Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 662
188 U.S.P.Q. 546
Frank L. Bate, Shanley & Fisher, Newark, N.J., James G. Foley, Philip T.
Shannon, Pennie & Edmonds, New York City, for appellant-cross
appellee.
Thomas F. Curry, Framingham, Mass., for appellee.
John N. Bain, Bain, Gilfillan & Rhodes, Newark, N.J., for appellees-cross
appellants.
Before VAN DUSEN, HASTIE and HUNTER, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge:
The instant appeals arise from a district court adjudication of certain disputes
concerning a patent for plastic shipping envelopes. The factual and technical
background is fully set forth in the opinion below, ADM Corp. v. Speedmaster
Packaging Corp., 384 F.Supp. 1325 (D.N.J.1974), but a brief summary of the
After an April, 1974 trial to the court lasting several weeks, the trial judge
made the following dispositions of the remaining claims:
Speedmaster appeals from the first of these holdings, while ADM appeals from
the third and fourth.3
I. PATENT INVALIDITY
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The determination that patent No. 3,339,826 is invalid for obviousness under
35 U.S.C. 1034 will be affirmed. After a careful consideration of
Speedmaster's contentions, we find no flaw in the trial court's legal analysis
under Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545
(1966), and related cases.5 If anything, the opinion has given the benefit of any
doubts to the patent owner. Nor has an examination of the record and the
devices in question revealed any underlying finding of fact which could be said
to be clearly erroneous. Since the court will not substitute its independent
judgment, the determination of obviousness will stand. We therefore have no
need at this point to consider the other grounds of invalidity advanced by ADM
and rejected by the district court.6
It is equally clear that the trial court's refusal to award attorneys' fees should not
be disturbed. In its extensive arguments on this point ADM seems to have
misapprehended the language of 35 U.S.C. 285, which governs the award of
attorneys' fees in patent cases:
11 court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
The
party.
12
13
Furthermore, we note that 285 speaks in permissive terms, so that the award
of attorneys' fees lies in the trial court's discretion. Randolph Laboratories v.
Specialties Development Corp., 213 F.2d 873 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
861, 75 S.Ct. 91, 99 L.Ed. 678 (1954). Thus even if we were inclined to agree
that ADM had shown the elements of an 'exceptional case,' a different result
would not necessarily be indicated, since the trial court here quite clearly did
not feel that the circumstances 'would make it greatly unjust for (the prevailing
party) to take care of its own counsel fees . . ..' Jacquard Knitting Machine Co.
v. Ordnance Gauge Co., 213 F.2d 503, 509 (3d Cir. 1954). In short, ADM has
failed to carry 'the double burden in this court of clearly establishing the
existence of an exceptional case and the abuse of discretion by the trial court in
not awarding attorney fees.' Q-Panel Co. v. Newfield, 482 F.2d 210, 211 (10th
Cir. 1973). (emphasis added).
III. COSTS
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The trial court arrived at its allocation of costs by holding that the prevailing
party on the validity/infringement issue, ADM, was not entitled to costs and
that Dennison, the prevailing party on the 'malicious abuse of process' issue,
was entitled to costs.
We now hold that when a district court finds that the prevailing party is not
entitled to its costs, it should support that determination with an explanation.8
The trial court here set forth its explanation in footnote 25 at 384 F.Supp. 1351:
We recognize the trial court's right to deny costs where the prevailing party has
unduly extended or complicated resolution of the issues. We also recognize an
attorney's duty to provide a client with complete and vigorous representation by
raising every good faith claim or defense in its behalf. We believe that in
balancing these factors, the trial court must take care to evaluate the attorney's
decision as of the time it was made, and not with the aid of hindsight gained
from the collection and evaluation of evidence on the additional issues.
22
.23. . the denial of costs to the prevailing party . . . is in the nature of a penalty for
some defection on his part in the course of the litigation . . ..
24
IV. CONCLUSION
25
The judgment of the district court on the issues of patent invalidity and
attorneys' fees will be affirmed and the case remanded for a consideration of
the costs issue in a manner consistent with this opinion.
26
Suit was initially filed against Stanley Beskind, the patentee. Speedmaster was
later substituted as assignee of the patent
The third-party claims against Mota and Osborne need not receive any separate
attention since all parties have proceeded as if these two individuals, principals
of ADM, stand in exactly the same position as ADM
While ADM still urges the facts upon which its malicious abuse of process
claims were based, it does so only in the context of its claims for attorneys' fees.
See part III, infra
35 U.S.C. 103:
Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made.
ADM's claims that the patent is invalid for anticipation under 35 U.S.C.
102(a) (prior use by others), 102(b) (on sale more than one year prior to the
application for a patent) or 102(g) (prior invention by another) are rejected at
384 F.Supp. 1330--43
Note 6, supra
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