Professional Documents
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101
metonymy. Scholars are aware that prior to and outside this trajectory
other versions of two-truth theory occurred, but detailed study of these
remains more a desideratum than an established set of data from which
to perform analyses. Consequently, Yogcra deployment of two-truth
theory has tended to be either analyzed in terms of its relation to the
metonymy (e.g., the relation between two-truths and trisvabhva
theories), or viewed as an appendage, possibly aberrant, to the metonymy,
or, because of all the unfamiliar and thus seemingly incongruous
usages, those passages reflecting understandings outside the metonymy
have been largely ignored. To remedy this, a fuller accounting of alternate
applications of two-truth theory in Buddhism would be necessary,
something which, in a modest, limited way, I shall try to do in this paper.
(4) By achieving a central and foundational status, the metonymic version
of the two-truth theory engenders a finite set of familiar philosophemes
which can be made to undergo permutations that the tradition and scholars
can recount, reiterate and re-parse endlessly. Reducing all of Buddhism
to two, and only two truths, everything must be made to fit into one or the
other truth. Alternate analytic pairs, such as dravya-sat vs. prajaptisat, are devalued, or atrophy, or are simply reduced to operations within
the lower truth. Deeming one of the two truths to be higher and the other
lower, obvious issues include: What makes one higher than the other?
Which of the countless Buddhist models, doctrines and practices are to
be sorted into which truth? Is the lower truth good, bad, both or neither?
What relation, if any, obtains between both truths, and how specifically
does that work? If, as was the tendency within Mahyna (Yogcra
included), the highest truth loses all or most of its concrete content,
characterized as being beyond predication or meaningful articulation,
what sort of truth does this contentless abstraction represent, or can it
even serve a representational function? Some of the Yogcra passages
to be discussed below make contributions to such questions, but perhaps
we may notice additional dimensions as well.
(5) Taking all the above into account, doing justice to how Yogcra
actually used two-truth theory and the terms associated with it (savti,
vyavahra, paramrtha, sat, satya) runs the risk of offering something
that seems out of synch with current academic discussions. The most
common strategy for sidestepping this (as mentioned in 3 above)
is to substitute ones own theorizing for the apparent lack of interest
in theorizing about the two truths in Yogcra, providing them with
102
104
So there are potentially innumerable truths, with the set savtiparamrtha only being one of them.
There are several interesting dimensions to the way Asaga formulates
this. The question arises in a section of the Yogcrabhmi that explicitly
examines the question of how language works a concern that Asaga
repeatedly returns to. Here Asaga is asking how truth is constructed
or transferred over to words (nma). His preamble clearly frames it as
asocial process, a process of group construction of conventions. Buddha
speaks. That is only the first step. That speech is grouped into various
categories, worked over through a variety of processes, collected, collated,
edited, codified, modified, and made communicative by groups of people,
such as Buddhist Councils. And unlimited numbers or configurations
of truths can be extracted and codified, put into words, on that basis.
Truth(s), when put into words, including the two truths, are conventions.
The insightful bodhisattva can generate them ad infinitum. They are
truths to the extent that they communicate, via conventions, communally,
some sense of Buddhas understanding, which he himself initially put
into words in the same manner, since language is precisely engaging in
conventionality par excellence.
105
Lest we be tempted to assume too quickly that when mentioning the two
truths this passage is evoking the metonymic version, or that the twotruth
pair appearing so high up on the list indicates a near-primacy rather than
mere enumerative order, we now turn to the first chapter of the second
of two parts of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, appropriately entitled Satyavinicaya (determination of truth), though satya here denotes the Four
Noble Truths, which are the subject of this chapter. Discussing the first
Noble Truth, suffering (dukha), Asaga lists eight kinds of suffering:15
[1] suffering of birth (jtidukha), [2] of aging (jar), [3] of disease
(vydhi), [4] of death (maraa), [5] suffering associated with what is
unpleasant (apriyasamprayoga), [6] suffering of separation from what
is pleasant (priyaviprayoga), [7] suffering if one does not obtain what
one desires (yad apcchan na labhate), and [8] in brief (sakiptena)
the five aggregates of attachment (pacopdnaskandha)
Asaga then provides further explanations for each of the eight, followed
by a list of six types of suffering16 to which, he says, the eight can be
reduced. Whether six or eight, it is the same thing (Boin-Webb, 2001,
85; a samnny aau bhavanti; ). This is followed
with the well-known list of three types of suffering: mere suffering
(dukha-dukhat), suffering caused by transformation (viparimadukhat), and suffering caused by conditioning (saskra-dukhat).
He explains:
The eight kinds of suffering are included in them the sufferings of
birth, aging, disease, death and association with what is unpleasant
are mere sufferings; the sufferings of separation from what is
pleasant and not obtaining what one desires are suffering caused by
transformation; in brief, the five aggregates of attachment are
suffering as suffering caused by conditioning. (Boin-Webb, 2001, 85)
The two-truth pair now make their brief appearance in this chapter.
It is said that there are two forms of suffering: suffering according to
conventional truth (savtisatya) and suffering according to ultimate
truth (paramrthasatya).
What is suffering according to conventional truth and what is
suffering according to ultimate truth? From the suffering of birth
up to thesuffering of not obtaining what one desires those are
106
It is worth pointing out that the introduction of the two truths is prefaced
by it is said that (yad ukta dvividhe dukhe iti, ), framing
what is to follow as thoroughly enmeshed in language and retelling.
Asaga is often very sensitive to the interplay of language and that
towards which language purports to point. That is the main theme of the
Tattvrtha chapter of the Bodhisattvabhmi. As well see in a moment,
distinguishing between vastu, prajapti, dravya, etc., are crucial to his
analysis. Alsoworthy of note is that in the passage just cited Paramrthasatya is given clear and specific content, viz., the five appropriational
skandhas (skandha-updna) which Asaga had just explained are
synonymous with saskra-dukhat, suffering caused by conditioning.
This indicates that paramrtha signifies a type of discourse or
understanding that points to what, below the obvious surface, is actually
transpiring. It is language speaking with precision and true accuracy.
The first seven types of dukha are ways of thinking about dukha;
theeighth, the dynamics of the five appropriational skandhas thatis,
the way a person is is, at bottom, what dukha is, the first seven
merely indicating facets of those skandhas. The first seven still contain
traces of selfhood thinking (whats pleasant to me, my goals, obstructions
to me, etc.); the eighth indicates purely impersonal processes driven by
appropriation (updna).
Paramrtha here has specific content, namely the appropriational
dynamics of the skandhas. To see things from that perspective is to
see things as they are. This, as well see, is not an uncommon usage.
However, Asaga elsewhere will undermine this type of application of
paramrtha-satya. We will return to this as well.
Finally, and this is perhaps the most significant point to take away from
this passage, the two truths are explicitly treated as reductive forms of
discourse that are not intended to replace or eclipse the other models
(the eight, six and threefold enumerations), but are merely summations,
shorthand (sakiptena) from which the other models may be extrapolated
at any time. This illustrates the point made in the Yogcrabhmi passage
about the ten truths, namely that Dharma-speech can expand or contract,
107
as the need arises. The implication seems to be that the deeper ones
understanding, the less that needs to be said or enumerated. But given
the imperative to benefit others that is one of the signature notions
of Mahyna, the ability to expand and enumerate on concise doctrinal
statements is indispensable. Truths can be extrapolated, or they can be
reductive. One might say that savti-satya and paramrtha-satya in this
case are both cases of vyavahra.
Savti and/or paramrtha are commonly found listed along with
additional sat-s or satyas. For instance, the final section of the
Yogcrabhmi states:
Briefly it is said that there are three types of existents (sat).
(1)dravyasat, (2) prajapti-sat, and paramrtha-sat.
(T.30.1579.878c19-21)
108
(T.30.1579.879a20-25)
110
111
112
115
116
This is an extremely important issue, not just for Abhidharma but for
Yogcra as well. Above all, the two truths serve as a value system,
a prioritizing of some things over other things. Savti and paramrtha
are evaluative labels, for things in general, but most especially for the
components of Buddhist doctrine. The value or degree of definitiveness
the truths assign are not necessarily ontological though their
use doesnt exclude ontological determinations either. Nonetheless,
they are not limited to ontological concerns. The Yogcrabhmi, and
indeed many Yogcra texts, are more concerned with linguistic issues,
linguistic-conceptual problems and their solutions, the relation of words
(nma) to real things (vastu), etc. Certain teachings, models, concepts,
etc., aredeemed definitive, of the highest order, while others are given
a lower, provisional status. Hence savti and paramrtha are also
synonymous with or parallel to the pair ntrtha (explicit) and neyrtha
(implicit), especially when in hermeneutic contexts.
Put another way, savti and paramrtha are themselves hermeneutic
labels for evaluating how specific items and qualities treated within the
variety of Buddhist teachings are to be classified and hierachized, and as
such are synonymous in function to the neyrtha-ntrtha distinction
(some texts make this explicit33). Which of the teachings are provisional,
and which are definitive? As the sprawling mass of Buddhist literature and
its proliferating categories exploded exponentially, generating countless
new models and doctrinal enumerations, many of which did not fit well
or easily with other models, finding keys to how to make all cases of
buddhavacana accord with each other became an increasingly urgent matter.
Is prattya-samutpda understood as the twelve links a provisional
or definitive teaching? Which interpretation of prattya-samutpda was
most accurate and best accounted for things as they are? Which teachings
were primarily therapeutic expedients that served as transitional
considerations (transitioning to a higher or deeper understanding)?
Teachings that one school considered definitive, anothermight declare
merely transitional. 34 In short, the savti-paramrtha distinction is less
117
118
Dhammajoti (pp. 79-80) translates the distinction that the Abhidharmakoabhya draws between savti and paramrtha thus:
That, the buddhi of which does not arise when it is broken into parts
(avayavao bhinne), is conventionally existent; for instance, a pot.
For therein, when it is broken into pieces, the buddhi of a pot does not
arise. And therein, when the [constituent] dharma-s [of a thing] are
mentally removed (apohya), the buddhi of it does not arise that too
is to be understood as a conventionally existent; for instance, water.
119
For therein, when the dharma, rpa, etc., are removed mentally,
thebuddhi of water does not arise.
A conventional notion (savti-sajn) is made with regard to those
very things. Thus, those saying that a pot or water exists by virtue of
convention speak truly and not falsely; thus this is conventional truth
(savtisatya). 39
Absolute truth (paramrthasatya) is other than this. Therein,
evenwhen [a thing] has been broken, the buddhi of it definitely arises
and likewise, even when its [constituent] dharma-s are removed
mentally that is [to be understood as] an absolute existent
(paramrthasat). For instance rpa: for, therein, when the thing is
broken into the atoms (paramua), and when the [constituent]
dharma-s taste, etc., have been removed mentally, the buddhi of the
intrinsic nature of rpa definitely arises. Vedan, etc., are also to be
seen in this way. This is called absolute truth as the existence is in the
absolute sense (etat paramrthena bhvt paramrthasatyamiti).40
There are all sorts of problems, as well as interesting ideas, in this short
passage, but we will move on.
Dhammajoti (77-78) translates the following discussion from the
Mahvibh on the various theories held by different bhidharmikas
on the existent. Words in square brackets are added by me.
Regarding the existents, some say that they are of two kinds:
1. Existents as real entities (dravyata sat) the skandha, yatana, etc.;
2. Existents as concepts (prajaptita sat) male, female, etc.
Some say they are of three kinds: 1. What exists relatively a given
thing [vastu] exists relatively to this but does not exist relatively to
that; 2. What exists by virtue of an assemblage a given thing exists
here but does not exist there; 3. What exists at some given time
a given thing exists at this time but does not exist at another time.
121
Some say they are of five kinds: 1. what exists in name (only)
[nma-sat ] a tortoises hair, a hares horn, a garland of [sky]
flowers, etc.; 2. what exists as a real entity (dravyato sti [])
all dharma-s each of which is abiding in its own-nature (svabhva);
3. what exists conventionally [prajapti-sat ] a vase, garment,
vehicle, army, forest, house, etc.; 4. what exists as an assemblage
[ *saghta-, *smagr-sat, etc.] a pudgala is designated with
regard to an assemblage of the skandha-s; 5. what exists relatively42
[ *apek-sat, *apekana-sat] this shore [exists relatively
to] thatshore, a long thing [exists relatively to] a short thing, etc.43
122
V. Paramrtha Gth
Since we have been snatching passages from various parts of Asagas
works, one might get the impression that the two truths make frequent
appearances throughout his corpus. Actually, they appear infrequently, and
tend to be concentrated in specific sections of his texts. In Yogcrabhmi,
123
The next section [of the verses] explicates purification, since when
[one engages in] correct investigation ( yath-parikyamna48) one
attains purification.
svalakaato rpdn phenapidyupamay
124
Or this may be [correct investigation in terms of] savti and paramarthasatya, i.e., although there is no deluder (), nor is it the case that delusion
arisen from a multitude of conditions is nonexistent, because of savti-satya
one says that delusion deludes.50
yan nmhasyyoniomanaskra tasmd asau moha na mohayatti |
Moreover, [the verse] reveals that not being nondeluded [arises from]
unfocused attention51 ( na-amhasya-ayonio-manasikra). It is,
therefore, that which deludes the deluded.52
paridpayati | tath hi vijna puydisaskropagam ucyate savty
paramrthatas tu nopagacchati |
Further, from [the perspective of] savti, [the verse] teaches that the various
consciousnesses are consequent on the fortuitous, [nonfortuitous and neutral]
saskras. Once paramrtha is achieved, that linkage no longer follows.53
trividh mat ity attngatapratyutpann |
Further, the three that should be known are past, future and present.
trividha cpi yat karmeti kydikarma
The three types of karma are bodily, [speech, and mental] karma.
sarvam etad asagata | parasparesamadhnt tath
All are not conjoined since [two items in] face-to-face mutual influence
[can] not be conjoined ().54
Why?
hi prabhgur vartamn | atit na kvacit sthit | ajt pratyaydhin
citta cpy anuvartaka |
[or ]
The present quickly dissipates; the past abides nowhere; what is to come is
based on a multitude of conditions; nonetheless the mind complies (with those
circumstances; anuvartaka).
125
As to whether the mind and those saskras are associated, or not associated,
that doesnt (follow from) this;
kadcid asaprayukta v | aviprayukta v bhavati |
sometimes they are not associated; sometimes they are not disassociated.
na ca sarvasya cittasya saprayogo v viprayogo v | eva paramrthata
cittasyopagatatvam asiddha |
Now it should be explained that [it is] from [the perspective of] savti that
it is said that the mind comes into existence consequent on a variety of
causes and conditions.
tasmin srotasya vicchinna iti gthy savti kriyate tv iyam ity upagam ity
e yath csati krake |
From this flows ceaselessly -- now in this verse, it shows that savti-satya
is not inactive so that [things] come into existence [causally] consequent to
[antecedents].
126
Again, one cant say whether doer and enjoyer are the same or different.
Themeaning is thus illuminated [according to savti and paramrtha].
paurvparyea cyatvd iti | gthay eva paramrthata
Next, the verses explain the differentiation of before and after according to
paramrtha...
(T.30.1579.364c26- 365a18)59
such as the Four Noble Truths, the Mrga, and so on. Asaga himself,
in an Abhidharmasamuccaya passage discussed above, indicated that
the paramrtha-satya of dukha is the five appropriational skandhas.
In his vykhy, Asaga removes all the items other Buddhists put on the
paramrtha side of the divide between the two-truths, and repositions
them as savti-satya. Chapter 19 of Buddhaghosas Visuddhimagga
covers ground very similar to the Paramrtha gth-vykhy,60 sometimes
in very similar language. A careful comparison between these two
texts would be interesting, but in the interest of time, I will restrict my
comments to one point. Buddhaghosas chapter is entitled Kakhvitaraavisuddhi-niddesa, Description of Purification by Overcoming Doubt,
just as Asaga framed his own discussion as an explanation of how
paying attention is euphemistically purification. Buddhaghosa begins:
Knowledge established by overcoming doubt about the three divisions
of time by means of discerning the conditions of that same mentalitymateriality [i.e., the five aggregates DL] is called Purification by
Overcoming Doubt.61 Dealing with causality, kamma, conditioned
coarising, kamma-phala, and so on, Buddhaghosa also offers an extended
poem in this chapter on kamma (PTS 602-03; amoli 700-01):
There is no doer of a deed,
Or one who reaps the deeds result;
Phenomena alone flow on
No other view than this is right.
Sectarians, not knowing this,
Have failed to gain self-mastery,
They assume a being, see it as
Eternal or annihilated.
Adopt the sixty-two wrong views,
Each contradicting the other.
A monk, disciple of the Buddha,
With direct knowledge of this fact
Can penetrate this deep and subtle
Void conditionality.
There is no kamma in result
Nor does result exist in kamma;
Though they are void of one another,
There is no fruit without the kamma.
128
(T.26.1530.303a26-c28)
This passage, in the light of what we saw Asaga say about paramrtha
earlier, should serve as a caution for those still insisting that the name
Yogcra entails some sort of metaphysical or absolutist idealism.
From the point of view of the two truths, all talk of citta and caittas,
eight consciousnesses, various partitions of consciousness, etc., are only
conventionalisms. Ultimately (paramrthata), to speak of such things
is to still dabble to some extent in prapaca and conceptualisms
(cintya). Ultimately uncontaminated cognition is devoid of prapaca
and its cognitive-object is nonconceptual (acintya). This is confirmed
by Sthiramati in his Triik-vijapti-bhya and by Cheng weishilun,
since they both characterize the first sixteen verses precisely those
that discuss the laya-vijna and the other seven consciousnesses as
upacra, figurative expressions.
130
Appendix:
Passage #1:
Abhidharmasamuccaya
[Pradhan, 37,13-38,9]
api khalu dukhalakaaprabhed aau | jtir dukha jar dukha
vydhir dukha maraa dukham apriyasaprayogo dukha
priyaviprayogo dukha yad apcchanna labhate tad api dukha
sakiptena pacopdnaskandh dukha || jti kim updya
dukham | sabdhadukhat tadanyadukhrayat copdya
| jar kim updya dukham | kle vipariatidukhatm updya ||
vydhi kim updya dukham | bhteu vipariatidukhatm updya ||
maraa kim updya dukham | jvitavipraadukhatm updya
|| apriyasaprayoga kim updya dukham | sayogajadukhatm
updya || priyaviprayoga kim updya duhkham | viprayogajadukhatm
updya || yad apcchanna labhate tat kim updya dukham
|
kmyaphalalbhvajadukhatm
updaya
||
sakiptena
pacopdnaskandh kim updya dukham | dauhulyadukhatm
updya || evam aau saghtni a bhavati | sabdhadukha
vipariati dukha saprayogadukha viprayogadukha
kmyaphalbhvadukha dauhalyadukha ca || eva a
bhulyenau bhavanti | a samnny aau bhavanti || yadukta tisro
dukhat | tsu aau dukhni saghtni bhavanti | tatra katha
tisu saghtny aasu v saghts tisra |
praparyalakaasagraht | jtir dukha jar dukha
vydhir dukha maraa dukham apriyasaprayogo dukham iti
santnadukhadukhat | priyaviprayogo dukha yad apcchanna
labhate tad api dukha tadviparimadukhat | sakiptena
pacopdnaskandh dukha tat saskradukhat || yad ukta dvividhe
dukhe iti | tat savtisatyena dukha paramrthasatyena dukha ca
| katamat savtisatyena dukha katamat paramrthasatyena dukham
| jtir dukha yvat yad apcchanna labhate tad api dukham iti
savtisatyena dukham | yad uktam sakiptena pacopdnaskandh
dukham iti paramrthasatyena dukham
132
31
(T.31.1605.674b14-c2)
Passage #2:
Abhidharmasamuccaya
[Gokhale 23,6-24]
katha kuala, kati kualni, kimartha kualapark | svabhvato
pi, sabandhato pi, anubandhato pi, utthnato pi, paramrthato
pi, upapattilbhato pi, prayogato pi, puraskrato pi, anugrahato pi,
parigrahato pi, pratipakato pi, upaamato pi, niyandato pi, kuala
draavyam | skandhn, dan dhtn, catur cyatann
pradea | dharmayukttmbhiniveatyjanrtham ||
svabhvata kuala katamat | raddhdaya ekdaa caitasik dharm ||
sabandhata kuala katamat | tatsaprayukt dharm || anubandhata
kuala katamat | tem eva y vsan | utthnata kuala katamat |
tatsamutthita kyakarma vkkarma || paramrthata kuala katamat
| tathat || upapattilbhata kuala katamat | em eva kualn
dharm prvbhysam gamya tadrp vipkbhinirvtti, yath tev
eva praktypratisakhyya ruci satihate || prayogata kuala katamat
| satpuruasasevm gamya saddharmaravaa yonio manaskra
dharmnudharmapratipatti kualasya bhvan || puraskrata kuala
katamat | yat tathgata v purasktya caitye v purastagate v citragate
v, dharma v purasktya dharmdhihne pustake pjkarma
|| anugrahata kuala katamat | yac caturbhi sagrahavastubhi
sattvnughata || parigrahata kuala katamat | yaddnabhayena
puuakriyvastun v lamayena v, svargopapattiparigraho v, hyo
ccakulopapattiparigraho v, vyavadnnuklyaparigraho v || pratipakata
kuala katamat | yo vidapratipaka, prahapratipaka, d
hrapratipaka,drbhvapratipaka,vikambhapratipaka,visa
133
134
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Asaga. Abhidharmasamuccaya.
Editions:
(1) (2003) Abhidharmasamuccaya and Abhidharmasamuccayabhya, Composite
edition. Shiga, Japan. PDF available at http://www.shiga-med.ac.jp/public/
yugagyo/ contains Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan versions of Asagas text and
Sthiramatis commentary, including:
V.V. Gokhale, ed. Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaga, JRAS,
Bombay Branch, New Series 23, 1947, pp. 13-38;
P. Pradhan, ed. Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaga, Viva-Bharati Series 12.
Santiniketan, 1950;
Nathmal Tatia, ed. Abhidharmasamuccaya-Bhyam, Tibetan Sanskrit Works
Series 17, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976 (Sthiramatis commentary).
(2) T.31.1605, tr. by Xuanzang.
(3) (Sthiramatis commentary) T.31.1606, tr. by Xuanzang.
(4) Abhidharmasamuccaya: The Compendium of the Higher Teaching (Philosophy).
(2001). Translated into English by Sara Boin-Webb from the French translation
by Walpola Rahula. Fremont, CA: Asian Humanities Press.
Asaga. Mahynasamgraha.
(1) T.31.1594, tr. by Xuanzang. (Vasubandhus bhya:
T.31.1597, tr. by Xuanzang).
(2) Lamotte, tienne. (1973) La Somme du Grand Vhicule dAsaga
(Mahynasagraha). Louvain-la-Neuve: Universit de Louvain, Institut
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Asaga. Yogcrabhmi. T.30.1579, tr. by Xuanzang. (also see Wayman
1984, Dutt 1966, and Wogihara 1971).
Boin-Webb (2001). (see Asaga, Abhidharmasamuccaya)
Buddhaghosa. Visuddhimagga.
(1) PTS edition.
(2) Eng. Tr.: (1975) The Path of Purification: Viuddhi Magga. Tr. by Bhikkhu
amoli. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
Dhammajoti, Bhikkhu KL. (2007) Sarvstivda Abhidharma. Hong Kong: Center of
Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong, 3rd ed.
(DDB) Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, edited by Charles Muller. <http://buddhism-dict.
net/ddb>. Edition of 12/16/2007.
Dutt, Nalinkasha, ed. (1966) Bodhisattvabhmi. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute,
(Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 7).
Lusthaus, Dan. (2002) Buddhist Phenomenology. London; NY: RoutledgeCurzon.
Lusthaus, Dan. (2008) A Pre-Dharmakrti Indian Discussion of Dignga Preserved in
Chinese Translation: The Buddhabhmy-upadea, Journal of Buddhist Studies, vol.
VI, 2008, 19-81.
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135
136
NOTES
1
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the XVth Congress of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, June 23-28, 2008.
This is not to deny that there are indeed a handful of relatively small passages in
which Yogcra texts do juxtapose the two truths with the three self-natures. E.g., cf.
Cheng weishilun T.31. 1585.47b16-c16; Yogcrabhmi, fasc.78,T.30.1579.732b7-15;
and fasc. 16, 362c21-363a7, though here five types of existences (astit) are presented,
rather than only three natures (svabhva):
This has to be qualified by the fact that not all of Asagas writings are available in full
in Sanskrit, which limits our ability to make definitive assertions. While, for instance,
Xuanzang tends to use distinct Chinese equivalents for savti[-satya] ( []) and
vyavahra (; ; ; ), it is not clear that he does so with infallible consistency.
137
10
Xuanzang adds this phrase here in Chinese; it occurs at the end of the list of satyas in
the Sanskrit, where he again translates it.
11
The Sanskrit, expecting readers to know the Four Noble Truths, merely says truth of
dukha up to truth of the mrga. Xuanzang fills in the two satyas in between.
12
Skt: jeya; the Chinese has , which is commonly used for viaya. (Jeya is more
commonly rendered .)
13
14
All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. The Sanskrit and Chinese
passages:
[From the Bodhisattva-gua-paalam
(Chapter 1.18) of the Bodhisattvabhmi:]
prajapti-vyavasthnam yuktiprajapti-vyavasthnam yna-prajaptivyavasthnam ca.
tatra y dvdagasya strdikasya
vaco-gatasynuprva-racan anuprvavyavasthna-samyogah. idam ucyate
dharma-prajapti-vyavasthnam.
punar anekavidham avitathrthena tvad
ekam eva satyam. na dvityam asti.
dvividham satyam. samvrti-satyam
paramrtha-satyam ca.
138
4618
15
(T.30.1579.547b20-c15)
The six are: (1) suffering due to obstruction, (2) suffering due to transformation,
(3)suffering due to association, (4) suffering due to separation, (5) suffering due to
non-obtaining of the desired result, (6) suffering due to agitation.
139
17
18
[6][][]
[][]
(T.30.1579.878c21-879a20)
[6]
[6-1]
[6-2]
[6-3]
[6-4]
19
(T.30.1579.486b12-15). Cf. Willis (1979) 70.
20
21
22
For the standard list of the Yogcra One Hundred Dharmas, cf. Lusthaus (2002)
Appendix One.
140
Boin-Webb (2001) 46. Actually, the Sanskrit is more succinct: paramrthata kuala
katamat | tathat.
24
Ibid, 48, modified. [Gokhale 23,25-24,1] katham akuala, katy akualni, kimartham
akualapark | svabhvato pi, sabandhato pi, anubandhato pi, utthnato pi,
paramrtho pi, upapattikbhato pi, prayogato pi, puraskrato pi, upaghtato pi,
parigrahato pi, vipakato pi, paripanthato py akuala draavyam | skandhn,
dan dhtn, caturm yatann pradea | adharmayukttmbhiniveaty
janrtham || svabhvato kuala katamat | mnasaprayukta rpryvacara ca
klea sthpayitv tadanya kleopakleo ducaritasamutthpaka || sabandhato
kuala katamat | tair eva kleopakleai saprayukt dharm || anubandhato
kuala katamat | tem eva vsan || utthnato kuala katamat | [tat] samutthpita
kyavkkarma || paramrthato kuala katamat | sarvasasra || upapattilbhato
kuala katamat | yathpi tadakualbhysas tadrpo vipko abhinirvartate, yenkuala
eva ruci satihate || prahogato kuala katamat | yathpi tadasatpuruasasevm
gamysaddharmaravaam ayoniomanaskra kyena ducarita carati vc
manas ducarita carati ||
21
While two physical objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, ka can
share its locus with any object. Both ka and apratisakhya-nirodha are neutral
in that they represent the absence of anything karmically disadvantageous (akuala),
but nonetheless involve no karmically advantageous (kuala) countermeasures.
Both nconditioned dharmas stand for absences. One of the more interesting statements
in the avykta passage is: What is neutral in delight [upabhoga]? It is the fact of
delighting in ones fortune without reflecting and without having an impure mind
(apratisakhyklia-citta). Ibid.
26
141
complete knowing (parijna). The focus of both sets of four are: (1) names (nma),
(2) things (vastu), (3) self-nature, and (4) knowing particulars (viea). To fully know
names is to realize they are nothing-but-names (nma-mtra); knowing things knowing
they are nothing-but-things (vastu-mtra); knowing svabhva is to see that svabhvas
are nothing-but-figurative expressions (prajapti-mtra); knowing particulars is to also
see that they are nothing-but-figurative expressions (prajapti-mtra). The third type
of knowledge (recognizing that svabhvas are prajapti-mtra) is called knowing just
as it is the object of the most profound cognitive field (yath-bhta-parijnam sugambhrrtha-gocaram). The fourth, knowing particulars fully is described thus:
Note that this seems to contradict the passage cited earlier from fascicle 100 of
Yogcrabhmi in which Asaga said of paramrtha-sat and any possible image of
it: You should know it is not an existent (). That passage, following the
argument in the Tattvrtha chapter, is attempting to avoid reification and objectification
in the form of taking nominal realities to properly represent vastus. Here the focus
has shifted to tathat, which itself is a prajapti for what occurs in correct cognition.
Thatentails seeing objects purified of mental distortions (klevaraa and jeyvaraa).
Put another way, paramrtha-sat is a way of seeing, while tathat is a euphemism
forwhat is seen when one is perceiving correctly.
142
The two types of correct cognition are explained immediately prior to the passages
translated above:
72 [2]
(T.30.1579.696a6-21) [2]
29
30
What is correct cognition? Briefly, there are two types. (1) Correct cognition that is
exclusively transmundate (lokuttara); and (2) correct cognition that is mundane and
transmundane (lokiya lokuttara).
What is called correct cognition that is exclusively transmundane? It is by this that
rvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas fully understand tathat.
Moreover, it is due to this that those Bodhisattvas skilled in the five sciences
(paca-vidy-sthna) cultivate expedient means, since in multiple abodes such
as this, theyeverywhere cultivate cognition of tathat, quickly realizing complete
purification from the obstruction to the knowable (jeyvaraa).
What is called correct cognition that is mundane and transmundane? Once rvakas
and Pratyekabuddhas have fully understood tathat by means of the first correct
cognition, they attain this subsequent cognition (phalabdha-jna) of the
mundane and transmundane. By positing such truths (vyavasthna-satya), they
make minds that are corrupted ( vi-d) in the Triple World pass beyond
grief, experiencing the tranquility of blissful samdhi. Moreover, due to abundant
peaceful abiding like this, they quickly realize complete purification from the
obstructions by mental disturbances (klevaraa). Moreover, it precisely is this
cognition of an artha unfamiliar (*asastavrtha) [to ordinary people] that is called
transmundane. Takingfor its lambana linguistic expressions (*vk, *upacra) and
images (*nimitta) as the referents (artha) of its cognitive field (*viaya-gocara)
is also called mundane. Thus it is called [both] mundane and transmundane.
The World Honored One, based on this implicit intention, spoke such words
[e.g., in the Sayukta gama #37, T.2.99.8b16-28, or Sadhinirmocana stra
T.16.675.682a20-22]: I say there are mundane cognitions and transmundane
cognitions. As to having mundane and transmundane cognitions, if a cognition
includes vikalpa, it is exclusively called mundane. The first cognition is classified
as a cognition that is exclusively transmundane, while the second cognition is
classified as a cognition that includes the mundane and transmundane.
143
Vyavahra appears in MMK only one time outside the verses of Ch. 24 about to be
cited: MMK 17:24.
32
E.g., the commentary on the Diamond Stra ascribed to Asaga and Vasubandhu, tr.
into Chinese by Yijing in 711, Vajracchedik-prajpramit-stra-stra
, at T.25.1513.881b12-20 and 884a27-29: and
; Dharmaplas commentary on Vasubandhus Viatik, also tr. into Chinese by
Yijing, in 710, , T.31.1591.79b19-c4 and 94a2-4.
33
34
35
36
(this is neyrtha) (that is ntrtha)
(this is based on
savti) (that is based on paramrtha)
(T.27.1545.41b26-c7)
The case of the so-called pudgalavdins is illustrative of this. Once almost every
Buddhist agreed that antman was an indispensable and essential tenet, pudgalavda
was doctrinally ostracized. Though, as Ive argued elsewhere, in terms of sheer
numbers, longevity and influence the Vtsputrya and Samitya schools should be
considered mainstream Buddhism their doctrines, even their explanation of the
pudgala, were not very different from that of their opponents, and in fact they drove
many of the subsequent developments in Buddhist thought but they refused to
declare outright that pudgala should not even have provisional status (all surviving
pudgalavda texts declare forcefully that the pudgala is a prajapti). Rehabilitating
their reputation should become a higher priority among scholars today if we want to
understand the evolution of Buddhist thought in India and China more accurately.
E.g., the term pudgala occurs 832 times in the Yogcrabhmi; 67 times
in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, 36 times in the Mahynasagraha, 12 times in the
Madhynta-vibhga-bhya, etc., and virtually never in a negative light, but as a type
of person [cf. Puggala-paati] or person in general. Pudgalavdins would have
no problem with the statement There is no eternal self in the pudgala (pudgalanairtmya). In fact, they would insist on it. Cf. Lusthaus 2009.
44
(T.29.1562.595a1-4)
The Koa passage reads:
dhynn rpadhtau tu tbhy dharmataypi ca ||838||
144
(T.29.1558.152a14-b12)
145
(T.27.1545.917c9-23)
37
38
(T.27.1545.400a4-b2)
39
Dhammajoti (p. 95 n.37) adds this footnote: Cf. Saghabhadras explanation that the
two truths are really two aspects of the one, absolute truth, Ny [= Nyynusara, T.29.
1562.] 666a ff. [square brackets added]
40
[Pradhan p. 334, ln.1ln.11] Cf. Valle Poussin, v.4, pp. 139-41; Pruden, v. 3, pp. 910-11.
146
50
(T.29.1562.621c21- 622a2)
more literally means "mutually dependent, interdependent." While seems
to imply something like apek, more typically Xuanzang uses or or simply
for apek.
42
(T.27.1545.42a24-b4)
43
44
45
(T.27.1545.3b5-13)
Schmithausens tentative speculation that the verses and their explanation may have
come from different authors seems to miss the point. Cf. Schmithausen (1987) v.1,
160-64 and Appendix 1.
46
47
48
49
The Sanskrit text is taken from Alex Wayman, Buddhist Insight, pp. 333-352. Skt texts:
verses pp. 335-341; Asagas vykhy on pp. 341-344; Wayman also offers anEnglish
translation, but I follow the Chinese and my own reading of the Sanskrit. This is
a diplomatic translation, drawing on both the Sanskrit and Chinese, which differ
from each other in a number of details. Where they differ, I tend to follow the Chinese,
sometimes offering a footnote to explain the difference, but sometimes, if the reading
is better or the meaning clearer, I follow the Sanskrit. Both texts have their difficulties,
and are profitably read together. Nonetheless, my translation is tentative in places.
Note that Xuanzangs text grouping and the Skt grouping (marked by | ) dont always
align. The verses and vykhy that come before and after the selection presented here
are helpful for framing the meaning of the matters discussed in this portion, but in the
interest of time and space I omit them.
Note that rushiguan sometimes also renders *yathbhta-pratyavek and
*bhta-pratyavek. Yath parikyamna would mean one examines or sees things
as they actually are. Shortly this will be opposed to ayonia-manasikra, unfocused
attention, or careless thinking.
Cf. Sayutta-nikya III.22.95 - Pheapipama sutta:
147
(tr. by Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, v.1, pp. 952-53.)
Asaga quotes this as part of the Paramrtha gths in Yogcrabhmi as follows:
50
, , ,,
Note that moha/mha (, ) here acts as a synonym for avidy (), the first
link of conditioned co-arising (prattya-samutpda; ). The subsequent discussion
will continue through the next two links saskra and vijna , raising questions
about the nature of their linkage. To paraphrase this line: There is no X that is
the deluder an agent with distinct, singular selfhood that causes delusion.
Delusion arises from multifarious conditions. But, by savti, one assumes the
convenience of speaking of things like a deluder, even if that is identified as delusion
itself, i.e., delusion deludes. This is a prajaptic selfhood.
51
52
The Sanskrit and Chinese seem to diverge in the last phrase, Xuanzangs Chinese
providing a gloss on the implication of the Sanskrit rather than strictly reproducing
it. The Chinese reads: It is, therefore, that [i.e., ayonio-manisikra] which deludes
the deluded, whereas the Sanskrit is phrased negatively: tasmd asau moha na
mohayatti, therefore it doesnt delude delusion. While, at first blush, these appear to
be opposite statements, in fact, they make the same point, since the it (asau) refers to
delusion in the tautology of the previous line: Delusion deludes.
Previously Asaga allowed that, speaking savtically, one might say delusion
deludes. This tends to imply that delusion is a self-existent thing acting as an agent;
It is that which causes the delusion. Here we are told that delusion is a metaphor for
ayonio-manasikra and its effects. In other words, unfocused or careless attention and
thinking not something called delusion or the deluder is what causes delusion,
i.e., delusion itself is a metaphor for this type of non-perspicacious mental activity.
TheSanskrit states this in stark negative terms:
Delusion doesnt delude (since ayonio-manasikra does that), while the Chinese
expresses the same conclusion by saying: That (ayonio-manasikra), therefore,
iswhat deludes the deluded.
Note that while the Sanskrit follows moha na mohayat with an iti, implying this is
a direct citation of the gth, that exact wording actually is not found in the gth.
Therelevant verses, 19 and 20, state: na moho mohayed moha para naiva ca mohayet
| na paro mohayaty ena na ca moho na vidyate || ayonio-manaskrt samoho jayate
sa ca | ayonio-manaskro nsamhasya jyate. It is possible that by moha na
mohayatti the vykhy is not suggesting a verbatim quote from the verse, but instead
148
53
(T.30.1579.364a18-20)
54
Both the Chinese and Sanskrit are somewhat unclear. The Chinese, I believe, reads as
Ive translated it above. The Sanskrit might suggest something different however. Note
that the verb previously introduced upagacchati, i.e., upagama is at play here
again, this time in the form of asagata, which literally implies the negative of being
put together or moved into the same place. Asaga is trying to get us to shift our focus
from nouns (substantives, nominals, accusatives, etc.) to verbs, i.e., whatis sometimes
viewed as the relations and linkages between nouns. Verbs are actions, movement;
and movement is time. The go verbs and noun derivatives (upagacchati, upagata,
[a-]sagata, gata/gata/angata, etc.,) are movements, temporalizations. It is those
relations that give the illusion of continuities, of a substratum to actions that persists as
the activities and modifications fluxuate, i.e., selfhood. Paying attention to the verbs
which Asaga has carefully selected and employed provides important clues on
how to understand his point.
As for this line, parasparesamadhnt: parasparea = by mutual influence; asama
= not the same; dhna = a place, seat, habitation. Thus: because they influence each
other from different places, i.e., they occupy different loci, and thus are notconjoined.
E.g., saskras are in time/place X while so-called resultant vijnas are in time/place
Y, and these vijnas subsequently engender further saskras. So while mutually
influencing, they nonetheless remain separate items with their own distinctive
characteristics and loci. The same would apply to the three types of karma (body, speech,
mind), the three times (past, present, future), the fortuitous vs. nonfortuitous types of
saskras, and so on. Again, the issue is what transfers between them, what connects
them while leaving them distinct and apart. Nothing can transfer if they are collapsed
into the same locus (sagata), hence they are asagata. Being both apart and connected
at the same time is a type of middle way. More importantly, being apart and staying
apart is a necessary condition for having a connection. In order to be mutual, they must
be distinct.
That is, how could these types of saskras, being distinct from each other, nonetheless
all be conjoined with the mind, which is distinct from all of them? According to
55
149
prattya-samutpda, saskras are the conditions that give rise to vijnas. But the
question being raised is how can that causal relation occur if these are dissociated in
some absolute sense?
56
The translation follows the Chinese. The Sanskrit asks: How would there be
an upagatvam of saprayukta? Upagata another variant on the upagacchati,
sagata, etc., verbs is a rich term. It means both gone to and to approach.
Monier-Williams gives this range of meanings: gone to, met, approached (esp. for
protection or refuge); attained, obtained; arrived, occurred, happened; undergone,
experienced; agreed, allowed; promised; near at hand; passed away, dead. It is
a movement, a promise, an act of possession. For upagam he gives: to go near to,
come towards, approach, arrive at, reach, attain, visit; to come upon, attack; to press
hard upon; to occur, happen, present itself; to undertake, begin; to approach (a woman
sexually); to enter any state or relation, undergo, obtain, participate in, make choice
of, suffer; to admit, agree to, allow, confess. For upaga: approaching, going towards;
being or staying in or on; following, belonging to; fit for, conducive to; approached;
furnished with; covered (as a female). Saprayukta is a relation, an association
between two or more things. Ileave the reader to sort out the nuances.
57
This is not an ontological statement about the mind and its associates, but an expression
of the anticipatory perspective of paramrtha in which saskras will no longer
karmically condition vijna; this is another way of describing enlightenment, i.e., the
end of karmic conditioning. If, sometime in the future, saskras will not cease to
condition vijna, then enlightenment is impossible.
58
Doer and enjoyer are the performer of an action and the subsequent recipient of its
consequences, respectively, which implies a theory of self (tma-di) by which the
doer is the same person as the receiver of its consequences.
59
The verses on which the above is commenting (with a few additional verses)
(T30.1579.363b18):
150
151
60
I thank Rev. Dhammadipa for bringing this to my attention. I would also like express
my appreciation to Dhammadipa and Wei-jen Teng who read through the Chinese and
Sanskrit of the vykhy with me at Harvard. Both offered helpful suggestions.
61
This and other translations are from amoli (1975). Ch. 19 appears on pp. 693-703,
and in the PTS Pali edition, pp. 598-605.
62
amoli renders sua dhamm as phenomena alone, the same English phrase he
used earlier and more appropriately for suddhamm. Why he chose to avoid
voidphenomena here (mimicking his equivalents) is unclear.
64
This final tag is crucial. It is not extolling an ineffable reality, but making clear that
the basic components of Yogcra doctrine, such as mind (citta), mental associates
(caittas), etc., are all only vyavahra, conventional descriptive terms, not the names of
ultimate realities, much less anything absolute.
152