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April 2010 Monthly Update

Alden Global Distressed Opportunities Fund


The Alden Global Distressed Opportunities Fund Class A was up 8.1% net and Class B was
up 9.1% net for the month of April. (Class A and Class B performance reflect performance
for outside investors who invested since inception). 2010 YTD Class A is up 25.2% net and
Class B is up 28.9% net through April month end. The strategy was created in October of
2008 and is up 390.5% net Class A and 419.6% net Class B from inception through April
30th. YTD through month end April, the Lyxor Distressed Securities Index is up 1.7% and
the S&P Index is up 6.4%.
In April, the Fund ended the month with significant investments (over 2% of long market
value) in 15 companies or positions (defined as an investment in more than one company
which expresses a similar thesis). Approximately 75% of the portfolio was concentrated in
our top 10 positions, which is consistent with our concentration target.
April was a very good month for the portfolio. Our top 10 winners were all larger by dollar
value than our largest losing position, and our largest losing position which was a hedge for
the portfolio was not significant in magnitude. Among the top 10 winning positions none
was dominant in terms of its contribution to the overall return of the portfolio.

Distressed Market Commentary


We often talk about industry themes in the portfolio because individual companies in the
same industry usually face similar economic drivers. When these economic drivers slow it is
common that many companies in an industry experience distress at the same time. Two of
our current industry themes are financials and media. Among other reasons, financials are
experiencing distress as a result of the credit crisis and media companies are experiencing
distress as a result of the significant slowdown in advertising in 2009. In both cases, we
think that the analyst community is underestimating each industry’s emergence from distress
and this out of consensus view provides support for our investment thesis. In most cases, our
positions in these industries have a direct catalyst event that we feel will drive price
performance in our respective positions. In others, the catalyst has passed, and we hold a
position that we feel has not yet fully benefitted from the catalyst event (such as long equity).
In the few that are non-event driven, valuations drive the investment when securities’ prices
are tainted by membership in a distressed industry. Catalyst or not, our investments are
underpinned by fundamental analysis where we seek to find mispricing of true value.
At the core of most opportunities that arise from corporate distress is a belief that securities
of companies facing distress are at times undervalued because of market inefficiencies,
technical anomalies and human biases which can create significant investing opportunities.
Many of these opportunities result from the fact that the actions a company takes when it is
experiencing corporate distress are out of the ordinary and therefore difficult to understand
by market participants who do not have an expertise in the effect of these types of corporate
events on securities prices. In fact, many of these actions are even difficult to understand by

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professional securities analysts. We believe that analysts (and investors generally) often
have an inclination to anchor their expectations to recent experience and as a result they
underestimate or overestimate corporate performance. In a market where the general
sentiment has been good and performance has been positive, analysts may be reluctant to
issue a sell rating on a company which has had a long stretch of good performance despite
the fact that it is facing a significant headwind or exposed to clear risks. Positive
performance is the most common condition of public markets, and so this bias is one that is
most familiar to many market participants. However, when sentiment changes so do the
biases. We are in a market where certain industries are weighed down by negative sentiment
as a result of the recent recession and credit crisis. The opposite bias occurs in markets such
as we see currently when the analyst community refuses to, or is hesitant to, upgrade
earnings expectations for companies and industries which have in the recent past been poor
performers or in distress. For value buyers with strong knowledge of the fundamental drivers
of company performance, this bias can create significant buying opportunities and it is one
that we look for in industries that are on our distressed radar.
We believe an example of this is occurring with the financials. Looking at a list of 29 major
financial institutions from banks to brokers to specialty finance companies, all but two beat
expectations in Q1. As a result of the credit crisis, most of these companies have been more
transparent than in the past, and we expect that the analysts covering them have had to be
more diligent. Despite this, the earnings of 27 of 29 companies were underestimated. The
likelihood of this happening randomly is small. Our belief is that because analysts covering
financials have had such negative experiences since the credit crisis, they are reluctant to turn
positive again and have been wrong on average with respect to financials. This is not to say
that every company in the financial industry is a good investment or that the industry’s
problems have entirely passed, but if it is possible through fundamental analysis to take a
position which is right and significantly different from consensus, this can lead to strong
returns.

Alden Developments

On April 1 we launched the Alden Global Value Recovery Fund (AGVRF) with
approximately $480mm in total capital. We were pleased that 100% of the capital was
taken by current or related investors and we were significantly oversubscribed. As a
result the fund is closed to new capital (with two small exceptions for additions June 1).
As of the writing of this letter, in mid May, the (AGVRF) was able to take advantage of
significant market dislocations in early May and the portfolio is well over halfway
invested (and up for the month) in investments that fit the fund’s objectives. In hindsight
it was good to have an available pool of cash during such a significant buying
opportunity and we are happy that our investors have had the benefit of this strong start.

Portfolio Notes

Losing position – We had no significant losing positions for the month.

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Winning position – Smurfit Stone Container Corp

Smurfit Stone Container Corp was our largest winning position in April. Smurfit-Stone
is the second largest paperboard and packaging company in the US. The company filed
for bankruptcy protection in January 2009, and we started buying its debt in mid 2009
based on our belief that it was a good company faced with the combined problems of a
cyclical downturn and the credit crisis. At the end of April, the company’s plan to
emerge from bankruptcy was awaiting decision by the reviewing judge. We expect an
emergence by mid summer at the latest. In April, we continued to think that the company
was worth more than the face value of the debt and owned the senior unsecured bonds
that ended the month trading at over 101. They began the month trading around 90 cents
on the dollar. The debt has appreciated significantly because many aspects of the
restructuring in bankruptcy have gone correctly. We continue to believe our debt will
recover significantly over par when the value of the post – reorganization equity which
we expect to receive in the restructuring realizes its appropriate valuation. Several
positive factors have driven appreciation in 2010 including a price increase in per ton
sales in January, volume uptick in export markets, and the raising of an exit facility from
bankruptcy from JP Morgan. Continued economic expansion would also be a clear
positive for the company and our investment.

Winning position – Citigroup

Our second largest winner in April was Citigroup. In Citigroup our primary position is in
common shares and our combined position was up close to 10% for the month. We
wrote about Citi in last month’s letter, so we apologize for any redundancy in this
description. Citi has been a company in which we have had many investments since the
inception of the portfolio in October 2008. At times we have owned debt, preferred stock
and equity or a combination of the three. We also successfully participated in a preferred
for common exchange in the summer of 2009. Citi played a key part in the credit crisis
and received a significant government bailout. By virtue of the government’s equity
stake, it fits our definition of distressed. Our (high level) view on Citi remains simple;
we believe that it trades at a discount to book. This is very unusual from a historical
perspective and in our opinion it represents a significant undervaluation of the shares.
We recognize that it is hard, if not impossible, to put a true value on Citi’s book and
frankly we do not think that even Citi could do so. However, even using a generous band
of assumptions we believe that Citi’s common has significant upside potential from here.

Near Term Outlook


We have no change in our near term outlook. We think it remains an excellent environment for
our strategy and remain very optimistic for the remainder of 2010 and beyond. That said, the
situation in Greece and the rest of Europe has injected uncertainty into the markets not seen
since early 2009. This is not unexpected during a distressed cycle and is a byproduct of the
combination of significant leverage and slow economic growth. This is unlikely to be the last
aftershock of the credit crisis earthquake. In times like these we look to protect the portfolio
where we can and opportunistically buy securities that we like. We have not created a

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portfolio that will never lose money and as of the writing of this letter we are down in May.
Poor monthly performance does not change our outlook as dislocations create opportunity.

Important Notes and Disclosures

All data is based on market value unless otherwise indicated.

This document and the information herein are confidential and may not be reproduced or further disseminated without
Alden's written permission. This document is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or
solicitation of an offer to buy any securities or investment services. The information presented herein is presented in
summary form and is therefore subject to numerous qualifications and further explanation. More complete information
regarding the investment products and services described herein, including Alden's fees thereon, is contained in the
offering documents for such products and services. Terms used herein not otherwise defined have the meaning ascribed
to them in such product's Confidential Private Placement Memorandum. The information contained in this document is
the most recent information available to Alden, however, all of the information herein is subject to change without
notice. Certain information included in this document is based on information obtained from sources considered to be
reliable, however, no representation may be made with respect to the accuracy or completeness of such data. Investors
in the Fund may lose some or all of their investment. The time periods shown are limited and do not reflect
performance in different economic and market cycles.

The net returns cited for October 2008 are the returns for the Distressed Opportunities Composite managed by Smith
Management LLC, not the Fund. The Distressed Opportunities Composite is a compilation of all of the investments in
the securities of businesses identified by Alden as "distressed", and the returns thereon, in the various accounts
managed by Smith Management LLC from October 1, 2008 through October 31, 2008. Performance results of the
composite were calculated net of any brokerage commissions and exclude any cash balances that may have been held
in the accounts. The composite returns are calculated by taking the gross investment returns of the composite for the
month and subtracting there from a hypothetical management fee of approximately 2% annually and a hypothetical
performance fee of 20% of the net income generated by such investments. The hypothetical management fee is
calculated using the following formula: (.02/12) x (Beginning month NAV + (Net purchases and sales/2)). The
hypothetical performance fee is calculated as 20% per annum of the net income generated by the investments. These
hypothetical calculations are used because no actual management fee or performance fees were charged during the
period shown. In the Fund, the actual management fee and performance fee are calculated differently and may
adversely impact any investor's returns. In the Fund, the management fee is calculated as 1/12 of 2.00% of the NAV
calculated as of the first calendar day of each month prior to any accrual for or payment of any management fee or
allocation of any profit allocation or withdrawal effected on such date.

The returns cited from November 2008 forward are the actual returns of the Fund.

The Dow Jones Hedge Fund Distressed Securities Index is published by Dow Jones Hedge Fund Indexes, Inc. For
important information on this index, please see www.djhedgefundindexes.com.

The S&P 500 Index is a market capitalization weighted index focusing on the large capitalization sector of the United
States equity markets.

The Lyxor Distressed Securities Index (LYXRDIST) aims at measuring the performance of the Distressed Securities
sector of the hedge fund industry.

Holdings are subject to change in the future. Portfolio holdings of stocks or bonds should not be relied on in making
investment decisions and should not be construed as providing any assurance or guarantee as to actual returns.

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Any person subscribing for an investment must be able to bear the risks involved and must meet the suitability
requirements set forth in the Fund's Confidential Private Placement Memorandum. Some or all alternative investment
programs may not be suitable for certain investors. No assurance can be given that the investment objectives set forth
herein will be achieved. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Among the risks Alden wishes to call to
the particular attention of prospective investors are the following:
•No guarantee or representation may be made that the Fund will meet its investment objectives, or avoid
losses.
•The Fund is dependent on the services of certain key personnel, and, were certain or all of them to become
unavailable; it may have a material and adverse effect on the Fund.
•An investment in the Fund is illiquid. There is no secondary market for the Fund's limited partnership
interests, and none is expected to develop.
•Alden will receive performance-based compensation. Such compensation could act as an incentive to invest
in riskier investments.
•The Fund's portfolio will be concentrated in distressed securities, which may be affected by a variety of
economic, geographic, political and other factors.
•The Fund is subject to conflicts of interest.
•Certain securities and instruments in which the Fund may invest can be highly volatile.

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