise the

powers of the mayor in the event of the latters inability to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. In the event of a
permanent vacancy in the office of mayor, the vice-mayor shall
become mayor for the completion of the unexpired term.
x x
x
Second, Perez resolved the question of whether the presiding officer could vote
in the selection of local appointive officials. In order to resolve this issue, the
Court had to determine whether the presiding officer was also a member of the
municipal board/city council. As previously discussed, the present case does not
involve the active role of the sanggunian as a body, exercising discretion
whether to favorably vote or not; only the sanggunians passive role in
accepting the resignation of a sanggunian member is involved. Recall in this
regard that under Section 82 of the LGC, the authority to accept a resignation
resides in the sanggunian concerned, and that under Article 457, the ViceMayor is part of the composition of the sanggunian. These distinctions can only
lead to the conclusion that the Dissent cannot draw strength from Perez in
determining whether there was quorum for the purpose of acting on petitioner
Rojos resignation.
Contrary to the Dissents posture, we are not here giving additional role and
prerogative to a presiding officer. Nor does our interpretation purport to give an
active role to a presiding officer aside from what inheres to his position. We only
resolve the issue of whether he should be counted for purposes of quorum on an
administrative matter which relates to his duties and inheres to his position a
passive participation in the affairs of the body over which he actually presides
and which he presumably influences for the common good.
The case of Zamora v. Caballero
In Zamora v. Caballero,[12] the Court was confronted with the question of
whether a regular sanggunian member, who filed a leave of absence and
whose alleged departure overseas was not proved, should be considered in
determining whether there was quorum at the time the sanggunian transacted
official business. The Court ruled in the affirmative, holding that In fine, the entire membership must be taken into account in computing
the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the constitution
merely states that majority of each House shall constitute a quorum,
Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the majority
of all members of the sanggunianelected and qualified shall
constitute a quorum.

The difference in the wordings of the Constitution and the LGC is not
merely a matter of style and writing as respondents would argue, but
is actually a matter of meaning and intention. The qualification in the
LGC that the majority be based on those elected and qualified was
meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members
thereof have been proclaimed. And, while the intent of the legislature in
qualifying the quorum requirement was to allow sanggunians to function
even when not all members thereof have been proclaimed and have
assumed office, the provision necessarily applies when, after all the
members of the sanggunian have assumed office, one or some of its
members file for leave. What should be important then is the
concurrence of election to and qualification for the office. And election
to, and qualification as member of, a local legislative body are not
altered by the simple expedient of filing a leave of absence.
Read in light of Zamora, the fact that the Vice-Mayor is elected and, by virtue
of his position, qualifies as the sanggunians presiding officer assumes added
significance.
I submit, however, that the force of Zamora should not go beyond what the
Court decreed in that case. The legality of the Vice-Mayors (as presiding officer)
inclusion as member of the sanggunian did not confront Zamora, which simply
assumed that the presiding officer was included in the determination of the
number of members required to constitute a quorum. For emphasis, Zamora
resolved the issue of whether an absent regular member should be included in
quorum determination; it did not rule on the inclusion of the Vice-Mayor, as
presiding officer, in the sanggunian membership. The latter issue is what the
Court now resolves.
The sanggunian is a collegial body performing several legislative and nonlegislative functions.[13] Under the LGC, the voting requirement for an affirmative
action on the part of the sanggunian varies depending on the particular power to
be exercised or the measure to be adopted. The voting requirement could be (i)
two-thirds (2/3) of all its members; [14] or (ii) two-thirds (2/3) vote of the members
present, there being quorum;[15] or (iii) three-fourths (3/4) of all its members;[16]
or (iv) majority vote of all the members; [17] or (vi) simply concurrence of the
sanggunian concerned;[18] or (vii) affirmative vote of a majority of the members
present, there being a quorum; [19] or (viii) unanimous vote of the sanggunian
concerned.[20]
If the voting level required would engage the entirety of the sanggunian as a
collegial body, making the quorum requirement least significant, there is no
rhyme or reason to include the presiding officers personality at all. The
possibility of that one instance where he may be allowed to vote is nil. To
include him in sanggunian membership without this qualification would

62

adversely affect the statutory rule that generally prohibits him from voting.
To illustrate, in disciplining members of the sanggunian where the penalty
involved is suspension or expulsion, the LGC requires the concurrence of twothirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian. [21] If the Sanggunian has
thirteen (13) regular members (excluding the presiding officer), the votes
needed to impose either of the penalty is eight. However, should the presiding
officer be also included, therefore raising the membership to fourteen (14), on
the premise that he is also sanggunian member even if he cannot vote in this
instance, an additional one vote is required i.e., nine votes are required
before the penalty is imposed. The presiding officers innocuous inclusion as
sanggunian member negatively impacts on the prohibition against him from
voting since his mere inclusion affects the numerical value of the required voting
level on a matter where generally and by law he has no concern.
For the foregoing reasons and qualifications, I vote to DISMISS the petition and
join the result of Justice Carpios ponencia.

63

DISSENTING OPINION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. [1]
Among the questions raised in the petition is whether respondents resignation
from the Sangguniang Panlungsod was effective. According to Section 82 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC), the resignation
is effective when it is presented before an open session of the concerned
sanggunian and duly entered in its records.[2] Relating this to Section 53,[3] the
session where the resignation is read must have a quorum, which is defined as
the majority of all the members of the sanggunian. Majority is defined as a
number greater than half of the total.[4]
In the instant case, respondents resignation was read in a session where six
councilors and the presiding officer were in attendance, while six other
councilors were absent. Given that councilors in attendance and in absentia
were equal in number, it became imperative to determine whether the presiding
officer should be counted for purposes of quorum. If he is counted, there was a
quorum of the sanggunian and respondents resignation was effective. If the
presiding officer is not counted, there was no quorum and respondents
resignation was ineffective. Thus, the resolution of the controversy is centered
on whether the phrase of all the members of the sanggunian in Section 53
of the LGC refers to the entire composition of the sanggunian (including the
presiding officer) or only the members of the sanggunian (excluding the
presiding officer).
While both parties referred to Section 457 of the LGC on the composition of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod for their respective positions, they emphasized
different phrases thereof. For the respondent, the phrase of all the members of
the sanggunian includes the presiding officer because he is included in the
composition of the legislative body. Respondents reading of Section 457 thus
made the following emphasis:
Section 457. Composition. (a) The sangguniang panglungsod, the
legislative body of the city, shall be composed of the city vice-mayor
as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of
the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the
panglungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the
sectoral representatives, as members.
Respondent contends that since the presiding officer is included in the
composition of the sanggunian, he should also be included in the phrase of all
the members of the sanggunian.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the presiding officer is not included in
the phrase of all the members of the sanggunian because Section 457 does
not make him a member of the sanggunian. Petitioners reading of Section 457
focuses on the following qualifying phrases:
Section 457. Composition. (a) The sangguniang panglungsod, the
legislative body of the city, shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as
presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of
the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the
panglungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the
sectoral representatives, as members.
In finding that the presiding officer is also a member counted for purposes of
quorum, the ponencia cites three grounds: First, it argues that Section 457
clearly includes the presiding officer in the composition of the sanggunian, which
necessarily means that he is a member counted for purposes of quorum. It
submits that a contrary construction would present an anomaly where the
presiding officer has the power to break a tie-vote in the sanggunian but is not
counted for purposes of quorum. Second, it claims that in Zamora v. Caballero,[5]
this Court has ruled that the Vice Governor, as Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is part of the entire membership of the sanggunian
who must be included in computing the quorum. Finally, it cites DILG Opinion
Nos. 46, S. 2007 and 13, S. 2010 stating that the vice-mayor is included in
determining the quorum of the sanggunian.
I regret that I cannot accept the ponencia's arguments.
I. Section 457 of the LGC does not
include the presiding officer as member
of the sanggunian for purposes of
quorum.
The vice-mayor is not a member, even if he is a part of the composition of the
Sanggunian. Section 457 itself does not treat everyone in the composition of
the sanggunian as members. Instead, Section 457 divides the composition of
the sanggunian into two: (a) the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, and (b) the
rest, as members. This division is not an imaginary distinction, but is dictated by
the very language of Section 457:
Section 457. Composition. (a) The sangguniang panglungsod, the
legislative body of the city, shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as
presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of
the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the
panglungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the
sectoral representatives, as members.

64

There are two qualifying phrases in this provision as presiding officer and as
members. Qualifying phrases refer only to the words to which they are
immediately associated. The phrase as presiding officer refers only to the
vice- mayor, while the phrase as members refers only to the component parts
that are mentioned after the phrase as presiding officer. Since the phrase as
members cannot in any manner refer to the vice-mayor, Section 457 itself does
not support the argument that the vice-mayor is a member that is included in
the quorum requirement of all the members of the sanggunian.
With due respect, the ponencia ignores the foregoing division or distinction
made by Section 457, by the expedient of ignoring the qualifiers found in
Section 457. I am unable to accept this because no valid reason was offered for
such selective reading of Section 457. It is a basic rule of statutory construction
that all the words in a statute should be given effect; thus, the qualifiers cannot
be disregarded without doing violence to the provision.
Going over the relevant provisions of the LGC, I find nothing therein which
makes the presiding officer also a member of the legislative body. Even in
Section 457, which respondent cites, the city vice-mayor was described as the
presiding officer of the sanggunian, not a member:
SEC. 457. Composition. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, the
legislative body of the city, shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as
presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of the
city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the
panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the
sectoral representatives, as members.
(b) In addition thereto, there shall be three (3) sectoral representatives:
one (1) from the women; and, as shall be determined by the sanggunian
concerned within ninety (90) days prior to the holding of the local
elections, one (1) from the agricultural or industrial workers; and one (1)
from the other sectors, including the urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, or disabled persons.
(c) The regular members of the sangguniang panlungsod and the
sectoral representatives shall be elected in the manner as may be
provided by law.
In describing the composition of the sangguniang panlungsod, Section 457
states that it has the city vice-mayor as its presiding officer, and the regular
members, ex officio members, and sectoral representatives, as members. The
present wording of the sanggunians composition, when read in conjunction with
Section 53, which describes quorum as a majority of all the members, leads to
the conclusion that quorum refers to the majority of the regular, ex officio and

sectoral members. The word all was added to encompass the three kinds of
members of the sanggunian; not to encompass its entire composition.
The inclusion of the presiding officer in the composition of the sangguniang
panlungsod is only logical considering that the presiding officer is the
administrative head of the said body. But his inclusion as such does not
automatically make him a member thereof. If it was the lawmakers intent to
make him a member of the body, the provision could have easily been made to
reflect such an intention.
Moreover, the Local Government Code treats the vice-mayor and his office
separately from that of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. The powers and duties of
the vice-mayor are provided in Section 456 and there is nothing therein which
states or even suggests that he is also a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod:
Article Two. The City Vice-Mayor
SEC. 456. Powers, Duties and Compensation. (a) The city vice-mayor
shall:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlungsod and
sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury for all expenditures
appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlungsod;
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all
officials and employees of the sangguniang panlungsod, except
those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in
this Code;
(3) Assume the office of the city mayor for the unexpired term
of the latter in the event of permanent vacancy as provided for
in Section 44, Book I of this Code;
(4) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of
the city mayor in cases of temporary vacancy as provided for in
Section 46, Book I of this Code; and
(5) Exercise such other powers and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance.
(b)
The city vice-mayor shall receive a monthly compensation
corresponding to Salary Grade twenty eight (28) for a highly urbanized
city and Salary Grade twenty six (26) for a component city, as prescribed
under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant
thereto.

65

Chapter 3, Title II of Book I of the Local Government Code, which is entitled Local
Legislation also did not describe the city vice-mayor as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. Section 49 thereof was devoted to designating the
vice-mayor as the presiding officer of the sanggunian, nothing more.
The law is clear: the city vice-mayor is the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlungsod, and not a member. As such, the vice-mayor should not be counted
for purposes of quorum.
This interpretation of the Vice-Mayors role in the Sangguniang Panlungsod also
finds support from the congressional deliberations of the bills which eventually
became Republic Act (RA) No. 7160 or the LGC. The deliberations on the Senate
floor reveal that the city vice-mayors role in the Sangguniang Panlungsod was
that of a presiding officer with administrative duties. Not once did our lawmakers
intimate that the vice-mayors powers extend to the legislative functions of a
Sangguniang Panlungsod member.
On August 6, 1990, Senator Ernesto Maceda (Sen. Maceda) suggested that,
unlike sanggunian members who are allowed limited practice of profession, the
incumbent vice-mayors should be prohibited from practicing their professions
because they will be busy with their administrative functions in the sanggunian.
He stated that the vice-mayors will now be administrative heads. They will sign
appointments; they will prepare the budget for the x x x sanggunian. The vicemayor, as presiding officer acquires a lot of administrative duties. [6] Sen.
Maceda also proposed that the vice mayors be given monthly salaries instead of
per diems because they now have administrative duties as presiding officers of
their respective sanggunian.[7]
On September 11, 1990, Sen. Pimentel revealed that some mayors resist the
proposal to make the vice-mayors the presiding officers of the sanggunian.[8]
The deliberations before the House of Representatives also revealed that the
only intention of its members was to make the vice-mayor the presiding officer
of the sanggunian. No mention was ever made that the vice-mayor would also
have the role and prerogatives of a sanggunian member.[9]
In maintaining that the presiding officer should be counted for purposes of
quorum, the ponencia puts emphasis on the presiding officers tie-breaking vote
in the sanggunian.[10] According to the ponencia, the conferment of this power
on the presiding officer naturally makes him a member of the sanggunian.
I disagree. Contrary to the inference drawn by the ponencia, the fact that a
presiding officer can only vote on very limited and exceptional occasions (in case
of a tie) would tend to show that he is not considered a member of the

sanggunian. A presiding officers right to vote is highly contingent, very much

unlike the actual members whose right to vote is absolute (i.e., they can always
vote).
Just like other deliberative assemblies, the sanggunian acts through voting.
Official business is transacted by a majority vote (or 2/3 vote in some cases),
where each member gets one vote. When the law deprived the presiding officer
of the right to vote on the business of the sanggunian, the law declares that his
presence is not determinative of whether the body can or cannot transact official
business. His tie-breaking vote would not alter this, as it is merely an exigency
measure to prevent deadlocks in the legislative body. It is no different from
drawing straws or flipping a coin to settle a deadlocked situation. Thus, if the
presiding officers presence is not determinative of the bodys ability to transact
official business, why should he be counted for purposes of quorum?
According to American Jurisprudence, the conferment of a tie-breaking vote does
not necessarily confer membership on a presiding officer:
6. Presiding officer
xxxx
Usually, the presiding officer of a body does not have a vote
except in case of a tie, but this power does not of itself make
the officer a member of the body. Where the presiding officer is a
member of the body, and as such member is entitled to vote with the
other members, the fact of being chosen to act as presiding officer does
not remove that privilege.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)
7. Quorum
xxxx
The fact that a statute gives a certain official the right to cast
the deciding vote in case of a tie in a governmental body does
not of itself make that official a member of that body for the
purposes of ascertaining a quorum or majority, or for any other
purpose. However, when an official is made a member of a
governmental body by its charter, the fact that he is given the right to
vote only in case of a tie does not affect his membership, and he must
be counted toward a quorum and in determining the number of votes
necessary to pass a measure.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply put, the presiding officer is not a member by the mere fact that he is the
presiding officer of the body and that he has a tie-breaking vote. He only

66

becomes a member when the law says he is so.

The authority on the issue of whether a presiding officer of a local legislative
body is also a member thereof is Perez v. Hon. Dela Cruz.[13] The Court held
therein that a city vice-mayor who serves as presiding officer of the local
legislative board cannot be considered a member thereof, in the absence of any
specific statutory authority constituting him as a member. Otherwise stated, a
presiding officer will only have the same rights as the members of the local
legislative council when the law itself confers on him such membership status:
[I]n the absence of any statutory authority constituting the vice-mayor
as a member of the municipal board, in addition to being the presiding
officer thereof, we cannot read into the law something which is not
there. For, as aptly put, differences in law beget differences in
legal effects.[14] (Emphasis supplied.)
In Perez, the charter of Naga City[15] simply provided that the vice-mayor shall
be the presiding officer of the City Council or Municipal Board. On that basis
the Court said that the vice-mayor is not a member of the municipal board:
In no manner does the law, either in its original form under Rep. Act 305,
or in its amendatory shape under Rep. Act 2259, constitute the vicemayor as a member of the municipal board. It simply says that the
vice-mayor shall be the presiding officer of the City Council or Municipal
Board. Nothing more.
In this connection, American Jurisprudence has this to say:
When the statutes provide that the mayor shall preside at the
meetings of the municipal council, he is a constituent part of the
council for certain purposes, and he sits and acts therein, but he
is not in any proper sense a member of the council, unless the
statutes expressly so provide.
xxxx
The mere fact, therefore, that the vice-mayor was made the
presiding officer of the board did not ipso jure make him a
member thereof; and even if he is an integral part of the
Municipal Board such fact does not necessarily confer on him
either the status of a regular member of its municipal board or
the powers and attributes of a municipal councilor. In sum, the
vice-mayor of Naga possesses in the municipal board of Naga no more
than the prerogatives and authority of a presiding officer as such, and
no more.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)

While Perez was decided prior to the enactment of the LGC, the principle
remains the same. The law determines whether the vice-mayor, as presiding
officer of the local legislative body, is considered a member thereof. If the law
provides that he is a member, the presiding officer should have all the rights and
privileges of a member, in addition to being a presiding officer. This includes the
right to be counted for purposes of determining quorum. On the other hand, if
the law does not make the presiding officer a member, there is no basis for
conferring membership on him. In the language of Perez, [t]he mere fact,
therefore, that the vice-mayor was made the 'presiding officer' of the board did
not ipso jure make him a member thereof.
The ruling in Perez that a presiding officer is not always a member of the body is
not alone in the legal wilderness. There are a number of American decisions
supporting Perez.
The facts of People ex rel. Lewis v. Brush[17] are similar to the case at bar. Under
the charter of the city of Mt. Vernon, the citys common council is composed of
10 aldermen, with the mayor as its presiding officer. A quorum for the
transaction of the councils business is defined as a majority of the common
council.
After the mayoral elections, the canvass was conducted by the common council
(as mandated by the charter), but only the mayor and five aldermen [18] were
present. The other five aldermen were absent.
Lewis filed a mandamus petition to compel the defendants (the common council
and mayor of the city of Mt. Vernon) to recognize him as the new mayor of the
said city. He maintained that there was a proper quorum during the canvassing
because the mayor is also a member of the common council. He cited as his
basis Section 159 of the charter which states that [i]n the proceedings of the
common council each member present shall have a vote except the mayor when
presiding, who shall have only a casting vote when the votes of the other
members are tied.
The Court denied Lewis application. It held that there was no quorum of the
common council during the canvassing of the votes because there were only five
members of the council present. The Court held that the mayor is not a member
of the common council because the statute itself does not say in express terms
that he is a member. It explained that [w]hen the common council xxx
convene[s] to make a canvass, [the mayors] functions are merely those of a
presiding officer, without any voting power except in case of a tie. He is no more
to be counted in ascertaining whether a quorum is present than the lieutenant
governor can be counted to make up a quorum of the state senate because the
constitution gives that officer a casting vote therein.

67

In City of Somerset v. Smith,[19] the City of Somerset, through its board of council
entered into a contract with Smith for the franchise of an electric light and power
plant. The resolution was approved by three members and the mayor, who is
the chairman of the board. The other three members were absent.
The Court invalidated the contract between the city and Smith for not having
been passed by a majority of the board of council. It was explained that the
mayor who is designated as the chairman of the board and has a tie-breaking
vote should not be considered as a member of the board in computing a quorum
for the transaction of business. This is because a quorum necessarily means a
majority of the members of the council, elected as such. The mayor, who serves
as the chairman of the board, should not be included in the determination of
quorum.
Bybee v. Smith[20] is also relevant. Under the statute governing the City of
Glasgow, a majority of the members shall constitute a quorum for the
transaction of business. It likewise provided that the mayor shall preside at all
meetings of the council, and may vote in case of a tie vote of the council. Based
on these provisions, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky invalidated an ordinance
that was passed by only three attending members and the mayor (three other
members were absent). The Court explained that the mayor should not be
included in the determination of quorum because the statute excluded him from
the privileges of a member, except for a vote in case of a tie. It clarified that a
quorum of the council means at least four members must have been present,
not counting the mayor therein.
These jurisprudence show that a presiding officer is not necessarily a member of
the body over which he presides. His authority to break a tie does not in itself
make him a member.
Relating these doctrines to Section 457 of RA 7160, which referred to the vicemayor only as the presiding officer of the sanggunian, the inevitable conclusion
is that the law only designated the vice-mayor as the presiding officer of the
sanggunian and not a member of the sanggunian. Thus, he should not be
considered a member, even if he has a tie-breaking vote. We cannot read into
Section 457 what is not there.
Aside from the fact that the presiding officer cannot vote in the regular
transaction of sanggunian business (where there is no tie vote to break), it is
also noteworthy that the presiding officer can never vote in important legislative
matters where a supermajority or a 2/3 vote of all the members is required (e.g.,
to override an executive veto,[21] closure and opening of roads,[22] suspension or
expulsion of members,[23] grant of tax exemptions, incentives or reliefs to entities

engaged in community growth-inducing industries). [24] In these instances where

a 2/3 vote is required, the presiding officer will never be called upon to break a
tie. When the body is tied or equally divided, it would simply mean that the
proposal fails to pass, as the supermajority requirement of 2/3 is not met.
As mentioned before, the sanggunian transacts its official business by voting.
The severe limitations on the voting right of the presiding officer reveal that, for
the most part, he cannot take part in transacting official business in the
sanggunian. Since the quorum requirement is intended to ensure the presence
of a majority of the body capable of transacting business, an official who is not
necessary for transacting business should not be counted in determining the
quorum.
II. Zamora v. Caballero is not in point because it did
not resolve the issue of whether the phrase of all the
members of the sanggunian in Section 53 of the LGC
refers to the entire composition or only to the members.
The ponencia cites Zamora v. Caballero[25] as authority for the proposition that
the entire membership of the sanggunian should be taken into account in the
determination of quorum.
Two important issues on quorum were resolved in Zamora: (1) whether a
member, sitting as temporary presiding officer, can vote even without a tie; [26]
and (2) whether a board member on leave of absence due to foreign travel
should still be included for purposes of quorum. [27]
On the first issue, the Court held that a board member who sits as temporary
presiding officer cannot exercise his right to vote as a regular member. He can
only vote in case there is a tie.[28]
On the second issue, the Court held that a board member who is on foreign
travel is counted for purposes of quorum so long as that board member has
already been elected and qualified. The Court explained that Section 53 of the
LGC provides an exacting definition of quorum, which is majority of all the
members of the sanggunian... elected and qualified. It goes on to explain:
On the applicability of Avelino[v. Cuenco][29] to the present case: The
issue in said case was whether there was a quorum in a meeting
attended by only 12 of 24 senators, one having been in the hospital
while another was out of the country. This Court held that although the
total membership of the Senate was 24, the presence of 12 members
already constituted a quorum since the 24th member was outside the
country and beyond the coercive power of the Senate.
In the instant case, there is nothing on record, save for respondents

68

allegation, to show that Board Member Sotto was out of the country and
to thereby conclude that she was outside the coercive power of the
Sanggunian when the February 8 and 26, 2001 sessions were held. x x x
xxxx
Also, in Avelino, the legislative body involved was the Senate and the
applicable rule on quorum was that embodied in Article VI, Section 10 of
the 1935 Constitution x x x
xxxx
The present case, however, involves a local legislative body, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley Province, and the
applicable rule respecting quorum is found in Section 53 (a) of the LGC x
xx
xxxx
The difference in the wordings of the Constitution [on senate quorum
requirement] and the LGC is not merely a matter of style and writing
as respondents would argue, but is actually a matter of meaning and
intention. The qualification in the LGC that the majority be based
on those elected and qualified was meant to allow sanggunians to
function even when not all members thereof have been proclaimed.
And, while the intent of the legislature in qualifying the quorum
requirement was to allow sanggunians to function even when not all
members thereof have been proclaimed and have assumed office, the
provision necessarily applies when, after all the members of the
sanggunian have assumed office, one or some of its members file for
leave. What should be important then is the concurrence of election to
and qualification for the office. And election to, and qualification as
member of, a local legislative body are not altered by the simple
expedient of filing a leave of absence.
The trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence
of a quorum on the total number of members of the Sanggunian without
regard to the filing of a leave of absence by Board Member Sotto. The
fear that a majority may, for reasons of political affiliation, file leaves of
absence in order to cripple the functioning of the sanggunian is already
addressed by the grant of coercive power to a mere majority of the
sanggunian members present when there is no quorum.[30]
Zamora thus construed quorum of the sanggunian with respect to the phrase
elected and qualified (vis--vis the yardstick of within the coercive power of

the body, as pronounced in Avelino). It did not in any manner resolve the issue
of whether the phrase in Section 53 of the LGC of all the members of the
sanggunian refers to the entire composition in Section 457, or only to the
members. It was never the issue because the parties in Zamora presented their
case upon the assumption that the presiding officer is counted in the quorum.
Neither party raised this matter as an issue; hence, Zamora did not resolve the
issue.
III. The DILG Opinions are mere declarations of the DILG
as the implementing agency; they do not bind the Court
which has the primary mandate and duty to interpret the law.
The ponencia also cites the opinions emanating from the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG) that the presiding officer is included for purposes
of quorum. A careful reading of the DILG opinions, however, will expose them as
totally bereft of rational and legal basis. These opinions, in a nutshell, state that
the presiding officer is included in the quorum merely because he is included in
the composition of the sanggunian. It assumes that everyone in the composition
of the sanggunian is a member, which assumption is false because, as I have
already discussed, Section 457 itself divides the composition of the sanggunian
into two: (a) the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, and (b) the rest, as members.
While these DILG opinions may have persuasive effect because the DILG is the
implementing agency of the LGC, this Court is not in any way bound by the
DILGs pronouncements, especially when its opinion does not seek to persuade a
critical mind but merely makes a declaration. The Court has the primary duty to
interpret the law, and any construction that is clearly erroneous cannot prevent
the Court from exercising its duty. The courts mandate is to the law and laws
remain despite non-use, non-observance and customs to the contrary. [31]
The resistance to the idea that a presiding officer is not necessarily a member,
may perhaps spring from the fact that in our political system, the two houses of
Philippine Congress have presiding officers who are also members thereof. But
what must be remembered is that the House Speaker and the Senate President
were elected first and foremost as a congressman and a senator, respectively. [32]
They are both elected by their respective constituency as legislators, just as the
rest of the members of their respective houses. Their roles of presiding officers
are mere adjuncts to their primary duties as legislators.
Clearly, the role of the vice-mayor is different from that of the House Speaker
and the Senate President. Unlike the two, the vice-mayor is not elected as a
legislator. He is elected as an executive or, more particularly, as the successor
of the local chief executive.
Of interest and distinct nature is the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Article VIII,

69

Sections 8 and 9 of the Constitution describes the Judicial and Bar Council and
its duties, as follows:

protect the checks and balances between the executive and the legislative
powers within the local government units.

Sec. 8 (1). A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

It must be remembered that while the vice-mayor is not strictly speaking vested
with executive power while he sits as presiding officer of the sanggunian, among
his functions is to take over the chief executive position, either temporarily or
permanently.[33] When he does take over, one of the crucial functions of the
mayor that he assumes is the power to approve or veto [34] ordinances of the
sanggunian. If we construe the quorum requirement to include the vice-mayor,
the vice-mayor will occupy a unique position of affecting an ordinance both at
the legislative and executive levels. The presiding officer could affect legislation
by his attendance or absence from sessions (thereby creating or preventing a
quorum for the transaction of official business) and, if he later occupies the
mayoral seat in a temporary or permanent capacity, he would also affect the
same legislation by approving or vetoing the sanggunians actions. This
potential fusion of powers is inimical to the checks and balances created by the
separation of powers between the local chief executives and the legislative
bodies.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the

President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. x x x
xxxx
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of the list. (Emphasis supplied.)
At first blush, Section 8(1) above may appear to be the same as that of Section
457 of the LGC on the composition of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, because it
describes the Chief Justice as Chairman and the others as Members.
However, unlike the LGC provisions on the sanggunian, the constitutional
provisions on the JBC do not include any provision that refers solely to the
members of the JBC. Thus, any apparent distinction between the JBC chairman
and the JBC members is not real. The JBC chairman and the members are on
equal terms in performing tasks within the JBC, as shown by the phrases
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, the Council shall have the
principal function of recommending appointees, and it (the Council) may
exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to
it. This is in stark contrast to the LGC provisions on quorum and voting, which
do not refer to the Sangguniang Panlungsod as a whole, but only to all the
members of the sanggunian.

My position, in sum, is this: The presiding officer of the sanggunian, while a part
thereof, is not a member that should be counted for purposes of quorum. He is
not defined by the law as a member; and the law, by denying him the right to
vote as the other members, does not make his presence determinative of
whether the body can proceed to transact its business. Quorum is not just a
matter of counting attendance. It requires counting the people that matter for
the conduct of a valid business. Otherwise stated, to be a presiding officer,
whether a member or not, is to be part of the sanggunian.[35] But while he is a
part of the sanggunian, the law simply does not make him a member thereof
such that he will be counted for purposes of quorum.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.

The conclusion that the vice-mayor, as presiding officer of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod, is not a member for purposes of determining quorum also serves to

70

DRILON V. LIM
G.R. No. 112497

August 04, 1994

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER
ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF
MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code reading as follows:
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval of
local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with
the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who
shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of
the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and
payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the
sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal,
the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as
the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy.[1]
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding
inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More
importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of
control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on

the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments.[2]
The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues
that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been observed.
Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for noncompliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a
certified true copy of the challenged decision. [3] However, on motion for
reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached,
the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised
therein.
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws
by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129
vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, [4] even as the
accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the
constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings
taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover,
Article X, Section 5 (2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such
courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of
this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its discussion. [5]
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the
duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the
theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the
legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing
that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a
conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the

71

discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck
down.
In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the
Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary
of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the
familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of
an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." [6] His conclusion
was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and
not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the
Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically
Section 4 thereof,[7] and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local governments,
[8]
and the policy of local autonomy in general.
We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the
provision.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon
did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise
or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment
it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing
their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for
the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control
but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may
not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on
this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the
Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so
performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
The case of Taule v. Santos[9] cited in the decision has no application here
because the jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over

election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the
Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over
jurisdiction, not supervision or control.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act,
which provided in its Section 2 as follows:
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage,
unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That
the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity
of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by
him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or
imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is
contrary to declared national economy policy, and when the said
Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall
be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days
within which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax
ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court
of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or
parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked.
Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or
fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have
ceased to exist.
That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax
ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the
exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or
not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it
would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never
questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not
given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain
the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare
that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no
discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue
Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires
provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment.
These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the
tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of
the Manila Revenue Code is another matter.
In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of
public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to
interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the
Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in
three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art.
276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings

72

had been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in
prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local
Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into
Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and
guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code.
Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements
had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the
City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary
only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present
to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial
court.
To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the
respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have
carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court
that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the
public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to
17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3.
Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita
and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the
approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila
Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q2, and Q-3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this
omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three
successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.
It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated
and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local
development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit
and not to tax ordinances.
We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as
their validity has not been raised in issue in the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged
decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been
observed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

73

NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V. PAREDES

G.R. No. 130775

September 27, 2004

THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY, REPRESENTED BY ALEX L.

DAVID IN HIS CAPACITY AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT AND FOR HIS OWN
PERSON, PRESIDENT ALEX L. DAVID, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 124, CALOOCAN CITY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTED THE HON.
SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS AND MANUEL A. RAYOS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 131939]
LEANDRO YANGOT, BONIFACIO LACWASAN AND BONY TACIO, petitioners,
vs.
DILG SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS AND DILG UNDERSECRETARY
MANUEL SANCHEZ, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J,:
At bottom, the present petition inquires into the essential nature of the Liga ng
mga Barangay and questions the extent of the power of Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), as alter ego of the
President. More immediately, the petition disputes the validity of the
appointment of the DILG as the interim caretaker of the Liga ng mga Barangay.
On 11 June 1997, private respondent Manuel A. Rayos [as petitioner therein],
Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District II, Caloocan City,
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan,[1] alleging that respondent therein
Alex L. David [now petitioner], Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7,
Caloocan City and then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the
Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the
notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay
elections in 1997. According to the petition, the irregularities consisted of the
following: (1) the publication of the notice in the Manila Bulletin but without
notifying in writing the individual punong barangays of Caloocan City;[2] (2) the
Notice of Meeting dated 08 June 1997 for the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City did
not specify whether the meeting scheduled on 14 June 1997 was to be held at
8:00 a.m. or 8:00 p.m., and worse, the meeting was to be held in Lingayen,
Pangasinan;[3] and (3) the deadline for the filing of the Certificates of Candidacy
having been set at 5:00 p.m. of the third day prior to the above election day,

or on 11 June 1997,[4] Rayos failed to meet said deadline since he was not able
to obtain a certified true copy of the COMELEC Certificate of Canvas and
Proclamation of Winning Candidate, which were needed to be a delegate, to vote
and be voted for in the Liga election. On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours,
enjoining the holding of the general membership and election meeting of Liga
Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975.[5]
However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David,
and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as scheduled. [6]
Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan, and thereafter
took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Caloocan.
On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo
warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages, against David,
Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan
City, and Secretary Barbers.[7] Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the
Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of
the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97. [8] On 18
July 1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO, enjoining therein respondents
David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the synchronized
elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of the Liga scheduled on
19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and
effective for a period not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours. [9]
Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action
(SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCA No. C508 pending before Branch 124.[10]
Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through
respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion,[11]
invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local government
units and seeking the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of the much-needed delivery of basic
services to the people, the maintenance of public order and to further
protect the interests of the forty-one thousand barangays all over the
country, herein respondent respectfully prays:
a
)

That the Department of the Interior and Local Government

(DILG), pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision,
be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer

74

the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of
National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed
office; ...[12]
The prayer for injunctive reliefs was anchored on the following grounds: (1) the
DILG Secretary exercises the power of general supervision over all government
units by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated 18 February 1992; (2) the
Liga ng mga Barangay is a government organization; (3) undue interference by
some local elective officials during the Municipal and City Chapter elections of
the Liga ng mga Barangay; (4) improper issuance of confirmations of the elected
Liga Chapter officers by petitioner David and the National Liga Board; (5) the
need for the DILG to provide remedies measured in view of the confusion and
chaos sweeping the Liga ng mga Barangay and the incapacity of the National
Liga Board to address the problems properly.
On 31 July 1997, petitioner David opposed the DILGs Urgent Motion, claiming
that the DILG, being a respondent in the case, is not allowed to seek any
sanction against a co-respondent like David, such as by filing a cross-claim,
without first seeking leave of court. [13] He also alleged that the DILGs request to
be appointed interim caretaker constitutes undue interference in the internal
affairs of the Liga, since the Liga is not subject to DILG control and supervision.
[14]

Three (3) days after filing its Urgent Motion, on 28 July 1997, and before it was
acted upon by the lower court, the DILG through then Undersecretary Manuel
Sanchez, issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176. [15] It cited the reported
violations of the Liga ng mga Barangay Constitution and By-Laws by David and
widespread chaos and confusion among local government officials as to who
were the qualified ex-officio Liga members in their respective sangunians.[16]
Pending the appointment of the DILG as the Interim Caretaker of the Liga ng
mga Barangay by the court and until the officers and board members of the
national Liga Chapter have been elected and have assumed office, the
Memorandum Circular directed all provincial governors, vice governors, city
mayors, city vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
panlungsod, DILG regional directors and other concerned officers, as follows:

affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay until further notice from the Courts
or this Department.[17]
On 04 August 1997, public respondent Judge Victoria Isabel A. Paredes issued
the assailed order,[18] the pertinent portions of which read, thus:
The authority of the DILG to exercise general supervisory jurisdiction
over local government units, including the different leagues created
under the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) finds basis in
Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992. Specifically,
Section 1 (a) of the said Administrative Order provides a broad premise
for the supervisory power of the DILG. Administratively, the DILGs
supervision has been tacitly recognized by the local barangays,
municipalities, cities and provinces as shown by the evidences presented
by respondent David himself (See Annexes A to C). The fact that the
DILG has sought to refer the matters therein to the National Liga
Board/Directorate does not ipso facto mean that it has lost jurisdiction to
act directly therein. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be
claimed or lost through agreements or inaction by individuals. What
respondent David may term as interference should caretakership be
allowed, this Court would rather view as a necessary and desirable
corollary to the exercise of supervision.[19]
Political motivations must not preclude, hamper, or obstruct the delivery
of basic services and the perquisites of public service. In this case, the
fact of confusion arising from conflicting appointments, non-action, and
uninformed or wavering decisions of the incumbent National Liga
Board/Directorate, having been satisfactorily established, cannot simply
be brushed aside as being politically motivated or arising therefrom. It is
incumbent, therefore, that the DILG exercise a more active role in the
supervision of the affairs and operations of the National Liga Board/
Directorate at least until such time that the regular National Liga
Board/Directorate may have been elected, qualified and assumed office.
[20]

xxx
1.

All concerned are directed not to recognize and/or honor any Liga
Presidents of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as ex-officio
members of the sanggunian concerned until further notice from the
Courts or this Department;

2.

All concerned are directed to disregard any pronouncement and/or

directive issued by Mr. Alex David on any issue or matter relating to the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion of the DILG for

appointment as interim caretaker, until such time that the regularly
elected National Liga Board of Directors shall have qualified and
assumed office, to manage and administer the affairs of the National
Liga Board, is hereby GRANTED.[21]

75

On 11 August 1997, petitioner David filed an urgent motion for the

reconsideration of the assailed order and to declare respondent Secretary
Barbers in contempt of Court.[22] David claimed that the 04 August 1997 order
divested the duly elected members of the Board of Directors of the Liga National
Directorate of their positions without due process of law. He also wanted
Secretary Barbers declared in contempt for having issued, through his
Undersecretary, Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, even before respondent
judge issued the questioned order, in mockery of the justice system. He implied
that Secretary Barbers knew about respondent judges questioned order even
before it was promulgated.[23]
On 11 August 1997, the DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, [24]
providing supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the
provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter
of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The Memorandum Circular set the synchronized
elections for the provincial and metropolitan chapters on 23 August 1997 and for
the national chapter on 06 September 1997.
On 12 August 1997, the DILG issued a Certificate of Appointment [25] in favor of
respondent Rayos as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Caloocan City.
The appointment purportedly served as Rayoss legal basis for ex-officio
membership in the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City and to qualify
and participate in the forthcoming National Chapter Election of the Liga ng mga
Barangay.[26]
On 23 August 1997, the DILG conducted the synchronized elections of Provincial
and Metropolitan Liga Chapters. Thereafter, on 06 September 1997, the National
Liga Chapter held its election of officers and board of directors, wherein James
Marty L. Lim was elected as President of the National Liga.[27]
On 01 October 1997, public respondent judge denied Davids motion for
reconsideration,[28] ruling that there was no factual or legal basis to reconsider
the appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker of the National Liga Board and
to cite Secretary Barbers in contempt of court.[29]
On 10 October 1997, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari[30] under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul public respondent judges orders
of 04 August 1997 and 01 October 1997. They dispute the latters opinion on
the power of supervision of the President under the Constitution, through the
DILG over local governments, which is the same as that of the DILGs as shown
by its application of the power on the Liga ng mga Barangay. Specifically, they
claim that the public respondent judges designation of the DILG as interim
caretaker and the acts which the DILG sought to implement pursuant to its

designation as such are beyond the scope of the Chief Executives power of
supervision.
To support the petition, petitioners argue that under Administrative Order No.
267, Series of 1992, the power of general supervision of the President over local
government units does not apply to the Liga and its various chapters precisely
because the Liga is not a local government unit, contrary to the stance of the
respondents.[31]
Section 507 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) [32] provides
that the Liga shall be governed by its own Constitution and By-laws. Petitioners
posit that the duly elected officers and directors of the National Liga elected in
1994 had a vested right to their positions and could only be removed therefrom
for cause by affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the entire membership
pursuant to the Liga Constitution and By-Laws, and not by mere issuances of the
DILG, even if bolstered by the dubious authorization of respondent judge. [33]
Thus, petitioners claim that the questioned order divested the then incumbent
officers and directors of the Liga of their right to their respective offices without
due process of law.
Assuming the Liga could be subsumed under the term local governments, over
which the President, through the DILG Secretary, has the power of supervision,
[34]
petitioners point out that still there is no legal or constitutional basis for the
appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker. [35] They stress that the actions
contemplated by the DILG as interim caretaker go beyond supervision, as what it
had sought and obtained was authority to alter, modify, nullify or set aside the
actions of the Liga Board of Directors and even to substitute its judgment over
that of the latter which are all clearly one of control. [36] Petitioners question
the appointment of Rayos as Liga-Caloocan President since at that time
petitioner David was occupying that position which was still the subject of the
quo warranto proceedings Rayos himself had instituted.[37] Petitioners likewise
claim that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing supplemental
guidelines for the synchronized elections of the Liga, replaced the implementing
rules adopted by the Liga pursuant to its Constitution and By-laws. [38] In fact,
even before its appointment as interim caretaker, DILG specifically enjoined all
heads of government units from recognizing petitioner David and/or honoring
any of his pronouncements relating to the Liga.[39]
Petitioners rely on decision in Taule v. Santos,[40] which, they claim, already
passed upon the extent of authority of the then Secretary of Local Government
over the katipunan ng mga barangay or the barangay councils, as it specifically
ruled that the Secretary [of Local Government] has no authority to pass upon
the validity or regularity of the election of officers of the katipunan. [41]

76

For his part, respondent Rayos avers that since the Secretary of the DILG
supervises the acts of local officials by ensuring that they act within the scope of
their prescribed powers and functions and since members of the various
leagues, such as the Liga in this case, are themselves officials of local
government units, it follows that the Liga members are subject to the power of
supervision of the DILG.[42] He adds that as the DILGs management and
administration of the Liga affairs was limited only to the conduct of the elections,
its actions were consistent with its rule-making power and power of supervision
under existing laws.[43] He asserts that in assailing the appointment of the DILG
as interim caretaker, petitioners failed to cite any provision of positive law in
support of their stance. Thus, he adds, if a law is silent, obscure or insufficient,
a judge may apply a rule he sees fit to resolve the issue, as long as the rule
chosen is in harmony with general interest, order, morals and public policy, [44] in
consonance with Article 9 of the Civil Code. [45]
On the other hand, it is quite significant that the Solicitor General has shared
petitioners position. He states that the DILGs act of managing and
administering the affairs of the National Liga Board are not merely acts of
supervision but plain manifestations of control and direct takeover of the
functions of the National Liga Board,[46] going beyond the limits of the power of
general supervision of the President over local governments. [47] Moreover, while
the Liga may be deemed a government organization, it is not strictly a local
government unit over which the DILG has supervisory power. [48]
Meanwhile, on 24 September 1998, James Marty L. Lim, the newly elected
President of the National Liga, filed a Motion for Leave to File Comment in
Intervention,[49] with his Comment in Intervention attached,[50] invoking the
validity of the DILGs actions relative to the conduct of the Liga elections.[51] In
addition, he sought the dismissal of the instant petition on the following
grounds: (1) the issue of validity or invalidity of the questioned order has been
rendered moot and academic by the election of Liga officers; (2) the turn-over of
the administration and management of Liga affairs to the Liga officers; and (3)
the recognition and acceptance by the members of the Liga nationwide.[52]
In the interim, another petition, this time for Prohibition with Prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order, [53] was filed by several presidents of Liga
Chapters, praying that this Court declare the DILG Secretary and Undersecretary
are not vested with any constitutional or legal power to exercise control or even
supervision over the National Liga ng mga Barangay, nor to take over the
functions of its officers or suspend its constitution; and declare void any and all
acts committed by respondents therein in connection with their caretakership of
the Liga.[54] The petition was consolidated with G.R. No. 130775, but it was
eventually dismissed because the petitioners failed to submit an affidavit of
service and proof of service of the petition.[55]

Meanwhile, on 01 December 1998, petitioner David died and was substituted by

his legal representatives.[56]
Petitioners have raised a number of issues. [57] Integrated and simplified, these
issues boil down to the question of whether or not respondent Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing the DILG as interim caretaker to
administer and manage the affairs of the National Liga Board, per its order dated
04 August 1997.[58] In turn, the resolution of the question of grave abuse of
discretion entails a couple of definitive issues, namely: (1) whether the Liga ng
mga Barangay is a government organization that is subject to the DILG
Secretarys power of supervision over local governments as the alter ego of the
President, and (2) whether the respondent Judges designation of the DILG as
interim caretaker of the Liga has invested the DILG with control over the Liga
and whether DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, issued before it was
designated as such interim caretaker, and DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97193 and other acts which the DILG made in its capacity as interim caretaker of
the Liga, involve supervision or control of the Liga.
However, the Court should first address the question of mootness which
intervenor Lim raised because, according to him, during the pendency of the
present petition a general election was held; the new set of officers and directors
had assumed their positions; and that supervening events the DILG had turnedover the management and administration of the Liga to new Liga officers and
directors.[59] Respondent Rayos has joined him in this regard. [60] Forthwith, the
Court declares that these supervening events have not rendered the instant
petition moot, nor removed it from the jurisdiction of this Court.
This case transcends the elections ordered and conducted by the DILG as
interim caretaker of the Liga and the Liga officers and directors who were
elected to replace petitioner David and the former officers. At the core of the
petition is the validity of the DILGs caretakership of the Liga and the official
acts of the DILG as such caretaker which exceeded the bounds of supervision
and were exercise of control. At stake in this case is the realization of the
constitutionally ensconced principle of local government autonomy; [61] the
statutory objective to enhance the capabilities of barangays and municipalities
by providing them opportunities to participate actively in the implementation of
national programs and projects;[62] and the promotion of the avowed aim to
ensure the independence and non-partisanship of the Liga ng mga Barangay.
The mantle of local autonomy would be eviscerated and remain an empty
buzzword if unconstitutional, illegal and unwarranted intrusions in the affairs of
the local governments are tolerated and left unchecked.

77

Indeed, it is the declared policy of the State that its territorial and political
subdivisions should enjoy genuine meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. [63] In the case of De Leon
v. Esguerra,[64] the Court ruled that even barangays are meant to possess
genuine and meaningful local autonomy so that they may develop fully as selfreliant communities.[65]
Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.[66] For the question of whether the DILG may validly be appointed as
interim caretaker, or assume a similar position and perform acts pursuant
thereto, is likely to resurrect again, and yet the question may not be decided
before the actual assumption, or the termination of said assumption even.
So too, dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness could lead to the
wrong impression that the challenged order and issuances are valid. Verily, that
does not appear to be the correct conclusion to make since by applying opposite
precedents to the issues the outcome points to invalidating the assailed order
and memorandum circulars.
The resolution of the issues of whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to
DILG supervision, and whether the questioned caretakership order of the
respondent judge and the challenged issuances and acts of the DILG constitute
control in derogation of the Constitution, necessitates a brief overview of the
barangay, as the lowest LGU, and the Liga, as a vehicle of governance and
coordination.
As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and
implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects and
activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the
people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may
be amicably settled.[67]
On the other hand, the Liga ng mga Barangay[68] is the organization of all
barangays, the primary purpose of which is the determination of the
representation of the Liga in the sanggunians, and the ventilation, articulation,
and crystallization of issues affecting barangay government administration and
securing solutions thereto, through proper and legal means. [69] The Liga ng mga
Barangay shall have chapters at the municipal, city and provincial and
metropolitan political subdivision levels. [70] The municipal and city chapters of
the Liga are composed of the barangay representatives from the municipality or
city concerned. The presidents of the municipal and city chapters of the Liga
form the provincial or metropolitan political subdivision chapters of the Liga.

The presidents of the chapters of the Liga in highly urbanized cities, provinces
and the Metro Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions
constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.[71]
As conceptualized in the Local Government Code, the barangay is positioned to
influence and direct the development of the entire country. This was heralded
by the adoption of the bottom-to-top approach process of development which
requires the development plans of the barangay to be considered in the
development plans of the municipality, city or province, [72] whose plans in turn
are to be taken into account by the central government [73] in its plans for the
development of the entire country. [74] The Liga is the vehicle assigned to make
this new development approach materialize and produce results.
The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels,
automatically become ex-officio members of the Sangguniang Bayan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respectively. They
shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents of the Liga
chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian
concerned.[75]
The Liga ng mga Barangay has one principal aim, namely: to promote the
development of barangays and secure the general welfare of their inhabitants. [76]
In line with this, the Liga is granted the following functions and duties:
a
)
b
)
c)
d
)
e
)
f)

Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the

barangays and in consonance with the policies, programs and projects of
the national government;
Assist in the education of barangay residents for peoples participation in
local government administration in order to promote untied and
concerted action to achieve country-wide development goals;
Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful employment
within the barangay;
Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials;
Serve as forum of the barangays in order to forge linkages with
government and non-governmental organizations and thereby promote
the social, economic and political well-being of the barangays; and
Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions
which will bring about stronger ties between barangays and promote the
welfare of the barangay inhabitants.[77]

The Ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government
Code. However, they are empowered to make their own constitution and bylaws to govern their operations. Sec. 507 of the Code provides:

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Sec. 507. Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga and the Leagues. - All
other matters not herein otherwise provided for affecting the internal
organization of the leagues of local government units shall be governed
by their respective constitution and by-laws which are hereby made
suppletory to the provision of this Chapter: Provided, That said
Constitution and By-laws shall always conform to the provision of the
Constitution and existing laws.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code, the Liga ng mga Barangay adopted its
own Constitution and By-Laws. It provides that the corporate powers of the Liga,
expressed or implied, shall be vested in the board of directors of each level of
the Liga which shall:
a) Have jurisdiction over all officers, directors and committees of the said
Liga; including the power of appointment, assignment and delegation;
b) Have general management of the business, property, and funds of said
Liga;
c)

Prepare and approve a budget showing anticipated receipts and

expenditures for the year, including the plans or schemes for funding
purposes; and

officers perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to
compel his subordinates to perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. [84] In Taule v. Santos,[85] the
Court held that the Constitution permits the President to wield no more authority
than that of checking whether a local government or its officers perform their
duties as provided by statutory enactments. [86] Supervisory power, when
contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it
does not include any restraining authority over such body. [87]
The case of Drilon v. Lim[88] clearly defined the extent of supervisory power, thus:
The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed,
he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the
prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of
the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that the rules
are followed[89]
In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng mga
Barangay? Otherwise put, is the Liga legally susceptible to DILG suspension?

d) Have the power to suspend or remove from office any officer or member
of the said board on grounds cited and in the manner provided in
hereinunder provisions.[78]

This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez,[90] where the Court ruled
that the Presidents power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by
the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.

The National Liga Board of Directors promulgated the rules for the conduct of its
Ligas general elections.[79] And, as early as 28 April 1997, the Liga National
Chapter had already scheduled its general elections on 14 June 1997. [80]

Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng

mga barangay, which is not a local government unit?

The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X of the

Constitution, which reads in part:
Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the Presidents
power of supervision over local governments and his power of control of the
executive departments bureaus and offices. [81] Similar to the counterpart
provisions in the earlier Constitutions, the provision in the 1987 Constitution
provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. [82]
In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al.,[83] this Court defined supervision
as overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate

We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the

Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a
government organization, being an association, federation, league or
union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either
appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code
defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for
the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the
sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues
affecting barangay government administration and securing, through
proper and legal means, solutions thereto.[91]
The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident,
whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an
aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented therein by their

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respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio

capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy
all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors,
city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga
is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment of
ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher
than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for
the bottom-to-top approach of development.
In the case at bar, even before the respondent Judge designated the DILG as
interim caretaker of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued Memorandum Circular
No. 97-176, directing local government officials not to recognize David as the
National Liga President and his pronouncements relating to the affairs of the
Liga. Not only was the action premature, it even smacked of superciliousness
and injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost government agency which
maintains coordination with, and exercises supervision over local government
units and its multi-level leagues. As such, it should be forthright, circumspect
and supportive in its dealings with the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga
Barangay. The indispensable role played by the latter in the development of the
barangays and the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve
no less than the full support and respect of the other agencies of government.
As the Court held in the case of San Juan v. Civil Service Commission,[92] our
national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these
provisions are based.[93]
When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim caretaker
to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the
management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the
DILG. Even a cursory glance at the DILGs prayer for appointment as interim
caretaker of the Liga to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga,
until such time that the new set of National Liga officers shall have been duly
elected and assumed office reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take
control over the Liga. Even if said caretakership was contemplated to last for a
limited time, or only until a new set of officers assume office, the fact remains
that it was a conferment of control in derogation of the Constitution.
With his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga,
Secretary Barbers nullified the results of the Liga elections and promulgated
DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 dated 11 August 1997, where he laid
down the supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the
provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter
of the Liga ng mga Barangay; scheduled dates for the new provincial,

metropolitan and national chapter elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as

president of Liga-Caloocan Chapter.
These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and
constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but
more importantly, of the barangay as an institution. The election of Liga officers
is part of the Ligas internal organization, for which the latter has already
provided guidelines. In succession, the DILG assumed stewardship and
jurisdiction over the Liga affairs, issued supplemental guidelines for the election,
and nullified the effects of the Liga-conducted elections. Clearly, what the DILG
wielded was the power of control which even the President does not have.
Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it appointed respondent Rayos as
president of the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly scheduled general
Liga elections, although petitioner Davids term had not yet expired. The DILG
substituted its choice, who was Rayos, over the choice of majority of the punong
barangay of Caloocan, who was the incumbent President, petitioner David. The
latter was elected and had in fact been sitting as an ex-officio member of the
sangguniang panlungsod in accordance with the Liga Constitution and By-Laws.
Yet, the DILG extended the appointment to respondent Rayos although it was
aware that the position was the subject of a quo warranto proceeding instituted
by Rayos himself, thereby preempting the outcome of that case. It was bad
enough that the DILG assumed the power of control, it was worse when it made
use of the power with evident bias and partiality.
As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILGs
authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it
cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or
replace them. In this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was
review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the
elections to determine if they committed any violation of the Ligas Constitution
and By-laws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and its
officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered the Liga to
conduct another election in accordance with the Ligas own rules, but not in
obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to
remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them, even temporarily,
with unelected Liga officers.
Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to
control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.
In the Bito-Onon[94] case, this Court held that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97193, insofar as it authorized the filing of a petition for review of the decision of
the Board of Election Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a post-

80

proclamation electoral protest, involved the exercise of control as it in effect

amended the guidelines already promulgated by the Liga. The decision reads in
part:
xxx. Officers in control, lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or
redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely
see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If
the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to
conform for to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner
the doing of the act.
xxx
xxx. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the
power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the
President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the
power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the
Administrative Code limits its authority to merely monitoring
compliance by local government units of such issuances. To monitor
means to watch, observe or check and is compatible with the power of
supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is
limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the
officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments.
Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere
with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of
the local government.[95]
In Taule,[96] the Court ruled that the Secretary of Local Government had no
authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers of
katipunan ng mga barangay or barangay councils. In that case, a protest was
lodged before the Secretary of Local Government regarding several irregularities
in, and seeking the nullification of, the election of officers of the Federation of
Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes. Then Local

Government Secretary Luis Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of

officers and ordered a new one to be conducted. The Court ruled:
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general
supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that
respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary
to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution
grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials
for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan
activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of
local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be
achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be
presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by
the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not
permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision
over local governments.[97]
All given, the Court is convinced that the assailed order was issued with grave
abuse of discretion while the acts of the respondent Secretary, including DILG
Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are unconstitutional and
ultra vires, as they all entailed the conferment or exercise of control a power
which is denied by the Constitution even to the President.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court
dated 04 August 1997 is SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. DILG Memorandum
Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are declared VOID for being
unconstitutional and ultra vires.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.

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