Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CHAPTER 4
GENERAL OBLIGATION
A. To PRESERVE the thing
to take care of the thing sold with the diligence of a good father of a family unless the
law or the stipulation requires another standard of care. (Art. 1163, 1480).
In case of loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing BEFORE delivery, the rules
under Art. 1189 shall be observed, the vendor being considered the debtor. (Art.
1538)
B. to DELIVER the thing sold
The vendor is bound to deliver the thing sold and its accessions and accessories in
the condition in which they were upon the perfection of the contract. All the fruits
shall pertain to the vendee from the day on which the contract is PERFECTED. (Art.
1537)
As a RULE, the creditor has the right to the fruits of the thing from the time the
obligation to deliver arises (Art. 1164), but in a contract of sale, the fruits shall
pertain to the buyer from the day the contract was perfected. (Art. 1537) The parties
may, however, stipulate that the fruits of the thing sold shall pertain to the buyer at
some future tie such as when the obligation is one with a period.
FORM of DELIVERY
1. Physical/Actual/Real Delivary delivery by physically placing the thing in the
hands of the vendee in case of movables or placing it in his possession and
control in the case of immovables.
2. Constructive or legal delivery
a. by legal formalities through public instrument (1498)
b. traditio simbolica e.g. delivery of the keys (also called traditio clavium)
(1498)
c. traditio longa manu delivery of a movable by mere consent or agreement of
the parties (1499)
d. traditio brevi manu vendee is already in possession of the thing
e. Constitutum possessorium vendor continues to be in possession of the thing
sold but in another capacity such as that of a lessee or depositary. (1500)
CASES
i.
Kinds of Delivery
SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO S. BABASANTA, SPS.
MIGUEL LU and PACITA ZAVALLA LU
G.R. No. 124242
By: Maila Omolon, Michele Espina, Janel Obnimaga, Jesa Carla Balahadia, Eduard Conde
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ii.
Possession vs Ownership
MEDINA vs. GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 140228, November 19, 2004
Facts
On June 5, 1962, Pedro, his brother Alberto Medina and his niece Nazaria Cruz (Alberto's daughter)
executed a notarized Contract to Sell in favor of respondent Greenfield Development Corporation over a parcel of
land in Muntinlupa City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 100177 (Lot 90-A). A notarized Deed of
Sale covering said property was subsequently entered into on June 27, 1962, in favor of respondent, and this time
signed by Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and
Nazaria Cruz, as vendors. Thereafter, a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage was executed on
September 4, 1964 in favor of respondent over Lot 90-B covered by TCT No. 100178, and was signed by Pedro,
Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz.
By virtue of these sales, respondent was able to register in its name the title to the two parcels of land.
These properties were consolidated with other lots and were eventually registered on July 19, 1995, in the name
of respondent.
On November 6, 1998, petitioners instituted an action for annulment of titles and deeds, reconveyance,
damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order, against respondent alleging that they are co-owners of
those two parcels of land. While the titles were registered in the names of Pedro, Alberto, Cornelio, Brigida and
Gregoria, all surnamed Medina, they alleged that they were recognized as co-owners thereof. In support of their
By: Maila Omolon, Michele Espina, Janel Obnimaga, Jesa Carla Balahadia, Eduard Conde
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Whether or not respondent was in constructive possession of the subject premises notwithstanding those
petitioners are in actual possession thereof.
Held
The respondent was in constructive possession of the subject lots. Possession and ownership are two
different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession
inconsistent with ownership. Even assuming that petitioners' allegations are true, it bears no legal consequence in
the case at hand because the execution of the deeds of conveyances is already deemed equivalent to delivery of
the property to respondent, and prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required. Under Article 1498 of
the Civil Code, "when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to
the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred."
Possession is also transferred, along with ownership thereof, to respondent by virtue of the notarized deeds of
conveyances.
In sum, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction,
and the Court of Appeals was correct in nullifying the same. Hence, the present petition is denied for lack of merit.
iii.
By: Maila Omolon, Michele Espina, Janel Obnimaga, Jesa Carla Balahadia, Eduard Conde
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iv.
Topic: Transfer of ownership by placing titles of ownership in the possession of the vendee.
Facts
On May 9, 1904, the sheriff of Nueva Ecija publicly announced that pursuant to a judgment rendered by the justice
of the peace of Cabanatuan against Paulino Mendiola and his property, a lot and a warehouse situated in
Sumacab of the case municipality is to be put in auction. The description of the property is given in the notice and
corresponds with that contained in the complaint. At the auction on June 2, 1904, Emilio Vergara was the highest
bidder and the lot and warehouse were knocked down to him. On February 10, 1906, Emilio Vergara sold the said
lot and warehouse acquired at auction to Maria Ramares; and the latter, in turn, sold them, on December 29,
1910, to Jose Aquino, their present possessor. In 1906 the lot was still assessed as being the property of Paulino
Mendiola.
The record in this case shows the following evident facts; (1) That as far back as 1895 the said lot was recorded in
the property registry of Nueva Ecija in the name of owners, who, on December 18, 1894, had conferred upon
Mateo del Rosario power to administer their property and especially to sell it, and, in the exercise of this authority,
Mateo del Rosario sold the lot and warehouse in question to Paulino Mendiola who in turn sold them to Ciriaco
Bautista on August 13, 1895, all of which sales were recorded in the said property registry. (2) That Paulino
Mendiola, notwithstanding the sale made to Ciriaco Bautista, continued in the possession of the lot and
warehouse, pursuant to a contract of lease executed between himself and the latter. Hence, in 1904, when the
judgment of the justice of the peace of Cabanatuan was rendered against Mendiola, the said property was
attached as though it still at that time belonged to him.
However, it is not Ciriaco Bautista, the last owner recorded in the registry, but Bartolome Tablante who now
intervenes for the recovery of the said property. The latter averred in his complaint that he purchased it from the
former and presented as the only proof of such purchase a letter addressed to him by Ciriaco Bautista.
With this proof and the titles aforementioned presented by the plaintiff, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
rendered judgment in the case "by sentencing Jose Aquino to deliver the plaintiff, Bartolome Tablante, the
property in litigation and to pay to the said plaintiff the sum of P387.50 with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per
cent per annum from this date, and to pay the costs of this suit."
Issue
Who between Tablante and Aquino is the rightful owner of the lot and the warehouse?
Held
Bartolome Tablante is the owner of the lot and warehouse described in the complaint.
The ownership of things is not transferred from one person to another by mere consent in the contract, but
through the delivery of the thing that is the subject of the contract. In the present case, it is admitted by the
appellee that there was no material delivery of the lot and warehouse by Ciriaco Bautista to Bartolome Tablante,
as up to now no proof has been presented of a contract of sale made between Bautista and Tablante.
Nevertheless, the law prescribes that the "the placing of the titles of ownership in the possession of the vendee or
the use which he may make of his right with the consent of the vendor shall be considered as a delivery." (Civil
Code, art. 1464.) The title deeds form the plaintiff's Exhibit A, and the use of his right by the purchaser who in his
complaint lays claim to the lot and the warehouse, appear to have been consented to by the vendor, by means of
the aforementioned Exhibit B (letter). It is the same as though Ciriaco Bautista were the intervener, and if he had
been, there would have been no cause for discussion.
Aquino was a possessor in good faith. "Any person who is aware that there is in his title or in the manner of
acquiring it any flaw invalidating the same shall be considered a possessor in good faith."(Civil Code, art. 433.)
"Good faith is always presumed, and any person alleging bad faith on the part of the possessor is obliged to prove
it." (Civil Code, art. 234.) Tablante could not have averred, nor did he aver in his complaint the defendant was
By: Maila Omolon, Michele Espina, Janel Obnimaga, Jesa Carla Balahadia, Eduard Conde
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v.
Whether or not a registered writ of attachment on the land is a superior lien over that of an earlier
unregistered deed of sale.
Held
It is a settled rule that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale. This
result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the property involved was duly covered by the Torrens system
which works under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the
prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property,
enforceable against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which
nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding,
in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners
debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the
judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
It bears stressing that in this case, though the subject land was deeded to petitioner as early as December 5,
1995, it was not until June 6, 1996 that the conveyance was registered, and, during that interregnum, the land was
subjected to a levy on attachment. It should also be observed that, at the time of the attachment of the property on
April 23, 1996, the spouses Uy were still the registered owners of said property.
Under the law, the execution of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner was not enough as a succeeding step had to
be taken, which was the registration of the sale from the spouses Uy to him. Insofar as third persons are
concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a persons interest in real property is the registration of the deed.
Thus, when petitioner bought the property on December 5, 1995, it was, at that point, no more than a private
transaction between him and the spouses Uy. It needed to be registered before it could bind third parties,
including respondents. When the registration finally took place on June 6, 1996, it was already too late because,
by then, the levy in favor of respondents, pursuant to the preliminary attachment ordered by the General Santos
City RTC, had already been annotated on the title.
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vi.
C. To TRANSFER OWNERSHIP
The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment the thing
is delivered to him. (Art. 1496)
Determination of place consummation of contract for purposes of imposing sales tax
(see 1503)
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals
G.R. No. L-20601; February 28, 1966
Expenses of delivery are borne by the seller: In sales F.O.B (free on board) or F.A.S (free alongside ship)
FACTS:
During the period of January 31, 1951 to June 8, 1953, Butuan Sawmill Inc. sold logs to Japanese firms at
prices FOB Vessel Magallanes, Agusan. The FOB prices included costs of loading, wharfage stevedoring and other
costs in the Philippines. The freight was paid by the Japanese buyers and the payments of the logs were effected by
means of letters of credit in favor of petitioner and payable through the Philippine National Bank or any other bank
named by it. Upon investigation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it was ascertained that no sales tax was filed by
petitioner and neither did it pay the corresponding tax on sales. Petitioner contends that the disputed sales were
consummated in Japan, and, therefore, not subject to the taxing jurisdiction of our Government.
The lower court upheld the legality and correctness of the amended assessment of the sales tax and surcharge, ruling
that the sales in question were domestic or local sales, and therefore subject to sales tax under the provisions of the
Tax Code.
ISSUE:
Who shall bear the expenses of delivery?
RULING:
SC ruled that the export sales have been consummated in the Philippines and were, accordingly, subject to
sales tax therein. Expenses of and incidental to putting the goods into a deliverable state must be borne by the seller
unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
That the specification in the bill of lading to the effect that goods are deliverable to the order of the seller or his agent
does not necessarily negate the passing of title to the goods upon delivery to the carrier is clear from the 2 nd paragraph
of Article 1503 of the Civil Code.
By: Maila Omolon, Michele Espina, Janel Obnimaga, Jesa Carla Balahadia, Eduard Conde
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II.
KINDS
A. Negotiable
i.
Definition
A negotiable document of title is one in which it is stated that the goods will be
delivered to bearer, or to the order of any persin named in such document.
(1507)
ii.
Negotiable
i.
Definition
ii.
WAYS
A. By Delivery (1508 par. 1)
If by the terms of the document of title, the carrier,
warehouseman or other bailee issuing it undertakes to deliver the
goods to bearer.
Effect of special indorsement of a document of title which states
that the goods are deliverable to bearer:
The document of title becomes an order document of title.
Consequently, it may be further negotiated by the indorsee only
by indorsement completed by delivery.
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Whether or not the bank is the owner and is entitled to possession of the property.
Held
The court hold that in January, 1919, the bank became and remained the owner of the five quedans Nos. 30,
35, 38, 41 and 42; that they were in form negotiable, and that, as such owner, it was legally entitled to the
possession and control of the property therein described at the time the insolvency petition was filed and had
a right to sell it and apply the proceeds of the sale to its promissory notes, including the three notes of
P18,000 each, which were formerly secured by the three quedans Nos. 33, 36, and 39, which the bank
surrendered to the firm. That is to say, the bank had a legal right to apply the proceeds from the property
descried in the five remaining quedans to the payment of its eight promissory notes.
The execution of the notes, the physical possession of the negotiable quedan, or warehouse receipt, and the
recognition of ownership by the warehouseman, legally carried with it both the titled to, and the possession of,
the property. In such a case, a title is not founded on a public instrument which should be authenticated by a
notary or by competent public official. Legally speaking, the execution of the promissory notes and the
pledging of the quedans, or warehouse receipts, as collateral, and the describing of them in the notes, and the
manual delivery of the quedan, or warehouse receipt itself carries with it not only the title, but the legal
possession of the property.
In other words, as to the property described in the quedans, or warehouse receipts, which were pledged, as
collateral, in January, 1919, to secure the eight respective promissory notes, both the title and the possession
of that property were delivered to and vested in the defendant bank in January, 1919. Three of those quedans,
or warehouse receipts, were returned to the firm by the bank on February 10, 1919, but the bank still owned
and held the notes, which were secured by those warehouse receipts, and no part of the debt itself was paid
by or through the surrender of the receipts. For such reason, as to the first cause of action, the plaintiff cannot
recover, and, as to it, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
iii.
Validity of negotiation
Art. 1518. The validity of the negotiation of a negotiable document of
title is not impaired by the fact that the negotiation was a breach of duty
on the part of the person making the negotiation, or by the fact that the
owner of the document was deprived of the possession of the same by
loss, theft, fraud, accident, mistake, duress, or conversion, if the person
to whom the document was negotiated or a person to whom the
document was subsequently negotiated paid value therefor in good faith
without notice of the breach of duty, or loss, theft, fraud, accident,
mistake, duress or conversion. (n)
The validity of the negotiation, if the person to whom the document is
negotiated or a person to whom the document is subsequently
negotiated was a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice, is
not impaired by the following:
a. That the negotiation was made in breach of duty of the
person negotiating
b. That the owner of the document was deprived of the
possession of the same by loss, theft, fraud, accident,
mistake, duress or conversion.
iv.
v.
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B. PLACE
i.
Place stipulated
ii.
If there is no stipulation, place fixed by usage or trade
iii.
In the absence of both, the sellers place of business if he has one; if non,
the sellers place of residence. However, in the case of sale of specific
goods, which to the knowledge of the parties when the contract was
made were in some other place, that place shall be the place of delivery.
(1521)
II.
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III.
EXPENSES OF DELIVERY ARE BORNE BY THE SELLER (1247) (1521 last par.)
The seller bears the expenses of and incidental to putting the goods into a
deliverable state, unless otherwise stipulated. (1521)
A. In sales C.I.F. (see Behn, Meyer & Co. vs Yangco, 38 Phil 602)
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I.
DEFINITION
An unpaid seller is one who has not been paid or tendered the whole of the price has
received a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument as conditionla payment
and the condition under which it was received has been broken by reason of the
dishonor of the instrument, the insolvency of the buyer, or otherwise. (1525)
II.
RIGHTS
a. Possessory lien, or lien on the goods or right to retain them while he is
in possessionof the (1526)
When available
This right is available to the seller and notwithstanding the he may be in
possession of the goods as agent or bailee for the buyer in the following
instances:
When the goods have been sold without any stipulation as to credit
Where the goods have been sold on credit, but the credit term has expired
Where the buyer is insolvent (1527)
Lien where there is partial delivery he may exercise his right of lien on the
remainder, unless such part delivery has been made under such circumstances as
to show and intent to waive or right of retention. (1528)
When lien is lost
The unpaid seller losses his lien on the goods in the following cases:
When he delivers the goods to a carrier or other bailee for the purpose of
transmission to the buyer without reserving the ownership in the goods or
the right to the possession thereof.
When the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains possession of the goods
By waiver thereof (1529)
The unpaid seller having lien on the goods does not lose his lien by reason only
that he has obtained judgment or decree for the price of the goods. (1529)
b. Right of stoppage in transitu
When available
The buyer is insolvent
Unpaid seller has parted with the possession of the goods
Effect of partial delivery
How exercised
1. By obtaining actual possession
2. By giving notice of his claim to the carrier or other bailee in whose possession
the goods are
The notice maybe given either to the person in actual possesion of the goods
or to his principal. If given to the principal, the notice to be effectual, must be
given at such time and under such circumstances that the principal, by the
exercise of reasonable diligence may prevent delivery to the buyer.
When notice is given to the carrier or other bailee for the buyer, he must
redeliver the goods to, or according to the instructions of the seller, with the
seller bearing the expenses of the delivery. However, if a negotiable document
of title representing the goods has been issued, the carrier or other bailee shall
not be obliged or justified in delivering the goods to the seller unless such
document is first surrendered to him. (1532)
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Held
Katigbak claims that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the doctrine enunciated in the Hanlon v.
Hausserman case which states that:
.... In the present case the contract between Hanlon and the mining company was executory as to both parties,
and the obligation of the company to deliver the shares could not arise until Hanlon should pay or tender payment
of the money. The situation is similar to that which arises every day in business transactions in which the
purchaser of goods upon an executory contract fails to take delivery and pay the purchase price. The vendor in
such case is entitled to resell the goods. If he is obliged to sell for less than the contract price, he holds the buyer
for the difference; if he sells for as much as or more than the contract price, the breach of contract by the original
buyer is damnum absque injuria. But it has never been held that there is any need of an action of rescission to
authorize the vendor, who is still in possession, to dispose of the property where the buyer fails to pay the price
and take delivery...
The facts of the case under consideration are identical to those of the Hanlon case. The herein petitioner failed to
take delivery of the winch, subject matter of the contract and such failure or breach was, according to the Court of
Appeals, attributable to him, a fact which We are bound to accept under existing jurisprudence. The right to resell
the equipment, therefore, cannot be disputed. It was also found by the Court of Appeals that in the subsequent
sale of the winch to a third party, the vendor thereof lost P2,000.00, the sale having been only for P10,000.00,
instead of P12,000.00 as agreed upon, said difference to be borne by the supposed vendee who failed to take
delivery and/or to pay the price.
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Effect of sale or other disposition of the goods by the original buyer on the
right of the unpaid seller
A. General rule
The sellers possessory lien or right of stoppage in transitu is not affected by
any sale or disposition of the goods made by the buyer.
B. Exceptions
When the seller has assented to the sale of the buyer
When a negotiable document of title representing the goods has been
negotiated to a purchaser for value in good faith (1535)
Completeness of Delivery
A. Real estate
Where it is sold per unit or number
The vendor shall deliver the are mentioned in the contract of sale. However, if
the actual area is more or less than the area specified in the contract, or if a
part of the immovable is not of the quality specified therein, the following rules
shall be observed
1. If the actual area is less than the stated in the contract. (1539) The
buyer may:
Ask for the reduction of the price if the lack in area is less than
1/10 of that stated in the contract, unless the vendee would have
not bought the thing had he known of its smaller area, in which
case, he may opt to rescind the sale
Rescind the sale if the lack in the area is not less than 1/10 of that
stated
2. If the
buyer
actual area is more than that stated in the contract (1540) The
may:
Accept the area stated in the contract and reject the rest
Accept the whole area and pay for them at the contract rate
3. If the areas is the same but a part of the immovable is not of the quality
specified in the contract (1539)
Ask for the reduction of the price if the lack in area is less than
1/10 of that stated in the contract, unless the vendee would have
not bought the thing had he known of its inferior quality, in which
case, he may opt to rescind the sale
Rescind the sale if the inferior value of the thing exceeds 1/10 of
the price agreed
Cebu Winland Development Corporation vs. Ong Siao Hua
G.R. No. 173215; May 21, 2009
Completeness of Delivery; Real Estate: where it is sold per unit or number; prescription of the action
FACTS:
Cebu Winland Development Corporation is the owner and developer of a condominium project called the
Cebu Winland Tower Condominium. Ong Siao Hua is a buyer of two condominium units and four parking slots
from petitioner.
Respondent bought two condominium units as well as four parking slots. The area per condominium unit as
indicated in petitioners price list is 155 square meters and the price per square meter is P22,378.95.
The price for the parking lot is P240,000 each. Respondent, therefore, paid P2,298,655.08 as down payment
and issued 24 postdated checks in the amount of P223,430.70 per check for the balance of the purchase
price in the total amount of P5,362,385.
On October 10, 1996, possession of the subject properties was turned over to respondent. The deeds of
absolute sale have yet to be signed by Ong Siao Hua.
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RULING:
1.
SC ruled that the action of the respondent has not yet prescribed.
Under Article 1543, the actions arising from Articles 1539 and 1542 shall prescribe in six months, counted
from the date of delivery.
In the case at bar, it has already been ruled that there has been no delivery yet. There has been no transfer of
ownership of the subject properties since the deeds of absolute sale have not yet been executed by the
parties. What has been transferred was possession only and not of the subject properties.
3.
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Rules applicable in sale sold per unit or number and lump sum.
Lump sum
---no increase or decrease of the price, although there be a greater or lesser area or number than that stated
in the contract.
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FACTS:
Spouses Pablo and Escolastica Mabanta were the registered owners of two lots located in Patul and
Capaltitan, Santiago, Isabela. On October 25, 1975, they mortgaged both lots with the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as collateral for a loan. Five years thereafter (September 1980), spouses
Mabanta sold the lots to Susana Soriano by way of a Deed of Sale of Parcels of Land With Assumption
of Mortgage. Included in the Deed is an agreement that they could repurchase the lots within a period of
two (2) years.
Spouses Mabanta failed to repurchase the lots. But sometime in 1984, they were able to convince
Alejandro Gabriel to purchase the lots from Susana Soriano. As consideration, Alejandro delivered to
Susana a 500-square meter residential lot with an actual value of P40,000.00 and paid spouses Mabanta
the sum of P5,000.00. Spouses Mabanta executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in
favor of Alejandro. For her part, Susana executed a document entitled Cancellation of Contract
whereby she transferred to Alejandro all her rights over the two lots.
Alejandro and his son Alfredo cultivated the lots. They also caused the restructuring of spouses
Mabantas loan with the DBP. However, when they were ready to pay the entire loan, they found that
spouses Benito and Pura Tan had paid it and that the mortgage was already cancelled.
Benito Tan, father of Zenaida Tan-Reyes, approached the Gabriels to refund the sum of P5, 000 which
they paid to the Spouses Mabanta. Alejandro refused because Tan was unwilling to return the formers
500-square meter lot delivered to Susana as purchase price for the lots. Thereafter, spouses Tan tried to
eject Alejandro.
Alejandro and Alfredo filed a complaint against spouses Mabanta, spouses Tan, the DBP and barangay
officials Dominador Maylem and Alejandro Tridanio. During the proceedings, it turned out that it was
spouses Tans daughter, Zenaida Tan-Reyes who bought one of the lots from spouses Mabanta on
August 21, 1985. Not having been impleaded as party-defendant, she filed an answer-in-intervention
alleging that she is the registered owner of the lot and that she is an innocent purchaser in good faith and
for value.
Trial Court ruled in favor of Alejandro and Alfredo Gabriel. It ratiocinated that Zenaida Tan was not an
innocent purchaser for value. Her registration was not made in good faith. Unsatisfied, spouses Mabanta
and Zenaida Tan-Reyes appealed before the CA.
CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court and held that the second sale between spouses Mabanta and
Zenaida was valid. Its basis is the principle that a person dealing with registered land may simply rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title and, in the absence of anything to engender suspicion, he is
under no obligation to look beyond it.
Aggrieved, the Gabriels filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the registration of the second sale confers better right to Zenaida Reyes-Tan over the
disputed property;
2.
Whether or not Zenaida Tan is an innocent purchaser for value and good faith.
RULING:
1.
The registration made by Zenaida Tan was made in bad faith. Hence, she does not have a better right
over the Gabriels.
The requirement under the law is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in good faith.
The prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or
a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with
good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that the governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in
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Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private respondents never
took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor
has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is in actual
possession of the immovable property.
CORONEL, et al. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA
PATRICIA ALCARAZ
G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996
Facts
On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et al. (hereinafter referred to as
Coronels) executed a document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment" in favor of plaintiff Ramona
Patricia Alcaraz the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of their inherited house and lot,
covered by TCT No. 119627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of
P1,240,000.00. They bind themselves to effect the transfer in their names from their deceased father,
Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon receipt of the down payment
above-stated. On their presentation of the TCT already in their name, they will immediately execute
the deed of absolute sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall immediately pay
the balance of the P1,190,000.00. On the same date (January 15, 1985), plaintiff-appellee
Concepcion D. Alcaraz (hereinafter referred to as Concepcion), mother of Ramona, paid the down
payment of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels' father was
transferred in their names under TCT No. 327043. On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the
property covered by TCT No. 327043 to intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag (hereinafter
referred to as Catalina) for One Million Five Hundred Eighty Thousand (P1,580,000.00) Pesos after
the latter has paid Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos. For this reason, Coronels
canceled and rescinded the contract with Ramona by depositing the down payment paid by
Concepcion in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.
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Held
The court is not persuaded with petitioners contention that the notice of lis pendens in the case at
bar was annoted on the title of the subject property only on February 22, 1985, whereas, the second
sale between petitioners Coronels and petitioner Mabanag was supposedly perfected prior thereto or
on February 18, 1985. The idea conveyed is that at the time petitioner Mabanag, the second buyer,
bought the property under a clean title, she was unaware of any adverse claim or previous sale, for
which reason she is buyer in good faith.
In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer
was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good
faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in good faith,
registered the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as early as February 22, 1985, a
notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the transfer certificate of title in the names of
petitioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time
of registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same property had already been
previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged with knowledge that a previous
buyer is claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes to the defect in
petitioners' title to the property at the time of the registration of the property.
This Court had occasions to rule that:
If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that there was a
previous sale of the same property to a third party or that another person claims said property in a
pervious sale, the registration will constitute a registration in bad faith and will not confer upon him
any right.
Pagaduan vs Ocuma
Melencion et. al. vs. CA and Aznar Brothers Realty Co.
G.R. No. 148846; September 25, 2007
Rule on Double Sale: to the one who registers the sale in good faith
FACTS:
The subject property is a 30,351 square meter parcel of land located at Suba-basbas, Marigondon,
Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu in the name of the late petitioner Go Kim Chuan.
The entire property was originally owned by Esteban Bonghanoy who had only one child, Juana
Bonghanoy-Amodia, mother of the late Leoncia Amodia and petitioners Cecilia Amodia Vda. de
Melencion, Veneranda Amodia, Felipe Amodia, and Eutiquio Amodia (the Amodias). The entire
property was brought under the operation of the Torrens System. However, the title thereto was lost
during the Second World War.
The Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale whereby they extra-judicially settled the estate of Esteban Bonghanoy and conveyed the subject
property to respondent Aznar Brothers Realty Company. The said Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act 3344 as there was no title on file at
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City (Register of Deeds). Thereafter, AZNAR made some
improvements and constructed a beach house thereon.
Melencion and the Amodias executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale,
conveying the subject property in favor of Go Kim Chuan. The lost title covering the subject property
was reconstituted pursuant to Republic Act No. 26. A reconstituted title designated as Original
Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Esteban Bonghanoy and, subsequently, a derivative title
was issued in the name of Go Kim Chuan. Thereafter, Go Kim Chuan exercised control and dominion
over the subject property in an adverse and continuous manner and in the concept of an owner.
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Held
The court held that Teofilo Legaspi and Iluminada Cabana are the true and rightful owners of the
property in litigation. As the Court stated in Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals "it is essential that the
buyer of realty must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale to merit the protection of the
second paragraph of Article 1544."
As the writer stressed in his concurring opinion therein, "(T)he governing principle here is prius
tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second
sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except only as provided by the Civil Code and that is where
the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first. Such knowledge of
the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first
her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso knowledge gained by the second buyer of
the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge
taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code
for the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain
priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first
sale and of the first buyer's rights) from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by
registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession. The second buyer must show continuing
good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full
ownership through prior registration as provided by law."
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In their answer to the complaint, respondents claimed that they are the absolute owners of the same property
which they acquired from Catalino Tonacao, the father of Brigido, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 6,
1986. The sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Leyte on June 10, 1986 and Tax Declaration No.
2408 was issued in their names. Prior thereto, or on January 11, 1984, they had a verbal contract of sale with
Catalino. They paid him P1,000.00 as downpayment. They agreed that the balance of P4,000.00 shall be
paid upon execution of the deed of sale. Since then, they have been exercising their right of ownership over
the property and the building constructed thereon peacefully, publicly, adversely and continuously. Apart from
being the first registrants, they are buyers in good faith.
Issue
1. Whether or not Article 1544 has been correctly applied in this case.
Held
The Court of Appeals, in upholding the validity of the sale in favor of respondents by relying on Article 1544 of
the Civil Code on double sale is wrong. Article 1544 of the Civil Code contemplates a case of double sale or
multiple sales by a single vendor. More specifically, it covers a situation where a single vendor sold one and
the same immovable property to two or more buyers. It cannot be invoked where the two different contracts
of sale are made by two different persons, one of them not being the owner of the property sold.
In the instant case, the property was sold by two different vendors to different purchasers. The first sale was
between Catalino and herein respondents, while the second was between Brigidos heirs and herein
petitioners.
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Warranties:
A. Concept
JAIME D. ANG vs COURT OF APPEALS AND BRUNO SOLEDAD
G.R. No. 177874
September 29, 2008
Topic: Warranties
Facts
Under a "car-swapping" scheme, respondent Bruno Soledad (Soledad) sold his Mitsubishi GSR sedan 1982
model to petitioner Jaime Ang (Ang) by Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 28, 1992. For his part, Ang
conveyed to Soledad his Mitsubishi Lancer model 1988, also by Deed of Absolute Sale of even date. As Angs
car was of a later model, Soledad paid him an additional P55,000.00.
Ang, a buyer and seller of used vehicles, later offered the Mitsubishi GSR for sale through Far Eastern Motors,
a second-hand auto display center. The vehicle was eventually sold to a certain Paul Bugash (Bugash) for
P225,000.00, by Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 14, 1992. Before the deed could be registered in
Bugashs name, however, the vehicle was seized by virtue of a writ of replevin dated January 26, 1993 issued
by a Cebu City Regional Trial Court (RTC), "BA Finance Corporation vs. Ronaldo and Patricia Panes," on
account of the alleged failure of Ronaldo Panes, the owner of the vehicle prior to Soledad, to pay the
mortgage debt constituted thereon.
To secure the release of the vehicle, Ang paid BA Finance the amount of P62,038.47 on March 23, 1993.
Soledad refused to reimburse the said amount, despite repeated demands, drawing Ang to charge him for
Estafa with abuse of confidence before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City.
Issue
Whether the complaint has already prescribed, depending on what kind of warranty is provided in the Deed of
Absolute Sale subject of the present case.
Held
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B. Kinds
Express Warranties (1546) Any affirmation of fact or any promise by
the seller relating to the thing is an express warranty if the natural
tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to
purchase the same, and if the buyer purchase the thing relying thereon.
No affirmation of the value of the thing, nor any statement purporting to
be a statement of the seller's opinion only, shall be construed as a
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Who should pay the BIR taxes and customs duties which the administrative regulations sought to
enforce?
Whether or not the petitioner is correct in its claim that it had paid the taxes due on the imported parts
otherwise it would not have been able to obtain their release from the BOC and to register the vehicles
with the LTO.
3.
Whether or not there was an express representation of payment of taxes and custom duties.
Held
1.
The court held that petitioners contentions that private respondent should be the one to pay the internal
revenue taxes and customs duties; its claim that at the time the Memorandum Orders and the two (2)
Memoranda of Agreement took effect the two (2) Elf trucks were already sold to private respondent, thus,
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Non-sequitur. The fact that petitioner was able to secure the release of the parts from customs and to
register the assembled trucks with the LTO does not necessarily mean that all taxes and customs duties
were legally settled. As a matter of fact, the provisions of the two (2) Memoranda of Agreement clearly
establish that the government is aware of the widespread registration of assembled motor vehicles with
the LTO even if the taxes due on their imported component parts remain unpaid.
Obviously, the two (2) Memoranda of Agreement were executed to prevent the anomalous circumstance,
as in the case at bar, where assembled vehicles are registered with the LTO even if taxes and customs
duties remain unpaid.
3.
It is true that the ownership of the trucks shifted to private respondent after the sale. But petitioner must
remember that prior to its consummation it expressly intimated to her that it had already paid the taxes
and customs duties. Such representation shall be considered as a seller's express warranty under Art.
1546 of the Civil Code which covers any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller which induces the
buyer to purchase the thing and actually purchases it relying on such affirmation or promise. It includes all
warranties which are derived from express language, whether the language is in the form of a promise or
representation. Presumably, therefore, private respondent would not have purchased the two (2) Elf
trucks were it not for petitioner's assertion and assurance that all taxes on its imported parts were already
settled.
This express warranty was breached the moment petitioner refused to furnish private respondent with the
corresponding receipts since such documents were the best evidence she could present to the
government to prove that all BIR taxes and customs duties on the imported component parts were fully
paid. Without evidence of payment, she was powerless to prevent the trucks from being impounded.
Under Art. 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached the buyer can accept or keep
the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. This was what private respondent did.
She opted to keep the two (2) trucks which she apparently needed for her business and filed a complaint
for damages, particularly seeking the reimbursement of the amount she paid to secure the release of her
vehicles.
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I.
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see ANG vs CA
Uy vs. Ariza
G.R. No. 158370; August 17, 2006
Warranty in case of eviction
FACTS:
Spouses Michael and Bonita Uy, petitioners, purchased 200 square meters of the parcel of land. The said
parcels form part of a bigger parcel of land owned by the Arizas. The contract stipulated that petitioners had
the right of choice to designate which portion of the bigger parcel of land would be the subject of the sale.
Petitioners exercised their right to choose, selected and in fact occupied around 200 square meters of a
portion of land. Petitioners purchased another 200 square meters from the same with the same option to
choose which portion. They selected and occupied an adjoining portion to the lot in their first sale. It appears
that the parcels of land petitioners had chosen and occupied were already titled in the names of the Delgados.
Thus, at the time of the first sale by the respondents to petitioners, the two parcels of land had been cancelled
and were already part of the claimed lot by the Delgados.
Petitioners were sued for unlawful detainer by the Delgados. Petitioners entered into a compromise
agreement with the Delgados and surrendered possession of the subject parcels of land. Petitioners
compromised the case without giving notice to respondents.
Thereafter, petitioners demanded from respondents that they be allowed to choose again. When respondents
refused, petitioners filed a case for specific performance with delivery of possession of real property and
damages.
Petitioners anchored their claim for specific performance on the averment that they "could not exercise their
right to choose the portion bought from the parcel of land afore-described because the portion pointed out by
the petitioners were already sold and claimed by third persons.
On the other hand, respondents alleged that they had already complied with their obligation to deliver, as
petitioners had already chosen and been in possession of the parcels of land they chose. Respondents also
faulted petitioners for losing possession of the parcels of land by entering into a compromise agreement with
the Delgados on two grounds: first, because respondents have allegedly initiated the necessary legal steps to
defend their possessory rights to the disputed land by filing a case for the declaration of nullity of the title of
the Delgados, and second, because petitioners failed to interpose a third-party complaint to implead
respondents in the unlawful detainer case.
Trial Court denied the Arizas motion to dismiss. This prompted herein respondent to file before the Court of
Appeals on certiorari and prohibition. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners had no cause of action to file
a case of specific performance against respondents. It ruled that the proper remedy of the petitioners is an
action for enforcement of warranty against eviction.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not spouses Uy can still exercise their right to choose again from the bigger parcel of land;
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Whether or not an action for warranty in case of eviction against the Arizas would prosper.
RULING:
1.
2.
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Whether or not there was an intentional waiver of warranty of eviction made by spouses
Andaya and Cibrato (buyers/ vendees).
2.
Whether or not Manasala (vendor) is liable for payment of the price of the land at the
time of eviction.
RULING:
1.
SC ruled that spouses Andaya and Cabrito had waived the warranty against eviction. At the
time that they purchased the land in question, they knew of the danger of eviction.
The vendor's liability for warranty against eviction in a contract of sale is waivable and may
be renounced by the vendee (last par., Art. 1475, Old Code; last par., Art. 1548, New). The
contract of sale between Manansala and spouses Andaya and Cabrito included a stipulation
as to the warranty. The lower court found that the parties understood that such stipulation
was merely pro forma and that the Manasala was not to be bound thereby, in view of the
fact that the same land had been previously bought by petitioners from Maria Viloria and
that their only purpose in buying the same again from Manansala was to enable them to
register their prior deed of sale; and the further fact that when the sale between the parties,
the property was already the subject of a pending litigation between petitioners and one
Eustaquia Llanes, who claimed its title and possession by virtue of an earlier sale from the
original owner. It was by final judgment in this litigation that petitioners were evicted from the
land. Not having appealed from the decision of the court below, petitioners are bound by
these findings, the implication of which is that they not only renounced or waived the
warranty against eviction, but that they knew of the danger of eviction and assumed its
consequences.
2.
On vendors liability for payment of the price of the land at the time of eviction.
As already stated, petitioners knew of the danger of eviction at the time they purchased the
land in question from defendant, and assumed its consequences. Therefore, Manansala is
not even obliged to restore to them the price of the land at the time of eviction, but is
completely exempt from liability whatsoever.
September 8, 1931
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II.
The same rule shall be observed when two or more things have been jointly
sold for a lump sum, or for a separate price for each of them, if it should
clearly appear that the vendee would not have purchased one without the
other.
CASES:
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Whether or not the defendant-appellant Ah Kee is entitled to the real properties belonging to the
Panabutan Lumber & Plantation Co., which were excluded from the chattel mortgage.
Ruling:
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Article 1560
Warranty
(easement/servitude)
against
hidden
encumbrance
for
immovables
I.
II.
III.
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Whether or not there has already been a prescription due to buyers inaction.
Ruling:
Gratia argumenti that there was a breach of the implied warranty against hidden encumbrances, notice of the
breach was not given to petitioner within a reasonable time. Article 1586 of the Civil Code requires that notice be
given after the breach, of which Sy ought to have known. In his Third-Party Complaint against petitioner, there
was no allegation at all that respondent had given petitioner the requisite notice.
More important, an action for damages for a breach of implied warranties must be brought within six months from
the delivery of the thing sold. The vehicle was understood to have been delivered to Sy when it was placed in his
control or possession. Upon execution of the Deed of Sale on September 12, 1996, control and possession of the
vehicle was transferred to respondent. That the vehicle had been delivered is bolstered by the fact that no
contrary allegation was raised in the Third-Party Complaint. Whether the period should be reckoned from the
actual or from the constructive delivery through a public instrument, more than six months had lapsed before the
filing of the Third-Party Complaint.
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GUZMAN vs TOYOTA
Article 1572 1581
Warranty against hidden vices of animals (redhibitory vices)
guys i did not follow the outline given to us coz i find it confusing instead i just followed
during my review
The animal dies within three (3) days from the time of purchase (1578)
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