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G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628


APEX MINING CO., INC. v. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING
CORP., et al.
G.R. No. 152619-20
BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE v.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., et al.
G.R. No. 152870-71
THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, et al. v.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION
FACTS:Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM) filed a motion for
reconsideration to assail the decision of the Court which held that the assignment
of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated a condition in the permit
which provides that the EP 133 shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of
Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents. SEM did not
submit any evidence to prove that it was an agent of MCC. The Court also ruled
that it violated Presidential Decree No. 463 and that the EP 133 is already expired.
Pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 (Mining Act of 1995), it further
held that it is within the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake
directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to
private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws,
rules and regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified. Apex
and Balite asked the Court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to
accept their application for exploration permit. CamiloBanad, et al., also filed a
motion for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by
MMC to SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions
set forth in Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself;
(2) WhetherSoutheast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over the
disputed area, which constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution;
(3)Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in
this case is contrary to and overturns the earlier Decision of this Court in Apex v.
Garcia (G.R. No. 92605, 16 July 1991, 199 SCRA 278);
(4)Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area as
mineral reservation outweighs the claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc. and Balite
Communal Portal Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area;
(5)Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297
was belatedly raised.
HELD: (1) Exploration Permit 133 was issued in favor of MMC on 10 March
1986, when PD No. 463 was still the governing law. An exploration permit cannot
be assigned without the imprimatur of the Secretary of the DENR. Exploration
permits are strictly granted to entities or individuals possessing the resources and
capability to undertake mining operations. While PD No. 463 has already been
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repealed by EO No. 279, the administrative aspect of the former law nonetheless
remains applicable. Hence, the transfer or assignment of exploration permits still
needs the prior approval of the Secretary of the DENR. Not only did the
assignment of EP 133 to SEM violate Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463, it
likewise transgressed one of the conditions stipulated in the grant of the said
permit. Furthermore, with the expiration of EP 133 on 6 July 1994, MMC lost any
right to the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
(2) SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because its
supposed right was extinguished by the expiration of its exploration permit and by
its violation of the condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to
SEM. In addition, even assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, such is
a mere license that can be withdrawn by the State. In fact, the same has been
withdrawn by the issuance of Proclamation No. 297, which places the disputed
area under the full control of the State through the Executive Department.
(3) The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that
were not attendant in the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133, the violation of
the condition embodied in EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and the unauthorized
and invalid assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since this assignment was
effected without the approval of the Secretary of DENR.
(4) Assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, it cannot assert any
mining right over the disputed area, since the State has taken over the mining
operations therein, pursuant to Proclamation No. 297. Since the Executive
Department has control over the exploration, development and utilization of the
resources in the disputed area, SEMs exploration permit, assuming that it is still
valid, has been effectively withdrawn. The exercise of such power through
Proclamation No. 297 is in accord with jura regalia, where the State exercises its
sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and the mineral deposits
found within, pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
(5) The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No.
297 was raised belatedly, as SEM questions the same for the first time in its
Motion for Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to be entertained, the said
proclamation is found to be in harmony with the Constitution and other existing
statutes.
The motion for reconsideration of CamiloBanad, et al. cannot be passed
upon because they are not parties to the instant cases. The prayers of Apex and
Balite asking the Court to direct the MGB to accept their applications for
exploration permits cannot be granted, since it is the Executive Department that
has the prerogative to accept such applications, if ever it decides to award the
mining operations in the disputed area to a private entity. The Court cannot pass
upon the issue of whether or not MMC complied with the mandatory exploration
work program, as such was a non-issue and was not raised before the Court of
Appeals and the lower tribunals.
The Motions for Reconsideration filed by CamiloBanad, et al. and Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation are denied for lack of merit. The Motion for
Clarification of Apex Mining Co., Inc. and the Manifestation and Motion of the
Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative, insofar as these
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motions/manifestation ask the Court to direct the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau
to accept their respective applications for exploration permits, are denied. The
Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated 25 January 2007 of Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corporation is denied.
G.R. No. 163101
BENGUET CORPORATION v. DENR-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD
and J.G. REALTY AND MININGCORPORATION
FACTS:In 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with
Option to Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the
owner of four mining claims with a total area of 288.8656 hectares in SitioBagong
Bayan, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. Benguet obligated itself to perfect the
rights to the mining claims, including the option to develop the mining claims upon
written notice to J.G. Realty. In 1989, Benguet issued a letter informing J.G.
Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims, but in 1999, J.G. Realty sent a
letter informing Benguet that it was terminating the RAWOP due to violations of
the contract. Benguet insisted that there was no valid ground for the termination of
the RAWOP because Benguet complied with its obligations. In 2001, the RAWOP
was cancelled upon petition of J.G. Realty. Upon appeal, the Mining Adjudication
Board (MAB) assailed the previous decision. Their Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Benguet filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: (1) Whether there was serious and palpable error when the Honorable
Board failed to rule that the contractual obligation of the parties to arbitrate under
the Royalty Agreement is mandatory;
(2) Whether the Honorable Board exceeded its jurisdiction when it
sustained the cancellation of the Royalty Agreement for alleged breach of contract
despite the absence of evidence;
(3) Whether the Questioned Decision of the Honorable Board in
cancelling the RAWOP prejudiced the substantial rights of Benguet under the
contract to the unjust enrichment of JG Realty.
HELD: The petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper
remedy.The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari and
question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB]. Petitioner
having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB
has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be
denied.
(1) There is a clear distinction between compulsory and voluntary
arbitration. The arbitration provided by the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) is
compulsory, while the nature of the arbitration provision in the RAWOP is
voluntary, not involving any government agency. There can be no quibbling that
POA is a quasi-judicial body which forms part of the DENR, an administrative
agency. Hence, the provision on mandatory resort to arbitration, freely entered into
by the parties, must be held binding against them. In sum, on the issue of whether
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POA should have referred the case to voluntary arbitration, we find that, indeed,
POA has no jurisdiction over the dispute which is governed by RA 876, the
arbitration law. The Court ruled that the jurisdiction of POA and that of MAB can
no longer be questioned by Benguet. What Benguet should have done was to
immediately challenge the POAs jurisdiction by a special civil action for certiorari
when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. To redo the proceedings
fully participated in by the parties after the lapse of seven years from date of
institution of the original action with the POA would be anathema to the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
(2) The cancellation of the RAWOP by the POA was based on two grounds:
(a) Benguets failure to pay J.G. Realtys royalties for the mining claims; and (b)
Benguets failure to seriously pursue MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 over
the mining claims. In the instant case, the obligation of Benguet to pay royalties to
J.G. Realty has been admitted and supported by the provisions of the RAWOP.
Thus, the burden to prove such obligation rests on Benguet. In fact, Benguet never
even alleged that it continuously followed-up the application with the MGB and
that it was in constant communication with the government agency for the
expeditious resolution of the application. Such allegations would show that,
indeed, Benguet was remiss in prosecuting the MPSA application and clearly failed
to comply with its obligation in the RAWOP.
(3) The cancellation of the RAWOP was based on valid grounds and is,
therefore, justified. Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the
cancellation of the RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right to
participate in further developing the mining claims, was brought about by its
violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but itself for its
predicament.
The petition is dismissed.

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G.R. No. 148267 August 8, 2002


ARMANDO C. CARPIO v. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
FACTS: Sulu Resources Development Corporation filed a petition forthe Mines
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No. MPSA-IV-131 to claim certain areas
in Antipolo, Rizal. The petitioner, Armando C. Carpio, opposed the claim alleging
that his landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by
respondents claim. He further claims that he enjoys a preferential right to explore
and extract the quarry resources on his properties.The Panel of Arbitrators of the
Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution in favor of
the petitioner. The respondent appealed. The Mines Adjudication Board dismissed
the petitioners opposition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
also denied by the Board. Pursuant to Section 79 of Chapter XIII of the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), the CA ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to
review the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) because the findings
of fact by the MAB as well as its decision shall be final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines
Adjudication Board should be made directly to the Supreme Court or to the Court
of Appeals.
HELD: In the present case, it is claimed that a petition for review is improper
because petitioners challenge is purely factual, bearing only on the MAB ruling
that there was no overlap or conflict between the litigants claims.Factual
controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA is
prepared to handle such issues because it is mandated to rule on questions of fact.
At the very least when factual findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to
have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present case, the CA may
review them, consistent with the constitutional duty of the judiciary. There are
sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB Decision under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
mandates that No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent. On
the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court on a petition for review by certiorari.
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
transfers to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial bodys
decisions, such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the
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substantive and vested rights of the parties. Third, the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasijudicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are
now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. Fourth, the
Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by RA No.
7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial
bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more
elbow room to resolve them. Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of
courts dictates that direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not
be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate
lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction. Consistent with these rulings and legal bases, the Court held that
Section 79 of RA 7942 is likewise to be understood as having been modified by
Circular No. 1-91, BP Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7902, Revised Administrative
Circular 1-95, and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Appeals from decisions of the
MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for review in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The petition is granted.

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G.R. No. 169080


CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION v.
MACROASIA CORPORATION , et al.
G.R. No. 172936 December 19, 2007
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORP. v. HON. ANGELO REYES, et al.
G.R. No. 176226
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION v. BLUE
RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION and MACROASIA CORPORATION
G.R. No. 176319
MACROASIA CORPORATION v. BLUE RIDGE MINERAL
CORPORATION and CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION
CORPORATION
FACTS: In 1973, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease
Contract (V-1050) for a term of 25 years up to September 23, 1998 for mining lode
claims covering an area of 216 hectares at Sitio Linao, Ipilan, Brookes Point,
Palawan. Infantas corporate name was changed to Macroasia Corporation. In
1997, Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease contracts on the
following grounds: (1) the nonpayment of Macroasia of required occupational fees
and municipal taxes; (2) the non-filing of Macroasia of Affidavits of Annual Work
Obligations; (3) the failure of Macroasia to provide improvements on subject
mining claims; (4) the concentration of Macroasia on logging; (5) the
encroachment, mining, and extraction by Macroasia of nickel ore from Celestials
property; (6) the ability of Celestial to subject the mining areas to commercial
production; and (7) the willingness of Celestial to pay fees and back taxes of
Macroasia. Blue Ridge also wrote the Director of Mines to seek cancellation of
mining lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and Lebach Mining
Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in Brookes Point.
The POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the following Mining
Lease Contracts of Macroasia. It gave Celestial the preferential right to
Macroasias mining areas. It upheld Blue Ridges petiotion only as against the
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Mining Lease Contract areas of Lebach and the said leased areas were declared
automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid
Lebachs areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the
MAB. Lebach did not file any notice of appeal and the resolution became final and
executory. The MAB affirmed the POA findings that Macroasia abandoned its
mining claims. The MAB found that Macroasia did not comply with its work
obligations from 1986 to 1991. The MAB found that it was Blue Ridge that had
prior and preferential rights over the mining claims of Macroasia, and not
Celestial. Celestial and Macroasia moved for reconsideration. In 2004, MAB
issued a Resolution holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to
revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB
further held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was
exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary; that a petition for cancellation is not
a mining dispute under the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA pursuant to Sec. 77 of
RA 7942; and that the POA could only adjudicate claims or contests during the
MPSA application and not when the claims and leases were already granted and
subsisting.
In 2005, Celestial assailed the Resolution before the CA. Blue Ridge filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. The CA Twelfth Division affirmed
the MAB Resolution. Celestial filed a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 169080). The
CA Special Tenth Division canceled Macroasias lease contracts and granted Blue
Ridge prior and preferential rights. It treated the cancellation of a mining lease
agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under
Sec. 77 of RA 7942. Upon inquiry with the DENR, Blue Ridge discovered that
sometime in December 2005 two MPSAs, duly approved and signed by the DENR
Secretary, were issued in favor of Macroasia. The Blue Ridge filed a Petition for
Certiorari (G.R. No. 172936) to invalidate the MPSAs issued to Macroasia.
Macroasia and Celestial filed petition (G.R. No. 176319, G.R. No. 176226) to
assail the CAs Resolution granting Blue Ridge prior and preferential rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not POA and MAB have jurisdiction to cancel Mineral
Agreements.
HELD: In G.R. Nos. 169080, 176226 and 176319, RA 7942 or The Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 is silent on who has authority to cancel the agreement. RA
7942 is also silent as to who is empowered to cancel existing lease contracts and
mineral agreements. After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279,
RA 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case
law, the Court ruled that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to
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cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the


following reasons: (a) The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral
agreements emanates from his administrative authority, supervision, management,
and control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987; (b) RA 7942 confers to the DENR Secretary
specific authority over mineral resources, particularly Sections 8 and 29 of; (c)
Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over
the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly
demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the
cancellation of mineral agreements; (d) The DENR Secretarys power to cancel
mining rights or agreements through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230,
Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of
a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA; (e) Celestial and Blue Ridge are not unaware
of the stipulations in the Mining Lease Contract Nos. V-1050 and MRD-52, the
cancellation of which they sought from the POA. It is clear from said lease
contracts that the parties are the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
DENR Secretary as lessor, and Infanta (Macroasia) as lessee, thus, the DENR
Secretary has the power to cancel the lease contracts for violations of existing
laws, rules and regulations and the terms and conditions of the contracts. The court
ruled that a petition for cancellation of a mineral agreement anchored on the breach
of the mineral agreement even if filed by an applicant to a mining claim, like
Celestial and Blue Ridge, falls within the jurisdiction of the DENR Secretary and
not POA.
In G.R. No. 172936, the records showed that the DENR Secretary did not
gravely abuse his discretion in approving and signing MPSA in favor of Macroasia.
Moreover, a preferential right would at most be an inchoate right to be given
priority in the grant of a mining agreement. It has not yet been transformed into a
legal and vested right unless approved by the MGB or DENR Secretary. RA 7942
further confers exclusive and primary jurisdiction on the DENR Secretary to
approve mineral agreements, which is purely an administrative function within the
scope of his powers and authority. In exercising such exclusive primary
jurisdiction, the DENR Secretary, through the MGB, has the best competence to
determine to whom mineral agreements are granted. Settled is the rule that the
courts will defer to the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by
reason of their expertise and experience in the matters assigned to them pursuant to
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Moreover, while it is true that the subject mining claims are under litigation,
this does not preclude the DENR and its Secretary from carrying out their
functions and duties without a restraining order or an injunctive writ. Otherwise,
public interest and public service would unduly suffer by mere litigation of
particular issues where government interests would be unduly affected. In the
instant case, it must be borne in mind that the government has a stake in the subject
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mining claims. Also, Macroasia had various valid existing mining lease contracts
over the subject mining lode claims issued by the DENR. Thus, Macroasia has an
advantage over Blue Ridge and Celestial insofar as the administrative aspect of
pursuing the mineral agreements is concerned.
The petitions under G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, and 176229 are dismissed
while the petition under G.R. No. 176319 is granted.

G.R. No. 157882 March 30, 2006

DIDIPIO EARTH-SAVERS MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOCIATION, et al. v.


ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as SECRETARY of the DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), et al.
FACTS: In 1987, Pres. Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 279 which
authorized the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation
of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In 1995,
Pres. Ramos signed into law RA No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995. However, in 1994, Pres. Ramos executed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC)
over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya
and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
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Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single


company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining
Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian
nationals. In 2001, counsels for petitioners filed a demand letter to the DENR
Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA on the
ground that RA No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40
are unconstitutional. In 2002, another letter was sent to Pres. Arroyo. This letter
was indorsed to the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(MGB), in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The MGB rejected the demand for the
cancellation of the CAMC FTAA. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of RA
No. 7942 and DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and
the FTAA entered into by the Republic and AMC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations are void and unconstitutional.
HELD: Section 76 of RA No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40; RA No. 7942
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 insofar as
they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph
4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution are constitutional.
While the Court declared that the Section 76 of RA No. 7942 is a taking
provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground that it allows
taking of private property without the determination of public use and the payment
of just compensation. Mining is an industry which is of public benefit.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its
implementing rules and regulations do not provide for just compensation in
expropriating private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107
of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation.
The legislature, in enacting the mining act, is presumed to have deliberated
with full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. Thus, it
is but reasonable to conclude that in passing such statute it was in accord with the
existing laws and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of courts in the determination of
just compensation and that it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any
former law relating to the same matter. Indeed, there is nothing in the provisions of
the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations that exclude the courts
from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in expropriation proceedings
involving mining operations.
Petitioners charge that RA No. 7942, as well as its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, makes it possible for FTAA contracts to cede over to a fully foreignowned corporation full control and management of mining enterprises, with the
result that the State is allegedly reduced to a passive regulator dependent on
submitted plans and reports, with weak review and audit powers. In the case of La
Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramo, it was held that the FTAA
contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get away with it; it will have to
follow the government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise; RA 7942 and DAO
96-40 vest in the government more than a sufficient degree of control and
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supervision over the conduct of mining operations. Furthermore, the 1987


Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State; and safety
measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime.
The petition for prohibition and mandamus is dismissed; however, RA No.
7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations are declared constitutional.

G.R. No. 127882 December 1, 2004


LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL. v. VICTOR O.
RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR,
MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB-DENR), RUBEN TORRES,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC.
FACTS: On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting
the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942) , DENR Administrative Order [DAO]
96-40, as well as of the entire Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) executed between the government and Western Mining Corporation
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(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service
contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the
subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, which, though permitted under
the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the
principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign
control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the
Filipino nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized
service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive
management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the
event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and
development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the
products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the
point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources.
According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII)
effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (DENR
Secretary), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGBDENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc.
filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control
over the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources
HELD: The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to enter into
agreements with foreign owned corporations. On the other hand, Congress may
review the action of the President once it is notified of every contract entered into
in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its
execution. In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the
exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of
the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President
and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a
proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the
judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power
of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and
coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding
into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum
discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of
foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry
for viable employment opportunities in the country. The judiciary is loath to
interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official
functions. As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm,
Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as
strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. Let the development of the mining
industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not
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the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the


Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations
and hopes of all the people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not
be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests.
Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient
discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and
expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of
prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal
Blaan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their
communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise
constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an
otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not
unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given
the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital
and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated
technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the
States need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance
our countrys competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control
standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its
Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial and
technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA).

G.R. No. 162331 November 20, 2006


LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. v. WMC RESOURCES INTL.
PTY. LTD., WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC.

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FACTS: In 1995, the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines executed a


Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (Columbio FTAA) to the
expoloration and development of possible mineral resources in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under
various Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by the Tampakan
Companies. The Option Agreement also provides for the grant of the right of first
refusal to the Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of
its rights and interests in the mining claims. In 2000, WMC Resources executed a
Sale and Purchase Agreement with Lepanto, however the Tampakan Companies
sought to exercise its right of first refusal. The petitioner filed a case against WMC
Philippines and the Tampakan Companies. The case was dismissed.
In 2001, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Shares of Stocks. The DENR Secretary approved the transfer of
the Columbio FTAA. The petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the
DENR Secretary with the Office of the President on several grounds. One of which
is that it violates Section 40 of the Mining Act (RA No. 7942). The petition was
dismissed. The appeal before the CA was also dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 40 of RA No. 7942 should be applied to the
Columbio FTAA.
HELD: No. Section 40 of RA No. 7942 should not be applied to the Columbio
FTAA. The Columbio FTAA was entered into by the Philippine Government and
WMC Philippines in March 1995, before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 took
effect on April 1995. In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express
declaration or an implication in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the
provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively.
Furthermore, if petitioner was indeed of the mind Section 40 of RA No.
7942 is applicable to the Columbio FTAA, thus necessitating the approval of the
President for the validity of its transfer or assignment, it would seem contradictory
that petitioner sought the approval of the DENR Secretary, and not that of the
President, of its July 2000 Sale and Purchase Agreement with WMC Resources.
Hence, it may be glimpsed from the very act of petitioner that it recognized that
the provision of the Columbio FTAA regarding the consent of the DENR Secretary
with respect to the transfer of said FTAA must be upheld.
Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of
the President with respect to assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable
retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would be tantamount to an impairment of the
obligations under said contract as it would effectively restrict the right of the
parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA. Furthermore,
if made to apply to the Columbio FTAA, it will effectively modify the terms of
the original contract and thus impair the obligations of the parties thereto and
restrict the exercise of their vested rights under the original agreement.
The petition is denied.
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006
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JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ


v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioners John are officers for Mining Operations of Marcopper Mining
Corporation in Marinduque. The tailings stored by Marcopper in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque leaked into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. In a few days,
millions of tons of tailings had been discharged. Marcopper was charged with
violation of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067), the National Pollution
Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA No.
7942), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property.
The MTC quashed the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 but maintained the Informations for violation of
RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. In 1998, the RTC Branch 94 ordered the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 reinstated. Petitioners filed a
petition with the CA. The petitioners contend that they should only be charged for
violation of Article 365 of the RPC since the acts complained of in the other
charges are the same acts complained of in the charge for violation of Article 365
of the RPC. The CA affirmed the decision of Branch 94 and their motion for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the charges filed against petitioners, except the charge for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property, should be quashed for
duplicity of charges
HELD: No. As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a
single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more
than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that
no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." In
the case, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.
However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners claim that they
should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94s
comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC
showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one
essential element not required of the others. Consequently, the filing of the
multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is
consistent with settled doctrine.
There is duplicity of charges when a single Information charges more than
one offense. The filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based
on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine. On petitioners claim that
the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se
felony, such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property, cannot
absorb mala prohibita crimes, such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
7942. What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence
(culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
The petition is denied.
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G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000


MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION v. ALBERTO G. BUMOLO in his
own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Benito Cachili, ConchitaBumolo,
Patricio Dumlao, Jacinto Aliguyon, Alfonso Maddawat, Toledo Gillao, Jose
Tigo and Peter CabiggatBumolo, DALTON PACIFIC RESOURCES, INC.,
OROPHILIPPINES VENTURES INC., and the MINES ADJUDICATION
BOARD (MAB)
FACTS: Marcopper Mining Corporation registered its mining claims in Pao,
Kasibu, NuevaVizcaya with the DENR. The private respondents also registered
their mining claims in the same area. The claims were subsequently converted into
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA). The petitioner entered into an
Option Agreements over the mining claims with respondents. The petitioner was
granted the exclusive right to explore the mining claims for three years. In 1982
and 1987, the petitioner filed Prospecting Permit Applications (PPA) with the
DENR and Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), but in 1991, the petitioner
informed the respondents that it was terminating the Agreements. It was found out
that the area was relatively weak and of limited tonnage which did not justify
further drilling for big tonnage of low grade gold exploration target. On the same
year, the PPA and petitioners subsequent request for reconsideration was rejected
by the DENR, however, DAR issued a clearance for six months. The petitioner
appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) where the previous decision was
affirmed. MAB also denied petitioners motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject
of the PPA was outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.
HELD: No. The petition lacks merit. Factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
which have acquired expertise in matters entrusted to their jurisdictions are
accorded by the Court not only respect but finality if supported by substantial
evidence. In this instance, there is no reason to disagree with respondent MAB.
The petitioner terminated the Option Agreements with respondents but it still
showed interest when it filed a PPA over the area. Petitioners action of filing a
PPA over the area it previously found relatively weak and of limited tonnage was
absurd. Furthermore, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is
outside the Magat River Forest Reservation has been adequately established by the
following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as May 1989 by the Forest
Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the July 1991 Memorandum
Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by the
National Mapping and Resources Information Authority per its June 1995
indorsement of the maps to the office of the Regional Executive Director.
Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the Magat
River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical error
committed by somebody in the Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from the
fact that the allegation does not have anything to support it, the aforementioned
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documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying the PPA
had already settled the issue.
The petition is denied.
G.R. No. 178188
OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. PLATINUM GROUP
METALS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 180674
CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. HON.
JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95, Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan, and PLATINUM GROUP METAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 181141
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION v. CITINICKEL MINES
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, acting for its own interest and on
behalf of OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 183527
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
and POLLY C. DY
FACTS: In 1971 and 1980, Olympic was granted Mining Lease Contracts by the
DENR Secretary covering mining areas in the Narra and Espanola, Palawan. In
2003, Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum whereby
Platinum was given the exclusive right to control, possess, manage/operate, and
conduct mining operations, and to market or dispose mining products on the
Toronto Nickel Mine in Narra, and the Pulot Nickel Mine in Espanola for a period
of 25 years. In return, Platinum would pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2% of the
gross revenues. Subsequently, Olympic and Platinum were granted government
permits and environmental compliance certificates. In 2006, Olympic informed
Platinum of the immediate termination of the Operating Agreement on account of
Platinums gross violations of its terms, and directed Platinum to surrender
possession of the subject mining areas. In 2006, Olympic instituted an action for
the issuance of an injunctive writ against Platinum. The RTC dismissed Olympics
complaint. Olympic then filed two cases with the DENR. The first case was
dismissed and the other was subsequently wihdrawn by Olympic. Meanwhile,
without the knowledge or consent of Platinum, Olympic transferred its applications
for mineral agreements, including its rights under the Operating Agreement, to
Citinickel via a Deed of Assignment in 2006, This was approved by the Regional
Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB). Citinickel filed 3
administrative cases. Citinickels petition to cancel Platinums SSMPs was
dismissed.
Citinickels request for the cancellation of the Environmental Compliance
Certificates (ECCs) of Platinum was not granted by the Office of the President. In
the other case, the POA issued a Resolution to cancel the Operating Agreement as
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well as Platinums SSMPs, and ordered Platinum to cease and desist from
operating the subject mining areas. The appellate court dismissed Platinums
certiorari petition. Platinum filed four petitions. In G.R. No. 181141, Platinum
contends that the non-filing of an appeal with the MAB would be useless, as the
POA declared that its decision to cancel the Operating Agreement was not just its
own, but also that of the DENR, which includes the MAB. G.R. Nos. 178188,
180674, and 183527 involve issues arising from the complaint for quieting of title,
damages, breach of contract, and specific performance filed by Platinum against
Olympic.
ISSUES: Whether or not the POA has the authority to hear and decide the dispute
between Olympic/Citinickel and Platinum, as parties to the operating agreement.
HELD: No. Although Section 77 (d) of the Mining Act has transferred to the POA
jurisdiction over disputes pending before the Bureau of Mines and the DENR, it
did not include all other forms of contracts involving mining rights nor a general
catch-all phrase to cover other agreements involving mining rights. POAs
jurisdiction over disputes involving rights to mining areas has nothing to do with
the cancellation of existing mineral agreements. The Operating Agreement is not
a contract between the government and a contractor; instead, it is a purely civil
contract between two private entities one of whom happens to be a party to a
mineral agreement with the government, and to contend that a dispute involving
operating agreements can be classified as a dispute involving mineral agreements
or permits stretches the definition of mineral agreement beyond the clear terms
of the law. The Mining Act has limited the jurisdiction of the POA, as successor of
the adjudicatory functions of the Bureau of Mines, to mineral agreements between
the government and the private contractor. Otherwise stated, while disputes
between parties to any mining contract, including operating agreements, may
previously fall within the Bureau of Mines jurisdiction under PD No. 1281, it can
no longer be so placed now within the authority of the POA to settle under Section
77 (b) of the Mining Law because its jurisdiction has been limited to the resolution
of disputes involving public mineral agreements. Since the Operating Agreement is
not the mineral agreement contemplated by law, the contention that jurisdiction
should be with the POA under Section 77(b) of the Mining Act cannot be legally
correct. In plainer terms, no jurisdiction vests in the POA under the cited provision
because the Operating Agreement is not the mineral agreement that Section
77(b) refers to.
Additionally, the Court notes that both Olympic and Citinickel have
previously recognized the RTCs jurisdiction to decide the dispute when they filed
civil cases before the trial courts of Palawan and Paraaque, respectively, for the
cancellation of the Operating Agreement on account of Platinums alleged gross
violations. By doing so, both Olympic and Citinickel acknowledged the authority
and jurisdiction of the trial court to resolve their dispute with Platinum. In other
words, they are now estopped from claiming that the POA, rather than the trial
court, has the sole and exlcusive authority to resolve the issue of whether the
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Operating Agreement may be rescinded for Platinums alleged violations. With the
foregoing, the Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC of Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, Branch 95, and dismissed Olympics petition for review on certiorari in
G.R. 178188. Platinums petition in G.R. No. 183527 was granted.
In the other case, although the Deed of Assignment between Olympic and
Citinickel was executed on June 9, 2006, the actual transfer of rights occurred only
after the Regional Director of the MGB Regional Office No. IV-B had given its
approval to the assignment on September 6, 2006, or after Civil Case No. 4199 was
filed on June 14, 2006. Accordingly, Citinickel, being a mere successor-in-interest
of Olympic, is bound by the questioned injunction order. Even if we disregard the
inclusion of Citinickel in the July 16, 2006 Order granting the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction, the result would be the same the injunction imposed on
Olympic will similarly bind Citinickel. Thus, the Court dismissed Citinickels
petition (G.R. No. 180674) for lack of merit.
Going into the merits of G.R. No. 181141, the Court finds that the POA
Resolution was issued in disregard of the injunctive writs in Civil Case No. 4199.
Both Olympic and Citinickel evidently trifled with the courts and abused its
processes by improperly instituting several cases before various judicial and quasijudicial bodies, one case after another, some even simultaneously filed during the
pendency of other cases, once it became evident that a favorable decision will not
be obtained in the previously filed case all of which are focused on the
termination of the Operating Agreement and the cancellation of Platinums mining
permits. The actions of Olympic and Citinickel, taken separately or collectively,
betray a pattern of calculated and intentional forum shopping that warrants denial
of the reliefs they pray for. Thus, the Court grants Platinums petition in G.R. No.
181141, and annul the POA Resolution.
The Court ruled that in G.R. Nos. 178188 and 180674, the assailed CA
Decisions are affirmed, while in G.R. Nos. 183527 and 181141, the assailed CA
Resolutions are reversed and set aside.

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G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006


PICOP RESOURCES, INC. v. BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES
CORPORATION, and THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD
FACTS: In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation
(CMMCI) entered into a Mines Operating Agreement (Agreement) with Banahaw
Mining and Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining) for the exploration,
development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs 18 mining claims in
Agusan del Sur. In 1998, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit
which upon expiration was renewed thrice. Also, in a Memorandum of Agreement,
PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining a right of way to its mining claims. In 1991,
Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA). While the MPSA were pending,
Banahaw Mining sold its rights and interests over 37 mining claims to Base Metals
Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals). This included those covered by its
mining operating agreement with CMMCI. The CMMCI approved the assignment
and recognized Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. In 1997, MPSA
applications were published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act
of 1995. PICOP opposed the application. In 1998, the Panel Arbitrator disapproved
the application. Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with MAB. Base Metals
MPSAs were reinstated. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB.
The Court of Appeals noted that the reinstatement of the MPSA does not impair
PICOPs timber license. Base Metals had already secured the necessary Area
Status and Clearance from the DENR and the areas applied for are not closed to
mining operations. The CA denied PICOPs Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP
contends that its concession area is within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao Forest
Reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 and is closed to mining
application pursuant to RA 7942.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2,756 hectares subject of Base Metals MPSA are
closed to mining operations
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HELD: No. There is no merit to PICOPs contention that the area covered by Base
Metals MPSA is, by law, closed to mining activities.
Sec. 6 of RA 7942 provides that mining operations in reserved lands other
than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain
limitations. RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves
but only those proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in
this case that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA has been proclaimed as
watershed forest reserves. Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in
timberland or forestry subject to existing rights and reservations. Sec. 47 of PD 705
permits mining operations in forest lands which include the public forest, the
permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations. Furthermore, these
provisions do not require that the consent of existing licensees be obtained but that
they be notified before mining activities may be commenced inside forest
concessions. PICOP also failed to present any evidence that the area covered by
the MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of the
National Ingrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) pursuant to a law, presidential
decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as required by RA 7586.
In addition, the Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as
a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment
of its concession areas. The Court emphasized that the reinstatement of Base
Metals MPSA does not automatically result in its approval. Base Metals still has
to comply with the requirements outlined in DENR Administrative Order (DAO
96-40), including the publication/posting/radio announcement of its mineral
agreement application.
The petition is denied.

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G.R. No. 179674 July 28, 2009


PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION v. MINES ADJUDICATION
BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, MINES AND GEO-SCIENCES BUREAU DIRECTOR
HORACIO C. RAMOS, REGIONAL DIRECTOR SAMUEL T. PARAGAS,
REGIONAL PANEL OF ARBITRATORS ATTY. CLARO E. RAMOLETE,
JR., ATTY. JOSEPH ESTRELLA and ENGR. RENATO RIMANDO, and
MONTAGUE RESOURCES PHILIPPINES CORPORATION
FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in mining business. In 2000, the Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA No. 153-2000-1) was issued to the petitioner for the
exploration, development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and
other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan.
Respondent, also a corporation engaged in mining business, filed an application
for Application for Exploration Permit over the same area in 2003. Prior to
petitioners opposition, the petitioners MPSA was cancelled. In 2005, the Mines
and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent.
The Panel of Arbitrators dismissed the petitioners Verified Protest/Opposition.
Petitioner appealed to the MAB then to the CA. The petition was dismissed. The
CA also denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the
Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was filed out of time.
(2) Whether or not the issuance by the DENR Secretary of DMO No. 200503 in February 2005 which cancelled MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner and the
issuance by MGB of EP No. 05-001 in favor of private respondent in September
2005 rendered the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner moot and academic.
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HELD: (1) Yes. The Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration
Permit of the respondent was filed beyond the reglementary period.
In the present case, notices of the Application for Exploration Permit of
private respondent were published in newspapers, announced on the radio, and
posted in public places. The posting was done the latest, so we reckon the last
possible date petitioner could have validly filed its Verified Petition/Opposition
with the Panel of Arbitrators therefrom.
Since the notice of the Application for Exploration Permit of private
respondent was last posted on July 28, 2005, the 30-day reglementary period for
filing any adverse claim/protest/opposition thereto ended on August 27, 2005. As
petitioner explained, however, August 27, 2005 was a Saturday; and August 29,
2005, Monday, was declared a national holiday, so the next working day was
August 30, 2005, Tuesday. Petitioner did send its Verified Protest/Opposition,
through registered mail, on August 30, 2005, as evidenced by the Affidavit of
Service of even date and Registry Receipts No. 10181; No. 10182; No. 10183; and
No. 10184. Nevertheless, the Court still could not consider the Verified
Protest/Opposition of petitioner as having been filed within the reglementary
period. The Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for
Exploration Permit of respondent is deemed filed with the Panel of Arbitrators only
upon payment of the prescribed docket fee on September 6, 2005, clearly beyond
the reglementary period, which ended on August 30, 2005.
(2) Yes. The Panel of Arbitrators dismissed the Verified Protest/Opposition of
petitioner because it has become moot and academic.
When the exploration permit issued to private respondent, petitioner had
nothing more to protest/oppose. More importantly, with the issuance by MGB of
EP No. 05-001 to private respondent, the remedy of petitioner is to seek the
cancellation thereof. The Panel of Arbitrators cannot simply consider or convert the
Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit
of respondent as a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 05-001. Since the Panel
of Arbitrators can no longer grant petitioner any actual substantial relief by reason
of the foregoing circumstances, then the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner
was appropriately dismissed for being moot and academic. Furthermore, the Panel
of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions
relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over cancellation of
mineral rights already granted and existing. The authority to deny, revoke, or
cancel EP No. 05-001 of respondent is lodged with the MGB, and not with the
Panel of Arbitrators.
The petition is denied.

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G.R. No.L-49109. December 1, 1987


SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC. v. HON. MINISTER OF
NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF
MINES JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ
FACTS: Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., a mining corporation, alleges that it
holds fifty mining claims in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the
Philippine Bill of 1902. In 1977, PD No. 1214 required holders of mining claims to
file a mining lease application. The petitioner filed a mining lease application, but
"under protest", with a reservation that it is not waiving its rights over its mining
claims. The petitioner also filed an action to question the constitutionality of PD
No. 1214. The petitioner claimed that its fifty mining claims had already been
declared as its own private and exclusive property in final judgments rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte in land registration proceedings
previously instituted. However, the respondents alleged that petitioner failed to
fully exhaust administrative remedies. Furthermore the respondents contend that,
provided that petitioner's mining claims were valid, if they are deemed abandoned
and cancelled due to non-compliance with the legal requirements for maintaining a
perfected mining claim, under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
petitioner has no valid and subsisting claim which could be lost through the
implementation of PD No. 1214, thus giving it no standing to question the Decree.
On the contrary, the petitioner claimed that it already had a vested right over its
mining claims even before PD No. 1214.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.


HELD: The Court ruled that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional. It is a
valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the
public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the
patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be
underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining claims
located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators
had failed to obtain a patent. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership
over the affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or
area from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the
same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. Moreover, PD
No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State.
The petition is dismissed.

G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002


SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION v. BALITE
PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE
HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL
MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao)
FACTS: The case involves the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area, a rich tract of mineral
land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. In 1988, Marcopper
Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No.
133) over the Diwalwal area. In 1991, the Congress enacted Republic Act No.
7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act which authorized the Provincial
Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) to declare and set aside small-scale mining
areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to
small-scale miners under certain conditions. Subsequently, DENR Secretary
Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729
hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. A
petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral
Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before
the DENR Regional Executive Director. While the case is pending, Marcopper
assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
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Corporation (SEM). The SEM applied for an integrated MPSA over the land
covered by the permit which was approved.
In 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act was enacted
and mining cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA). In 1997,
the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed Resolution No. 26,
Series of 1997, authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs) to smallscale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines. The petitioner filed a complaint.
The RPA reiterated the validity of the EP No. 133. The petitioner elevated the case
to the CA but it was dismissed.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the
assailed memorandum order did not adopt the direct state utilization scheme in
resolving the Diwalwal dispute.
HELD: No.The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals ruling that the challenged
MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a policy in
resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate
that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing
else.
Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any
party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to
undertake studies to determine its feasibility.
Incidentally, it must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances
may petitioners rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133
merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended,
modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so
since the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral
resources are matters impressed with great public interest.
Pursuant to Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4,
Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, the State may pursue the
constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration,
development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources, by either
directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified
entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study
of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the
constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded
from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy
in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. As implied
earlier, the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling
for this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.
The petition is denied.

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G.R. No. 69997. September 30, 1987


UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC v. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS,
AUREA ARAOJO, GERVACIO ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX
DETECIO, JESUS ASUNCION, MELANIO ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO
ASUNCION
FACTS: In 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned their rights
over the mining claims to the petitioner. In 1962, the President of the Philippines
granted several mining patents on mineral claims located at UngayMalobago,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay. Subsequently, free patents were granted by the respondent
Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued
by the Register of Deeds of Albay in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos
Stilianopulos, and the petitioner. The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment
and cancellation of patents and that the original certificates of title issued be
declared null and void. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the petitioner has no personality to institute the case because the disputed
properties form part of disposable land of the public domain and the action for
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reversion should be instituted by the Republic through the Solicitor General. The
petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
previous decision.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it
ruled that the lands in question belong to the public domain;
(2) Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint on
the ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same.
HELD: (1) No. The Court ruled for the private respondents. Applying Article XIII,
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution to the case at bar, the Court conclude that the
issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines
in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the
minerals which may be found on or under the surface of the land. On the other
hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979
in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to
use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right
to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
Although the original certificates of titles of the petitioner were issued prior to the
titles of the private respondents, the former cannot prevail over the latter for the
provisions of the Constitution which governed at the time of their issuance
prohibited the alienation of mineral lands of the public domain.
(2) No. The appellate court did not err in concluding that the petitioner has
no personality to institute the action for annulment and cancellation of patents.
The mineral lands over which it has a right to extract minerals remained part of the
inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the
person acting in his stead can bring an action for reversion.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

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