Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The author acknowledges the comments of two anonymous reviewers but assumes full
responsibility for the final manuscript.
55
56
r
While at least three book-length collections of articles sympathetic YO
the parliamentary cause have been published since the 1987 ratification of
the EDSA Constitution,' not a single collection defending the current
presidential form or answering the specific criticisms of or claims by the
pro-parliamentary position has come out. In fact, not even one single article
by any Filipino scholar has come out to systematically answer or at least
give a comprehensive critical review of the parliamentary position in the
Philippines as it has developed over the successive charter change
cornpoiqns.? Nor has anyone employed the comparative literature on
constitutional design skeptical of the pro-parliamentary position to answer
either the comparative claims of the local parliamentary position or its use
of the comparative literoture."
Instead, the most salient defenses offered against a shift are neither
theoretical nor conceptual but a host of conjunctural, cynical, cultural, and
"personality-not-the-system" arguments. The conjunctural argument is that
constitutional change for the Philippines is inappropriate at this time since it
will be too divisive for the country and too disruptive to the country's tasks
of addressing its political and economic problems. The cynical argument
zeroes in on the motives of the politician-proponents seeing the call as a
smokescreen to a power grab to perpetuate themselves in power or, in the
case of the Cha-cha 2 campaign led by House Speaker Jose De Venecia, to
catapult a politician to power. The cultural argument is that the Philippines'
highly personalistic political culture is not appropriate to the more
depersonalized political behavior associated with a parliamentary system.
The "personality-not-the-system" argument is that constitutional change is
not necessary since it is not the "system" that needs changing but the
personalities in the system. Largely left untouched is the theoretical and
conceptual validity of the claimed superiority of parliamentary over
presidential democracies. The opposition has therefore failed to confront
head-on many of the central arguments of the pro-parliamentary position
in the Philippines.
In view of this, it is high time to start the long overdue process of offering
a more systematic critical review of the pro-parliamentary position. It is also
high time to attempt to present the opposite side of the form-of-government
debate in the comparative constitutional design literature. For without the
57
58
parliamentary forms, the more urgent and more fruitful research direction
to be taken is on the more specific level of how institutional varieties and
fine-tuning can affect the functioning and performance of the two forms o~
government, but especially of the presidential form which the Philippines
currently has and will likely continue to have for the foreseeable future.
Pro-Parliamentary Arguments
We wont to put on end to paralysis and gridlock and the constantdivisions
"
"
statement of House Speaker Jose De Venecia upon the approval of the House
Concurrent Resolution no. 16 on March 19,2003 asking Congress to convene
as a constituent assembly to write a parliamentary constitution
59
Abad echoes the arguments of the eminent pro-parliamentary
comparative scholar Juan Linz who identifies two defining features of
presidential forms of government as producing the two basic flaws inherent
to a presidential democracy. The first feature is the separate election of the
president and members of the legislature which creates the problem of the
"dual democratic legitimacy" enjoyed by both the executive and legislative
branches. The second feature is the fixed term enjoyed by the executive and
legislative branches independent of each other which creates the problem
of "rigidity" in the relationship between the two branches. Abad quotes Linz
this way:
Linz attributes this problem to an inherent structural weakness in a
presidential system: the tenure of the president is fixed independent of
the legislature and the legislature can survive without fear of dissolution
by the executive. This feature derives from the separate but coexisting
democratic legitimacy enjoyed bythe executive and legislative branches,
being both directly and popularly elected. (Abad 1997: 60)
These two defining features of presidentiolism are said to create serious
. political problems that plague the workings of the executive-legislative
relations in a presidential system. The dual democratic legitimacy of the
executive and legislative branches in a presidential system provides weak
incentives for cooperation between the two branches since direct election
gives each of them a direct mandate to represent the people. On one hand,
the executive has the feeling of superior democratic legitimacy over the
legislative. This feeling of superiority springs from the fact that the president
does not. only hold the highest office of the land but also represents the
nation as a whole. As a result, the president is said to be unwilling to
compromise with the legislature on crucial policy issues. Abad quotes
another doyen of the parliamentary literature, Arend Lijphart, to further
develop the argument:
Lijphart goes along with this view, but at the same time holds that this is
only part of the explanation. For him, 'the real problem is... that
everyone-including the president, the public at large, and even political
scientists-feels that the president's claim (to legitimacy) is much stronger
than the legislature's. Consequently... the feeling of superior democratic
60
r
legitimacy may make the president righteously unwilling and
psychologically unable to compromise.' (Abad 1997: 60)
On the other hand, the legislative branch also feels that it cannot be
dictated upon by the executive since it too enjoys a direct mandate from the
electorate and in its collective capacity also represents the whole nation.
This in turn may give the executive a hard time to achieve the necessary
cooperation needed to push its policy agenda in the legislature, even in
situations when the executive has majority control of the legislature .
I
I
This problem becomes more acute in cases wherein the president does
not have majority control in the legislature. Sincethe president and legislators
are elected separately, presidentialism is especially prone to situations where
the executive and majority of the legislative members come from different,
even opposing, parties. (Abad 1997: 60) Where outright conflicts between
the two branches happen, these conflicts then degenerate into a prolonged
and unproductive gridlock or impasse since, and this is the crucial part of
Abad and Linz's argument, there is said to be no clear democratic mechanism
to resolve the conflicts.
Similarly, the fixed terms enjoyed by both the executive and legislative
branches also act as a disincentive for them to cooperate. Since the executive
has no power to dissolve the legislature nor the legislature the power to
dismissthe executive, except in the rare and tedious process of impeachment,
the guaranteed term of office of both branches leaves little room for them to
coordinate their action if only to stay in office. In short, each can ignore the
other without undermining the two branches' tenure. Accordingly, this setup results in frequent policy stalemates and gridlocks between the two
branches.
In addition to Abad, this point is raised by Pablo Tangco (1991: 10)
when he argues that "[t]he Presidentin the Presidential system must contend
with institutional deadlocks" brought about by the "checks and balances
from both legislative and judicial departments." This argument is also
reproduced by Jose Abueva (2002: 79-102) when he presents Abad's
arguments on the inferior ability of presidential systems to prevent gridlock
and attain good working executive-legislative relations.
The PhilippinePro-ParliamentaryPositionrrorres
61
All these infirmities of a presidential system are said to be in sharp contrast
to a parliamentary system where the fusion of executive and legislative
functions creates the proper institutional incentives for cooperation between
the two branches of government. Where the legislature is the only directly
elected institution and from which the executive-the prime minister and
cabinet-comes from, there is said to be no dual democratic legitimacy
conflict. Moreover, the flexibility of the tenure of both the executive and the
legislature where each has the power to dismisseach other, the prime minister
abolishing parliament and calling for new elections and the legislature
securing a vote of no confidence on the prime minister and/or cabinet,
provides a built-in powerful incentive for cooperation between the branches
absent in a presidential system.'
In the Philippine case, these infirmities said to be inherent in the executivelegislative relations of the presidential system have been traced as institutional
root causes of many of the country's political malaise. For Abad (1997:
60), the principle of checks and balances behind the separate powers of
the executive and legislative branches of the country's presidential system
has resulted in a "chronic problem of gridlock" preventing the country "from
responding-in an efficient and timely manner-to the many challenges
and opportunities it faces cs it struggles to catch up with the rest of the
advancing economies in Southeast Asia." It has also caused the widespread
discrediting of the two institutions as the public becomes frustrated over
their frequent quarrels and their failure to put their act together on important
policy issues. (Abad 199.7: 59-60)
This point is shared by Abueva and Tangco who also believe that the
system of checks and balances has had serious adverse effects on the
executive-legislative relations in the Philippines. Abueva (2002: 79-80) opines
that the separation of powers and the checks and balances partly explain
'not only the competition and conflict between the President and Congress
as they enact laws but also the frequent buck-passing between them as they
fail 'to enact much needed legislation. He argues that the result is that the
country has lagged behind the restof East Asia. Tangco (1995: 2), for his
part, argues that it is the system of checks and balances that "institutionalized
the hostility between the legislative and executive departments and resulted
in the gridlock that emasculate the government and render it weak and
ineffectual. "
62
'.~
1997: 116).
Lines of Counter-Arguments
63
64
-l
J'"
--------------------
The PhilippinePro-ParliamentaryPositionfTorres
65
"I'
I,
66
67
and committee assignment powers for party leaders, and weak policy
committees." Such arrangements have been identified elsewhere in the
constitutional design literature as measures that facilitate executive control
of and/or coordination with the legislature.
These three features of the party system are largely determined not by
the form of government a country has but by its electoral system. According
to Haggard (1997: 145), " [e]lectoral rules that provide low barriers to
political entry encourage the fragmentation and polarization of the political
system, factors that make coordination difficult." For party discipline,
Haggard (1997: 139-141) sees the effects of the electoral system on at
least four electoral features, namely: (1) manner of candidate selection; (2)
control of the order of electoral tickets; (3) choice voters make whether
between parties or candidates; and (4) control of campaign finonce.!'
4. The supposed superior features of parliamentarism. depending on their specific institutional features-suffer from
their own political pathologies (or from similar problems that
parliamentary advocates attribute to presidentialism).
It is crucial to point out that the specific pathologies would depend on
the institutional varieties of the parliamentarism in question. This buttresses
the argument of scholars that it is not the ideal-typical qualities of the form
of government that is determining but the specific institutional varieties and
context/configuration that the form of government finds itself in.
In addition to the trade-offs between the mutual checks and balances
of presidentialism and the executive dominance in Westminster-type
parliaments, and the trade-offs between the potential policy stability provided
by fixed terms in presidentialism and the policy flux offered by proportional
representation-based parliaments already mentioned above, scholars have
raised other possible trade-offs and problems concerning specific types of
parliamentarism as they relate to executive-legislative relations. Some of
them are mentioned below.
68
69
could act as 'veto players,' since a report from the committee was necessary
for consideration of a bill by the floor." (Cheibub and Limongi 2002: 174)
In the Italian parliament, "one finds the same pattern: the parliament's
independence to set the legislative agenda/strong committees, and legislative
rights that favor individual members' influence over decisions."(Cheibub
and Limongi 2002: 174) Like their French counterparts, Italian legislative
committees can act as important veto players of the executive's legislative
agenda since, among others, committee chairmen are autonomous in
defining their legislative priorities and even in convening their committees. 13
c) Parliamentary systems with a fragmented and/or polarized party
system may also suffer from policy irnmobilism.
Parliamentary advocates assume that because parliamentary systems,
almost by definition, can command a 'majority in the legislature, they will
not experience the same problem of policy immobilism that presidential
systems face, especially when the president's party lacks rnojority support in
the legislature. Contrary to this belief, however, Cheibub and Limongi suggest
that majority support in parliament may also make the parliamentary system
suffer from its own version of policy immobilism (especially as legislation
relates to policy reforms) if the majority in the legislature is formed out of a
fragmented and/or polarized party system.
In terms of status quo-changing legislation (i.e., enacting reforms), the
fact that the formation of a majority government in a parliamentary system
is based on the conglomeration of a number of parties with different political
preferences makes government action necessarily "limited to the area that
contains the policy proposals preferred by its supporters over the status
quo."(Cheibub and Limongi 2002: 156) As the government attempts to
court and broaden majority support, the once limited area in which the
government can take action may become even smaller. Citing George
Tsebelis's concept of "veto players," Cheibub and Limongi (2002: 156157) explain that the number of parties that come together to form the
majority would help determine the number of actors who can veto status
quo-changing policy proposals." The biqqer the majority, the more the veto
players. With this reduction in the scope of governmental action, "governments
may have to pay the price of policy immobility in order to form a majority."
(Cheibub and Limongi 2002: 157)
70
d) Parliamentary systems with a fragmented and/or polarized party
system may also suffer from a different form of executive-legislative deadlock.
71
institutional differences significantly affect the performance of each of these
forms of government. As discussed in the paper, the success or failure of
any form of government, whether presidential or parliamentary, depends
on the various institutional features associated with it such as the electoral
and party system. For instance, executive-legislative relations whether in
parliamentary or presidential systems can be affected by the extent of party
froqrnentotion, polarization and discipline. Thesequalities, in turn, are shaped
by the type of electoral system found in each form of government.
. Sensitivity to these institutional varieties is crucial since it shows that the
choice for an institutional arrangement aimed to promote harmonious
executive-legislative relations must not merely be between presidentialism
or parliamentarism but must also be in terms of what specific types of
presidentialism and parliamentarism. There are many variations of
presidentialism as there are many variations of parliamentarism. The specific
arrangements within these variations are as important as whether
presidential ism or parliamentarism is chosen because these arrangements
strongly affect the functioning and performance of each of these forms of
government. Moreover, these distinctions are crucial given that, as discussed
earlier, there are trade-offs involved not only between presidentialism and
parliamentarism but also among variations within each of these basic regime
types.
government.
Pursuing this research focus must involve the employment of the
comparative literature on constitutional design on similarly situated countries
as' the Philippines since this would help both proponents and opponents of
the local pro-parliamentary position develop a more sophisticated and
nuanced grasp ofthe conceptual and political stakes involved in the forms-.
72
I.
The PhilippinePro-ParliamentaryPositionlTorres
73
and party system. Reforming these institutions are crucial in addressing the
problems that Filipino pro-parliamentarians raised against the presidential
system since they could significantly affect the way it functions and performs.
For example, specific features of the Philippine single-member district
electoral system and the current electoral nomination process of Filipino
political parties affecting the extent of party system fragmentation or cohesion
may be addressed which, in turn, are likely to have an impact on the legislative
support and level of party discipline the Philippine executive can count on.
Given these possibilities for reforms, the limitations of the Philippine
presidential system may not necessitate grand constitutional changes but
only more modest piecemeal changes. Since the reforms involving the forms
of government and electoral systems can be made by more conventional
legislative actions compared to a shift to a parliamentary form that would
need a constituent assembly or a constitutional convention, these reforms
are far more politically manageable and politically less risky to undertake. If
the claims of the pro-parliamentary position on the virtues of parliamentarism
are seen as exaggerated, then this institutional fine-tuning of the presidential
form might even be more important and politically constructive than
overhauling the form of government itself. Moreover, because this would
not involve a wholesale rewriting of the constitution wher~ all institutional
features are potentially up for grabs, then these piecemeal changes may
substantially lessen the danger of ending up with a version of parliamentary
form of government far worse than the presidential form of government the
Philippines currently has.
Concl usion
This paper has presented the claim by Filipino parliamentary advocates
that parliamentary forms of government are superior over presidential forms
in encouraging more efficient and harmonious executive-legislative relations
and, conversely, in avoiding political gridlock between the two branches.
Where appropriate, the paper has traced the influences of the local position
from their original sources in the pro-parliamentary comparative
constitutional design literature. In turn, the paper has employed at least
four lines of counter-arguments distilled from the works of scholars who are
critical of the pro-parliamentary position in the comparative constitutional
design literature to guide the paper's presentation of the contrary position
available on this claim. The paper has argued that the counter-arguments
of some comparative constitutional design scholars pose serious challenges
74
I could only find two published papers (to be differentiated from single-issue newspaper
commentaries) that have attempted to answer some of the arguments advanced by the proparliamentary position as it relates to the 1987 Constitution. The first is the 1995 paper by
Jose Abueva which does not really answer the arguments advanced by parliamentarism but
is more a plea to give presidentialism a chance to work for about 12 more years from
1998 before shifting to a new form of government. In the meantime, he proposes importont
electoral and political reforms that would strengthen the presidential form of government.
2
Calling the parliamentary position as "beguiling and seductive" but arguing that the present
constitution is "good and solid," Abueva himself later succumbs to parliamentarism's siren
song that by the year 2001, he has shifted gears and has joined the parliamentary call,
complete with a draft constitution based on a parliamentary government (and a federal
organization of the state) but to be enacted in 2010 (in line with his earlier 12-year plea).
He is therefore included by this paper as a parliamentarista and would be reviewed as one.
See and compare his 1995 paper published as a four-part series in Today, "Proposals for
Changing the Constitution" (4-7 July) with his 2002 paper "Towards a Federal Republic of
the Philippines with a Parliamentary Government by 2010" in Towards a Federal Republic
of the Philippines with a Parliamentary Government: A Reader, pp. 79- 102 that introduced
his draft constitution.
The second paper is by Emil Bolongaita, "Presidential versus Parliamentary Democracy,"
Philippine Studies 43 (First Quarter 1995): 105-123. Here, he challenges the stronq claim
made for parliamentorism by some congressmen. But his work is a commentary of pre1995 events, well before Ramos's Chc-cho gathered steam and shortly before a number of
major pro-parliamentary articles appeared.
This is also the complaint of Bolongaita. He complains that "the debate between
presidential and parliamentary government in the Philippines has not been supported by a
corresponding debate among international scholars concerning constitutional choices far
reemerging and new democracies," (Bolongaita 1995: 107). However, he himself does not
explicitly employ camparative insights against parliamentarism and for presidentialism in
this article. While this dismal state for the pro-presidential position still exists up to the
75
present, this is no longer true for the parliamentary position after the 1997 publication of
Shift where one article in the collection written by Florencio "Butch" Abad ("Should the
Philippines Turn Parliamentary: The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation and
Institutional Reform," pp. 48-86) extensively employs the pro-parliamentory comparative
literature to buttress his claim of the superior performance of parliamentary over
presidential democracies in the world.
It is possible to identify at least eight major argumentswhy the parliamentary posltlon '
believes that the parliamentary form of government is superior to the currently existing
presidential form in the Philippines. These are parliamentarism's superior incentives for
more efficient and harmonious executive-legislative relations; superior democratic
survivability; superior accountability in governance; superior representation of nonmajoritarian interests; stronger inducement for more disciplined political parties; superior
economic performance; superior incentives for a better functioning bureaucracy;' and
superior set-up in promoting cheaper elections.
4
This review is more illustrative than exhaustive. The stress of the review would be
according to the theoretical positions espoused and not on the individual positions of
either Filipino parliamentary advocates or of the comparative constitutional design
scholars. The modest aim is more to raise the main themes of the debate than to arrive at
an ambitious, thorough matrix of positions of both camps.
The importance of Abad 's work for the pro-parliamentary camp is evidenced by the fact
that it was reprinted in the 2002 book Towards a Federal Republic of the Philippines. His
work is also one of the most cited by the parliamentarista camp. For example, Abueva,
doubtless the leading intellectual light of the parliamentary movement in the 2001-2004
cha-cha2 campaign, heavily depends on the arguments found in Abad's work to mcike his
case for the superiority of parliamentary forms of government over presidential ones.
See Mainwaring and Shugart's discussion of how parliamentary systems with disciplined
parties and a majority party promote a winner-takes-all approach more than presidential
systems in "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal," Helen Kellogg
Working Paper Series no. 200, Kellogg Institute for International Studies (July 1993), pp. 910. Available from: http://www.nd.edu/-kettogg/WPS/200.pdf.
"This review does not imply complete agnosticism on the question of the effects of
parliamentary versus presidentiol rule. However, it suggests that the effects of this
fundamental constitutional choice are contingent on other components of institutional
design, particularly the party system." (Haggard 1997: 133)
9
"
76
"
10 Consistent with his argument that it is the party system not the form of government that is
at work here, Haggard does not mean that parliamentary systems are immune to this
problem of fragmentation, only the mechanisms of the coordination problem are different.
(Haggard 1997: 135-136).
11 Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) raise the same points. For them, the effects of the two
features on executive-leqislctive deadlocks are mitigated by the party system presidentialism
finds itself in. They focus on two aspects of the party system. First is the level of party
fragmentation and second is the level of party discipline. In turn, many characteristics of the
party system are products not of the form of government per se but of the country's
electoral system.
12 Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) concede that in most parliamentary systems, mechanisms
exist to allow one or both houses to be dissolved in an attempt to resolve the deadlock.
The point is that dual legitimacy conflicts can also happen in some parliamentary systemsa point unacknowledged by many parliamentary advocates.
Cheibub and Limongi acknowledge that the two examples of parliamentary systems
represent more the exception than the rule. However, this in no way lessens the force 01
their argument that it is the specific design of supporting institutions not any ideal-typico:l
understanding of the forms of government that matters. (Cheibub and Limongi 2002: 175)
13
The work of Tsebelis they cite is the article "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto
Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentorism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British
Journal of Political Science 25-3 (July 1995): 289-325 .
14
References.
Abad, Florencio. 1997. "Should the Philippines Turn Parliamentary: The Challenges of
Democratic Consolidation and Institutional Reform." In Soliman Santos et aI., Shift.
Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and the PhilippinesCanada Human Resource Development Program, pp. 48-86.
Abueva, Jose V. et al. (eds.) 2002. Towards a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a
Parliamentary Government: A Reader. Marikina City: Center for Social Policy and
Governance.
_ _ _ _ _. 1995. "Let 's Make our Presidential System Work." Today 4-7 July.
Bolongaita, Emil. 1995. "Presidential versus Parliamentary Democracy." Philippine Studies
43 (First Quarter): 105-23.
77
Haggard, Stephan. 1997. "Democratic Institutions, Economic Policy, and Development." In
Institutions and Economic Development: Growth and Governance in Less-Developed
and Post-Socialist Countries, edited by Christopher Clague. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, pp. 121-149.
Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 335-355.
lijphart, Arend. 1994. "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical
Observations." In The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Volume One: Comparative
Perspectives, edited by Juan J. linz and Arturo Valenzuela. Baltimore and London: Johns
Hopkins University Press, pp. 91-105.
linz, Juan J. 1994. "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" In
The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Volume One: Comparative Perspectives and
Volume Two: The Case of Latin America, edited by Juan J. linz and Arturo Valenzuela.
Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-87.
Main~aring Scott and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1997. "Presidenfiolism and Democracy in
Latin America: Rethinking the Termsof the Debate." In Presidentialism and Democracy in
Latin America, edited by Mainwaring and Shugart. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 12-54 and 394-439.
_----:-:-:-:-__. 1993. "Juan linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical AppraisaL" Helen
Kellogg Institute for International Studies Working Paper no. 200. Available from: http:!
/www.nd.edu/-kellogg/WPS/200.pdf.
Rocamora, Joel. 1997. "The Constitutional Amendment Debate: Reforming Political Institutions,
Reshaping Political Culture." In Soliman Santos et 01. Shift. Quezon City: Ateneo Center
for Social Policy and Public Affairs and the Philippines-Canada Human Resource
Development Program, pp. 90- 133.
Shugart, Matthew. 1995. "Parliaments over Presidents?" Journal of Democracy 6-2: 168-
172.
Shugart, Matthew and John M. Carey. 1992. President and Assemblies: Constitutional Design
and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-17.
Tangco, Pablo. 1995. "A Guide to Adoption of a Parliamentary Government." Paper presented
at the National Conference on Constitutional Reforms sponsored by the Philippine
Constitutional Association, AGORA, and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 12-13 July.
_--::-;-_'""7'7.2001. "The Never Ending Cha-Cha Beat: How Should Progressives Dance?"
Political Brief 9-7 (November-December): 2-31.
78