ARTICLE 1-18

ARTICLE 2
1.
TANADA V. TUVERA
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Tanada invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required
by Article 2 of the Civil Code. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the clause unless it is otherwise provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code refers to the date of the effectivity and not to the mandatory publication of laws?
C. HELD:
YES. The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of the effectivity and not the requirement of the publication itself, which cannot in any event
be omitted. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication, it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did
not know of its existence. Moreover, Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
LORENZO M. TAADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446
April 24, 1985
Facts:

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not
been published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the
necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which
are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The
publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed
first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new civil
code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.
Issues:
(1)
(2)

Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette

Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full

Held:
(1)
The court held that all statue including those of local application shall be published as condition for their effectivity unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
(2)
The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.

2. PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

94 SCRA 641, March 29, 1954 (Constitutional Law Publication of Bank Circulars and Regulations)
FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central
Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the
claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said
appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued
for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and effect.
HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
ARTICLE 3
1.
GARCIA V. RECIO
A. FACTS:
Respondent, Rederick A. Recio was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and on January 12,
1994, married petitioner Grace J. Garcia in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared
single and Filipino. Then, on March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the ground of bigamy. The trial court declared
the prior marriage of Recio with Samson to be dissolved based on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
B.

B.

ISSUES:

1.
2.

1.
2.

W/N the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven?
W/N the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?

B.
C.
HELD:
C.
1. YES. The divorce decree between respondent and Samson appears to be an authentic one issue by an Australian family court. However, appearance
is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately, for respondents cause, when the divorce decree
was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected not to its admissibility but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, failure of the petitioner to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
D.
E.
2. REMANDED. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. As it is however, there is absolutely no
evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner since it failed to provide the type of divorce taken. The court cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The court however agreed with petitioner that the court a
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence
to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
ARTICLE 6
1. DM Consunji v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001
FACTS: A construction worker died when he fell 14 floors when the platform which he was on board fell from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig City. He works for
DM Consunji Inc. It was noted that this happened because the pin inserted to the platform loosened and there was no safety lock. His widow filed with RTC of
Pasig a complaint for damages against DM Consunji Inc. The employer averred that the widow already availed benefits from the State Insurance Fund and that
she cannot recover civil damages from the company anymore.

ISSUE: W/N the widow is already barred from availing death benefits under the Civil Code because she already availed damages under the Labor Code
HELD: Although SC ruled that recovery of damages under the Workers Compensation Act is a bar to recover under a civil action, the CA ruled that in this case,
the widow had a right to file an ordinary action for civil actions because she was not aware and ignorant of her rights and courses of action. She was not aware
of her rights and remedies. Thus, her election to claim from the Insurance Fund does not waive her claim from the petitioner company. The argument that
ignorance of the law excuses no one is not applicable in this case because it is only applicable to mandatory and prohibitory laws.
D.M. CONSUNJI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 137873
April 20, 2001
FACTS:
On November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer
raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow
Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.
Held:
The decision of the CA is affirmed.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of
all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence
when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
2. Cui vs Arellano University
TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University
CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135
FACTS:
Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his
4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last
semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The
defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without
Arellanos issuance of his TOR.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the
memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient
students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a
school.
ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University.

HELD:
The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the
stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy
and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.
The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case
as well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim.
EMETRIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
2 SCRA 205
May 30, 1961
Facts:
Cui was a law scholar at the Arellano University; he paid the tuition fees but it was returned to him at the end of every semester. Before Arellano
awarded the scholarship grant, Cui was made to sign a contract covenant and agreement saying that he waives his right to transfer to another school in
consideration of the scholarship grant and if he transfers, he shall pay the tuition fees awarded to him while being a scholar. He transferred to another school to
finish his last term in law school. When he was about to take the Bar, his TOR at Arellano was not issued unless he pays the amount of the tuition fees that were
returned to him when he was still their scholar. He paid under protest.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school
without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship grants in cash, is valid or not.
Held:
The waiver signed by Cui was void as it was contrary to public policy; it was null and void.
Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of Private Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are awarded in recognition of merit and not
to attract and keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value. To look at such grants as a business scheme designed to increase the business
potential of an educational institution is not only inconsistent with sound public policy but also good morals. Consequently, the waiver signed by the student,
waiving his right to transfer to another school unless he refunds to the university the equivalent of his scholarship grants, is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reverse and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendants
counterclaim. It is so ordered.
ARTICLE 15-16
Miciano vs Brimo
TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo)
opposed Micianos participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimos estates.

HELD:
Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine
Island, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law
of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO, JUAN MICIANO, Administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant
50 Phil. 867
November 01, 1927
Facts:
Andre Brimo opposed the appeal of Juan Miciano, administrator of the estate of the deceased Joseph Brimo. The property was said to be in the Philippines and
the testatrix wished that the distribution of his properties and everything in connection with it be in accordance with the Philippine laws. Oppositor-appellant
Brimo claimed that the will of the testatrix is not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. The errors he (oppositor) assigned in his opposition were
the following: (1) the approval of said scheme partition, (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance, (3) denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order
approving the partition, (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lanza of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business, and (5)
the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the
deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine laws shall be applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen who have resided for a considerable length of time in the
Philippines.
Held:
Article 10 of the old Civil Code of the Philippine law was applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, where it was provided, nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated. However, the oppositor did not prove, though was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, that said testamentary dispositions
are not in accordance with the Turkish laws. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the national law of the testatrix was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed; thus, the approval of the scheme of partition in this
respect was not erroneous.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
1.
PILAPIL V. SOMERA, ET AL.
A.
FACTS:
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, Filipino citizen and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national were married before the Registrar in the Federal Republic of Germany
(Germany).
After about three and a half years of marriage, respondent initiated a divorce proceeding in Germany which was recognized under Philippine law. More than five
months after the issuance of the divorce decree, respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to

said respondent, petitioner had an affair with William Chia and Jesus Chua. Petitioner contends that the court is without jurisdiction for the purported
complainant does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under Germany prior to his filing of the criminal complaint.
B.
ISSUE:
W/N it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the material bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and
existing at the time of the institution of the action?
C.
HELD:
YES. The court based its ruling on the Loftus case of the Supreme Court of Iowa. The status of the complainant vis--vis the accused must be determined as of
the time the complaint was filed. Respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner for when the divorce decree was issued in Germany, the same shall take
effect under Art. 26 of the Philippine Family Code. Petitioner had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed his suit. The allegation of respondent that he could have not brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge,
even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence. There was no longer a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI;
HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents
174 SCRA 653
June 30, 1989
Facts:
This is a SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI.
Petitioner, a Filipina, and private respondent, a German national, got married on 7 September 1979 before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together for some time in Malate, Manilawhere their only child Isabella Pilapil Geiling
was born on April 20, 1980. However, on 15 January 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the marriage of Pilapil and Geiling on the ground of failure of their marriage.
27 June 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said
respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982, and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. Several
motions for dismissal were filed by Pilapil. She also filed a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issues:
(1)
Whether or not the family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity of the petitioner are also covered by the foreign law of her former
husband.
(2)
Whether or not private respondent has the legal capacity to initiate an action for adultery against the petitioner.
Held:
(1)
The petitioners family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity are all bound to Philippine laws, regardless of where she lives. However,
Philippine laws recognize decrees validly and legally obtained abroad, because if not, the enjoyment of rights of a foreign spouse who obtained a divorce
decreed by his national law would eventually injure or be prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would still be valid under her national law.
(2)
As a consequence of the divorce decree, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
action for adultery under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other; hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No.
87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149,
respondents.
G.R. No. 142820
June 20, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg,
Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine.
Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by the trial court.
In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to
the father.
It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioners motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September
1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the
trial courts lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country.

Held:
children.

Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as those concerning with support and custody of the

In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the
issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in
all questions concerning his care and custody.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care,
support and education of the children, namely Carolyne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for
continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
*GARCIA VS RECIO
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent
G.R. No. 138322
October 2, 2001
Facts:
Rederick, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and
wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian Family Court. On 26 June 1992,
respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by an Australian government.
Subsequently, Recio-Garcia nuptial took place in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City on January 12, 1994. In their marriage
application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.
Since October 22, 1995 Garcia and Recio lived separately without prior dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 1996, in accordance with their declaration secured in Australia.

March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the trial court, on the ground of bigamyrespondent allegedly
had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she only learned of Recios marriage to Samson in November 1997.
In his answer, Recio averred that as of 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage to an Australian citizen, that it had been validly
dissolved by decree of divorce in 1989, making him legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not a Filipino, who became a naturalized Australian citizen, is still bound by Philippine Laws.
2.
Whether or not the respondent has legal capacity to marry the petitioner after the Australian decree of divorce.
3.
Whether or not a former Filipino need not to present any document proving his divorced marriage with a foreigner which he obtained abroad.
Held:
1.
No. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13, and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal
laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen.
2.
No. In this case, respondent failed to prove his legal capacity to remarry even if he showed the Australian divorce decree, which he said was a public
document, a written official act of an Australian family court, and thus needs no further proof of authenticity and due execution. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. The Court ruled that presentation
solely of the divorce decree, which is what the respondent did, is insufficient.
3.
Yes. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Since the
divorce was a defense raised by the respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. The Court still stands
that compliance with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantive justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage on the ground of
bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
HUMAN RELATIONSARTICLE 19-36
ARTICLE 19-22
1Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes
TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes
CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner
liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years
back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff
agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his
great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around
them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his
shame and humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr.
Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it
personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant
specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food
then leave the party.
During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close
because we nearly kissed each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes
who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of
Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years
of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages
brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA, respondent
G.R. No. 154259
February 28, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus,
making the petitioners liable for damages through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages, P200,000 as
moral damages, and P10,000 as attorneys fees.
Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr.
Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotels former managers birthday was being
celebrated. He consented and carried the latters present. At the party, when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners,
approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied the
embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.
Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish
his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisayas
claim that she invited him to the party.
Issue:
Held:

Whether or not petitioner Lims conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for damages caused to plaintiff.

No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within
the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close
that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent that
the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiffs reaction to
the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need
for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent
G.R. No. 142943
April 3, 2002
Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by petitioners regarding the February 1, 2000 Decision and the April 10, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
where the decision of the trial court is set aside, the complaint against MERALCO is dismissed, and plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay defendant-appellant
the differential billing of P193,332.00 representing the value of used but unregistered electrical consumption.
Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing, plaintiffs-appellees in this case, are the owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue,
Quezon City which they bought from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. On March 3, 1995, around 9am, defendant-appellants inspectors headed by Emmanuel C.
Orlina were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house owned by the spouses. The inspectors performed their
standard operating procedure by first asking permission from the secretary of the couple before they proceed to the inspection of the house. Later, the
inspectors found out that there were few illegal markings on the meter which made defendant-appellant temporarily disconnect electrical services that will
only be restored unless the couple will pay P178, 875 representing the differential bill. However, at around 2pm, the electric service was reconnected as
instructed by defendant-appellants officer. Plaintiff-appellees filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
despite the immediate reconnection.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of the defendant-appellants inspectors in immediately disconnecting the electrical service of MERALCO constituted a violation
of rights of the plaintiffs-appellees, making the respondent liable to pay damages to petitioner.
Held:
Yes. Respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners electrical supply without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are
akin to due process. Public utilities have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers. Any act on their part that
militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision is MODIFIED as follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent
the billing differential of P193, 322.96; while respondent is ordered to pay petitioners P100,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, and
P50,000 as attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing vs MERALCO
TITLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO
CITATION: GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002
FACTS:

The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3,
1995, defendants inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house
and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiffs secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter
had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the
meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the
electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the
amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBINGs rights, feelings, social
and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.

HELD:
Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners
moral and exemplary damages including attorneys fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of
property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized
the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. Under the law,
the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the
cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board. During the
inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present.

Petitioners claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was premised only upon Lornas testimony. These are compensation for an
injury that will put the injure position where it was before it was injured.
Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs CA
TITLE: Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
CITATION: 219 SCRA 115
FACTS:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to
get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted her and proposed marriage. The
petitioner even went to Marilous house to secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his apartment.
Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied
the respondent in the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to abort
the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never
proposed marriage or agreed to be married neither sought consent and approval of Marlious parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his

apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual
expenses.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.
HELD:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive
a woman to consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioners deceptive
promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid
for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.

4. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS
176 SCRA 778
August 25, 1989
Facts:
10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager,
discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He
reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report,
Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a
crook and a swindler, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation.
Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila
police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of
six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias,
then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00)
as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Held:
Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that
they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the
company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as
well as against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and

the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to
harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of
Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
University of the East vs Jader
TITLE: University of the East vs. Jader
CITATION: GR No. 132344, February 7, 2000
FACTS:
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During his last year, 1stsemester, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court
1where he was given an incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1,
1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave
him a grade of 5.
The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took
a leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review
classes and was not able to take the bar exam.
Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights due to UEs
negligence.

ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case.
Can he claim moral damages?

HELD:
SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the latters actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform
the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not have been awarded moral damages
though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what
CA held because its also respondents duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations.
As a senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in order.
Before taking the bar examinations, it doesnt only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and
submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annumcomputed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELETED.
c
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee

5 SCRA 200
May 30, 1962
Facts:
This is an appeal brought before the Court of Appeals upon the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants, who are the
parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita, based on their claim that defendant Alfonsoa married man who works as an agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory, staying in Gasan, Marinduque, an adopted son of a Chinese named Pe Beco who is a collateral relative of Lolitas fatherdeliberately and in bad faith
tried to win Lolitas affection, causing moral damages to plaintiff.
Because of the frequency of his visits to Lolitas family who has allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a
member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs both in Gasan, and Boac where Lolita used to teach
in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even
from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs
with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home on April 14, 1957.
Issue:

Whether or not defendant caused moral damages to plaintiff, when as a married man, he pursued his love affair with Lolita.

Held:
Yes. No other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolitas family contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and
P2,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
ARTICLE26
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees
15 SCRA 179
November 29, 1965
Facts:

Out of their love affair, Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got married on 24 February 1948 before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares.
Their marriage was duly registered in the local civil registrar. Later in their marriage, Vicentas parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, found out of their secret
marriage; however, she continued living with her parents than eloping with her husband. Pastor went to Manila, leaving his wife in Cebu. Vicenta later went to
Jimenez, Misamis Occidental to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. On 24 June 1950, she applied for a passport where it is
indicated the she is single. After approval of the application, she left for the United States and there, on August 1950, filed a complaint for divorce against
Pastor on the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character; marriage was decreed divorced as final and absolute in Nevada on October 1950. She
then sought papal dispensation for her marriage to Tenchavez. In 1954, Vicenta married an American and begotten children. She acquired American citizenship
in 1958. Herein petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta Escao and her parents, whom he alleged to have influenced her from living with him.
Issue:

Whether or not parents-defendants shall pay petitioner for damages.

Held:
No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent
divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected.

Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown,
good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to
seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled
by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent
to their prejudices or spleen.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way
of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents
133 SCRA 179
November 14, 1984
Facts:
This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 issue of the Sunday Times
where St. Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio. Moreover, there was violation of
Aramil's right to privacy.
Trial court through Judge Leuterio awarded P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorneys fees. Had it not been
a late action for publication of rectification and apologywhich only took place 15 April 1969 issue ofManila Times Doctor Aramil could have not suffered
mental anguish and his income would have not been reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Petitioner assailed the decision of the Appellate Court when it
affirmed the trial courts decision. Furthermore, the corporation contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in
conformity with the rulings of this Court and still continues to argue that the case is not covered by article 26.
Issue:
Whether or not the case filed against St. Louis Realty Corporation is covered by Article 26 of the new Civil Code.
Held:

Yes, this case is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code.

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the
Sunday Times. Through that negligence, persons who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was
renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered
diminution of income and mental anguish.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
St. Louis Realty Corp. vs CA
TITLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA
CITATION: 133 SCRA 179
FACTS:
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful
advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart is. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the
house featured was Dr Aramils house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil
noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it
was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramils counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary
damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed
a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.
ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.
HELD:
St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the
mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the
Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code
because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that
contretemps.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
ARTICLE 36
Spouses Yu vs PCIB
TITLE: Spouses Yu vs. PCIB
CITATION: GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon
City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a loan.
As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon, respondent filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on
the Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10,
1998.
Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan
City on October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before RTC
of Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said
RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the
filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
HELD:

Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction
independently of each other.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former
an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because issue raised in civil action would be determinative de jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO,
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents
160 SCRA 441
April 15, 1988
Facts:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner when the Court denied his motion for reconsideration
due to lack of merit.
Private respondent Paz Abayan filed an information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner claimed that his
second marriage was void because it was solemnized without a valid marriage license and that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz
to obtain his consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the case because the civil action
raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined before the criminal case can proceed.
Issue:

Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for
annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
Held:

The respondent judge answered in the negative. The Court sustained him.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the
ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. Petitioner Donato failed to prove that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of
threats, force and intimidation.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Civil personality (article 37-47)
Article 37-41
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing sued Felix Icao. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations;
that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent;
that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at
P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the
trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl.
B. ISSUE:
W/N an unborn child is entitled to support?
HELD:
YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. The unborn child, therefore,
has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of Icao, whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss, even if the said
child is only in the mothers womb just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations. Its being ignored by the parent in his testament may
result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator.
Geluz vs CA
TITLE: Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became
pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it
aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years,
on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo
and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor
given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with
personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita
clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned
his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that
hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under
the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

RA No.6809

Republic Act No. 6809

December 13, 1989

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO
HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::


Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."

Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.

Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all
acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.

"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.

"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one
years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references
and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.

Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: December 13, 1989

De Jesus vs Syquia
TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia,
the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got
acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child
is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time
for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed
signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of
paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of
the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by
Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.

The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough
to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action
on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby,
Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per
month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.
Article 43
Limjuco vs Pedro Fragante
TITLE: Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate
Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial
juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes
those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony
with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Dumlao vs Quality Plastics
TITLE: Dumlao v Quality Plastics
CITATION: GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976
FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity
Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby
authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as
security under the bond.

Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint was
personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March
1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Orias
testate estate.

ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.

HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their
stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack
of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees
against the corporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction.
The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void.
Citizenship and Domicile (Article 48-51 and 1987 Constitutuion)
Article 48-51, 1987 Constitution
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
GR L-21289, 4 October 1971
Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter thePhilippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March
1961. On thedate of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually
depart from the Philippines onor before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within theperiod as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration. After repeated extensions,she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962,she contracted marriage with
Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an allegedFilipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigrationto confiscate her
bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expirationof her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary
injunction.The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer forpreliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage
to a Filipino citizen.
Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying aFilipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is
notdisqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise,an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows thePhilippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a parallel provision to Section
16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalizationas Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through anaturalization proceedings, in
order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it shouldfollow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytimethe citizenship
of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to
suchcitizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed outagain and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was
declared to havebecome a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al asEdilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January
1962.
Facts:
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was disqualified by the Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to
have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Respondent Lee was the second placer in the canvass and claimed that the votes cast in favor
of petitioner should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the
most number of valid votes; or the incumbent Vice-Governor should take over the said post due to permanent vacancy due to Frivaldos ineligibility.
Issues:
1) Was the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office?
2) Is disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for or be elected to or hold public office?
3) Did Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that said petition is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto
case?
4) Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
Ruling:
1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of Congress, 2) by naturalization or 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not
specifically state a particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at least 1 year residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least 35 years old on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office to ensure that no alien, or person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. An
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship on the very day the term of his
office began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. The
law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. The Local Government Code
requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to
ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all the previous
elections. The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate
of candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner retroacted upon the date of filing of his application.
2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
3) No. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective provincial officials. Such power to annul a proclamation must be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation. Frivaldo's
petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
4) No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. Lee is just a second placer. The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
The petition was DISMISSED for being moot and academic and has no merit.

Frivaldo vs Comelec Digest with additional info

G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On
March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any
public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for
during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the following votes obtained by
the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on
June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that
on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he
filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec)
x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of
Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy
said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of
votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor
of Sorsogon".
Issues: 1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the
governorship of Sorsogon NO!
2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? -NO!
Held:
1.)
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654
was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion
demands."
2.) Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, Lee is
"a second placer, just that, a second placer."

"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the
1995 elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
==========================================================
CONCLUSION OF THE COURT
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not
having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus
valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative
intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he
abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having
given ' up his U. S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been
proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to
have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a
continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's
authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in
case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal
niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly
stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal
of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is
merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his
repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have
disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification
"from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds
from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent
with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of
the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to
this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this
Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal
technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and
love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo
was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and
serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in

the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming
choice.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently,
she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in
the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there
as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation,
wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed
on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact
that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a
new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions
upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even
kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is
hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

THE FAMILY CODE

Requisites of Marriage (Articles 1-26)
PT&T vs NLRC
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from
November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina
F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in
the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner
learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in
the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had
already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is
recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in
those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all
women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of
the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her
status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals
and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its
indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.
Article 2 Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Estrada vs Escritor (August 4, 2003)
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge
of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and
had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand,
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.
According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and
procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and
recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is
nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override

respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.
The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the
compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given
the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's
"compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this
Decision.

GOITA vs. Campos rueda

Balogbog vs CA
Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their
grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the
latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older
brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were
entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and
that he was married. They started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted
during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from
1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three children. Catalina herself
testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil
Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer
Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of
1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry,
unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the

continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their
legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.
HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and
Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the
Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower
court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil
Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence
may be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in
1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the
legitimate children of Gavino.
Article 2-6

Section 444, Local Government Code

Eugenio vs Velez
Eugenio vs Velez
185 SCRA 45
FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the
RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in
his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the
sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of
jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
nearest kin of the deceased.

Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where a
man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it requires
that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
Cosca vs Palaypayon
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process
Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines
Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get
married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer;
Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the
following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the
marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement.
According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because
Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are
in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by
him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the
requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including
the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return
after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the
formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering
that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to
believe that it was simulated.

On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so
the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and
wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had
been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when
they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting
parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas
an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable.
Wassmer vs Velez

Leave a comment
12 SCRA 648
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz, following their promise to love, decided to get married. Two days before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their
marriage had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her nothing changed rest assured returning
soon. Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE:
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
HELD:
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary
damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
Navarro vs Domagtoy
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a
subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and
been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but
he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
HELD:

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda.
Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of
the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
ARTICLE 7
2.
NAVARRO V. JUDGE DUMAGTOY A. FACTS:
3.
On September 27, 1994, respondent Judge Dumagtoy, whose jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga in Dapa, Surigao del Norte, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. The
certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borga states that Tagadans civil status is separated. Respondent, in his defense, states that
he merely relied on the joint affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen
each other for almost seven years. Moreover, respondent maintained that he did not violate
Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Judge Dumagtoy acted in excess or lack of jurisdiction?
D.
HELD:
YES. Respondent judges jurisdiction cover the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. There is no pretense that either Tagadan or Borga was at the point of death or in a remote place hence Art. 8 of the
Family Code cannot be applied. Moreover, the court disagreed to the excuse of Judge Dumagtoy that the joint affidavit above-mentioned is sufficient proof of
Mrs. Tagadans presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. Absent the summary proceeding, such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous and therefore void marriage under Art. 35 of the Code.
Aranes vs Judge Occiano
Aranes vs. Judge Occiano
AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couples residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on
January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date
considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the postponement of the

wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that they
will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Lim Tanhu vs Ramolete
Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete
66 SCRA 425
FACTS:
Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of
Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they
were mere employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including
their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took
actual and active management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the
other assets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two
others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what
corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife and children.
Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of
the latter sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the
investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and
retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former
had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.
ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from the company of the latters share.
HELD:
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument"
signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an
authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be

satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of
loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification issued
by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to
unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant
provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is
hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of
common-law marriage and promised not to interfere with each others affairs since they are incompatible and not in the position to keep living together
permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of
P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of
dismissal of October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20,
1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein
petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further
action in said civil case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.
Vda de Chua vs CA
Vda de Chua vs. CA
GR No. 70909, January 5, 1994
FACTS:
Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate children,
Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May 28, 1992. Vallejo filed on July 2, 1992 with
RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of guardianship of the two child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00.
Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true wife of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the
surviving spouse of the latter but a pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and died a bachelor.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua.
HELD:
The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent. She could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their
marriage certificate. Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such marriage contract between petitioner and Roberto
Chua was ever registered with them, attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage, that he has not
solemnized such alleged marriage.
Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage
contract which she failed to produce.
Article 25
Republic vs CA and Castro
Republic vs. CA and Castro
GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon
Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways
and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a
petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of
their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the
parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that
the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a
ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he
chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of
the subject marriage license.
Article 26
Garcia Vs. REcio
Pilapil vs ibay-somre
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay
City and RICHARD UPTON, respondents
139 SCRA 139
October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in
Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner
remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioners business is a conjugal property of the
parties and that respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as
of June 11, 1982.
Issues:
a.
Whether or not their divorce in Nevada, USA in 1982 is recognized in the Philippines.
b. Whether or not the private respondent as petitioners husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets

Held:
The policy against absolute divorce covers only Philippine nationals.
However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law. The
divorce the parties obtained from the Nevada Court released both parties from marital ties, thus, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation
before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son
and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and
married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
Marriages Exempt from license requirement
Ninal vs Bayadog
Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot
inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito
and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting
from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed
that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to
Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Manzano vs Sanchez
Manzano vs. Sanchez
AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001

FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They
had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly
stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he
officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint
affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been
cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage,
as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly,
respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
*Cosca Vs,. PAlayon
Mariategui vs CA
Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a
bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7
children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On
the other hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with
Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal.
The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the
Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.
HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from
bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
Republic vs Dayot
Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had
lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics
and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman.
On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa
was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn
marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.
Void and voidable Marriages (article 35-54)
Article 35
Domingo vs CA
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know
that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy
against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman
and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the
declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of
remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent
spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with
bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of
property relations governing them.

Ninal Vs. Bayadog

Article 36
Republic vs CA and Molina

Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological
incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring
to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites
and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds
for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown
gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage

such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code

decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected

court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.
Leouel Santos vs CA
Leouel Santos vs. CA
GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995

FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr.
Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and promised to
return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under
AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide
all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
Republic vs Quintero-Hamano
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to
Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but
never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for
leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a
motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule,
actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios
illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some
psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
Choa vs Choa
Choa vs. Choa

GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002

FACTS:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to
Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the
trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because according to him it
clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The
evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Lenis personality
namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes
psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in
the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established
that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was
completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
Antonio vs Reyes
Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City
Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which
she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for
good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.
HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner,
aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and
pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified
that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to
the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an
inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable
considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no
sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private
place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk
during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result
of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that
the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want
their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he
loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome
their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of
erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme
Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

Te vs Te
Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to
Rowenas close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who
asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to
Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married but
without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month,
Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edwards parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that
they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways
in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her
disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this
case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus,
declared null and void.

ARTICLE 40
Morigo vs People
Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of
letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada,
which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question
in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in
good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy
case.
HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his
second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Wiegel vs Sempio-Dy
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy
143 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter
into a marital union, she contents that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE: Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.
HELD:
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her
marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law.

DOROTHY B. TERRE vs ATTY. JORDAN TERRE

211 SCRA 6
July 3, 1992
Facts:
Complainant Dorothy Terre was married to her first cousin while respondent Jordan Terre, who is a member of the Philippine Bar, with the knowledge of her
marriage still courted her and have convinced her to marry him since her prior marriage is void ab initio.
Later, respondent disappeared, and abandoned Dorothy and their first-born Jason. Complainant found out that Atty. Terre married one named Helina Malicdem.
Upon knowing of this, she filed an administrative case to disbar respondent. Jordan claimed that his marriage to complainant, which he believed in good faith,
was null and void from the beginning; thus, does not need a judicial declaration of nullity. He also denied that Jason was his son to Dorothy.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is needed in order to contract a second marriage.
Held:
YES. A judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential, for through it, a person can be determined as to be legally free to
contract a second marriage.
However, in this case, the marriage between Dorothy and Atty. Jordan is deemed to be void since the complainant's first marriage has not obtained a judicial
declaration nullifying it. The respondent was not charged of bigamy, but was proved to be guilty of gross immoral conduct, a factor that affected his moral
fitness for membership in the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be
spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this Resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land. SO ORDERED.
Valdes vs RTC
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During
the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in

the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family.
People vs Aragon
People vs. Aragon
100 Phil 1033
FACTS:
Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in
Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the
latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo
treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.
HELD:
The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the
third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper.
Mercado vs Tan
Mercado vs. Tan
337 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did
not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993
declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had
already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
Article 41-42
Republic vs Nolasco
Republic vs. Nolasco

220 SCRA 20
FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted
until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left
the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and
cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing another seamans contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where
they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead
because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did
not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.
Lukban vs Republic
Lukban vs Republic
L-8492, February 29, 1956
FACTS:
Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently
looked for him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for more than
20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.
ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry.
HELD:
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933.
It provides that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Armas vs Calisterio
Armas vs. Calisterio
GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
FACTS:

Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00.
He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February
1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of
Bounds presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta
and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the
estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death.
HELD:
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family
Code which only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is
not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrietas marriage with
Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
Republic vs CA
Republic vs. CA
GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005
FACTS:
Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single
person, it will be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents house but was not there and even
inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-laws house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help
from the Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001,
Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed
a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.
ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
HELD:
The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a
witness other than the Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make
inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries
from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police
authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in RTC.

Valdez vs Republic
Valdez vs. Republic
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed
and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her
parents home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a
document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married
Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilios application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March
2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
HELD:
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7
consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.
Article 45-46
Anaya vs Palaroan
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was
obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim. While the
amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the
annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for
annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an action
to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.
Buccat v Buccat (1941)
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
April 25, 1941
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.

Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never
returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that
Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly
developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.
Decision:
SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant
Aquino vs Delizo
Aquino vs. Delizo
109 Phil 21
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on
December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a
child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.
HELD:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground
for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally plump or fat. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
womans abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside.
Jimenez vs Canizares
Jimenez vs. Canizares

L-12790, August 31, 1960

FACTS:
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina
was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave the
conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was
ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be
deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.
HELD:
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be
concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination
unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is
not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.
Article 48-49
Sin vs Sin
Sin vs. Sin
GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001
FACTS:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed
Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated
November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain
hearings, nothing more was heard of him.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings.
HELD:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition.
The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
De Ocampo vs Florenciano
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
107 Phil 35

FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered
on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June
1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas.
In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of
having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided
she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
HELD:
Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the
confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a
pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should
be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
Legal Separation (Article 55-67)
Article 55-56
Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and
canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They
acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She
prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial
proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present
surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the
petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved
property rights.
HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely
rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could
be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
Gandiongco vs Penaranda
Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a
civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support
pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents
consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for
legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction
or acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead
of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both
the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal
consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from
the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case,
the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
Bugayong vs Ginez
Bugayong vs. Ginez
GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the
marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with

his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the
hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these
communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the defendants godmother. They proceeded to the house of
Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to
verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts
of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties
ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of
or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
Article 58
Pacete vs Carriaga
Pacete vs Carriaga
231 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de
la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was
married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion
and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue
living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to
declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and
22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in
default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of
Pacete to Clarita.
HELD:

The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of nonappearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion,
the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of
marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which
provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
Article 63
Macadangdang vs CA
Macadangdang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981
FACTS:
Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6
children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into
merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged
in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in
Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint
for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal separation.
HELD:
The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the
separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not
yet been commenced nor terminated.
The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably
with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to
the deceased spouse.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the
effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal
separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

Rights and Obligations Between Husbands and Wives (articles 68-73)

Article 68
Potenciano vs CA
Potenciano vs. CA
GR No. 139789, 139808, July 19, 2001
FACTS:
In March 1999, Erlinda Illusorio, the wife of herein petitioner, Potenciano, petitioned for habeas corpus which was dismissed on May 2000 for lack of merit and
granted the petition to nullify the CA ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda. This case before SC is Erlindas motion to reconsider the decision made. A
conference was set on September 2000 to determine the propriety and relevance of a physical and medical examination of Potenciano and how it will be
conducted. Erlindas motion to have Potenciano be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court was denied with finality in March
2001.
ISSUE: Whether a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live together and observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.
HELD:
Erlinda claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium but clearly she wanted the latter to live with her and is the root cause of
her petition. What the law provides is that husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction thereof is
the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order to enforce consortium.
Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having separated from bed and board since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a
shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital
union is a two-way process. It is for two loving adults who view the relationship with respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious
of its value as a sublime social institution.
*Goita Vs. Campos-Rueda
Ty vs CA
Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in
August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the
marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in
August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that
the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her
children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint
causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her
marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages
would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and
maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.
Article 266-C, Revised Penal Code
Ilusorio vs Bildner
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board
and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin IllusorioBildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in
Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this
time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over
the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the
latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With
his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his
right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to
see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
Article 69
*ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. Comelec
Article73
Ayala Investments vs CA
Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo
Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to
AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally
pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff,
caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed
injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower
court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC,
being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed
to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of
Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as
surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are given to another person
surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession,
conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.

or entity, and the husband acted only as a

for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the

The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings
employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one
directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.
Property Relations Between Husbands and Wives
General Provisions (Article 74-81)
Donations by Reason of Marriage (Article82-87)

Article 87
Agapay vs Palang
Agapay vs. Palang
GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was
born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he
refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a
Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later,
Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back
the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with
Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court
that she actually contributed money to but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was
already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her
share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during
the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The
judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlindas claim that
she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed
Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the
prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Arcaba vs Tabancura Vda de Batocael
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda De Batocael
GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after
his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Franciscos
house as well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco
claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the masters bedroom
when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila
who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her
family was provided with food and lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Franciscos only source of income
was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m.,
together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of the 10
year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedents nephews
and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor was valid.

HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of
Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of Cirila Comille such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of
Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
System of Absolute Community (Article 88-104)

Articles 94-96
Uy vs CA
Uy vs. CA
GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of
their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest that such
illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled
in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship
of the person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows
the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife contemplating a situation
where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower
court.
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may
assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
HELD:
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract.
Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal
property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC
further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.
Article 101
Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz
Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz
GR 19565, January 30, 1968
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of
land and were engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of their properties. She further alleged that her
husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited the
conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. Since

1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was
affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for the
fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal
partnership.
HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal
home, one must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and not mere separation. In
fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal abode. The
plaintiff even testified that the husband paid short visits implying more than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the
wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the
progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the
partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
Partosa-Jo vs CA
Partosa-Jo vs CA
GR 82606, December 18, 1992

FACTS:
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15
children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was
consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated
the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground
that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently.
She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.
ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.
HELD:
SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to exist, there
must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her
demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence,
the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment
as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them,
share and share alike. The division will be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those
that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.
Article 102
BA Finance Corp vs CA
BA Finance Corp vs. CA
GR 61464, May 28 1988
FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a
representative of A&L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under
whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2months prior the
procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable,
Augusto failed to pay the same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment
assigning the rights, titles and interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed
for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties
attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.
HELD:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also
acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations
contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his
family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the
petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of
attachment cannot be issued against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting to P660,000.00.
Johnson & Johnson vs CA
Johnson & Johnson vs CA
GR No. 102692, September 23, 1996
FACTS:
Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her retail business under the name of Vinluan Enterprises incurring an obligation of P235,880.89 for
which she issued seven checks of varying amounts and due dates that bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Partial
payments were made after several demands. When no further payments were made to settle the obligation, J&J filed a complaint against the spouses for
collection of the principal obligation plus interest with damages. RTC rendered decision in favor of J&J and found that there was no privity of contract between

J&J and defendant husband Alejo Vinluan regarding the obligations incurred by the wife. Husband was made a co-owner of the enterprise afer the obligation
involved in this action has been incurred. The court then issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to execute judgment on the properties of the wife.
However, the 2 notices of levy on execution covered not only her exclusive paraphernal properties but also the properties of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses. This led the husband to file a third-party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Trial court denied the third-party claim since
Alejos consent became evident when he did not seek the intervention of the Court to air his objections in his wifes engaging business coupled by the fact that
he made several representations for the settlement of his wifes account. Thus, even his own capital may be liable aside from the conjugal and paraphernal
property. Private respondent elevated the matter to CA, charging the trial court with grave abuse of discretion for effectively reversing its own final judgment.
CA upheld private respondent. Hence this petition by J&J.
ISSUE: WON a husband may be held liable for the debts incurred by his wife without his consent and did not benefit the conjugal partnership?
HELD:
SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the trial court cannot, in the guise of deciding the third-party claim, reverse its final decision. Only the wife
and her paraphernal property can be held liable. And since the pwer of the execution of judgment extends only to properties belonging to the judgment debtor
alone, the conjugal property and the capital of the husband cannot be levied upon. In any event that Delilahs paraphernal properties are insufficient, in order to
bind the conjugal partnership properties, the debts and obligations contracted by either the husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership and that the husband must consent to his wifes engaging in business. The respondent court already found that the husband did not give his
consent neither did the obligation incurred by the wife redound to the benefit of the family.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains (Articles 105-133)
Article 109
Spouses Laperal vs Spouses Katigbak
Spouses Laperal vs Spouses Katigbak
GR 16991, March 31, 1964
FACTS:
CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with
this finding reiterating that its improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak.
When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the marriage. Ramons occupation rendered him a monthly income of
P200.00. The property in question was registered in the name of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak. The latter declared that her mother was
the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the
names of her children. The husband having no interest with the property only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his wife.
In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or
in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of property
and separate administration which was granted by the court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals.
ISSUE: WON the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.
HELD:

All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property
belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it was purchased, the property
was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to buy considering the singular source of income.
Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a paraphernal property of the wife.
Villanueva vs IAC
Villanueva vs. IAC
GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987
FACTS:
Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modestos illegitimate children, borrowed money from private
respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as collateral their fathers property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the absolute co-owners.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in 1977 and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest
bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same land unto themselves in equal share proindiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the
name of Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name.
In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the
cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases, and they be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and Victoria in
1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said
Victorias shares from the conjugal partnership property; and second Modestos interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his separate
properties bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property.
IAC likewise affirmed the lower courts decision.
ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal property.
HELD:
The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It was Modestos exclusive property since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover,
since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of otherwise to
Consolacion.
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements
from the partnership or through the industry of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership
during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who
owns the same.
There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds
used thereof in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. What is certain is
that the land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto and that where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only
and there is no showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is belongs exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible
to declare the improvements to be conjugal in character.
Furthermore, Bernas mode of acquisition of ownership over the property appears in all respect to be regular, untainted by any defect whatsoever. Bernas must
therefore be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently arising and of which
he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their assertion and ventilation.
Articles 115-116
BPI vs Posadas
BPI vs. Posadas
GR No. 34583, October 22, 1931

FACTS:
BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint
filed against him in recovering the inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under protest, and sum of P20,150
representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased.
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and living in Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter
while in Germany, executed a will in March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The deceased possessed not only real
property situated in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is a
life insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance
policy, the estate of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator
of the decedents estate and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding
various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.
HELD:
SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute
community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and
partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable
to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the
insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy
on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.
Wong vs IAC
Wong vs. IAC
GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
FACTS:
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of
the time living separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money
borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry
valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in September
1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money
against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of
execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public
auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision
including the writ and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the conjugal property.

HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions
of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained
the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the
husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of
the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment
debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did
redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses
Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
Articles 121-122
*AYALA Investments Vs. Ca
Carlos vs Abelardo
Carlos vs. Abelardo
GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002
FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque.
It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The seller of the
property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses
pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various
death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated
in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as
a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in
the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there
was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an
instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the
spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is
untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
Separation of Property of the Spouse and Administration of Common Property during the marriage (Articles 134-142)
Regime of Separation Property (Articles 143-146)

MULLER VS MULLERGr 149615

FACTSElena and Helmut,a German national were married in Germany and resided there in a house owned by
RHelmut
s parents but later permanently resided in the Philippines.
Helmut had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for thepurchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo and in the
construction of a house. The Antipolo property wasregistered in the name of Elena.
After they separated, Helmut filed a motion for separation of properties for reimbursement of the property inAntipolo.ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to
reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property?NO. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, Helmut
s
disqualification from owning lands inthe Philippines is absolute.Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision, no trust can result in favorof the party who is guilty of the fraud.Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Article 147
Mallilin vs Castillo
Mallilin vs. Castillo
GR No. 136803, June 16, 2000
FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979
while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the President
and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents
name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter
refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife
because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and
granted the latter.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting
relationship when they started living together.
HELD:
The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and were living together could not have owned properties in
common. Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or
industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence,
there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other.

Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed
properties was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in
the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.
The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
*valdez vs RTC
Francisco vs Master Iron Works
Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corporation
GR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005
FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983. The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private
Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of
waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own savings and that he
waived whatever claims he had over the property. When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In
1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery
and trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on execution over the
alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2
parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the
sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before
the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any
vested right.
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the
wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will not arise.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed.
Article 148
*Agapay Vs. Palang
Juaniza vs Jose
Juaniza vs Jose
GR. No. L50127-28, March 30, 1979
FACTS:

Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in
November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been cohabiting with
Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir
of the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be reconsidered.
ISSUE: WON Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney.
HELD:
The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership
with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages caused by its operation. There is therefore no
basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and physical injuries suffered by the passengers.
Tumlos vs Fernandez
Tumlos vs Fernandez
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez
alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for the last 7
years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was
not complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new
building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was
likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by
collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.
ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.
HELD:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no
other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children
were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry
each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said
provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then
there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
The Family
Family As An Institution (article 149-151)
Article 149
Docena vs Lapesura
Docena vs. Lapesura

GR No. 140153, March 28, 2001

FACTS:
Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena.
The spouses claimed ownership of the land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed the
petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of nonforum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.
ISSUE: WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.
HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery
brought against the spouses and is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of Samar whereas
the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husbands signing the certification in his
behalf and that of his wife is too harsh.
In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all the petitioners in a case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate
signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The two petitioners in this case are husband and wife
and their residence is the subject property alleged to be a conjugal property. Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the
husband and wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or
administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to
the intervention of the court in proper cases.
Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.
Article 150
Martinez vs Martinez
Martinez vs Martinez
GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005
FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The former executed a last will and testament directing the
subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In
October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to
Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the
deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This
prompted the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement but
none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved futile.
ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.
HELD:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but the same have failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her
deceased husband and the respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted that the
petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the
respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was
arrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.
Hontiveros vs RTC
Hontiveros vs. RTC
GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land
registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also
denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in
question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioners motion that while in the amended
complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.
ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.
HELD:
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151.
Under this provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers
and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as
spouses of the Hontiveros are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.
Article 151
Manalo vs CA
Manalo vs CA
GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001
FACTS:
Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in
Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
father and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were
granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.
HELD:

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the
complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the
estate belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. It is clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff
pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed
in the Report of the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.
Albano vs Gapusan
Albano vs. Gapusan
AM No. 1022-MJ, May 7, 1976
FACTS:
Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Judge Gapusan seeking disciplinary action involving latters malpractice in his notarization of a separation agreement
between Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. Likewise, a complaint was filed alleging that said
Judge influenced Judge Crispin of CFI-Ilocos in deciding two criminal cases. In the abovementioned separation agreement, it was stipulated that the spouse
guilty of adultery or concubinage shall be barred to file an action against the other. Respondent judge denied that he drafted the said agreement and explained
that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed it and the wife had begotten children with her paramour. He further added that there
was a stipulation in the said agreement that the spouse would live together in case of reconciliation.
ISSUE: WON Judge Gapusan should be reprimanded because of notarizing the void agreement between the spouses.
HELD:
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the
conjugal partnership.
There is no question that the stipulation contained in the said separation agreement is contrary to law, morals and good customs. The family is a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects. To preserve the institution of marriage, the law considers void any contract for personal separation
between husband and wife and every extra-judicial agreement for the dissolution of the partnership. SC held the action of respondent judge Gapusan as
contrary to law.
*Article 332, RCP
Family Home (Articles 152-162)
Articles 152-162
Mondequillo vs Breva
Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a
parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to quash was filed by the

petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be
enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the
transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family
home by operation of law under Article 153.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
HELD:
The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which
was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was
dismissed.
Manacop vs CA
Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the subcontract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a
complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner.
The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that
said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not
exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.
Paternity and Filiation
Legitimate children (Articles 163-171)

Article 166
Andal vs Macaraig
Andal vs. Macaraig
GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by
Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter
was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can
hardly move and get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Marias father until 1943. Emiliano
died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.
ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.
HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because
he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife
during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during the initial
period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation
of prison regulations. Marias illicit intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband
and wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the parcel land.
Benitez-Badua vs CA
Benitez-Badua vs. CA
GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989.
Vicentes sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of the nephew, herein private respondent.
The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted.
The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were
reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente
declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner
as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.
ISSUE: WON petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.
HELD:

The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption. It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification
of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized
document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants and ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared thathe was the petitioners father.
Concepcion vs CA
Concepcion vs. CA
GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in
December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario
Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an
illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law
granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion
to Almonte, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling
and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.
HELD:
Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of the child. Theresas contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo.
In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons
legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a
legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo
cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.

Articles 170-171
Liyao vs Liyao
Liyao vs. Liyao
GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002
FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L.
Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent
during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but living separately for more than

10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and
the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the deceased.
HELD:
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose
it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or
recognized his paternity.
Proof of Filiation (Articles 172-174)
Eceta vs Eceta
Eceta vs Eceta
GR No. 157037, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Rosalina Vda de Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta in 1926. They had a son named Vicente. The husband died in 1967 leaving Rosalina and Vicente as his
compulsory heirs. However, the deceased has an illegitimate daughter named Theresa whose grandmother was Rosalina, the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the admission made by Rosalina that Theresa was her granddaughter is enough to prove the filiation with the deceased.
HELD:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. However, what was tried before the
trial court and CA was for partition and accounting of damages only. The filiation or compusolry recognition by Vicente of Theresa was never put in issue. In fact
both agreed in the trial courts pre trial order that Theresa was Rosalinas granddaughter. The deceased establishing acknowledgement of his paternity over
Theresa nevertheless signed the duly authenticated birth certificate shown by the latter. Hence, the Court granted 1/8 share of the land to Theresa.
Constantino vs Mendez
Constantino vs. Mendez

209 SCRA 18
FACTS:
Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelias complaint on
damages. The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of
marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual
contact. Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.
Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivans illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the
latter which was set aside by CA.
ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.
HELD:
Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of
Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified
that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan
and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Bernabe vs Alejo
Bernabe vs. Alejo
GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981.
After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir left was Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian
be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given a share of his fathers estate.
Trial courts ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the
latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child
has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.
HELD:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance
to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their
existence.

Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
Hence, the petition wad denied and assailed decision was affirmed.
Jison vs CA
Jison vs. CA
GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998
FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed
20 years after her mothers death and when she was already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since
childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged
that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present
total of 11 witnesses.
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article
172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.
Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1.
That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed by the former;
2.
That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of
participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the
affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not
Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence
hurdles the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on open and
continuous possession. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of
law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.

Article 173
Conde vs. Abaya Case Digest
Conde vs. Abaya
13 Phil 249
Facts: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia died on the 1899. Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and
Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession.
An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However, Roman Abaya brother of Casiano, came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed
it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya and to be therefore entitled to
take possession of all the property of said estate.
Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that she considered her right was superior
to his and moved for a hearing on the matter. She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in the acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya.
Ruling: The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child may
exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he or she died during his
or her minority, or while insane, or after action had already been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his or her legitimacy
lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs. The right of action which the law
concedes to the natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.
Illegitimate children and Legitimated Children (Articles 175-182)
Article 176
*RA No. 9255
Marquino vs IAC
Marquino vs. IAC
GR No. 72078, June 27, 1994
Eustiquio Marquino and Maria Terenal-Marquino (wife) survived by Luz Marquino, Ana Marquino and Eva Marquino legitimate children (Petitioners)
Bibiana Romano-Pagadora survived by Pedro, Emy, June, Edgar, May, Mago, Arden and Mars Pagadora (Respondents)
FACTS:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on
December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was hired as domestic
helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an
acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish
presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered
to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.

Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can
continue the action already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can be continued by the
heirs substituting the said deceased parent.
ISSUES:
1. WON right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs and
2. WON Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
SC ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case,
not even as an exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an action for recognition of a natural child can
not be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners
transmitted to them at the time of death of their father.
IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquinos dismissed.
Article 177-180
Abadilla Vs. CA
Adoption
Teotico vs Del Val
Teotico vs Del Val
GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before
Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrixs niece,
Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted
child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed as required
by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of
fear.
ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in
the property to be affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor.
Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because
it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of

the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased
sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and
that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as
expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate proceeding.
*Republic Act No. 9523
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents
were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998,
Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.
Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario
gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was
not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint
adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the
level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and
well-being.
Republic vs CA and Bobiles
Republic vs CA and Bobiles
GR No. 92326, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat who had been living with her family since 4 months old. Salvador Condat, father of the child, and
the social worker assigned was served with copies of the order finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also posted on the
bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The judgment declared that surname of the child be changed to Bobiles.
ISSUE: WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the petition.

HELD:
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or
both of them. After the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA, Family Code took effect where joint adoption
of both spouses is mandatory.
Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or
impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in force at the time and thus vested
and must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the time. Furthermore, the
affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory
testimony in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid
adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.
Hence, Petition was denied.
Tamargo vs CA
Tamargo vs CA
GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners,
natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and
disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that
they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the civil code.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time
when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of
the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of
trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual
custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.
Petition for review was hereby granted.
Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995

Support
Javier vs Lucero
Javier vs Lucero
GR No. L-6706, March 29, 1953
FACTS:
Alfredo Javier Sr. and Salud Arca had begotten a son before they got married, named Alfredo Jr. After the celebration of marriage, the father went to US since he
was listed as US Navy. The mother and Alfredo Jr. went to live with her parents while the husband was in US. When the relationship between the spouses
become strained, husband petitioned for divorce before State of Alabama. After the decree was issued, Alfredo Sr. subsequently married twice (having been
divorced with the former before celebration of subsequent marriage).
An action for alimony was filed where respondent Judge ordered the father to give a monthly allowance of P60 to his wife and son. The father filed notice of
appeal questioning the status of the wife; second, the fact that his son was over 21 years old making him no longer entitled to be supported and third, decision
is vague and silent in relation to granting the son entitlement to support even if over 21 years old for purposes of completing his education/ training for some
profession, trade or vocation. Nevertheless, the judge directed the father to pay the monthly pensions notwithstanding pendency of the appeal.
ISSUE: WON Alfredo Jr. is entitled for support.
HELD:
Alfredo Jr. indeed has reached the age of majority yet under the provision of Family Code, the support may be given beyond the age of majority in order enable
him to complete his education, for some trade and profession.
If financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal, his education or the completion thereof would be unduly delayed. This is a good
reason for immediate execution. The father claimed that based on the records, the son is no longer studying. However, it might have resulted to lack of means
to support his studies considering that the father admits that the son is just a pre-law graduate.
*Goita Vs. Campos-Rueda
De Asis vs CA
De Asis vs. CA
GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999
FACTS:
Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who
failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied
paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint
with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the
minors legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is
based on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.
ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support.
HELD:

The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial
complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuels contention for the lack of filial
relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial
relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim
support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested
in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief
(no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise
or waiver.
General Provisions (Article 209-215)
Espiritu vs CA
Espiritu vs. CA
GR 115640, March 15, 1995
FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was
sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back
to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate.
Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the
children in the Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.
ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.
HELD:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age
may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years
of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from
emotional shock caused by her mothers infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying
his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mothers conviction for the
crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.
Substitute and Special Parental Authority (Articles 216-219)
Amadora vs CA
Amadora vs. CA
GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the formers death. Daffon was convicted of
homicide through reckless imprudence. The victims parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its
rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped.

Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic
institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There
was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in
maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for
graduation (submission of Physics reports).
ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
HELD:
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident
happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed incharge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student
and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no
proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with
Alfredo resulting to his death.
Petition was denied.
Ylarde vs Aquino
Ylarde vs. Aquino
GR No. L33722, July 29, 1988
FACTS:
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. During
that time, the school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War II. Defendant decided to help clear the
area so he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a one ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. It was
left unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation. Defendant left the children to level
the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom where he can get some rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the
children not to touch the stone. After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete block slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito
Ylarde was pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein
petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.
ISSUE: WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages.
HELD:

As held in Amadora vs CA, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students.
Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, this is the general rule. However, in casea of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is
an academic school and he did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his tudents should make sure that the children are protected from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly exposed
the students to risk and should not be placed under the category of Work Education such as school gardening, planting trees etc. Aquino acted with fault and
gross negligence where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his students. Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to
cast away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the excavation would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the
petitioners.
St. Mary's Academy vs Carpetanos
St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos
GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin
Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless
manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.
HELD:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor
to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered
negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The
spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which
the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it
is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin.
Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.
Effect and Suspension/Termination of Parental Authority (Articles 220-233)
*Tamargo Vs. CA
CRESENCIO LIBI and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, vs HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, respondents
G.R. No. 70890
September 18, 1992

Facts:

Julie Ann Gotiong, daughter of respondent spouses, and Wendell Libi, son of petitioners, were sweethearts for more than two years before their
death. Julie broke up with Wendell upon finding out of his sadistic and irresponsible character. Wendell kept on pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but her persistent refusal caused him to threaten her. 14 January 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound of the same
firearm. Private respondents claimed that it was Wendell who deliberately caused their daughter's death, and his, respectively. Spouses Libi contended that a
third party, probably a person related to Wendell's work as a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) agent, must have caused his death and Julie's. Gotiong
spouses filed a civil case against the Libi spouses to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The court
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for insufficiency of the evidence, and denied defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient merit. On appeal to respondent court,
the lower court's decision was set aside.
Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of respondent court promulgated on 2 January 1985 sentencing defendants-spouses Libi to
pay to plaintiff P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
Issues:

Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established decisional laws; and
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

Held:

The court ruled that the Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their
minor son under their legal authority or control, and who lives in their company. It is also proven that defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise the requisite
diligentissimi patris familias in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible
to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from safety deposit box only after the
crime had been committed.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against
petitioners. SO ORDERED.
*R.A. 7610
Emancipation and Age of Majority (Articles 234-237)
R.A. No. 6809
Summary Judicial Proceedings (Article 234-253)
The New Civil Code
Funerals/Care and Education of Children (Articles 305-310;Articles 356-363)
Use of Surnames (Articles 364-380)
Laperal vs Republic
Laperal vs. Republic
GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962
FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later
on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this
petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art.
372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married
woman legally separated from his husband.
HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of
her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in
1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more
occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.
Llaneta vs Agrava
Llaneta vs. Agrava
GR No. 32054, May 15, 1974
FACTS:
Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later Atanacia had a
relationship with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafins mother in Manila. Teresita was raised in
the household of the Ferrers using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealing even her school records. She then applied for a copy of her birth certificate in
Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. Subsequently, she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta and
that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. She prayed to have her name changed from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer
since not doing so would result in confusion among persons and entitites she dealt with and would entail endless and vexatious explanations of the
circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer.
HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of Teresita and granted her petition to change her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. In support to her petition, the mother of Serafin
Ferrer and his two remaining brothers have come forward in earnest support and were proud to share the surname of Ferrer with her. Furthermore, adequate
publication of the proceeding has not elicited slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of Serafin Ferrer.
Absence (Articles 381-396)
Lukban vs Republic
Lukban vs Republic
L-8492, February 29, 1956
FACTS:

Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently
looked for him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for more than
20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.
ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry.
HELD:
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933.
It provides that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Civil Registry (407-413)
*R.A. No. 7048
Republic vs Cagandahan
Republic vs. Cagandahan
GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later
on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones,
androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC
Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.
ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
HELD:
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC
is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.