Administrative Law Case Digest PDF

Administrative Law POLITICAL LAW
Table of Contents
JURISDICTION OF THE CA OVER CIAC ..................................................................................................5
METRO CONSTRUCTION INC., VS. CHATHAM PROPERTIES INC. .............................................................. 5
POWER OF APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ....................................................................................5
RAMON P. BINAMIRA VS. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR. ................................................................................ 5
JURISDICTION OF THE CA OVER THE CTA.............................................................................................6
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION VS. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT MANUFACTURERS CORP. .... 6
POWER TO ABOLISH AN OFFICE ..........................................................................................................6
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB VS. HON.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO B.ZAMORA ........................... 6
POWER OF THE DENR TO ISSUE AN ORDER OF DEMOLITION ...............................................................7
THE CITY OF BAGUIO VS. FRANCISCO NINO ............................................................................................. 7
LEGAL STANDING TO CHALLENGE A DISAPPROVAL BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS .............7
FRANCISCO ABELLA JR., VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ......................................................................... 7
POWER OF THE HDMF TO AMEND RULES AND REGULATIONS .............................................................8
YAZAKI TORRES MANUFACTURING, INC VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS ..................................................... 8
POWER OF THE PSC TO REGULATE PULIC TRANSPORTATION ...............................................................8
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. VS THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ................................ 8
POWER OF THE BIR TO IMPLEMENT RULES AND REGULATIONS ...........................................................9
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. BOCILOANDIA DRUG CORPORATION................................ 9
RULE MAKING POWER OF DAR ...........................................................................................................9
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS DELIA T. SUTTON ................................................................... 9
REASONABILITY OF RULE .................................................................................................................. 10
KMU V. DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NEDA ....................................................................................................... 10
IMPOSITION OF FINES AND PENALTIES FOUND IN THE LAW ITSELF .................................................... 10
PEOPLE V. MACEREN............................................................................................................................... 10
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS (WITH PENAL SANCTIONS) ............................................................. 11
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ v. LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. .......................................................................................................................................................... 11
PUBLICATION ................................................................................................................................... 11
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT ............................. 11
TANADA V. TUVERA ................................................................................................................................ 12
Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OF LAW Bar Operations Committee 2014
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. v. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES ............................ 12

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICES CORPORATION V. SECRETARY OF DOLE ............. 14
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION V. GONZAGA .............................................................. 14
JIMMY O. YAOKASIN v. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS .................................................................. 15
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER................................................................................................................... 15
NORMA PATALINGHUG v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ....................................................................... 15
QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ........................................................................................................ 16
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH C. LANTION............................................................................... 16
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER V. JUDICIAL POWER .................................................................................... 17
EMELITA A. DORAN v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE JIMMY HENRY F. LUCZON ..................................................... 17
INVESTIGATION AND ADJUDICATION ............................................................................................... 17
ARNOLD P. MOLLANEDA v.LEONIDA C. UMACOB. ................................................................................. 17
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW .............................................................................. 18
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. [PLDT] v. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION .......................................................................................................................................... 18
AWARD OF DAMAGES ...................................................................................................................... 19
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) v. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and
DIEGO MORALES ..................................................................................................................................... 19
EXCEPTION TO AWARD OF DAMAGES............................................................................................... 19
SOLID HOMES, INC. v. TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS .................................................... 19
POWER TO FIX RATE AND NOTICE AND HEARING .............................................................................. 20
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION V. JOSE LUIS ALCUAZ ................................. 20
FIXING OF RATES AND DISTINGUISH QUASI LEGISLATIVE FROM QUASI JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS ............. 20
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., V. SECRETARY OF DECS.................................................. 20
PROPER FILING OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES...................................................................................... 21
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICES CORPORATION V. THE SECRETARY OF DOLE...... 21
RULES LIBERALLY CONSTRUED .......................................................................................................... 21
YOLANDA SIGNEY v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM ..................................................................................... 21
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PNOC-EDC) v. EMILIANO G. VENERACION, JR. ........... 22
SUBDELEGATION OF AUTHORITY ...................................................................................................... 22
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY v. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS........................................................... 22
DELEGATION TO DIVISION ................................................................................................................ 23
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION V. SENDINO .................................................................... 23

CONCEPT OF DUE PROCESS .............................................................................................................. 23
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. LUCAS ................................................................................................... 23
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, ET. AL. V. ......................................................... 24
UNIVERISTY V. CA AND AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE .................................................. 24
BAROT V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ................................................................................................. 24
LOLITA ARTEZUELA V. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO ............................................................................. 25
MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORPORATION V. MINISTER ROBERTO ONGPIN, ET. AL. .............................. 25
LEONOR MARIANO V. SUSAN ROXAS, CLERK III, COURT OF APPEALS .................................................... 26
SPS. GREGORIO AND TERESITA LORENA V. JUDGE ADOLFO V. ENCOMIENDA, MTC PAGBILAO, QUEZON
................................................................................................................................................................ 26
THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD, PNP, REGION VI, ILOILO
CITY V. C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA ........................................................................................................... 26
ESTELITO V. REMOLONA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ...................................................................... 27
RAY PETER O. VIVO vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION (PAGCOR) ..................... 27
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES .................................................................................. 28
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT ................................. 28
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AND NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO V. SECRETARY
MICHAEL DEFENSOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF HUDCC, ET. AL. ............................................ 28
JUANITO A. ROSARIO V. COURT OF APPEALS AND ALEJANDRO CRUZ ................................................... 29
SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC. VS HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES .......................... 29
ZABAT V. CA ............................................................................................................................................ 29
TRANSFER OF CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE OFFICER TO A LOWER RANK POSITION ............................ 30
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SERAFIN CUEVAS VS. ATYY. JOSEFINA G. BACAL .............................................. 30
POWER OF CONTROL BY THE DEPARTMENT HEAD OVER SUBORDINATE OFFICER .............................. 30
WENCESLAO VINZONS TAN VS. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY ............................................................... 30
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION ............................................................................................. 31
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ...................................................... 31
THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, V JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP .......................... 31
DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENT ................................................................................. 32
PEDRO CARREON v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION ....................................................... 32
MIRO V MENDOZA .................................................................................................................................. 33
PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENT ........................................................... 34

EMERLITO F. AGUILA v. CARMEN R. BALDOVIZO.................................................................................... 34
AZUCENA MAGALLANES, ET. AL. V. SUN YAT SEN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, ET. AL.................................. 34
NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL ....................................................................................... 34
SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ v. OLGA RAMISCAL ......................................... 34
TAXPAYERS STANDING .................................................................................................................... 35
RAMON A. GONZALES v. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA ............................................................................. 35
SUPREME COURTS APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER DECISION OF OMBUDSMAN IN CRIMINAL CASES36
GARCIA-RUEDA V. PASCASIO .................................................................................................................. 36
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN BRING ACTION ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT,
EXCEPTION ...................................................................................................................................... 36
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. DOLEFIL AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
COOPERATIVE, INC., ET. AL. .................................................................................................................... 36
HIRING OF A PRIVATE LAWYER ......................................................................................................... 37
DANTE POLLOSO V. HON. CELSO GANGAN, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, ET. AL. .................. 37
PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY V. CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION................................................... 37
RES JUDICATA .................................................................................................................................. 38
NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY, INC. V. NLRC, ET. AL. ................................................................................ 38
DUE PROCESS & RES JUDICATA ......................................................................................................... 38
EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR V. LUIS BUNDALIAN, ET. AL. .......................................................................... 38
RES JUDICATAON CITIZENSHIP ...................................................................................................... 39
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), ET. AL. V. HON.
JOSELITO DELA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC MANILA, BRANCH 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN .......... 39
JURISDICTION OF THE CA OVER CIAC

METRO CONSTRUCTION INC., VS. CHATHAM
PROPERTIES INC.
GR NO. 141897 [SEPTEMBER 24, 2001]
FACTS:
Chatham
Properties
and
Metro
Construction entered into a contract for the
construction of a multi-storey building known as
Chatam House. MCI sought to collect from Chatam
a sum of money for unpaid progress billings and
other charges and instituted a request for
adjudication with the CIAC. The CIAC ruled that
there was an implied take over by Chatam and that
MCI only finished 94.10% of the project and
diposed of the specific money claims by both
parties and that MCI is held liable for liquidated
damages due to its delay. However, that Chatam is
liable for the unpaid balance less the liquidated
damages. Chatham appealed the decision of the
CIAC before the CA. The CA ruled that, absent any
showing of arbitrariness, the CIASs findings
should be accorded great respect. However, the
CA ruled that there was no implied takeover as
MCI still has the control and supervision over the
project and that Chatham only subcontracted to
help MCI complete the project. Hence, it awarded
liquidated
damages
in
the
amount
of
P4,935,578.31.
MCI
filed
a
motion
for
consideration alleging that the CA has no
jurisdiction to review and reverse factual findings of
the CIAC. EO No. 1008 provided that the power to
review of the CA is limited only to review only
questions of law. Likewise, that based on the Term
of Reference of the contract, the decision of the
CIAC is final and non-appealable. However,
Chatham alleged that, E.O. No. 1008 has been
repealed and amended by Circular No. 1-91,
revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and R.A.
No. 7902.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the under existing laws and
rules the Court of Appeals can also review findings
of facts of the CIAC.
RULING:
Yes. Under the present rules and laws
particularly the amendment of BP Blg. 129 by RA
No. 7902 when the latter law expanded the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to include final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or

awards of the RTC and quasi-judicial agencies.
Likewise, when the Revised Administrative Circular
was issued by the SC. The right to appeal granted
under EO No. 1008 still remains although the
procedure of exercising such right was merely
modified by the said laws and rules. The TOR
cannot amend, modify, limit or restrict the
jurisdiction of courts. Hence, it is within the power
of the CA to review the factual findings of the CIAC
POWER OF APPOINTMENT BY THE
PRESIDENT
RAMON P. BINAMIRA VS. PETER D.
GARRUCHO, JR.
GR. NO. 92008 [JULY 30, 1990]
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks reinstatement to the office
of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority from which he claims to have been
removed without just cause. Petitioner Binamara
was designated by the Minister of Tourism as
General Manager on April 7, 1986. On April 10, the
Mnister Gonzales sought the approval of the
composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA,
which included Binamara as Vice-Chairman in his
capacity as General Manager. The same was
approved by the President on the same day.
Respondent Garrucho, the new secretary of
Tourism, demanded the resignation of Binamara
on the ground that he was not appointed by the
President. Hence, Binamara was removed.
Petitioner contends that under P.D. 564, was
appointed by the President of the Philippines, he
cannot be removed without cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correct in his
allegation that he has a security of tenure as
General Manager of PTA.
RULING:
The court ruled that the security of tenure
cannot be applied in favor of petitioner. Under PD
564, it provides that the General Manager of the
PTA shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines. However, in petitioners case, he was
merely designated by the then Minister of Tourism.
This prerogative or discretion of the President

cannot be encroached by the Minister or Secretary.
Under the existing principles, the act of the
Secretary shall only be considered as valid act of
the President when the same is regular and not
disapproved which is not the case. The argument
that the designation by the Minister was approved
by the President through her approval of the
composition of the Board of Directors is not
persuasive. Petitioner was only included therein as
Vice-Chairman only because of his designation as
General Manager by the Minister of Tourism. Such
designation is merely provisional and may be
recalled, as in fact it was recalled.
JURISDICTION OF THE CA OVER THE
CTA
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION
VS. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT
MANUFACTURERS CORP.
GR NO. 158540 [JULY 8, 2004]
FACTS:
The Philippine Cement Manufacturers
Corporation (philcemcor) applied before the DTI for
the imposition of provisional measure and then
later a definitive safeguard measure in the
importation of gray Portland cement which has
negatively affected the domestic industry as
provided under the Safeguard Measures Act
(SMA). After investigation the DTI imposed a
provisional measure equivalent to P20.60 per 40kg
bag on all importation of gray Portland cement for
a period not exceeding 200 days. Thereafter, it
asked the Tariff Commission the proprietary of the
imposition of e definitive safeguard measure. The
tariff Commission found no justification to impose a
safeguard measure. The DTI believed that it is
proper to impose a safeguard measure which
however, upheld the findings of the Tariff
Commission upon the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice that it is bound by the factual findings of the
Tariff Commission.
Upon receipt of the decision of the DTI
based on the findings of the Tariff Commission, it
filed a petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside
the decision and findings. Southern Cross filed its
comment that the Court of Appeals has no
jurisdiction to review the decision of the DTI with
respect to the non-imposition of a safeguard
measure. Philcemcor alleged that under the SMA,
ruling of the Secretary in connection with the
imposition of a safeguard measure may file with
the CTA, the Secretary did not impose any

safeguard measure, hence it is the CA which has
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
the jurisdiction to review the decision of the
Secretary.
RULING:
No. the court advanced several grounds to
support such finding. First, split of jurisdiction is
abhorred. The idea the jurisdiction is exercised by
two different courts depending on the decision
cannot be favored. The power to adopt or withhold
a safeguard measure emanates from the same
law. Hence, there is only one subject and
jurisdiction over one subject cannot be divided but
granted only to one tribunal and in this case is the
CTA. Second, under the clear text of the law, the
CTA is vested with jurisdiction to review the ruling
of the DTI Secretary in connection with the
imposition of safeguard measure. Clearly, nonimposition is connected with imposition of
safeguard measure. Third, even assuming that
such jurisdiction was not expressly granted to the
CTA, such division of jurisdiction would
unnecessarily lead to illogical and onerous results
which must be avoided.
As to the power of the DTI to issue a
safeguard measure despite the negative act of the
Tariff Commission, the law provides that the
Secretary can only impose such safeguard
measure upon the positive recommendation of the
Tariff Commission.
POWER TO ABOLISH AN OFFICE
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB VS.
HON.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO
B.ZAMORA
GR. NOS. 142801-802 [JULY 10, 2001]
FACTS:
Former President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 127 establishing the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) primarily responsible for anti-smuggling
operations. After eleven years, President Estrada
issued EO No. 191 deactivating the EIIB on the
ground that its function is overlapping with the
Bureau of Customs and the NBI. After which, he
issued EO No. 196 creating the Presidential AntiSmuggling task Force Aduana. The President
likewise issued EO No. 223 providing that all
employees under the EIIB are deemed separated

from the service.
Petitioners alleged that the President has
no authority to abolish the EIIB as it is the
legislature which has such authority and the
abolition of the EIIB was made in bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President can abolish
the EIIB
RULING:
Yes. It is a mistake to assume that the
President has no power to abolish an office. The
general rule is that such power is vested with the
legislature. However, if the offices in the executive
are concerned, the Presidents power of control
may justify him to inactivate a particular office.
Section 48 of RA 7645 provides that actual scaling
down, phasing out or abolition of activities in the
executive shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or
Orders issued by the Office of the President.
Likewise, RO No. 292 provides that the president
shall exercise such other powers and functions
vested in the President which are provided for
under the laws like PD No. 1772 and PD No. 1416
providing for the power to reorganize the national
government.
Likewise, there is no bad faith in the
abolition of the EIIB despite the creation of Task
Force Aduana. The latter has a broader power but
with less officers and budget. Moreover, the
government did not hire new employees for such
Task Force since it is operated by existing
government employees.
POWER OF THE DENR TO ISSUE AN
ORDER OF DEMOLITION
THE CITY OF BAGUIO VS. FRANCISCO NINO
GR. NO. 161811 [APRIL 12, 2006]
FACTS:
The Bureau of Lands awarded to Narcisa
Placino a parcel of land located at Baguio City.
Francisco Nino who has been occupying the land
contested the award by filing a Petition Protest
which as later dismissed until the Supreme Court.
An Order of Execution was issued in favor of
Narcisa directing the CENRO to order Nino to
refrain from occupying the area and remove the
properties. Attempts to enforce the Order failed.
Counsel for Narcisa moved that the Order of
Execution previously issued be amended. The

same was granted and the amended Order
includes an order to the CEBRO to remove
whatever improvements therein with the assistance
of the sheriff and local police. The demolish was
started but stopped upon instruction of the DENRCENR Officer. Nina then filed a petition for
Certiorari with Prohibition and Prayer for TRO. On
appeal, the CA granted the TRO ruling that a
demolition may not be undertaken except upon
special order of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DENR has the power to
issue an Order of Demolition
RULING:
No. The quantum of power of an
administrative body like the Bureau of Lands or the
DENR is defined in the enabling act of such body.
There is no explicit provision granting the DENR
the authority to issue an order of demolition. The
DENR may have the power to award lands but
such power does not include the power to resolve
conflicts of possession and order of demolition.
Such power belongs only to the court of justice. In
fine, it is the court sheriff which is empowered to
remove improvements and turn over possession of
the lot to Narcisa. The defense that the City Mayor
may simply order the demolition of an illegally
constructed building may not be entertained as it
was raised for the first time.
LEGAL STANDING TO CHALLENGE A
DISAPPROVAL BY THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
FRANCISCO ABELLA JR., VS CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
GR. NO. 152574 [NOVEMBER 17, 2004]
FACTS:
Petitioner, a lawyer, retired from the PEZA
as Department Manager of the Legal Service
Department. He held a civil service eligibility for
such position having completed the program for
Executive Leadership and Management. On May
1994, the CSC issued memorandum Circular No.
21 classifying a Department Manager as a Career
Executive Service. Petitioner was then hired by the
SBMA as Department Manager III. However, such
appointment was disapproved by the CSC
Regional Office on the ground that petitioner lacks
the
required
Career
Executive
Service
requirements. On appeal, the CSC upheld the

disapproval. Petitioner appealed before the CA.
the CA denied the appeal on the ground that
petitioner was not the real party in interest since
under the Section 2 Rule VI of CSC Memorandum
Circular No 40 it is the appointing authority who
has the personality to challenge the disapproval of
the CSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, the appointee,
has the legal standing to challenge the disapproval
RULING:
The court ruled that while there is
justification to allow the appointing authority to
challenge the CSC disapproval, there is none to
preclude the appointee from taking the same
course of action. Legal standing and real party-ininterest must be distinguished. The former does
not require that the party suffers any injury while
the latter requires. in a challenge of
constitutionality, a person may have a legal
standing despite lack of personal injury, then more
so should petitioner be allowed to contest the CSC
Order for clearly he is injured. Moreover, CSC
Resolution 9901936 recognizes the right of the
adversely affected party to appeal. Hence, since
petitioner is adversely affected, he may make an
appeal.
With respect to the disapproval, the court
finds the same to be proper. First it is within the
prerogative of the CSC to issue new rules and
regulations. The Circular reclassifying Department
Manager III as Career Service is proper. Hence,
since petitioner lacks the requirements, his
appointment may be properly disapproved.
POWER OF THE HDMF TO AMEND RULES
AND REGULATIONS
YAZAKI TORRES MANUFACTURING, INC VS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO. 130584 [JUNE 27, 2006]
FACTS:
PD Mo. 1752 was amended by RA No.
7742 which provides that coverage of the PAGIBIG fund is mandatory and extends to all
members of the SSS and GSIS. The HDMF
promulgated Rules and Regulations providing that
an employer providing for a superior provident or
retirement plan may apply for waiver of the
coverage of the fund. Petitioner then applied and
was granted by the HDMF a waiver from the Fund

coverage for the year 1995. The HDMF amended
the Rules and Regulations making the waiver
applicable only to employer providing both for a
provident/retirement and housing benefits. Hence,
when petitioner applied for a new waiver, the same
was denied by the HDMF on the ground that
petitioner does not offer any housing plan.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review before the
CA arguing that the HDMF cannot amend the
existing rules and regulations until RA 7742 is
likewise amended. Otherwise, the HDMF is
encroaching to the power of the legislative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HDMF has the power
to amend the existing rules and regulations despite
the RA 7742 remaining to be the same.
RULING:
The general rule is that it is within the
exclusive power of the legislature to make, amend
or modify a law. However, the legislature cannot
foresee every contingency involved in a particular
problem. Thus it has become customary for it to
delegate to instrumentalities of the executive
department the power to make rules and
regulations. Statutes are generally couched in
general terms which express the purpose or
objective intended by the legislature. The details
and manner of carrying out the law are left to the
administrative
agency
charged
with
its
implementation. Hence, rules and regulations
promulgated are product of a delegated power to
create new or additional provisions that have the
effect of law.
POWER OF THE PSC TO REGULATE
PULIC TRANSPORTATION
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. VS
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
GR.NO. 47065 [JUNE 26, 1940]
FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of
transporting passengers in the Province of Tarlac
and Pangasinan by means of motor vehicle known
as TPU buses, in accordance with the certificate of
public convenience issued by the former Public
Utility Commission. On August 26, 1939, petitioner
filed with the Public Service Commission an
application for authorization to operate ten
additional new Brockway trucks on the ground that
they were needed to comply with the terms and

conditions of its existing certificates. Respondent
granted the application but with conditions that it
may be acquired upon payment of the reasonable
cost price and that it is for a limited life as
prescribed under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146
and 454.
Petitioner challenged the conditions
imposed on the ground that under its existing
certificates, the same were not imposed. Likewise
that the conditions should apply only to certificates
issued after the enactment of CA No 454 and
amendment of CA No. 146.
tax purposes and from their gross sales xxx.

Respondent Bicolandia Drug then deducted the
same from its gross income. However, it did not
benefit for it suffered loses. Hence, instead it
claimed for a tax credit or refund. Respondent
argued that Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is
illegal for under RA No. 7432 what is granted is a
tax credit and not simply a tax deduction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BIR exceeded its
authority
when
it
implemented
Revenue
Regulations No. 2-94 which granted only tax
deduction instead of a tax credit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be covered
by the conditions imposed by the PSC under the
CA Nos. 146 and 454
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner is mistaken in the
suggestion that simply because its existing
certificates had been granted before the enactment
of CA No. 454 and amendment of CA No. 146, it
must be deemed to have the right of holding them
is perpuity. Section 74 of the Philippine Bill
provided that no franchise or privilege except
under the conditions that it shall be subject to
amendment. Likewise, statutes enacted for the
regulation of public utilities, being a proper
exercise of police power, are applicable to those
already established and in operation. Hence, the
challenged provisions of CA No. 454 are valid and
constitutional. However, due to failure to observe
procedural due process, the case is remanded to
the PSC for further proceedings.
POWER OF THE BIR TO IMPLEMENT
RULES AND REGULATIONS
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS.
BOCILOANDIA DRUG CORPORATION
GR. NO. 148083 [JULY 21, 2006]
FACTS:
RA No. 7432 granted senior citizens
several privileges, one of which was obtaining a 20
percent discount from all establishments. The law
also provides that such discounts may be claimed
as tax credit by the establishment. In compliance
with said law, the BIR issued Revenue Regulations
No. 2-94 which defined tax credit xxx which
discount shall be deducted by the said
establishment from their gross income for income
RULING:
Yes. There is a clear difference between a
tax credit and tax deduction. Clearly when the
establishment suffered a net loss, it will not benefit
from a tax deduction since the tax will remain to be
zero. However, in a tax credit, despite the loss, the
establishment may still be granted a tax credit.
Hence, despite the fact that the establishments
may profit from such tax credit, it must remain as it
is granted by law. Therefore, Revenue Regulations
No. 2-94 is null and void. However, taking into
consideration the amendment of RA No. 7432, it
now grants only a tax deduction.
RULE MAKING POWER OF DAR
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS
DELIA T. SUTTON
GR. NO. 162070 [OCTOBER 19, 2005]
FACTS:
Respondents made a voluntary offer to sell
their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of
certain incentives under the law. Respondents
land has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf
breeding. On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law,
RA No. 6657 took effect including in its coverage
farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
However, in the case of Luz Farms vs. Sec. of
DAR, the SC ruled that lands devoted to livestock
and poultry-raising are not included in the definition
of agricultural land. Hence, declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL.
Respondents then notified the DAR of their
withdrawal of the voluntary offer to sell since their
land is not covered by the agrarian reform law.
However, DAR issued AO No. 9, s 1993, which
provided that only portions of private agricultural
lands used for raising livestock, poultry and swine
shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.
As a result, only a portion of the respondents land

was excluded from the coverage.
systems of government entities under existing

laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive
issuance and not an act of legislation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AO No. 9 issued by the
DAR is valid
RULING:
No. the fundamental rule in administrative
law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and
regulations must be issued by authority of a law
and must not contravene the provisions of the
Constitution. Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power
to regulate livestock farms which have been
exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of
agrarian reform. The argument that it was issued in
response to unscrupulous landowners converting
their agricultural lands to livestock farms will not
even warrant such issuance. Respondents family
have long been in the business of breeding cattle
which petitioner does not dispute.
REASONABILITY OF RULE
KMU V. DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NEDA
GR. NO. 167798 [APRIL 19, 2006]
FACTS:
In April 13, 2005, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 420
requiring
all
government
agencies
and
government-owned corporations to streamline and
harmonize their Identification Systems. The
purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID
format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and
reliability and ensure compatibility and provide
convenience to the people served by government
entities. Petitioners allege that EO420 is
unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation
of legislative functions by the executive branch of
the government. Furthermore, they allege that
EO420 infringes on the citizens rights to privacy.
ISSUE:
In issuing EO 420, did the president make,
alter or repeal any laws?
RULING:
Legislative power is the authority to make
laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO
420, the President did not make, alter or repeal
any law but merely implemented and executed
existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as
insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and userfriendliness in the implementation of current ID
IMPOSITION OF FINES AND PENALTIES

FOUND IN THE LAW ITSELF
PEOPLE V. MACEREN
GR. NO. L-32166 [OCTOBER 18, 1977]
FACTS:
This is a case involving the validity of a
1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries
Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission. Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo
Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture
exceeded its authority in issuing the administrative
order.
RULING:
The Court is of the opinion that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not
warranted under the Fisheries Commission,
Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the
Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that
law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. In other words,
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal
basis. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing
specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84,
in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate
that such an offense fails within the category of
"other violations" because, as already shown, the
penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower
to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious
or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and
is not the same as the penalty for "other violations"
of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the
10
Fisheries Law.
33, as amended may be carried out. Nothing

extraneous was provided in the Circular that could
result in its invalidity.
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS (WITH

PENAL SANCTIONS)
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S.
PEREZ v. LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
GR. NO. 159149 [AUGUST 28, 2007]
FACTS:
In
its
Motion
for
Reconsideration, respondent
LPG
Refillers
Association of the Philippines, Inc. seeks the
reversal of the Supreme Courts Decision dated
June 26, 2006, which upheld the validity of the
assailed Department of Energy (DOE) Circular No.
2000-06-10.The
respondent
LPG
Refillers
Association of the Philippines, Inc. argued that the
said Circular listed prohibited acts and punishable
offenses which are brand-new or which were not
provided for by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended; and that
B.P. Blg. 33 enumerated and specifically defined
the prohibited/punishable acts under the law and
that the punishable offenses in the assailed
Circular are not included in the law. That the
assailed Circular not only prescribed penalties for
acts not prohibited/penalized under B.P. Blg. 33,
as amended, but also prescribed penalties
exceeding the ceiling prescribed by B.P. Blg. 33,
as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular No. 2000-06-010
(the assailed Circular) listed prohibited acts and
punishable offenses which are brand-new or which
were not provided for by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended.
RULING:
The Court held
that
Respondent
misconstrued the Courts our decision. A criminal
statute is not rendered uncertain and void because
general terms are used therein. The lawmakers
have no positive constitutional or statutory duty to
define each and every word in an enactment, as
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. Thus,
respondents reliance on the void for vagueness
doctrine is misplaced. Demonstrably, the specific
acts and omissions cited in the Circular are within
the contemplation of the B.P. Blg. 33, as amended.
The DOE, in issuing the Circular, merely filled up
the details and the manner through which B.P. Blg.
PUBLICATION
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING
CORPORATION V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
GR. NO. 152688 [NOVEMBER 19, 2003]
FACTS:
The undisputed facts show that in
accordance with Department Order No. 79 (D.O.
No. 79) of the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), subject to the availability of savings of the
respective bureaus/offices/GOCCs, a Staple Food
Incentive (SFI) in the maximum amount of
P7,200.00 each to the officials and employees of
DTI bureaus, attached agencies and government
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs). This
was in accordance with Rule X of the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules. D.O. No. 79 further provided
that in case of disallowance, the employee shall
refund the incentive through salary deduction.
Pursuant to D.O. No. 79, petitioner PITC, a
government owned and controlled corporation
attached to the DTI, issued Resolution No. 98-1207 dated December 9, 1998, approving the grant
of SFI to its officers and employees. Consequently,
PITC released the total amount of P1,094,400.00
as SFI for the year 1998. On April 29, 1999, the
Resident Auditor of PITC issued a Notice of
Suspension disallowing the grant of the SFI and
requiring the PITC to submit the approval of such
grant by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), in accordance with Section
12 of Republic Act No. 6758, or the Salary
Standardization Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the approval of the DBM is
needed.
RULING:
The basis of COA in disallowing the grant of
SFI was Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 and not
DBM-CCC No. 10. Moreover, the nullity of DBMCCC No. 10, will not affect the validity of R.A. No.
6758. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction
that statutory provisions control the rules and
regulations which may be issued pursuant thereto.
Such rules and regulations must be consistent with
and must not defeat the purpose of the statute.
The validity of R.A. No. 6758 should not be made
to depend on the validity of its implementing rules.
11
Likewise, PITC failed to substantiate its allegation

that it was singled out by the COA, which act
therefore violated the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. The alleged violation by the COA
of PITCs right to equal protection cannot bind the
Court to an erroneous interpretation of R.A. No.
6758. No vested right can be acquired on a wrong
construction of the law by administrative officials
and such erroneous interpretation does not place
the government in estoppel to correct or overrule
the same.
TANADA V. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, through the
Solicitor General would have this case dismissed
outright on the ground that petitioners have no
legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence
of any showing that the petitioner are personally
and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged
non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question. Respondent further contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of the law where
the law themselves provides for their own
effectivity dates.
ISSUE:
Whether the presidential decrees in
question which contain special provisions as to the
date they are to take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.
RULING:
Publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for
then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th
day following its publication, but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.
The publication of all presidential
issuances of a public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Obviously,

presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as
tax revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concern.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE
EXPORTERS, INC. v. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES
GR. NO. 101279 [AUGUST 6, 1992]
FACTS:
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published
stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino
housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE
Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment
agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to
Hong Kong." The DOLE itself, through the POEA
took over the business of deploying such Hong
Kong-bound workers. Pursuant to the said DOLE
circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular
No. 30, Series of 1991, providing GUIDELINES on
the Government processing and deployment of
Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the
accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies
intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. On
September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this
petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned
DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their
implementation for the following reason that the
requirements of publication and filing with the
Office of the National Administrative Register were
not complied with.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DOLE Department Order
No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum
Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, is valid.
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. They are
held to be legally invalid, defective and
unenforceable for lack of proper publication and
filing in the Office of the National Administrative
Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and
4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code
of 1987. Furthermore, the Courts ruling in Taada
vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 states that
Administrative rules and regulations must also be
12
published if their purpose is to enforce or

implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation. As such, for lack of proper publication,
the administrative circulars in question may not be
enforced and implemented.
13
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND

SERVICES CORPORATION V. SECRETARY OF
DOLE
GR. NO. 103144 [APRIL 4, 2001]
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged
in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment. Sometime in January 1985, private
respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for
employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay
placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for
private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00
each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa
and Cedric P. Leyson. While in Saudi Arabia,
private respondents were allegedly made to sign a
second contract on February 4, 1985 which
changed some of the provisions of their original
contract resulting in the reduction of some of their
benefits and privileges. On April 1, 1985, their
foreign employer allegedly forced them to sign a
third contract which increased their work hours
from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any
corresponding increase in their basic monthly
salary. When they refused to sign this third
contract, the services of private respondents were
terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were
repatriated to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in
the Philippines, private respondents demanded
from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement
fees and for the payment of their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contract. When
petitioner refused, they filed a case before the
POEA against petitioner Philsa and its foreign
principal, Al-Hejailan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty for illegal
exaction.
RULING:
In Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as
follows: We hold therefore that all statutes,
including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative

regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letter of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION V. GONZAGA
GR. NO. 158761 [DECEMBER 4, 2007]
FACTS:
On November 13, 2000, respondent
Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for membership in the Board of
Directors of Zamboanga del Sur II Electric
Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO). Later
that day, the screening committee resolved to
disqualify respondent because his spouse was an
incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on the
Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC),
promulgated by petitioner National Electrification
Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse
occupies an elective government position higher
than Barangay Captain is prohibited to run as
director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECOs
by-laws, however, do not provide for such ground
for disqualification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NEAs rule-making
authorityare cognizable by regular courts.
RULING:
It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers
to "order, ruling or decision" of NEA. What is being
challenged in this case is the decision of the
screening committee of ZAMSURECO to disqualify
respondent. Likewise assailed is the validity of the
ECEC, particularly, whether the requirement of
publication was complied with. The ECEC was
issued by NEA pursuant to its rule-making
authority, not its quasi-judicial function. Hence, the
issue regarding the controversy over respondents
disqualification and the question on the ECECs
validity are within the inherent jurisdiction of regular
courts to review. Petitioners reliance on NEA is
misplaced. The subject in that case was the
electricity rates charged by a cooperative, a matter
which is clearly within NEAs jurisdiction. The issue
in the present petition, however, centers on the
validity of NEAs rules in light of the publication
14
requirements of the Administrative Code and New

Civil Code. The present issue is cognizable by
regular courts.
JIMMY O. YAOKASIN v. THE COMMISSIONER
OF CUSTOMS
GR. No. 84111 [December 22, 1989]
FACTS:
On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast
Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar,
which were being unloaded from the M/V
Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of
the Bureau of Customs. The petitioner presented a
sales invoice from the Jordan Trading of Iloilo to
prove that the sugar was purchased locally. The
District Collector of Customs, however, proceeded
with the seizure of the bags of sugar. Show-cause
hearings were conducted and, the District Collector
of Customs ordered the release of the sugar. On
June 10, 1988, the decision, together with the
entire records of the case, were transmitted to, and
received by, the Commissioner of Customs. The
Collector of Customs found that the 9,000
bags/sacks of refined sugar in question are of
foreign origin, smuggled into the country, and
declares them forfeited in favor of the government.
It is petitioner's contention that the June 7, 1988
decision of the District Collector of Customs
became final and executory, in view of the
absence of an appeal therefrom by the "aggrieved
party" (himself) within the 15-day period provided
for in Sec. 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Hence, the release of the 9,000 bags of sugar
must be upheld. On the other hand, the District
Collector and the Commissioner of Customs argue
that since the June 7, 1988 decision is adverse to
the government, the case should go to the
Commissioner of Customs on automatic review,
pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 20-87, dated
May 18, 1987, of former Acting Commissioner of
Customs Alexander Padilla, which provides:
ISSUE:
Whether or not CMO No. 20-87 should not
be enforced on the ground that they had not been
published in the Official Gazette.
RULING:
No. Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
requires laws to be published in the Official
Gazette, does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 which
is only an administrative order of the
Commissioner of Customs addressed to his
subordinates,
the
customs
collectors.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for
the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the

Official Gazette) enumerates what shall be
published in the Official Gazette besides legislative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the
Congress of the Philippines. Executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, shall also
be published in the Official Gazette, except such
as have no general applicability." CMO No. 20-87
requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly
with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is
addressed only to particular persons or a class of
persons (the customs collectors). It need not be
published, on the assumption that it has been
circularized to all concerned.
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
NORMA PATALINGHUG v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
GR. No. 178767 [January 30, 2008]
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 national and local
elections, petitioners Patalinghug et.al. ran for the
local positions (mayor, vice-mayor and councilor)
in Lapu-Lapu City. At the start of and during the
canvassing, petitioners questioned the composition
of the Board of Canvassers (BOC), and objected to
the inclusion of several election returns (ERs). As
the BOC ruled against them, petitioners filed their
notices of appeal, and consequently, initiated with
the
COMELEC
a
Pre-Proclamation
Petition docketed as SPC No. 07-011, seeking the
declaration of the composition and the proceedings
of the BOC as illegal. Consequently, on June 28,
2007, the COMELEC en banc issued the
assailed Resolution No. 8212 or the Omnibus
Resolution on Pending Cases. In the said
Resolution, petitioners casesSPC Nos. 07-11
and 07-180were not included in the list of preproclamation cases that shall remain active after
June 30, 2007 pursuant to Section 16 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7166.
Discontented with the said COMELEC issuances,
petitioners, instituted the instant petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No.
8212 could not be questioned via a petition
for certiorari because it was not issued in the
COMELECs exercise of quasi-judicial functions.
15
RULING:
The Court held that, at this point, the
COMELEC Resolution No. 8212 is an issuance in
the
exercise
of
the
COMELECs
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial function. The same
was issued pursuant to the second paragraph of
Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166. The determination by
the COMELEC of the merits of a pre-proclamation
case definitely involves the exercise of adjudicatory
powers. The COMELEC examines and weighs the
parties
pieces
of
evidence vis--vis their
respective arguments, and considers whether, on
the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the
case appears to have merit. Where a power rests
in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial
nature or character, but does not involve the
exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred
upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is
deemed quasi-judicial. The Court, in this case,
therefore finds the instant petition to be the correct
remedy in challenging COMELEC Resolution No.
8212.
QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH C.
LANTION
GR. No. 139465 [January 18, 2000]
FACTS:
Former Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
Drilon, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
"Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of
the United States of America" (hereinafter referred
to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate,
by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. On
June 18, 1999, the DOJ received from the DFA
U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request
for the extradition of private respondent Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court,
Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradition. Pending evaluation
of the aforestated extradition documents, private
respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter
addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U.S.
Government, as well as all documents and papers
submitted therewith; and that he be given ample
time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers. Private
respondent also requested that the proceedings on

the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
However, such requests were denied by the
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the two Departments (the
DFA and the DOJ) misread the scope of their
duties and authority.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that for while it is true
that the extradition request was delivered to the
Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999,
the following day or less than 24 hours later, the
Department of Justice received the request,
apparently without the Department of Foreign
Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating
the same and its accompanying documents. The
record cannot support the presumption of regularity
that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly
reviewed the extradition request and supporting
documents and that it arrived at a well-founded
judgment that the request and its annexed
documents satisfy the requirements of law. In
administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding
involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence
presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved. Inquisitorial power,
which is also known as examining or investigatory
power, is one or the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to
exercise its quasi-judicial authority. This power
allows the administrative body to inspect the
records and premises, and investigate the
activities, of persons or entities coming under its
jurisdiction, or to require disclosure of information
by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony
of witnesses, production of documents, or
otherwise. The power of investigation consists in
gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence,
which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative
agency's performance of its rule-making or quasijudicial functions. Notably, investigation is
indispensable to prosecution.
16
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER V. JUDICIAL

POWER
EMELITA A. DORAN v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE
JIMMY HENRY F. LUCZON
GR. No. 151344 [September 26, 2006]
FACTS:
Emelita A. Doran, petitioner, is a court
stenographer detailed with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Amulung-Iguig, Cagayan presided by
Judge Salvador B. Campos, respondent. On
August 17, 1999, petitioner filed with the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) an affidavitcomplaint charging respondent Judge Campos
with grave misconduct, In his counter-affidavit,
respondent denied petitioner's allegations. Upon
recommendation by then Court Administrator
Alfredo I. Benipayo, the Court referred the
administrative matter to Executive Judge Jimmy
Henry F. Luczon, Jr., Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Tuguegarao City, for investigation, report, and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the records. After the petitioner had completed
the presentation of her evidence, respondent,
through counsel, asked the opinion of Investigating
Judge Luczon whether it is procedurally
permissible for him to file a demurrer to evidence
or a motion to dismiss. Judge Luczon answered in
the affirmative with the advice that counsel must
first seek leave of court. Accordingly, respondent
filed a Motion and Manifestation praying that he be
allowed to file a demurrer to evidence since
petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations in
her complaint. Petitioner opposed the motion
arguing that such pleading is not permitted since
the administrative proceeding is investigative in
nature. In his Resolution, Investigating Judge
Luczon allowed respondent to file his demurrer to
evidence and petitioner to file her opposition
thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Investigating Judge, in
allowing respondent to file a demurrer to evidence,
committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
The Court held that it is the nature of the
act to be performed, rather than of the office, board
or body which performs it, that determines whether
or not it is exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial
function. Judicial or quasi-judicial function involves
the determination of what the law is, and what the
legal rights of the contending parties are, with
respect to the matter in controversy and, on the
basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the

adjudication of their respective rights. In other
words, the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial function must be clothed
with power and authority to pass judgment or
render a decision on the controversy construing
and applying the laws to that end. Where an
administrative body or officer does not exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial power, certiorari does not
lie. In this case, Judge Luczon was designated by
this
Court
merely
to investigate and,
thereafter, submit a report and the appropriate
recommendation relative to the said complaint.
Simply
stated,
his
function
is
merely investigative and recommendatory in
nature. . His designation as investigator, therefore,
does not involve the exercise of judicial or quasijudicial power. Hence, his act/s may not be
challenged in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
INVESTIGATION AND ADJUDICATION
ARNOLD P. MOLLANEDA v.LEONIDA C.
UMACOB.
GR. No. 140128 [June 6, 2001]
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the affidavit-complaint for
sexual harassment filed by Leonida Umacob
(respondent) against Arnold Mollaneda (petitioner)
with the Civil Service Commission Respondent
furnished the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports - Regional Office XI, Davao City
(DECS-RO XI) a copy of her affidavit-complaint.
Thus, Regional Director Susana Cabahug issued
an order directing the formation of a committee to
conduct an investigation of respondent's complaint
against petitioner. On October 4, 1994, petitioner
filed with the CSC-RO XI his answer to the
affidavit-complaint denying the allegations therein
and
alleging
that
there
are
"material
contradictions," in respondent's version of the
incident, On June 5, 1995, the CSC-RO XI issued
a resolution charging petitioner with grave
misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The said office found there was a prima
facie case against him and eventually elevated to
the Civil Service Commission the records of the
case. Thereafter, the Commission designated Atty.
Anacleto Buena to hear and receive the evidence
in the case. A formal hearing was conducted in
Davao City. Both parties were assisted by counsel.
Subsequently, the Commission issued Resolution
17
No. 973277 finding petitioner guilty of grave

misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. He was meted the
penalty of dismissal from the government service
with all its accessory penalties. Forthwith, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in
Resolution No. 981761. On May 14, 1999, the
Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming in
toto Resolution No. 973277 of the Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is failure on the part
of the CSC Commissioners to "personally observe
the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses" and their reliance solely on Atty.
Buena's recommendation and notes should have
discouraged the Court of Appeals from giving
weight to the findings of the Commission.
RULING:
The Court held that the petition is bereft of
merit. In assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, petitioner is actually urging the Supreme
Court not to give credence to the factual findings of
the Commission on the ground that the
Commissioners did not personally hear the case.
The fact that the Commission assigned Atty.
Buena to hear and receive evidence does not
render its factual findings unworthy of credence. At
any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that the term
"administrative body or agency" includes the
subordinate officials upon whose hand the body or
agency delegates a portion of its authority.
Included therein are the hearing officers through
whose eyes and ears the administrative body or
agency observes the demeanor, conduct and
attitude of the witnesses and listens to their
testimonies. It must be emphasized that the
appointment of competent officers to hear and
receive evidence is commonly resorted to by
administrative bodies or agencies in the interest of
an orderly and efficient disposition of administrative
cases. Under our jurisprudence, an administrative
agency may employ other persons, such as a
hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive
evidence, conduct hearing and make reports on
the basis of which the agency shall render its
decision. Such a procedure is a practical necessity
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAW
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO.
[PLDT] v. THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
GR. No. 88404 [October 18, 1990]
FACTS:
On 22 June 1958, Rep. Act No. 2090, was
enacted, otherwise known as "An Act Granting
Felix Alberto and Company, Incorporated, a
Franchise to Establish Radio Stations for Domestic
and Transoceanic Telecommunications." Felix
Alberto & Co., Inc. (FACI) was the original
corporate name, which was changed to ETCI with
the amendment of the Articles of Incorporation in
1964. Much later, "CELLCOM, Inc." was the name
sought to be adopted before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, but this was withdrawn
and abandoned. However, alleging urgent public
need, ETCI filed an application with public
respondent NTC for the issuance of a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to
construct, install, establish, operate and maintain a
Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an Alpha
Numeric Paging System in Metro Manila and in the
Southern Luzon regions, with a prayer for
provisional authority to operate Phase A of its
proposal within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an
Opposition with a Motion to Dismiss. In an Order,
NTC overruled PLDT's Opposition and declared
that Rep. Act No. 2090 (1958) should be liberally
construed as to include among the services under
said franchise the operation of a cellular mobile
telephone service.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the status and coverage of
Rep. Act No. 2090 as a franchise is limited to
"radio stations" and excludes telephone services
such as the establishment of the proposed Cellular
Mobile Telephone System (CMTS).
RULING:
Rep. Act No. 2090 grants ETCI (formerly
FACI) "the right and privilege of constructing,
installing, establishing and operating in the entire
Philippines radio stations for reception and
transmission of messages on radio stations in the
foreign and domestic public fixed point-to-point and
public base, aeronautical and land mobile stations,
with the corresponding relay stations for the
reception and transmission of wireless messages
on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony. PLDT
maintains that the scope of the franchise is limited
18
to "radio stations" and excludes telephone services

such as the establishment of the proposed Cellular
Mobile Telephone System (CMTS). However, in its
Order of 12 November 1987, the NTC construed
the technical term "radiotelephony" liberally as to
include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone
system. Administrative bodies may interpret the
law they are tasked to implement. To otherwise
deprive administrative bodies the duty, at the first
instance, to interpret the laws which they are
mandated to execute would make them impotent
bodies. Hence, the construction given by an
administrative agency possessed of the necessary
special knowledge, expertise and experience and
deserves great weight and respect. It can only be
set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion,
fraud, or error of law.
AWARD OF DAMAGES
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) v. BOARD OF
COMMUNICATIONS and DIEGO MORALES
GR. No. L-43653 [November 29, 1977]
FACTS:
These
two
petitions
have
been
consolidated as they involve the same issue. As to
the first case, complainant respondent Diego
Morales claimed that while he was in Manila his
daughter sent him a telegram from Santiago,
Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife. The
telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however
never reached him. He had to be informed
personally about the death of his wife and so to
catch up with the burial of his wife, he had to take
the trip by airplane to Isabela. In the second case,
complainant respondent Pacifico Innocencio
claimed that Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram
from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the
petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti,
Laguna for the Purpose of informing him about the
death of their father. The telegram was never
received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the nonreceipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to
said address, the sender, Lourdes Innocencio has
not been notified about its non-delivery. As a
consequence Pacifica Innocencio was not able to
attend the internment of their father at Moncada,
Tarlac. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver
said telegrams, they alleged to have suffered
mental anguish and personal inconveniences.
Thus, they prayed for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
Board
of
Communications has jurisdiction over claims for
damages allegedly suffered by private respondents
for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the
petitioner
Radio
Communications
of
the
Philippines, Inc., RCPI for short.
RULING:
The Court agreed with petitioner RCPI. In
one case, the Court ruled that the Public Service
Commission and its successor in interest, the
Board of Communications, "being a creature of the
legislature and not a court, can exercise only such
jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by
necessary implication, conferred upon it by
statute". In this case, the charges however, do not
necessarily involve petitioners failure to comply
with its certificate of public convenience or any
order, decision or regulation of respondent Board
of Communication. The charge does not relate to
the management of the facilities and system of
transmission of messages by petitioner in
accordance with its certificate of public
convenience. As such, if complainants Diego
Morales and Pacifica Innocencio allegedly suffered
injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual
obligation arising from negligence, the proper
forum for them to ventilate their grievances for
possible recovery of damages against petitioner
should be in the courts and not in the respondent
Board of Communications.
EXCEPTION TO AWARD OF DAMAGES
SOLID HOMES, INC. v. TERESITA PAYAWAL
and COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 84811 [August 29, 1989]
FACTS:
The complaint was filed on August 31,
1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes,
Inc. before the Regional Trial Court. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her
a subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for
the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by
September 10, 1981, she had already paid the
defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in
monthly installments and interests. Solid Homes
subsequently executed a deed of sale over the
land but failed to deliver the corresponding
certificate of title despite her repeated demands
because, as it appeared later, the defendant had
mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing
company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title
to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the
19
amounts paid by her plus interest. She also

claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and the costs of the suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Housing
Authority has competence to award damages.
RULING:
The Court held that the competence of the
Board to award damages is part of the exclusive
power conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear
and decide "claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyers against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman. As a result of the
growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its
ramified activities. Specialized in the particular
fields assigned to them, they can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch
than can be expected from the legislature or the
courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers in what is now not unreasonably
called the fourth department of the government.
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative
agencies must be liberally construed to enable
them to discharge their assigned duties in
accordance with the legislative purpose.
POWER TO FIX RATE AND NOTICE AND
HEARING
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION V. JOSE LUIS ALCUAZ
G.R. NO. 84818 [DECEMBER 18, 1989]
FACTS:
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing
for
services
involving
telecommunications.
Charging rates for certain specified lines that were
reduced by order of herein respondent Jose
Alcuaz
Commissioner
of
the
National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were
ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%)
due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the
NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued
without prior notice and hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not E.O. 546 is
unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. Respondents admitted that the
application of a policy like the fixing of rates as
exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial
rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents
contention that notice and hearing are not required
since the assailed order is merely incidental to the
entire proceedings and temporary in nature is
erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act,
providing for the proceedings of the Commission,
upon notice and hearing, dictates that a
Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper
notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the
exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.
It is thus clear that with regard to ratefixing, respondent has no authority to make such
order without first giving petitioner a hearing,
whether the order be temporary or permanent, and
it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a
complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case.
FIXING OF RATES AND DISTINGUISH
QUASI LEGISLATIVE FROM QUASI
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC.,
V. SECRETARY OF DECS
G.R. NO. 78385 [AUGUST 31, 1987]
FACTS:
The DCES through the respondent
Secretary issued an Order authorizing the 15% to
20% increase in school fees. Thereafter, it was
decreased to 10% to 15% upon the
reconsideration by petitioner. Despite this
reduction, petitioner still opposed the increases.
Petitioner argues that while the DECS is
authorized by law to regulate school fees, it does
not always include the power to increase school
fees. Likewise, it was argued that the Order was
issued in violation of the due process of law for
lack of proper notice and hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DECS has the power to
regulate school fees and whether the Order was
issued in violation of the due process of law.
RULING:
As to the first issue, Section 70 of BP Blg.
232 otherwise known as The Education Act of
1982 vests the DECS the power to regulate the
educational system which includes the power to
20
issue rules. In the absence of a statute stating

otherwise, this power includes the power to
prescribe school fees. No other government
agency has been vested with such authority.
As to the second issue, the function must
be determined if it is a legislative or quasi-judicial
function. If it were a legislative function, the grant
of prior notice and hearing is not a requirement. In
this case, it is an exercise of a quasi-legislative
function since the Order is applicable to all private
schools in the country for that particular school
year.
PROPER FILING OF ADMINISTRATIVE
RULES
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND
SERVICES CORPORATION V. THE
SECRETARY OF DOLE
356 SCRA 174
FACTS:
Private respondents left for Saudi Arabia
who were recruited by petitioner for employment.
While in Saudu Arabia they were forced to sign
new contracts. When they refused to sign the third
contract, their services were terminated and
repatriated back to the Philippines. Upon arrival in
the Philippines, private respondents filed, among
others, illegal exactions, for they were charged
more than what is allowed by the POEA per
Memorandum Circular No. II, s 1983. Petitioner
was found guilty. Petitioner alleged that it cannot
be held liable for illegal exaction as the
Memorandum is void for lack of publication.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject memorandum
was properly promulgated.
RULING:
As a general rule, administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose
is to enforce or implement existing laws pursuant
to a valid delegation. Interpretative and those
merely internal in nature need not be published.
The Memorandum was be declared ineffective as
the same was never published or filed with the
National
Administrative
Register.
The
Memorandum is in compliance with the provisions
of Article 32 of the Labor Code. It is thus clear that
the administrative circular is one of those
issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid

delegation.
RULES LIBERALLY CONSTRUED
YOLANDA SIGNEY v. SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM
G.R. NO. 173582 [JANUARY 28, 2008]
FACTS:
Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS,
died on 21 May 2001. In his members records, he
had designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as
primary beneficiary and his four children with her
as secondary beneficiaries. On 6 July 2001,
petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the
public respondent SSS. She revealed in her SSS
claim that the deceased had a common-law wife,
Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor
children. Petitioners declaration was confirmed
when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death
benefits on 13 July 2001 in which she also
declared that both she and petitioner were
common-law wives of the deceased and that
Editha Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife. In
addition, Editha also filed an application for death
benefits with the SSS stating that she was the
legal wife of the deceased. The SSS, denied the
death benefit claim of petitioner. However, it
recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor
children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary
beneficiaries under the SSS Law. The SSS also
found that the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased was null and void because of a prior
subsisting marriage contracted between the
deceased and Editha, as confirmed with the Local
Civil Registry of Cebu City. In a Resolution, the
SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC
gave more weight to the SSS field investigation
and the confirmed certification of marriage showing
that the deceased was married to Editha on 29
October 1967, than to the aforestated declarations
of Editha in her waiver of rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is legal wife or the two
common-law wives with whom the deceased had
six children is the one entitled to the social security
benefits of a Social Security System (SSS)
member.
RULING:
The Court held that whoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial
21
evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a

beneficiary and because the deceased has no
legitimate child, it follows that the dependent
illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be
entitled to the death benefits as primary
beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a
minor child to qualify as a "dependent," the only
requirements are that he/she must be below 21
years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.
In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn
and Rodelyn were born on 13 April 1996 and 20
April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of
the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as
a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and
Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share
equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said
legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the
deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn,
as the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the
deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (PNOC-EDC) v. EMILIANO G.
VENERACION, JR.
G.R. NO. 129820 [ NOVEMBER 30, 2006]
FACTS:
This case involves the conflicting claims of
the petitioner Philippine National Oil CorporationEnergy Development Corporation and the
respondent over the mining rights over Block 159
of the Malangas Coal Reservation, Alicia,
Zamboanga del Sur. On 31 January 1989,
respondent applied with the Mines and GeoSciences Development Services, DENR, Region
IX, Zamboanga City for a Declaration of Location
(DOL) over Block 159 of the Malangas Coal
Reservation. On 18 May 1989, the Office of the
Regional Executive Director (RED) of the DENR
informed the respondent that his DOL cannot be
registered since Block 159 was part of the
Malangas Coal Reservation, as provided under
Proclamation No. 284, issued by the President on
19 July 1938. With the endorsement of the Office
of Energy Affairs (OEA) and the DENR Secretary,
the respondent petitioned the Office of the
President for the withdrawal of Block 159 from the
coal reservation and its conversion into a mineral
reservation.The petitioner applied for a mineral
prospecting permit over Block 159 (and Blocks 120
and 160) with the OEA, which the latter granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has already
lost its right to appeal.
RULING:
The Court held that the petitioner invoked
the judicial policy of allowing appeals, which,
although filed late, when the interest of justice so
requires. Procedural law has its own rationale in
the orderly administration of justice, namely, to
ensure the effective enforcement of substantive
rights by providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in
the settlement of disputes. Hence, rules of
procedure must be faithfully followed except only
when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal
application of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
explain his failure to abide by the rules. In the
instant case, petitioner failed to state any
compelling reason for not filing its appeal within the
mandated period. Instead, the records show that
after failing to comply with the period within which
to file their motion for reconsideration on time, they
again failed to file their appeal before the Office of
the DENR Secretary within the time provided by
law. Even if petitioner had not lost its right to
appeal, it cannot claim any mining rights over
Block 159 for failure to comply with the legal
requirements.
SUBDELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY v. THE
DIRECTOR OF PATENTS
G.R. NO. L-26803 [OCTOBER 14, 1975]
FACTS:
In
this
petition
for mandamus with
preliminary injunction, petitioners challenged the
validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of
Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in
Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the
Director of Patents to designate any ranking official
of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings.
Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments
determining the merits of the case shall be
personally and directly prepared by the Director
and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the
hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark
or trade name, interference proceeding instituted
for the purpose of determining the question of
priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade
name or service-mark, and cancellation of
registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending
at the Patent Office. Subsequently, the Director of
22
Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of

Agriculture and Commerce, amended the aforequoted Rule 168. In accordance with the amended
Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing
of petitioners' cases to hearing officers,
specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo
Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the
other respondents herein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment of the Rule
is illegal and void because under the law the
Director must personally hear and decide inter
partes cases.
RULING:
The Court held that even if it is well-settled
that while the power to decide resides solely in the
administrative agency vested by law, this does not
preclude a delegation of the power to hold a
hearing on the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be made. The rule that
requires an administrative officer to exercise his
own judgment and discretion does not preclude
him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates
to investigate and report to him the facts, on the
basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is
sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally
exercised are those of the officer authorized by
law. In the case at bar, while the hearing officer
may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of
questions raised at the hearings of these cases,
the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues
and questions involved is left to the Director of
Patents.
DELEGATION TO DIVISION
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE
CORPORATION V. SENDINO
G.R. NO. 109703 [JULY 5, 1994]
FACTS:
Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino
entered into a reservation agreement with Realty
Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square
meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat,
Paranaque. He paid the full downpayment on the
purchase price. However, she was advised by
REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed,
asking for an extension of one month to do so. For
alleged non-compliance with the requirement of
submission of the appropriate documents under
the terms of the original agreement, REVI,
informed respondent of the cancellation of the

contract. Private respondent filed a complaint for
Specific Performance against REVI with the office
of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs
(OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB). The HLURB rendered its
judgment in favor of private respondent and
ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the
house and lot and to pay private respondent
P5,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as exemplary
damages andP6,000 as attorney's fees and costs
of the suit. An appeal from this decision was taken
to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the
Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA
Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President
(OP). The OP rendered its decision dismissing the
petitioners' appeal. The Motion for reconsideration
of the decision was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HLURB has quasijudicial functions.
RULING:
Yes. The HLURB properly exercised its
jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners
with its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering
petitioners to comply with their obligations arising
from the Reservation Agreement. Recognizing the
HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's
powers and functions, it therefore follows that the
transfer of such functions from the NHA to the
HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of
1981, thereby resulted in the acquisition by the
HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included the
power to "hear and decide cases of unsound real
estate business practices . . . and cases of specific
performance." Obviously, in the exercise of its
powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret
and apply contracts, determine the rights of the
parties under these contracts, and award damages
whenever appropriate.
CONCEPT OF DUE PROCESS
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. LUCAS
G.R. NO. 127838 [JANUARY 21, 1999]
FACTS:
On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an
assistant information officer at the Agricultural
Information Division, Department of Agriculture
(DA for brevity), filed with the office of the
Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint against
respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the
23
same agency, for misconduct. On May 31, 1993,

after a formal investigation by the BOPI, DA, the
board issued a resolution finding respondent guilty
of simple misconduct and recommending a penalty
of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day.
The Secretary of Agriculture approved the
recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to due process is
applicable to administrative cases.
RULING:
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from
basic and fundamental procedural principles, such
as the right to due process in investigations and
hearings. The right to substantive and procedural
due process is applicable in administrative
proceedings. The court do not in any way condone
respondents act. Even in jest, he had no right to
touch complainants leg. However, under the
circumstances, such act is not constitutive of grave
misconduct, in the absence of proof that
respondent was maliciously motivated. We note
that respondent has been in the service for twenty
(20) years and this is his first offense.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF
REGENTS, ET. AL. V.
UNIVERISTY V. CA AND AROKIASWAMY
WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE
GR NO. 134625 [AUGUST 31, 1999]
FACTS:
After investigation of various committees
and holding of meetings to allow private
respondent to explain her side, the Board of
Regents of the University of the Philippines
resolved to withdraw the doctoral degree in
Anthropology of private respondent on the ground
of plagiarism. Thus, a petition for mandamus and
damages was filed by respondent against
petitioners alleging that petitioners had unlawfully
withdrawn her degree without justification and
without affording her procedural due process. The
RTC dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent was
denied of due process.
RULING:
No. in administrative proceedings, the

essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. In this case, private respondent
was informed in writing of the charges against her
and afforded opportunities to refute them. She
was asked to submit her written explanation, which
the same she forwarded. It is not tenable for
private respondent to argue that she was entitled
to have an audience before the Board of Regents.
Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the
courts of justice.
BAROT V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(G.R. NO. 149147. June 18, 2003)
FACTS:
Felix Barot (petitioner) and Rolando
Tabaloc (private respondent) were candidates for
councilor. On May 17, 2001, the Board of
Canvassers (BOC) of Tanjay City proclaimed the
winning candidates for mayor, vice-mayor, and ten
councilors including petitioner who was proclaimed
the 10th. On May 29, 2001, BOC Chair
Nochefranca sent a Memorandum to the
COMELEC En Banc requesting for authority to
correct the erroneous entries in the Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
Candidates, and to proclaim private respondent in
place of petitioner. In said Memorandum,
Nochefranca alleged that the erroneous entries
were made due to oversight as a result of which
votes for some candidates for mayor down to the
city councilors were increased and petitioner was
inadvertently proclaimed as the 10th winning
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod when it
should have been private respondent who actually
received more votes than petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not due process require a
hearing.
RULING:
As correctly argued by the COMELEC,
while petitioner was unable to attend the
scheduled hearings of the petition, he was given
the opportunity to file his comment thereon and he
in fact filed an opposition thereto. Petitioner was
thus able to air his side of the case. Due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing,
but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One
may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation
24
but also perhaps many times more creditably and

predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.
MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORPORATION V.

MINISTER ROBERTO ONGPIN, ET. AL.
GR NO. L-67784 [FEBRUARY 28, 1986]
LOLITA ARTEZUELA V. ATTY. RICARTE B.

MADERAZO
A.C. NO. 4354 [APRIL 22, 2002]
FACTS:
In February 1983, respondent Garments
and Textile Export Board revoked petitioners 1983
export quota allocations. The trial court upheld the
cancellation of petitioners export quota allocations
and the suspension of its officers. This decision
was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court
even as it set aside the basis of such cancellation
and suspension on the ground of violation of due
process.
FACTS:
Artezuela filed before the Supreme Court a
verified complaint for disbarment against the
respondent, who served as her counsel in a case
instituted against Allan Echavia. She alleged that
respondent grossly neglected his duties as a
lawyer and failed to represent her interests with
zeal and enthusiasm. Complainant also claimed
that respondent engaged in activities inimical to
her interest, i.e. while acting as her counsel,
respondent prepared Echavias Answer to the
Amended Complaint. The Board of Governors of
the IBP recommended the suspension from the
practice of law of Atty. Maderazo for the period of 6
months, with a stern warning that repetition of the
same act will be dealt with more severely. On the
other hand, respondent contended that the
Investigating Committee did not conduct trial;
hence, he was not able to confront and examine
the witnesses against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Maderazo was
deprived of due process.
RULING:
No.
In
administrative
cases,
the
requirement of notice and hearing does not
connote full adversarial proceedings, as actual
adversarial proceedings become necessary only
for clarification or when there is a need to
propound searching questions to witnesses who
give vague testimonies. Due process is fulfilled
when the parties were given reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in
support of their arguments. In the case at bar,
records have shown that respondent repeatedly
sought the postponement of the hearings,
prompting the Investigating Commissioner to
receive complainants evidence ex parte and to set
the case for resolution after the parties have
submitted their respective memorandum. It is by
his own negligence that the respondent was
deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine
the complainant and her witness. He cannot
belatedly ask the Court to grant new trial after he
has wasted his opportunity to exercise his right.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in
allowing the implementation of the orders of the
respondent Board when such orders were set
aside for having been issued without a hearing.
RULING:
Yes. The appellate court should have
reversed and set aside the cancellation of
petitioner's export quota allocations and the
suspension of its officers since the very bases of
these measures were set aside because of lack of
due process. In the case at bar, the petitioner was
never given the chance to present its side before
its export quota allocations were revoked and its
officers suspended. While it is true that such
allocations as alleged by the Board are mere
privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may
deem fit, these privileges have been accorded to
petitioner for so long that they have become
impressed with property rights especially since not
only do these privileges determine the continued
existence of the petitioner with assets of over
P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some
700 workers who are employed by the petitioner
and their families.
In judicial proceedings, the irreducible rule
is that the dismissal of an action upon a motion to
dismiss constitutes a denial of due process of law if
from a consideration of the pleadings it appears
that there are issues of fact which cannot be
decided without a trial of the case on the merits. In
quasi-judicial proceedings, the counterpart rule is
that where an adjudicative fact is at issue, a trialtype hearing ought to be held.
25
LEONOR MARIANO V. SUSAN ROXAS, CLERK

III, COURT OF APPEALS
A.M. NO. CA-02-14-P [ JULY 31, 2002]
advised to be more prudent and more circumspect

in his actions and utterances.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Complainant Leonor Mariano filed an
administrative case with the Court of Appeals,
against Susan Roxas with forgery and dishonesty.
She alleged that respondent refused to pay her the
balance of the price of jewelry items complainant
sold to respondent. The latter latter insisted that
she made an overpayment as shown by 4 receipts,
the same being later found as being forgery. An
investigation was conducted as ordered by then
Acting Presiding Justice Garcia of the CA. Finding
the report of the investigation in order, CA issued
an order finding Roxas guilty of misconduct and
meted with the penalty of suspension for one
month and one day.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Roxas administrative
liability was proved sufficiently with the required
quantum of proof.
RULING:
Yes. In administrative proceedings, such
as the one at bar, the quantum of proof required to
establish the administrative liability of respondent
is substantial evidence, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
based on the evidence on record, respondent is
administratively liable. As found by the CA, there
were marked differences between the signatures in
the receipts and complainants specimen signature
which are easily discernible by the naked eye.
SPS. GREGORIO AND TERESITA LORENA V.
JUDGE ADOLFO V. ENCOMIENDA, MTC
PAGBILAO, QUEZON
A.M. NO. MTJ-99-1177 [FEBRUARY 8, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses filed with the Office of
the Court Administrator a sworn letter-complaint
charging respondent judge with grave abuse of
authority for allegedly ordering their arrest and
subsequent detention without an issued warrant of
arrest. Respondent judge, however, denied the
charge against him. In his Report, Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo recommended
that the charge of grave abuse of authority be
dismissed and that the respondent judge be
Whether or not complainants were able to

prove by substantial evidence the allegations in the
complaint.
RULING:
In
administrative
proceedings,
the
complainant has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint. In the present case, the complainants
were not able to do so. There was no showing that
respondent judge used the powers and influence
of his office in an arbitrary manner. From the
documents presented, it was apparent that he had
no hand in bringing the Lorenas to the police
station. Likewise, it cannot be said that he had any
participation in the conflict between his brothers
family and the Lorenas. The complainants may
have assumed otherwise, but mere suspicion
without proof cannot be the basis of conviction.
THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE
REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD, PNP, REGION
VI, ILOILO CITY V. C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA
GR NO. 130442 [APRIL 6, 2000]
FACTS:
Several verified complaints were filed
against respondent by Manuel Puey, Jesus Puey,
Alex Edwin del Rosario. The twelve administrative
complaints were the subject of administrative
hearings before the Summary Dismissal Board of
the PNP. The Regional Director of the Philippine
National Police of Iloilo City, through its Summary
Dismissal Board, ordered the suspension of herein
respondent from the service for 20 days for
"Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty
under Section 41 of R.A. 6975." The Court of
Appeals, nevertheless, set aside the decision of
the Regional Director upon finding that it was
rendered without or in excess or in excess of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in setting aside the decision of the RD.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that the
Court of Appeals correctly found that the decision
of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction, as respondent Torcita was
found guilty of an offense for which he was not
26
properly charged. A decision is void for lack of due

process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard. A void judgment never
acquires finality. Hence, aforementioned decision
cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory.
ESTELITO V. REMOLONA V. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
GR NO. 137473 [AUGUST 2, 2001]
FACTS:
Spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona, a
Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in Infanta,
Quezon,
and a teacher at the Kiborosa
Elementary School, respectively, were found guilty
by the Civil Service Commission of dishonesty and
were imposed the penalty of dismissal and all its
accessory penalty. The case arose from petitioner
Remolonas act of obtaining a fake eligibility for his
wife, to which he admitted himself. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision
dismissing the petition for review filed by herein
petitioner Remolona. In the present petition before
the Supreme Court, Remolona claimed that his
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible because he
was not assisted by counsel during the
investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
confession is inadmissible.
the
extra-judicial
RULING:
No. The right to counsel under the
Constitution is meant to protect a suspect in a
criminal case under custodial investigation. As
such, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2),
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not
to those made in an administrative investigation. In
the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any
crime in the investigation conducted by the CSC
field office. The investigation was conducted for the
purpose of ascertaining the facts and whether
there is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a
belief that an offense cognizable by the CSC has
been committed and that Remolona is probably
guilty thereof and should be administratively
charged. Necessarily, the admissions made by
Remolona during such investigation may be used
as evidence to justify his dismissal.
RAY PETER O. VIVO vs. PHILIPPINE

AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION
(PAGCOR)
G.R. No. 187854. November 12, 2013
Facts:
The
petitioner
was
employed
by
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986,
and was PAGCORs Managing Head of its Gaming
Department at the time of his dismissal from office.
On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from
Teresita S. Ela, the Senior Managing Head of
PAGCORs Human Resources Department,
advising that he was being administratively
charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering,
conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company,
and loss of trust and confidence6 that he should
submit a written explanation of the charges; and
that he was at the same time being placed under
preventive suspension.
On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received
the summons for him to attend an administrative
inquiry, instructing him to appear before
PAGCORs Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) on
March 15, 2002. At the petitioners request,
however, the inquiry was conducted at his
residence. His statement was taken in a questionand-answer format. He was also furnished the
memorandum of charges which was based on the
statements of PAGCOR personnel who had
personal knowledge of the accusations against
him. However, when his counsel requested to be
furnished copies of the statements, PAGCOR
rejected the request on the ground that he had
already been afforded the sufficient opportunity to
confront, hear, and answer the charges against
him during the administrative inquiry. The CIU
tendered its investigation report to PAGCORs
Adjudication
Committee.
The
Adjudication
Committee summoned the petitioner to appear
before it on May 8, 2002. His counsel moved for
the re-scheduling but the Adjudication Committee
denied the request upon the reason that the
presence of counsel was not necessary in the
proceedings. The petitioner received the letter
dated May 15, 2002 from Ela informing him of the
resolution of the PAGCOR Board of Directors to
the effect that he was being dismissed from the
service. He appealed to the CSC which ruled that
PAGCOR had violated the petitioners right to due
process. PAGCOR elevated the case to the CA
which reversed and set aside the decision of the
CSC. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
27
Was there violation of due process?

Ruling:
No. The observance of fairness in the
conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of
procedural due process. The essence of due
process is to be heard, and, as applied to
administrative proceedings, this means a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain ones side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or
trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
In this case the petitioner actively participated in
the entire course of the investigation and hearings
conducted by PAGCOR. He received the letter
apprising him of his being administratively charged
for several offenses, and directing him to submit an
explanation in writing. He was later on properly
summoned to appear before the CIU, which
conducted its proceedings in his own residence
upon his request. During the administrative inquiry,
the CIU served him a copy of the memorandum of
charges, which detailed the accusations against
him and specified the acts and omissions
constituting his alleged offenses. He was also
given the opportunity to appear before the
Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory
questions. Lastly, he was informed through a
memorandum of the decision of the Board of
Directors dismissing him from the service. In
administrative proceedings, the right to counsel is
not
imperative
because
administrative
investigations are themselves inquiries conducted
only to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining
the dignity of government service.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
GR NO. 158791 [JULY 22, 2005]
FACTS:
Petitioner Civil Service Commission filed a
petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court
for mandamus seeking to compel the Department
of Budget and Management to release the balance
of its budget for fiscal year 2002. Petitioner alleged

that the balance was intentionally withheld by
respondent on the basis of its no report, no
release policy whereby allocations for agencies
are withheld pending their submission of the
documents required. It further contended that the
application of such policy upon independent
constitutional bodies of which it is one is a
violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and,
therefore, unconstitutional. On the other hand,
respondent opposed and claimed that petitioner
did not exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
exhaustion
of
administrative remedies is applicable in the case.
RULING:
No, exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not applicable in the present case. The rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked by
the respondent applies only where there is an
express
legal
provision
requiring
such
administrative step as a condition precedent to
taking action in court. In the case at hand, the Civil
Service Commission is not mandated by any law to
seek clarification from the Secretary of Budget and
Management prior to filing the present action.
Thus, its failure to do so does not call for the
application of the rule.
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC. AND NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO V.
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF HUDCC, ET. AL.
GR NO. 163980 [AUGUST 3, 2006]
FACTS:
The present case involves an instant
petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent
respondents from enforcing the implementing rules
and regulations of Republic Act No. 9207,
otherwise known as the National Government
Center Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.
The OSG claimed that the instant petition for
prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ
of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a
quasi-legislative function.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the OSG is correct.
RULING:
28
Yes. Quasi-legislative or rule-making

power is the power to make rules and regulations
which results in delegated legislation that is within
the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers. And in questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle, however, applies only where the act
of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function,
and not when the assailed act pertained to its rulemaking or quasi-legislative power.
JUANITO A. ROSARIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
AND ALEJANDRO CRUZ
GR NO. 89554 [JULY 10, 1992]
FACTS:
The City Tenants Security Commission
revoked the award to petitioner Rosario of Lot 3-A
(through the Citys Land for the Landless Program)
and awarded the same to Alejandro Cruz, who
protested that Rosario could not qualify as a bona
fide occupant because his possession was only
that of a sublessee. Thus, before the CFI of
Manila, petitioner filed an action to quiet title
praying for the annulment of the order by the
involved commission. The trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that plaintiff had not been
denied procedural due process, and that he failed
to exhaust administrative remedies for he should
have appealed the resolution of the City Tenants'
Security Commission to the Office of the President
before seeking a judicial review thereof. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower courts ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is fatal to petitioners
action.
RULING:
No. Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is not necessarily fatal to an action. It
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The
effect of such non-compliance with the rule is that it
will deprive the complainant of a cause of action,
which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not
invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed
waived and the court can then take cognizance of
the case and try it.
SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC. VS

HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES
GR. NO. L-49109 [DECEMBER 1, 1987]
FACTS:
Petitioner is the holder of 50 mining claims
situated in Camarines Norte acquired under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. PD No.
1214 was issued requiring holders of subsisting
and valid patentable mining claims to file a mining
lease application within one year from approval of
the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining
lease application, but under protest, with an
annotation that it is not waiving its rights over its
mining claims until the validity of PD No. 1214 shall
have been passed upon by the Court. Petitioner
then filed this special civil action to declare PDP
1214 unconstitutional. It argues that its 50 mining
claims had already been declared as its own
private and exclusive property by the CFI of
Camarines Norte. Respondent allege that
petitioner has no standing to file the instant
petitioner as it failed to fully exhaust administrative
remedies due to the pendency of petitioners
appeal with the Office of the President of the ruling
of the Secretary of Natural Resources declaring
that 40 of its mining claims were void for lack of
valid tie points as required under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, and that all mining claims were
abandoned and cancelled for non-compliance with
the Bill and EE No. 141
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may rule on an
issue pending appeal before an administrative
agency
RULING:
The court ruled that it is premature for the
Court to now make a finding on the matter of
whether petitioner had abandoned its mining
claims. Until petitioners appeal shall have been
decided by the Office of the President, where it is
pending, petitioners attempt to seek judicial
recognition of the continuing validity of its mining
claims, cannot be entertained by the Court.
ZABAT V. CA
G.R. NO. 122089 (August 23, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed this case questioning the
award of a certain lot to the respondent by the
29
Awards and Arbitration Committee of the National

Housing Authority which declared petitioners as
absentee owners. The National Housing Authority
signed a contract to sell with respondent, and sent
a notice of demolition to petitioner. Hence this
petition.
appointment to that position cannot be considered

permanent and cannot claim security of tenure.
Moreover, security of tenure in the career
executive service is acquired with respect to rank
and no to the position or office. Hence, even
though appointed as Chief Public Attorney, she
was not appointed as CESO I but remained to be
CESO III.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioners action correct?
HELD:
NO. The SC ruled that petitioner should
have exhausted all applicable administrative
remedies. All decisions of the Awards and
Arbitration Committee are subject to review by the
General Manager. Petitioner should have appealed
the award of the lot and the execution of the
contract to sell to the Office of the President.
POWER OF CONTROL BY THE

DEPARTMENT HEAD OVER
SUBORDINATE OFFICER
WENCESLAO VINZONS TAN VS. THE
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
GR. NO. L-24548 [OCTOBER 27, 1983]
FACTS:
Respondent Josefina Bacal has a Career
Executive Service Officer III (CESO III). She was
appointed by President Ramos as Chief Public
Attorney in the PAO which has a CES RANK Level
I and was subsequently transferred without her
consent t the Office of the Regional Director of the
PAO. Respondent argued that her transfer was in
effect a removal from her office without cause
hence, invalid. That she has a security of tenure
with respect to her office. The CA ruled in her
favor.
FACTS:
The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No.
2807 advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales.
Petitioner-appellant submitted his application and
was awarded. On May 1963, Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin
Gozon, who succeeded Secretary Fortich issued
General Memorandum Order No. 46 providing that
the Director of Forestry may grant ordinary timber
licenses. Thereafter, Jose Feliciano was appointed
as Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, replacing Gozon. He immediately
revoke the authority delegated to the Director of
Forestry under the General Memorandum No. 46.
On the same date that the authority was revoked,
the Ordinary Timber License in favor of appellant
was signed by the Acting Director.
The Secretary of Agriculture, through the
letter of Ravago Commercial, declared the
Ordinary Timber License as having been issued
without authority and is therefore void ab initio.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
TRANSFER OF CAREER EXECUTIVE

SERVICE OFFICER TO A LOWER RANK
POSITION
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SERAFIN CUEVAS
VS. ATYY. JOSEFINA G. BACAL
GR. NO. 138382 [DECEMBER 6, 2000]
Whether or not the transfer of respondent

is valid
RULING:
Respondent is a CESO III and that the
position to which she was transferred corresponds
to CES Rank Level III. While the position of Chief
Public Attorney of the PAO requires a CES Rank
Level I for appointment. As respondent does not
have the rank appropriate for the position, her
Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources may order the nullity of the
Ordinary Timber License
RULING:
Yes. As a general rule, timber licenses are
subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry.
However, as a subordinate officer, the Director of
Forestry is subject to the control of the Department
30
Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources,
who,
therefore,
may
impose
reasonable regulations in the exercise of the power
of the subordinate officer. This power of the
Department Head includes the power to modify,
reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials.
Moreover, the court took of judicial notice that the
subject area has been declared as a watershed
forest reserve.
be supplied by the courts even though the matter

is within the proper jurisdiction of the court.
THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, V JODY KING
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP
G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262. November 27, 2013
FACTS:
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO. 88550 [APRIL 18, 1990]
FACTS:
Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI)
was granted a coal operating contract by the
Government through the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED) for the exploration of five
blocks, the area is also called as Giporlos Area.
EIE and MMIC executed a Memorandum of
Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred
to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal
blocks as advised by the BED. Subsequently, IEI
filed an action for recission of the Memorandum of
Agreement with damages against MMIC before the
RTC. In a summary judgment, the trial court
ordered the rescission of the MOA and ordered
BED to issue its written affirmation f the coal
operating contract and its conversion from
exploration to development.
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court
on the ground that it is the BED which has
jurisdiction to decide controversies with respect to
coal blocks.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BED has the power to
decide on the controversy.
RULING:
Yes. Under the provisions of PD No. 910,
972 and 1206, the BED has the jurisdiction to pass
upon any question involving a coal operating
contract. The court also applied the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. It provides that, the court may
have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
particular case. However, if the case is such that
its determination requires expertise, specialized
skills and knowledge of the proper administrative
agency, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before any remedy will
On January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan

(petitioner) and Jody King Construction and
Development Corp. (respondent) entered into a
contract for the design and -construction of the
Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in
Malay, Aklan. The total project cost is
P38,900,000: P 18,700,000 for the design and
construction
of
passenger
terminal,
and
P20,200,000 for the design and construction of the
jetty port facility. In the course of construction,
petitioner issued variation/change orders for
additional works. The scope of work under these
change orders were agreed upon by petitioner and
respondent. On January 5, 2001, petitioner
entered into a negotiated contract with respondent
for the construction of Passenger Terminal Building
(Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay,
Aklan. On October 22, 2001, respondent made a
demand for the total amount of P22,419,112.96
which petitioner allegedly failed to settle.
On July 13, 2006, respondent sued petitioner in
the RTC of Marikina City to collect the aforesaid
amounts. On August 17, 2006, the trial court
issued a writ of preliminary attachment. Petitioner
denied any unpaid balance and interest due to. It
asserted that the sums being claimed by
respondent were not indicated in Change Order
No. 3 as approved by the Office of Provincial
Governor. The RTC rendered in favor of plaintiff
Jody King Construction And Development
Corporation. The Petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner filed in
the CA a petition for certiorari with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction but it was likewise denied. On May 20,
2010, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari
in the CA but was dismissed.
ISSUE:
31
Must the petition be granted?

RULING:
Yes. COA has primary jurisdiction over private
respondents money. Petitioner is not estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such
that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is
supplied by the courts even if the matter may well
be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where
a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under
a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative agency. In
such a case, the court in which the claim is sought
to be enforced may suspend the judicial process
pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view or, if the parties
would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the
case without prejudice. The objective of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court
in determining whether it should refrain from
exercising
its
jurisdiction
until after
an
administrative agency has determined some
question or some aspect of some question arising
in the proceeding before the court. The petitioner
was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a
certain amount of money against a local
government unit. This brought the case within the
COAs domain to pass upon money claims against
the government or any subdivision thereof under
Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines. Since a judgment rendered by a body
or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case is no judgment at all, it cannot
be the source of any right or the creator of any
obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect and the void
judgment can never be final and any writ of
execution based on it is likewise void.
DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENT

PEDRO CARREON v. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
GR. NO. L-43112 [MAY 31, 1977]
FACTS:
In these two cases decided jointly as
involving a common issue of law, the Court
annuled respondent commission's decisions and
reinstated the referees' awards of disability
compensation in favor of petitioners-claimants on
the fundamental ground of the commission's lack
of jurisdiction and authority to set aside an award
that had already become final and executory for
failure to appeal the same within the reglementary
period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent commission no
longer had authority and jurisdiction to set aside
the referees' decisions that had already become
final and executory for failure to take an appeal
within the reglementary period.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that in the case of
Vitug vs. Republic it has once again again
reaffirmed its ruling in Ramos vs. Republic that
"(the) basic rule of finality of judgments is
applicable indiscriminately to one and all and
regardless of whether respondent employer be a
public or private employer, since the rule is
grounded on fundamental considerations of public
policy and sound practice that at risk of occasional
error, the judgment of courts and award of quasijudicial agencies must become final at some
definite dated fixed by law." It was stressed therein
once again that "It is of course beyond question
that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory
or
reglementary
period
is mandatory and jurisdictional and that failure to
so perfect an appeal renders final and executory
the questioned decision and deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. An
exception to this basic rule is where there is a
timely petition for relief from judgment within the
reglementary period (within 30 days from
knowledge/notice of the decision- award and within
3 months from entry thereof in workmen's
compensation cases), however, in this case, no
petitions for relief from judgment had been timely
filed or granted.
32
MIRO V MENDOZA
G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45.

November 20, 2013
granted the respondents petition and reversed

the Deputy Ombudsmans joint decision in the
administrative aspect.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Mendoza, Director of the Regional
Office VII of the Land Transportation Office,
Cebu City (LTO Cebu), Erederos, Mendoza's
niece and secretary, Alingasa, LTO clerk, and
Peque, Officer-in-Charge, Operation Division
of LTO Cebu, were administratively charged
with Grave Misconduct before the Deputy
Ombudsman by private complainants. They
were
likewise
charged
with
criminal
complaints for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
administrative and criminal charges arose
from the alleged anomalies in the distribution
at the LTO Cebu of confirmation certificates,
an indispensable requirement in the
processing of documents for the registration of
motor vehicle with the LTO. The private
complainants accused Alingasa of selling the
confirmation certificates, which is supposed to
be issued by the LTO free of charge. The
NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO
Manila also revealed that the confirmation
certificates were given to the representatives
of car dealers, who were authorized to supply
the needed data therein.
On September 25, 2002, the Deputy
Ombudsman ordered the respondents to file
their respective counter-affidavits. The
respondents complied with the order. On
December 12, 2002, the case was called for
preliminary conference. At the conference, the
respondents, thru their counsels, manifested
their intention to submit the case for decision
on the basis of the evidence on record. In the
interim, additional administrative and criminal
complaints for the same charges were filed. In
the joint decision, the Deputy Ombudsman
found Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa guilty
of grave misconduct and imposed the penalty
of dismissal from the service. Peque, on the
other hand, was only found guilty of simple
misconduct and was meted the penalty of
reprimand. On November 22, 2005, the CA
Was grave misconduct on the part of CA in

ruling for the accused?
RULING:
No.
Doctrine
of
conclusiveness
of
administrative findings of fact is not absolute.
It is well settled that findings of fact by the
Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence.
Their factual findings are generally accorded
with great weight and respect, by reason of
their special knowledge and expertise over
matters falling under their jurisdiction. This
rule on conclusiveness of factual findings,
however, is not an absolute one. The CA may
resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate
the evidence on record and reverse the
administrative agency s findings if not
supported by substantial evidence. In the
present case, the CA found no substantial
evidence to support the conclusion that the
respondents are guilty of the administrative
charges against them. Since the Deputy
Ombudsmans findings were found wanting by
the CA of substantial evidence, the same shall
not bind the SC. Also, Substantial evidence is
defined as such amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe,
based on the evidence submitted, that the
respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of.
The affidavits show that the complainants lack
personal knowledge of the participation of
Mendoza and Erederos in the allegedly
anomalous act. These affidavits indicate that
the complainants have commonly noticed and
witnessed the anomalous sale transaction
concerning the confirmation certificates. It is a
basic rule in evidence that a witness can
testify only on the facts that he knows of his
own Personal knowledge. A witness may not
33
testify on what he merely learned, read or

heard from others because such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth of what he has learned,
read or heard. The affidavits also show that
the complainants did not allege any specific
act of the respondents.
that judgment may be amended. Upon finality of

the judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. Except for
correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc
pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any
party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment
can neither be amended nor altered after it has
become final and executory. This is the principle of
immutability of final judgment that is subject only to
a few exceptions. None of the exceptions are
present in this case.
PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL

JUDGMENT
AZUCENA MAGALLANES, ET. AL. V. SUN YAT

SEN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, ET. AL.
GR NO. 160876 [JANUARY 18, 2008]
EMERLITO F. AGUILA v. CARMEN R.

BALDOVIZO
GR. NO. 163186 [FEBRUARY 28, 2007]
FACTS:
On May 20, 1994, Marlun Lisbos was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide at the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City since the van he was driving
sideswiped Fausto who was walking along the
pedestrian lane which later on caused his death.
Faustos wife, Carmen R. Baldovizo, and children,
Edgar and Carmelo, filed before the RTC of
Quezon City, a separate complaint for damages
against Marlun Lisbos, Danilo D. Reyes, petitioner
Emerlito F. Aguila, the actual operator and
possessor of the van, and Times Surety and
Insurance Company, the insurer of the van under a
third-party liability insurance contract. After the
parties failed to arrive at a settlement, trial ensued.
Petitioners were considered to have waived their
right to present their evidence due to their failure to
appear on the hearing. On March 7, 2000, the trial
court ordered them to jointly and severally pay
damages to the plaintiffs. However, subsequently,
the trial court issued an Amended Decision dated
August 13, 2001, which deleted the name of
Marlun Lisbos as a party liable for damages. The
appellate court sustained the Amended Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have the right to
appeal the amended decision after the original
decision had become final and executory.
RULING:
No. The Court held that under Section
2, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or
final order becomes final and executory if no
appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration
was filed within the period provided by the Rules.
Before a judgment becomes final and executory,
FACTS:
Respondents filed complaints against
respondents for illegal dismissal and money claims
related to such termination. The Labor Arbiter ruled
that there was illegal dismissal and ordered
reinstatement among others. The decision,
however, was reversed by the NLRC, holding that
petitioners are contractual employees and that
respondents merely allowed their contracts to
lapse. The Court of Appeals reinstated the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Meanwhile,
petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a motion for
execution of his Decision, to which the latter has
acted upon. On appeal, NLRC modified the Labor
Arbiters computation for the monetary awards.
The decision was elevated by petitioners to the
Court of Appeals but the petition was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in modifying the award of the Court of
Appeals.
RULING:
Yes. Quasi-judicial agencies have neither
business nor power to modify or amend the final
and executory decisions of the appellate courts.
Under the principle of immutability of judgments,
any alteration or amendment which substantially
affects a final and executory judgment is void for
lack of jurisdiction.
NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ and ALFREDO
DE LA CRUZ v. OLGA RAMISCAL
GR. NO. 137882 [FEBRUARY 04, 2005]
34
FACTS: The subject matter of this case is a 1.10meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land
owned by respondent Ramiscal which is being
used by petitioners as their pathway to and from
18th Avenue, the nearest public highway from their
property. Petitioners had enclosed the same with a
gate, fence, and roof. In 1976, respondent leased
her property, including the building thereon, to Phil.
Orient Motors. Phil. Orient Motors also owned a
property adjacent to that of respondents. In 1995,
Phil. Orient Motors sold its property to San Benito
Realty. After the sale, Engr. Rafael Madrid
prepared a relocation survey and location plan for
both contiguous properties of respondent and San
Benito Realty. It was only then that respondent
discovered that the aforementioned pathway being
occupied by petitioners is part of her property.
Through her lawyer, respondent immediately
demanded that petitioners demolish the structure
constructed by them on said pathway without her
knowledge and consent. However, since her
demand went unheeded, respondent filed a
complaint with the RTC seeking the demolition of
the structure which was allegedly illegally
constructed by petitioners on her property. The
RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners
from the RTC decision for failure to file brief within
the reglementary period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court Appeals erred in
dismissing the appeal filed by petitioners for failure
to file appellants brief on time.
RULING: No. The Court held that the evidence on
record evinced contrariety to petitioners assertion
that they have beat the 45-day period to file
appellants brief before the appellate court. It is
clear from the registry return receipt card that the
Notice to File Brief was received on 12 March 1998
by one May Tadeo from the Office of Atty. Judito
Angelo C. Tadeo, petitioners previous counsel.
Thus, when their new counsel entered his
appearance and at the same time filed an
appellants brief, the 45 days have run out. For
failure of petitioners to file brief within the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed said appeal pursuant to Section 1(b),
Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.The
Court further held that petitioners must be
reminded that the right to appeal is not a
constitutional, natural or inherent right - it is a
statutory privilege and of statutory origin and,
therefore, available only if granted or provided by
statute.
TAXPAYERS STANDING
RAMON A. GONZALES v. HON. ANDRES R.
NARVASA
GR. NO. 140835 [AUGUST 14, 2000]
FACTS:
In
this
petition
for
prohibition
and mandamus , petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in
his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assailed the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and
of the positions of presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks the
Supreme Court to enjoin the PCCR and the
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants
from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their
advice and recommendations. In addition,
petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit
from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR
and the presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants. Finally, petitioner prayed for an order
compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner
with information on certain matters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has standing to
file the case.
RULING:
The Court held that petitioner has not
shown that he has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress,
not petitioner, which can claim any "injury" in this
case since, according to petitioner, the President
has encroached upon the legislatures powers to
create a public office and to propose amendments
to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has
sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury.
Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges
have been or are in danger of being violated, nor
that he shall be subjected to any penalties or
burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities.
Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus
standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress
as a citizen. A taxpayer is deemed to have the
standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed
in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. Thus payers action is properly
brought only when there is an exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. In this
case, however, it is readily apparent that there is
no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
35
power. The PCCR was created by the President by

virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70.
There being no exercise by Congress of its taxing
or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to
question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity
as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he
has a "personal and substantial interest in the case
and that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of its enforcement."
SUPREME COURTS APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OVER DECISION OF
OMBUDSMAN IN CRIMINAL CASES
GARCIA-RUEDA V. PASCASIO
GR. NO. 118141 [SEPTEMBER 5, 1997]
FACTS:
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner
Leonila
Garcia-Rueda,
underwent
surgical
operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a
stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr.
Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while
Dr.
Erlinda
Balatbat-Reyes
was
the
anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery,
however, Florencio died of complications of
unknown cause, according to officials of the UST
Hospital. Not satisfied with the findings of the
hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her
husbands body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that
Florencios death was due to lack of care by the
attending physician in administering anaesthesia.
Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that
Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda BalatbatReyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence before the Office of the City
Prosecutor. Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft
charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 [3] against Prosecutors
Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest
partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of
the Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, the
Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution
dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City Prosecutors were
guilty for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
RULING:
The City Prosecutors were charged with
violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act which requires the following facts: 1.
The accused is a public officer discharging

administrative or official functions or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2. The
public officer committed the prohibited act during
the performance of his official duty or in relation to
his public position; 3. The public officer acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross,
inexcusable negligence; and 4. His action caused
undue injury to the Government or any private
party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference to such parties.
The Supreme held that the better and more
logical remedy under the circumstances would
have been to appeal the resolution of the City
Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to
the Secretary of Justice under the Department of
Justices Order No. 223, otherwise known as the
1993 Revised Rules on Appeals From Resolutions
In Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations, as
amended by Department Order No. 359. In
exercising his discretion under the circumstances,
the Ombudsman acted within his power and
authority in dismissing the complaint against the
Prosecutors and this Court will not interfere with
the same.
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS THE ONLY ONE
WHO CAN BRING ACTION ON BEHALF OF
THE GOVERNMENT, EXCEPTION
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V.
DOLEFIL AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
COOPERATIVE, INC., ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 137489 [MAY 29, 2002]
FACTS:
The case arose when CDA Administrator
froze the funds of Dolefil Agrarian and created a
management committee to manage the affairs of
the said cooperative, upon acting on several
complaints alleging mismanagement and/or
misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the
incumbent officers and members of the board of
directors of the cooperative. Private respondents
were placed under preventive suspension, hence,
paving the way for the newly-created management
committee to assume office. Upon reaching the
Court of Appeals, orders of the CDA were declared
null and void. It was contended that the present
petition for review on certiorari suffers from a basic
infirmity for lack of the requisite imprimatur from
the Office of the Solicitor General, thus, it is
dismissible on that ground.
36
ISSUE:
Whether or not only the Solicitor General
can bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines or its agencies and
instrumentalities.
Whether or not the prohibition from hiring

private lawyers to handle their legal cases apply to
a lawyer hired by virtue of a service contract but
who actually handle purely right-of-way matters
(excluding handling of court cases).
RULING:
The general rule is that only the Solicitor
General can bring or defend actions on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines and that actions
filed in the name of the Republic, or its agencies
and instrumentalities for that matter, if not initiated
by the Solicitor General, will be summarily
dismissed. As an exception to the general rule, the
Solicitor General, in providing legal representation
for the government, is empowered under Section
35(8), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to deputize legal
officers of government departments, bureaus,
agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General
and appear or represent the Government in cases
involving their respective offices, brought before
the courts and exercise supervision and control
over such legal officers with respect to such
cases.
RULING:
Yes. As the hiring of Atty. Satorre was
clearly done without the prior conformity and
acquiescence of the Office of the Solicitor General
or the Government Corporate Counsel, as well as
the written concurrence of the Commission on
Audit, the payment of fees to Atty. Satorre was
correctly disallowed in audit by the COA.
Government agencies and instrumentalities are
restricted in their hiring of private lawyers to render
legal services or handle their cases. No public
funds will be disbursed for the payment to private
lawyers unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer,
there is a written conformity and acquiescence
from the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel.
HIRING OF A PRIVATE LAWYER
FACTS:
PHIVIDEC, through Atty. Adaza who is a
private lawyer, filed a complaint for expropriation
against the respondents on 24 August 1999.
PHIVIDEC is a government-owned corporation
which was created by Presidential Decree No. 538.
Five (5) days later, or on 29 August 1999,
PHIVIDEC, also through Atty. Adaza, filed an
Amended Complaint, which however lacked the
prescribed certification against forum shopping.
On 13 October 1999, respondents filed an
Omnibus Motion, praying for the dismissal of the
expropriation case on the grounds of absence of
the certification against forum shopping and lack of
authority of Atty. Adaza to represent PHIVIDEC.
Along with its Opposition to the Omnibus Motion,
PHIVIDEC filed a Manifestation/Motion, attaching
thereto a Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. In
an Order dated 4 November 1999, the RTC denied
the Omnibus Motion. Respondents moved for the
reconsideration of the RTCs Order, but the motion
for reconsideration was denied on 27 June 2000.
DANTE POLLOSO V. HON. CELSO GANGAN,

CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 140563 [JULY 14, 2000]
FACTS:
The
National
Power
Corporation,
represented by its President Dr. Francisco Viray,
entered into a service contract with Atty.
Benemerito A. Satorre. However, the Unit Auditor
of NPC-Visayas Regional Center, Cebu City issued
a Notice of Disallowance for the payment of the
services by Atty. Satorre. Among the grounds for
which the Notice of Disallowance was made is that
the contract for services did not have the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor
General or the Corporate Counsel and
concurrence of the Commission on Audit as
required under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated
April 2, 1986.Accordingly, several officers of NPC
were held personally liable. Petitioner Polloso
refuted the alleged violation in the Notice of
Disallowance
and
sought
reconsideration.
Subsequently, it reached the Commission on Audit
Central Office which denied the appeal of Polloso.
ISSUE:
PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY V.

CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION
GR. NO. 155692 [OCTOBER 23, 2003]
ISSUE:
Whether or not GOCCs can hire private
lawyers.
RULING:
In 1959, Republic Act No. 2327, which
37
declared the position of Government Corporate

Counsel separate and distinct from that of the
Solicitor General, was enacted. Four years later, it
was amended by Republic Act No. 3838. The
amendatory law made the Government Corporate
Counsel the principal law officer of GOCCs. It also
imposed the prohibition on GOCCs from hiring
private counsels. Thus, beginning with the year
1963, the general rule disallowing GOCCs from
hiring private lawyers was put in place, subject to
the exception that the GOCC may do so with the
written consent of the Government Corporate
Counsel or the Secretary of Justice.
RES JUDICATA
NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY, INC. V. NLRC,
ET. AL.
GR NO. 54424 [AUGUST 31, 1989]
FACTS:
Through an application for clearance to
dismiss filed by petitioner Nasipit Lumber, private
respondent Collado was terminated from
employment on the basis of him being implicated
to have committed theft. The same order of the
Regional Office was affirmed by the Secretary of
Labor. Subsequently, Collado filed a complaint for
unjust dismissal and reinstatement with backwages
and benefits with the Butuan District Labor Office.
Having been certified for compulsory arbitration,
the Executive Labor Arbiter rendered decision
reinstating Collado to his former position without
backwages. Both parties appealed to the NLRC,
with petitioner contending that the order of the
Regional Office which was subsequently approved
by the Secretary of Labor has become the law of
the case. NLRC ruled however that res judicata
cannot be validly invoked in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata
is applicable in the case.
RULING:
No. As held in a long line of cases, the
principle of res judicata may not be invoked in
labor relations proceedings considering that the
implementing rules and regulations of the Labor
Code provides that such proceedings are "nonlitigious and summary in nature without regard to
legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law." This
pronouncement is in consonance with the
jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not

administrative powers.
to
the
exercise
of
DUE PROCESS & RES JUDICATA

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR V. LUIS
BUNDALIAN, ET. AL.
GR NO. 149335 [JULY 1, 2003]
FACTS:
An unverified letter-complaint addressed
by private respondent Bundalian accused
petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III,
of the DPWH, of amassing wealth from lahar funds
and other public works projects. Bundalian claimed
that it is in violation of RA 3019. As such, the
Philippine Commission Against Graft and
Corruption conducted an investigation regarding
the said complaint and later recommended with the
Office of the President petitioners dismissal form
service. The Office of the President concurred with
the same and ordered Montemayors dismissal
form service. The case was later elevated to the
Court of Appeals but it was dismissed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Montemayor was denied
due process in the investigation before the
PCAGC.
2. Whether the earlier dismissal of similar
cases before the Ombudsman rendered
the administrative case before the PCAGC
moot and academic.
RULING:
1. No. The essence of due process in
administrative
proceedings
is
the
opportunity to explain ones side or seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. As long as the parties are
given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met. In the case at
bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify
the complainant of the proceedings but his
Philippine residence could not be located.
Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue
that he was deprived of due process
because he failed to confront and crossexamine the complainant.
2. No, the decision of the Ombudsman did
not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC
38
case subject of the case at hand. The

doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to
the exercise of administrative powers. As
the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner
was administrative in nature, the doctrine
of res judicata finds no application in the
case at bar.
RES JUDICATAON CITIZENSHIP
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION
ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), ET.
AL. V. HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC MANILA, BRANCH 29,
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN
G.R. NOS. 95122-23 [MAY 31, 1991]
FACTS:
The acting director of NBI wrote to the
Secretary
of
Justice
recommending
that
respondent Gatchalian be charged with violation of
Sec. 37(a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45
(c), and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613,
as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of
1940, not being a Filipino citizen. Petitioner
Commissioner Domingo of the CID issued a
mission order commanding the arrest of

respondent William Gatchalian. On the other hand,
the latter filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with injunction before the RTC. Among
others, Gatchalian contended that petitioners have
no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case
until the courts shall have finally resolved the
question of his citizenship. On the part of
petitioners, they claimed that respondents
alienage has been conclusively settled by the
Supreme Court in the previous cases of Arocha
and Vivo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not res judicata finds
application in a case regarding citizenship.
RULING:
Generally, the doctrine of res judicata does
not apply to questions of citizenship. However, as
an exception, in order that the doctrine of res
judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the
following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship
must be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor
General or his authorized representative took
active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the
finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
39

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JURISDICTION OF THE CA OVER CIAC

judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or

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This prerogative or discretion of the President

the CTA, the Secretary did not impose any

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employees under the EIIB are deemed separated

Execution previously issued be amended. The

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requirements. On appeal, the CSC upheld the

was granted by the HDMF a waiver from the Fund

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they were needed to comply with the terms and

tax purposes and from their gross sales xxx.

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As a result, only a portion of the respondents land

systems of government entities under existing

IMPOSITION OF FINES AND PENALTIES

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33, as amended may be carried out. Nothing

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS (WITH

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Likewise, PITC failed to substantiate its allegation

applicability is mandated by law. Obviously,

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published if their purpose is to enforce or

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PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND

pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative

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requirements of the Administrative Code and New

the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the

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respondent also requested that the proceedings on

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QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER V. JUDICIAL

basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the

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