Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No.

175352, January 18, 2011

RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled
as Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the
Senate against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec.
13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited the case
of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held
that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of
Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that
the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for
purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC
Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a
GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable
organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which
are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as
Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended
by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that [t]he Congress shall
not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed the
PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and

Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision

read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95,
as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for

Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its
own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of
the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and
the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
II.

THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
III.

THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of

the Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional
issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in
nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and
was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the
very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider
the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a wellestablished rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC
Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter,
especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based
its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this

declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was
being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of
existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly
on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue
of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The
passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding the
effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law
is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,]
not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in
PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui
generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from
the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its
amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not
even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys adherence to the Geneva Convention
and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty
obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and
harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to
negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just
like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs
special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as
not to lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a
private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated
as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the
government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under
the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply
that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the provision of the
Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui

generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC

on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of
the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised
by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of
the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court
should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would
not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster
and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in
the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void
must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court
MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to
now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution .]

[1] Concurring with Justice Antonio Carpio, who wrote the Decision, were then-Chief Justice Puno and
Associate Justices Quisumbing, Carpio Morales, ChicoNazario, Velasco, and Leonardo-de
Castro. Joining Associate Justice Nachura in his Dissenting Opinion were Associate Justices YnaresSantiago, Brion, Peralta, and Bersamin. Then-Justice [now Chief Justice] Corona took no part.