Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 555
The complaint in this action in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York alleged substantially as follows: Plaintiff, Eileen R. Yoder, is a
nationally known specialist in the field of food allergies. In 1981, she
established the Healthful Living Company ("Healthful Living"), a sole
proprietorship which was registered to do business in Indiana, through which to
conduct her professional activities. By 1983, as a result of her work as a
consultant, author and lecturer, plaintiff had developed a mailing list with the
names of over 2,000 doctors, other health professionals dealing with food
allergies and individuals suffering from such allergies. By this time, plaintiff
had also acquired certain proprietary information consisting of special recipes,
sources of allergy-free ingredients that the plaintiff had tested extensively,
special diet plans, programs for the physical and psychological management of
multiple food allergies, and information and material required to develop an
individual computerized allergy-free diet program. In the summer of 1983,
plaintiff began to seek additional funds to expand Healthful Living, and
particularly to enable her to implement and promote the computerized
individual allergy-free diet program; she also sought to move from Indiana. She
met defendant Henderson, president and chief executive officer of defendant
Orthomolecular Nutrition Institute, Inc. ("Ortho-Nutrix"), a publicly held
Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in New York City.
Henderson expressed an interest in having Ortho-Nutrix purchase Healthful
Living and employ plaintiff to assist in the development of the computerized
diet program. After negotiations in New York with Henderson and defendant
Rothstein, treasurer and a major shareholder of Ortho-Nutrix, an oral agreement
was reached whereby Ortho-Nutrix would purchase from plaintiff the assets of
Healthful Living, including its name and good will; the copyright and exclusive
right to distribute and promote the book "Allergy Free Cooking" and other
Healthful Living publications, including a subscription newsletter; allergy-free
recipes developed by plaintiff; all materials and proprietary information
necessary to develop and promote the computer diet program; and the exclusive
right to publish, copyright and market all of plaintiff's writings during the
period of her employment by Ortho-Nutrix. As consideration for the sale of
Healthful Living, Ortho-Nutrix was to pay Healthful Living's debts, at that time
approximately $82,560; to employ plaintiff for three years at a salary of
$40,000 per annum plus insurance benefits; to pay 10% royalties on the sale of
publications written by plaintiff after payment of the debts; and to issue to the
plaintiff up to 30,000 shares of Ortho-Nutrix stock based on profits generated
by the development of the computer diet program. Defendants were alleged
also to have agreed to provide the necessary funds and support staff required to
develop and promote the program. This oral agreement was to be reduced to
writing by the defendants before plaintiff's return to New York.
3
The complaint alleged further that, at the conclusion of the negotiations in New
York, Henderson requested a copy of plaintiff's mailing list for use by OrthoNutrix, and that she declined to furnish this prior to receipt of a written
acknowledgement of the oral agreement. As a result, plaintiff received a twopage memorandum, signed by Henderson for Ortho-Nutrix, which was stated to
constitute "a tentative agreement the spirit of which will remain but will be
The complaint alleged as a first cause of action for violation of the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act that
defendants made fraudulent representations as to the assets, liabilities and
earnings of Ortho-Nutrix. The complaint also alleged pendent state law causes
of action for fraud, breach of contract and conversion.
given
the present level of operating expenses and the lack of significant operating
7
revenues to date, management believes that the Company may face a serious
liquidity problem during the next year unless significant revenues can be achieved
from the orthomolecular practice assistance program, operating expenses can be
reduced and additional sources of financing can be found.
8
Judge Griesa granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action under the federal securities laws and that the
pendent jurisdiction claims should therefore be dismissed. Not unreasonably in
light of its inept drafting, Judge Griesa construed the complaint as predicating
the applicability of the federal securities laws only on the basis that the
agreement constituted an "investment contract" under Sec. 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78c(a)(10). He held that the
arrangement described above did not constitute an "investment contract" as that
term has been defined in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99, 66
S.Ct. 1100, 1102-03, 90 L.Ed. 1244 (1946); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp.,
687 F.2d 577, 581-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S.
1086, 103 S.Ct. 568, 74 L.Ed.2d 931 (1982); and SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117,
38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973): since Ms. Yoder was expected to be an active participant
in the business, the agreement thus "was not an investment contract, but an
employment contract." Cf. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., supra, 687 F.2d at 582 (a
scheme that is primarily "a means whereby participants could pool their own
activities, their money and the promoter's contribution in a meaningful way" is
not an investment contract).
10
If the case involved no more than this, we would readily affirm the judge's
ruling. However, we are required to read the complaint with great generosity on
a motion to dismiss. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99,
102-03, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Indeed, we have previously stated that "it is our
duty ... to determine whether the facts set forth justify taking jurisdiction on
grounds other than those most artistically pleaded." Chahal v. Paine Webber,
Inc., 725 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir.1984) (quoting New York State Waterways Ass'n
v. Diamond, 469 F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir.1972)). This complaint alleged a
contract for the sale of up to 30,000 shares of Ortho-Nutrix stock, conditioned
on achieving given levels of sales,2 as part of the consideration accruing to
plaintiff for her sale of the assets of Healthful Living and her entering into the
employ of Ortho-Nutrix. Stock is indubitably a security within the definitions
of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77b(1), and the Securities Exchange Act,
id. Sec. 78c(a)(10); indeed, as the Fifth Circuit observed recently, it is "the
paradigm of a security." Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir.1983).
There was thus no occasion for the plaintiff to rely on the concept of an
"investment contract" in order to state a claim under the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws. As said in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344, 64 S.Ct. 120, 88 L.Ed. 88 (1943), the use of the term "investment
contract" in the legislation was part of Congress' effort to reach beyond "the
obvious and commonplace" to include "[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular
devices, whatever they appear to be, ... if it be proved as matter of fact that they
were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which
established their character in commerce as 'investment contracts' ...." Id. at 351,
64 S.Ct. at 124. The fact that the contract between plaintiff and Ortho-Nutrix
was not an "investment contract" is inconsequential if the transaction
constituted a sale of stock.
11
The agreement alleged between the plaintiff and the defendants constituted a
sale of stock under the securities statutes even though the Ortho-Nutrix stock
was not in fact sold. Section 2(3) of the Securities Act provides that "[t]he term
'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or
interest in a security, for value;"3 Sec. 3(a)(14) of the Securities Exchange Act
similarly provides that "[t]he terms 'sales' and 'sell' each include any contract to
sell or otherwise dispose of." Thus, a contract for the issuance or transfer of a
security may qualify as a sale under the securities laws even if the contract is
never fully performed. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d
166, 181 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941, 99 S.Ct. 2884, 61 L.Ed.2d
13
In Collins v. Rukin, 342 F.Supp. 1282 (D.Mass.1972), the court dealt with a
situation quite similar to this one, except for the immaterial distinction that the
contract involved stock options as well as stock, see supra note 2. Like Ms.
Yoder, the plaintiff there alleged that he was induced to accept employment
with the defendant at least partly on the basis of the latter's promises of stock
and stock options. In a thorough opinion the court held that a complaint
alleging fraudulent misrepresentation as to the value of the stock stated a claim
under Rule 10b-5, saying:
14 compelling reason has been suggested to this Court why one who, in the interest
No
of promoting his company and employing the most talented people in a particular
field, engages in fraudulent practices in connection with the offer or sale of securities
should enjoy any greater freedom from the operation of the federal securities laws
than one who perpetrates a fraud without promotional or employment motive.
15
Id. at 1287-88 (footnote omitted). The court also held that the plaintiff's
acceptance of employment and subsequent performance of services satisfied the
requirement of value imposed expressly by the Securities Act and assumed also
to be imposed by the Securities Exchange Act. 342 F.Supp. 1290. Although
Niederhoffer, Cross & Zeckhauser, Inc. v. Telstat Sys., Inc., 436 F.Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y.1977), dismissed a complaint that alleged a violation of Sec. 10(b)
from defendants' failure to pay plaintiff in securities for work performed for
defendants under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), its reasoning gives the Collins decision
added weight. In Niederhoffer, a "finder" in the field of corporate acquisitions
alleged breach of an agreement that it would receive a portion of the securities
of any corporation that acquired the defendant. The fraud alleged had nothing
to do with any particular security but related only to defendants' intention not to
comply with the agreement. Judge Conner expressly agreed with Collins v.
Rukin, supra, saying:
16
Collins v. Rukin, supra, upon which plaintiff relies, involved a very different
set of circumstances. The plaintiff there was offered a stock option by the
defendant corporation as an inducement to accept employment. In becoming a
party to the option contract--through his acceptance of the offer of
employment--the plaintiff was banking upon the continued financial health of
the corporation. His interest as an investor could hardly have been clearer.
17
18
In fact, this case does not require us to hold that an action under Rule 10b-5 can
be maintained whenever sufficient allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations
are made relating to stock where the plaintiff merely promises to work for a
defendant in return for the latter's promise to issue stock, whether with or
without the payment of a salary--although, as developed above, we see little
reason for not holding to that effect. Here the complaint alleged that Ms. Yoder
also transferred assets to Ortho-Nutrix, to wit, the name "Healthful Living," its
mailing list, copyrights on various publications, allergy-free recipes, special
diet plans, sources of allergy-free ingredients, programs for the management of
multiple food allergies and materials and proprietary information necessary to
develop a computerized allergy-free diet program. In order to affirm the
dismissal of her complaint, we should thus have to hold not merely that the
"context requires" that the antifraud provisions not apply to stock contracted to
be issued as compensation for services performed in connection with an
employment relationship, but also that it requires holding them inapplicable to
situations where an employment relationship forms a part of the consideration
for a contract to sell stock although assets are also transferred. This we are quite
unprepared to do.5
19
Appellees argue in the alternative that the complaint was properly dismissed on
a ground which the district court did not reach, namely, that the complaint did
not plead fraud with sufficient particularity, as required by F.R.Civ.P. 9(b). We
have held that the specificity requirement of Rule 9(b) is satisfied by
allegations that identify who made the misstatements, the occasions on which
these were made and the content of the misstatements. Zerman v. Ball, 735
F.2d 15, 22 (2d Cir.1984). While the allegations in the cause of action relating
to the violation of the federal securities laws might be insufficient in the last
respect if taken alone, the state law cause of action for fraud alleged that
defendants' representations as to the ability of Ortho-Nutrix to provide the
financial resources necessary to develop a computer-diet program and service
Healthful Living customers were false when made and known to be so in that
defendants knew or should have known that Ortho-Nutrix was in serious
financial difficulties and was unlikely to have sufficient funds in the foreseeable
future to meet its obligations to plaintiff. These allegations were sufficient to
state a claim that Ortho-Nutrix stock was not the sound security it was
represented to be. It is elementary that, on a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must be read as a whole, drawing all inferences favorable to the pleader. Conley
v. Gibson, supra, 355 U.S. at 47-48, 78 S.Ct. at 102-103. When such a generous
reading is given to this complaint, it was adequate to survive a Rule 9(b)
motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficient particularity. See Credit &
Finance Corp. Ltd. v. Warner & Swasey Co., 638 F.2d 563, 566 (2d Cir.1981).
Moreover, the Ortho-Nutrix quarterly reports to the SEC attached as exhibits to
the affidavit of plaintiff's attorney in support of plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction indicate that the complaint could readily have been
amended to afford greater particularity, and we have little doubt that the district
court should and would have permitted an amendment if it had reached the
issue here discussed. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 213 (2d
Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069, 98 S.Ct. 1249, 55 L.Ed.2d 771 (1978);
Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 547, 557-59 (2d Civ. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 2175, 64 L.Ed.2d 802 (1980).6 On remand, the
court should afford plaintiff an opportunity to do this.
20
The order dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Incentive:
"Computer Allergy Program"--Stock options will be based on gross annual
production; at $2 million gross sales per year 10,000 shares will be released; at
$3 million gross sales per year 10,000 additional shares will be released; at $4
million gross sales per year 10,000 additional shares will be released. (A total
of 30,000 shares of stock may be released).
Our references in this opinion to the Securities Act are not intended as taking
any position on the question whether there is an implied cause of action for
damages for violation of Sec. 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77q(a).
There is a split among the circuits that have addressed this question; compare,
e.g., Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th Cir.1977) (no
private cause of action), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98 S.Ct. 1281, 55 L.Ed.2d
792 (1978) and Landry v. All American Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 389-91
(5th Cir.1982) (same) with Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir.1975)
(private cause of action exists); and the Supreme Court has reserved answering
the question no less than three times, see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1924 n. 6, 44 L.Ed.2d 539
(1975); International B'hd of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 n. 9, 99
S.Ct. 790, 795 n. 9, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979); Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 103 S.Ct. 683, 685 n. 2, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983). In
Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 2821, 61 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979), this court held, in an opinion
characterized by Professor Loss as being "with no analysis," Fundamentals of
Securities Regulations 1149 (1983), that there was such a cause of action. This
We do not need here to rely on our decision in Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d
1139 (2 Cir.1982), which held that acquisition of a business by the purchase of
stock is subject to the securities laws, even though the transaction could have
been accomplished by a purchase of the assets. Here there was no way in which
Ms. Yoder could be given an equity position in Ortho-Nutrix except by her
acquisition of its stock. The conflict among the circuits over the sale of
business doctrine at issue in Golden, compare, e.g., Coffin v. Polishing
Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.) (sale of business is covered), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 868, 100 S.Ct. 142, 62 L.Ed.2d 92 (1979); Cole v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 680 F.2d 549 (8th Cir.1982) (same); Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d
496 (5th Cir.1983) (same) and Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3d
Cir.1984) (same) with King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir.1982) (sale of
business is not covered); Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir.1982) (same);
Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir.1983) and Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.1984), is currently awaiting resolution by the
Supreme Court. See Landreth Timber Co., supra, 731 F.2d 1348, cert. granted,
--- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 427, 83 L.Ed.2d 354 (1984); Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran,
supra, 737 F.2d 320, cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 428, 83 L.Ed.2d 355
6
Professors Moore and Lucas point out that complaints dismissed for failure to
satisfy Rule 9(b) are "almost always" dismissed with leave to amend. 2A
Moore & Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 9.03 at 9-34 (2d ed. 1984). In cases
where such leave was not granted, the plaintiff had already been afforded at
least one opportunity to plead fraud with greater specificity. See, e.g., Denny v.
Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470-71 (2d Cir.1978); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd.,
681 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir.1982); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 93-94
(2d Cir.1983). The plaintiff here has not sought to amend her complaint even
once