Influence of Nyssa On Eriugena

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BODY, SOUL, AND IMAGE:

GREGORY OF NYSSA'S INFLUENCE O N ERIUGENA
A D issertation
Subm itted to th e G raduate School

o f the U niversity of N otre Dame
In Partial Fulfillm ent of the Requirem ents
of the D egree of
D octor o f Philosophy
by
Joel Irving B arstad, B.A., M.A., M.M.S.
Stephen G ersh, D irector
M edieval Institute
N otre D am e, Indiana
Septem ber 1997
UMI Number: 9806436
Copyright 1997 by
Barstad, Joel Irving
All rights reserved.
UMI Microform 9806436

Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
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C op yright by
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1997
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BODY, SOUL, A N D IMAGE:

GREGORY OF NYSSA'S INFLUENCE O N ERIUGENA
A bstract
by
Joel Irving Barstad
This dissertation clarifies th e n atu re an d extent of G regory o f N yssa's
influence on E riugena. Research began w ith the identification o f those portions
of De opificio hominis, the only w o rk b y G regory know n to E riugena, w hich play
th e m ost direct role in E riugena's Periphyseon; and of those loci in E riugena's
th ou g ht w here he m akes use of G regory's authority. It then m oved to a them atic
analysis in w hich the philosophical and theological doctrines o f th e tw o authors
w ere com pared. To this conceptual analysis w as added the philological labor of
tran slating all quotations from G regory an d E riugena in o rder to identify any
significant issues arising from E riugena's translation of G regory's G reek text into
Latin. The fruits o f this research are presented using a them atic organization that
also follow s the general lines of developm ent in the Periphyseon. The
p resentation is both argum entative an d expository and highlights E riugena's
app rop riatio n and transform ation o f G regorian m aterial. This ap p ro p riatio n and
transform ation is illum ined by com parison w ith E riugena's u se o f other sources
w hen necessary. The dissertation dem onstrates th at th ro ughout th e Periphyseon,
E riugena's account of m an 's bodily existence, o f the relation o f so u l to body, and
of th e n atu re of the divine im age d ep en d heavily on G regory o f N yssa's view s
and authority. Eriugena approaches these doctrines w ith the conviction that
Joel Irving B arstad

m an 's tru e life is an angelic one. T his fundam ental presupposition is G regory's
m ost im p o rtan t contribution to E riugena's thought. The dissertatio n concludes
w ith the suggestion th a t fu rth er research should be devoted to considering
G regory's influence on Eriugena w ith in the historical context o f O rigenism and
the diverg en t w ays in w hich E astern a n d W estern orthodoxies d ealt w ith its
challenge.
To m y d ear w ife, Leslie,

an d to the children w ith w hom w e have
so far been en tru sted ,
G regory, N icholas, T im othy, Sophia, and Peter
the causes and th e cure
ii
TABLE OF C O N T E N T S
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................. vi
ESJTRODUCnON.............................................................................................................. 1
.1
G eneral approaches to E riugena's u se o f patristic sources................. 3
.2
E riugena's G reek patristic so u rc es.........................................................18
.3
M ethod and outline o f this s tu d y ...........................................................23
CHAPTER 1
MATTER AND BODY................................................ 33
1.1
Ex n ihilo...................................................................................................... 34
1.11
G regory's defense of creation ex n ih ilo ................................................ 37
1.12
E riugena's defense of creation ex n ih ilo ............................................... 44
1.2
M otion and re s t..........................................................................................53
1.3
A concourse of accidents...........................................................................64
1.31
G regory on the concourse of qualities and of elem ents......................65
1.32
The concourse of accidents in E riugena's theory o f body...................75
1.4
C onclusion...................................................................................................86
CHAPTER 2
BODY, SOUL, AND IMAGE............................................ 88
2.1
M ind and body according to G regory o f N yssa...................................90
2.11
Im age of the divine sovereignty.............................................................. 92
2.12
G regory's Platonic problem atic............................................................... 95
2.13
The problem o f receptivity.....................................................................100
2.131
The sim ile of the ly re ...............................................................................103
2.132
The analogy of th e seed.......................................................................... I l l
2.133
The m etaphor o f the m irror....................................................................115
2.14
T he un ity of the so u l............................................................................... 121
2.15
Bodily consequences of sin .................................................................... 127
2.2
Soul and body according to E riugena..................................................133
2.21
The created trin ity ................................................................................... 134
2.22
Sense as an essential m otion o f the s o u l..............................................139
2.221
The tw o paths o f sense know ledge....................................................... 142
2.222
A closer look a t the three m otions o f the soul.................................... 147
2.223
E riugena's solution to the problem o f receptivity............................. 152
2.224
The su peradd ed body............................................................................. 155
2.225
The distinction betw een m ortal and sp iritu al body.......................... 158
2.226
S piritual body and interior sense..........................................................163
2.23
Incom prehensibility of im age and arc h ety p e .................................... 164
2.3
C onclusion................................................................................................ 168
iii
CHAPTER 3
"LET US MAKE M A N ".............................................. 171
3.1
E riugena's exposition of the Sixth D ay............................................... 172
3.11
G regory o f N yssa's place in E riugena's exposition.......................... 177
32
G enus, species, and plerom a................................................................ 179
3.21
The h u m an plerom a and the divisions o f b ein g ................................181
3.22
U niversal life........................................................................................... 187
3.221
The arg u m en t for a universal life......................................................... 188
3.2211
Body, ouola, an d life............................................................................... 189
3.2212
P articip ation ............................................................................................ 195
3.2213
Inseparability o f n a tu re ......................................................................... 198
3.2214
S piritual b o d y ..........................................................................................200
3.222
Species o f universal life......................................................................... 201
3.223
W hat is life?..............................................................................................204
3.23
Survived o f species.................................................................................. 207
3.24
Species a n d in d ivid u als.........................................................................212
3.25
Causes a n d effects...................................................................................216
3.251
N ature a n d grace.................................................................................... 218
3.252
Saving th e effects, saving the causes....................................................224
3.26
C onclusion............................................................................................... .227
3.3
M an's kinship w ith the animeds............................................................229
3.31
G regory o n m an 's kinship w ith the b easts......................................... 230
3.32
E riugena o n m an 's kinship w ith the beasts.........................................235
3.321
The re tu rn of the w hole sensible w orld in m an................................ .249
3.33
C onclusion................................................................................................257
3.4
M an's eq u ality w ith the angels............................................................ 258
3.41
G regory's rejection of m icrocosm ism .................................................. 258
3.411
Sex and angelic life................................................................................. 262
3.42
M an and angel in the Periphyseon........................................................ 266
3.421
D ivisions an d causes of nature.............................................................267
3.4211
A u gustine's division o f n atu re............................................................. 273
3.4212
M axim us' division o f n a tu re ................................................................ 277
3.422
K now ledge an d existence..................................................................... 280
3.423
H ow the w o rld exists in m an and in a n g e l........................................ 283
3.43
C onclusion................................................................................................293
CHAPTER 4
RETURN TO PARADISE...........................................296
4.1
G regory o n P aradise and m an's retu rn ............................................... 302
4.11
The trees o f Paradise.............................................................................. 303
4.12
N ecessity o f th e retu rn to Paradise...................................................... 309
4.2
E riugena o n th e Paradise and retu rn o f hu m an n a tu re ................... 313
4.21
A once a n d fu tu re Paradise?................................................................. 319
4.22
U nification o f n a tu re .............................................................................. 323
4.23
The necessity o f th e retu rn .................................................................... 329
4.3
C onclusion................................................................................................335
iv
CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................337
BIBLIOGRAPHY...........................................................................................................345
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
W ith gratitude I acknow ledge m y d eb t to the M edieval In stitu te o f the
U niversity of N otre Dame for a D issertation Year Fellowship th a t go t m e going;
to The C olorado College for p u ttin g m e to w ork w hile I kept on going; an d to
A untie ReE ternal memory!w hose beq uest g o t us through. O f th e m any
people w ho encouraged, w orried, rebuked, and com m iserated along th e w ay, I
w ish to thank publicly m y director, S tephen G ersh, for his su p p o rt and high
stan d ard s; all m y students, friends, colleagues, and form er professors a t The
C olorado College, b u t especially O w en C ram er, Tim othy Fuller, C arol N eel, and
Joseph Pickle; tw o friends w ho m ade th e difference in the final year, M ichael
M arko an d John M cCarthy; and m y g reat com panion, Leslie C lark B arstad, who
show ed indefatigable courage, perseverance, and charity on a very long road. Of
course, w ithin and beyond all is the M ystery to w hom I owe all. G lory to Jesus
Christ!
vi
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation seeks to clarify th e nature and extent o f G regory o f
N yssa's influence on the th o u g h t o f John Scottus E riugena. It p u rsu es th is end
b y analyzing specific portions o f th eir texts and the philosophical and theological
them es th a t em erge from an d link those texts. In the course o f th is analysis,
som e progress w ill also be m ade in gauging G regory's im pact o n E riugena
relative to E riugena's other sources an d authorities, although any efforts in th at
direction are strictly secondary an d ancillary to the prim ary labor. The w ork
takes E riugena's explicit references to G regory in the Periphyseon1 as its startin g
p oint. These acknow ledged borrow ings touch m any aspects of E riugena
thought: his physical theory, h is psychology, his doctrine of the div in e im age in
m an, his view s on the relationship betw een hum an and angelic n atu res, his
in terp retatio n of Paradise, an d his understanding o f the process o f resurrection
1 Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae Periphyseon (De Diuisione Naturae), Books I-IH,

ed ited by I. P. Sheldon-W illiam s (w ith L. Beiler), Scriptores Latini Hibemiae 7 ,9 , &
11 (D ublin: D ublin In stitute fo r A dvanced Studies, 1968-1981). These texts are
referred to by the abbreviations PP I, PP 2, and PP 3. For the rem aining books, I
have used De Diuisione Naturae, Books 1-5, edited by H . J. Floss, in PL 122:4391022. The abbreviations, PP 4 an d PP 5, refer to Books 4 an d 5 o f th is text.
Since Sheldon-W illiam s' tex t includes the PL colum n num bers in his
edition, I have, for consistency's sake, used them instead of his page num bers in
m y citations.
Sheldon-W illiam s' tran slation o f the w hole text, Books 1-5, revised b y J.J.
O 'M eara, is also available as Periphyseon: Division o f Nature (M ontreal:
Bellarm in; W ashington: D um barton O aks, 1987).
The fourth volum e of th e critical edition has now appeared, b u t n o t in
tim e for m e to m ake use o f it.
an d retu rn b y w hich h u m anity m oves from its present bodily existence back to
th e u n ity o f its prim ordial causes.
E riugena's know ledge o f G regory o f N yssa's w ork w as lim ited to th e Ilepi
,z
KaTaotcevfis avQpumou (De opificio hominis) w hich he cites, in h is ow n translation,

as De imagine. 3 The task of com paring these tw o thinkers, then, consists
principally in com paring th e doctrine contained in De opificio hominis w ith th a t of
th e Periphyseon. M atters are com plicated by the fact th at about half-w ay through
th e Periphyseon E riugena begins to confuse G regory of N yssa w ith G regory of
N azianzus (the Theologian), fragm ents o f w hose w ritings w ere available to him
in the Ambigua ad lohannem o f M axim us the Confessor.4 D ue to th is confusion,
as w ell as to the fact th a t the th o u g h t of M axim us and of the tw o G regories are
them selves closely related, it becom es difficult from then on to distin gu ish
clearly w h at E riugena ow es to G regory o f N yssa from w hat he ow es to the other
G regory and his com m entator, a difficulty w hich can best be m et b y rem aining
2 For the G reek text o f th is w ork I have used the version found in PG 44:
125-256, a rep rin t of the editio Morelliana (1638). This text is referred to by the
abbreviation OH.
A ccording Philip Levine, 'T w o Early Versions of St. G regory o f N yssa's
Trepl KaTaoiceuns duGpomou," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 [1958] 482, n.
1), a far better edition is th at o f G. H . Forbes (B urntisland, 1858-1861), b u t I have
so far been unable to locate a copy.
3 M. C appuyns, "Le T )e im agine' d e G regoire de N ysse tra d u it p a r Jean
Scot E rigene," Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 32 (1965) 205-262. This
tex t is referred to by the abbreviation Imag.
4 E riugena's tran slatio n o f th is text has b een edited by E douard Jeauneau,
M axim i Confessoris Ambigua ad lohannem : iuxta lohannis Scotti Eriugenae Latinam
interpretationem (T um hout: B repols; Leuven: U niversity Press, 1988). This edition
is referred to by the abbreviation, Amh.; the G reek text of the PG is referred to as
Amb. (Grk).
focused o n w h at Eriugena ow es to the tex t of De imagine rath er th an on w h at he

attrib u tes to its author.
U n til n o w E riugena's dependence on G regory, though w ell an d frequently
acknow ledged, h as received only p a rtial tre a tm e n t There are studies identifying
the sources o f E riugena's quotations o f th e Fathers,5 as w ell as his role as
tran slato r^ there are studies th at consider his relation to his G reek patristic
sources generally;7 there are studies th a t expound E riugena's anthropology and,
5 C appuyns incorporated the earlier w ork o f Draseke and T hery into his
ow n Jean Scot Erigbte: sa vie, son ceuvre, sa pensee (Louvain and Paris, 1933; repr.
Brussels: C u ltu re e t C ivilisation, 1969). T he notes to the critical editio n and
G oulven M adec's Jean Scot et ses auteurs: Annotations erigeniennes (Paris: Etudes
A ugustiniennes, 1988) have since p ro v id ed m ore com plete identifications and
lists of citations an d sources.
6 E specially his translations o f (Pseudo-)D ionysius. See G. T hery, "Scot
Erigene in tro d u cteu r de Denys," The New Scholasticism 7 (1933), 91-108; L.
V ietorisz, Greek Sources in the 'Periphyseon' o f John Scotus, called Eriugena
(D issertation, Pontifical Institute o f M ediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1966); IP .
Sheldon-W illiam s, "E riugena's In terpretation of th e Ps. D ionysius," Studia
Patristica 12 (1975), 151-154; Paul M eyvaert, "E riugena's T ranslation of the Ad
Thalassium o f M axim us: Prelim inaries to an ed itio n o f this w ork," in The M ind o f
Eriugena. Papers o f a colloquium, Dublin, 14-18 July 1970, ed. John J. O 'M eara and
L udw ig Bieler (D ublin Irish U niversity Press, 1973), 78-88; Rene Roques,
"T raduction o u interpretation? Breves rem arques su r Jean Scot trad u cteu r de
D enys," in The M ind o f Eriugena, 59-77; R. Le Bourdelles, "C onnaissance d u Grec
e t m ethodes d e traduction dans le m onde carolingien ju squ 'a Scot Erigene," in
Jean Scot Erigene et Vhistoire de la philosophie. Colloque du C.N.R.S., Laon,juillet 1975,
ed. Rene R oques (Paris: C entre national d e la recherche sdentifique, 1977), 117123; E douard Jeauneau, "La traduction erigenienne des Ambigua de M axim e le
C o n fesseu r Thom as G ale (1636-1702) e t le Codex Remensis," in Jean Scot Erigene et
Vhistoire de la philosophie, 135-144; Jean P epin, 'J e a n Scot trad ucteu r d e Denys:
L'Exem ple d e la Lettre DC," in Jean Scot ecrivain. Actes du IVe Colloque international,
Montreal, 28 aout-2 septembre 1983, ed. G .-H . A llard (M ontreal: Bellarm in; Paris:
Vrin, 1986), 129-142.
7 See especially, E douard Jeauneau, "Pseudo-D ionysius, G regory of
N yssa, a n d M axim us Confessor in the W orks o f John Scottus E riugena," in
Carolingian Essays, ed. Uta-Renate B lum enthal (W ashington: C atholic U niversity
(continued o n next page)
3
in doing so, indicate G reg ory s place w ith in it;8 b u t no one has m ade a system atic
com parison o f G regory of N yssa's th o u g h t w ith th a t of Eriugena.9 A m ore
detailed ap preciatio n o f E riugena's u se o f G regory w ill contribute n o t only to the
history o f philosophy, b u t also, and perh ap s m ore significantly, to th e history of
theology; in p articu lar, to the history o f th e divergence of L atin C atholicism from
Byzantine O rthodoxy.
Before saying m ore about the m ethod and content of these pages, it w ill be
useful to su rv ey previous view s on E riugena's relationship to his sources and to
Gregory of N yssa in particular.
of A m erica P ress, 1983), 137-149; I. P. Sheldon-W illiam s, "The G reek C hristian
Platonist T radition from the C ap pad od an s to M axim us and E riugena," in The
Cambridge H istory o f Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H .
A rm strong (C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1967), 425-537; I. P.
Sheldon-W illiam s, "E riugena's G reek Sources," in The M ind o f Eriugena, ed.
O 'M eara an d Bieler, 1-15.
8 See especially, Brian Stock, "The Philosophical A nthropology of
Johannes Scottus E riugena," Studi Medievali, 3a serie 8 (1967), 1-57; W illem ien
O tten, The Anthropology o f Johannes Scottus Eriugena (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991).
9 E do u ard Jeauneau, "La division des sexes chez G regoire de N ysse et
chez Jean Scot E rigene," in Eriugena: Studien zu seinen Quellen. Vortrdge des in.
Intemationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums, Freiberg im Breisgau, 27-30. A ugust 1979,
ed. W erner B eierw altes (H eidelberg: C arl W inter; U niversitatsverlag, 1980), 3354, and M ario N aldini, "G regorio N isseno e G iovanni Scoto Eriugena: N ote
sull'idea d i creazione e sull'antropologia," Studi Medievali, 3a serie 2 0 ,2 (1979),
501-533, m ove in this direction. The form er focuses o n one im portant them e; the
latter com pares the th o u g h t of G regory an d E riugena in broad strokes th at do not
reveal the influence of the one on the other, o r the transform ation of th e one by
the other, in th e detail for w hich this thesis strives.
G en era l a p p roach es to E riu g en a 's u se o f p a tr istic

so u rc es
B ernard M cGinn notes, in his in tro d u ctio n to a recent collection of essays
on E riugena's place w ithin th e history o f Latin-B yzantine relations,10 th at

E riugena is an em inent ecum enical figure an d an exam ple o f the kind of
catholicity o f m ind required for th e reu n io n o f the tw o traditions, trad itio ns
w hich w ere poised for schism in E riugena's ow n tim e. W hile E riugena's
philosophical and theological achievem ent does n o t pave the w ay to the
solutions sought today, an appreciation o f how he u sed and developed th e ideas
he fo un d in his diverse Greek and L atin sources, an d of the difficulties he
encountered in reconciling them , can be a valuable lesson in the d ep th and
com plexity of the issues stirred u p , then as now , by hope for a fruitful u n io n of
E astern an d W estern C hristianity.
E riugena's achievem ent is significant because it draw s its conceptual
m aterial from both traditions, w restles w ith the tensions betw een the traditions,
and m akes som e contribution tow ard th e resolution o f those tensions. The
ecum enical approach to E riugena's use o f his sources focuses on these elem ents
in his th o u g h t and assesses them in the lig h t of the w hole subsequent h isto ry of
these trad ition s and th e controversies th a t hav e e ru p ted w ithin and betw een
them . The ecum enical approach thus sets E riugena's achievem ent w ithin th e
horizon o f com peting accounts of w hat constitutes orthodox C hristianity.
G regory of N yssa has an especially significant role w ithin E riugena's
achievem ent becauseif for no other reasonE riugena uses him as the
10 Introduction to Eriugena: East and W est Papers o f the Eighth International

Colloquium o f the Society for the Promotion ofEriugenian Studies, Chicago and Notre
Dame, 18-20 October 1991, ed. by B ernard M cG inn an d W illem ien O tten (N otre
Dam e, Ind.: U niversity o f N otre Dam e Press, 1994), 1-14.
spokesm an for "th e G reeks" and, m ore particularly, as a counterpoise to the

m assive au th o rity o f A ugustine of H ippo. A t issue is th e doctrine o f m an an d the
interpretation o f the biblical revelation regarding m an 's origin and the original
state of his n atu re.
In sid ing w ith th e G reeks, Eriugena adopts w h a t John M eyendorff calls a
"theocentric anthropology" over against a view o f h u m an n atu re in w hich the
divine life o f com m union w ith G od is a donum superadditum rather th an "a
constitutive elem ent o f tru e hum anity."11 M eyendorff does n o t regard E riugena
as finally successful in bridging the intellectual gap betw een the O rthodox and
Catholic traditio n s because th e N eoplatonic m onism u n d er girding his system
does n o t su p p o rt the full O rthodox doctrine o f C reation, w hich was elaborated
w ithin a C hristological context in the course o f the Seven Ecum enical Councils.
He nonetheless acknow ledges Eriugena as "a lonely, b u t prophetic and
pow erful, voice, searching for the right solutions," w ho deserves to be
11John M eyendorff, "Rem arks on Eastern P atristic T hought in John

Scottus E riugena," in Eriugena: East and West, ed. M cG inn and O tten, 55.
M eyendorff m akes no claim to be a scholar of E riugena. H is rem arks, how ever,
are valuable, an d so receive th e attention they do here, because he evaluates
Eriugena in term s o f his broader critique of L atin theology w hich does lie w ith in
the m ain sphere o f his scholarly w ork. H is view s offer a prima facie reading of
Eriugena in term s of later O rthodoxy, a reading w hich has particular value for
fram ing discussions of E riugena's ecum enical significance. H is com m ents do n o t
help one p en etrate E riugena's thought very for and for its ow n sake, perhaps,
except insofar as th e issues w hich he finds generally significant are also
significant for u n d erstan d in g the deep structures o f E riugena's thought. For
exam ple, M eyendorff's contrast betw een a "theocentric anthropology" and th e
donum superadditum belongs properly to a polem ic ag ain st certain developm ents
in Latin scholasticism ; nonetheless, it does highlight issues w ith sim ilar or related
structures th at are significant for assessing E riugena's p o sition w ith respect to his
G reek and L atin p atristic sources.
rediscovered by those w h o desire to undertake the sam e task w hich had p roved
"m uch too v ast to be h an d led b y his lonely, isolated genius."12
No one has m ore eloquently described the fate o f th is lonely genius than I.
P. Sheldon-W illiam s, in h is Forw ard to the first volum e o f th e critical edition of
Periphyseon, as h e describes his ow n interest in this rem arkable figure.
The interest lies in th e fascinating spectacle o f this elusive and
controversial Irishm an gliding in and o u t o f die sh ad o w s o f official
disapproval; d istin g u ish ed enough as a young m an to be invited by
prelates to d efend th e Faith against heresy; th ro w ing him self w ith such
abandon into th e task th a t his attack upon dam nable doctrine leant so far
the other w ay as to be itself condem ned;13 recovering from this setback
sufficiently to be com m issioned by his K ing w ith th e solem n task of
translating into L atin th e w orks ascribed to th e P atro n Saint o f France;14
falling as a consequence so com pletely u n d er the sp ell o f th e Platonizing
theology of the G reeks th a t he and all his w orks w ere declared anathem a;
vanishing th ereafter into an oblivion fitfully illum ined b y the lurid glow
reflected by the sub seq u ent heresies th at w ere fath ered u p o n him;15 and
12 M eyendorff, "R em arks," 66.

13 Eriugena w as com m issioned to w rite a refutation o f G ottscalc's doctrine
of double predestination, w hich he d id in his De praedestinatione: PL 122:347-440
and lohannis Scotti De Divina Praedestinatione Liber, ed ited b y G oulven M adec,
C orpus C hristianorum C ontinuatio M ediaeualia, 50 (T um hout: Brepols, 1978).
A n appendix in the latter ed itio n contains the list of the erro rs detected in De
praedestinatione by F loras a n d Prudentius.
14 (Pseudo-) D ionysius the A reopagite, identified in E riugena's day w ith
D ionysius of Paris.
15 For exam ple, A m alric of Bena and his follow ers w h o w ere condem ned
in the Decree o f 1210 and a t the F ourth Lateran C ouncil (1215). E riugena, from
w hom Am alric derived h is teachings, shared in this fate. See G. C. Capelle,
A utour du decret de 1210: UL Am aury de Bene; ttiid e sur son pantheisme formel (Paris:
V rin, 1932). For a fu ller account and docum entation o f E riugena's
condem nation, see C ap pu y ns, Jean Scot, 247 ff.
A ccording to a tex t b y H enry Suso (Capelle, Am aury de Bene, 94), the
Periphyseon contains m any heresies, the chief o f w hich are: 1) quod omnia sunt
Deus; 2) quod primordiales causae creant et creantur; 3) quod post consummationem
seculi erit adunatio sexuum, sive non erit distinctio sexus. E riugena h as been cleared
7
finally, after being rescued from th at by the publication o f the first edition
of his m asterpiece a t th e en d of the seventeenth century, placed upon the
Index w ithin four years o f th e publication; w here he rem ained.16
The theological an d anthropological issues involved in th e "spell of the
Platonizing theology o f th e G reeks" are o f interest n o t only to those engaged in
th e C atholic-O rthodox dialogue, b u t also lie a t the h e art o f the efforts tow ard
ressourcement w hich preceded the Second Vatican C ouncil. It is surely no
accident th at C atholic theologians like H enri de Lubac,17 H ans U rs von
B althasar,18 and Jean D anielou19 w ere rediscovering th e theocentric anthropology
of the cruder form s o f pantheism espoused by A m alric an d others, b u t these
three points sum m arize w ell th e essential points of tension betw een E riugena's
thought and the traditional orthodoxies o f both Latin a n d G reek churches.
16 "Forew ord and A cknow ledgem ents," PP 1, vii.
17C onsider Sumaturel: Etudes historique (Paris: A ubier, 1946), w hich w as
revised as Le mystere du sum aturel (Paris: Aubier, 1965), tran slated into English as
The M ystery o f the Supernatural (N ew York: H erder & H erder, 1967); Catholicisme:
les aspects sociaux du dogme (Paris: Les Editions d u Cerf, 1957), translated as
Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny o f Man (T um bridge W ells: Bum s &
O ats, 1950; San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988); the distinguished series o f texts
and translations, Sources chretiennes, w hich he and Jean D anielou founded in
1942; and Memoire sur I'occasion de mes ecrits (N am ur C u ltu re e t Verite, 1989),
translated as A t the Service o f the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the
Circumstances that Occasioned His W ritings (San Francisco: C om m unio
B ooks/Ignatius Press, 1993).
18 Especially: Presence et pensee: Essai sur la philosophie religieuse de Gregoire
de Nysse (Paris: Beauchesne, 1942; 2nd ed., 1988), translated as Presence and
Thought: An essay on the religious philosophy of Gregory o f Nyssa, trans. Marc
Sebanc (San Francisco: C om m unio B ooks/Ignatius Press, 1995; Kosmische
Liturgie: Hohe und Krise des griechischen Weltbildes bei M aximus Confessor (Freiberg:
H erder, 1941), 2nd, com pletely revised ed.: Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbilt des
M axim us' des Bekenners (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1961); and M ein Werk
Durchblicke (Einsiedeln: Johannes V erlag, 1990), tran slated as M y Work in
Retrospect (San Frandsco: C om m unio B ooks/Ignatius P ress, 1993).
Balthasar gives a sh o rt assessm ent o f E riugena' th o u g h t in Herrlichkeit:
Eine theologische Asthetik, Band HI, 1: Im Raum der M etiphysik, Teil L Alterium
(Einsiedeln: Johannes V erlag, 1967), translated as The Glory o f the Lord: A
(continued on next page)
8
o f the Greek Fathers in th e sam e period of ferm ent in w hich Eriugena him self
w as being rediscovered b y D om M aieul C appuyns an d others. Eriugena and his
G reek sources dem and th a t the understanding o f h u m an n atu re be understood
n o t m erely in the context o f m an 's creation as the im age o f G od, b u t that this
creation itself be placed w ith in a T rinitarian and C hristological perspective. The
fathers of the Second V atican C ouncil acknow ledged this need w hen they w rote
th at "only in the m ystery o f the incarnate W ord does the m ystery of m an take on
light" and th at C hrist "fu lly reveals m an to m an him self."20
The theocentric, ev en C hristocentric, anthropology th a t Eriugena learned
from the G reeks and h is o w n originality in developing it fu rth er thus take on a
kind of contem poraneity w ith the recent theological discourse regarding m an.
This dissertation does n o t presum e to enter directly into this discourse, b u t hopes
to contribute to it in a m odest w ay by exam ining the thread s and patterns of
thought that connect E riugena to m ore authoritative figures in the C hristian
theological tradition, an d in particular, to the "Father of Fathers," G regory of
N yssa.21
One dim ension, th en , of th e ecum enical approach to E riugena concerns
his value as a representative (good or bad) of orthodoxy and as an interpreter of
theological Aesthetics, IV: The Realm o f Metaphysics in A ntiquity (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1989), 343-355.
19O f special in terest to this study is his Platonisme et theologie mystique:
Doctrine spirituelle de Saint Gregoire de Nysse (Paris: A ubier, 1944). H e also
published m any articles o n G regory du ring the '50s an d '60s, a group of w hich
w as published as L'Etre et le temps chez Gregoire de Nysse (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970).
20 Gaudium et spes, 22.
21 Balthasar, on the first page of his Introduction to Presence et pensee,
rem inds us of this title giv en to G regory by Nicea II (787); M ansi 13:293.
o th er such representatives. A less polem ical dim ension em erges w hen a m ore
literary question is asked: H ow does E riugena him self use, regard , and reconcile
th e acknow ledged representatives o f orthodoxy o f his day?
E riugena's use o f the Fathers of the C hurch is a reg ular topos of Eriugenian
scholarship. C ap p u y n s' classic 1933 stu d y o f E riugena22 provides a basic list of
E riugena's p atristic citations23 consolidating th e earlier labors o f scholars like
M. D raseke and P. Theryan d sum m arizes his view s o n the n atu re of patristic
authority.24 This la tter kind of investigation allow s one to exam ine, w ithin this
one historical field o f view , the conception o f "orthodoxy" as such, or at least
those issues o f au th ority th a t are intim ately connected w ith it.
For E riugena th e Fathers have authority as interpreters of Scripture, w hich
is itself die suprem e authority. It is m ainly as guides to un d erstand in g Scripture
th at E riugena tu rn s to them . The richness o f E riugena's know ledge of the
Fathers, and especially such differences as are evid ent betw een his Greek and
Latin authors, p rev en t him from sustaining a sim ple unanim ity am ong them .
W hen their interpretations are contradictory on p o in ts critical to his
investigation, E riugena m u st have recourse to criteria o th er th an their authority
22 C appuyns, Jean Scot.

23 C appuyns, Jean Scot, 387-392. G oulven M adec has developed and
refined this list w ith his ow n catalog of passages in w hich E riugena m akes
"appel a quelque au torite," w hich appeared first in his 'Je a n Scot et ses auteurs,"
in Jean Scot ecrivain, ed. A llard, 143-186, b u t w hich is republished together w ith
other of M adec's articles concerning E riugena's sources in Jean Scot et ses auteurs.
A dditional references are pro v ided by Sheldon-W illiam s' notes to the first three
books of the Periphyseon.
24 C appuyns, Jean Scot, 280 ff.
10
to determ ine the relative v alu e o f th eir interpretations o f Scripture;25 bu t even in

such cases, in w hich his preference for one interpretation o v er another is d ear, he
avoids bringing them into d irect contradiction o r opposing his ow n view s to
theirs.
E riugena achieves th is nonconfrontation, first, by a n appeal to the
diversity of senses in the Scriptures, th e infinity o f m eanings th a t can be draw n
from it. M ore especially, how ever, h e does so by distin g uish in g tw o levels o f
S criptural exposition. A t th e first level the exegete ad ap ts him self to ordinary
language and the capacity o f o rd in ary readers o r listeners; a t the second level the
in terp reter of Scripture expounds th e deeper m eaning of th e text for those
capable of receiving it. E riugena's obvious preference for G reek Fathers like
G regory and M axim us finds its justification, on one occasion a t least, in the
generalization th a t the G reeks penetrate m ore deeply into th e m eaning of
things.26
Be th at as it m ay, th e fundam ental solution to the difficulty of reconciling
or choosing betw een different interpretations, C appuyns explains, lies still
elsew here, in the conviction th at tru e authority cannot contradict rig h t reason b u t
in fact follow s from it. The Fathers have discovered th e tru th throu g h the
exercise o f right reason an d then com m itted th eir findings to w riting.
C onsequently, w hen th e F athers difrier am ong them selves, E riugena feels him self
free to choose w hichever view seem s best in lig h t of his ow n investigation of
S cripture.27
25 Ibid., 284.
26 Ibid., 285-287; PP 5 :955A.
27 Ibid., 287-290; PP 2 :548D-549A: non tamen prohibemur eligere quod magis
11
E riu g en a's choices fall to w ard the G reeks, especially, D ionysius,

M axim us, an d G regory. C harles d ie Bald h ad asked him to translate the works
of D ionysius an d later, those of M axim us Confessor. To these h e ad d ed
tran slatio n s of G regory of N yssa's De opificio hominis and p a rt, a t least, of
E p ip h an iu s' Ancoratus. This acquaintance, says C appuyns, p ro v ed intoxicating,
and in an y contest betw een a G reek and a L atin authority, E riu g en a's sym pathies
alw ays lay w ith th e Greek.
Le contact des Grecs a litteralem ente grise son esp rit. II parle du
sacrum Graecorum nectar, d u fans christiferum Patrum, d es "sources tres
p u res, tres abondantes, tres illustres des Grecs"; e t il e st convaincu qu'en
les ren d a n t accessibles, il travaille a "accroitre 1'edification d e la foi", a
"eclairer la foi catholique". L orsqu'un Pere latin e st e n d isacco rd avec les
G recs, sa cause est vite jugee: il a to r t C ertes, on p re n d ra des
m anagem ents infinis p o u r form uler la sentence; car il n e fau t pas qu'on
p araisse ne suivre que les G recs, sans tenir aucun com pte d es ecrivains
latin s.28
D erm ot M oran's m ore recent survey o f E riugena's p hilosophy29
approaches E riugena's relations to the Fathers from a rath er different
perspective. E riugena's C hristian G reek sources interest M oran prim arily insofar
as they p ro v id ed Eriugena, no t w ith access to the "pure and a b u n d an t sources"
of the C atholic Faith, but to "the q u ite un u su al outlook o f late antiquity." The
distin ctiv e features o f that outlook, notes M oran, are m ost ev id en t in the notion
of reality as a series of causes and effects, in w hich effects rem ain in, proceed
from , an d retu rn to their causes and in so doing give rise to o th er effects related
videtur divinis eloquiis rationis considerations convenire.
28 Ib id ., 180-181.
29 D erm ot M oran, The Philosophy o f John Scottus Eriugena: A study o f idealism
in the M iddle Ages (Cam bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1989).
12
to them according to the sam e dynam ic.30 For M oran, the significance of
E riugena's ado p tio n o f this kind o f hierarchical m etaphysics lies in the fact th at
he thus escaped "a reified ontological schem e," w hich allow s for his idealism
and his "deconstruction of the m etaphysics o f substance."31
C onsequently, M oran's ch ap ter o n "E riugena's Sources" concentrates on
E riugena's relation to the N eoplatonic th o u g h t o f pagan antiquity. "E riugena's
m ain concern is in fact to integrate in to a single coherent system th e diverse
N eoplatonism s h e received from G reek an d L atin authorities as the tru th of
C hristianity and the m eaning o f n atu re itself." N ot th at he th o u g h t o f him self as
a "N eoplatonist," o f course; he w as sim ply a practitioner "of vera philosophia, true
philosophy, th e tru th as given to reason."32
E riugena's contact w ith such figures as Plato, Plotinus, an d P ro d u s w as
m ediated alm ost entirely through C h ristian sources. Plotinian echoes derive
from his know ledge of Basil, G regory o f N yssa, and G regory o f N azianzus, on
the G reek side, an d A m brose an d A ugustine, on the Latin. Parallels w ith
P rodus, P orphyry, and Iam blichus are d u e to the influence of Pseudo-D ionysius.
Indirect as these contacts w ere, E riugena's th ought is dosely linked to these later
N eoplatonists. "[I]t is as if E riugena w ere reinventing the theses an d them es o f a
30 E riugena's place w ithin this trad itio n of thought is set fo rth by Stephen
G ersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena (Leiden: Brill, 1978), to w hom M oran
acknow ledges his debt. For a general overview o f late-antique philosophy, see
A rm strong, Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy; and for th e C hristian
philosophical trad itio n leading to E riugena, Sheldon-W illiam s, "G reek C hristian
Platonist T radition."
31 M oran, Philosophy, 122.
32 Ibid., 103-104.
13
N eoplatonism w hich had been lost an d forgotten, and w ere able thro u g h
fragm ents an d com m entaries to retrieve th e 'authentic sp irit' of N eoplatonism ."33
M iddle Platonic thought w as available to him through Latin translations
o f O rigen and through the influence o f O rigen an d Philo on the C ap p ad o d an s
and A m brose. H e also had a t hand later L atin N eoplatonists like B oethius,
M acrobius, M artianus Capella, and pro b ab ly M arius Victorinus.34
M oran considers A ugustine's influence o n Eriugena to be deep an d
pervasive, contributing to his idealistic outlook. For E riugena's A ugustine is not
that of the Scholastics. A lthough m odem scholars ten d to attribute E riugena's
idealism to his G reek sources, "A ugustine him self can be interpreted in a
strongly id ealist and intellectualist light." W herever possible Eriugena uncovers
the u n ity betw een A ugustine and the G reek Fathers, although at tim es h is
reading seem s forced, even violent.
E riugena's entire philosophical com m itm ent is a grand a ttem p t to
show the underlying deep unity a n d agreem ent betw een the C hristian
system s of G reek East and L atin W est, system s w hich seem ed so d isp arate
to th e L atin m ind of th at age. In p articu lar, he w ants to show the in n er
harm ony betw een the w ritings o f A ugustine, on the one han d , an d the
Pseudo-D ionysius, the C ap p ad o d an fathers, and M axim us, on the other.
... E riugena is aw are th at to achieve this aim he w ill have to apply a
herm eneutic m ethod w hich w ill seem to d isto rt A ugustine.35
E riugena's d ep artures from A ugustine, says M oran, and die slan t he gives w hen
interpreting him are tow ard an even m ore im m aterialist and intellectualist form
of thought.
33 Ibid., 106.
34 Ibid., 107-110. See also G ustavo A . Piem onte, "L'Expression 'Q uae su n t
et quae non su n t': Jean Scot et M arius V ictorinus," in Jean Scot ecrivain, ed. A llard,
81-113.
35 Ibid., 115.
14
W hen M oran turns to the influence o f G reek C hristian w riters, he

em phasizes th e fact th a t Eriugena read these G reek sources as a single b o d y of
doctrine a n d th at, consequently, it is d ifficult to identify individual influences,
especially o f th e tw o Gregories, as E riugena reduces them to one G regory w hose
com m entator is M aximus.36 H e does, how ever, suggest G regory of N y ssa as
E riugena's source for "the idea o f m atter a s a com m ingling of incorporeal
qualities, th e concept of the infinite progression of th e soul in the after-life, an d of
course the id ea o f d ie post-lapsarian d ivision o f d ie soul into tw o sexes."37 In
M oran's perspective, w hat is significant in E riu gen a's relationship to h is G reek
sources is th e connection they provided h im to the philosophical m ovem ents of
pagan L ate-A ntiquity.
As n o ted above, M eyendorff regards E riugena as an im portant ecum enical
figure, genuinely interested in the theological in terpretation of C hristian
revelation an d an exceptional stu den t o f th e B yzantine tradition. H e nonetheless
draw s atten tio n to E riugena's deficiencies as an in terp reter of th at trad itio n .
A fter sum m arizing Eriugena's principal d eb ts to h is G reek sources as
constituting a "theocentric anthropology," w hich sets him ap art from th e
m ainstream o f L atin theology, he observes th a t this anthropology draw s heavily
on the philosophical resources of N eoplatonism m ade available to him th ro u g h
36 Ibid., 116-117: "It w ould be an im possible task to sift through

E riugena's w o rk try in g to detect the in d iv id u al influences of each of the
C ap p ad o d an s, esp ed ally w hen G regory o f N yssa's De hominis opificio w as
w ritten to su p p lem en t Basil's Hexaemeron a n d E riugena relied m ost heavily on
these tw o related w orks. Furtherm ore, E riugena m erged the tw o G regories and
saw M axim us as a com m entator on them . H ence h e thought of these d iverse
sources as o n e b o d y of thought" (p. 117). Cf. PP 4 :808A.
37 Ib id., 117.
15
his G reek sources. Too heavily. By w orking only w ith the m ost richly
N eoplatonic p o rtio ns of the tradition, E riugena m isses other, balancing currents
w ithin the trad itio n , currents th at preserved a m ore biblical anthropology o f m an
as a psychosom atic w hole w hose center is th e "h eart" and so refused to reduce
the divine im age to the "m ind" (rous) alone. This lack, M eyendorff claim s, biases
his reading o f th e Fathers in a m ore exclusively N eoplatonic direction th an a
fuller acquaintance w ould have allow ed. H ere th e ecum enical approach and die
history o f philosophy approach to E riugena's use o f patristic sources intersect.
E riugena's p iety tow ard his authorities, for th e sake of w hich h e preferred
even to d isto rt their teachings rather th an contradict them o r oppose them to
each other, a n d h is em phasize on rig h t reason as the norm for choosing am ong
their doctrines, w hen they differ, leave him op en to a rationalist interpretation
that perh ap s underestim ates the tru ly C hristian character of his thought and
reduces his p iety to a disingenuous rhetoric.39 N onetheless, the kind of
38 This is th e direction taken by O tten, Anthropology: "Thus E riugena's

descriptive u n iverse appears successfully to encroach o n the infinite universe of
natura, w hich originated w ith G od's creation. H ow ever, this also m eans th at, in a
sense, the d iv in e original now has to give w ay to its descriptive counterpart.
W hat w e are left w ith instead is th e sheer p ro d u ct of creative hum an artistry " (p.
219). O tten can ad o p t this view , I w ould argue, because she has no t fully
appreciated th e C hristological context w ith in w hich E riugena consistently places
his anthropology, o r perhaps because she assesses his C hristology differently.
Cf. the view s o f M arcia L. Colish, 'Jo h n the Scot's C hristology and Soteriology in
Relation to H is G reek Sources," Downside Review 100 (A pr 1982), 138-151, and
D onald F. D uclow , "D ialectic and C hristology in E riugena's Periphyseon,"
Dionysius 4 (Dec 1980), 99-117. The latter is, I believe, correct in his conclusion
that "E riugena's C hristology is n o t only rem arkable, b u t also central to the entire
dialectic of Periphyseon" (p. 100).
39 O r a dialectical exercise preparatory to casting aside the restraints of
authority, as is argued by J. C. M arler, "D ialectical U se o f A uthority in the
Periphyseon," in Eriugena: East and West, ed. M cG inn an d O tten, 95-113.
16
interpretation offered by C appuyns, an d refined in a recent article by G iulio

D 'O nofrio;40 as w ell as echoed b y M eyendorff, show s a fuller sym pathy w ith
E riugena's ow n intention, w hich is to uncover the true m eaning o f th e divine
revelation, as found in both Scripture and sensible nature. The insig h t, w hich he
attributes to th e soaring w ings o f John th e Evangelist,41 th at th e W ord w ho
becam e flesh is precisely the sam e W ord thro u gh w hom all th ing s w ere m ade,
seem s to be th e central affirm ation o f his ow n philosophical an d theological
synthesis, creating a subtle balance betw een the claims of both reason and
authority, b u t a t th e sam e tim e opening the w ay to a deeper u n ity o f thought, or
rather, to an astonishing vision of th e w orld unified and transfigured, as it exists
even now in C hrist.
The risen C hrist now already fills d ie w orld, so th at "only a m adm an
could say th a t his body is contained w ithin the w orld": b o ld ly Erigena
explodes the w hole picture o f th e co sm o s... and subordinates it to an
unim aginable ideal or archaic firm am en t Carefully, patien tly , b u t
inexorably, he dem ythologises th e eschatology w orked o u t in cosm ic
categories b y m any a C hurch father (Basil, A ugustine) in o rd er to m ake
room th ro u g h the philosophy o f A ntiquity for an ultim ate vision of the
w hole C hrist in the harmonia compacta... o f the "m anifold enfolded into
un ity ." So everything is resolved into a gloria o f G od m anifesting him self
in C hrist w ho as flamma ultima totum mundum implebit in th e claritas
manifestationis in omnibus ["as the last flam e w ill fill the w hole w orld in the
brightness of his m anifestation in all things."]42
40 G iulio d'O nofrio, "The C oncordia o f A ugustine and D ionysius: Tow ard
a H erm eneutic o f th e D isagreem ent o f Patristic soures in John the Scot's
Periphyseon," in Eriugena: East and West, ed. McGinn and O tten, 115-140.
41 Homelia in prologum Sancti Evangelii secundum Joannem, 3; G iovanni
Scoto, II Prologo di Giovanni, a cura d i M arta C ristiani ([n.p.]: Fondazione Lorenzo
Valla; A m oldo M ondadori Editore, 1987), 12. For an E nglish translation, see
John J. O 'M eara, Eriugena (Oxford: C larendon Press, 1988), 158-176.
42 B althasar, Glory of the Lord IV: Metaphysics in A ntiquity, 351.
17
.2
Eriugena's G reek patristic sources

E douard Jeauneau has said th a t "[t]he im portance an d , in d eed , the
originality o f John Scottus lay in the fact th at he w as, a t once, a tran slato r and a
thinker, a philologist an d a philosopher. He w as a thinker w h o , seeking to
invigorate his tho ught b y recourse to Greek sources, becam e a tran slator." Thus,
he says, E riugena's relation to these sources is not a m atter of philological
interest m erely. W hen one considers the disparity "betw een G reek texts
painfully and often poorly translated and a sophisticated set o f philosophical
speculations inspired by them ," one confronts the "m ystery in h eren t in the
philosopher's act o f creation."43 This invigorating encounter w ith th ree G reek
Fathers w as an event, fortuitous and progressive, w hose developm ent sheds
light on th e relative im pact o f each on E riugena's thought. Jeauneau offers the
follow ing reconstruction o f this encounter.44
A t the com m and o f C harles the Bald, Eriugena undertook a translation of
the w orks o f D ionysius the A reopagite45 to replace one m ade th irty years earlier
43 Jeauneau, "Pseudo-D ionysius," 139; Sheldon-W illiam s, "G reek

Sources," 1-15, gives a sim ilar account. They differ in their ev aluation of the
relative im pact o f each au th o r on E riugena's thought, w ith Jeauneau yielding a
m ore significant role to M axim us th an does Sheldon-W illiam s, w ho sees PsD ionysius as greatly overshadow ing the others, rem aining "E riugena's prim ary
source and the m ain govem er o f his thought from the m om ent th a t he read him "
(p. 14).
44 Jeauneau, "Pseudo-D ionysius," 140-143.
45 The G reek text o f the corpus is found in PG 3 and in a n ew critical
edition, Beate Regina Suchla, ed., Corpus Dionysiacum, 2 vols. (B erlin/N ew York:
de G ruyter, 1990-). E riugena's Versio operum S. Dionysii is found in PL 122:10231194; see also, H . F. D ondaine, Le Corpus dionysien de V Universite de Paris au xiiie
siecle (Rome: Edizione d i storia e letteratura, 1953). For a com plete E nglish
translation, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, transl. Colm L uibheid,
Classics of W estern S pirituality (M ahw ah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1987).
18
by H ilduin, A bbot o f Saint-Denys, w hen Louis the Pious received a codex of

those w orks from th e Byzantine E m peror in 827. The translation w as criticized
by A nastasius, librarian to the H oly See, w ho included w ith his corrections
certain glosses b y M axim us Confessor. Jeauneau suggests th at these scholia
piqued E riugena's interest and perh ap s led to the translation of M axim us'
Ambigua ad lohannem, w hich Eriugena m ade, again at the behest o f th e king.46
Eriugena fo u n d in M aximus som eone w ho could clarify for him th e obscurities of
D ionysius' tho u gh t.
H aving been led from D ionysius to M axim us, E riugena n o w found
him self d raw n from M axim us to G regory of N yssa. The Ambigua ad lohannem is
a set of explanations of difficult passages in die w orks of G regory o f N azianzus.
Jeauneau finds it n atu ral that E riugena, considering the high esteem in w hich
M axim us h eld the Theologian, should seek o u t w orks by him . C onfusing
G regory N azianzen w ith G regory N yssen, E riugena m istakenly found th is desire
fulfilled w hen De opificio hominis som ehow cam e his way.
W hy d id E riugena confuse the tw o Gregories? The best arg u m en t on this
po in t is given by Jeauneau in another article.47 The first explicit confusion of
G regory of N yssa an d G regory of N azianzus occurs at PP 3 :735C-D:
Si itaque sanctorum p atru m testim onia quaeris, au d i nobilissim um
Basilium C aesariae C apadotiae an tistitem in septim a om elia in G en esim ...
46 G reek te x t PG 91; E riugena's translation: M aximi Confessoris Ambigua

ad lohannem, ed. Jeauneau. The dedicatory letter and a short p o rtio n o f his
translation are included in PL 122:1193-1222; the dedicatory letter can also be
found in M G H Epp. 6.
47 Jeauneau, "La division des sexes."
19
Gregorius item Nyseus qui etiam Nazanzenus uocatur praedicti Basilii germanus
frater in Serm one d e Im agine ,..48
Jeauneau com pares this w ith tw o extracts from C assiodorus' Historia ecclesiastica
tripartita 49 found in MS. P aris, Bibl. nat. Lat. 14088:
In V m n libro tripertitae Histori(ae)
Fuit ergo G regorius antiquus iste d isd p u lu s O rigenis et alter nazanzenus
fraterque basilii. fu it alius g(re)g(orius) alexandrinus arrianus;
Item in VIUIlibro eiusdem historiae XZZT Kap(itulo)
D istribuerunt itaq u e N ectario quidem m axim am du itatem e t trad am .
ponti[fi] cam uero diocessi(m ) elladio q u i p o stb asiliu m fuit. C aesaream
C apo d od ae gregorio nyseno basiliique germ ano.50
These extracts an d E riugena's confusion are connected by the fact th a t th e h an d
in w hich the extracts are w ritten is identified as i2, a h an d w hich appears
frequently in m anuscripts of E riugena's w orks. In Jeauneau's judgm ent,
"l'irlandais i2 etait sans d o u te u n des fam iliers d u m aitre."51 Thus, it w ould seem
48 Em phasis added.
49 C assiodorus-E piphanius, Historia ecclesiastica tripartita, ed. W alter Jacob
and R udolph H enslik, C orpus Scriptorum E cdesiasticorum Latinorum , 71
(Vienna: F. T em psky, 1952); M.L.W. L aistner, "T he V alue and Influence of
C assiodorus' E cdesiastical H istory," Harvard Theological Review 41 (1948), 51-67;
regarding the role o f E piphanius Scholasticus in th e com position of this w ork,
see "E piphanius Scholasticus, m onk," Encyclopaedia o f the Early Church, ed.
Angelo Di B erardino and trans. A drian W alford (N ew York: Oxford U niveristy
Press, 1992), 2:282.
s As transcribed b y Jeauneau, "La d ivision des sexes," 34.
51 Ibid. O n this identification, see w orks d te d b y Jeauneau, pp. 34, n. 5.
R egarding the identification and characteristics of h an d s found in E riugena MSS.
and th eir bearing o n th e evolution of the text o f th e Periphyseon, see SheldonW illiam s' Introduction to P P 1, pp. 6-9.
20
th at E riugena's confusion arose from the m isleading prosopographical d ata a t his

disposal.
When d id E riugena confuse the tw o G regories? Jeauneau does n o t address
this question directly. Eriugena introduces G regory the Theologian v ery early in
Book 1 of th e Periphyseon, citing him nine tim es (three tim es in conjunction w ith
M axim us, h is expositor, w ho is cited alone an other three times) before h e cites
G regory o f N yssa.52 Each tim e h e uses d ie title Theologus and once he rails
special atten tio n to his authority, sancti Gregorii theologi summa uenerabilisque
auctoritas.53 The texts to w hich he alludes are all found in the Ambigua ad
lohannem. W hen he cites Gregory of N yssa for th e first tim e, about m idw ay
through Book 1, h e does so in a w ay th a t seem s calculated to distinguish him
clearly from th e o th er Gregory, referring to him as magnus Gregorius NTCEYC
episcopus.54 The text referred to is from De imagine. This pattern continues until
near the end o f Book 3: the two G regories are clearly distinguished by title and
linked consistently w ith their respective source texts, De imagine for N yssen and
the Ambigua fo r th e Theologian.55
In Book 4, w hen the N utritor defends his sp iritu al interpretation of
Paradise ag ain st the A lum nus' dogged appeals to A ugustine, the identification of
the tw o G regories enables die N u trito r to m u ster quotations from both Ambigua
and De imagine aro u n d a single Father, w hose au tho rity swells sufficiently to
52 See T able 1 below .

53 PP 1 :456D.
54 PP 1 :477A.
55 The lin k is som ew hat m ore flexible for the Theologian since E riugena
often cites a w o rk b y G regory N azianzen w ith o u t calling attention to the
m ediating text o f M axim us.
21
counterbalance th e gzeat w eight of A ugustine. This a t least is the im pression one

gets as the controversy over the proper in terp retatio n o f P aradise develops. W as
E riugena's confusion o f th e G regories prom pted b y th is rhetorical need, o r did h e
sim ply lack th e decisive prosopographical inform ation h e needed for the
identification u n til m idw ay through the w ritin g o f the Periphyseon?
Jeauneau (and Sheldon-W illiam s)56 accepts an account of E riugena's
encounter w ith the G reeks th at suggests th a t his m eeting w ith G regory of N yssa
w as p rep ared , perhap s even initiated, by h is encounter w ith G regory of
N azianzus by m eans of M axim us Confessor. This account ignores another
possibility, th a t G regory o f N yssa w as of interest to E riugena because he w as the
brother of Basil w hose Hexaemeron G regory's De imagine com pletes.57 Perhaps
he discovered later in the course of a search for G reek Hexaemera to supplem ent
the reading o f A ug u stine's De Genesi ad litteram.
56 Sheldon-W illiam s, "G reek Sources," 6.

57 M oran, Philosophy, 117, suggests som ething like th is, noting th a t Basil's
influence on E riugena has y et to receive p ro p er attention: "E riu g en a... also
translated an d com m ented on Basil's Hexaemeron, from w hich he took an idealist
account of tim e, w hich also m ay have influenced A ugustine. In fact if the view s
of Plotinus are to be found in Eriugena, they are alm ost certainly a consequence
of the latter's read in g of Saint Basil, w ho w as a close read er o f the Enneads.
Eriugena sees Basil and G regory as teaching the sam e kind of theory concerning
the divine ideas and the participation of sensible things in diem . It w ould be an
im possible task to sift thro u gh E riugena's w ork try in g to d etect the individual
influences of each o f the C appadodans, especially w hen G regory of N yssa's De
hominis opificio w as w ritten to supplem ent Basil's Hexaemeron and Eriugena
relied m ost heavily on these tw o related w orks."
O n B asil's know ledge o f Plotinus, how ever, see John M . Rist, "Basil's
'N eoplatonism ': Its background and natu re," in Basil o f Caesarea: Christian,
humanist, ascetic. A sixteen-hundredth anniversary symposium, ed . Paul Jonathan
Fedw ick (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for M ediaeval Studies, 1981), 1:137-220.
Rist argues th a t B asil's know ledge of Plotinus w as n o t extensive and probably
derived from h is brother, Gregory.
22
To explore this line o f reasoning, how ever, one w ould need to look m ore
dosely a t the influence o f Basil on E riugena's thought, a task beyond th e scope of
this dissertation. In th e m eantim e, it seem s reasonable to begin w ith a n account
of G regory's relative im pact on E riugena's thought th a t tentatively ad o p ts the
order of E riugena's encounter w ith th e Greeks as reconstructed b y Jeauneau.
Thus, A ugustine's speculations regarding eternity, tim e, an d h isto ry in
relation to the single act (the "O ne Day") by w hich G od created everything, all
together and a t once, are the startin g point for E riugena's th ought on th e C reatorcreature relation. U nder th e influence of Pseudo-D ionysius (interp reted by
M aximus),58 how ever, E riugena's understanding of creation is perm eated by the
concept of theophany, w hich show s up in his u nd erstanding o f m atter an d
corporeality and in the general idealist cast o f his thought. M axim us'cosm ic
M an/C hrist provides a p rin tip le of u nity for the w hole creation and o f its final
transfiguration. G regory o f N yssa, for his p art, offers a m eans for u nd erstan d in g
the m eaning of bodily, tem poral existence in term s of m an's p rim ord ial fall into
anim ality and h is fu tu re equality w ith the angelic nature, w hich dove-tails nicely
w ith the C hristology of M axim us.
.3
M ethod and o u tlin e o f this study

The general m ethod o f this thesis is to com pare the view s expressed by
Gregory o f N yssa in De opificio hominis /De imagine w ith those found in

E riugena's Periphyseon. C ap pu y ns' list of quotations o f De imagine in th e
Periphyseon and M adec's list o f citations of G regory served as guides to the
significant portions of these texts. The form er helped identify those p ortio n s of
58 Sheldon-W illiam s, "G reek Sources," 10.
23
G regory's text w hich p la y th e m ost direct role in th e Periphyseon; the latter, to

identify those loci o f E riug ena's thought w here E riugena m akes deliberate u se of
G regory's authority. T his latter list, how ever, includes citations of both
G regories, N yssen an d N azianzen. It w as necessary, therefore, to clarify, for
each citation, the n atu re o f th e citation (quotation, reference, o r allusion), the
actual text being cited, a n d th e philosophical o r theological them e a t issue. T his
w ork is reflected in Table 1. O n the basis o f th is w o rk it w as possible to g ath er
texts pertaining to the sam e them e and to identify o th er passages w here
G regory7s influence m ay b e a t w ork bu t no explicit citatio n is m ade. The analysis
o f these texts w as taken fu rth er b y the labor o f tran slation . A lthough the in terest
o f this stu d y is m ore philosophical and theological th a n philological, the
translation of quotations from G reek and L atin sources h elp ed locate any
philosophically significant issues th at arise w ith respect to E riugena's tran slation
o f Gregory.
In p resenting the resu lts o f this research, the p resen t w ork uses a them atic
organization, one th at for the m ost p art follow s th e g eneral lines of developm ent
in the Periphyseon itself. (H ow ever, since no effort is m ad e to sum m arize th at
developm ent m ore th an necessary, readers w ho are u n fam iliar w ith the
Periphyseon, m ay w ish to co n su lt John J. O 'M eara's su m m ary in his general stu d y
of Eriugena.)59 The o utline o f chapters, then, is as follow s:
59 O 'M eara, Eriugena, C hapters 5-8.
24
TABLE 1
CITATIONS
OF "GREGORY"
IN ERIUGENA'S PERIPHYSEON
Location
A ttrib u tio n
T ype
Id en tifie d Source
T hem e
1 :443B6
1 :449A9
1 :451A ff
1 :456D1
1 :457D2
1 :464D3
1:471B9
1:477A13
1 :479A2
1 :479B11
1 :481B13
1 :502B-503A
Theo
Theo+M ax
Theo+M ax
Theo
[Theo]
Theo
Theo+M ax
N ys
[Nys]
N ys
Theo+M ax
N ys
3
2
2
2
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
1
k f.A m b . 13& 30
1cf. A m b. 3 & 6.3
1cf. Am b. 6.1 & 6.3
2cf. Am b. 22
Ibid.
Ibid.
2Am b. 13
2Im ag. 1
2cf. Im ag. 24
Ibid.
2cf. Am b. 6.38
3Im ag. 24
DMCOMPR1
THEOPH AN
SUBUM TN
TRINITY
Ibid.
Ibid.
INCOMPR1
M OTION
CONCOURS
Ibid.
TIME
CONCOURS
2 :523D9
2 :585D6
2 :586A9
2 :587A5
2 :600C14
2 :613A12
2 :615B3
Theo
N ys
N az/T h eo
N az
Theo
Theo+M ax +Oth
Theo+M ax
3
2
3
1
1
3
1
2cf. Am b. 3
2cf. Im ag. 17
2cf Am b. 13
Ibid.
2Am b. 21
1cf. Am b. 19
2A m b. 19
PARTICIP
IMAGE
INCOM PR2
Ibid.
TRINITY
Ibid.
Ibid.
3 :732A11
3 :735D-736A
3 :736A-B
3:737A
3 :739C
N ys +O th
N y s/N az
[N ys/N az]
N ys
[Nys]
2
1
1
1
1
2cf. Im ag. 10-11

3Im ag. 8
3Im ag. 15
3Im ag. 16
3Im ag. 16
PHANTASY
THREEFLD
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
4 :758C
4 :772A5
4 :787D8
4 :788B-789A
4 :789A-790B
4 :791C-792A
4: 792A-D
4: 792D-793A
4: 793C-797C
[Nys]
Theo
Nys
[Nys]
[Nys]
[Nys]
[Nys]
[Nys]
[Nys]
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
3Im ag. 3
l cf. Am b. 12& 13
4cf. Im ag. 11
3Im ag. 11
3Im ag. 13
3Im ag. 14
3Im ag. 15
3Im ag. 16
3Im ag. 17
DOM INION
INCOMPR1
SIMPLCTY
Ibid.
MIRROR
FLUX
INSTRUMT
Ibid.
IMAGE
25
TABLE 1 (contd)
4: 797D-799A
4 :801A-C
4 :802C
4 :804D1-805A
[Nys]
Theo
[Theo]
Theo
1
1
1
3
4 :808A2
4 :812A
Nys+M ax
[Nys]
3
1
4 :812B
4 :812B11
4 :812C8
4 :813B5
4 :817A3
4 :819A-820A
4 :820A-821D
4 :823A1
4 :824B8
4 :824C10
4 :831B7
4 :835A-C
4 :860A7
[Nys]
Theo
Theo+M ax
[Theo]+Max
Theo
Nys
[Nys]
Theo
[Theo]
[Theo]
Theo
Theo+Max
N y s/N az
+M ax+Oth
1
3
1
1
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
1
3
5 :0872B-873A
5 :0875A-B
5 :0876C6
Nys
Nys
Theo+Max
1
1
3
3Im ag. 27
3Im ag. 19
5 :0877C7
5 :0879C1
5 :0880B4
5 :0884A-C
5:0889A7
5 :0892C2
5 :0896B1
5 :0899C3
5 :0917A-918A
5 :0922D-923C
5 :0951A14
5 :0967B8
5 :0987B
5 :0992A6
5 :0995C2
5 :1005B11
5 :1015B9
T heo/[N ys] +Max

Nys
Nys+M ax
Theo+M ax +Oth
Theo+M ax
Theo /N a z
[Theo]+Max
Theo
Theo
Theo
[Theo]
Theo+O th
Theo+M ax +Oth
Theo+Oth
Theo+M ax +Oth
Theo+M ax
Theo
1
1
1
1
1(?)
3
3
3
1
1
3
2
3
3
3
1
1
1A m b. 17
1Am b. 3
Ibid.
1Am b. 17
1cf. Am b. 6.38
3Im ag. 18
3Im ag. 27
Ibid.
3Im ag. 18
Ibid.
1Am b. 38
1Am b. 6.28
3hnag. 20
3Im ag. 21
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
1Am b. 41
3Im ag. 22
3Im ag. 17
cf. Im ag. 19
1Am b. 29
'c f. Am b. 6.1
ANGEL
SPIRBODY
Ibid.
Ibid. &
AUTHORTY
FOREKNWL
ANGEL &
PLEROMA
FOREKNWL
Ibid.
ANIM AL
TREES
PARADISE
TREES
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
NAKEDNSS
PARADISE &
AUTHORTY
SPIRBODY
PASSIONS
SUBLIMTN &
AUTHORTY
SUBLIMTN
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. & TIME
ENDBEGIN
NOSEXDIF
NECESSTY
Ibid.
PLEROMA
SUBLIMTN
PASSIONS
SUBLIMTN
Ibid.
Ibid.
INCARNTN
DEIFICTN
26
TABLE 1 (contd)
LEGEND:
Location
This list of locations w here Eriugena rites G regory w as com piled from M adec,
"Jean Scot e t ses a u te u rs/' in Jean Scot et ses auteurs, 39-43, and C appuyns, "Le
T>e im ag in e/" 208-209.
Attribution
This indicates b y w hich title(s) E riugena rites "G regory" and w hether h e rites
him in conjunction w ith other authorities.
N yssen
N azianzen
th e Theologian
a n d M axim us the Confessor
an d other(s)
im plied attribution
N ys
N az
Theo
+Max
+O th
[]
Type
The types of citations are as follows:

1
2
3
Q uotation
Reference
A llusion
Id en tified Source
The texts w hich Eriugena quotes, refers to, o r alludes to, as identified (or
suggested) by:
1
2
3
4
Jeau neau's introduction to A m b., pp. bood-lxxxiii.

Sheldon-W illiam s's notes to PP1, PP2, an d PP3.
C appuyns, "Le 'D e im agine/" 208-209.
M adec, 'J e a n Scot e t ses auteurs," in Jean Scot et ses auteurs, 39-43.
Them e
The cited passages are categorized according to the philosophical o r theological
them e in connection w ith w hich Eriugena em ploys the citation, as follows:
27
TABLE 1 (contd)
ANGEL
ANIMAL
AUTHORTY
CONCOURS
DEIFICTN
DOM INION
ENDBEGIN
FLUX
FOREKNWL
IMAGE
INCARNTN
INCOMPR1
INCOMPR2
INSTRUMT
MIRROR
MOTION
NAKEDNSS
NECESSTY
NOSEXDIF
PARADISE
PARTIOP
PASSIONS
PHANTASY
PLEROMA
SIMPLCTY
SPIRBODY
SUBLIMTN
THREEFLD
TIME
TREES
TRINITY
M an's original an d final eq u ality w ith the angels

M an's anim al n ature
R elative authority of variou s Fathers, especially G regory an d
A ugustine
B ody as a concourse o f incorporeal qualities o r accidents
T he doctrine o f m an's deification by grace
M an's dom inion over the re st o f creation
T he n o tio n that m an's fin al en d is a retu rn to his original state
F lux as a property of m aterial n atu res
S uperaddition of anim ality to hum an nature ow ing to G od's
foreknow ledge of sin
T he d ivine im age in m an
T he doctrine of the Incarnation o f the Son of G od
Incom prehensibility of ousia
Incom prehensibility of G od
Body conceived as an in stru m en t of th e soul
T he m etaphor of the m irro r to describe the n ature of soul and
body
M otion a n d rest w ithin th e cosm os
Interpretation of m an's original nakedness
T he necessity of m an's re tu rn to his original state
N o sexual difference in th e resurrection
In terp retation o f Paradise generally
P articipation
T heory o f the passions an d th eir transform ation into virtues
P h an tasy and phantasm in know ledge of sensibles
T he u n ity o f all m en in th e fullness o f hum an n ature
T he sim plicity of the h u m an soul
S p iritual body
Sublim ation or unification o f low er natures to higher ones
The threefold division o f 'so u l'
T im e in relation to created n atu res
In terpretation o f the trees o f Paradise
T rin itarian doctrine
28
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 1: M atter and Body. The doctrine th a t bodies are produced by a

concourse o f accidents th at are in them selves incorporeal is o f particular
im portance to E riugena, and he devotes a su b stan tial digression w ithin his
treatm ent o f the ten categories to his version o f this theory, developed in explicit
dependence on G regory's De imagine. This th eo ry also has an im portant place
w ithin his in terp retatio n o f creatio ex nihilo, a n d form s the basis for his
in terp retatio n o f th e Second and T hird D ays of creation. The first chapter,
therefore, com pares G regory's and E riugena's teachings concerning m atter an d
the com position o f bodies.
Chapter 2: Body, Soul, and Image. G regory's De imagine is also an im p ortant
source for E riu g en a's treatm ent of the relation betw een body and soul and of the
p arts and m otions w ith in the soul. In Book 2, E riugena illustrates his
speculations o n the D ivine T rinity by reference to its im age in the hum an soul.
This section contains E riugena's m ost su stained discussion on the so ul's relation
to the m ortal body, including discussions o f sense an d phantasy; it also develops
the distin ctio n betw een the m ortal and sp iritu al body. In this section E riugena
develops th e concept o f the spiritual body as a m anifestation of the soul,
analogous to th e m anifestation o f G od in creation, a view w hich closely
resem bles G regory's notion of the body as th e im age o f the im age.
A lthough G regory is only one o f the sources for this section o f Book 2, an d
is never qu o ted directly, his influence is nonetheless significant; a t the end of the
section, E riugena urges th e reader w ho w ishes a fuller know ledge "concerning
th e sim ilitude o f the im age" to consult G regory's De imagine. In later sections o f
th e Periphyseon, the no tion o f the sp iritual b o d y is developed further w ith explicit
reference to G regory. The second chapter, th en , com pares G regory's treatm ent
29
of the body-soul relation in De opificio hominis w ith E riugena's, concentrating on

those points w here E riugena seem s closest to him .
Chapter 3: "Let Us Make M an." This chapter com prised three long parts
introduced by a sum m ary o f E riugena's exposition of the Sixth D ay o f Creation.
Each of the three larg e p arts is devoted to one o f the central presuppositions th at
governs th a t exposition an d w hich Eriugena shares w ith G regory of Nyssa. The
first, "G enus, Species, an d Plerom a," considers E riugena's treatm ent of universal
life (w ithin his exposition of the Fifth Day of C reation in Book 3) w hich draw s on
G regory's doctrine of the relation betw een die hum an soul an d the dissolved
body and on his division o f different kinds of soul to develop a notion of the
relation betw een universals an d particulars (rem iniscent of G regory's hum an
plerom a) w hich im plies the eternity of all individual beings, a notion w hich he
then sets against G regory and B asil's teaching th at souls o f irrational anim als
perish w ith the d issolution o f their bodies. This is a rem arkable transform ation
of G regorian m aterial. The section also looks at several o th er contexts in which
Eriugena develops his notion o f an eternal correlative relation betw een genera
and species, w hole an d part.
The second p a rt, "M an's K inship w ith the A nim als," com pares G regory's
and E riugena's view s on m an's anim ality, including the latter's notion that the
w hole sensible creation w ill retu rn into hum an nature. Indeed, E riugena's
exposition of the Sixth D ay in Book 4 is prim arily occupied w ith understanding
m an's paradoxical relation to die rest of creation: on the one h an d , m an stands
w ithin the genus o f anim als, an d , on the other, he is m ade in the im age of God.
Closely related to h is difficulties w ith these seem ingly contradictory affirm ations
about m an is E riugena's p ersistent interest in the equality o f hum an and angelic
nature. G regory's th o u g h t and authority have a decisive role in E riugena's
30
exposition o f the Sixth D ay an d seem to underlie E riugena's ow n thought on

m an's relation bo th to angels an d to beasts. The th ird p a rt o f chapter 3, "M an's
Equality w ith th e A ngels," considers specifically G regory's discussion of the
relation betw een m an a n d angel and then E riugena's, p lacing both w ithin the
larger context of E riugena's understanding of d ie divisions and causes o f n ature.
Chapter 4: Return to Paradise. E riugena's in terp retatio n of the Sixth Day
leads him into a confrontation w ith the teachings o f A ugustine regarding the
validity of a literal, tem poral interpretation of P aradise. H ere the consolidated
authority o f G regory the Theologian (N yssen an d N azianzen) comes into play.
"A fter the H oly A postles there has been none am ong the G reeks of greater
authority in die exposition o f Scripture th an G regory th e Theologian, and none
am ong the Rom ans o f greater authority than A urelius A ugustine."60 E riugena's
spiritualizing in terp retatio n o f Paradise is closely connected w ith his doctrine of
the R eturn. A t one p o in t in his exposition of d ie re tu rn of n atu re to G od,
Eriugena asks w hether th e resurrection o f all flesh is a w ork o f nature o r of grace.
Form erly, he tells us, h e h ad held th at it w as entirely th e w ork of grace. "But
after I read the serm on De fide by Epiphanius ... an d th e disputation De imagine
of the great G regory th e Theologian, I changed m y opinion."61 The other
G regory (no longer d istin g uish ed by Eriugena) also m akes a contribution to die
60 PP 4 :804C-D: post sanctos Apostolos nullum apud Graecos fuisse in

expositionUms dioinae Scrrpturae majoris auctoritatis Gregorio theologo, nullum apud
Romanos Aurelio Augustino.
61 PP 5 :899C: Sed postquam sancti Eptphanii, episcopi Constantiae Cypri,
Ancoratum seu sermonem de Fide legi, magnique Gregorii Theologi de Imagine
disputationem, mutaui sententiam, u t ... resurrectionem mortuorum naturali virtute
futuram esse concederem.
31
doctrine o f the retu rn , especially the notion o f a sublim ation by w hich low er
orders o f reality a re taken u p and transform ed in h ig h er orders, body into soul,
soul into sp irit, an d so on.
The Conclusion review s this m aterial, draw s it together into generalized
observations about G regory of N yssa's influence o n E riugena, and suggests
possible lines for fu rth er research.
32
CHAPTER 1
MATTER AND
BODY
This ch ap ter identifies the points in E riugena's theory o f bodily nature

th at depend on id eas found in G regory o f N yssa's De opificio hominis and show s
how those ideas w ere transform ed by his use of them .
W ith th e h elp o f G regory's theory o f the bo d y as a concourse of
incorporeal q ualities, E riugena grounds th e tem poral flux of corporeal accidents
in eternal causes from w hich bodies em erge th rou g h th e process of generation, to
w hich they retu rn th ro u g h th eir dissolution, b u t in w h ich they rem ain eternally
because th e reasons th a t govern their generation an d dissolution are created all
together an d a t once in the W ord of G od. The p rim ary concern, then, of this
chapter w ill be to com pare E riugena's version of th is th eo ry w ith G regory's. This
com parison w ill sh ow h ow an account o f the com position of sensible bodies th at
w as for G regory secondary, even incidental, becom es for E riugena prim ary and
central.
Before this com parison is m ade, how ever, tw o o th er them es w ill be
considered. The first concerns the defense each a u th o r p resents for the doctrine
o f creation ex nihilo. The tw o offer sim ilar form ulations of the argum ent against
such a doctrine, b u t E riug en a's response goes beyond G regory's b y using the
D ionysian doctrine o f th e d iv ine superessentiality. T he second them e pertains to
the m anner in w hich th e opposites, m otion an d rest, are proportioned and
harm onized to p ro d uce the u n ity of the sensible cosm os.
33
1.1
Ex n ih ilo
In a passage o f Periphyseon, Book 3, the N u trito r claim s th a t 'n o th in g '
m eans th e absence o f th e w hole o f essence, an d th at w h en one says th at God

created all things o u t o f n othing, one intends the fact th a t the th ing s th at are,
once w ere n o t1
The A lum nus is tro ub led by this position. H e fin d s a contradiction
betw een affirm ing, o n th e one h an d , that the things th a t are, once w ere not, and,
o n the oth er, th at all things are eternal in the W isdom o f the Father, though not
coessential w ith it, a p o sitio n established earlier in the dialogue. If to be eternal
m eans n o t to begin o r cease to b e, "by w hat reason th en are all things both
eternal in th e W isdom of G od an d m ade o ut of nothing, th a t is, how is it that
before th ey w ere m ade they w ere not?"2
O ne solution to th is difficulty m ight be to say th a t the p rim o rd ial causes of
things are eternal b u t th a t the unform ed m atter in w hich they m anifest their
effects is n o t. U nfortunately, observes the A lum nus, th is w o uld m ean th at not all
things are created o r etern al in th e W isdom of G od; for if m atter is created, then
its cause too m ust be eternal in th e W isdom of G od. The original difficulty
rem ains.3
The N utritor replies th a t those who look to S cripture an d consider the
establishm ent of n atu res w ith rig h t reason understand th a t th ere is one C reator
w ho created all things b o th causally in their causes and pro p o rtio n ately in their
l PP 3:634C -D .
2 PP 3 :636B: Qua ratione et omnia in sapientia dei aetema su n t et de nihilo facta,
hoc est priusquam fierent non erant?
3 PP 3 :635A-636C.
34
effects. Both the universe m ad e from unform ed m atter an d the unform ed m atter
m ade from nothing have one an d th e sam e Source.4 The chief e rro r of the secular
philosophers, in fact, lay in th e ir denial o f this: "they said th at unform ed m atter
is coetem al w ith G od an d th a t from it G od took, as som ething subsisting outside
him and coetem al w ith him , th e occasion for his w orks."5
This error arose from th e difficulty posed b y the evid en t opposition
betw een m utable and im m utable things. H ow can the one be d eriv ed from the
other? M atter is form less, G od is th e Form of all; m atter is variable an d m utable,
G od is im m utable and invariable; m atter is subject to accidents, G od is not;
m atter adm its intervals of place an d tim e and quantity, G od is n o t extended by
any intervals of places and tim es; m atter receives diverse qualities an d figures
and is corruptible and com posite, b u t G od is sim ple, incorruptible, an d subject to
no accidents. Blinded by clouds o f false reasoning, these thinkers concluded that
m atter is uncreated.6
4 PP 3 :636C-D: De infbrmi materia quam Graeci HLHN uocant nullus in

sancta scriptura exercitatorum naturarum conditionem recta ratione considerans ambigit
quod a conditore omnium et causaliter inter causales et inter causarum effectus
secundum suas proportiones condita sit. Qui enim fecit mundum de materia infbrmi ipse
fecit informem materiem de omnino nihilo.
5 PP 3:637A: Nam et in hoc maxime saecularium philosophorum qui de mundi
huius factura tractare ausi sunt error conuincitur quoniam informem materiem
coaetemam deo esse dixerunt de qua deus ueluti extra se subsistente et coaetema sibi
suorum operum sumpsit auspicium.
6 PP 3 :637A: Quomodo enim, inquiunt, ex forma omnium infbrme fieret, ab
immobili et in nullo in se ipso uariabili uarium ac mutabile, ab eo cui nihil accidit uariis
accidentibus subiectum, a non distento per spacia locorum et temporum quod recipit
locorum temporumque interuatta et quantitatum, similiter ab eo quod nulli qualitati
subditum diuersarum qualitatumfigurarumque receptiuum, ab incorruptibili
corruptibile, a simplici compositum, et caetera id genus, suaefalsae ratiocinationis
nebulis obcaecati?
35
W e, how ever, who exam ine th e tru th o f the H oly Scriptures an d follow
d ie footsteps of its divine in terp reters believe through faith an d consider
th ro u g h understanding, as m u ch as is given, th at both th e form lessness of
all things and their form s an d ev ery thin g th at is in them , e ith er essentially
o r accidentally, is created by th e one cause o f all.7
T he m istake results from th in k in g th a t G od creates only w h at is like him
and n o t w h at is dissim ilar and opposite; his om nipotence em braces b o th the
sim ilar a n d foe dissim ilar.8 Indeed, foe beauty o f foe universe lies in foe
m arvelous harm ony and ineffable u n ity com posed from foe like an d foe unlike.9
So, all things, w hether prim ordial causes, o r unform ed m atter, o r th eir effects
m anifested in foe course of this w orld as it journeys from its beginning to its end,
flow from foe sam e Principle. N onetheless, h e concludes, retu rn in g to foe
A lum nus' form ulation of foe difficulty, how all these things are a t foe sam e time
both etern al and m ade is a question th a t deserves a careful exam ination by
reason.10
7 PP 3 :637B: Nos autem sanctae scripturae ueritatem inspicientes diuinorumque

ipsius interpretum uestigia sequentes et informitatem rerum omnium et formas et omne
quod in eis siue secundum essentiam siue secundum accidens est ab urn omnium causa
condita esse et perfidem credimus et quantum datur per intellectum consideramus.
8 PP 3 :637C-D.
9 PP 3 :637D-638A.
10 P P 3 :638B-C: Confectum est enim et inconcuse diffinitum omnia quae sunt et
quae non su n t ab uno omnium principio confluere siue in primordialibus causis semel et
simul in uerbo dei unigenito aetemaliterfactis siue in materia infbrmi ex qua
primordiales causae uisibilis creaturae apparitionis suae per generations occasiones
acceperunt siue in effectibus earum quibus mundus iste ab initio usque ad finem naturali
ordine diuina prouidentia ministrante peragitur, .... Sed quemadmodum haec ueluti
sibimet aduersantia in unam quondam intelligentiae copulum conueniunt, hoc est
quomodo omnia simul et aetema et facta sun t, non solum tibi uerum etiam et mihi
diligentissima rationis inquisitione dignum esse uidetur.
36
1.11
G regory's defense o f creation ex n ih ilo

A lthough th e N u trito r does n o t invoke G regory's authority in the
preceding passage, h is version o f the arg u m ent against the C hristian doctrine is
essentially th a t o f De opificio hominis, C hapter 23, w hich begins w ith G regory
arguing against th ose w ho cast doubt on the doctrine o f the resurrection by
denying th a t th e p resen t course of the w orld w ill one d ay pass aw ay and all
m otion cease. To d en y th a t the w orld w ill hav e an en d , says Gregory, is also to
deny th a t it h ad a beginning, for w hat begins to be m u st also cease to be. W e
m ust be w illing to accept this by faith and n o t b e su rp rised if it exceeds the grasp
of reason; ind eed , G regory adm its th at "concerning m any things reason suggests
to us difficulties th a t offer no sm all occasions fo r d o u b t about the things w hich
w e believe."11
There are those w ho brin g forth plausible argum ents against this ten et of
faith, m aintaining th a t m atter is coetem al w ith G od. The argum ent G regory
records is close to th a t given by the N utritor:12
If G od is sim ple in nature, and im m aterial, w ith o u t quality o r size, an d is
incom posite, and a stranger to circum scription b y w ay of figure, w hile all
m atter is ap p reh end ed in spatial extension an d does not escape the grasp
of the senses, b u t becom es know n in color, an d figure, and m ass, and
m agnitude, an d resistance, and the o th er things contem plated about it,
11 O H 2 3 :209C: Kcutoi irepi rroXXwy f||uv o \6yog diropeti' wreTiOeTO, oi>

[iiKpas rrapexwi' d<t>opp.ds trpos rr\v twv TTTTtcrreup.evwv dp4>i{loXiai'.
Cf. Im ag. 23:244,20-22: ... etenim de m ultis ignorare sermo nobis constituit
Non [sic] paruas praestans occasiones ad eorum quae credita sunt amphiboliam.
12 W ith som e difference, however. W here E riugena contrasts m utability
an d im m utability, G regory stresses the opposition betw een intelligible and
sensible.
37
none o f w hich can be observed in the divine n a tu re w h at device extracts

m atter from th e im m aterial, or die spatial n a tu re h o rn the unextended?13
Gregory, how ever, answ ers th is argum ent differently th an does E riugena's
N utritor. H is first response is to note the heretical consequences C hristians risk
by adopting this p ositio n ; it leads very quickly, he suggests, to M anichaean
dualism . It is b etter sim ply to believe Scripture and n o t p ry into m atters beyond
reason's pow er. T he p o w er o f th e divine w ill is sufficient grounds for a
reasonable belief b o th in creation out o f nothing an d in th e future reconstitution
o f the w orld.14
Sufficient as faith alone m ay be, G regory does n o t w ish to leave the
im pression th at th e p a g an argum ent is unansw erable. A nd so h e w rites C hapter
24, in w hich he argues th a t m atter is a concourse o f qualities, w hich, since they
are intelligible, can b e u n d ersto o d w ithout difficulty to derive from the
intellectual n atu re o f G od.
The argum ent is fairly sim ple. Each of the sensible qualities w hich one
contem plates in bodies h as its ow n lo g o s', its ow n p rinciple of intelligibility.
13 O H 2 3 :209D211A: Ei airXoOs o 0eo<r rfj <J>ucTi, Kal aiiXos, airoios re xal

diie-yeOris, xai aow G eros, icai rq s Kara t o
irepiypa^Tis aXXoTpuos exiov,
TTdcra 8e uXti ev SiacrrqpaTiKfi Traparaoei xaTaXap.0dvTai, xai rag 8ia tcDv
aio0TiTTipia)i/ KaTaXfjiJjei? ou 8iaire<J)vyev, ev xpcip.an, icai ox^M-aTi, xai oyxtp, xai
rniXLKOTTiTL, xal dvTiTuma, xai rolg Xonrols t o i s trepi avrr|v 0ecopoup.evoi.syivcoaxopevTi, <Lv ou5ev ev Tfj Oeig <f>uaei 8uvaTdv ecrri xaravoiiCTar t l ? p.T]xavf| ex
t o u auXou t t | v u X tiv d i r o T e x f i ^ v a i ; ex t o o d S i a o T d T o u T q v 8iacmip.aTixf|v <j>uoiv;
Cf. Im ag. 23:244,27-34: ... si simplex deus natura et immaterialis, ac sine
quantitate, et sine magnitudine, et incompositus, et ab ea quae est secundum figuram
circumscriptione alienus existit. Omnis uera materies in spatiosa extensione
comprehenditur, et comprehensiones quae per officia sensuum sunt non effugit, in re
atque tumore et quantitate et soliditate ceterisque circa earn consideratis cognita.
Quorum nihil in diuina natura possibile est intelligi, quae machina ex inmateriali
materiem creatam fuisse, ex non distante spatiabilem naturam.
14 O H 2 3 :212C. Cf. Im ag. 23:245,13.
38
w hich is itself incorporeal. If one begins stripping aw ay these intelligible

qualities from o n e's contem plation of a body to isolate som e underlying subject,
one arrives a t nothing. S tripped of its qualities there is n o th ing left in th e body to
consider. T hus, it is reasonable to conclude th at the m aterial n atu re is caused by
the concourse, the com ing together, of these particular qualities w hich
distinguish this p articu lar body. Consequently, th o u g h th e bo d ily nature thus
constituted is contrary to th e divine nature, the causes o f th a t n a tu re are
com pletely consistent w ith the intellectual n ature o f th e divine.
There is a sim ilar passage in De anima et resurrectione (AR121A ff.), w here
G regory defends th e C hristian doctrine of creation against tw o contrary errors.
O n the one hand are those w ho assert too close an id en tity betw een the w orld
and its creator;15 o n the other, those w ho posit another p rinciple different from
and coetem al w ith G od. Since C hristians reject both of these view s, they ought
to explain how G od could create a w orld th at is as distin ct from him as they say it
is. H ow can a w orld of m otion come from a principle w hich is itself a t rest? A nd
how can a w orld o f com posite things come from one w ho is sim ple?
H ere, too, G regory m akes an appeal to faith. Q uoting H ebrew s 11:3, he
d te s the A postle as teaching th at only by faith do w e perceive th a t the w orld and
all th at belongs to it w ere fram ed by the w ill o f God. The pow er o f reason by
151 suppose G regory has in m ind som e kind of pantheistic im m anence or

em anation. The distinction betw een an em anationist an d a creationist
m etaphysics is n o t alw ays an easy one to draw , as Lloyd P. G erson em phasizes
in his interesting article, "P lo tin us's M etaphysics: E m anation o r C reation?"
Review o f Metaphysics 46 (M ar 1993), 559-574. G ersh pays p articu lar attention to
the C hristian neoplatonist transform ation of pagan neoplatonist em anation
m etaphors in From Iamblichus to Eriugena.
39
itself is unable to achieve certainty on this point. C onsequently, it is best n o t to

inquire too deeply into the how o f creation.16
N onetheless, G regory denies th at the C hristian view is an absurdity. It is
difficult b u t n o t im plausible.
The corporeal creation is contem plated in properties th at have n othing in
com m on w ith die divine, and so it causes reason this great
em barrassm ent, nam ely, th at reason cannot know exactly how the visible
comes from th e invisible, the solid and h a rd from d ie intangible, the
lim ited from th e unlim ited, the m easured from the unm easured and
sizeless, an d so o n for every one of such things as are com prehended
about the corporeal nature. C oncerning these, how ever, w e can say this
m uch, th a t in itself none o f die things contem plated about the bod y is a
body, n o t shape, n o t color, n o t w eight, n o t extension, n o t m agnitude, n o r
any other o f th e contem plated qualities; b u t each o f these is a reason; and
the concourse and union of these becom es a body. Since, therefore, the
constitutive qualities of the body are grasped b y intellect and n o t by sense,
and the divine is intellectual, w hat difficulty is there in intelligible things
being caused b y a n intellect? Intelligible things, the concourse of w hich
generates for us the n ature o f the body.17
G regory's argum ent dissolves m atter into intelligible qualities w hich are
sufficiently like to th e divine n atu re th at their creation b y G od does no t pose a
difficulty. Once corporeal n atu re is reduced in this w ay, there is no need to p o sit
some principle coetem al w ith God.
16 AR121B.
17 AR 124C-D: Tfjs 8e awpaTixijs XTiaews eo dxoLOworyrois cos frpos to
0eioo rocs LSuoiiaoi SewpoopeoTjs- xai Taurqi' paXicrra t t \ v ttoXXt|o apTixaoiao
e|jLTroioTJcrqs tu> Xoyw, pr| Suoapeoou xaTiSeto, trws ex too aopaTou to opwpeooo; ex
too dua<J>oOs to crreppoo xal amirxmov, ex too aopicrrou to wpiopeooo, ex too
dtroaou Te xai apeyeQoo to Trdimog peTpois tkj'i Tots xaTa to ttooov Gewpoupiooi?
rrepieipyopeooo; Kal Ta xa0 exacrrou ooa rrepl tt|o awpxmxxrjo xaTaXappdoeTai
Trepi wo toooutoo 4>apeo, otc ooSeo e4> eairrou two irepi to crwpa Oewpoupeowo
awpa ecmo, ou <rxflM-Ct* ou XP^pn, ou Papos, ou SidoTppa, ou tttiXixottis, oux aXXo ti
two eo ttolottiti Gewpoupeowo oiiSeo, aAXa toutwo exacrroo Xoyos ecrrio- f| 8e irpos
dXXr^Xa cnjo8popf| toutwo xai eowais crwpa yioeTai. Errei ouo al ox)pirXT]pwpaTiKai
too awpaTos troioTTiTes uw xaTaXapPaooimiL xai oiix aiaOiiaei, ooepoo 8e to eioo,
tls irooos two ooiyrwo [var. tw oot|tw] Ta ooqpxrra xaTepydaaaQai/Qo f| trpos
aXXT)Xa oxio8po|if| tt|o tou awpurros f|pio atreyeooeae 4>uml/.
40
Behind th e problem atic w hich G regory addressesindeed, fundam ental

to his ow n responseis th e characteristically Platonic division of reality in to the
'noetic', o r intelligible, o n the one hand, an d th e 'aisth etic', or sensible, on th e
other, h i a significant passage of Oratio catechetica magna, G regory reveals h ow
deeply his ow n u n derstan d in g of creation is inform ed by this Platonic
fram ew ork.18
There is a certain tw ofold contem plation in the things th at are, theo ry
being d iv id ed into the intelligible and d ie sensible. A nd ap art from these
n oth ing rem ains in th e nature o f th e th ing s th a t are w hich falls o u tsid e
th is division. M oreover, these are d ivid ed from each other by a g reat gap,
so th a t n eith er is the sensible am ong th e intelligible properties, n o r are the
opposite am ong the sensible, b u t each is characterized in distinction from
its opposites. For th e intelligible n a tu re is a certain bodiless thing, b o th
im palpable and form less; the sensible, according to the nam e itself, falls
w ith in th e contem plation of the sense organs.19
T hrough th e harm onizing m ixture o f these opposites, the order o f creation
em erges. The sensible w orld, w hich constitutes a w hole w ithin the larger w hole
of creation, gives an ev id en t dem onstration o f this process.
But ju st as in the sensible cosm os itself there is a great opposition of th e
elem ents to each other, and yet w ith in it a certain harm ony, harm onized
18 D anielou, L'Etre et le temps, 75-94, describes G regory's problem atic,

som ew hat m ore fully, as the need to reconcile an optim istic appraisal of the
m aterial w orld, insp ired b y th e biblical account, b u t also by Stoicism, w ith
Platonic dualism . G regory is preceded in his efforts by Philo w hose influence on
him is great. A distinctive p o in t in G regory's solution is the identification o f the
intelligible realm (the 'hypercosm os') w ith th e angels rath er th an w ith the divine;
Philo h ad identified the the intelligible realm w ith the Logos of G od (p. 93).
19
OCM 6: Sraw ley 29:2-12:
SLirXfj t l ?
ecrnv ev
r o t s o u c tip f | a r r a v 'O T ia is ,
e i ? t o p o t | t o p r e ic a l a i a th i T O P TTjs G e a ip ia s S u jp r i p e P T i s . x a i ovSev av T ra p a T a u r a
K a r a X r |4>0LTi ev T fj r a w o p t g j p 4>ucri
S i a i p e a e a > ? r o u r q s e u ) 4>ep6 p P O P .
8LT)pTiTaL Se Tairra rrpos dAXrjXa iroXXtp t<3 peaa), as pfrre tt|v aLofhvriiP ev Tolg
potitol? eipai ypupiapaai, ptjTe ev Tot? aiaffriTois eKeivr\v, aXX diro Ta>p evavrloiv
exaTepap xapaimipiCeoGai. f| pep yap potitt| <j>u<ns aaatparop t l XPhM-d ccttl Kai
avafyeg Kal apeiSeoP' f| 8e aiafi^TTi icaT airro to opopa cpto? ecrri TTjs Sid twp
ala&TiTTipicup KaTapofjaetug.
41
b y m eans o f the opposites, has been contrived b y the w isdom th at

oversees the All; so too there is a sym phony o f th e w hole creation w ith
itself. N ow here does the n atu ral op po sitio n dissolve the connection of th e
u n ity . In d ie sam e m anner th ere is according to d ie divine w isdom a
m ixing an d blending of the sensible w ith d ie intelligible, so th at
ev ery th ing m ig h t participate equally in th e beautifiil, and th a t none o f th e
th in g s th a t are m ight lack a share o f th e b e tter n atu re.20
The m o tiv ation fo r th is divine harm onization is th e self-com m unicating
goodness o f G od, w ho has provided the "com m ingling o f th e intelligible w ith th e
sensible so th a t n o th in g in creation m ight b e rejected, as th e A posde says, n o r be
w ith o u t a share o f the divine com m union."21
W hile G regory's cited authorities are S criptural, the kinship w ith P lato's
Timaeus is obvious. Tim aeus begins his account o f th e divine C raftsm an's w ork
th u s :
L et u s tell for w h at cause the com poser com posed this universe of
generation. H e w as good, and in th e good n o thing envious concerning
an y th in g ev er com es to be; and being far from envy, he desired th at all
th in g s be m ost like him self. T hat this is th e suprem e cause o f generation
a n d th e cosm os is the best view h an d ed o n b y w ise m en and one th at can
be m o st rig h d y accepted. God desired th a t all things be good and in no
w ay b ad , as far as possible, and fin d in g th is visible universe n o t a t rest,
20 OCM 6: Sraw ley 29:1230:9: aXX dxrrrep ev airrqi tc o ai.o8r|T<3 xoapci),

TroXXijg rrpog aAXriXa tc o v crroixeicov oucrr)g evai/Tiakrecjg, emvevoTiTaL Tig appovia
8ia t w v evavTicov app.oCop.evri irapa Tfjg t o u rravTog emcrraTOucnrig a o rta s; xai
oimog Trdcrr|9 yiveTai Trpog eaimf|v aupcfxovia Tfjg xTiaecog, ouSapou Tfjg <j>uaixfjg
evavTioTTyrog t o v Tij? auprrvoiag eippov SiaXuoucrng' Kara rov airrov Tpoirov Kai
t o u ai.cr0r|ToO Trpog t o v o ^ t o v yiveTai t i s K a r a deiav oofyiav piig re xai
avdxpaoig, ci>s av rrdvTa t o u xaXou xaTa t o icrov peTexoi xai prjSev t w v o v t w v
dpoipoiTi Tr\g t o u xpeiTTOvog <j>uaeug.
21 OCM 6: Sraw ley 30:12-31:3: rrpopTiGeia 8e xpeiTTovi rrpog t t | v aio6TiTf|v
xTtaiv yiveTat Tig t o u v o t |t o u auvavaxpaaig, cog av pqSev dtropXriTov c l t i rrjg
xTiaecog, xaGcog <j>riaiv o dTrocrroXog, pqfie T fjg Qeiag xoivwvtag aTroxXTjpov. Cf. 2 Pet
1:4.
42
but moving in an erring and disorderly way, he brought it into order out
of disorder, considering this to be in every way better than the other.22
It would seem that Gregory has his kinship to Plato well in mind, for he
introduces his own account by distancing himself from the Timaeus, saying that
the account of creation that he offers 'lias been handed down to us from the
Fathers. This account is not a mythical narrative, but from our nature itself stirs
up faith."23 He considers it essential to orthodox Christian faith that God be
understood as the sole principle of creation, whereas Plato's myth implies the
prior coexistence of the Craftsman, his sensible material, and his intelligible
m odel.
The chief defect of Plato's account, from Gregory's Christian point of

view, is that die Craftsman, the Demiurge, is limited in what he may effect. The
nature of matter imposes limits on what can be made from it. This present
sensible, mortal world, in which man has his appointed place, is as good as it can
be, given the principles from which it is made. The Christian sensibility,
however, as expressed especially in the doctrines of the fall and of the
resurrection, is not content with this. The present corruptible world is not the
world as it ought to be or as it will be. God has consented to its existence in its
22 Timaeus 29e-30a (ed. Burnet): Aeywpep 8f| 8l rjpTipa a m a v yepeaip ical

to Trcty toSc o aupicrrds aw eovqoev. ayoGos fji\ dyaSai 8e oi/Seis1Trepi ovSevdg
ovSinore eyytyveTat <J>66vos rovrrou S etcrog dip TravTa otl p.dXicrra e(louXf|0T|
yepeaGai rrapairXiicna eatmS. tchjtt|p 8fj yeveaews ical Kocrp.oi> pdXurr' ap tis apxf|P
KupiuTrimiP trap apSpdip <Jpopip.ojp drro8exdnepos opOoTcrra dtroSexoiT dp.
3ou\Ti0elg yap o Geos ayaGa pep naura, <j>Xaupop 8e priSep eipai icaTa SOpojup, outoj
Sfj Trap oaop r]P opaTOP TrapaXapcup ovx f|cruxCap ayop aXXa Kipoupepop TrXiip.p.Xdis
Kai dTdKTO)?, eis Taftp airro Tjyayep K -rife dramas, r|yiiadp.ePos eicetpo toutou
ird p T to s djiCLPOP.
23OCM 6: Srawley 28:15-29:2: toloutop npa Xoyop trapa rdip -rraTepojp

SieSe^dpeGa- eon 8e o Xoyo? oil p.v0ai8Tis Snyypoi?, aXX' airnfe Tfj? 4>ucojg f|puip
to ttlotop errayopepos.
43
p resent state b u t does so w ith the in tention of restoring it to its p ro p er perfection.

H e is n ot lim ited by the n a tu re o f m atter. For G regory it is en o u g h to
dem onstrate th at G od has po w er over w h at he creates,24 an d for th is purpose he
proposes his teaching reg ard ing the concourse of incorporeal qualities.
1.12
Eriugena's d efen se o f creation ex n ih ilo

Eriugena is w ell aw are o f the sim ilarities betw een P lato 's an d G regory's
cosm ogonies25 and the problem atic posed b y the intelligible-sensible dichotom y,
for his statem ent o f th at problem atic is after all alm ost the sam e as th e one
form ulated by Gregory; an d h e know s w ell G regory's doctrine o f bod y as a
24 E riugena's aim is less m odest. The N utritor and A lum nus are set upon
the p ath of reason, follow ing, to be sure, the teaching of Scripture diuinorumque
ipsius interpretum uestigia, b u t in an effort to acquire u n d erstan d in g for
them selves.
The passage on the m eaning o f 'n o th in g ' m entioned above begins w ith the
A lum nus com plaining th a t dum uero de his quae sola fide retineo aliquid conor ad
purum intelligentiae habitum perspicere fugientium me subtilissimarum rationum nimia
obscuritate, immo etiam nimia claritate aciem mentis perculsus repellor (PP 3 :635A).
The N u trito r will n o t let him stop w ith faith alone b u t pro ds h im to locate the
source o f his difficulty. Qua ratione, replies the A lum nus (PP 3 :636B)by w hat
intelligible principlecan one unify such contradictory affirm ations (th at created
things are eternal in the W ord an d th a t they once w ere not) a n d b rin g them , to
use the N utritor's later ph rase, in unam quondam intelligentiae copulam (PP 3:
638B).
By contrast, as evident in the passages above, and as a recu rren t note in
M acrina's interventions in De anima et resurrectione, G regory rhetorically
represents reasoned argum ent for substantiating the truths o f faith as a
concession necessarily, b u t grudgingly, given to avoid the im pression th at
C hristians are fools. H aving lived throu g h Julian's pagan revival an d fought
against the rationalism of E unom ius, his speculative drive w as perh ap s
chastened by the pastoral sensitivity o f a n apologist w ho know s th a t the
instrum ents of reason are difficult to handle and can aw kw ardly cu t tw o w ays.
Cf. AR 52B-C w here M acrina cautions against reliance on dialectical argum ent
because it is so easily abused.
25 See the section 1.2 below .
44
concourse o f qualities, w hich he ad o pts an d develops in his ow n account of

corporeal reality; b u t he does n o t u se th a t doctrine here, as G regory does, to
solve the ap p aren t contradiction involved in the creation of m utable, corporeal
being by an im m utable, incorporeal G od.
P erhaps Eriugena does n o t cite G regory in the passage exam ined above
because he does n o t find his answ er adequate. As it stands G regory's argum ent
seem s to dism iss the traditional n o tio n of m atter altogether, leaving in its place
th e concourse of qualities. By itself such an account does n o t fully explain this
concourse of qualities because it does n o t identify the principle of th e m utability
o f th at concourse.
In a passage of Periphyseon I (PP 1 :498B ff.), the A lum nus and N utritor
discuss precisely this question. The N utritor has just repeated the theory that
incorporeal and invisible things by th eir concourse produce visible bodies. The
A lum nus objects.
But I do no t cease to debate w ith m yself in w hat m anner these can come
together w ith them selves. In w h at w ay do things incorporeal and
invisible in them selves effect, by the concourse am ong them selves, visible
bodies so th at that the m atter is nothing else, and has no o ther cause of its
constitution, except the tem pered intercourse, am ong them selves in
them selves and not in som ething else, of those things w hich are
considered only through the glance of w isdom ?26
H e th en appeals to "the g reat B oethius" w ho gives a list of im m utable
things contem plated by wisdom : qualities, quantities, form s, m agnitudes,
sm allnesses, equalities, conditions, acts, dispositions, places, tim es, an d so on.
26 PP 1 :498B: Sed mecum tractare non desino qualiter haec stbimet possunt
connenire, quo modo incorporates res per se atque inuisibiles suo concursu inter se
inuicem uisibilia corpora efficiunt ita ut nihil aliud sit materia nullamque aliam causam
constitutionis habeat nisi eorum quae solo sapientiae contuitu considerantur inter se ipsa
in se ipsis et non in aliquo contemperatum coitum.
45
A ll o f th ese h ave in com m on th a t in them selves they are im m utable, b u t w hen

observed to be u n ited in bodies th ey are m utable.27 If m atter an d bodies are the
effects o n ly of im m utable and intelligible things, how can they b e m utable an d
sensible? By th e touch o f w hat variable th in g (tactu uariabilis) are th e im m utables
ren d ered m utable?
T he discussion naturally tu rn s to a consideration of m atter an d questions
th at b e ar u p o n its nature. W hat is m atter? W hat is form? W hat is m ade from
m atter a n d form ? Is m atter a prim o rdial cause? A secondary cause? Is it am ong
sensibles o r intelligibles? C an it be defined?28 The cornerstone o f th e N u trito r's
arg um en t is th e observation th at the existence o f m atter is n o t som ething sensibly
perceived b u t is know n by reason th ro u g h the stripping aw ay o f a b o d y's
various qualities. T hroughout, the N u trito r defends the position th a t body is
p ro du ced b y the concourse of incorporeals know n through reason; m atter, too, is
incorporeal, although, adm ittedly, it is unlike th e other incorporeals listed b y
Boethius.
A n object o f reason, as are the qualities, m atter is nonetheless
d istin g u ish ed from them by its indefinability. This, as the A lum nus notes, m akes
27 PP 1 :498B-C (Boethius, De inst. arithmet. prooem., p . 7,26 8,13 Friedlein

[as id en tified b y Sheldon-W illiam s' n o te to E riugena's text]): Sapientia est rerum
quae sunt suique immutabilem substantiam sortiuntur comprehensio ueritatis. Esse
autem ilia dicimus quae nec intentione crescunt nec retracticme m inuuntur nec
uariationibus permutantur sed in propria semper ui suae se naturae subsidiis nixa
custodiunt. Haec autem sunt qualitates quantitates formae magnitudines paruitates
aequalitates habitudines actus dispositiones loca tempora et quicquid adunatum quodam
modo corporibus inuenitur, quae ipsa quidem natura incorporea sunt et immutabilis
substantiae ratione uigentia, participatione uero corporis permutantur et tactu uariabilis
rei in uertibilem inconstantiam transeunt. Haec igitur quoniam, ut dictum est, natura
immutabilem substantiam uimque sortita sunt uere proprieque esse dicuntur.
28 PP 1 :499C.
46
m atter ak in to God. The Fathers, h e recalls, tau g h t th a t only tw o things cannot

b e defined, G od and m atter. In d eed , b o th are form less, though in contrary w ays.
G od, w ho gives form to the things th a t can be form ed and form lessness to the
things th a t transcend form , is him self form ed b y none. M atter lacks all form s
an d gives form to nothing, it is m erely the capacity o f receiving form .29
The N u trito r confirm s this conclusion by recalling the definitions of
m atter given b y som e o f th e Fathers. O n th e one h an d , A ugustine and Plato hold
th a t "th e m utability o f m utable things w hich is receptive of all form s is unform ed
m atter." O n the other, D ionysius th e A reopagite says that "m atter is
p articipation in adornm ent an d form an d species, w ithout w hich it is in itself
form less an d cannot be understood in anything.... If m atter is participation in
ad ornm ent an d form an d species, th en th a t w hich lacks participation in
adornm ent an d form and species is n o t m atter b u t a certain form lessness." In
eith er view , m atter, if it can be und ersto od a t all, is perceived only by the
intellect.30
A t this po in t it is n o t ev id en t th a t E riugena has gone beyond G regory's
argum ent. Like G regory he has reduced corporeal reality to incorporeal
29 PP 1 :499D-500A: Deus siquidem infinitus informisque quoniam a nullo

form atur dum sit forma omnium, materia similiter infbrmis infinita, aliunde enim
formari indigetfinirique dum per se non forma sedfbrmabilis sit.
30 PP 1 :500D-501A: His ambobus sibimet consentientibus potest sic d id et
difftniri: M utabilitas rerum mutabilium capax omnium formarum infbrmis materia est.
Sanctus Dionysius Ariopagita in libro de Diuinis Nominibus materiam d id t esse om atus
etformae et spedei partidpationem, quibus sine per se infbrmis est materia et in nullo
intelligi potest. A c sic secundum Dionysium potest colligi: Si materia est omatus et
formae et spedeae partidpatio, quod om atus et formae et specid partidpatione caret
materia non est sed quaedam infbrmitas. Siue itaque infbrmis materia mutabilitas sit
formarum capax secundum A ugustinum atque Platonem siue infbrmitas quaedam specid
formae omatusque partidpatione carens secundum Dionysium, non negabis, u t arbitror,
si quodam modo intelligi potest non nisi solo intellectu perdpi.
47
principles, principles w hich derive from a single divine source. B ut there is an

im portant difference. The N u trito r arrives a t the concept of m atter b y the very
procedure G regory uses to dism iss it, th a t is, by stripping aw ay th e intelligible
qualities u n til one is left w ith raw m utability. For Eriugena this m utability m ust
have its ow n principle as do th e qualities; m oreover, this principle contrasts
sharply w ith the qualities an d its relation to the divine nature is d ifferen t from
theirs.
The section of Periphyseon 3 discussed above seeks to uncover th e nature
of this relation, the relation o f the m utability of created things to th e im m utable
divine nature. The contem plation o f reality does no t fall, finally, in to a sim ple
dichotom y of intelligible and sensible, o r of form and m attero r rath er, w hile
the realm o f being m ay fall into such a dichotom y, the divine n a tu re cannot, as
G regory's argum ents w ould suggest, b e tied exclusively to one po le of the
opposition. Eriugena adopts a D ionysian view grounded in the apophatic
affirm ation th at God is beyond being. Because o f its superessentiality, the W ord
of G od is n o t only the Form o f all things, b u t also the source of form lessness in
m utable things.31 God is the ultim ate source of both in all com posite things and
transcends the intelligible-sensible, im m utable-m utable dichotom y th a t led
M anichaeans and secular philosophers to th eir erroneous view s on m atter.
All w hich delusions the light of tru th expels, proclaim ing th a t all things
are from one principle an d th at there is nothing in the n atu re of things
visible an d invisible, by w hatever m ode of generation they b u rst forth into
their p ro p er species, w hich does n o t rem ain established in th e onlybegotten W ord of G od, in w hom all things are one; and th a t G od him self
receives from outside him self no m atter o r cause for the universe created
by him self in his w isdom , since th ere is nothing outside him ....
31 Cf. PP 1 :501D-502A.
48
Therefore no place is given to 'n o th in g ' eith er external or internal to

God; and yet, it is n o t m eaningless to believe th a t all things w ere m ade
from nothing.32
The solution to th e A lum nu s' original quandary, how created things are
both eternal an d y et once w ere not, is found in E riugena's distinctive theory o f
the prim ordial causes a n d th eir procession into effects. A ll dungs are eternally
established in the W ord, b u t are unknow n to any b u t G od, "surpassing all sense
and intellect of the w hole creature" until they proceed thro u g h generation into
their proper places an d tim es, clothed in quantities a n d qualities. From the point
of view of creaturely sense an d intellect, all things, p rio r to th eir m anifestation,
are said no t to be; so th a t w hile they are in God eternally, they are not eternally
know n to the creature. T hus is it tru e to say th at those things th at come to be in
created intellects once w ere not.33
32 PP 3 :664B-665A: Quas omnes delusiones [of M anichaeans and secular

philosophers] lux ueritatis expulit, ab uno principio omnia esse praedicans et nil in
natura rerum uisibilium et inuisibtlium inueniri quoquo modo generationis in speciem
propriam erumpat quod in uerbo dei unigenito aetemaliter non constat substitui, in quo
omnia unum sunt, ipsumque deum pronuntians nullam nateriam seu causam uniuersitatis a se conditae in sua sapientia extrinsecus accepisse quia extra ilium nihil e st...
Proinde non datur locus nihilo nec extra nec intra deum, et tamen de nihilo
omnia fecisse non in uanum creditur.
33 PP 3 :665C-D: Siquidem incommutabiliter et erat et est et erit ipsa prima
constitutio in sapientia dei per primordiales causas, sed quia ipsa constitutio soli deo
cognita est, omnem uero sensum et intellectum totius creaturae superat a nulloque adhuc
intellectu creato cognosci potest quid sit, incipit per generationem temporaliter accipere
quantitates et qualitates in quibus ueluti quibusdam uestimentis aperta potest
manifestare quia est, non autem quid sit. Inchoat ergo quodammodo esse non in
quantum in causis primordialibus subsistit sed in quantum ex causis temporalibus
accipit apparerecausas autem temporales dico qualitates et quantitates et caetera quae
substantiis accidunt temporaliter per generationem et ideo de eis dicitur "erat quando
non erant.
49
This m anifestation o f the creature in the creatu re is also a m anifestation of

the divine, th at is, a theophany, an d the nothing from w hich creatures proceed is
the superessential d iv ine goodness. O w ing to its transcen den t excellence, the
divine goodness is incom prehensible and "is n o t u n w o rth ily called 'nothing'; b u t
w hen it begins to a p p ear in its theophanies, it is said to proceed from nothing
into som ething."34
into som ething on th e teaching of D ionysius. The follow ing passage sum m arizes
E riugena's doctrine an d m akes explicit his dependence o n D ionysius.
Therefore the d iv in e goodness, w hich is called n oth in g for th e reason th at,
being beyond all things th a t are and th a t are n o t, it is discovered in no
essence, descends b y itself and in itself o u t o f th e negation o f all essences
into the affirm ation o f th e w hole universe of essence as if o u t o f nothing
into som ething, o u t o f inessentiality into essentiality, o u t of form lessness
into innum erable form s an d species. Indeed, its first progression is into
the p rim ordial causes, in w hich it is m ade as a certain unform ed m atter
spoken of by Scripture"m atter," th at is, because it is the beginning of
the essence of th in gs, b u t "unform ed" because it is close to th e
form lessness of th e divine w isdom .
A nd the d iv in e w isdom is rightly called "unform ed" because it is
turned tow ard no form superior to itself for its ow n form ation. For it is
the infinite exem plar of all form s, and w hen it descends into diverse form s
of visible and invisible things it looks to itself, as it w ere, for its form ation.
H ence the divine goodness considered above a ll things is said n o t to be
and to be no thin g at all, b u t considered in all filings it b o th is an d is said to
be because it is th e essence o f the w hole u niverse an d its substance and
genus and species and quantity and quality a n d bon d o f all, and situation
and habit and place an d tim e and action and p assio n an d each and every
34 PP 3 :681A: Dum ergo incomprehensibilis intelligitur per excellentiam

nthilum non immerito uocitatur, at uero in suis theophaniis inctpiens apparere ueluti ex
nihilo in aliquid dicitur procedere...
This statem ent follow s a long discussion in w hich created things are
show n to be identical w ith th e divine volitions, w hich, since G od is indentical
w ith his ow n w ill, are in th a t sense identical w ith G od, altho u gh th ey are not
coessential w ith G od (PP 3:673C-680C).
50
th in g in every creatu re a n d around every creature th a t can be understood

by w hatever kind o f intellect. A nd w hoever exam ines carefully the w ords
o f St D ionysius w ill d isco ver th a t they have th is m eaning.35
E riugena agrees w ith th e teaching of G regory in sofar as h e denies that
m atter is a kind of stu ff o u t o f w hich bodies are m aderath er, bodies are the
concourse o f incorporeal qu alities th a t in them selves lack th e m utability of
bodies, form s that derive from the O ne source of all form b u t he goes beyond
G regory b y understanding th a t one m u st still account fo r th e m utability of the
concourse. To give this account h e goes beyond G regory's representation of God
as th e suprem e intelligible reality: G od is indeed the source o f all form , b u t is
h im self beyond form in su ch a w ay th a t he is also the source o f form lessness.
T hus, G regory's intention, to find in th e One C reator the source o f all th a t is, is
fulfilled in an even m ore rad ical w ay.36 Eriugena com bines G regory's doctrine of
35 PP 3 :681B-682A: Diuina igitur bonitas quae propterea nihilum dicitur

quoniam ultra omnia quae sunt et quae non sunt in nulla essentia inuenitur ex negatione
omnium essentiarum in affirmationem totius uniuersitatis essentiae a se ipsa in se ipsam
descendit ueluti ex nihilo in aliquid, ex inessentialitate in essentialitatem, ex infbrmitate
in form as innumerabiles et species. Prima siquidem ipsius progressio in primordiales
causas in quibus fit ueluti infbrmis quaedam materia a scriptura dicitur, materia quidem
quia initium est essentiae rerum, infbrmis uero quia infbrmitati diuinae sapientiae
proximo est.
Diuina autem sapentia infbrmis recte dicitur quia ad nullam jbrmam superiorem
se ad formationem suam conuertitur. Est enim omnium formarum infinitum exemplar,
et dum descendit in diuersas uisibtlium et inuisibilium formas ad se ipsam ueluti ad
formationem suam respicit. Proinde diuina bonitas super omnia considerata dicitur non
esse et omnino nihil esse, in omnibus uero et est et dicitur esse quoniam totius
uniuersitatis essentia est et substantia et genus et species et quantitas et qualitas et
omnium copula et situs et habitus et locus et tempus et actio et passio et omne
quodcumque in omni creatura et circa omnem creaturam a qualicunque intellectu potest
intelligi. E t quisquis intentus sancti Dionysii uerba inspexerit haec ita se habere inueniet
... E riugena then guotes a n u m b er o f passages from D ionysius to illu strate this
p oint.
36 H arry A. W olfson, 'T h e identification of ex nihilo w ith em anation in
G regory o f N yssa," Harvard Theological Review 63 (1970), 53-60, has argued that
51
m atter an d b ody as a concourse o f intelligible qualities w ith the D ionysian

them es o f superem inence, participation, and theophany, them es w hich find their
m o st strik in g expression in th e doctrine, the paradox a t th e h e art o f E riugena's
th o u g h t, th a t th e W ord o f G od is b o th C reator of all and created in all, and its
corollary, th a t all things are b oth etern al and m ade.
d esp ite th e rejection of neoplatonic em anation found in o th er fourth-century
F athers, G regory's ow n in terp retatio n o f creation ex nihilo is in feet a theory of
em anation. A t d ie end o f the article, h e uses E riugena's in terp retatio n of
G regory's doctrine of body as a concourse o f incorporeal qualities as evidence for
his claim .
I am inclined to regard W olfson's interpretation o f G regory's view as an
extrapolation from , rather th an an exposition of, G regory's explicit teaching.
G regory states his views w ith caution, u sing his doctrine o f concourse to rem ove
certain objections to the doctrine o f faith, and show s him self leery o f too close an
identification o f creation w ith G od (as m entioned above in connection w ith De
anima et resurrectione [PG 46:121A ff.]). The concourse of qualities is n o t
G regory's prim ary account of the com position of bodies. N or does W olfson take
into account the later assim ilation o f neoplatonic thought, m ost n otably by the
Pseudo-D ionysius, which inform ed E riugena's use o f G regory's doctrine of
concourse.
The traditional m eans for d istin gu ish ing creation from em anation
d ep en d s o n th e distinction betw een a n atu ral and a voluntary act. N aldini,
"G regorio N isseno e G iovanni Scoto E riugena," show s th a t G regory and
E riugena agree in understanding creation as the "sostantificazione" of th e divine
w ill (p. 518). H ow ever, E riugena radicalizes G regory's view of th e divine free
w ill w hen h e identifies w illing an d b eing in G od, d ue to his insistence o n the
absolute sim plicity of G od (p. 518). Eriugena thus blurs (overcom es?) the
trad itio n al distinction betw een creation and em anation. In feet, R obert D.
C rouse, "The M eaning of C reation in A ugustine and E riugena," Studia Patristica
22:229-234, argues that the results o f recent research call for a radical revision of
conventional interpretations o f the relationship betw een C hristian an d pagan
Platonism , including the conventional distinction betw een A ugustinian and
D ionysian Platonism .
For a closer look a t E riugena's developm ent of G regory's suggestions
regard in g the derivation of the corporeal from the incorporeal, see the section
below on th e concourse of qualities. For a detailed discussion of th e C hristian
assim ilation of neoplatonic theories of em anation inherited b y E riugena, see
G ersh, From lambichus to Eriugena.
52
1.2
M otion and rest

Perhaps no ro u te into the heart o f E riugena's understanding o f N ature is
m ore direct th an a consideration of the p o larity o f m otion and rest. It is the

dynam ism o f creation, a paradox em bracing b o th C reator and creature; for, the
creature is th at abo u t w hich one can affirm b o th th at it is eternal in its causes and
that it once w as n o t b u t com es to be in its effects; and th e C reator is th a t w hich is
the beginning, end, a n d cause o f m otion w hile ev er rem aining unm oved.
Eriugena him self draw s attention to the im portance of this polarity w hen his
N utritor instructs the A lum nus w ith the follow ing purpose:
T hat yo u should plainly know th a t the ten genera [A ristotle's ten
categories]37... are com prehended b y tw o other superior and m ore general
37 Aristoteles acutissimus apud Graecos, u t count, naturalium rerum discretions

repertor omnium rerum quae post deum sunt et ab eo creatae innumerabiles uarietates in
decem uniuersalibus generibus conclusit, quae decern kategorias, id est praedicamenta,
uocauit. (PP 1 :463A.)
Eriugena know s th e categories from th e Pseudo-A ugustinian Decem
categoriae, edited as A nonym i Paraphrasis Themistiana by L aurentius M inioPaluello, Aristoteles Latinus, 1.1-5 (Bruges: D esd ee de Brouw er, 1961), 129-176.
For the influence of th is text, and categorical th eo ry generally, am ong
C arolingians, in d u d in g Eriugena, see John M arenbon, From the Circle o f Alcuin to
the School o f Auxerre: Logic, theology and philosophy in the early Middle Ages
(Cambridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1981). For a stu d y of P lo tin us' critique
and P orphyry's su b seq u en t vindication of A risto tle's categories, see C hristos
Evangeliou, Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988).
Porphyry, how ever, d id n ot apply the categories to the intelligible realm.
A ugustine sow ed the seeds for applying die categories to G od (see De trinitate
5.1), seeds from w hich B oethius reaped his h arv est (in De trinitate an d Contra
Eutychen). A ugustine introduces, and B oethius develops, the p rin d p le that
predicates can be predicated o f God either according to substance o r to relation
b u t not as acddents.
Eriugena, for his p art, applies the D ionysian apophatic and kataphatic
theologies to the use o f d ie categories in reference to G od. The p rim ary purpose
for the discussion of d ie categories in PP 1 is to illu strate apophatic an d
kataphatic thology; w ith in this context E riugena elaborates on the m eaning of the
categories for created being.
53
ones, nam ely, m otion and rest, w hich in tu m are collected in the m ost
general genus w hich the G reeks call t o w a v , b u t w hich by u s is
custom arily called the Universe.38
M otion an d rest m anifest them selves in various w ays and so acquire
various m eanings. In a m ost general sense, m otion is w h at distinguishes
creatures from G od.
For all things are m oved o u t o f nonexisting things into existence th rough
generation by the divine goodness calling them from nonbeing into being
so th at th ey are ex nihilo; and each o f these things th a t are is m oved by
n atu ral ap petite tow ard its ow n essence, genus, species, and its ow n
num ber.39
M otion an d rest have other m eanings. For exam ple, am ong the categories,
those said to b e a t rest are those th a t su b sist per se, w hich the N utritor identifies
as 'p lace', 'q u a n tity ', 'situ atio n ', and, o f course, 'ouoia'; w hile the rem ainder exist
in aliquo and are therefore said to be in m otion.40 M otion is also found in a m ore
38 PP 1 :469B: V t scias plane decent genera praedicta alliis duobus superioribus

generalioribusque comprehendi, motu scilicet atque statu, quae iterum generalissimo
colliguntur genere quod a Graecis TO FLAN, a nostris uero uniuersitas appellari
consueuit.
39 PP 1 :470A :... (ut enim de ipsa generalissima ratione nunc plura non dicam
quae omnia quae a deo post deum condita sunt in motu esse manifestatomnia nanque
ex non existentibus in existentia per generationem mouentur ex non esse in esse diuina
bonitate omnia uocante u t sint de nihilo, et unumquodque eorum quae sunt ad essentiam
suam genusque speciemque numerumque suum naturali appetitu mouetur) ...
G.-H. A llard, "The Prim acy of Existence in the T hought of Eriugena," in
Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. D om inic J. O 'M eara (Norfolk, Virginia:
In t'l Society for N eoplatonic Studies, 1982), 89-96, discusses the distinctive
im portance existentia has w ithin E riugena's u n d erstan d in g of creation ex nihilo.
40 PP 1 :470A: ... ea proprie dicimus in statu esse quae per se subsistunt
nulliusque indigent subiecti u t sint, quae uero in aliquo existunt quia per se subsistere
non possunt in motu esse non incongrue iudicamus. The N u trito r then nam es th e in
statu categories, locus, quantitas, situs, ousia, a n d m ust subsequently defend this
position; w hich leads to his division o f the categories into those th at are around
ousia, those th at are in it, those th at are outside it, and those th at are b oth inside
54
p articular w ay in th e category of relation w hich E riugena defines as "the m u tu al

striving of tw o things tow ard each other."41 O f course, m otion and rest also
appear, w ith th e ir m ore conventional m eanings, in d ie visible w orld of bodies.
PP 1 :474B begins a protracted treatm ent o f d ie category 'place' in the
course of w hich d ie N u trito r advances d ie p o sitio n th a t 'p laces' are the
definitions of finite things and as such exist in th e m in d alone.42 The A lum nus
comes to die defense of ordinary language, objecting th a t it is com m on to say
and outside it (PP 1 :471C-472B).
It is p erh ap s sufficient here to note how h e explains 'p lace' as in statu. P u t
sim ply, he arg u es th a t 'p lace' is not in m otion because it is th e term of m otion: S i
enim nil aliud locus sit nisi terminus atque diffinitio uniuscuiusque finitae naturae
profecto locus non appetit u t in aliquo sit, sed omnia quae in eo sunt ipsum merito
terminum finem que suum semper desiderant, in quo naturaliter continentur et sine quo
in infinitum fluere uidentur. Locus itaque in motu non est cum omnia quae in eo sunt
ad se moueantur; ipse uero stat (PP 1 :470C). This is a foretaste of the m uch longer
discussion o f 'p la c e ' in w hich the N utritor defends a p u rely dialectic notion o f
this category. In term s of die general m otion of creatures m entioned above,
'place' is precisely the definition of its essence a n d genus and species and
num ber, tow ard w hich each thing is m oving an d w ith in w hich it exists.
A t PP 1 :481C483C Eriugena identifies 'p la c e ' w ith A ugustine's modus et
mensura. For a discussion of Eriugena's use o f W isdom 11:21 ("God m ade all
things according to m easure, num ber, and w eight") in relation to earlier uses, see
James M cEvoy, "Biblical and Platonic M easure in John Scottus Eriugena," in
Eriugena: East and West, ed. McGinn and O tten, 153-178.
41 PP 1 :469D: De relatione item miror cur dubitas cum uideas earn in uno
eodemque esse non posse, in duobus nanque semper uidetur. Duorum autem ad se
inuicem appetitus motu quodam fieri quis dubitarit?
42 PP 1 :474B: Locus... in dijfinitionibus rerum quae diffiniri possunt
constituitur. N il enim aliud est locus nisi ambitus quo unumquodque certis terminis
concluditur.... A s th e passage continues it becom es clear th a t the N utritor inten d s
to restrict the category o f 'p lace' to the notion o f a 'to p ic ' w ith in the a rt o f
Dialectic. This n o tio n is then extended to all die arts, w hich by their definitions,
each according to its ow n portion of reality, encom pass all things in their p ro p er
places. This arg u m en t leads to the conclusion, reluctan tly adm itted by the
A lum nus, th a t non esse locum nisi in animo. Si enim diffinitio omnis in disciplina est
et omnis disciplina in animo, necessario locus omnis, quia diffinitio est, non alibi nisi in
animo erit (PP 1 :475B).
55
th a t the e a rth is th e place of m en and anim als, a ir the place of birds, w ater d ie
place of fishes, an d aether th e place o f stars. T he N u trito r replies th at such usage
confuses th e notions of part and place. The fo u r elem ents are the universal p arts
of the sensible w o rld, w hich by being m ixed to g eth er produce the p articu lar
bodies of all h erbs, trees, an d anim als; in tim e these p articular bodies dissolve
and retu rn once again to d ie general.43 This observation sets the N u tritor onto a
tangential lin e o f inq u iry about the kinds o f m otion an d rest involved in th is
process.
A s w ater, air, an d fire, arranged about e arth as th eir center, w hirl in an
unceasing ro tatio n , these universal bodies m ingle in an uninterrupted m otion
and join to g eth er to form particular bodies an d th en separate again. This m otion,
too, has its center; each of these particular bodies h as "its ow n proper and n atu ral
essence w hich can neither be m oved n o r increased n o r dim inished," rem aining at
rest th ro u g h o u t th e process of its com position an d dissolution. The m otion th at
one observes is n o t o f the essence b u t of the accidents, o r rather, no t of the
accidents them selves, b u t of the participation in th e accidents by the essence and
vice versa. 'T o r participation can both begin an d increase and can be dim inished
u ntil this w orld achieves the goal of its stability in all things, after w hich n eith er
essence n o r accident n o r their participation in one an o ther w ill suffer any m otion
a t all."44 T hus, the N utrito r draw s a parallel betw een the m ingling of elem ents as
43 PP 1 :475C-D: Constat etenim hunc mundum uisibilem quattuor elementis

ueluti quattuor generaltbus quibusdam partibus compositum esse, et est quasi quoddam
corpus suis partibus compactum ex quibus, uidelicet partibus catholicis, omnium
animalium arborum herbarum propria specialissimaque corpora mirabili ineffabilique
mixture coeuntia componuntur inque eas iterum resolutionis tempore redeunt.
44 PP 1 :476A-B: V t enim totus iste mundus sensibus apparens assiduo motu
circa suum cardinem uoluitur, circa terram dico circa quam ueluti quoddam centrum
56
they w hirl ab o u t the earth and the participation in accidents centered about the
essence. The p o larity o f m otion and rest in both these form s bring s the changing
w orld of bodies to th e senses.
For w h at reason th e earth rem ains a t rest w hile foe other elem ents are in
perpetual n o tio n is a question the N utritor thinks deserving of m ore th an a little
attention. W hy he finds this question so interesting is n o t d e a r, unless one
supposes th a t h e has in view a possible objection to any p a rt of foe sensible
w orld show ing itself to be at rest since the realm o f bodies is above all foe realm
of m utability. To answ er this question he turn s to the opinions o f secular
philosophers, th e greatest of w hom , he d ed ares, is Plato, and to foe opinions of
the Catholic Fathers, w hom he represents w ith G regory of N yssa.
E riugena's use o f Plato in this context show s how he approaches the
relationship betw een different m anifestations of foe m otion-rest polarity . H ere
the m otion an d rest found in foe sensible w orld as a w hole is an im age o f foe
m otion and re st characteristic of foe soul th at anim ates it. This so u l is alw ays
m oved and alw ays at rest. Consequently, foe w orld th a t is m oved by it
m anifests b o th a perpetual m otion and a p erp etu al rest.
caetera tria elementa, aqua uidelicet aer ignis, incessabili rotatu uoluuntur, ita inuisbili
motu sine ulla intermissione uniuersalia corpora, quattuor elementa dico, in se inuicem
coeuntia singularum rerum propria corpora convitiunt, quae resoluta iterum ex
proprietatibus in uniuersalitates recurrunt, manente semper immutabiliter quasi quodam
centro singularum rerum propria naturalique essentia quae nec moueri nec augeri nec
minui potest. Accidentia enim in motu sunt, non essentia, nec etiam ipsa accidentia in
motu sunt seu in incrementis detrimentisue sed partidpatio eorum ab essentia tales
patitur mutabilitates. Aliter enim uera ratio non sinit esse; omnis siquidem natura seu
essentiarum seu eis accidentium immutabilis est, partidpatio uero, u t diximus,
essentiarum ab acddentibus seu accidentium ab essentiis semper in motu est. Partidpatio
siquidem et inchoari et augeri minuique potest donee mundus iste ad finem suae
stabilitatis in omnibus perueniat, post quern nec essentia nec accidens nec eorum inter se
inuicem partidpatio ullum motum patietur. Omnia enim unum et idipsum immobile
erunt quando in suas immutabiles rationes omnia reuersura sunt.
57
Because the soul its e lf... is eternally m oved for the vivifying o f its
body, th a t is, the w hole w o rld , an d the governing o f it and for m oving it
w ith th e conjunctions a n d dissolutions o f various individual bodies
according to their diverse reasons, it also rem ains in its n atu ral and
im m obile rest, it is ev er m oved an d ever a t rest. For this reason its body
also, th a t is, th e universe o f visible things, in p a rt rests w ith an eternal
stability, as does the earth ; in p a rt it is m oved w ith an eternal velocity, as
are th e aeth en al spaces; in p a rt it n eith er rests nor is m oved w ith velocity,
as w ater; in p a rt it is m oved w ith velocity b u t no t the greatest velocity, as
is air.45
T hus, w hile th e u n ity of m otion a n d rest is evident in the body of the w o rld , it
does no t show the sam e perfection found in the dynam ic im m utability of the
w orld soul.46
E riugena's use of G regory does n o t em phasize the intim ate relation
betw een the w orld and its m oving cause, as does his exposition of Plato, b u t
focuses on th e m ethod by w hich th e divine Engineer orders opposites into a
dynam ic continuum . The first m ethod is th e interposition of m ediating term s;
45 PP 1 :476D-477A: Sed quia ipsa anima, u t ait ipse [i.e., Plato], aetemaliter
mouetur ad corpus suum, id est totum mundum, uiuificandum regendum diuersisque
rationibus uariorum corporum singulorum coniunctionibus resolutionibusque
mouendum, manet etiam in suo naturali immobilique statu, mouetur ergo semper et stat,
ac per hoc et corpus eius, id est uniuersitas rerum uisibilium, partim quidem stat aetema
stabilitate, ut est terra; partim uero aetema uelocitate mouetur, u t est aetherium spatium;
parim nec stat nec uelociter mouetur, u t aqua; partim uelociter sed non uelocissime, u t
estaer.
46 The N u trito r says th a t P lato 's account is both incisive and n atu ral {acuta
... atque naturalis esse uidetur). N o t surprisingly, then, the doctrine o f the w orld
soul appears in altered form s elsew here in d ie Periphyseon. H ere the N utrito r
defines the w orld so u l as generalis uita quae omnia quae in motu atque in statu sunt
uegetat atque mouet (PP 1:476C). T his 'gen eral life' becom es the subject o f the later
exposition of the Fifth Day (PP 3 :729A ff), w hich is discussed in section 3.22 ff.
A nother form o f th e doctrine is found in the treatm ent of the ferm entative an d
distributive operation proper to d ie H oly Spirit, although E riugena takes p ains to
show th at the H oly Spirit transcends every creature and so cannot be reduced to
the soul of the w orld (see PP 2 :552C-556A an d 563A-566D).
58
the second, th e tem pering o f th e extrem es them selves; the re su lt is a g rad ed scale
o f p roportions.
In G regory's account, found in th e first chapter of De opificio hominis, there
is no w orld soul b u t a n atu ral dynam ism created by the h arn essin g o f opposed
forces.
A s a certain bond an d stability o f th e things th at com e to be, the divine a rt
an d po w er is stored u p in the n a tu re o f beings, controlling everything by
th e reins o f a tw ofold activity. For b y rest and m otion it contrived the
genesis o f things th at w ere n o t an d th e continuance o f things th a t are.47
This d ivine a rt, as it crafts the universe, begins w ith the extrem es, heaven and
earth . The stability of earth an d the rap id revolving m otion o f th e heavens then
act u p o n each o th er in such a w ay th a t each reinforces the co n trary p ro p erty of
the other. The earth, com pacted by the revolution of the w o rld ab o u t it, by its
d ensity and stability increases the intensity o f th at revolution. As these extrem es
act th u s u p o n each other the rem ainder o f th e w orld begins to em erge, so th at
"all things th a t appear w ithin th e creation are the offspring o f m otion an d rest."48
47 O H 1 :128C: vv8e<xp.os 6e t i ? xai {iefkuoxTis xwv yeyevx\\Levuiv t| Geia

Tex^n *al Suva|XLs xfj (Jmcrei rGtv oi/xgjp evairexeQri, SiirAats evepyeiais f)uioxoOcra xa
Travxa. Zxricrei yap xai xti/iyrei xf|i/ yeveaiv xot? px| oicri, xai xt|i/ 8iap.oi/f|v xoig
ovoiv ep.Tixcn^craxo.
E riugena's translation of th is text w eakens the im m anence o f the divine
a rt an d po w er im plied by m y English tran slatio n above: ... coniunctio autem
quaedam acfirm itas naturae existentium diuina arte atque uirtute adiecta est. Duplis
operationibus uniuersa gubemarts in statu siquidem et motu generationem non
existentibus et perseuerantiam existentibus machinata est. (Im ag. 1: 210,36-40.) The
im m anence o f divine pow er, u p o n w hich th e harm ony and o rd e r o f the cosmos
d epen d, is a strikin g feature of G regory's cosm ology, h i De anima et resurrectione,
m any of the argum ents advanced by M acrina involve the analogy betw een
G o d /w o rld an d so u l/b o d y .
48 O H 1 :129A: ... oxi xivqaeaig xe xai crracrews exyova x a ev xfj xxiaei
(fau/dp-eva iTdvxa.
59
The dynam ic opposition of heaven an d earth su stain s and reinforces itself,

b u t it also gives rise to certain tem pering effects th ro u g h the presence of
intervening elem ents. W ater and air, situ ated as th ey are betw een the extrem es,
m oderate the extrem es b y participating, according to th e ir proxim ity to each, in
the properties o f both. W ater and air b o th exhibit a m ixtu re o f m otion an d rest,
w ater inclining to w ard th e stability o f earth by v irtu e o f its proxim ity to earth,
and air, tow ard heaven. This intervening zone unifies th e extrem es by "m ixing
and distinguishing a t th e sam e tim e w ithin itself th in g s th a t are separate by
nature,"49 so th at th e extrem es them selves, though sep arate by nature, m ay come
together and be unified b y m eans of th is m ediation.50
This p ro portioning of m otion an d rest p ertains to m otion in space, b u t
there are other kinds o f m otion. As G regory notes, a closer look reveals th at the
extrem es them selves are already tem pered w ith resp ect to each other by the w ay
in w hich they com bine tw o kinds of m otion, the kin d observed in locom otion
and the kind observed in change and alteration.51 T hus, w hile the heavens
exhibit the m axim um o f locom otion, they are no t subject to alteration; w hereas,
earth, rem aining statio n ary in place, is subject to all th e varieties of alteration and
change. Both, by th eir nonm otion, reflect the im m utability of th e divine nature,
and each by its m otion falls short of it.52
49OH 1:129B:
... j u y v u s d f i a ic a l S i a i p a w e v a i m S T a S i e c r r o m i r r j 4 > u a e u
50OH 1:129C:
. .. w a r e u u fifk u t/e L is
<t>uaei S ie c rrq K O T a S i a r d i v [x e a iT e u o u T c o v
rrp o s aXXr|Xa r a K a r a
aXX^Xois e v o u p . e v a .
to
axpoT aT oi'
rrj
51 OH 1:129C: Tfjs yap Kiuqaews ou p.6uov icaTd Tf|v Tomxf|i/ p.eTd<rraau/

uoou|iei/Tis, aXXa xai ev rpotrfj xai dXXoiakrei Gewpoupii/Tis*...
52OH 1:129C-D.
60
The N u trito r does n o t quote G regory directly, b u t gives his ow n loose

p araphrase o f G regory's text, em phasizing, how ever, the sam e general points:
that the C reator established the w orld betw een tw o extrem es contrary to each
other, the heaviness o f earth and the lightness o f aeth er (heaven); that betw een
these, air an d w ater "m ove ceaselessly w ith a p ro p ortio n al m oderation betw een
heaviness an d lightness," each follow ing m ore closely the nearer extrem e; th at
even the extrem e p arts of the w orld, although op p osed to each other b y the
qualities of heaviness and lightness, nonetheless, in certain respects resem ble
each o ther because both com bine a kind o f m otion w ith a kind of rest.
For th e aetherial region though it ever revolves w ith the fastest speed, the
chorus o f its stars keeps its position im m utably so th at it revolves w ith the
aether an d y et does n o t leave its n atu ral place, in likeness to the earthly
stability. O n the contrary, w hile earth is etern ally at rest, everything that
arises from it is ever in m otion, in likeness to th e aetherial lightness, by
being b o m through generation, grow ing in to th e num ber of places and
tim es an d again decreasing and arriving a t the dissolution of form and
m atter.53
53 PP 1 :477B-D: Sed quoniam de hoc eadem causa magnus Gregorius NYCEYC

episcopus subtilissime disputat... Dicit enim conditorem uniuersitatis hunc mundum
uisibiliem inter duas sibi inuicem contrarias extremitates constituisse, inter grauitatem
dico atque leuitatem, quae sibi omnino opponuntur, atque ideo quoniam in grauitate terra
est constituta semper intmobilis m anet..., aetheria uero spatia prop terea ineffabili
uelocitate semper circa media uoluuntur quoniam in natura leuitatis constituta s u n t...
Duo uero in medio elementa constituta, aqua uidelicet et aer, proportionali moderamine
inter grauitatem et leuitatem assidue mouentur ita u t proximum sibi extremum
terminum utraque magis sequantur quam ab eis longe remotum. . .. Sed quamuis
uideantur extremae mundi partes a se inuicem discrepare propter diuersas eorum
qualitates non tamen per omnia a se inuicem dissentiunt. Nam aetheria spatia quamuis
semper caelerrima uelocitate uoluantur, chorus tamen astrorum suam immutabilem
obseruat sedem ita u t et cum aethere uoluatur et naturalem locum ad similitudinem
terraenae stabilitatis non deserat. Terra uero e contrario cum aetemaliter in statu sit,
omnia tamen quae ex ea oriuntur ad similitudinem leuitatis aetheriae semper in motu
sunt, nascendo per generationem crescendo in numerum locorum ac temporum
iterumque decrescendo et ad solutionem formae atque materiae perueniendo.
E riugena's p arap hrase differs from G regory's text at several points:
61
H aving sum m arized this m aterial from G regory, E riugena does nothing m ore
w ith it. O nly w h en h e discusses the "firm am ent" o f elem ents in Book 3, does he
m ake fuller use o f this m aterial.
In Book 3 d ie no tio n th a t even die extrem e p arts of th e w orld, w hich seem
to be m ost opposed, are y e t n o t entirely so, finds an other expression in the idea
th at the natu res o f all fo u r elem ents are present, tho u gh p erh aps only hiddenly,
in all sensible bodies.
So alth o ug h som e qualities are m ore m anifest in som e sensible
bodies an d som e less, the assem bly o f the general elem ents them selves
exists uniform ly in all as one and the sam e com m ensurable thing. Indeed,
the d ivine m ind balanced the w eighing o f th e w hole body of the w orld
w ith a level scale betw een tw o extrem ities m u tu ally opposed to each
other, th a t is to say, betw een heaviness an d lightness, betw een w hich
every m ean of visible bodies is suspended. Thence all bodies, inasm uch
as they p articip ate in heaviness, are receptive o f earthly qualities ..., b u t
inasm uch as th ey share in lightness they particip ate in celestial q u alities...,
and those in th e m iddle, w hich are balanced betw een die extrem es,
possess an eq u al participation of their qualities. But in all of them there is
one and th e sam e m otion and rest and capacity and possession of the four
universal elem ents.54
Eriugena uses 'a e th e r' w here G regory uses 'h eav en ' (or once, tt}s tmpwdous
o w las); w here G regory stresses the opposition of n atu res, E riugena em phasizes
the opposition o f qualities, distinguishing the qualities, quae sibi omnino
opponuntur, from th e p arts of th e w orld, w hich, th o u g h opposed in quality, non
tamen per omnia a se inuicem dissentiunt; E riugena does no t m ake a point of
distinguishing betw een locom otion and alteration as does G regory; and
Eriugena does n o t speak o f stability reflecting, and m otion falling short of, the
divine nature. Cf. Im ag. 1:210-211.
54 PP 3: 714A-B: Quamuis itaque qualitatum quaedam quidem in quibusdam
corporibus plus, quaedam uero minus sensibus appareant, synodus tamen ipsorum
catholicorum elimentorum una eademque uniformiter commensurabilis in omnibus est.
Mens siquidem diuina examinationem totius mundani corporis inter duos extremitates
sibi inuicem e contrario oppositas equali lance librauit, inter grauitatem dico et leuitatem,
inter quas omnis medietas uisibilium corporum ponderata est. Proinde omnia corpora in
quantum grauitatem participant in tantum terrenarum qualitatum capacia est, hoc est
soliditatis et stabilitatis, in quantum uero ex leuitate attrahunt in tantum qualitates
caelestes participant, inanitatem dico et mutabilitatem, media autem, quae simili
62
The n otio n o f harm onizing opposites th ro u g h an interposed m ean also

appears in th is later discussion of the elem ents. Sensible bodies are constituted
b y opposing qualities com bined in som e proportion. The four elem ents lend
th eir qualities, as it w ere, for this purpose, b u t in them selves rem ain hid d en and
stable. E riugena in terprets th e creation of die firm am ent in the m idst of w aters
as the creation o f the four elem ents betw een etern al prim ordial causes and
m utable, sensible bodies. "If som eone w ill look carefully, he w ill understand
th at this w orld is constituted in this threefold proportionality."55 A t one extrem e
are the spiritu al "reasons," w hich are eternal and th e g ro un d o f the substantial
existence of dungs; a t the other, the corporeal, m utable bodies w ith their flux of
generation and corruption. Between them lies the n atu re of th e four elem ents.
A nd if som eone w ill look at the n ature of th e sim ple elem ents, h e w ill
m ore clearly th an ligh t find a certain p roportioned m ediation by w hich
they are n eith er entirely bodyalthough n atu ral bodies subsist by their
com ing to g eth er and falling apartn o r entirely devoid of bodily nature
since from them all bodies flow forth and in to them are again dissolved.
A nd again, com pared to the superior extrem e they are neither entirely
sp irit because n o t entirely rem oved from the bo d ily extrem e, nor entirely
n ot sp irit since they receive the occasions o f th eir subsistence from entirely
spiritual principles. N o t irrationally then do w e say th at this w orld
possesses certain extrem es w hich are com pletely opposed to each other
and m eans by w hich th e concordant harm ony of th e universe itself is
com posed.56
libramine extremitates attingunt, aequali partidpatione illarum qualitates possident. In
omnibus autem quattuor elimentorum uniuersalium unus idemque motus est et status et
capadtas et possessio.
55 PP 3 :695B: Proinde si quis intentus inspexerit in hoc temaria
proportionalitate hunc mundum constitutum intelliget.
56 PP 3 :695B-C: A t si quis simplidum elimentorum naturam intueatur luce
clarius quondam proportionabilem medietatem inueniet qua nec omnino corpus sunt
quamuis eorum corruptione naturalia corpora subsistant et coitu nec omnino corporeae
naturae expertia dum ab eis omnia corpora profluant et in ea iterum resoluantur. Et
iterum alteri superiori quidem extremitati comparata nec omnino spiritus sunt quoniam
63
E riugena's view o f th e proportioning an d h arm onizing of opposites,

w hether the ab solute o p po sition betw een prim o rd ial causes and sensible body o r
the relative op p ositio n of p a rts w ithin th e sensible w o rld , is b u t an u nfolding o f
his deeper in sig h t into the dynam ic o f m otion a n d rest th a t characterizes th e
w hole creative process. In one direction, it leads back to th e procession o f the
divine nothing in to die essences of created things, h i another, it invites closer
scrutiny of the concourse o f elem ental qualities th a t co nstitute corporeal n atu re.
1.3
A c o n c o u rs e o f a c c id e n ts
G regory speaks b o th o f a concourse o f q ualities an d of a concourse o f
elem ents, w hich are n o t the sam e. The latter is m ore fundam ental for G regory,
providing his p rim ary account o f the com position of corporeal nature; w hile the
form er is introduced in relation to the opposition betw een intelligible and
sensible objects, w hich is so g reat th at it has m isled som e thinkers to p o sit the
existence of tw o ultim ate principles o f the u niverse, the divine and m atter. The
form er concourse p ertain s to the objects of know ledge an d perception, the form s
produced by m eans of the latter. The concourse o f qualities, discovered by
exam ining the m in d 's know ledge of sensible objects, bridges the gap betw een the
intelligible an d th e sensible an d elim inates the need to p o stulate a second
principle coetem al w ith the divine.
In his account o f corporeal nature, E riugena acknow ledges b o th kinds of
concourse, b u t gives th e concourse of qualities th e p rim ary place. It finds its
place w ithin an in terp retatio n o f the Ten C ategories an d an elaborate theory of
the relations of accidents to substance an d of th e accidents to each other.
non omnino spiritualibus subsistentiae suae occasiones suscipiant. Non irrationabiliter
itaque diximus hunc mundum extremitates quasdam a se inuicem penitus discretas et
medietates in quibus uniuersitatis ipsius concors armonia coniungitur possidere.
64
C onsequently, the concourse o f qualities w hich h e takes from G regory becom es

m ore specifically a concourse o f accidents. T he concourse of elem ents is th en
interpreted accordingly.
1.31
G regory o n the concourse o f q u alities and o f elem en ts

h i De opificio hominis, there are tw o contexts in w hich G regory discusses
the com position of b odies in term s of concourse. O ne begins w ith the co n trast
betw een intelligible and sensible natures an d is governed by th e question, how
G od w ho com pletely lacks any sensible qualities can be the sole source o f a
sensible w orld. The o th er concerns the doctrine o f the resurrection of the body.
This p attern can also be seen in the dialogue, De anima et resurrectione.
In C hapter 24 o f De hominis opificio, G regory offers an argum ent in defense
of the C hristian doctrine o f creation ex nihilo. The objection is stated in C hapter
23. Bodies becom e know n to us through qualities such as color, shape, w eight,
quantity, and so on, qualities th at require extension, com position, and lim itation;
none of w hich ap plies to th e divine because it is sim ple, unextended, and
changeless; how , th en, can the qualities of m aterial n atu re be derived from the
divine nature? This difficulty is sim ply an application o f the Platonic opposition
betw een intelligible an d sensible objects and b etw een th e m odes o f know ledge
associated w ith them , a dichotom y as d ear to G regory as to those he seeks to
refute.
H ere, how ever, he attenuates th at opposition by reflecting on the
know ledge one can have o f sensible objects: reason can distinguish the various
qualities prop er to sensible objects from each o th er and from the subject in w hich
they are found. For th is to be so each quality m u st possess its ow n prop er
'reaso n ' (Xoyos). The crux o f his argum ent lies in the fu rth er observation th a t
w hen one subtracts all the reasons of the qualities from the reason of the object as
65
a w hole, the latter disappears: bodies are know able only th ro u g h th e properties
they possess. It is n o t unreasonable, then, to th in k th a t bodies ow e their
existence to the com ing together of these qualities. If such is die relation betw een
bodies and o u r reason, w hich is a noetic reality, th ere is no cause to posit an
absolute opposition betw een these objects an d th e suprem e noetic reality, God.
Because this chapter has such an im portant role to E riugena's theory of corporeal
nature, it is quoted here in full.
XXIV. Reply to those who say that matter is coetemal with God.
The view of m atter th at m aintains th a t it exists o u t of w hat is noetic
and everlasting seem s to be intrinsic to w h at is found by orderly
investigation. For w e find that all m atter consists of certain qualities, o f
w hich if it is stripp ed, it w ill in itself be in n o w ay com prehended by
reason; b u t each form of quality is separated from its subject by reason;
and reason is a noetic, and not a bodily, perception.
T hus, if w e contem plate som e living thing, o r w ood, o r som ething
else having m aterial existence, w e observe m any things about the subject
by m eans of conceptual division, each of w hich has a reason th at is
unm ixed in relation to the w hole being considered. For the reason of its
color is one an d th at of its w eight another, an d likew ise th at of its quantity
and of its k in d o f tangible property. For softness and a length of two
cubits, and th e rest of its predicates, p ertain neither to each other nor to
the body, w ith respect to its reason. For each o f these has its ow n
expressive definition of w hat it is, w hich is n o t com m on to any other
quality contem plated about the subject.
If, th en , th e color is noetic, and the h ard n ess is noetic, and likewise
the quantity, an d the other such properties, and if w hen each of these is
separated from the subject, the w hole reason of the body is dissolved; it
m ight logically follow to assum e th a t those things w hose absence we find
to be the cause o f the body's unloosing are th e sam e things w hose
concourse gives b irth to the m aterial n ature. For as there is no body in
w hich color a n d shape, and hardness and extension, and w eight and the
rest of the p roperties, are not present; none o f these is a body, b u t
som ething alongside body, and each is discovered by its pro p er
characteristic; so also, by a conversion of term s, w hen the predicates are in
concourse, th ey produce the bodily substance.
Now,, if the observation o f these prop erties is som ething noetic, and
the divine is noetic, there is nothing inconsistent in affirm ing th a t these
intelligible sources for the genesis of bodies su bsist from the bodiless
nature: the noetic n ature sustains the noetic pow ers, and the concourse of
these am ong them selves brings to genesis th e m aterial nature.
66
H ow ever, let these considerations be for u s m ere accessories; let us

again recall in faith th e passage through w hich w e received the
affirm ation th a t th e universe exists o u t of nonbeing; a n d again, being
tau g h t b y Scripture, w e do n o t doubt th at it w ill be transform ed into som e
other state.57
57 O H 2 4 :212D-213C: X XIV . Ainippqm q rrpog rovq Xeyouraq, aw atSiov
eivai rip Oeqj rrju vXtju.
Ou8e yap ea) t<3u Kara to axoXoutiou eupiaxopeuan/ f | Trepl Tqg uXqg
vttoXthIjls âiverai, f| ex tou uoqTou Te xai auXou Tcrirrqu irrroarquai. rrpeaPeuoucra*
rrdcrau yap eupqaopeu ex rroiOTryraiu Ttuaiu auveoraxrav *rqu uXqu, diu ei yupuu>0elr|
xa9' eairrqu, ouSapou Tai Xoytu xaTaXq<t>0qaeTai. AXXa pqu exaaTou rroioTqTeg eiSog
Xoyti) tou inroxeipeuou xwpiCeTau 'O 8<e Xoyog uoqTq t l s ecrri, xai oux'i aaipanxq
Qecupia. Olou, trpoxeipeuou Cwou Tiuog q uXou Tq Gewpia, q Tiuog aXXou tuju uXixqu
exouTcou Tqu avaraaiv, rroXXa Trepl to irrroxeipeuou Tq xaT eTriuoiau Siaipeoei
xaTeuoqaapeu, uiu exacrrou rrpog to auuGeupoupeuou apixTtog o Xoyog exei. "ETepog
yap o tou xpwpaTog, xai eTepog tou papoug o Xoyog, o Tqg rrocroTqTog rraXiu, xai o
Tqg rroiag xaTa *rqu a<t>qv ISioTqTog. "H Te yap paXaxoTqg xai to Srrrqxu, xai Ta
Xoirra Tdiu ei.pqpeua>u, oure aXXqXotg, outc tw aaipaTi xaTa tou Xoyou aup<J>epeTai.
E x a c r r o u y a p t o u t o i u I S u j g , x a0* o e a r n / , o e p p q u e u n x o g o p o g e m u o e i T a L , o u S e u
e m x o i u w u d i u aX X q T i u i rto u t r e p i t o ir r r o x e ip e u o u 0 ea > p o u p e u a )u t t o l o t t j t l . Ei t o i u u u
i/o q T o v p e u t o XP^M-a t'o q T T j 8 e x a i q d u T iT u r r ia , x a i q r r o a o T q g , x a i T a X o irra Tail/
t o l o u t o ) ! / iS iw p d T o ju , e x a c r r o u 8 e t o u t o j u e i u 4 > a ip e 0 e iq t o u i r r r o x e i p e u o u , r r a g o t o u
CTcupaTog o u v S i a X u e T a i X o y o g * a x o X o u G o u a u e t q , <Lu T q u a r r o u a t a u * rq g t o u cx a ip a T o g
X u a e c u g a i T i a u e u p o p e u , t o u t g j u T q u a u u 8 p o p q u d t r o T t x T e i u T q u u X ix q u <{>uatu
irrro X a p P a u e L U . Q g y a p o u x e c m c x a ip a , w t o XP<>M-a KaL To c r x q p a , x a i q a u T iT U T ria
x a i q S id c r ra c r L g , x a i t o P a p o g , x a i T a X o ir ra t g j u iS ia ip d T w u o u r r p o a e a T i i / , e x a c r r o u
8 e t o u t g j u a c S p a o u x e c r r t u , aX X ' e T e p o u t i r r a p d t o a a j p a , x a T a t o i 8 i a o u
e u p ic r x e T a i* o u t g j x a T a t o d u T L crrp o ^ > o u , o r ro u 8 a u a u u S p a p q T a e i p q p e u a , T q u
a a j p a T L x q u u r r o a T a a i u d i r e p y a C e T a i . A X X a p q u e i u o q T q t w u IS L O jp aT aju t o u t o i u q
x a T a u o q a c g , u o q T o u 8 e T q <t>uaet t o 0 e t o v * o u fie v a i r e i x o g , e x T q g d a w p a T o u <J>uaea)g
T a g u o e p a g T a v r a g a< t> o p p a g r r p o g T q u t u u a a tp a T c o u y e u e a t u ir tr o c r r q u a L , T q g p e u
u o q T f j g <J>uaeajg T a g u o q T a g i x j ) i a T u a q g S u u a p e i g , T q g 8 e t o u t o j u r r p o g aX X qX a
o u u S p o p q g T q u uX ai8 q 4 > u a tu r r a p a y o u o q g e i g y e u e a i u . A X X a T a v r a p e u x a T a t o
i T a p e p y o u q p i u r r a p e ^ e T d o 0 a ) * q p t u 8 e rraXLU e r r i T q u r u a n u e r r a u a x T e o u t o u X o y o u ,
8 l q g e x T e t o u p q o u T o g v rrro c rrq u a L t o r r a u e 8 e ^ a p e 6 a , x a i r r a X i u e i g aX X q u T i u a
p e T a o T o i x e i o u a O a i x a T d c r r a a t u r r a p d T fjg rpa<{>qg 8 i 8 a x 0 e u T e g , o u x a p 4 > ip d X X o p e u .
Cf. Im ag. 24: 245,18-246,9: <Caput XXZZZT>. Controuersia aduersus eos qui
dicunt coaetemam esse deo materiem.
Neque enim extra ea quae consequenter inuenta sunt de materia, susceptio ilia
fertur quae ex intellectuali et immateriali earn subsistere profert. Omnem siquidem
materiam ex quibusdam qualitatibus amsistere inuenimus, quibus si nudata fuerit per
seipsam nulla ratione comprehendetur, atqui unaquaeque qualitatis species ratione
subiecto separatur. Ratio autem intellectualis est quaedam et incorporalis theorica
utputa proposito copiam animali seu ligno in theoria seu aliquo alio materialium
constitutionem habentium, multa circa subiectum secundum intellegentiam diuisione
intelligimus, quorum uniuscuiusque ad id quod consideratur inconfusae habetur ratio,
alia siquidem coloris et alia grauitatis ratio, alia iterum quantitatis et alia intellegentiae
67
The im portant th in g to n o te h ere is th at this account o f corporeal nature

takes as its p oint o f d ep artu re th e opposition betw een die p ro p erties of sensible
bodies, such as color, shape, w eig h t, extension, and so on, a n d those ascribed to
th e divine, noetic n ature, an d th a t this account applies p rim arily to bodies insofar
as they are know able b y reason and sense. It is no t the only account G regory
gives of bodily nature.
In C hapter 27 of De opificio hominis, G regory gives a n o th er account as he
argues for the plausibility of th e C hristian doctrine of die resu rrectio n of the
body. It is difficult to im agine, h e adm its, that, once the v ario u s elem ents that
m ake up the body retu rn to th e com m on source of the elem ents, the individual
sh o u ld receive again w hat h ad form erly belonged to him ; b u t he offers the
analogy of a herd of anim als com prising the sm aller herds o f several herdsm en:
h av in g becom e m ingled, the anim als can again be separated because they
recognize their ow n m asters a n d because they are m arked w ith distinctive
b ran d s by w hich their m asters can recognize them . In som e analogous fashion,
quae est secundum tactum proprietatis. Mollities enim et bicubitale cetera etiam eorum
quae dicta sunt, neque sibi inuicem neque corpori secundum rationem commiscentur.
Nam in unoquoque horum specialis iuxta quam est interpretata intelligitur causa.
Nullaque eorum quae circa subiectum theorizantur alteri qualitati promiscetur. Si ergo
intelligibilis color, intelligibilis etiam soliditas et quantitas, et cetera talium
specialitatum, horum autem unumquodque si sublatumfuerit subiecto omnis ratio
corporis simul soluitur consequens erit, quorum absentiam solutionis corporis causam
inuenimus, horum concursum materialem naturam creare assumere. l it enim non est
corpus cui res oycia et figura, et soliditas, et distantia et grauitas ceteraque specialitatum
non assunt, horum autem unumquodque corpus non est, sed alterum quid praeter corpus
seorsum inuenitur. Sic conuersim ubicumque quae dicta sunt concurrerint corporalem
substantiam perfidunt, at si intelligibilis quoque natura deus nihil inconsequens ex
incorporali natura has intellectuales occasiones ad corporum generationem substitutes
esse ab intellectuali quidem natura intelligibiles substituente uirtutes, horum uero ad se
inuicem concursu materialem naturam in generationem adducente. Sed haec quidem a
nobis iuxta quod promptum est discussa sunt, iterum uero nobis infidem sermo
reducendus per quam ex non existente uniuersitatem substitutam esse accepimus, et
iterum in alium quendam statum ex scripture discentes transformandam non dubitamus.
68
th e d isso lv ed elem ents bear a distinctiv e sign of the one to w hom they belong.
The so u l, too, retains som e m ark from its form er possessions so th a t it can
recognize them in the com m on su p p ly o f elem ents.
h i the next step of his argu m en t, G regory introduces th e distinction
betw een th a t in o u r nature w hich is m utable and in flux and th a t w hich rem ains
stable and unchanging. T hrough g ro w th an d loss, the body u n dergoes a
succession o f statures, w hile th e form rem ains apparent and th e sam e
th ro u g h o u t h i cases of disease, th is form is obscured; b u t w ith th e restoration of
h ealth the form is once again m ade m anifest. This abiding form , as som ething
stable an d unalterable, is related to th e flux of m atter as the im pression of a seal
is to th e w ax.
W hat adheres to the godlike p a rt of th e soul is n o t th at w hich flow s and is
tran sien t in change, b u t th a t in o u r com posite structure w hich is constant
and ev er th e same. A nd since variations in m ixture transform the
differences w ith respect to form , and m ixture is nothing b u t th e blending
o f elem ents, and elem ents, w e say, are the substrata for th e m aking of the
universe, from w hich the h u m an body, too, consists, w hile the form
necessarily rem ains in th e so u l like an im pression in a seal, and those
things stam ped by the seal are n o t unrecognized by it, b u t in th e tim e of
th e restoration each receives ag ain to itself w hatever fits in to the stam p of
th e form ; those w ould fit perfectly, w hich w ere stam ped originally w ith
th e form .58
58 O H 2 7 :228A-B: T<3 t o i v u v 6eoei8et rfjg

ou t o peov ev Tfj dAAoiuicrei
xal p.e0icrrdp.evov, oMa t o ii.6vip.6v Te xai uxrauTcog exov ev t <5 xa0 npag
cxuyxpipaTi, t o u t o > irpoa<J>ueTai. Kai etreiSf) Tag xaTa t o el8og 8ia<t>opag a i Troiai
T fjg xpdaetug aapaAAayai peTapop<t>ouaiv, f | 8e xpaoig oux aXXTj Tig irapd tt|u twv
aToixeicDV p ifu ' ecrri, crroixeia 8e <J>a|xev Ta Tfj xaTacnceufj t o u -rravTog irrroxeipeva,
8i <Lv x ai t o dv0permvov auveanixe aoip.a, avayxaiwg t o u elSoug oiov expeyeiu)
acfrpayiSog Tfj t|n/xfj TrapapeivavTog, ouSe Ta evairopafapeva Tfj acj)payi8i t o v tuttov
irrr aurfjg ayvoeiTai, aXX ev t o xaipu Tfjg dvaoToixeiaiaeog exetva SexeTai irdXiv
irpog eairrf|v, airep av evappooT) t u > tutto ) t o u eI8oug- evappoaeie 8e TrdvTug exelva,
oaa xaT1apxag eveTvrrwOi] T(5 eiSei.
Cf. Im ag. 27:251,16-252,3: Igitur in de[i]fbrmitate animae non flu xile per
mutabilitatem et transmutabile est, sed quod permanet similiterque in nostra concretione
habet hoc inseritur, et quoniam ipsas per speciem differentias ipse mutabUes concretionis
69
This form unites the soul perm anently to its bodily parts; and so strong is
the correspondence th a t should G od b rin g them back together, "the
corresponding p a rts w ould spontaneously unite w ith their ow n"like spilled
m ercury th a t scatters into tiny balls w hich th en naturally and easily m erge again
w ith each o th er w hen collected. O r one can th in k o f the w ay m any p lan ts share a
com m on source of w ater and nourishm ent, each spontaneously d raw ing to itself
w hat it needs. W hat is surprising, then, if in th e resurrection, each soul draw s to
itself from the com m on store of elem ents th e p arts belonging to it?59
G regory has offered here a tw ofold account of the resurrected b o d y 's
identity w ith th e body as it now is: die id en tity of its m aterial parts an d the
identity o f its form . The m etaphors of th e herd s and of the spilled m ercury
im ply an atom istic theory of the elem ents an d the body's com position; the
resurrected bod y is the sam e as the m ortal bod y because the form er is com posed
of the sam e atom s as the latter. The m etaphor of the seal and the recognition of
the continuous flux o f m atter w ithin the m ortal body im plies a rather different
account, one th a t seem s to render the oth er unnecessary: If the form of the body
im pressed by th e soul is the principle o f th e id en tity for the m ortal body
throughout its life of m aterial flux, in w h at sense is its identity d ep end en t on the
identity of its elem ental parts? W hy assert th a t th e resurrected body is com posed
of the sam e atom s as the m ortal body? Yet it is precisely this m aterial id en tity
cjualitates performant. Concretio uero non alia quaedam est praeter elementorum
mixturam, elementa autem dicimus uniuersitatis constitutioni subiecta, ex quibus etiam
humanum corpus constat. Necessario specie ueluti descripti signaculi in artima
permanente, neque refbrmanda in signaculo ad formam ab ea uidelicet anima ignorantur,
sed in tempore reformationis ilia iterum ad seipsam recipiet quaecumqueformae caracteri
coaptabit, coaptabit autem omnino ilia quae ab initio in forma caracterizata sunt.
Q uoted by E riugena at PP 4 :801A-C and 802C.
59 O H 2 7 :228C-D. Cf. Imag. 27:252.
70
th at the th eo ry of the so u l's continuing relatio n to th e p arts of the dissolved body

aim s to preserve.60
It is difficult, m oreover, to determ ine how the account of body as a
concourse o f qualities relates to the m ore atom istic account o f a concourse of
elem ents suggested here. H ow ever, even a cursory reading of De anima et
60 A m ore d etailed exam ination o f G regory's theory of the elem ents and o f
the bond betw een bod y an d soul, and especially o f his argum ents against
theories o f th e so u l's preexistence and transm igration, w ould shed light on this
apparent inconsistency. In De anima et resurrectione, G regory is w ell aw are of the
objections th a t can b e raised against his account of th e so u l's perm anent relation
to the elem ents o f the dissolved body. But h e feels constrained to adopt it in
order to an sw er th e objection th at if the form is the only principle of continuity,
and the resu rrected bod y does n o t consist o f the sam e parts, then it is no t the
sam e body b u t only a sim ilar body, new ly created. Yet, as he m akes clear, if the
m aterial id en tity of th e resurrected body is u nderstood too narrow ly, then th at
body appears n o m ore desirable th an the p resen t m ortal body; therefore, in the
final po rtion o f th e dialogue he stresses the discontinuity betw een the m aterial
condition of th e m ortal body and the resurrected body.
G regory's u se of the two types of concourse reflects the com plexity of
ancient elem ental theory. Pierre Duhem , Le Systeme du Monde (Reprint. Paris:
H erm ann, 1988), 1.2.1-5 (vol. 1:28-49); 1.4.111 (vol. 1:130-148), em phasized the
epistem ological issues th a t led A ristotle to reject atom ism in favor of his ow n
qualitative view , the latter being m ore congruent w ith sense know ledge. S.
Sam bursky, The Physical World o f Late A ntiquity (R eprint. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton U niv. Pr., 1987), pp. 21-61, surveys the history o f three schools of
elem entary theory: the m echanical (atom istic) theory of Dem ocritus and the
Epicureans, th e geom etrical (atomistic) theo ry of Plato, an d A ristotle's qualitative
theory.
G regory a n d E riugena retain both an atom istic and a qualitative theory.
Typically, w hile G regory takes no special p ain s to reconcile the tw o, Eriugena
w orks o u t a coherent theory (see below ). The place given to quantity and quality
(as shape) in th e form ation of bodies clearly p u ts E riugena w ithin the
geom etrical trad itio n o f Plato, yet his notion o f the four elem ents as the
firm am ent betw een corporeal and incorporeal realm s, and o f the insubstantiality
of bodies, also pro v id es an interesting developm ent o f A ristotle's qualitative
theory.
In vol. 3:53-57, D uhem discusses E riugena's d eb t to G regory for his
theory of the elem ents.
71
resurrectione suggests th a t the atom istic theory is p rim ary for G regory and th a t
the theory o f th e concourse o f qualities has a m ore restricted application.
De anima et resurrectione is a dialogue betw een G regory and his sister,
M acrina, in w hich the sister seeks to allay G regory's grief over their brother
Basil's recent, a n d h e r ow n im pending, death. She diagnoses his problem as the
fear "th at th e so u l does n o t rem ain for ever b u t ceases together w ith the
dissolution o f th e body."61 A rgum ents h o rn au th o rity , even scriptural authority,
are insufficient rem edies, so she consents to engage w hatever argum ents he
w ishes to b rin g fo rth from those w ho deny th e C hristian hope in im m ortality an d
resurrection.
G regory assum es as his p o int of d ep artu re the description of d eath as it
pertains to the sensible body: "the body being com posite is entirely dissolved
into those thin gs o u t of w hich it is com posed." The elem ents from w hich the
body is com posed because they are of different kinds defined by contrary
qualities (hot an d cold, solid and fluid, and so on) do n o t naturally mix;
consequently, left to them selves, they collect in hom ogeneous groups o f the sam e
kind. T hus, "w h en th e organic unity (ouprpuia) of the elem ents62 in the body is
dissolved," th ey disperse each to its ow n kind.63 N ow here in the dialogue is this
61A R17A : Mfj t L ? oe t o i o u t o ? , 4>qai, 4 x3{Jo ? inroTapacrcreL Kai auvexei t q v

Siavoiav, a)? ou SiapeuoucTi? el? del -rife
aXXa auyxaTaXqyouaq? Tfj SiaXuaei
t o u au>p.aTos;
62 The expression used here (20B), cxuprpuia tu jv aToixeiwv, occurs only once
in the dialogue; m ore com m on is auv8pop.f| t<Zu trroixeiajv (cf. 24B; 48A-B; 73D,
76B; 77B; 80A; 84D; 152D-153A); Spop.fi t w v o T O ix e i io v also appears once (109A).
63 AR 20B: TH trou ... Toura av eiiroiev oi
t< 5
evaimco Trapurrdpevoi Xoya), o t i
t o a a jp .a c t u v Q c to v ou, naurajs ei? Ta, e aiv c r u i/e a T Q x e , SiaXuerat; AuGeiaq? 8e tiS w

O T O L xeiw i/ T f j? ev t Q qwp.aTi aup.<J>uta?, em t o olxetov ev exacrra) yiveTat xaTa t o
elxd? f | poTrf| a u r f j ? (pucretu? Tail/ aToixeiaiv, Si' oXxfj? t l v o ? avayxaia? t q opnyevel
t o oixetov dTroStSoucrQ?....
72
basic description challenged.64 W hat is a t issu e are th e various inferences d raw n

from it w ith resp ect to th e soul, such as w h eth er th e so ul is a kind of invisible
elem ent, w h eth er th ere even is such a thing, w h eth er it causes the u nion o f the
elem ents, w h at is its relatio n to the elem ents once th is u n io n is broken, a n d so on.
T hat body is a concourse o f elem ents is assum ed th ro u g h o u t the dialogue.
The account o f b o d y as a concourse o f qualities o nly appears once a n d , as
in De opificio hominis 24, is u sed to overcom e th e sta rk opposition betw een th e
qualities of m in d an d those o f body, an opposition th a t h as led som e to p o sit tw o
ultim ate principles, the div ine and a m atter coetem al w ith the divine.
C oncerning all th e b o d ily qualities, w hich are opp o sed to th e divine n atu re,
M acrina observes
th at in itself n one o f th e things contem plated abo u t the body is a b o d y , n ot
shape, n o t color, n o t w eight, n ot extension, n o t m agnitude, n o r any o th er
of the contem plated qualities; b u t each o f these is a reason (Xoyos); an d the
concourse an d u n io n o f these becom es a b o dy. Since, therefore, the
constitutive qualities o f the body are g rasp ed b y intellect and n o t b y sense,
and the d iv in e is intellectual, w hat difficulty is there in intelligible things
being caused by a n intellect? Intelligible things the concourse o f w hich
generates fo r u s th e n atu re of the body.65
64 A t 45A G regroy says: AXXa Ta pev crroixeta aupmirTeiv re irpos aXX^Xa,

xai Trpos aXXqXwv StaKpiveaOai, xai touto eivai Tfjv tou crwpaTos cnxrraaCv t c Kai
SidXucni/, ouSei? av dvTeiTroi. See also 108D-109B, w here M acrina locates the
difference betw een th e C h ristian doctrine of resurrection and the non-C hristian
belief in transm ig ratio n o f souls, n o t in the belief th a t the body is form ed ttis
8pop% twv CTTOLxeiwv, b u t in th e conviction th a t th e b o nd betw een b o d y a n d soul
is p erm an en t ots to pev etc twv tou xocrpou pepwv eivai tt|v auoTaaiv
opoXoyetTai, 8ia<f>wvei 5e to pTj ex twv airrwv oiecrGai twv k o t' apxas ev tt) 8ia
aapxos wfj Tfj 4*uxT) npoa<f>uevTwv.
65 AR 124C-D: K ai Ta Ka0 eKaaTov oaa Trepi TTjv awp.aTLxof|v
KaTaXapPdveTaL <f>uaiv, Trepi wv tocoutov <J>apev, o n ouSev e<f> eavrou twv trepi to
awpa Sewpoupevwv aw pa cotlv, ou oxrjpa, ou xp^pa, ou papog, ou Siacm ipa, ou
tttiXlkottis, ouk aXXo tl twv ev TroiorqTi dewpoupevwv ou8ev, aXXa toutwv exacrrov
Xoyos eaTLv f| 8e rrpos aXXr]Xa cruv8popf| toutwv Kai evwcns' cxwpa yiveTai. 'Errei
ouv ai cruptrXTipwpaTLKai tou awpaTog iroioTtiTeg vw KaTaXapfJavovTai. xai ouk
73
H ere G regory do es n o t use this argum ent to m ake any claim s regarding the
existence o r nonexistence o f m atter,66 b u t sim ply to show th a t the opposition
betw een sensible an d intelligible is n o t so radical as to require the supposition o f
two coetem al principles for the created universe.
From this b rief m ention it is difficult to d eterm ine how G regory
understood the relatio n betw een this concourse o f qualities and the m uch m ore
frequently used concourse o f elem ents. P erhaps th e b est indication of how they
are related is fo und in De opificio hominis 27, w here h e says th at "variations in
m ixture transform the differences w ith respect to form , an d m ixture is nothing
b u t the blending o f elem ents, and elem ents, w e say , are the substrata for the
m aking of the universe."67 Perhaps the d ifferent levels o f com position suggested
here correspond to different kinds of concourse, w ith the variations of m ixture
and their a tten d an t form al m anifestations p ertain in g to the concourse of
cuoSricrei, voepov 8e to Qetov, t l s t o w s twi/ voTjTtuv [var. toj voTjTdi] Td voTjpcrra
KarepYdcraaQai; TQv f| trpos dAXqXa auu8pop.fi Tfjv to u aiop.aTos f|plv aTTeyevveae
<J>uaiv.
66 T hat is to say, he does not argue, as he does in O H 24, that if one

m entally strips these qualities from the notion o f th e ir subject, nothing is left. A
sim ilar argum ent does ap pear in an earlier phase o f the dialogue, as p a rt of a
discussion ab o ut h ow one reaches know ledge o f su ch natu res as God and the
soul, w hich lack a ll sensible properties. Such n atu res can be know n to exist
because of the activity they produce in the sensible realm , b u t cannot be reduced
to any of the qualities observed in th at realm . O u r know ledge of these
incorporeal realities, in fact, is reached prim arily th ro u g h th e negation of sensible
properties. G regory notes th a t this via negativa can lead in tw o directions. O ne
m ay by follow ing it gain som e know ledge of im m aterial, unextended, intangible
realities beyond body. N onetheless, sensible qualities have an im m ediacy th at
their transcendent opposites lack, and som e m ay decide th a t negating the
sensible qualities sim ply leaves one w ith nothing a t all (AR 40A-41A).
67 As q u o ted above.
74
qualities, and the blending of elem ents pertaining to th e fam iliar concourse of
elem ents.
In both De opificio hominis and De anima et resurrectione, G regory of N yssa
proposes two kinds of concourse underlying corporeal n atu re, the concourse of
qualities and the concourse of elem ents; of these the concourse of elem ents
rem ains his prim ary account o f th e constitution o f sensible reality, w hile the
concourse of qualities is u sed only to attenuate the o p po sitio n betw een
intelligible and sensible objects and m odes o f perception so as to avoid the need
to postulate an eternal m atter.
1.32
The concourse o f accidents in Eriugena's theory o f body

Eriugena's view s o n the natu re of corporeal th ings are presented m ost
fully in Periphyseon I, in th e long treatm ent of th e category o f 'p lace' (474B503D).68 The N utrito r an d A lum nus frequently refer back to this discussion in
later books w hen the course of th eir investigations touches again on the natu re of
bodies.69 This section can be outlined as follows:
The C ategory of Place (474B-503D)
1.
Introduction: Places as definitions w ithin th e m ind (474B-475B)
2.
The D ifference betw een Places & Bodies (475B-489B)

2.1 A gainst th e erroneous confusion of bodies & places (475B)
2.2 Place p ro p erly understood as definition (481A)
2.3 The relationship betw een definition & essence (484A)
2.4 Final argum ents against the confusion o f bodies & places (487B)
68 This treatm ent, in fact, accounts for about a th ird o f Book 1.

69 E.g., PP 3 :663A; 703A; 704A.
75
3.
The Difference betw een Bodies & Owxia (489C-501B)

3.1
A gainst the com m on view th at bodies are ouatai (489C)
3.2 O uaia, q uan tity , & quality in the com position o f bodies (494A)
3.3
4.
The incorporeality o f m atter (496D)
Conclusion: From incorporeal things som ething corporeal is (501B503D)
R ather th an give a detailed exposition o f this section, it w ill suffice to show w hat
u se he m akes of the concourse o f qualities w ithin it and to sum m arize the
u n d erstan d in g of corporeal n atu re th a t he develops.
The N u tritor begins his treatm ent o f 'p lace' by juxtaposing and identifying
w h at to m odem com m on sense ap p ear as tw o rather different notions: place and
definition.70 Place, he says, "is constituted in the definitions of things th a t can be
70 O f course, Eriugena w as n o t concerned w ith m odem com m on sense,

th o u g h the A lum nus' difficulties w ith the doctrine suggest th a t h is position was
u n u su al even b y ninth-century stan d ard s. For a general consideration of the
originality o f E riugena's view s o n the m aterial w orld, see D erm ot M oran, 'T im e,
Space an d M atter in the Periphyseon: A n exam ination of E riugena's
u nd erstan d in g of the physical w orld ," in A t the Heart o f the Real, ed. F. O 'R ourke
(D ublin: Irish Academ ic Press, 1992), 67-96.
Cf. also Sean M ulrooney, "B oethius on Place," Proceedings o f the PMR
Conference 15 (1990), 117-126. The au th o r discusses the distinction m ade by
B oethius betw een 'place' an d th e A ristotelian category 'w h ere', as w ell as the
N eoplatonic background o f his no tio n of place. In this view place is an
incorporeal w hich is "seen as a m ean betw een th e sensible and th e intelligible
w orlds" (p. 120). Eriugena seem s to share B oethius' distinction betw een 'p lace'
an d 'w h ere' b u t w ith tw o im p ortan t changes. First, 'place' has w holly displaced
'w h ere ' w ith in the list o f categories. Secondly, w hereas for B oethius 'p lace' is
lim ited to causing the num erical difference of bodies, Eriugena extends it to
include differences betw een species an d genera as well.
Both D uhem (Le Systbne du Monde, 1.2.1-5, vol. 1:28-49; 1.4.1-11, vol. 1:
130-148; 1.5.1-17, vol. 1:242-342) and Sam bursky (Late A ntiquity, 1-20) explore
the h isto ry o f the notions o f space and tim e. Sam bursky has also published a
collection of texts from late neoplatonists on each of these concepts (The Concept
76
defined. For place is nothing else b u t th e b o u n d ary by w hich each is enclosed

w ith in definite lim its/'71 There are, then, as m any species of place as th ere are
th ing s th a t can be circum scribed, w hich h e d ivid es into corporeals and
incorporeals. H e th en illustrates his notion o f 'p la c e ' b y exam ples o f things
enclosed by th eir definitions.
The first exam ple is th a t o f bodies being enclosed w ithin the definition of
'b o d y '. T he definition"a certain com posite o f th e qualities o f the four elem ents
com bined u n d er a single species"72includes, o r contains, all bodies consisting of
form a n d m atter. The second exam ple is th a t o f all sp irits being encom passed by
the definition o f 'sp irit': "an incorporeal n a tu re lacking form thro ug h itself and
m atter."73 Introduced in the dialogue a t first sim ply as exam ples of p la c e s/
definitions, the n atu res o f body and sp irit becom e leading them es o f the
discussion th a t follow s. G regory's influence is central to the explication o f this
d efin itio n o f body.74
o f Time in Late Neoplatonism [Jerusalem : Israel A cadem y o f Sciences and
H um anities, 1971] and The Concept o f Place in Late Neoplatonism [Jerusalem : Israel
A cadem y of Sciences an d H um anities, 1982]).
E riugena's doctrine and its relation to th is h isto ry deserves m ore attention
th an I have been able to give here. T hat atten tio n w ould have to begin, how ever,
w ith M axim us, to w hom Eriugena ow es som e o f the m ost im portant texts w ith
w hich h e expounds his doctrine. See chapter 3 (section 3.423), n. 198.
71 P P 1 :474B: Locus sequitur qui, u t paulo ante diximus, in dijfinitionibus
rerum quae difftniri possunt constituitur. N il enim aliud est locus nisi ambitus quo
unumquodque certis terminis concluditur.
72 PP 1 :474B: Corpus est composite quaedam quattuor elementorum qualitatibus
sub una quadam specie conglobata.
73 PP 1 :474C: Item spiritus est natura incorporea forma per se atque materie
carens.
74 The developm ent of the body them e, w hich concerns us here, is
obvious. The sp irit them e is n o t so obvious, th o u g h I w ould place its
77
The N u trito r first introduces G regory's no tion of a concourse o f qualities

a t 478D, w ith in section 2.1 of the above o u tline. A t issue is the com m on view
th at th e w o rld an d th e regions of th e fo u r elem ents are places. A ccording to the
N u trito r, th is erroneous w ay of speaking involves a confusion of categories:
bodies b elo n g w ithin the genus of qu an tities, n o t o f places.75 M oreover, a closer
exam ination show s th a t none of the categories should be confused w ith body
because in them selves none of them is accessible to bodily senses. W hat follow s
is an arg u m en t for the incorporeality of th e categories: 1) O im a is incorporeal
and n o t an object of sense; 2) A nything th a t dep en d s on otm a for its existence
m u st share its incorporeality; 3) The o th er nin e categories exist w ith in o r about
ovoia; 4) T herefore, all the categories are incorporeal in them selves.76
developm ent in the discussion of the relatio n betw een definitions, defining
m inds, an d ousia (section 2.3 of the outline). The plausibility of m y conjecture
th a t E riugena introduces these definitions in o rd er to foreshadow subsequent
discussion w o uld be enhanced if one could show a correlation betw een die later
discussion a n d the b rief explanation of h is definition w hich he offers here,
nam ely, th a t every rational and intellectual sp irit is form less u n til it tu rn s tow ard
its cause; th e cause of all things is the W ord; therefore, the Form of all rational
and intellectual spirits is the W ord. Irration al sp irits are equally form less in
them selves, receiving th eir form from ph antasies of corporeal things.
75 PP 1 :478B: Q uantity is defined as "th e definite dim ension o f p arts,
w hich are sep arated eith er by reason alone o r by natu ral differences, an d the
rational p rogression of things that are extended b y n atu ral dim ensions, nam ely,
by length, b read th , and height, to definite b o u n d s;" place is defined as "the
bord er an d enclosure o f things w hich are b o u n d ed b y a definite lim it." (Nam
corpora in kategoria quantitatis continentur; kategoria autem quantitatis a kategoria loci
longe naturaliter distat. Non est igitur corpus locus quia localitas non est quantitas,
siquidem u t praediximus nil aliud est quantitas nisi partium quae seu sola ratione seu
naturali differentia separantur cera dimensio eorumque quae naturalibus spatiis
extenduntur, longitudine dico latitudine et altitudine, ad certos terminos rationabilis
progressio; locus uero nil aliud est nisi rerum quae certo fine terminantur ambitus atque
conclusio.)
76 PP 1: 478D: Nam OYCIA incorporalis est nullique sensui subiacet, circa quam
aut in qua aliae nouem kategoriae uersantur. A t si ilia incorporea est, num tibi aliter
78
A lthough the categories considered in them selves are incorporeal and

therefore should n o t be confused w ith bodies, bodies do nevertheless derive
from them . H ere is w here he introduces G regory's doctrine. Some o f the
categories, nam ely, quantity and quality, situ ation and condition, n o t in
them selves, b u t "by a certain m arvelous conjunction w ith each other, as G regory
says, produce visible m atter;" w hile th e othersoucria, relation, place, tim e,
action, and passionalw ays rem ain beyond the grasp of the senses.77 Since
place belongs to the latter group, there is all the m ore reason for avoiding a
confusion betw een it and body. As w ith G regory's own use of the concourse of
qualities, th is argum ent is governed by th e opposition betw een objects o f sense
and objects of reason.
The N u trito r also parenthetically acknow ledges th at the com position of
sensible bodies involves another kind o f concourse, the concourse of th e
elem ents. H e notes th at the production o f visible effects pertains to bodies m ade
from the elem ents:
N ow , by bodies I m ean those p ro d u ced from the com ing together (coitu) of
the four elem ents of the w orld; fo r although the four elem ents o f the
w orld are in them selves discrete bodies, they surpass, by their ineffable
n atu ral subtlety and purity, all m ortal sense.78
uidetur nisi u t omnia quae out ei adhaerent aut in ea subsistunt et sine ea esse non
possunt incorporea sint? Omnes igitur kategoriae incorporates sunt per se intellectae.
77 PP 1:479A: Earum tamen quaedam inter se mirabili quodam coitu, u t ait
Gregorius, materiem uisibilem conficiunt, quaedam uero in nullo apparent semperque
incorporates fiu n t. Nam OYCIA et retatio locus ternpus agere pati nullo sensu corporeo
attinguntur, quantitas uero qualitasqtte situs et habitus dum inter se coeuntes materiem,
u t praediximus, iungunt corporeo sensu percipi solent.
78 PP 1:479A-B: Corpora nunc dico quae ex coitu quattuor mundi elementorum
conficiuntur; nam quattuor mundi elimenta dum corpora sint per se ipsa discrete
ineffabUis sua naturali subtilitate atque puritate omnem sensum mortalem superant
H ere as w ell as elsew here Eriugena seem s to use coitus as a synonym to
79
H e does n o t, how ever, endeavor to explain y et how the tw o kinds o f concourse

are related.
The A lum nus is accustom ed to thinking o f bodies as com binations o f form
an d m atter, granting th at only thro u g h form does m atter becom e perceptible.
T hat bodies should becom e visible th ro u g h a concourse of accidents is h ard for
him to sw allow . The N utritor assures him th a t "the great G regory o f N yssa
convincingly show s this to be so by m any sure reasons in his serm on De
imagine,79 adding his ow n argum ent th at if it w ere n o t so, bodies w ou ld have
th e sam e im m utable and indivisible character as the genera, species, and
individuals o f owrCa.80
In this passage E riugena has m odified G regory's concourse o f qualities in
tw o w ays: first, by linking G regory's qualities w ith the ten categories, he has
transform ed the concourse of qualities into a concourse of accidents; secondly, he
has narrow ed the list of categories involved in th e concourse to q uantity, quality,
situation, and condition, thus giving th e first indication of the special functions
q uan tity and quality have w ithin the com position of bodies.81
concursus.
79 PP 1 :479B: Nam, u t dixi, magnus Gregorius NTCCETC in sermone De
Imagine certis rationibus ita esse suadet, nil aliud dicens materiam esse nisi accidentium
quandam compositionem ex inuisibilibus causis ad uisibilem materiem procedentem. See
section 3.2211 below.
80 A t 492A-D, E riugena contrasts body an d ousia precisely in term s of
divisibility vs. separability.
81 M oran, "Time, Space and M atter," 76-77, m akes sim ilar observations in
his exposition of E riugena's u n derstanding of th e categories and of accidents and
m atter. H is consideration of E riugena's originality is broader and does not
concentrate on E riugena's relation to G regory in the detail th at I am attem pting
here.
80
W hen th e N utritor again retu rn s to d ie notio n of a concourse o f accidents

(495B-496B), h e does so in the course o f explaining how oixria, qu antity , and
q u ality com bine to create a body. O n th e basis o f th is explanation, h e is also able
to offer a solution to a contradiction som e m ay rind in affirm ing tw o k inds of
concourse.
E riugena explains the interaction o f ouoia, quantity, an d q u ality by
analyzing th e difference betw een n atu ral and geom etrical bodies. Form s are of
tw o k in d s, substantial and qualitative. Substantial form s are the g enera and
species o f oixria; qualitative form s are those observed in the arrangem ents an d
p ro p o rtio n s o f bodily parts. The num ber and extension of th e p a rts them selves is
q uantity. G eom etrical bodies are com posed o f quantitatively defined p arts an d
qu alitative form , called a 'fig u re', b u t do n o t subsist in their ow n o w ia , th a t is,
they hav e no substantial form . For exam ple, a p urely geom etrical bo d y, such as
a trian g le, is com posed of quantity (a definite num ber of lines of definite length)
and q u ality (the triangular figure), b u t is im aginary, n o t grounded in any
su b stan tial form . N atural bodies also have p arts, w hich are arranged in som e
definite form , b u t beyond this they also have th eir existence from a substantial
form .82
N ow , according to the concourse-of-accidents theory of bodily
com position, th e quality and quantity o f a n atu ral body exist incorporeally in the
82 PP 1 :495B-C sum m arizes die theory (w hich is discussed m ore fully a t

494A-495A): Ex praedicta formanim differentia, usiadum scilicet qualitatiuarumque
uideris m ihi non aliud suadere nisi earnformam quae species qualitatis est materiae
superadditam corpus cui OYCIA subsistit perficere.... Si enim geometricum corpus, cui
nulla subest OYCIA, sola quantitate spatiorum lineorumque qualitatisque forma quae
figura dicitur rationabiliter constare probatur, quid impedimenti est u t naturale corpus,
cui uirtus OYCIAE ad permanendum substat quantum manere ualet, ea forma quae ex
qualitate est adiecta quantitati quae ex materia assumitur perfici non dicamus?
81
o w ia ; th ro u g h th e ir concourse they pro d u ce the visible quantum and quale of

the sensible body. W hile in the concourse-of-elem ents view , th e sensible body is
com posed o f a form an d the fo u r elem ents as its m atter. If th e concourse-ofacd d en ts th eo ry is correct, w h at need is there for a concourse o f elem ents? The
A lum nus n o tes th a t som e readers w ill in fact accuse them of contradicting
them selves b y affirm ing both. The so lution lies in noting th at the concourse of
accidents is as tru e for the four elem ents as for th e bodies com posed o f them .
H eat joined w ith dryness produces fire; h e at w ith w etness, air; w etness
w ith cold, w ater; and coldness joined w ith dryness produces earth . A nd
since these qualities com ing togeth er w ith them selves cannot in
them selves ap p ear visibly, q u an tity serves them w ith a quantum in w hich
th ey m ay sh in e sensibly. Indeed, q u an tity is like a second subject after
ouoxa an d is placed first after it in d ie o rd er of the categories because
w ith o u t q u an tity quality could n ev er be m ade m anifest.83
H ence the ten sio n betw een the tw o kinds o f concourse is resolved by
u n d erstan d in g th a t th e concourse o f accidents occurs a t two different levels
w ithin the visible body, first a t the level o f th e elem ents them selves and secondly
in the o rg an izatio n o f the assem bled m atter o f these elem ents into the visible
body. S ubstantial form is a th ird level, th e g rou n d for the accidents involved in
th e concourse. A s th e N u trito r p u ts it a little later,
T here are th ree things w e should keep discrete w hen w e th in k ab o u t
ourselves o r som e other living thing: w h at w e are, w hat is ours, w h at is
aro u n d us. W e are our substance, w hich is vital and intelligible, above the
body, all its senses, and its visible form . W hat is ours, b u t n o t u s, is the
bod y th a t adheres to us b y quantum an d quale and the o th er accidents,
83 PP 1 :496A: Nec mirum, quoniam illos latet non aliunde mundi huius
elimenta nisi praedictorum OTCIAE accidentium concursu componi. Ignem siquidem
caliditas ariditati, aera caliditas umiditati, aquam umiditas frigiditati, tenam frigiditas
ariditati copulata conficiunt. Et quoniam praedictae qualitates sibimet coeuntes per se
apparere non possunt, quantitas sum ministrat eis quantum in quo est post O YCIAN
ideoque in ordine kategoriarum prima post earn ponitur, quoniam sine quantitate qualitas
nescit manifesto fieri.
82
com posite and sensible W hat is aro u n d us are all the sensible things
w hich w e use, such as the four elem ents o f th is w orld and the bodies
com posed o f them .84
W hen E riugena speaks o f bodies as com posed o f form and m atter he
seem s u su ally to m ean the collection o f th e qualities o f the elem ents, w hich are
organized a n d p roportioned by the in terventio n o f a qualitative form g ro u n d ed
in the o w ia to w hich th e resulting body belongs. The elem ents them selves are
n o t m atter, b u t possess a firm and stable n a tu re , having a substance o f th eir o w n
and serving as the m ean betw een the p rim o rd ial causes, on the one h and, an d
m utable bodies, on th e other. In Book 3 E riugena finds this stable n ature in the
'firm am ent' spoken of in Genesis 1, w hich teaches fu rther th a t the great lum inary
bodies are m ade in the firm am ent b u t n o t o f it.85 Likew ise, the qualitative form s
th at en ter into com position w ith the qualities o f the elem ents, or rather, are the
proportioning an d ordering of those qualities, depend on their ow n unm oving
84 PP 1 :497C-498A: Tria siquidem discrete debemus cognoscere siue de

nobismet ipsis cogitantes siue de allis animalibus: quid sumus; quid nostrum est; quid
circa nos. Nos sum us substantia nostra quae uitalis atque intelligibilis est supra corpus
omnesque eius sensus uisibUemqueformant. Nostrum est, non autem nos, corpus quod
nobis adhaeret quanto et quali caeterisque accidentibus compositum atque sensibUe....
Circa nos sunt omnia sensiMlia quibus utim ur, u t su n t quattuor mundi huius elimenta
corporaque ex eis composita.
85 In th is connection, Eriugena is explicit th a t foe substance of foe elem ents
never enters in to foe com position of o u r bodies b u t only th eir qualities joined in
certain pro portions. PP 3 :712B: Vbi notandum quod non ex coitu substantialium
elimentorum, dum sint incorruptibilia et insolubilia, sed ex eorum qualitatibus sibi
inuicem proportionaliter copulatis corpora sensibilia conficiuntur: caliditas umiditas
frigiditas siccitas, ex quibus omnia corpora materialia adiectis formis componifysica
perhibet theoria. If I m ay hazard an analogy, foe firm am ent o f elem ents is like a
screen o r holographic plate th at lends its ow n reflective qualities for foe
production o f im ages b u t does not itself change o r en ter into com position w ith
fight.
83
foundation. They are the effects o f the substance th a t lies beyond the concourse
of accidents.
The A lum nus has one m ore objection to the concourse-of-acddents theory:
If m atter consists o f the com ing together of acd d en ts w hich are in them selves
incorporeal an d im m utable things, w hy is their concourse n o t itself im m utable?
The answ er to th a t question, w hich w as discussed in th e first section of this
chapter, is th at m atter is properly understood to be m utability receptive o f form
and has for its p rin d p le the transcendent form lessness of the divine w hich
transcends all form s and so is the source o f both form an d m utability. W ith this
explanation the lon g discourse o n place draw s to its d o se .
The conducting passage o f the section begins: "So now you see th a t from
incorporeals, nam ely, from the m utable form lessness receptive o f form s and
from the form s them selves, som ething corporeal is created, th a t is to say, m atter
and body."86 Ju st as shadow s, w hich are latent in the n atu res of body and light,
proceed w hen th ere is a certain conjunction of a body w ith light and disappear
once m ore w hen th e lig ht su rrounds the body leaving no place for their
m anifestation, th u s returning to th eir latent state;87 so too, bodies proceed from
and retu rn to th eir ow n incorporeal causes, as these in tu rn proceed from and
return to the one creative C ause o f all.
For from th e form of all, nam ely, the only-begotten W ord o f the Father, is
created every form , w hether substantial o r th a t w hich, assum ed from
quality an d th e attendant m atter, generates a body; from him too is every
form lessness. N or is it am azing th at ou t of a form th at is form less because
86 PP 1 :501B: Nunc itaque uides ex incorporeis, mutabili uidelicet informitate

formarum quidem capaci ex ipsaque forma, quoddam corporeum, materiam dico
corpusque, creari.
87 PP 1 :501B-C.
84
of its transcendence, there should be a form lessness w hich is established

by the p riv atio n o f all form s, w hen n o t only things o f one kind b u t also of
diverse k in d s ... an d n o t only those things w hich because of
transcendence, b u t also those w hich because o f p riv atio n are said to be or
n o t to be, flow from th e sam e source of all.88
A lthough the N u trito r has alluded to G regory's teaching several tim es
before, only now does h e finally quote him directly, reproducing, w hen he does,
all b u t the last few lines o f De opificio hominis, C hapter 24.w h i conclusion he
adds his ow n sum m ary of G regory's argum ent
If body w ere o th er th an th e concourse o f the accidents of ovoia, then w hen
those are taken aw ay, it w ould continue to sub sist in itself and through
itself.
Indeed, every subject subsisting through itself needs no accidents
in o rd er to be, such is o w ia itself; for, w hether accidents occur to it or do
n o t occur o r w heth er there are in it those th at cannot be w ith o u t it or
w hether from it are w ithdraw n those th at can be sep arated from it, either
in th ought only o r in action o r in operation, oixria subsists ever and
im m utably by its ow n n atural reserves.
Body, how ever, w hen the accidents are w ith draw n , can in no w ay
subsist through itself because it is supported by no substance of its own.
88 PP 1 :501D-502A: Non mireris itaque ex incorporalibus causis corpora creari

incjue easdem iterum resolui, ipsas uero causas ab urn eademque rerum omnium creatrice
creatas procedere. Ex forma enim omnium, unigenito uidelicet patris uerbo, omnis forma
siue substantialis siue quae ex qualitate assumitur materiaeque adjuncta corpus generat,
creata est; ab ipsa quoque omnis informitas. Nec mirum ex informiforma per
excellentiam informitatem quae est formarum omnium priuatione conditam fieri
quandoquidem non solum monogena sed etiam eterogena, hoc est non solum quae sunt
unius sed etiam quae sunt diuersi generis, et non solum quae per excellentiam sed etiam
quae per priuationem dicuntur esse uel non esse ab eodem fonte omnium manant. Cf.
sim ilar passages cited above.
89 The novelties o f E riugena's interpretation of th is passage do n o t enter at
the level of translation b u t a t the subsequent level o f philosophical explication
and developm ent. G regory's doctrines are sufficiently general to accom m odate
E riugena's m ore elaborate version w ithout violence to his text. It is by setting the
relevant passages o f De opificio hominis against the backdrop o f De anima et
resurrectione (w hich presum ably E riugena never read) th a t one can begin to
assess the w ays in w hich E riguena has transform ed G regory's doctrine.
85
N ow , if you rem ove q u an tity from a body, th e body w ill not be; for, it is
contained b y d ie dim ensions and num ber o f its m em bers. Likewise, if you
rem ove qu ality from it, it w ill rem ain a shapeless nothing. This sam e
p attern is observed in th e other accidents b y w hich a body is seen to be
contained.
T herefore, th a t w hich cannot subsist th ro u g h itself w ithout
accidents is to be u n d ersto o d as nothing o th er th an the concourse of those
sam e accidents.90
This is n o t a sim ple restatem ent by Eriugena o f G regory's theory, b u t a
condensation o f his o w n m ore elaborate view s, in w hich the tw o kinds of
concourse found in De opificio hominis are synthesized in a new w ay w ithin
E riugena's distinctive in terp retatio n of the Ten C ategories and the relations
am ong them . G regory's concourse o f qualities h as becom e a concourse of
incorporeal accidents g ro u n d ed in im m utable oixria.
1.4
C on clu sion
E riugena begins h is long discourse on 'p lac e' w ith the definition of body
as "a certain com posite o f the qualities of the four elem ents com bined u n d er a
single species." H ow E riugena understands this definition, and the p a rt played
in that understan d in g b y ideas found in G regory's De opificio hominis, should
90 PP 1 :503A-B: N um itaque uides maximum fortissimumque praedicti

magistri argumentum sufficere? S i enim aliud esset corpus praeter accidentium
OYCIAE concursum subtractis eisdem in se ipso per se ipsum subsisteret. Siquidem
omne subiectum per se subsistens accidentium non indiget ut sit, sicut ipsa OYCIA; siue
enim accidant ei siue non accidant siue in ea sint quae sine ea esse non possunt siue ab ea
recedant quae ab ea segregari possunt seu sola cogitatione seu actu et opere, suis
naturalibus subsidiis semper immutabiliterque subsistit. Corpus autem subtractis
accidentibus nullo modo per se subsistere potest quoniam nulla sui substantia fulcitur.
Nam si quantitatem a corpore subtraxeris corpus non erit; spatiis enim membrorum
numeroque continetur. Sim iliter si qualitatem ab eo dempseris deforme remanebit et
nihil. Eadem ratio in caeteris accidentibus quibus corpus contineri uidetur contemplanda
est. Quod igitur sine accidentibus per se non potest subsistere nihil aliud intelligendum
est praeter eorundum accidentium concursum esse.
86
now be d e ar. G regory's defense of creation ex nihilo, his description o f the

harnessing and p rop o rtio n in g of m otion an d rest, an d his theories o f concourse
are all taken u p an d transform ed w ithin E riugena's Dionysian u nd erstan d in g o f
a divine n atu re th a t is beyond being, b u t w hich descends from its transcendent
nothing into th e som ethings of creation. T he w orld o f corporeal natu re, w hich is
the last stage o f th a t descent, is a harm onious concourse of m utability and form ,
a dynam ic p rop o rtio n in g o f m otion and rest.
87
CHAPTER 2
BODY, SOUL, A N D
IMAGE
For both G regory o f Nyssa and E riugena, a theory of the hum an soul
involves an account o f m an as im age and likeness of G od. Since God is
incorporeal, b o th authors take for granted th a t die divine im age in m an cannot
pertain to his bodiliness b u t m ust pertain to h is soul. In the first half of De opificio
hominis, G regory provides an account of this sp iritu al p a rt th at reduces soul to
m ind. In doing so, how ever, he m ust still account for the soul's functions w ith
respect to the body, show ing how the m ultiplicity of these functions does n o t
com prom ise the m ind's essential unity, sim plicity, and im passibility.
G regory7s De imagine is an im portant source for Eriugena's treatm ent of
the relation betw een body and soul. In Book 2, E riugena illustrates his
speculations on the D ivine Trinity by m eans o f its im age in the hum an soul.
A lthough G regory is only one of the sources fo r this section, and is never quoted
directly, his influence is significant, p articularly a t the en d of die section w here
Eriugena urges th e reader w ho w ishes a fuller know ledge "concerning the
sim ilitude of the im age" to consult G regory's De imagine.1
This chapter, then, w ill com pare G regory's treatm ent of the body-soul
relation in De opificio hominis w ith E riugena's in the Periphyseon. It w ill consider
the account each gives o f the m ultiplicity of th e so u l's operations and in
i PP 2 :585D.
88
p articular the account of know ledge gained th ro u g h the senses. Sense know ledge
introduces a degree o f passivity and m ultiplicity, w hich contrast sharply w ith the
divine n atu re a n d so threaten the sou l's statu s as divine im age. G regory w restles
w ith these issues, defending the sovereignty o f th e soul w ith respect to the body
w hile acknow ledging m an's com posite n atu re. In his defense of the soul's
sim plicity he finally m akes th e apophatic claim th a t th e soul is incom prehensible
like its divine archetype, w hich possesses a m ultiplicity o f operations w ithout
sacrificing its o w n essential unity and sim plicity.2
E riugena, for his p art, deals w ith these issues w ith a greater philosophical
thoroughness, offering the unity of the so u l's essential m otions as an im age of
the Divine T rinity. M oreover, he adopts a distin ctio n betw een interior and
exterior sense w hich he th en develops into a distinctio n betw een the m ortal and
spiritual body. E riugena's concept of the sp iritu al body as a m anifestation of the
soul, analogous to the m anifestation of G od in creation, perhaps resem bles
G regory's notion o f the body as the im age of the im age, b u t certainly draw s on
G regory's account of th at unchanging form of th e body w hich assures its identity
throughout the flux of m aterial life and beyond d eath into the resurrection.
2 G erard V erbeke, "La dignite d e 1'hom m e dans le traite De hominis opificio

de G regoire d e N ysse," Rocznfla filozoficzne 27,1 (1979), 139-155, provides a good,
general introduction to the doctrine of De hominis opificio th at highlights its
contribution to th e b irth of C hristian anthropology (w hich Verbeke locates in the
second h alf o f the fourth century), setting it in relation b oth to patristic
antecedents and th e m ore general questions of th e age. The discussion of
G regory7s doctrine here seeks only to illum inate G regory's influence on, and u se
by, Eriugena.
89
2.1
M ind and body according to G regory o f N yssa

As w as no ted already in chapter 1, G regory o f N yssa's cosm ology
proceeds from th e opposition betw een noetic a n d sensible reality. This

dichotom y is fundam ental w ithin the created o rd er.
T here is a certain tw ofold contem plation in the things th at are,
theory bein g div id ed into the noetic and th e sensible. A nd a p art from
these n o th in g rem ains in the nature of th e things th a t are w hich falls
outside o f this division. M oreover, these are d ivided from each other b y a
g reat gap , so th a t neither is the sensible am ong th e noetic properties, n o r
is the [noetic] am ong the sensible, b u t each is characterized in distinction
from its opposites. For the noetic n ature is a certain bodiless thing, b o th
im palpable an d form less; the sensible, according to the nam e itself, tells
w ithin th e contem plation of the sense organs.3
The d ivin e w isdom and pow er, how ever, is able to m ix and blend these
opposites to p ro du ce a beautiful harm ony. N oetic realities are naturally close to
the divine n atu re, w hereas their opposites, the sensibles, are m ost rem oved from
it; b u t by blend in g the noetic and sensible together, die divine w isdom m anifests
its desire th at "every thin g m ight participate equally in th e beautiful, and th at
none of the th in g s th at are m ight lack a share of th e b etter nature." W ithin the
sensible cosm os, th is participation in the divine is m ost evident in the n ature o f
the ethereal region, b u t also, and especially, in m an.
A lthough the region appropriate to the noetic nature is th at fine
and agile being w hich in accord w ith its sup ram u nd ane lot has by the
p ro perty o f its n atu re a great affinity to th e noetic; yet, by an even better
provision there is a certain com m ingling o f the noetic w ith the sensible
3 OCM 6: Sraw ley 29,212: SiirXfj t l s ecrnv ev ro is ovaiv f| KcnwoTiCTis, e ls

to voryrov tc icai aiaOiyrov tt\s Gewpias 8tT|pqp.evn?. ical oiiSev av trapd rauTa
KaTaXr|<{>0LTi ev rfj rd v ovtuv <f>uaei rfjs Siaipeoeotg rairnris
fyepoyievov.
8ii]pTiTai de Tcarra jrpo? aXXr|\a ttoXXw tw p.eaa>, w? p.qTe tt|v aiadryrriv ev to Is
uor|TOL9 elm i yvtopiapuxai, [iryre ev to l? aicrOriTot? eKelvxyv, aXX' airo Toil/ evavrioiv
eKarepav xapaicnipiCeaGaL. f| pew yap i/oiynri <J>uais daap.aTov t l xpTlpa ccttl icai
am<J)s Kai aiêLSeov f| 8e aioihiTfi icaT' airro to o w p a evros e tm Tfjs Sid twi/
aicT0Tyrr|pici}i/ KaTavoqaea)?.
90
creature, so th a t n o th in g in creation m ight be rejected [cf. 1 Tim 4:4], as the

A postle says, n o r b e w ith o u t a share o f th e div in e com m union [cf. 1 Pet
1:4]. For th e sake o f th is, o u t o f both noetic an d sensible, th e m ixture
p ro p er to m an is ap p o in ted b y the divine n atu re, ju st as the account of die
cosm ogenesis teaches: for, as it says, taking d u st from the earth G od
form ed m an and b y h is ow n in-breathing he infu sed life in the thing he
h ad fashioned, so th a t th e earth ly m ight be placed alongside the divine,
an d one grace w ith eq ual honor m ight pervade th e w hole creation, the
low er natu re h av in g b een m ixed w ith d ie su pram u n dane.4
The account G regory gives o f the constitution of m an is a n account of tw o
n atu res, fundam entally o p p o sed to each other, b ro u gh t in to a harm onious union
b y th e divine pow ero r rath e r, since G regory insists o n th e far g reater value of
th e soul, it is an account o f how the low er, sensible n atu re is b ro u g h t to
p articip ate in the higher, noetic n atu re. Because m an is co n stitu ted from tw o
su ch opposites, an account o f his unified nature begins as a problem ; and
because one of these o pp o sites is n aturally superior to th e other, the problem
4 OCM 6: Sraw ley 30 ,9 31,11: 8ia touto to pev xaTdXXriXov tq voiyrf) 4>ucreL
Xoipiov' f| Xeirrfi xai eutdvnriTos ecrnv oucxia, Kara rfjv irrrepKoapiov Xfju/ ttoXXt|v
exouaa tw ISidCovTi xfj? <j)ixrea>g irpds to votitov rfjv cnryyeveiav, -rrpopTiOeig 8e
KpcLTToi'i irpos tt|i/ ai.o(hiTf|i/ ktlctiv yiverai t l ? toO voiyrou crwavaicpacris, u>s av
(iTlSev atropXriTov' eiTi Tfjs imaecog, Kadco? <f>riaiv o d-rrocrroXog, p^Se Tijs Qeias
icoivwviag aTTOKXripov. toutou xdpu' ck votvtou re xai aixrihyroO to Kara tou
avQpomov ptypa irapa rfjg Geiag avaSeiicvimu
icadbtg SiSacncei Tfjg
Kocrpo'yovtag o Xoyog' Aafktn/ yap o Beds, <f>r)aiv, \ovv and Tfjg yijs tou dvQpomov
etrXaae xal 8ia Tfjg LSiag epTTveucreojg tcIj TrXacrpaTi TTjv Carfjv 6ve<t>uTvaev [var.
eve4>ixrnaev], wg av aweTrapSeiTi tw 0eup to yrjivov Kai p ia Tig koto to opoTipov
8ia -rrdoTig frjs KTiaewg f| xdpi? SujKoi, Tfjg KaTw 4nxTa>g irpog tt|v irrrepKOCTpiov
ovyKipvagevris.
Cf. "O n In fan t's E arly D eath," LNPF2 5 :375a-b, w here G regory teaches
m ore clearly th at angelic a n d sp iritu al natures find a m ore congenial habitation
am ong th e heavenly b o dies, b u t, so th a t earth w ould n o t lack d ie presence of an
intellectual n atu re, m an w as fashioned from the earth. "T he d esig n o f all th at is
b ein g b o m , then, is th a t th e P ow er w hich is above b oth th e heavenly and the
earth ly universe m ay in all p a rts o f the creation be glorified by m eans of
in tellectual n atu res, con spirin g to the sam e end by virtu e o f th e sam e faculty in
o p eratio n , I m ean th a t of looking u p o n G od" (p. 375b).
91
becom es m ore specifically h ow th e su p erio r can be joined to th e inferior w ithout

lo sin g its pro per superiority.
2.11
Im age o f the d iv in e sovereign ty

h i De opificio hominis th e com bination of noetic and sensible th at
co nstitu tes hum an n atu re d oes n o t im m ediately appear as problem atic. The
treatise is proposed as a su p p lem en t to B asil's Hexaemeron, w hich end s w ithout
considering th e creation of m an. T hus, after a brief review o f th e m otion by
w h ich th e heavens, the sea, th e air, an d the earth w ere b ro u g h t forth and each
ad o rn ed w ith creatures suitable to it u n til all the w ealth of creation w as
unfo lded , G regory asks w hy m an sho u ld only appear now , a t th e last. H is
an sw er is th a t it was fitting th a t the king should have been b ro u g h t into being
o nly w hen his kingdom w as ready . Like a good h ost G od p rep ared the feast in
anticipation o f the guest's arrival. M oreover, since h e him self m akes this guest,
he creates him w ith a n ature su ited to the enjoym ent of the feast prepared.
In this way, o ur n a tu re 's rich an d extravagant host, h av in g adorned the
house w ith every kind o f b eau tifu l thing and p repared th is g reat and
m anifold banquet, b ro u g h t in m an and gave him w ork to do: n o t the
creation of nonexistent th in g s, b u t the enjoym ent o f th e things already
present. A nd for th is reaso n h e established the bases o f a double
form ation for him , m ixing th e divine w ith the earthly, so th a t through
b oth m an m ight connaturally an d congenially have the enjoym ent
p ertaining to each, enjoying G od through the m ore d ivine n atu re and
earth ly goods through d ie k in d red sense.5
5 O H 2 :133B: KaTa tov avrdv Tpoirov o ttXouctio? re ical TroXirreXri? rfj?

<j>Txreo)S T|p.uiv ecmdTwp TravToioi? KaXXeat KaTaKoap.tjaa? rijv oIktictiv, ical tt|v
peyaXqv ravrr\v Kai iravToSatrij -rravSauriav eroip.aCTdp.evo?, outoi? eiaayei tov
dvQpuxrrov, epyov airnli Sou? ou rrjv KTrjaiv tcuv p.f| ttpoctovtcjv, aXXa tt|v diroXauCTiv
tiSv -rrapovTwv. Kai Sia to u to SifrXa? avrrai rfj? KaTaatceufj? Ta? a<J>opp.d?
KaTapdXXerai, tw yriiva) to Geiov eyKaTap.ifa?- iva Si dp.<t>OTepG)v auyyevois Te Kai
oiKeitu? irpo? eKaTcpav dfroXauCTiv exa tou 0eou pev Sia rij? OeioTepa? <(>UCTea)?, tojv
5e KaTa tt|v yrjv ayaGwv Sia Tij? 6p.oyevou? aiaOriCTeiij? diroXaucov.
Cf. Im ag 2:212,31-38: In hunc modum dines atque perfectus naturae nostrae
92
The form ation of m an req u ired a p rio r deliberation an d a n intim acy of

divine involvem ent th at set it a p a rt from the creation of other creatures; for, m an
w as being form ed in the likeness o f a n archetype th at surpassed th e w hole
creation. G od so form ed m an "in th e privileges o f his soul an d in the shape itself
of his body7' as to exercise th e ro yalty befitting one w ho is the icon o f "th e nature
th at rules over all." The first indication o f this sovereignty is the freedom by
w hich m an governs him self,6 b u t th ere are others.7
satiator, omnigenis formis habitationem om auit, magnamque talem ac uariam
refectionem praeparauit, ac sic hominem introduxit. Opus ei dans non u t ea quae non
erant crearet, sed ut his quae aderantfrueretur. Ac per hoc duplicis eifbrmationis
occasiones constituit terreno diuinum commiscens, u t ambobus per cognationem et
societatem quae ad utrumque est potiretur, deo quidem per diuiniorum natura terrenis
uero bonis per cognatum sensum perfruens.
6 See Tito Di Stefano, "La liberta radicale delTim m agine secundo S.
G regorio d i N issa," Divus Thomas 75 (1972), 431-454. Di Stefano argues for the
unique im portance of liberty w ith in G regory's doctrine th at m an is a perfect
im age of God: m an participates in all the divine perfections, b u t liberty is the
essential condition for such a perfect likeness. Free w ill is a divine ho nor (De
mortuis, PG 46:523B). It establishes m an as a sp irit, that is, as a tem poral and
existential absolute (p. 449). This view , argues D i Stefano, distinguishes G regory
from early Platonic notions of m an o r the w orld as an imperfect im age o f the
divine (pp. 447-448). See also D anielou's com parison o f G regory's and Plotinus'
view s on the im age (Platonisme et theologie, 48ff.), b u t especially the contrast
betw een their view s on the soul as m irro r (pp. 210ff.)concerning w hich, see
For a fuller treatm ent of the issues involved w ith m an's participation in
the divine natu re, see D avid L. Balas, METOYEIA THEQY: M an's participation in
God's perfections according to Saint Gregory ofN yssa (Rome: H erder, 1966).
7 O H 4 : 136B-C: otmog oioi/ n oxeOog elg fkunXeiag evepyeiav eTriTnSeioi;
tt\v rineTepau <t>Gou/ o dpiCTTorex^S' eSTip.ioupyricre, Totg Te KaTa tt|i/ i|ntxfl1'
r r p o T e p x iix a a i Kai airrw tgj toG crt6p.aTos a x ^ iu m toioGtov eivai trapaaKeudaas, oiou
emTTiSeiws trpog (JaaiXeiai/ eew. 'H
yap <j;uxr| to paoiXixov' Te Kai eirqpp.evov'
airroQev Seiicvuai troppo) Tffe iSuaTudis TanivoTT|Tog Kexwpiap.evov, ck toG
dSecrrroTov' aurfji/ eivai Kai auTeôwnoi/, LSlotg 0eXiip.aoLU airroKpaTopiK(Gg
SLOLKOupevnv. Tlk)? yap aXXou toGto, Kai oux'l PaaiXewg eoriv; Cf. Im ag 4 : 213,2627.
93
If one im agines this im age as a statu e of a king, G regory suggests, the

signs o f royalty w hich distinguish it from th e im age o f a com m on m an are a
p u rp le robe, scepter, and crow n. In m an, w ho is m ade in th e im age of G od, the
signs o f royalty are virtue, im m ortality, a n d righteousness.8 If one im agines this
im age as a p ainted portrait, the colors an d hues by w hich th e P ain ter represents
his ow n beauty in the im age are p urity, freedom from passion, blessedness,
alienation from all evil, and die like.9
M oreover, w hoever considers w h at is p ro p er to divine being finds
im itations of these sam e things in him self. D ivinity is m ind a n d w ord: H um an
reason and understanding are im itations o f this tru e m ind an d tru e w ord. God is
charity: W hen possessed by m an, charity perfects the w hole character of G od's
im age in him . G od sees all, hears all, exam ines all: M an has "th ro u g h sight and
hearing the reception of the things th at are an d a living and exam ining
understand in g of the things th at are."10
8 O H 4 :136D: dvri p.ev Tfjs aXovpyCSos tt|v apeiriv ... a im 6e toO ataiTrrpou
tt} p.aKapiOTT|Ti Tfjs aQavaaias ... aim 8e toO PacrtAucoO 8ia8qgaTOS t<J>rfjs
SLKaiocnjuqs aTe^dvw ... axrre 8ia Trdimov ev rcy Tils' PaatXeias diutp.aTi SeticvuaQai
8l dxpipeias trpos to apxennrov koAAos ofiouoGeiaav. Cf. Im ag. 4:213,36-39.
9 O H 5 :137B: aim toutojv KaBapoxTis, atrdGeia, paKapioTTis, kokou -rravTos
dAAoTpiaxxis, Kai oaa tou toloutou yevous cotI, 8i' <Lv pop4>oOTai tois avOpomois i|
trpds to etov opoLuxns. Cf. frnag. 5:214,9-10.
10 O H 5 :137B-C, esp. C ll-1 4 : "ExeLS KaL w T111' 5*-* oêtus- Kai aKoi|s twv
ovtwv avTiAiujjiv, xai tt|v C t|ttitikt|v tc Kai 5iepeuvt|Tiicr|v twv ovtojv Siavoiav.
Cf. Im ag. 5:214,12-24: habes et tu uisum et auditum ad eorum quae sunt
receptionem, uitalemque et scrutantem ea quae sunt intellectum. In h is account of the
so ul's three essential m otions (w hich w ill be exam ined in the second h alf of this
chapter), E riugena identifies interior sense w ith 8iavoia. Sheldon-W illiam s notes
(PP 2: n. 347 [p. 238]) th at this usage appears to be unique to E riugena; perhaps a
passage such as this one provided the occasion for E riugena's curious
identification.
94
This last p o in t of resem blance provides die tran sitio n to G regory's long
exam ination o f th e body-soul relation and introduces th e problem atic aspect of
the com bination in m an o f noetic and sensible realm s. A lth ou g h m an h as a m ind
living and perceptive like God, the m anner by w hich th a t m in d m akes contact
w ith its objects is n o t a t all like G od's relation to the objects o f h is know ledge.
"For it is n o t possible to understand there to be, in th e sim plicity of d eity ,
reception and m ultiform ity of receptive operation."11 T h at is to say, G od does
n o t receive his know ledge as m en do through the senses, n o r b y m eans o f
anything h av in g th e receptive and m ultiform character o f th e senses.12
2.12
G r e g o r y 's P la to n ic p r o b le m a tic
G regory's Platonic opposition of noetic and sensible en tails a Platonic
problem atic reg ard in g the com posite n ature of m an.13 "Plato seem s to say th at
11 O H 6 : 137D: Ou yap m Suvotov ev rfj dtrXorriTi rijs 0616*01x09 to

nondXov Te xai TroXueiSes Tfjs dvTiXT|TTTLicfj? evepyeiag KaravofjaaL.
Cf. Im ag. 6:214,28-30: Non enim est possibile in simplicitate deitatis
receptionem, et multifbrmitatem receptoriae operationis intelligere.
12 O n G regory's understanding of the divine sim plicity, see B.
K rivocheine, "S im p lid te d e la nature divine e t les distinctions en D ieu selon S.
G regoire de N ysse," Studia Patristica 16:389-411, especially p. 400f. w h ere the
author discusses how G regory uses the hum an soul as a n analogy for th e divine
sim plicity to show th at "u n ity in diversity" is com patible w ith sim plicity of
nature. K rivocheine also discusses the relationship betw een sim plicity an d
incom prehensibility in G regory's theology; it is to the latte r th a t G regory finally
resorts in his discussion of divine sim plicity in De opificio hominis.
13 In this section and in the com parisons w ith P lotinus fu rth er below , m y
analysis aim s o nly to uncover certain structures in G regory's th o u g h t th a t are
relevant to the com parison w ith Eriugena; it has n o t b een m y in ten tio n to ad d to,
or im prove up o n, the literature devoted to G regory's relationship to th e ancient
philosophical schools.
Perhaps th e m ost extrem e exam ple of th at literatu re is H aro ld F redrik
C hem iss, The Platonism o f Gregory ofNyssa (Berkeley, Calif.: U niversity o f
(continued o n nex t page)
95
m an is n o t bo th so u l an d b o d y together, b u t a soul using such an d such a

body."14 This b it o f doxography comes from N em esius o f Em esa w hose treatise
On the Nature o f M an begins b y situ ating the C hristian un d erstanding of m an in
relation to Plato, P lotinus, an d A ristotle.15 That the body is b est understood as a
tool of the soul is ev id en t, says N em esius, from the fact th a t th e body lies
m otionless w hen d eath separates soul and body. The m erit of this position lies in
its axiological em phasis on the so ul's superior value. N em esius, nonetheless,
continues to define m an as a com posite being, "nobly com posed of an intellectual
soul an d a body."16
C alifornia Press, 1930), w ho reduces G regory to a Platonist (w ith m uch d irect
know ledge of the Dialogues) w ho w as unfortunately crippled and restrained by
certain pious C hristian influences th at dom inated his form ative years (his m other
and sister). M ore to m y liking is the approach taken by B althasar, Presence et
Pensee, and D anielou, Platonisme et theologie, and L'Etre et le temps, w ho take
seriously G regory's d eb t to G reek philosophy (Stoic as w ell as Platonic) w hile
nonetheless em phasizing the distinctively C hristian and personally unique
elem ents in his thought.
A very concise an d useful sum m ary of G regory's relationship to
neoplatonism , as m anifested in his anthropology, is A. H . A rm strong's "Platonic
Elem ents in St. G regory o f N y ssa's D octrine of M an," Dominican Studies 1 (1948),
113-126. A rm strong takes th e early w ork of Balthasar and D anielou as his
starting point, accepting th eir insistence on the distinctively C hristian character
of his thought, b u t th en ad d s som e precision to the understanding of G regory's
philosophical antecedents.
14 Nemesii Emeseni De natura hominis, ed. M oreno M orani (Leipzig:
Teubner, 1987), p. 2,1-4: nXdrajv Se ov Soxet Xeyeiv t o v avSpanrov elvcu t o
a u v a jK jio T e p o v , 4wxflv Kai t f w g a , aXXa
u c j j i a T i to k D S c
15 For a com parison o f N em esius' treatise w ith De opificio hominis, see
Frances M. Y oung, "A dam an d A nthropos: A study of the interaction of science
and the Bible in tw o anthropological treatises of the fourth century," Vigiliae
Christianae 37 (1983), 110-140. The exact historical relationship betw een the tw o
authors is n o t d e a r, b u t their m ilieux w as sim ilar enough th at it is not too
surprising th at N em esius' w ork w as often attributed to G regory.
16 De natura hominis 1,3-4: Tov dvGporrrov ex 4fUX1HS voepas xal crajpaTos
96
The phrase "intellectual soul" (<jwxn roepd) requires fu rth er interpretation.

Plotinus, he notes, h old s th a t soul and m ind (vous) are different things. A ristotle,
o n the contrary, regards understanding (vou?) as a poten tiality of die soul, w hich
in those w ho give them selves to philosophy becom es actual. Betw een these
extrem es are those "w ho do n o t separate m ind (wiJ?) from the soul, b u t regard
intellect ( t o i/oepdi/) as the g uid in g principle (nyep.oi/iic6i/) o f the so u l's essence
itself."17
This p attern a Platonic affirm ation of the body's instrum ental relation to
the soul, corrected b y an acceptance of m an's com posite n atu re, and com bined
w ith an affirm ation th a t the hum an soul is a m indthis p attern , w hich
N em esius presents so succinctly in the first chapter of his w ork, can be also
discerned in G regory's consideration of hum an nature in De opificio hominis. But
certain internal tensions threaten this pattern. H ow can one and the sam e soul be
both a m ind, sim ple an d im passible, and a subject receptive of sense im pressions
and diversified according to the other bodily functions o f w hich it is the source?
O r, if this receptivity a n d diversification are alien to the so u l an d come about as a
result of its connection w ith th e body, how w ill one avoid a negative appraisal of
th a t union? If the so u l itself, like the body, is com posite, how can it avoid
dissolution or m erit th e godlike status w hich G regory attributes to it?
In the Phaedo, P lato argues th at the hum an soul is m ost probably im m ortal
because it resem bles m ost closely invariable and stable things, things th at are
dpicrra KtrrecnceuaCTji.ei'ov' <iwa>.
17 De natura hominis 1,14-15: Tives 8e ov SiecrreiXav' airo t t j ?
to v
vouv, aXka T f j s ouoias' c h r r f j s fiyejiovucov elvai t o voepov ljyowTai.
For English tran slation and com m entary, see Cyril o f Jerusalem and
Nemesius ofEmesa, ed. W illiam Telfer, Library of C hristian Classics (Philadelphia:
W estm inster Press, 1955).
97
stable and invariable because they are n o t com posite. For w hat is n o t com posed
cannot be dissolved.18 In the Phaedrus, he argues th a t the soul is im m ortal
because it is self-m oved: w hatever m oves itself m ust alw ays be in m otion, w hat
is alw ays in m otion is im m ortal.19 T hus, the sim plicity and aseity o f th e soul are
the perfections u n derly in g its im m ortality.
In the Republic, how ever, Plato gives another argum ent for its im m ortality,
nam ely, th at the soul m u st be im m ortal because it is n o t destroyed even w hen
corrupted by vice; for, if a thin g is n o t destroyed by its ow n proper evil, th en it
cannot be destroyed b y any evil.20 This argum ent, w hile affirm ing the so u l's
im m ortality, nonetheless ceills attentio n to the fact th at the soul can be corrupted.
In fact the text goes o n to acknow ledge th at it is difficult to discern the tru e
nature of the soul, encrusted as it is by the accretions resulting from its existence
in the body. H ow does this corruption and encrustation square w ith the
sim plicity and self-m otion w hich Plato affirm s elsew here?
In the sam e passage o f the Phaedrus in w hich Plato argues from the sou l's
self-m otion, he also suggests th at th a t m otion is com plex, including w ithin itself
com peting tendencies th a t are the source of its erratic m otion. This is th e sim ile
of the chariot draw n b y one noble and one ignoble steed w hich reason m ust
struggle to control.21 A ll soul m oves itself, b u t the hum an soul does n o t alw ays
m ove on the sam e p ath . A n u p w ard p ath takes it to the realm of p ure tru th ,
w hile a dow nw ard p a th leads into the realm o f the truth-like and finally into
18 Phaedo 78b-80c.
19 Phaedrus 245c.
20 Republic 10:608c-612a.
21 Phaedrus 245c ff.
98
conjunction w ith the body. The so u l's aseity is preserved because both
m ovem ents originate in die soul. The conjunction w ith a body, on this account,
is an evil fo r th e soul and indeed, a p u n itiv e one.
ha th e Timaeus,22 how ever, Plato offers a som ew hat m ilder acco u n t The
soul is created im m ortal and w hile still unem bodied receives know ledge of the
"law s o f destin y ." Like the w orld-soul, h u m an souls are blended from the sam e
and the d ifferent an d so have their ow n p ro p er m otion and courses, and they are
im m ortal. U nlike the w orld-soul, th ey are created to anim ate m ortal bodies, the
experience o f encountering w hich they find so disorienting th at their ow n prop er
m otions are for a tim e hidden. The ebb and flow o f nourishm ent and th en the
tu m u lt of sense experience im pede the so u l's p ro p er courses and it m ust labor to
control these chaotic m otions and assert its ow n. A s th e soul succeeds, the
com posite living being show s itself to be a ratio n al anim al. The soul's success in
this task is th e ground on w hich its fate w ill b e decided w hen its body is
dissolved. H ere the conjunction of body an d so u l is n o t entirely negative; the
com posite m o rtal anim al contributes to the perfection of the cosmos as a w hole
and the so u l's first em bodim ent has no p u n itiv e aspect, b u t it is a trial for the
soul, a traum a caused by the alien n atu re of th e bod y to w hich it is joined.
The alien character of the body enables Plato to account for the corruption
o r accretions to th e soul th at hide its n atu ral sim plicity and self-m otion.
N onetheless, th e so u l's apparent receptivity, th a t is, its being m oved by things
outside itself an d , indeed, below itself, its a p p aren t m ultiplicity, and its
corruption b y vice are all problem s for w hich som e account m u st be given if one
is to m aintain the d iv inity and im m ortality o f th e soul.
22 Timaeus 41a-44c.
99
G regory, w hose affirm ation of this divinity an d im m ortality of the soul is

sim ilar to P lato 's, m u st likew ise come to grips w ith th e problem s posed by the
sou l's ap p aren t recep tiv ity an d m ultiplicity w hile in th e body; b u t he cannot
appeal to th e alien n atu re o f the body and the so u l's con strained conjunction
w ith it to account for th e anom alies. As a C hristian, G regory m u st account for
the original u n ity o f bo d y and soul and for die final im m ortality of the com posite
m an, n o t ju st o f h is soul.
G regory's De anima et resurrectione is easy to com pare w ith Plato's Phaedo,
both of w hich se t o u t to reassure m ourners th a t th e so u l continues to exist after
the d eath o f the body. G regory's De opificio hominis, how ever, approaches th e
body-soul problem atic from a different startin g p o int, nam ely, the biblical
teaching th a t m an is created as a union of body and so u l an d in the im age o f the
divine nature. A s already noted above, the obvious discrepancy betw een the
sovereignty and sim plicity o f the divine m ind, on th e one h an d , and the
m ultiplicity of a m in d d ep en d ent on sense perception w ith its obvious
receptivity, on th e oth er, are the context in w hich G regory begins his account of
the body-soul relation. To w hat degree, then, does th e tw ofold constitution of
m an, by w hich h e is inten d ed to enjoy the feast set before him by his C reator,
com prom ise o r lim it die divine im age w hich h is C reator also intends that he
bear?
2.13
T h e p r o b le m o f r e c e p tiv ity
R eceptivity is the capacity to receive w ithin o n eself th e action of another
and is exem plified b y sense know ledge, in w hich th e sensing subject receives
w ithin itself an im age o r im pression of the object sensed. It is n o t m ere passivity
because it requires o f the receptive subject a certain activ ity , b u t it does im ply
th at the operation o f the agent is incom plete ap art from th e activity of another;
100
th e agent cannot act from him self alone b u t only together w ith som e other. This
dependence on another com prom ises the sim plicity of the act an d th e extent of
control th e agent has over his ow n acts. To w h at extent, then, do es m an's
corporeal and sensitive nature com prom ise, in G regory's term s, th e royalty of the
d iv in e im age?
G regory tackles this question straight-aw ay by arguing th a t m an's
dependence on another is n o t entirely a t o d d s w ith his royalty, h i fact, m an's
dependence on instrum ents, such as clothing, w eaponry, and dom esticated
anim als, o r even o n his body itself, can be seen to confirm his sovereignty over
a n d w ith in th e sensible creation. G regory introduces the argum ent by asking
w hy, if m an is intended to rule over other creatures, he is so p oo rly provided
w ith n atu ral m eans of self-defense. O ther anim als have fur, h orns, claw s, teeth,
stin gs, an d the like, w hich enable them to survive in the w orld. W hy has nature
n o t m ade sim ilar provision for m an? G regory gives tw o answ ers. The first is
th a t being in a position of need forces m an to assert his dom inance over other
creatures in o rd er to m aintain him self in the w orld.
The m ore im portant answ er to the question, how ever, is th a t m an requires
a special bodily arrangem ent in o rd er to be a rational, corporeal being. In
C h ap ter 8 o f De opificio hominis, G regory, taking as his basis the o rd e r o f the
S criptural account of creation, presents a theory of different levels o f soul:
vegetative soul observed in plants, w hich is responsible for the n o urishm ent and
g row th; the soul proper to irrational anim als, w hich adds sense a n d perception
to nourishm en t and grow th; and the perfect bodily life proper to a rational (that
is, hum an) n ature, "w hich is nourished an d sensitive, and partakes o f reason,
101
a n d is adm inistered by intellect-"23 By th e order of his n arratio n plants,

anim als, m anM oses delivers th is teaching in a hidden w ay.
G regory then ad ds th e follow ing division: O f existing things, som e are
intellectual an d som e are corporeal; of corporeal things, som e are devoid o f life,
som e share in vital energy; o f liv in g bodies, some are w ith o u t sense, som e w ith
it; of those having sense, som e are irrational, and som e rational. Each level
p ro v id es a foundation for the n ex t higher level. The final level, th a t of rational
n atu re, involves the blending o f sense w ith (noncorporeal) intellect. T hus, m an,
w ho is the highest level of corporeal being, is a m ixture o f every k ind of soul and
is therefore represented in the M osaic account of creation as th e final step in the
ascent of n ature, its perfect form .24
T he m ind thus im planted in a bodily creature finds th a t it cannot
com m unicate itself to others o r to u ch anything outside itself except th ro u g h the
instrum entality of its body. "T he operation of the instrum ent, then, is tw ofold:
one for the production of so und, and the other for the reception of
u nd erstan ding s from outside."25
There are tw o kinds of dependence im plied here. O ne is the ag ent's
dependence on certain external conditions in order to com plete an action w hich
23 O H 8 :145A.: ' H 8e TeXeia kv aoigaTi a)f| kv Tfj Xoyucij, Tij avGpannvT)

Xeyo), KaOopdTai <t>uaei, Tpe<f>op.evr| re ical alodavoiiei'Ti, ical Xoyou jieTexouaa, Kai wp
8ioLKOup.evri.
24 O H 8 :145A-B. See section 3.2 for a fuller discussion of this division of
beings. See also the discussion o f the hierarchy and division of being in Balas,
METOTSIA EOT, 34-53.
25 O H 1 0 :152B: AcrrXi) 5e trepl to opyavov r| evepyeia* f| \ikv irpos epyaaiai/
flXTlS, t| Se Trpos irrro8oxf|i' twv e^wQev wtip.dT(i)i/.
Cf. Im ag. 10:219,41-42: D uplex autem circa organum operatio est, urn quidem
ad officium soni, altera uero ad susceptionem extrinsecus intellectuum.
102
begins w ith in itself b u t term inates o utside itself. T he o th er is reception, in w hich

the agent receives w ith in itself from outside itself th e conditions for the exercise
of an im m anent act. In both cases th e agent d epends o n another, b u t w hereas in
th e first case it requires passivity in another in o rd er to com plete its act, in the
second case th e agent m u st a t the sam e tim e be a p a tie n t in som e respect, th at is,
the requisite p assiv ity lies w ithin the agent and is a p assiv ity tow ard an external
source of m otion. To this extent, sense know ledge com prom ises the self-m otion
of the soul, th a t is, if th e sensing agent is conceived to be th e soul. H ow ever, if
the agent is th e com posite being, constituted by the u n io n o f b o d y and soul, then
the passivity need n o t be located in d ie soul. N onetheless, this latter solution
im plies th at th e locus o f consciousness is no t the soul itself b u t the com posite
being.
G regory does n o t provide even this m uch philosophical analysis of the
problem . H e seem s to w an t to keep die soul both as th e locus of consciousness
as the m indand as im passive w ith respect to the body. G regory w orks o u t
his position by m eans o f certain analogies and m etaphors rath e r th an rigorous
conceptual distinctions.
2.131
The sim ile o f the lyre

The m ixture of intellect and sense im poses certain specifications on the
bodily form of su ch a being. For exam ple, w e notice th a t m an w alks erect. This
frees his forw ard lim bs to serve as h ands rather th an feet.26 W ith his hands he is
able to perform a g reat variety of tasks, including the p rep aratio n of food. This
m eans th at his m o uth an d face need n o t be fitted for su ch w ork b u t can instead
26 O H 8 :144Bff. Cf. Im ag. 8 :216,23-35ff.
103
be fitted for articulate speech, w hich is p ro p er to a ratio n al n atu re.27 The m ind,
deprived of any o p p o rtu n ity to express itself directly, plays u p o n the body thus
form ed as a m usician plays u p o n his instrum ent.
A nd ju st as som eone, w ho is skillful in m usic, m ig h t n o t have his ow n
voice d u e to som e m isfortune, an d yet w ishing to m ake apparent his
know ledge, m ight then m ake m usic w ith o th er so u nd s, displaying his a rt
through p ip es an d lyre; so too th e h u m an m in d , w hich is a discoverer of
all kinds o f th oughts, b y n o t being able th ro u g h bodily senses to show to
d ie perceiving soul th e occasions o f its th o u g h ts, like a skillful m usician,
takes ho ld o f these ensouled instrum ents an d m akes ap p aren t through the
sound in th em its h id d en thoughts.28
27 O H 8 :148C-149A. Cf. Im ag. 9:218,22-219,1. (The G reek text [Migne]

and E riugena's translatio n often d ivide chapters differently, as in this case.)
28 O H 9 :149C: Kai dxnrep Tig pouaucfjg epireipog cov, av iSLav eic raSoug pf|
exoi (j)tjvf|v, {JouXopevog 8e <f>avepav Troitjaai rf|v emcrnjpT|v, aXXoTpiaig eppeXtoSoLTi
<t>wvalg, 6i auXcuv fj Xupag STipoaieuwv tt|v reyyr\v outoj Kai o avQparrrivog voug,
-rravToSairdiv voTpdTwv eiipenig wv, tw pf| Suvao6ai Sia aojpaTiK&iv aiaOtjaeajv
eTraLovcrr) rfj 4*^X0 Seucvueiv Tag rijg Siavoiag oppag, tcaQdirep Tig appocrnf|g
evTexwg, twv epi|n)xwv toutojv opyavwv dirropevog, 8ia Tijg ev rouTOLg Tixijg
<f>avepa Troiel Ta xexpuppeva voijpara.
Cf. Im ag. 9:219,11-19: ac ueluti si quis musicae peritus existens propriam ex
passione quadam non haberet uocem, uolens autem manifestam facere musicam alienis
uocibus modularetur, per tibias seu lyras artem publicans. Sic et animus humanus
diuersorum intellectuum dum sit inuentor non ualendo per nudam dictionibus animam
dicit, quia anima per seipsam dum sit incorporea sine corpore dictiones habere sensibiles
non potest nudam dictionibus animam quae sunt per corporates sensus intelligentiae
impetus ostendere. Ueluti quidam coaptatus in arte animata talia organa tangens per
sonum qui in eis est occultos intellectus manifestos facit.
N ote the aw kw ardness of the clause tcDpf| SuvaoOai 8ia awpaTucdiv
aiaQâeaiv e-rraioucrri Tfj ijmxti Seucvuetv Tag -rijg Siavoiag oppag, w hich is
represented by a m ore convoluted one in E riugena's tran slatio n . As it stands the
G reek text seem s to m ean th a t th e m ind, finding th a t it cannot com m unicate w ith
other souls by m eans of its sense organs, tu rn s to the so u n d producing organs
and uses them to express itself. The senses contain Tag Tfjg 8iavoiag oppag w hich
the m ind w ould like to share directly w ith the senses o f o th er souls b u t cannot,
and therefore resorts to speech to convey its thoughts. It is difficult to construe
E riugena's translation. H as a gloss on the ph rase per nudam dictionibus animam
been interpolated in to th e text? B ut even th a t phrase is m issing in the Greek,
unless it represents e-naiovoT) Tfj 4mxTj. This an d o th er tex tu al differences and
difficulties w ill be easier to resolve w hen a critical ed itio n o f th e G reek text is
104
G regory adopts the m usid an -in stru m en t relationship as the prim ary m etaphor
for the relationship o f soul to body. The m usical instrum ent m ost su ited to this
purpose is the lyre.
The sim ile of th e lyre has a rich history in the philosophical an d patristic
tradition p rio r to G regory.29 The w ell-tuned harp o r lyre represents th e ordering
o f diverse and opposing elem ents into a harm onious unity. It is som etim es
applied to m an, som etim es to the universe, and its application to bo th suggests
the ease w ith w hich certain authors tu rn ed their m inds from m an to th e cosm os
and back again, and th e sim ilarity o f ord er w hich they found in so doing.
O f the various au tho rs G regory m ight have read, Plotinus uses th e lyre
sim ile in w ays closest to his ow n. In the follow ing passage, Plotinus addresses
the soul's relation to its b od ily existence.
Plato w as rig h t in m aintaining th a t die m an w ho intends to be w ise and in
a state of w ell-being m u st take his good from There, from above, an d look
to the good and b e m ade like it and live by it. H e m ust hold o n to this
only as his goal, a n d change his other circum stances as he changes his
dw elling-place, n o t because he derives any advantage in the p o in t of w ell
being from one dw elling-place o r another, b u t guessing, as it w ere, how
his alien covering w ill be affected if he lodges h ere o r there. H e m u st give
to this bodily life as m uch as it needs and he can, b u t he is him self other
th an it and free to abandon it, an d he w ill abandon it in n atu re's good
tim e, and, besides, has the rig h t to decide about this for him self. So som e
of his activities w ill ten d tow ards well-being; others w ill n o t be directed to
the goal and w ill really n o t belong to him b u t to th a t w hich is joined to
published.
29 Cf. Plato, Symposium 186d-187c; Timaeus 32a-c; Philo of A lexandria, De
plantatione 167; Quod Deus sit immutabUis 24-25; De posteritate Caini 88; De opificio
mundi 126; De cherubim 110-112; De specialtbus legibus 11:244-246; Ignatius of
A ntioch, A d Ephesios 4.1; A d Phillipianos 12; Justin M artyr, Cohortio ad Graecos 8;
A thenagoras, Legatio 16.3; Irenaeus o f Lyons, Contra haeresies U.25.2; A thanasius,
Contra gentes 42; C lem ent of A lexandria, Protrepticus 1.5 (see Thom as H alton,
"C lem ent's Lyre: A Broken String, a N ew Song," The Second Century 3, no. 4
[W inter 1983], 177-200); an d P aulinus o f Nola, Poema.
105
him , w hich he w ill care for an d bear w ith as long as h e can, like a
m usician w ith his lyre, as long as h e can use it; if he cannot use it he w ill
change to another, o r give u p using the lyre and abandon the activities
directed to it. Then he w ill have som ething else to do w hich does not
need th e lyre, and w ill let it lie unregarded beside him w hile he sings
w ith o u t an instrum ent. Yet the instrum ent w as n o t giv en him a t the
beginning w ithout good reason. H e has used it often u p till now .30
In o th er passages, Plotinus uses the lyre to represent the harm ony w ith one
an oth er th a t the heavenly bodies exhibit because all contem plate the sam e object,
the sym pathy th at exists betw een th e various parts o f the cosm os w hich causes
one p a rt to be m oved w hen another m oves, and the effects o f illness w hich
"u n tu n e" the body and prevent its p ro p er use by the soul.31
W hen G regory first uses the sim ile, he em phasizes the m erely
instrum ental relation of the body to the soul, b u t he does no t, as Plotinus does,
em phasize the incidental character o f the relation, since in fact he defends the
view th a t body and soul come into existence together and th a t the soul's
connection to the body is not dissolved even by death.32 Initially, G regory
em phasizes the organs and processes o f speech. The m ind n eeds an instrum ent
by w hich to express its thoughts to others.33
The m ind, how ever, does n ot dw ell in the organs of speech. Indeed,
G regory denies that the m ind is located in any p art o f the body, b u t rath er relates
30 Ennead 1.4.16; A.H. A rm strong, ed. and transl., P lotinus, 7 vols., Loeb
C lassical L ibrary (Cambridge: H arvard U niversity Press, 1979-1987), 1:211. O ut
of respect for the very technical n atu re o f P lotinus' Greek, I h av e given
A rm strong's translation rather th an m y ow n.
31 Ennead 4.4.8; A rm strong, 4:157; Ennead 4.4.41; A rm strong, 4:265;
Ennead 2.3.13; A rm strong, 2:85-87.
32 See chapter 1 of this thesis.
33 See O H 8,9,10.
106
to the body as a w hole. There are other operations besides speech for w hich the
m ind depends o n th e instrum entality of the body. The m ind needs its body to
express itself to o th er m inds, b u t it also needs its senses in o rd er to receive
inform ation from w ith o u t The apparatus of sense organs an d the m in d's
dependence o n them p articu larly trouble G regory. In coping w ith this difficulty,
G regory explores o ther aspects of the lyre m etaphor.
A lthough teaching th a t the noetic activities are blunted o r even
en tirely ineffective in a certain condition o f the body, I do n ot h o ld this a
sufficient p ro of th a t the pow er of the m ind is confined in som e place, as
w hen inflam m ations come into the p arts and the extra space is filled up.
For the notion of 'b o d ily ' requires that, w hen the vessels are preoccupied
by som e of the things th at have been p u t in, som ething else cannot find
space in it. For th e noetic n atu re does n o t prefer to dw ell in the em pty
spaces o f bodies, n o r is it forced out by an excess of flesh. But since the
w hole b o d y has been crafted like a m usical instrum ent, ju st as it is
possible p erhaps am ong those w ho know how to m ake m usic, being
unable to display th eir know ledge, the unfitness o f th e instrum ents n o t
receiving th eir a rt (for w hether corrupted by tim e, o r broken by a fall, or
m ade useless by som e ru st an d m old, [a flute] rem ains m ute and
inoperable, even if it is blow n by som e one w ho seem s to excel in the art of
flute-playing); so too th e m ind, pervading the w hole of the instrum ent,
and system atically w ith its intellectual activities, insofar as it is natural,
reaching o u t to each o f the p arts, on those disposed according to n atu re it
w orks w h a t is congenial, b u t on those th at are unable to receive its artful
m otion, it w ould rem ain ineffective and inoperative. For it is n atu ral how
the m ind is congenial to w h at is disposed according to nature, b u t is alien
to w h at is rem oved from nature.34
34 O H 1 2 :160D-161B: ApflXuveoOai 8e Tas voip-itcas evepyelas, f\ kclL

navranaaiv aupaKTelv ev Tfj -rroiq StaGeaet tou autpaTos SiSaxOeig, oux Iicavov
Troioup.ai to u to Ttcp.fjpiov, tou tottoj tlu l tt|v Suvap.iv tou vou irepielpyeaQat, tog
Tatg eiriyivopeyaig to ls (repeat <{>Xeyp.ovals Tfjs oiiceias eupux^plag eeipyop.evT(s.
IwpaTucf| yap f| Totatrrri 8oa, to (tfj SuvaaQat TrpotcaTeiXTjppevou tou ayyeiou Sia
tivos twv epPepXr|(ieva)v, eTepov t l ev aurai x^pav eupetv. 'H yap voTyrfj <j>uatg otrre
T a t g KevuKieaiv ep4>tXoxwpet twv awpdTwv, ouTe tw TrXeovaCovri rfjg aapicds
eôjGetTat. AXX' errei8f| tcaGcfrrep t l pouaucov opyavov anav to a<5p.a
SeSriptoupypTaL, tixnrep aupjkrivet TroXXdicis erri tgjv peXcoSetv p.ev emaTap.evwv,
aSuvaTouvn'tov 5e 8etai Trjv eTTiorqp.T(v, Tfjg t<2v opyavuv dxpTiaTtas ou
TrapaSexopevTis^ Tf|v T ex ^v (to yap fj xpdwp <{>0apev, fj TrapeppTyypevov ex
KaTaTTTwaecjg, fj utto tiv o s tou xal eupaiTos ijxpettiipevov, a<j>0oyyov pevet teal
107
T hus, the sim ile h elps G regory account for m om ents o f unconsciousness w ith o u t
sacrificing th e m in d 's essential sovereignty o v er the body.
H e likew ise uses it in his explanation of th e sem iconsciousness o f sleep,
explaining th e a p p aren t effect th at a low er being m igh t have on a higher as a
consequence o f th e sym pathy w hich exists b etw een p a rts o f a whole. Plotinus
uses such an arg u m ent in discussing the efficacy of prayer.
But the su n , o r another heavenly body, do es n o t h ear his prayers. A nd
th at w hich h e p ray s for com es about because one p a rt is in sym pathetic
duevepyTjToi/, xav irrro tou Trpoexei-u Sokouvtos Kcrra rf|i/ auXrvrucfii/ Texi/rl1'
e(iuveT|Tai)' ovrru xai o uoiis 8i oXou tou opyavou 8irjK(oi\ xal KaTaXXnXws- Tal?
uoTiTiKals evepyeiais, xa0o treûKev, eKacrnu t Gv pepoii/ Trpoaatrropevos, em pev
t &v xaTa <J>uaiv SiaKeipevajv to oLklov evqpyriaev, em 8e t &v aoQevovvruiv
8eaa9ai tt|v Texvucfjv auTou KivTjaiv, drrpaicTos t c xal avevepynTo? epeive.
rie<J)UK6 yap iraj? o uous Trpog pev to k o to
SiaKeipevou otKeCaJS exeiu, trpos 6e
to rrapei/exQev dtro T aurus, aXXoTpiouoOai.
Cf. Im ag. 12; 223,36-224,7: Obscurari autem intellectuales operationes seu per
omnia in omnibus inactuales fieri in qualicumque corporis affectu docens non magnopere
facio argumentum loco quodam uirtutem animi prohiberit ac si superuenientibus
particulis flagrantibus sua amplitudine uetitam. Corporalis enim est talis opinio, non
posse praeoccupato organifolle per quoddam eorum quae in eo inspiciuntur, alterum
quendam locum inuenire. Intellectualis enim natura, neque concauitatibus corporum
interius locatur, neque abundantia caris expellitur, sed quoniam ueluti organum
musicum omne corporis creat. Quaedam quidem accidunt modulari scientibus, non
ualentibus autem notitiam organorum inusitationis ostendere quae artem non recipit.
A u t enim tempore corruptum aut ex laxitate tardum a ut a quodam ueneno cariosum, out
atritum absonum manet, et in actuosum, et ab eo qui habere uidetur contra artem
tibicinalem inspirator. Sic et animus ter totum organum ueniens, et conuenienter
intellectualibus operationibus singulas partium per quas consueuit tangens in his quidem
quae secundum naturam disponuntur, quod suum est operator, in his uero quae
infirmantur artificalem sui motum inactuosus et piger manet accipere. Consueuit enim
animus quodammodo ad id quidem quod secundum naturam disponitur societatem
habere, ab eo uero quod ab ea distat alienari.
E riugena's tran slatio n of the first p a rt of th is passage is so difficult as to be
undecipherable w ith o u t reference to G regory's G reek. This obscurity perhaps
reflects the lim itations o f E riugena's lexicographical resources. Eriugena's
version also contains a significant m istranslation: h e translates the passive
5e8r| pioupyT]Tai as a n active creat, thus suggesting th a t the intellectual nature
creates its ow n body a position w hich Eriugena him self advances in his
presentation of th e body-soul relation.
108
connection w ith ano ther, ju st as in one tense strin g ; fo r if the strin g is

plucked a t th e low er en d , it has a vibration a t th e u p p er. But often, too,
w hen one strin g is plucked another has a k ind o f sense o f this b y its
concord an d th e fact th a t it is tuned to th e sam e scale. B ut if th e vibration
can even pass from one lyre to another in so far a s a sym pathy exists, then
there is also o n e single harm ony in the all, even if it is com posed o f
opposites; and it is in feet com posed of p a rts w h ich are alike an d all akin,
even w hen th ey are opposites.35
G regory m akes a sim ilar argum ent from sym pathy36 in connection w ith
dream s, in w hich d ie m in d seem s to be captive to the vag aries o f the low er,
nutritive pow er. The p a rts o f the soul are so related th a t "even if one p a rt of it is
still, if another h ap p en s to b e m oved, the w hole is coaffected w ith the p art".37
W hen one p a rt is do m in ant the others are carried along in th e w ake o f its
operation. For exam ple, w hen the m ind rules, sense a n d the n u tritiv e pow er
contribute their p ro p er function in su pport of its activity. Such is the norm al
condition of those w ho are aw ake and a le rt In a co n dition such as sleep,
how ever, the n u tritiv e p o w er dom inates, concentrating th e w hole n atu re on
itself. Sense is im peded b y th e relaxation of the sense o rg an s, b u t n o t entirely
35 Ennead 4.4.41; A rm strong, 4:265.

36 O n G regory's u se o f cruptrvola and aupTraOela, see Paulos M ar Gregorios,
Cosmic Man: The Divine Presence: The theology o f S t Gregory ofN yssa (NY: Paragon
H ouse, 1988), 7-12; also, D anielou, L'Etre et le temps, 51 ff.
37 O H 13 :168D-169A: Ka0direp 8e Kara Tag awpaTiKag evepyelas, tc5v
pepuiv LSiaCovraig tl Kara tt|v eyKeipevqv auTui cfjixriKuig Suvap.LV evepyouvTog,
yiveTaL tl? xal tou lipepouvTog pepoug* irpog to Kivoupevov cruvSiaOeaig- avaAoycog
Kai em Tfjg tfjuxfis. xav to pevairrijg ijpepouv, to Se Kivoupevov Tuxfl, to oXov tw
pepei auvSiaTiOeTai.
Cf. Im ag. 14:227,41-43: quomodo autem per corporales operationes in
unaquaque partium specialiter quid iuxta impositam sibi naturaliter uirtutem operante,
f it quaedam etiam silente membro ad id quod ponitur. Ita corrationabiliter et in anima et
si quoddam quidem eius sileat, quoddam uero moueatur totum parti coaffectari
consequitur.
109
extinguished. To th e extent th a t the sense pow er is active, the m ind too is at

work: the sleeper dream s.38
The m ind once join ed to th e body, m ust suffer w ith th e body the constant
flux and m otion th a t characterizes m aterial life, u p o n w hich indeed bodily
existence, being m aterial, depends.39 N onetheless, G regory w ould have us
understand th a t th e m in d itself does n o t now begin an d later cease its action, b u t
alw ays acting according to its ow n nature is som etim es im peded, like a tire
w hich sm olders u n d e r a heap of chaff until it can ag ain g et air enough to b u m
brightly, o r like a m usician w hose lyre is o u t of tune.
A nd ju st as a m usician w ho strikes the plectrum against the loosened
strings of a ly re does n o t produce a m easured tu n e (for a string th at has
n o t been tigh ten ed w ill n o t sound); his h and m ay m ove very skillfully,
bringing the p lectru m to the proper position o f the notes, b u t w hat sounds
is only a certain in distin ct and disorderly buzz from the m otion of the
strings; so too w h en on account of sleep the in stru m ental structure of the
sense organs is loosened, either the artist is en tirely q u iet (if the
instrum ent suffers com plete loosening from som e satiety and heaviness),
o r it w orks d u lly an d indistinctly because the sensitive instrum ent does
n o t receive h is a rt accurately.40
38 O H 1 3 :169B; cf. Im ag. 14:227,43-228,10. Especially, O H 13:169B: KaTa

t o v a i r r o v 8 e X o y o v ic a l t o u v o u t r p d s t o a L a 0 T]TiK6 v 1805 T ils ' ^ X f i s oi.icei.oufi.evou,
aicoX ouflov a v e u i K a i K iv o u p e v o u t o u t o u , a u y i c i v e i a O a i X e y e i v a i r r o v , K a i ijp e f io u v T o s
cn ry K a T a n a u e o Q a i .
Cf. Im ag 14:228,8-10: iuxta eandem rationem etiam animo ad sensualem

animae spedem sociato, consequens est etiam dum ipsa mouetur vpsum commoueri
dicere, et silentio conquiescere.
39 O H 1 3 :165A; cf. Im ag. 14:226,3-12.
40 O H 1 3 :169CD: Kai dxrrrep t i s pouaixos KexaXaafievaLS Tats xop&riS'
Xupas epPaXcov t o TrXfjKTpov, ou KaTa puQpov rrpoayei t o peXos' ou yap av t o pr|
auvTCTapevov rixnaeiev* aXX f| pev xeip Texw.Kais rroXXaias laueiTai, rrpos t t | v
Tomicf|v 0eaiv t w v t o v o jv t o TrXfjicrpov ayouaa, t o 8e lixouv o u k eariv, ei pr| oaov
d<rqp6v Tiva Kai aauvTaKTov ev Ttj Kivrjaei tcSv xop8oiv mrqxei t o v {36pfk)v outco Sia
t o u uttvou Tijs opyaviKfjs Tdiv aiaOriTTiptcuv KaTaaKeuijs xctâ a etaris, rj KaSoXou
T fjs
t ) p e p e i o T e x ^ T T ) s , e i r r e p T e X e ta v X u a iv e x TrXT)0 a > p a s t i v o s K a i P a p o u s TraOoi t o

o p y a v o v , t) a T o v c u s T e K a i a p u S p i o s e v e p y r j a e i , o u x v r r r o S e x o p e w u t o u a i o 9 T]TLK0 u

110
Such phenom ena trouble G regory. T hat th e m ind should find itself in this
position, he reg ard s as a m isfortune. But w h at can be done to rem edy this
m isfortune? Should one, as Plotinus suggests, b e ar w ith the instrum ent only as
long as necessary a n d th en exchange it for an o ther an d hope to m ove on
eventually to a sta te in w hich no instrum ent is needed?
W ith P lotinus G regory shares the conviction th at the soul is naturally
superior to the body. H ence the need to explain certain phenom ena in a w ay th at
preserves in principle th e m in d 's sovereignty. H ence th e aptness of the lyre
sim ile. U nlike P lotinus, how ever, G regory does n o t envision a tim e w hen the
soul w ill be free o f its body (even in death); he cannot w rite off the troubling
phenom ena as sim p ly alien to the soul; w hich is to say, for all his em phasis on
the sovereignty a n d sim plicity of the m ind, he does n o t finally deny th a t h um an
nature as such is a com pound of body and soul, ha fact, he argues bo th th at m an
is a com posite bein g an d th a t body and soul are generated sim ultaneously.
2.132
T h e a n a lo g y o f th e s e e d
In his preface to De opificio hominis, G regory h ad prom ised no t to leave
unexam ined an y th in g im po rtan t that pertained to m an, neither those things th a t

happened before h e w as m ade, nor those th at are expected to happen in the
opycu'ou 61' aicpiPeia? Tfjv' Texvriv.
Cf. Im ag. 14:228,18-27: Ac ueluti quidam musicus laxatis cordis lyrae
plectrum immitens non secundum numerum melos adducit. Non enim inordinatum
sonuerit, sed manus quidem artificaliter saepe mouetur ad localem tonorum positionem
plectrum ducens, quod autem sonat nil est nisi ignobilem quendam et inordinatum in
motu cordarum bombum subsonare. Sic per somnum organica ojficinarum sensuum
laxata constitutione uniuersaliter artifex silet. Siquidem perfectam solutionem ex
humiditate quadam etgrauitate organum patitur, uel infirmiter uel obscurae operabitur,
dum sensuale organum diligenter artem non susceperit.
Ill
future, n o r those th a t can be contem plated now .41 H aving explored the Genesis
account of m an 's creation and defended d ie C hristian doctrine o f resurrection, he
suddenly observes, a t the end of C hapter 27, th a t h e h as so far said nothing o f the
m ost notable th in g ab o u t us, "I m ean, the first occasion itself of o u r form ation."42
It is a m arvel, h e says, th a t from hum an seed som ething so g reat and com plex as
the hum an body sh o u ld develop, and n o t only th e body, fo r this seed com prises
the soul, as w ell.
This claim leads G regory to give an account o f the unity' o f m an's
com posite n atu re over against those w ho teach th e preexistence o f souls. H e
does n o t have p ag an authors like Plotinus in view , b u t those w ith in the C hurch
w ho tau gh t such things in th eir discussion o f "Principles"43 a clear reference to
O rigen's IlepL dpxwu (De principiis). G regory positions his response to this
teaching as a m ean betw een extrem es. O n th e one h an d , som e h old th at souls
constitute a kind o f "nation" and enjoy a d istin ct w ay o f life, in w hich they are
exposed to exam ples o f v irtu e and vice; if they rem ain attached to the good, they
stay w here they cure an d d o n o t experience conjunction w ith a body, bu t if they
m ove o u t of p articipatio n in the good tow ard th is life, they are lost and so come
to be in a body.44
O n the o th er h an d , som e hold th at th e so u l is ad d ed to th e body after the
body's form ation in o rd er to anim ate and m ove it. A gainst the latter, G regory
41 O H Pref: 127A; cf. Im ag. Pref: 210,14-18.

42 O H 27:228 D: airrf|V' Xeyw tt|i/ irpaiTTii/ T i j g oixrrdaeajS' fpcjju dcjjoppujy.
Cf. Im ag. 27:252,22-23: ipsam dico primam constitutionis nostrae occasionem.
43 O H 28:229B ff.: Tot? p.ei/ yap toju irpo f|p.d)v Soicet, ois o Tlepi raiu dpxuv
Trpay|iaTeu9ri Xoyog ... Cf. Im ag. 28:252,36ff.
44 O H 2 8 :229B; cf. Im ag. 28:252,39-44; cf. O rigen, De principiis 1.8.2.
112
argues th at the so u l h as a d ig n ity and a d estin y su p erio r to bodily existence an d

th at the body serves th e soul an d n o t th e soul th e b ody. The form er position he
rejects as leading to fabulous absurdities such as the transm igration of souls o r
their com plete annihilation, b u t his ow n position retain s certain obvious features
of this view . H e rejects th e preexistence o f in d iv id u al souls, affirm ing th at m an
is a com posite o f b o d y an d soul, b u t keeps th e no tion o f a hum an plerom a in
w hich all hum an in d iv id u als preexist in the divine foreknow ledge.
Therefore th e accounts o f both are equally to b e cast aside. I think th a t o u r
doctrine sho u ld b e directed thro ug h th e m id st o f these positions. It is this:
th at n eith er according to the G reek deception it is to be thought th a t the
souls m oving aro u n d together w ith th e all w ere w eighed dow n in som e
evil and w ith pow erlessness fell to e arth from ro tatin g together w ith the
sw iftness o f th e m otion o f th e axis; n o r, conversely, to say th a t as if m an
w ere a clay sta tu e thoroughly fashioned beforehand w ith reason, on
account o f w hich th e so u l comes to be (for, th e noetic n atu re then w ould
be received as som ething less valuable th an th e clay figure); but, since
m an is one, con stituted o f soul and body, to su pp o se one com m on
beginning o f this constitution (lest h e be m ade o ld er o r younger than
him self, th e b od ily e a s tin g first in him an d th e o th er com ing about later);
and m oreover, to say th a t the w hole hum an plerom a preexists in the
prognostic p o w er o f G od (for the reason offered a little earlier)w hich the
prophecy confirm s w hen it says th a t G od know s all things before their
generationb u t th a t in its creation in in d iv id u als the one does not
precede the oth er, n eith er the soul, th e body, n o r th e body, the soul, lest a
m an be d iv id ed against him self, being p artitio n ed by difference of tim e.45
45 O H 2 8 :233B-29:235A: O u k o u u d ird p X T iT o s em ori? o T ra p ' ap<t>OTepa)v

Xoyog. Al<z 8e t o u peaou t w u vrroXTyjfeaju euOuueiu olpai Setu ev aXnOeig t o f|peTepou
Soypa. E o t l 8e t o u t o , t o piyre Kara nf|u 'E X X tiu ik t|v dm rrnu ev icairig t i v l
PapnQeuras Tag t w m u m aupirepnroXouaas (Jjuxgs, dSuuapia t o u aupirapaOeeu/ Tfj
o ^ i m i T i T T js t o u iroXou Kiurjoecos, em t t | u yf\v KaTamirreiu olecrOai- [W ilson's
chapter breaksee com m ents below ] pTjS' au iraXiu oiouel TnjXiuou duSpidvra
TrpoSiairXaoSevTa tu> Xoytu t o u auQpcorrov, t o u t o u euexa rf|u ipuxnv yiueoOai Xeyeiu.
TH yap au aTipoTepa t o u miXtuou TrXdapaTos fj uoepa <J)uai? airoSeLxOeiTi. [M igne
chapter break] AXX euo? o u t o ? t o u duQpoi-rrou, t o u Sia ipuxfjg Te xai aaipaTo?
ouveoTT|kotosptau airrou Kai KOiufju Tfjs auoTaaecDS Tfju apxf|u irrroTiGecrQaL, ojs au
pf| airros eatrrou Trpoyeuecrrepos Te Kai ueafrepos yeuotTO, t o u peu acupaTLKOu
trpoTepeuouTos eu aurui, t o u 8e eTepou e<j>uaTepiCouTos. AXXa rrj peu TrpoyuooriKfj
t o u eou Suuapei, KaTa t o u pixpcD upoo8eu aTro8o0euTa Xoyou, airau irpoujjeaTduaL
113
M oreover, the w hole m an is p resen t a t the beginning o f his form ation.

Like the seed of grain w hich contains virtually o r potentially the stalk, and leaf,
and b eard of the fully developed p lan t, th e h um an germ o f m an, too, contains
p otentially the form o f the m atu re body. The seed bears w ith in itself the pow er
of life, receiving from w ith o u t such nourishm ent as th is pow er requires in the
course o f its natural developm ent. A s the body o f m an develops, his soul
m anifests m ore an d m ore o f its ow n pow ers. The soul, m oreover, does not
m erely w ait on the body, b id in g its tim e u n til the b odily conditions exist in
t o dvQpwTTivov TrXTjpupxt Xeyeiv, cnjp.p.ap-njpoiJcnr]g el? t o u t o 1^9 Trpo^qTeiag, t t ) s
Xoyoucnrig eLSeim r a irai/ra t o v 0eov irpli/ yeveaetog airrdh/. Ey 5e rfj xa0' exaoTov
6Tip.Loupyta p.f| irponQevai rou erepou t o eTepov, p-iyre trpo t o o CTwp.aTog t t | i / i|ivxfji/,
p.T]Te t o ep.TraA.Li'- a g av p.t| crracridôi Trpos eairroi/ o avOponros t t ) x a T a t o i / 'xpovov
Sia<(>op4 peptCopevog.
Cf. Imag. 28:254,23 - 29:254,41: Non ergo dixeris utrorumque depulsa est
ratio, per medium uero opinionum oportere arbitror nostram doctrinam in ueritate
dirigere. Est autem haec quod neque secundum grecum errorem in quadam malitia
grauatas animas, cum uniuerso circum uoluptas per inpotentiam concurrendi cum
uelocitate caelestis motus in terram cadere aestimandum. Neque bene iterum ueluti
luteam statuam, prius formatum a uerbo hominem propter quern anirm fieret dicendum.
Ipsa enim ignobilior luteo plasmate intellectualis natura ostenderetur. [C hapter break]
Sed dum sit unus homo ex anima et corpore constitutus unum ipsius atque commune
constitutionis prindpium substituitur, ne ipse seipso antiquior iuniorque fia t, corporali
quidem prius existente in ipso, altero uero posterius constituto. Sed in prognostica
quidem dei uirtute, iuxta paulo ante redditam rationem omnem humanam plenitudinem
substitisse dicendum, contestante in hoc prophetia quae dicit deum uidisse omnia ante
generationem eorum. In conditione uero per singula alterum altero praeposuisse, neque
ante corpus animam, neque iterum ante animam corpus, ne dissideat a seipso homo
temporis differentiam partitus.
In the published E nglish translation (LNPF* 5, p . 420, n. 2), H A . W ilson,
w ho follow s die text of Forbes rath er th an th at of the PG , notes the aw kw ardness
o f eith er chapter break. The gram m atical u n ity of th e passage is indicated by the
absence of a finite verb in the last several sentences, except in clearly subordinate
o r parenthetical clauses. P erhaps the original chapter titles w ere m arginal and
w ere subsequently inserted in to the tex t by later copyists; such a hypothesis
m ig h t account for the frequent differences o f chapter division, n o t only betw een
th e M igne text and E riugena's translation b u t am ong o th er w itnesses (noted by
W ilson), as well. There are also differences betw een th e chapter titles given by
v ario u s w itnesses.
114
w hich it can m anifest itself, b u t itself shapes the body to its o w n needs, preparing
for itself a dw elling-place th at is tru ly its ow n. G radually th e rational pow er
begins to shine, n o t all a t once, "b u t carefully grow ing along w ith the perfection
of the instru m en t, it ever bears fru it to th e extent th at th e p o w er o f th e subject is
able."46 Like a sculptor w ho gradually shapes the stone to h is pu rpose, th e form
of the statu e em erging a t first indistinctly and being g rad u ally perfected, so the
soul fashions for itself its ow n instrum ent upon w hich to play.47
2.133
The m etaphor o f the mirror

T he affirm ation th a t the soul, w hich is united w ith a b o d y from the
beginning, is a m ind, th at the m ind is not som ething su p erad d ed to the soul or
m erely o ne o f its p articu lar activities, b u t w hat the soul essentially is, governs
G regory's detailed discussion of the soul-body relationship. T hat discussion is
focused o n the question, w hether the m ind has its seat in som e p a rt o f the body.
G regory answ ers, using the sim ile of the lyre, that w hile the operations o f the
soul d ep en d on the pro per condition of their respective bodily organs, the soul
46 O H 2 9 :237C: Oil yap xwpel t o irepiaaoTepou f| t o u Sexopeuou 0paxurr|S'.

Eura trpoeXOovTos e is <jx3s t o u <J>u t o u , tcai TiXicp t t |v pXaaniv 8eiavTos, f| aia(hymcf|
xapig eTnjuGnaeu. A6puv0ei/Tos 8e fjSri xai e is OTjppeTpou jiijKOS dua8pap.6uros,
KaQcrrrep t l ? xaptros SiaXdp/rreii/ f| Xoyucf| 8uvap.is apxeTai, ou Tracra dGpocjg
eKâLi'Ofiei/iy aXXa T fj t o u opyauou TeXeitocrei 8i eTTLp.eXeiag auuauôucra, t o o o u t o u
del KapTro<{>opouaa, ooov xwpei t o u irrroKeip.euou f| 8uvap.L5.
Cf. Im ag. 29:256,9-14: Non enim plus capit assumpti in conceptionem paruitas,
deinde accedente in lucem germine soleque pullulationem ostendente, sensiua gratia
superadicitur, corroborato uero iam el incommensurabilem longitudinem recurrente,
rationabilis uirtus ueluti quidam fructus incipit lucere, non tota cumulatim apparet, sed
organi perfectioni studiose concrescens, tantum semperfructifera quantum subiecti
uirtus capit.
47 O H 3 0 :253B-C; cf. Im ag. 30:262,8-37. Eriugena develops this notion
(that the so u l fashions its ow n body) so for as to posit a m ortal body distinct from
the sp iritu al body originally created by G od. See section 2.225 below .
115
itself relates to the w hole and so is n o t resid en t in any one of the parts, w hich are,
according to the sim ile of the lyre, in d iv id u al strings of the w hole in stru m en t
u p o n w hich the soul plays.
D uring his explanation o f this view , how ever, Gregory introduces another
view , in w hich n o t the strings o f the lyre b u t th e artist him self bears the
responsibility for th e poor playing. In its n atu ral state the com pound n a tu re of
m an is a hierarchy in w hich the m ind is governed by God and in tu rn governs
the m aterial life o f the body. G regory has so far stressed the difficulties th a t arise
if the bodily instrum ent is badly tu n ed , w h ether due to injury o r sickness o r
n atu ral tim es of sleep: the m ind seeks to p lay b u t cannot. H ere, how ever, he
suggests th at this unnatural condition arises because the m ind itself has been
deflected from its proper relation to G od. The hierarchy is thus disturb ed a t the
level o f m ind w ith consequences a t the level of body.
To illustrate this view of the relationship betw een God, m ind, and body,
G regory uses the m etaphor of a m irror, o r a p a ir of m irrors, w hich w hen
p ro p erly aligned reflect the im age of the G ood into bodily existence.
A nd to m e it seem s th at p a rt o f a certain speculation is m ore
n atu ral [than the sim ile of a m usical instrum ent], and th at throu g h it a
m ore refined doctrine is tau g ht. For since of all things the m ost beautiful
and the m ost excellent good is G od him self, to whom all things incline,
having a longing for the good, w e therefore say that the m ind, too, w hich
is m ade as in die im age of die m ost beautiful, rem ains in the good as long
as it participates in the likeness o f the archetype, as m uch as possible; b u t
if it should som ehow come to be ou tsid e this, it is stripped of th a t beauty
in w hich it w as. As w e hold th a t the m ind is adorned by the likeness of
the archetypal beauty, like a m irro r form ed w ith the figure of w h at
appears; likew ise w e th in k th a t th e n atu re adm inistered by the m ind is
held in the sam e proportion to it, an d is adorned by the beauty w hich is
presented, like a m irror of the m irror; and th at by it is com m anded and
controlled the m aterial o f the substance, concerning w hich the n atu re is
contem plated. Therefore inasm uch as one has w hat it has from th e other,
th e com m union of the tru e good passes through all proportionally,
beautifying w h at is adjacent th ro u g h w h at is above. But w hen there
should happen some tearing a p art of the good of this bond, or even if by a
116
rev ersal th e superior should be preced ed b y the inferior, then the

shapelessness o f m atter itself, d eserted by n atu re (for m atter in itself is
som ething form less an d un co nstituted ), an d th e beauty of nature is
co rru p ted b y its form lessness rath er th an beautified by the m ind. A nd
th u s is b ro u g h t about the transfer o f th e ugliness o f m atter to the m ind
itself th ro u g h the nature, so th a t no longer is th e im age of God observed in
th e features o f the reflection. For the m in d , w hich m ade the idea o f the
goods like a m irror from b ehind, casts aside th e reflections of the radiance
o f d ie good, an d absorbs into itself th e form lessness of m atter. A nd in th is
m an ner th e genesis of evil is b ro u g h t ab o ut, being coincident w ith the
rem oval o f th e good.48
48 O H 1 2 :161C164A: Kai poi Sokcl 4>ixtlkwtPov etvai t i Kcrrd to pepog

toOto 0eu>pT|pa, 8i' ou pa0elv ecrn t l tuv aoTeiOTepwv SoypdTtuv. ErreiSfl yap to
koXXlotov irdvTajv Kai eôxwTarov ayaQov airro t o Qetov e o n , lrpog o TrdvTa
vcvcukev, oaa to u koXou tt|v eêaw e\ei, 8 ia to u to <J>apev Kai tou vow, are kot'
eiKova to u koXXlotou yevopevov, eaig av peTexn Tfjg- Trpos t o apxeTurov
opoioTTjTog, KaOoaov evSexerai, Kai avrov ev t<3 koAco SiapeveLv, ei 8e mug ea)
yevoiTo to u to u , yupvouaflai tou KaXXoug ev w fjv. "Qcrrrep 8e ecfcapev ttJ opoiaioei
tou ttpojTOTutrou KaXXoug KaTaKoapeiaOai to u vow, oiov t l KdroTrrpov tw xapaKTfjpi
tou ep<|>aivogevou pop<(>oupevov- KaTa rf|v aimfjv avaXoyiav, Kai tt|v oiKOvopoupevTjv
inr' airrou ({mlxjiv exeotiai tou vou Xoyi6pe9a, Kai tw TrapaKeipevqi k^XXcl Kai airrf|v
KOcrpeiaQai, olov t l KaToirrpou KaToirrpov yivopevr|v KpaTeio6aL 8e imo Taurijg Kai
auvexeaOaL to uXlkov Tqs irrroaTdaeajg, Trepi i)v OeajpeiTai l) <J>uaig. "Eojs av ouv
exT|Tai to u Tepou to CTepov, 8ia trdvTajv avaXoycog t\ tou ovTojg KaXXoug Koivtuvia
SieêLOL, Slo to u irrrepKeipeuou to Trpoaexeg KaXXamiCoucra. ETrei8av 8e Tig yevr|Tai
yrjg d y a 9 % Taurr^g aup<J>uiag Siacrrraapog, r\ Kai irpog t o epiraXiv, avTaKoXouOfj t u
utto^cPtikotl to inrepexov to tc aurfjg t c Trig uXTig, o to v govcoGfj TTjg <j>uatug,
8LT|vexTl t o daxnpov (apop<t>ov yap t l Ka0* eairrf|v f| uXrj Kai aKaTaoKcuov) Kai rfj
d[iop4>ig TauTT|g <7uv8ie<J)0dpTj to KaXXog Tfjg <j)uaeo>gt t) 8 ia tou vou KaXXumiCeTai.
K a i ouTtog e rr' airrov to v vouv to u KaTa nfjv uXtiv aiaxoug 8 id Tfjg <j>uaea)g f|
SiaSoaig yiverai, cjg pi^KCTi tou eou tt|v eiKova ev t<5 xapaKTTjpi Kadopaotiai tou
trXaapaTog. Olov yap t l KaTorrrpov k o to vojtou tt|v twv ayaQcSv iSeav o voug
TTOLTâapevog, etcfJaXXei pev Tfjg eKXapipeug to u aya9ou Tag epâaeig, Tijg 8e uXr^g
nf|v apop<J>iav elg eaurov dvapdaaeTai. Kai to u tw yiveTOL tw Tpotrw tou kokou f|
yeveoig, 8ia Tiig irrreâLpeaecog tou koXou Trapu<|)L(rrapevri.
Cf- Im ag. 13:224,10-225,5: Et mihi uidetur etiam naturaliorem quondam in
hoc parte speculationem esse per quam quiddam ciuiliorum dogmatum est discendum
quoniam enim pulcherrimum omnium et excellentissimum bonum ipse deus est, ad quern
omnia respiciunt quaecumque boni habent desiderium, propterea dicimus etiam animum
sic ad imaginem formosissimifactum, quatinus ad principale exemplum similitudinem
participant quantum quidem ipsum in bono licet permanere. Si uero quodammodo extra
hoc fuerit pulchritudine illius in quo erat denudatur, siquidem dicimus similitudine
principalis exempli pulchritudinis animum omari. Ueluti quoddam speculum caractere
apparentis form atum iuxta eandem analogiam etiam administratam a se naturam habere
animum arbitramur, pulchritudineque quae ab illo est ipsam omari. Ueluti quoddam
117
T his account of th e m ind turning aw ay from th e G ood and becom ing

darkened b y th e m aterial n atu re of the body is n o t unlike a Platonic account of
the so u l's descent into the body, though, o f course, strip p ed o f the assum ption of
its preexistence. In P lato 's account in the Phaedrus o f th e so u l's descent into
body, th e dow nw ard m otion originates in th e so u l w ith its one u nruly steed. In
this w ay th e so u l's self-m otion is to som e extent p reserv ed . But w ould Plato call
this descended soul "m ind"? h i the picture Plato p ain ts in the Phaedrus the souls
of gods an d m en m ove to w ard the o uter edge o f th e w o rld and stand ing on the
back o f it, o r a t least poking their heads above th e w orld, they gaze u p o n the
intelligible realm . T here is a certain contrast im p lied h ere betw een soul an d this
intelligible realm . Is a soul separated from the intelligible realm still a m ind?
G regory's affirm ative response to this question con trasts nicely w ith P lotinus'
account, in w hich soul an d intellect are clearly distinguished. The difference
betw een th e tw o can be illustrated by the difference in th eir use of the m irror as a
m etaphor.
speculi speculum factam, tenerique ab ipsa et cotnprehendi materiale substantiae, circa
quam consideratur natura. Si ergo habetur ab altero alterum per omnia corrationabiliter
ipsa ueri boni societas deducendo per id quod superponitur id quod consequens
formificat, cum uero efficitur huius optimae connaturalitatis dispersio, et ad contrarium
consequens fu erit supereminenti, supereminens tunc ipsius materiae cum desolata fuerit
ex natura redarguitur deformitas. Informis enim res quaedam est per seipsam materia, et
imperfecta, et ipsius infbrmitati concorrumpitur pulchritudo naturae in qua per animum
formatur, ac sic in ipsum animum turpitudinis materiae per naturam distributio
efficitur, u t non iam dei imaginem in caracterefigmenti consideres. Nam ueluti
quoddam speculum retro bonorum formam animus factus proicit quidem fulgoris boni
notitias, materiae uero infbrmitatem in seipsum absorbet. Et hoc modo fit mali generatio
per priuationem boni subtexta.
T his passagean d m ore (Imag. 13:224,11-225,17)is quoted by E riugena
a t PP 4: 789A-790B.
49 E nn. 4.8, esp. 4.
118
P lotinus uses th e sim ile o f a m irror in a passage in w hich he tries to

account for th e in term ittent character of conscious intellectual activity. For
Plotinus, consciousness is centered n o t o n th e m ind, b u t on the im age-m aking
pow er o f the so u l w hich can be stim ulated by sense perception, o r by intellect if
the soul is p ro p erly disposed.
It seem s as if aw areness exists an d is produced w hen intellectual activity
is reflexive an d w hen th a t in the life o f the soul w hich is active in thinking
is in a w ay projected back, as happens w ith a m irror-reflection w hen there
is a sm ooth, brig h t, untroubled surface. In these circum stances w hen the
m irror is there th e m irror-im age is produced, b u t w hen it is n o t there or is
n o t in th e rig h t state the object o f w hich the im age w ould have been is [all
the sam e] actually there. In the sam e w ay as regards the soul, w hen th at
kind of th in g in u s w hich m irrors th e im ages of thought an d intellect is
u nd istu rb ed , w e see them and know them in a w ay p arallel to senseperception, along w ith the p rio r know ledge th at it is intellect and thought
th at are active. But w hen this is broken because the harm ony of the body
is u p set, tho u gh t an d intellect operate w ithout a n im age, an d then
intellectual activity takes place w itho u t a m ind-picture. So one m ight
come to th is so rt of conclusion, th a t intellectual activity is [norm ally]
accom panied by a m ind-picture b u t is n o t a m ind-picture.50
In this version o f the relation betw een the p arts of the hum an com pound, the
intellect cannot be blam ed for its failure to produce the p ro p er effects of its
activity. E lsew here Plotinus says th at m an's intellect is free from all
responsibility fo r the evils th a t m an does an d suffers. Instead o f speaking of the
intellect as being o r n o t being involved in the acts of the com posite m an, "w e
ought rath er to say th at w e are in touch w ith the intelligible in th e intellect or w e
are notw ith th e intelligible in ourselves; for one can have it a n d n o t have it
available."51 If the soul is p roperly disposed to the intellect, it acts as a m irror of
50 Enn. 1.4.10; A rm strong 1:199-201. Bracketted m aterial ad d ed by

translator.
51 Enn. 1.1.9; A rm strong 1:113.
119
th e intellect's activity, b u t if it is tu rn ed only tow ard th e senses, it w ill be

darkened accordingly.
G regory and Plotinus have sim ilar view s regarding th e m in d 's superiority
and its relation to the low er parts o f the com pound natu re o f m an. This can be
seen in the w ays they use the sim ile of th e lyre. They differ, how ever, o n their
evaluation o f the soul's conjunction w ith the body. For G regory th e hum an soul
is a m ind, a m irror created to reflect the divine im age an d tran sm ittin g th a t to the
body w hich itself acts as a m irror. If die prim ary m irror turns aw ay from G od, it
receives into itself the im age of m atter reflected to it by the inferior m irror. Such
a view com prom ises the soul's self-m otion. G ranted th a t G regory locates the
origin o f th e m otion aw ay from G od in the m ind itself, preserving its self-m otion
th at far, he nonetheless recognizes a degraded state of m ind in w hich it is m oved
from below . This im plies a degree o f receptivity natural to the m ind , w hich
Plotinus cannot accept. H e m akes instead a distinction betw een soul and
intellect th a t preserves the im passivity of th e latter w ith respect to th e form er.52
W hile, in G regory's view , th e hum an body is best understood as an
instrum ent o f the m ind, and the sovereignty o f the m ind over its bod y is an
im age of the divine sovereignty, th e union of m ind and body is a n atu ral one.
G regory is w illing to accept the consequences o f this naturalness even to the
52 Plotinus acknow ledges a receptivity o f m ind w ith respect to w h at is

above it, the G ood, b u t resolutely defends its im passivity tow ard w h at is below .
W hen D anielou discusses the soul as m irror of G od (Platonisme et theologie, 211217) he too com pares G regory w ith Plotinus, b u t his attention focuses on the
stages and processes of the spiritual life. In the case of the m irror, w hich for both
G regory an d Plotinus reflects the divine unless obscured by som e m u d , D anielou
notes a distinctively C hristian elem ent in G regory's view , nam ely, th a t the
cleansing o f the m irror is n o t the so u l's w ork b u t an effect o f the d iv ine presence;
the so u l's responsibility is sim ply to tu rn again tow ard God.
120
extent of acknow ledging the possibility o f a perverse passivity o f m ind w ith

respect to the body. M oreover, G regory seem s to accept in a positive w ay the
m ind's dependence on the senses, w hich im plies both a natural an d a perverse
kind o f passivity. N onetheless, G regory does n o t focus the m ind-sense
relationship on the question o f receptivity, b u t on its sim plicity.
2.14
The unity o f the soul

A s d ifferen t as m an's sensitive n a tu re is from the divine natu re, G regory
holds th at, w ith respect to the m in d 's sim plicity, m anhis sensitive n atu re
notw ithstandingdoes indeed im itate th e divine sim plicity. The question then,
as he poses it, is how the sim plicity of m in d can be reconciled w ith the
m ultiform ity of the senses and of th e o th er nonperceptive operations of th e soul.
W hen G regory describes the progressive creation of living beings n arrated
by M oses, h e finds three levels of soul: n u tritiv e, sensitive, and rational. P lants
exhibit th e first level, anim als, the first an d second, and hum an beings, all three.
A nd again w hen he analyzes the so u l's activity w ith respect to the body, h e finds
the sam e sequence. H ow is one to u n d erstan d this cum ulative series? Is the
hum an soul a com posite of three kinds o f soul? G regory raises this possibility
him self, b u t only to reject it.
Reason finds three differentiae o f v ital pow er: the n u tritiv e pow er
w ith o u t sensation, the nutritive an d grow ing* devoid of rational activity,
an d th e rational and perfect p erv ad in g all the pow ers, as both being in
them an d having the fullness of th e intellectual [power]; no one sho u ld on
account o f this suppose th at three souls are m ixed in the hum an
com posite, contem plated in th eir ow n circum scriptions, so as to th in k th a t
h u m an n atu re exists as a certain com bination of m any souls. R ather, tru e
an d perfect soul is one in nature, intellectual an d im m aterial, w hich
th ro u g h th e senses is m ixed w ith th e m aterial nature, b u t w hat is m aterial
is p laced entirely in conversion an d m utability. If it participates in the
anim ating pow er, it changes in th e m anner o f grow th; b u t if it falls aw ay
from the v ital operation, it dissolves m otion into corruption. T herefore,
121
n eith er does sense exist w ith o u t th e m aterial essence, n o r does th e

o peratio n o f the intellectual p o w e r w ith o u t sense.53
H e goes o n to argue th at only in su ch beings as exhibit all three o p eratio n s can
th e source o f these operations be p ro p erly called 'so u l'; the term 's o u l' is used
equivocally o f o th er beings because th e v ital operations observable in them do
n o t have the sam e principle as do th e v ita l operations in m an.
In m an th e source o f vital o p eratio n s is a noetic reality, the m ind-soul.
The v ital pow ers an d operations them selves, how ever, are consequences o f th e
union o f th a t noetic principle w ith a sensible body. The soul w hich is sim ple in
itself m anifests itself in a variety of p o w ers an d operations w hen it is jo ined w ith
the body. The m ultiplicity o f the senses an d o th er vital operations, as w ell as the
53 O H 1 4 :176B: ETrei8f| 8e Tpelg KaTa t t | v cmicf|i/ 8uvapiv 8ia<(>opdg o

Xoyog eupe, t t | v pev Tpe<{>opevTiv
aioOnaeajg, t t jv 8e rpe<{>opevr|v pev Kai
aufavopevnv,* apoipouaav 8e Tfjg Xoyucng evepyeiag, TTjv &e Xoyucf|v Kai TeXeiav 8i
drrdaT]S' SujKOuaav TTjg Suvapearg, tog Kai ev eKeivaLg elvai Kai Tfjg voepag t o irXeov
e x eiv pTiSeig 8ia t o u t w v imovoeiroi Tpetg auyKeKpoTijoQaL |>uxag ev Tui avQpufnLvto
cnryKpL(j.aTL, ev L8Caig Trepiypaâis Sewpoupevag, clkrre auyKpoTTipa t i TroXXdiv (Jruxdiv
t t | v dvQponrivriv 4>ucriv elvai uopLeiv. AXX' f| pev aXTiOrjs Te Kai TeXeia 4*VXH P-ici
rfj <j>uaei eoriv, f| voepa Te Kai diiXog, q 8 ia t w v aiaOijaeuv rfj uXiKfj KaTap.Lyvup.evri
<J>uaeu To 8e uXdi8eg array ev TpoTrfj Te Kai dXXouoaei Keipevov, el pev peTexoi Tfjg
(jiuxoucnig Suvapewg, KaTa auftiaiv KivriOqceTai- ei 8e dirorreaoi Tfjg CamiCTig
evepyeiag, eig <f>0opav avaXucrei tt|v Kivqatv. Oure ouv aiaOTiaig xuPte uXucijg
ouaiag, oure Tfjg voepag Suvapearg x^pig, aioOrjaewg evepyeia yiveTai.
Cf. Im ag. 15:230,17-29: quoniam uero tres secundum uitalem uirtutem
differentias ratio inuenit. Primam quidem nutritiuam sine sensu, secundum uero
nutritiuam quidem et sensiuam* expertem uero rationabilis operationis, item terciam
rationabilem et perfectam, perque omnem uirtutem penetrans, ut et in illis sit et si
intellectuali plus possideat, nemo ex his opinetur tres animas commixtas esse in humana
concretione, in propriis drcumscriptionibus consideratas ita ut conformations multarum
animarum humanam esse arbitretur. Sed uera quidem perfectaque anima una in natura
est, intellectualis et immaterialis, quae per sensus materiali copulatur naturae, materiale
autem omne in conuersione et mutabilitate positum est, siquidem animantem uirtutem
participauerit iuxta incrementum mouebitur. Si uero uitali operatione deciderit, motum
in corruptionem resoluet. Neque igitur sensus absque materiali essentia neque
intellectualis uirtutis sine sensu fit operatio. N early the w hole chapter from w hich
this passage com es is quoted a t PP 4 :792A -D ; p a rt o f it also, a t PP 3 :736A-B.
122
so ul's dependence on a bodily in stru m en t for the exercise of its o w n p roper

activity, p u t the hum an soul in co n trast w ith th e sim plicity o f th e d ivine nature.
N onetheless, G regory m aintains th a t, even w ith his sensitive n a tu re , m an
provides an exam ple o f sim plicity sufficient to rebuke those w h o argue th a t the
m ultiplicity of operations attrib u ted to G od contradicts his sim plicity.
A nd let no one th in k th a t I say th a t G od touches the th in g s th a t are w ith
different pow ers in th e likeness o f hum an activity. For it is n o t possible to
observe th e variety an d m ultiform ity o f the receptive activity in the
sim plicity of deity.54 For n o t even w ith us are the pow ers w hich are
receptive of things m any, even th o u g h w e touch the th in g s o f this life
m ultiform ly through the senses. F or it is some one p o w er, th e im planted
m ind itself, w hich pervades each o f th e sense organs, a n d takes hold of the
things th a t are. It beholds th ro u g h the eyes w hat is seen; it understands
throu g h the ears w hat is said; it loves w hat is agreeable a n d tu rn s itself
aw ay from w hat is n o t pleasant; an d it uses the hand for w hatever it
w ishes, holding o r repelling som ething through it, as it m ay judge bene
ficial, m aking use of die cooperation of the instrum ent fo r th at end. If
th en in m an, the instrum ents p rep ared by nature for sensation hap pen to
be different, that w hich w orks an d m oves through all o f them , and uses
each in a m anner ap p ro p riate to the thin g at hand, is nonetheless one and
the sam e, and it does n o t change its n ature by the differences o f its
activities. How could anyone see in G od a division of h is essence into
p arts on account of various pow ers? For "he w ho m olded the eye," as the
p ro p h et says, "and im planted th e ear,"55 intended these activities as
recognizable signs in the n a tu re o f m en of paradigm s w hich are in
him self; for he says, "Let u s m ake m an according to o u r im age."56
54 E riugena has a different read in g a t this point: "For it is n o t possible to

u nd erstand reception, and the m ultiform ity of receptive activity, in the sim plicity
of deity."
55 Ps 93:9 LXX: o <t>urei3aag t o o fe oux'i dtcouei, t) o trXaaag t o v (tydaXpdv oti
KOTavoet; "D oes he w ho planted th e e ar n o t hear, or he w ho m olded the eye not
observe?"
56 O H 6 :137D-140B: Kai p.e puiSeig oieaGaj ica0' 6p.0(.0TT|Ta Tfjg avOponrivTig
evepyeiag ev 8ia<{>6poig 8vvap.eai to 0etov Xeyeiv twv ovtwv ecjjaTrreaOau Ou yap
ecrri SuvaTov ev -rfj oitXottjti Tfjg Qeiomyrog to troudXov Te tea! iroXueiSeg Tfjg
avTiXTiTrn.KTjg evepyeiag tcaTavofjaai. OuSe yap f|plv iroXXal Tiveg elcnv a!
dvTLXt|TTTitca! Tuiv Trpayp.aTa)v 5uvap.eig, e! tea! TToXirrpomog 8ia twv alcrQfjaeajv twv
123
The m in d , according to G regory, is m eant to be in contact both w ith G od

and w ith o th er beings o f the sensible w o rld an d consequently requires th e
instrum entality o f the senses. W hile the so u l's need o f a bodily instrum ent
m akes it d ifferen t from the divine n atu re, the so u l itself retains a sovereignty an d
sim plicity th a t m ake it a true im age of G od.
G regory likens the soul's inner receptacle to a city w ith five gates57 to
illustrate th e m arvelous w ay in w hich so m any sensible phenom ena en ter the city
KaTa ut|p e<(>aTrTa(ie0a. Mia yap t l s e tm S w apis, airros o eyKeigepos wOs, o Si
eKacrrou raw aiaOTjTTipiup 8iefiup, Kai tu p optup emSpaaaogevos. O utos 0eupei
8ia tu p 64>8aXp.up to 4>aip6p.epop' outos aupiei 8ia tt\s aKofjs to Xeyogepop, ayarrq
Te to KaTeuOupiop, Kai to pjj Ka0 f|8opfiP diroaTpe<|>TaL, Kai tt] xeiPL XP^Tai TrpoS'
to o t l 0ouXeTait KpaTuP 8l' auTfjs Kai aTru0oup.ePOs crrrep ap XuaiTeXetp Kpipq, Tfj
too opyapou ow epyia e is touto cruyxpupepos- Ei tolpup cp tu apOpuirp kop 8id<f>opa
tuxU Ta irpos aio0r|OLP KaTeaKeuaageva irapa th s <{>uaeus opyapa, o 8ta Traprup
epepyup Kai Kipougepos Kai KaTaXXijXus Kacrru Trpos to upoKeipevop Kexp^pepog,
e ls e o n Kai o avrros, T ais 8ia4>opaLs tu p eiêpyeiup ou aweaAXdaaup tt)p 4>uolp*
ttu s dp t l s em tou 0eou 8ia tu p ttolklXup Supageup to TroXugepes Tfjs ouaias
KaTOTrreuaeLep; '"O yap "trXaaas top a|>8aXgdp, Ka0us <}>tioip o npoc|>tynris, Kai "o
cjjirreuaas to ous." Trpos Ta cp airru rrapaSeiygaTa Tas euepyeias ravra s olop tlp o s
yPUpiOTLKOUS XOPOKT^PttS TT) <|>UaL TUP dP0pUTTUP UaTlgTlPaTO. "Il0Oiaup.P" yap,
<j>T}crip, "dp0puTrop k o t eiKOPa f|gTepap."
Cf. Im ag. 6:214,30-46: Et nemo me aestimet dicere iuxta similitudenem
humanae operaticmis, differentibus potentiis deum ea quae sunt tangere. Non enim est
possibile in simplicitate deitatis receptionem, et multiformitatem receptoriae operaticmis
intellegere. Neque enim et apud nos multae quaedam sunt receptiuae rerum potentiae, et
si multiformiter per sensus ea quae in hoc uita sunt tangamus, una siquidem quaedam
est potentia, ipse qui insitus est animus, qui per singula sensuum instrumenta exiens ea
quae sunt transcurrit, ipse aspicit per oculos quod uidetur, ipse intellegit per aures quod
dicitur. D iligit quod est concupiscibile. Item nolit post uoluptatem uerti, et manibus
utitur ad quodcumque uelit, per eas quippiam tenens seu repellens, prout expedire
iudicauerit cooperationem organi ad id quo utitur. Si igitur in homine et si ex natura
constructa differentia ad sensum consequatur organa, qui per omnes operationes
mouetur, et consequenter singulis ad propositum utitur. Unus est atque idem et in
diuersis operationibus non compartitur naturam, quomodo quis in deo propter uarias
uirtutes partitam multipliciter essentiam suspicatus fuerit. Q ui enim fin x it oculum ut
ait propheta, et plantauit aurem ad paradigmata quae in seipso sunt has operationes
ueluti quosdam cognoscibiles caracteres in natura hominum signauit,faeiamus enim
inquit hominem ad imaginem nostram...
57 E riugena uses the simile as w ell: "Sense is called fivefold no t because it
is in itself d iv id ed into five p a rts ... b u t because it is through the fivefold
(continued on n ex t page)
124
of die m ind th ro u g h the senses. "The m ind, exam ining each of the things th at
enters an d distinguishing each by kind, places them in appropriate places of
know ledge." It does n o t m atter th at related th ings en ter through different gates
o r u n related things through the sam e; "for travelers w ho do n o t know each other
often use one entrance into the d ty , b u t this association itself does n o t b in d them
to each other."58 The m ind, n o t the senses, sorts an d arranges th e phenom ena
in stru m en t of th e body, as though through th e five gates o f a d ty , th at it receives
w ith in likenesses* o f sensible things originating from th e qualities and quantities
o f the outside w o rld ... and like a gate-keeper an d m essenger announces to the
p resid in g interior sense w hatever it lets in from o utside" (569C-570A).
*PP 2, n. 309: [Lat.J similitudines = [Gk.] phantasm [cf. 569B]). G regory,
how ever, does n o t use the m etaphors of gate-keeper o r m essenger. As o ther
possible sources, PP2, n. 310, also suggests C ald d iu s, Comm, in Tim. 200, SVF
ii.879; A ug., Conf. 10.8; Aug., Enarr. in Ps. cxlvi.xiii, PL xxxii.1907.
58 O H 1 0 :152C153A 'Opoitug yap Kai 8ia t o u t w v o voug t <3v ew t o u
acupaTog etri8pda<JTaL, Kai irpog eatrrov eXkei t w v <j>aivopevcov Ta eiSoiXa, Toug
Xapaimjpag t w v opardv ev eairrai KaTaypa<(>G)v. Kai (jxrrrep ei Tig iroXuxupog eir|
iroXig 6K 8ia4>opa)v eiaoSwv Toug irpog airrfjv aup<{>oiTtoVTag eiaSexopevq, o u k eirl t o
airro KaTa t i t w v ev rrj -rroXei auv8papovTeg oi iravreg, aXX oi pev KaTa tt|v
ayopav, oi 8e kotcl oiKfjaeig, aXXoi KaTa Tag eKKXqaiag, ti Tag TrXaTelag, ii Toug
oTevamroug, Ta Bearpa, Kara t t | v ISLav eKacrrog yvopqv paTaxwpoucn* Toiaurnv
Tiva pXeirco Kai Tfjv t o u voii iroXiv Tfjv evSo6ev ev qpiv auvtotacrpevTiv, qv 8ia<t>opoi
pev al 8ia tg jv alaOqaeaiv elaoSoi KaTairXTjpouaiv exaorov 8e Taiv eiaiovrcov
<J>iXoKpivcDv Te Kai SiefeTaCwv o voug, Totg KaTaXXqXoig Tfjg yvtuaewg Toiroig
evairoTiGeTaL. Kai axrrrep eiri t o u KaTa t t | v iroXiv irtroSeiypaTog, e<m iroXXaiag
opo<i>uXoug Tivag ovTag Kai auyyeveig pqSe Tfjg airrfjg iruXijg evTog yeveaOai, aXXou
KaT' dXX-qv eiaoSov KaTa t o ouppdv eiaSpapovTog, ouSev 8e t)t t o v evTog rrjg
TrepipoXfjg t o u Teixoug yevopevoi, rraXiv peT aXXtjXwu eiai, irpog aXXijXoug oiKeuog
exovreg* Kai t o epiraXiv eonv eupeiv yiwpevov* oi yap aireêvajpevoi Te Kai
dyvcucrroi aXXiiXuv pLa xP^vtoi irpog Tfjv iroXiv eLao&p iroXXaiag, aXX ou ouvdirTei
TOiJToug aXXqXoig f| KaTa Tijv eiaoSov Koivuvia* Suvaimn yap Kai evTog yevopevoi
8iaKpi8fjvai irpog t o opo4>uXov t o i o u t o v t i pXeiro) Kai eiri rrjg KaTa t o v u o u v
eupuxwpiag. IIoXXdKig yap Kai ex Sia<t>op(i>v aioOrjTTjpuov p ia yvakng f|piv
cruyayeipeTai, t o u auTou irpaypaTog iroXupepug irpog Tag aioQiiaeig pepiCopevou.
ITaXiv S' au t o evaimov, e a n v eK piag Tivog tcS v aioQf\oe<nv iroXXa Kai iroiiaXa
paGeiv, ouSev aXXijXoig KaTa t t | v <j>uaiv aupPaivovTaC f. Im ag. 10:220,7-30: Similiter enim per eos animus in his quae extra corpus
sunt peragit, etadse uisibilium imagines trahit. Caracteres eorum quae uidentur in
seipso describens, ac ueluti quaedam amplissima sit ciuitas, in differentiis conuentuum
concurrentes ad earn susdpiens, non ad eundem locum in ciuitate omnes concurrunt.
A lii quidem ad forum , quidam uero ad possessiones, alii per ecclesias, seu plateas seu
(continued on nex t page)
125
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
know n th ro u g h diem . N either the m ultiform ity o f th e sense instru m ents n o r die
m u ltitu de o f th e things know n through them threaten the unity o f th e m in d o r of
its unifying a n d discrim inating activity.
h i C h ap ter 11, concluding his consideration o f the m ind's relationship to
the senses, G regory acknow ledges th e difficulty posed b y this conjunction of
u n ity and p lu rality , b u t his response is to d en y th a t reason can hope to solve it.
"W hat th en is the m ind, according to its o w n n atu re, w hich divides itself b y the
pow ers of th e senses an d through each app ro p riately receives know ledge o f the
things th at are?" H ow can som ething "sim ple an d incom posite" be d iv id e d into
a m ultiform p o w er o f sensation, how does it rem ain one in the m idst o f variety?
Such questions trouble reason and resist solution because the n ature o f th e m ind
itself eludes reaso n 's grasp. "Let us m ake m an in o u r im age and likeness." Like
its exem plar, th e im age is incom prehensible. "Because the very n atu re o f our
m ind, w hich is according to the im age of its creator, flees know ledge, it h as an
accurate likeness o f th a t w hich is superior, characterizing the incom prehensible
n atu re by b eing in itself unknow n."59
angustos uicos, seu teathra, unusquisque secundum suam uoluntatem transeunt Talem
quondam uideo etiam animi ciuitatem intra nos cohabitatem, quam differentes quidam
introitus implent per sensus. Unumquemque uero introeuntium animus inquirens
perque gentes discemens conuenientibus scientiae locis imponit, ac sicut in exemplo
ciuitatis est uidendum, saepe quidam dum sint ex uno genere et cognatione per eandem
ciuitatem non sim ul, sed alius quidem per alium introitum prout accidit incurrunt.
Nihil uero m inus intra ambitum muri uenientes, iterum apud se inuicem sunt dum ad se
inuicem proprietates habeant, e contrario etiam est inueniendum quid efficitur, peregrini
enim et se inuicem non cognoscentes uno in ciuitatem introitu saepe utuntur, sed eosdem
sibi inuicem non copulat ipsa per introitum societas. Possunt enim etiam intus dum sint
discemi ad suas cognationes, tale aliquid uideo etiam in amplitudine quae in animo est.
Saepe siquidem ex differentibus sensuum instrum ents, una nobis notitia eiusdem rei
congeritur multiformiter ad sensus dispertitae. Iterum Ulud est e contrario ex uno aliquo
sensu multa uariaque discere in nullo sibi inuicem secundum naturam accedentia.
59 O H 1 1 :153C, 156A,B: TL t o l v u v ecrri. KaTa rf|v eairroO <j>uau/ o uous, o ev
126
2.15
B o d ily consequences o f sin

D espite a ll th a t h e h as said concerning the sovereignty an d sim plicity of
the soul, d espite a ll th a t h e has said regarding the natu ral u n ity an d p ro p er
relationship betw een bod y an d soul,despite all this, w hen, in th e m iddle of De
opificio hominis, G regory tu rn s to look m ore closely at w hat it m eans for m an to be
m ade in the im age o f G od,60 he still finds an unreconciled contradiction betw een
this claim an d th e facts of m an 's bo d ily existence. The crux o f the difficulty lies
in the conviction th a t divin ity is characterized by im passibility, w hile hum anity
a io 0 T iT L K a is Suydpecriy eairrou empepCCcoy, xal 8i e K d a r q s KaTaXAtjAaig rf|i/ t<Si/
ovtuv yvQoiv dyaXap.0dyuy;... AAA airXoCg rat aauv0eTog* ra t irais e ls Tr|y
iroAupepeiay Tf|i/ ato0fryn.icrjy 8iaoiretpTai; iraig ev p o i a S t t i t l t o troudAoy; iraig
TrouaXia t o ev; 'AXX.' eyvuv tQ v Tjiropiipevajy t t | i / Auoxy err airrf|v avaSpapcoy
ToCOeou tt)v (jxm/qv* "noiqaajpev" yap, <j>T]<jiv, "dvQpumov raT eiKova ra t ra0'
opoiaxjLy f i p e T e p a v . " 'H yap i.Ku>y ewg av ev pT]Sevl XeiTrqTai Toiy K a T a t o
a p x e T i n r o v yooupeyajy, Kupiaig etrriy ei.Ku>y ra0* o S' av StaireaTj -n q g irpog t o
irp a jT O T m ro y 'o p o iO T T iT o g , k o t ' exelyo t o pepog eiKcoy o u k ean y .... Eirei.8r| 8e
8La<j)ei>yeL Trjv yvQoiv f| k o t o t o v youv T o y f|pTepoy <|>uaig, og ecm k o t ' eiraya t o o
KTioavTog, dxpipfj irpog t o irrrepKetpeyoy exei TT|y opotorqTa, to > Ka0 eaurov
dyvukrru) xapcucTqptCcoy Tf|y draTdXriirTov 4>uaiy.
Cf. Im ag. 11:220,46-221,2; 221,15-21; 221,27-30: Quid igitur est animus,
secundum sui naturam, qui sensuum uirtutibus seipsum impartitur et per singulas
conuenienter eorum quae sunt scientiam recepit?... Sed simplex et incompositus,
quomodo in multipliciter partitam sensualitatem diuiditur, quomodo in singularitate
uarium, quomodo in uarietate unum , sed cognoscens eorum de quibus dubitatur
solutionem in ipsam dei uocem recurro. Faciamus enim inquit hominem ad imaginem, et
similitudinem nostrum. Imago enim donee in nullo eorum quae in principali
intelleguntur exemplo deficiat proprie est imago. Si uero in aliquo ex similitudine
principalis exempli excesserit, in ilia parte imago non est... Quoniam uero scientiam
fu g it ipsa nostri anim i natura, quae est secundum imaginem conditoris, diligentem ad id
quod ei superponitur habet similitudinem eo quod secundum seipsum est incognitus
incomprehensibilem naturam caracterizans. Eriugena quotes the w hole of Im ag. 11
a t PP 4: 788B-789A.
60 W hat follow s is a sum m ary o f the account G regory gives in O H 16 and

17 (Imag. 17 & 18). A t PP 4 :793C-799A, Eriugena quotes all o f th e first of these
chapters and m ore th an h alf o f the second; he also quotes them in sm aller
portions elsew here.
127
is certainly passible, being b oth m utable an d subject to passion. Indeed, the

p resen t w retchedness of m an is a far cry from the divine bliss.61
This fact leads G regory to p o sit a d uality in hum an n atu re, a distinction
betw een w h at can be said to be m ad e in th e im age and w hat lies o u tsid e th e
im age. This distinction G regory fin d s obscurely draw n in the sacred tex t itself:
w hen G od m ade m an, he b oth created him in his ow n im age an d created him
m ale an d fem ale. Because die divisio n o f m ale and fem ale is u tterly alien to the
divine n atu re, the text surely m eans to signify that elem ent of h u m an n atu re
w hich is n o t in the image.62
G regory offers three perspectives from w hich to consider this tw ofold
creation of h u m an nature. First, h e suggests th at if w e consider th e divine n atu re
and th e irrational, bodily nature o f beasts as extrem es, then p erh aps hum an
n atu re sh ou ld be understood as th e m ean betw een them , containing, o n the one
61 O H 1 6 :180B ff.: IIoSs ouv o dvBpctmos t o Qv tito u t o u t o Kai ep-traQes Kai

aiKujiopou, rfjs diaipdTou Kai xaBapa? Kai del otjor)s <j>0aeofe ecrnv elkg ji/;...
Cf. Im ag. 17:232,29-31 ff.: Quomodo ergo homo mortale hoc et passabile
citoque deficiens, immortalis ac purae semperque existentis naturae est imago. ...
62 O H 1 6 :180D ff.; cf. Im ag. 233,5 ff. O n the continuity betw een G regory's
view s o n this p o in t and those of th e other C appadodans, see V erna E. F.
H arrison, "M ale and Female in C ap p ad o d an Theology," Journal o f Theological
Studies, N S 4 1 ,2 (Oct 1990), 441-471.
See also M ark D. H art, "R econciliation of Body and Soul: G regory of
N yssa's deeper theology of m arriage," Theological Studies 51 (1990), 450-478,
w hich argues th a t G regory's tru e inten tion in De virginitate is to h ig hlight a level
of v irtu e w hich is consistent w ith m arried life and is superior to th e "th e virtue
generally found am ong celibates, ju st as it is also superior to the v irtu e generally
found am ong those who are m arried ," though not necessarily su p erio r to the
celibate life lived w ith the excellence of a Basil. H art notes th at th e p rin d p a l
objection to h is interpretation lies in the teachings of De opifido hominis regarding
the ad d itio n of sexual difference to th e im age. I think th at the objection m ight
nonetheless b e m et by considering th e im plications o f G regory's view s regarding
the transform ation of irrational im pulses into virtues (concerning w hich, see
section 3.31 in the next chapter).
128
h an d , a ration al and intelligent elem ent an d , on the other, an irrational bodily

stru ctu re d iv id ed into die tw o sexes.63 In th is view , m an's du ality has the
p ositive function of unifying th at w hich is m ost divine in creation w ith th at
w hich is least.
The second perspective em erges from a closer look a t the conditions
necessary for there to be a created im age o f G od. G od is all th at is good, an d in
w illing to m ake m an in his im age he d esires to com m unicate to m an a share in all
th at is good; nonetheless, there m ust b e som e elem ent of dissim ilarity, som e
difference, betw een God and m an; otherw ise, the relation betw een them w ould
be one of identity rather th an th at o f im age an d prototype. Therefore, as betw een
C aesar an d the coin that bears the im age o f C aesar, there is betw een G od and
m an "a difference as to underlying m aterial,"64 an d th at difference is found in
th at p ro p erty w hich distinguishes a creature as such, nam ely, the m utability
g ro u n d ed in the fact that the creatu re's existence depends upon the m otion from
nonexistence to existence. The im age o f the im m utable nature, even w hen
im pressed u p o n the creature, never rem oves from the creature th at radical
m utabilityand all the other properties th at follow from itw hich distinguishes
it from its C reator. Thus, the second perspective draw s attention to the duality
63 O H 1 6 :181C; cf. Im ag. 17:234,2-4.

64 O H 1 6 :184D; cf. Im ag. 17:235,4-9. E riugena translates G regory's ev 8e
tw uTTOKeijiei'co Tt|i/ 8ia<J>opdi/ exeii' as in subjecto uero differentiam habere. See below
for a fu ller discussion of E riugena's u se of th is form ula, "difference w ith respect
to subject." See also Balas, METOTHA 0EOY, 121-140. Balas identifies five
ontological differences th at distinguish sp iritu al creatures from God: creatures
receive perfection from w ithout, are com posite, are finite, are m utable, and are
tem poral.
129
involved in th e notion of one thin g b ein g th e im age of another. In m an this

d u ality en tails th e paradox o f a m utable im age o f an im m utable n atu re.
T he th ird perspective com bines th is paradox w ith the p rev io u s distinction
betw een th e irrational and godlike elem ents in hum an n atu re an d view s hum an
n ature n o t as a n abstract form com m on to in dividual hum an beings, b u t as a
concrete w hole, contem plated b y the d ivine foreknow ledge, com prising all
in d iv idu al hu m an beings, past, p resen t, an d futu re, as its parts. T he im age of
G od is th a t w hich is im m utable in this flux an d diversity of h u m an n atu re, w hich
has been etern ally circum scribed an d perfected in the divine prescience.
C reation in the im age of God pertains to th a t w hole m an and to su ch features
(nam ely, m ind) as all individual m en sh are by v irtu e of being p a rts o f th at
w hole.65 The bodily division into m ale an d fem ale, w hich distinguishes m en at
the level o f individuals, bears only an accidental relation to the w hole and w as in
feet ad d ed only as a tem poral (and tem porary) device for ensuring th e
m ultiplication o f individuals to th e full m easure of the foreseen w hole, a device
th at w ou ld have been unnecessary if G od h ad n o t foreseen the tendency o f this
universal m an tow ard sin.66
A lthough the addition of m ale a n d fem ale is the consequence o f a foreseen
evil it is n o t itself an evil; it has the positive value o f preserving h u m an ity u n d er
the conditions o f the fell67 and even of m aking m an the m ean betw een divine and
irrational n atu res. In the eternal perspective of the w hole m an, created b y G od in
65 O H 16:185C-D; cf. Im ag. 17:235,22 ff.

66 O H 1 6 :185A; cf. Im ag. 17:235,12-17. See section 3.21 for m ore on the
67 T his is the burden o f O H 17 (Im ag. 18).
130
the beginning b u t n o t perfected un til th e en d , all the m isery, corruption, an d

p assion th a t n o w characterize h um an existence disappears.
B ut w h a t o f m an 's bodily existence rem ains? H ow m uch o f m an 's bodily
existence su rviv es an d transcends h istory an d how m uch derives from th e
division in to m ale an d fem ale w hich is d estin ed to disappear?
For G regory th e constant flux o f m atter is th e hallm ark o f corporeality.
T he ord ering o f th is p erp etual m otion in to an orderly cosm os is th e g reat
evidence of th e creato r's pow er; for, w hile th e w hole cosm os and all of its p arts
are in p erp etu al m otion, w hether locom otion o r alteration, there is everyw here
m ixed som e k in d o f stability and rest. T hus, the heavens m ove p erp etu ally in
place b u t do n o t alter, w hereas the earth rem ains fixed in space b u t gives b irth to
a h ost of m utable beings.68 Likewise in m an, thro u gh o ut all the stages o f his
physical developm ent and inevitable decline, th e soul possesses w ithin itself the
im pression o f th e b o d y 's perfect and p erm an en t form , w hich provides stability
an d id en tity in the constant flux of m atter in and o u t of the body, an d seem s to
be the m ain g u aran to r of identity betw een this body and the resurrected b o d y of
the future.69
The flux o f th e hum an body is em bedded in the greater cosm ic m otion.
This m otion, how ever, serves m an and w ill cease w hen hum anity has m ultiplied
to its pred eterm ined num ber. Suddenly th e revolutions and alterations o f th e
cosm os w ill cease an d all things w ill be reestablishedw ithout the h allm ark of
flux. For G od has m ade tim e coextensive w ith the creation o f m an, the w hole,
universal m an, an d decreed th at "w hen th e generation of m en w ill have been
68 O H 1. See th e discussion of m otion an d rest in chapter 1.

69 O H 27. See th e discussion of this p o in t in chapter 1.
131
com pleted, w ith th is end tim e w ill be stopped, a n d th u s the reconstitution o f all
w ill take place, an d w ith the change o f the w hole, hum anity, too, w ill be changed
from som ething corruptible and earthly to som ething im passible and eternal."70
This change to im passibility w ill involve a radical change in the character
of bodies, b u t G regory provides very few suggestions for how one should
im agine th a t new state. C ertainly all m arks of sexuality and passion w ill be set
aside, an d presum ably, the perfected form of the b o dy , w hich is firm ly
established in th e soul, w ill a t last m anifest itself fully, b u t w hat bodily structures
w ill be p resen t, o r even w h at function such a body w ill serve, is unclear. A t the
end of De anima et resurrectione, echoing the w ords o f St. Paul, G regory likens the
p resen t m o rtal bo d y to a seed, both continuous an d discontinuous w ith the p lan t
th at w ill sp rin g from it. "So the divine pow er by th e excellence of its authority,
n o t only gives back to you w h at was dissolved, b u t m akes great and beautiful
additions, th ro u g h w hich for you a n atu re is constructed for som ething m ore
m agnificent."71 A nd so, w h at is sow n in co rruption is raised in incorruption,
leaving b eh in d the m utability and passibility w hich is the proper characteristic of
n atural bodies.
Then n o th in g contrary to the im age of G od w ill rem ain in hum an n atu re,
except p erh ap s th e inescapable m utability of havin g been brought into existence
70 O H 2 2 :205C: TeXeo0eurT|s 8e rq s t<Si/ di/Gpanron/ yeveaews, Tui TeXei

TauTTis auyKaTaXfjfai tou xpduoy, Kai- outw Tf|i/ tou irai/Tds di/acrroiKeiGKTii/
yeveoQai, K a i Tfj p.Ta(}oXfj tou oXou cruuajieuJjOfiuai Kai to duGpanrivov, atro tou
<j>0apTou K a i yetoSous eiri to airaOes K a i aiSioi/. The w hole chapter in w hich this
passage occurs is m issing in E riugena's translation. C appuyns discusses this
om ission a t p . 205, n . 1, of his edition of De imagine; see also Jeauneau, "La
division des sexes," 35, n. 12.
71 A R 153C : tos ttj? Qeiac Suvdjiew? ev t w Ttepioim irjs eouatas, ou \lovov
eKeiuo t o SiaXuGev croi TtdXiu d'rro8i.6oucrns, aXXa neyaXa Te Kai KaXa TrpooriGeicnis,
8l <Li/ aoi trpos t o p.eyaXoTrpeTrecrrepoi/ f| <t>uais KaTaaKeuaCeTat.
132
from nonexistence. M an w ill be as he w o uld hav e been h ad G od not foreseen the

need to p rovide him w ith an anim al m ode o f procreation.
2.2
Soul and body according to Eriugena

The rem ainder of this chapter aim s to sho w Eriugena w restling w ith the
sam e Platonic problem atic as G regory, b u t resolving it by a m ore thorough

philosophical analysis. The several essential m otions of the soul are show n to
constitute a n a tu ra l u n ity because they are a created im age of the divine unity-intrinity. The relatio n o f these essential m otions to sense know ledge provides an
especially interesting solution to the problem o f receptivity. Eriugena illum ines
the problem o f th e so u l's natural relation to th e body by a distinction betw een
m ortal and sp iritu al body.
E riugena's solution to the Platonic problem atic of the soul's superio rity to
the body, as it is w orked o u t m ost fully in Periphyseon 2, draw s on A ugustine's
account of in terio r and exterior sense as w ell as G regory's account of the bodysoul relation, b u t also and especially on certain portions of the Ambigua in w hich
M axim us treats the three m otions of th e soul (Am b. 6.3) and the soul's relation to
the body (Amb. 37 & 38). It is very difficult to discern how m uch E riugena ow es
to G regory because he cites De imagine only once a t the end of the section an d
then only in a general w ay. M oreover, in th e likely portions of the Ambigua,
M aximus him self, it seem s, reflects view s expressed by G regory in De opificio
hominis, especially in his denial that the soul exists p rio r to the body or the body
prior to the soul.72
72 To assess G regory's influence on E riugena as m ediated through

M axim us w ould require a stu dy of G regory's influence on M aximus, w hich lies
beyond the scope of this dissertation. F urtherm ore, it is difficult to assess the
originality o f E riugena's transform ations o f G regory w ithout considering
133
N evertheless, the sim ilarities a n d differences betw een E riugena and

G regory o f N yssa can be seen clearly in E riugena's treatm ent o f sense as one of
the three essential m otions of the soul a n d in his distinction betw een m ortal and
spiritual body. The context of th at p o rtio n o f th e dialogue o f p rim ary concern
here is set b y th e N u trito r and A lum nus' inquiries regarding th e H oly Trinity. In
order to gain a b etter understanding o f th is d ivine m ystery, the A lum nus
suggests th a t th ey consider its created im age, m an. To m ake use o f th e created
im age as a source o f know ledge regarding th e divine, they m ust atten d both to
the sim ilitude betw een image and p ro to ty p e an d to the dissim ilitude.
2.21
T h e c re a te d tr in ity
N u trito r and A lum nus im m ediately agree th at the sim ilitude does n o t
pertain to m an 's body because it is certain th a t God is a sp irit and n o t a body.73

In the ouaia-Suvajug-evep-yeta (essmtia-virtus-operatio) triad of the h u m an soul,
how ever, one can see a created trinity sim ilar to the U ncreated T rinity, the
created ovola corresponding to the Father, th e created 8wap.ig to the Son, and the
created evepyeia to the H oly S p irit74 T he first sim ilitude then is the ouataSwap.ig-ev'epyeia triad w hich Eriugena h as alread y identified in the first book as
the ineradicable structure of every rational creature.75
M aximus. A system atic com parison o f E riugena and M aximus also lies beyond
the scope of th e p resen t work. H ow ever, a com parison of E riugena's doctrines
exam ined in th is stu d y w ith those of M axim us as presented in B althasar's
Kosmische Liturgie offers a striking rem inder o f ju st how pervasive is M axim us'
influence on E riugena's thought.
73 PP 2 :567A-B.
74 PP 2 :567D-568C.
75 PP 1 :486C.
134
The second trin ity found in hu m an n a tu re is intellect-reason-sense. The

'sense' referred to here, how ever, is th e in terio r sense rath er th an th e exterior
sense th at links so u l an d body. The form er, to g eth er w ith intellect a n d reason, is
an essential m otio n o f th e soul, w hereas th e latter depends on, and perish es w ith,
the body and therefore cannot p ertain to the im age o f G od in m an. E xternal
sense is "a certain conjunction of soul a n d bod y."76
E riugena rig h t aw ay coordinates th is distinction w ith the definitions of
sense given b y A ugustine: Sensus est passio corporis per se ipsam non latens
animam77 and Sensus est sensibilium rerum 4Savraoia per instrumenta corporis
assumpta.78 Both of these definitions a p p ly to exterior sense. A ugustine him self
m akes a distinction betw een interior a n d exterior sense, fo r exam ple, a t De liber
arbitrio 2.3-5 79 b u t it seem s not to be the sam e distinction E riugena is after.
A lthough A ugustine em phasizes the distinction an d superiority of th e inner
sense w ith respect to the five bodily senses, he also holds th at this in n er sense is
found in beasts an d is therefore clearly differen t from reason. In contrast,
E riugena m aintains th at the interior sense is "coessential w ith reason and
intellect."80
76 PP 2 :569A: coniunctio quaedam est animae et corporis. Cf. A m b. 6.3,127131 (PG 91:1113A).
77 De quantitate animae 23; cf. De musica 6.5.
78 De Genesi ad litteram (GL) 3.5,7; De musica 6.10.
79 It strikes m e th a t the w hole discussion o f m em ory in Book 10 o f the
Confessions m ay b e m ore im portant to E riugena's view s on interior sense and
m em ory th an su ch passages as these. See section 2.221 below , w hich considers
another account o f sense know ledge, one th a t suggests a close connection
betw een in terio r sense an d m em ory.
80 PP 2:569A: Nam interior coessentialis est rationi atque intellectui.
135
E riugena further justifies h is distinction betw een interior and exterior

sense b y an appeal to G reek term inology: mtellectus corresponds to the G reek
vous, ratio to Xoyos, sensus interior to Sidvota, an d sensus exterior to aiaOriaig w ith
its bodily instrum ents, ataOrynjpia.81 H is identification of interior sense w ith
Sidvoia is curious, b u t h e repeats it in th e nex t step o f his argum ent, w here he
show s th a t the first trinity is in fact the sam e as th e second: both triads designate
b y different nam es the sam e three essential m otions o f the soul. Thus, vou? and
oucrta nam e th e highest m otion o f th e soul; Xo-yo? an d Suvapi?, the second; and
Siavoia an d evepyeia, the th ird .82
E riugena's distinction betw een interior and exterior sense, w ith both the
identification o f the form er as an essential m otion and the exclusion o f the latter
from h um an nature as created in th e im age o f G od, hints at a problem atic
division w ithin hum an nature itself. H e now m akes it explicit. W here, asks the
A lum nus, are w e to place the life-p rin d p le, "called by the Greeks OpeTrrtKii and
aij^TLiai,"83 an d by w hich the soul nourishes and gives increase to the body, for
th is also seem s to be a substantial p a rt of the soul?84
In contrast to G regory of N y ssa's three levels of souln utritiv e, sensitive,
an d rationalthe m otions, w hich E riugena identifies as essential, p ertain entirely
to th e rational level. Exterior sense, E riugena has said, belongs to the conjunction
o f bod y an d soul, not to the soul p ro p er. T hat leaves only the n utritiv e level or
81 PP 2 :569B-C. See above, no te 10, on O H 5 :137B-C.

82 PP 2 :570A-570C.
83 PP 2 :570C. Cf. Im ag. 24; 228,4. E riugena seem s now to have G regory of
N y ssa's text in m ind rather th an M axim us'.
84 PP 2 :570C-D.
136
w hat E riugena calls the vital m otion. Like exterior sense, th is m otion lies
"outside th e p ro p erty o f o ur intelligible essence according to w hich w e are
created in th e im age of G od." It w as add ed to interior sense for adm inistering
"those things w hich w ere superadded to hum an n atu re after sin, nam ely, this
corruptible a n d m ortal body, w hich is varied in tim es and places, quantitatively
d iv id ed into its p arts, spatially extended, subjected to increase and decrease and
to diverse qualities and quantities, and prone to every irratio n al m otion," and
liable to all the o th er unhappinesses w hich have beset h u m an n atu re since its
expulsion h o rn Paradise.85 This striking list includes the basic properties of
corporeality as such. A re w e to understand th at hum an n a tu re as prim ordially
created lacked body?
E riugena anticipates and rejects such an inference, b u t to do so he
distinguishes tw o kinds of bodies. 'T o r the C reator," he says, "created ou r souls
and bodies all together and at once in Paradiseby bodies I m ean such as they
w ill be after the resurrection, celestial and spiritual. For it is n o t to be doubted
th at th e sw ollen, m ortal, and corruptible bodies w ith w hich w e are now
oppressed take th eir origin not from nature b u t from sin."86 T hanks to C hrist's
85 PP 2 :571B: Quae pars quoniam extra proprietatem intelligibilis nostrae

essentiae qua ad imaginem dei conditi sumus dinoscitur propterea a nobis praesentialiter
intermissa est dum sit motus quidam extra naturam primordialiter conditam substantiali
nostrae operationi quae sensus interior ut diximus uocitatur subiectus inque poenam
peccati additus quo uidelicet motu ea quae post peccatum humanae naturae superaddita
sunt administrat, corpus hoc corruptibile dico atque mortale locis temporibusque uarium,
partium suarum numero discretum, spatiis distentum, incrementis decrementisque
subditum, qualitatibus quantitatibusque diuersis subiectum, ad omrtes irrationabiles
motus pronum, camalis adhuc animae merito suae inoboedientiae superbiaeque diuersis
calamitatibus inuolutae hospitium, caeteraque quae de infelidtate in hanc uitam
humanae naturae ex felicitate paradisi expulsae et d id et experimento cognosd possunt.
86 PP 2 :571C-D: Semel enim et simul animas nostras et corpora in paradiso
conditor creauit corpora dico caelestia spiritualia qualia post resurrectionem futura
137
renew al o f h u m an nature, how ever, th e n atu ralth at is, spiritualb o d y w ill be

restored,
so th a t even th a t w hich w as su p erad d ed m ight n ot perish b u t m ay pass
into th a t w hich w as created originally an d m ay becom e one th in g w ith it,
n o t as tw o b u t as one thing, incorruptible and spiritual, through the grace
o f th e W ord o f G od, w ho has d escended n o t only into w hat is n atu rally
o urs, b u t even into w hat w as su p erad d ed to us, so th at he m ight restore in
him self all th at is ours and g raft them naturally to w hat w as ad d ed h o rn
above, he w ho m akes b o th one.87
W hen one has set aside w hatever in th e im age is dissim ilar to th e
archetype, th e w ay is clear to argue by sim ilitude from know ledge o f th e im age
to an u nd erstan d ing of its prototype. W ithin hum an nature, it is n o t th e body
b u t the soul w hich is m ade in the d ivine im age, and even w ithin the so u l one
m ust set aside those m otions w hich p ertain to its adm inistration of the m ortal
body, nam ely, exterior sense and vital m otion. The path is open "to exam ine th at
suprem e T rinity, w hich is God, and, as it w ere, its proper operations in created
nature, d istrib u ted to the individual Persons, b y arguing from the substantial
trinity of o u r n atu re created in the im age of G od."88 Eriugena then gives an
account of th e sou l's three essential m otions.89
sunt. Tumida nanque corpora mortalia corruptibilia quibus nunc opprimimur non ex
natura sed ex delicto occasionem ducere non est dubitandum.
87 PP 2 :572A: ... non ut et illud superadditum pereat sed ut in illud quod primo
est conditum transeat et unum cum illo fia t non quasi duo sed unum incorruptibile et
spirituale per gratiam dei uerbi qui non solum in nostra naturalia uerum etiam in
superaddita nobis discenderat ut omnia nostra in se ipso restauraret et desuper adiectis
naturaliter insita faceret quifecit utraque unum.
88 PP 2 :572B: Quaerimus nanque niJailor quomodo ex argumento substantialis
trinitatis nostrae naturae ad imaginem dei creatae summam Ulam trinitatem quae deus
est eiusque ueluti proprias in natura condita operationes singulis personis distributas
possumus inuestigare.
89 PP 2 :572Cff.
138
2.22
Sense as an essen tial m o tio n o f the soul

E riugena begins his treatm ent of the so u l's th ree m otionsintellect,
reason, an d sensew ith a brief presentation o f M axim us' treatm ent o f them in
Ambigua 6.3.90 To th e discussion of d ie th ird m otion he adds a digression o n the
term s 'p h an tasy 7an d 'p h an tasm '; after w hich h e retu rn s to the three m otions,
going over each o f them again at greater length.
The first, b rief account of each m otion stays close to the w ords o f the
"venerable M axim us."91 'M in d' or 'in tellect' (vous o r intellectus) is the first, a
m otion su rp assin g the n atu re of the soul, by w hich the soul m oves aro u n d G od
w ho "surpasses everything th at is and th a t is n o t an d w ho can in no w ay be
defined as to w h a t h e is."92 The second m otion, 're aso n ' (Xoyog o r ratio), by
contrast, lies w ith in the n atu re of the soul. By it the soul is able to define G od as
C ause of all th in g s and expresses w ithin itself the n atu ral reasons of th ing s,
w hich subsist as eternally m ade in th eir C ause. "This know ledge is b o m of the
first m otion in th e second."93
90 E riugena th u s enlists M axim us in a v ery W estern search for vestigia

trinitatisa project to w hich M axim us him self w o uld n o t have been disposed,
according to B althasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 91.
91PP 2 :572C; cf. Am b. 6.3. For an E nglish translation of this long and
im portant ambiguum, see A ndrew Louth, M aximus Confessor (London: R outledge,
1996), p p . 94-154.
92 PP 2 :572C-D: Et primus quidem simplex est et supra ipsius animae naturam
et interpretatione caret hoc est cognitione ipsius circa quod mouetur, "per quem circa
deum incognitum mota nullo modo ex ullo eorum quae sunt ipsum propter sui
excellentiam cognoscit" secundum quod quid sit hoc est in nulla essentia seu substantia
uel in aliquo quod d id uel intelligi ualeat eum reperire potest; superat enim omne quod
est et quod non est et nullo modo diffiniri potest quid sit. E riugena is qu otin g
M axim us. Cf. A m b. 6.3,121-123.
93 PP 2 :572D-573A: Secundus uero motus est quo "incognitum" deum "diffinit
139
The th ird m o tio n, 'sen se' (Siavota o r sensus), is th a t by w hich the soul
reconstitutes w ith in itself the reasons o f things o u tsid e it, w ith w hich it comes
into contact th ro u g h exterior sense. M axim us calls it a com posite m otion,
explains the N u trito r, because the soul does n o t com e into d irect contact w ith the
reasons of sensible things. R ather, the fivefold exterio r sense provides the
m edium throu g h w h ich the soul receives the 'p h a n ta sie s' o f exterior things. From
these phantasies it m olds and shapes w ithin itself th e reasons o f the things
them selves.94
H ere E riugena digresses to explain the am biguity o f th e term 'p h antasy'.
In its first m eaning, it refers to "th at w hich is b o m o f a sensible nature in the
instrum ents of th e senses and is properly called th e 'im age expressed in the
senses.'" Secondly, it refers to exterior sense, w hich is form ed in the soul from
the im age expressed in the body.95
secundum quod causa" omnium s it Diffmit enim deum causam omnium esse et est
motus iste intra animae naturam "per quern ipsa naturaliter mota omnes naturales
rationes omnium formatrices quae in ipso cognito solummodo per causam"cognoscitur
enim quia causa est "aetemaliter factae subsistunt operatione scientiae sibi ipsi
imponit," hoc est in se ipsa per earum cognitionem exprim it ipsaque cognitio a primo
motu nascitur in secundo. Cf. Am b. 6.3,124-127, w hich differs som ew hat from the
translation E riugena gives here.
94 PP 2 :573A: Tertius motus est compositus, per quern quae extra sunt" anima
"tangens ueluti ex quibusdam signis apudse ipsam uisibilium rationes reformat." Qui
compositus dicitur non quod in se ipso simplex non sit quemadmodum primus et
secundus simplices su n t sed quod non per se ipsas sensibilium rerum rationes incipit
cognoscere. Primo siquidem phantasias ipsarum rerum per exteriorem sensum
quinquepertitum secundum numerum instrumentorum corporalium in quibus et per
quae operatur accipiens easque secum colligens diuidens ordinans disponit, deinde per
ipsas ad rationes earum quorum phantasiae sunt perueniens intra se ipsam eas rationes
dico tractat conformit. Cf. Am b. 6.3,127-129.
95 PP 2 :573C: Phantasiarum enim duae species su nt, quorum prima est quae ex
sensibili natura primo in instrum ents sensuum nascitur et imago in sensibus expressa
proprie uocatur, altera uero est ipsa quae consequent ordine ex praedicta imagine
140
The function o f in terio r sense, the th ird m otion, seem s to be th a t o f leaving

even the second k in d o f phantasy behind and ren d erin g the reasons o f the sensed
objects tran sp aren t to reason. As it comes to u n d erstan d these reasons "bare of
corporeal im agery," in a p u re and sim ple m ode ap p ro p riate to its ow n nature, it
passes them on to th e second m otion, reason. For strip p ed o f their individuating
im ages, the reasons o f sensible things are universals, w hich fall in the dom ain of
the reason. These un iv ersal reasons are then referred to the first m otion, th at is
to say, they are se t in relation to th at transcendent C ause from w hich they derive.
By this threefold m otion, th e soul understands th a t th e reasons of things proceed
from G od throu g h th e p rin cip al causes, w hich are created by him and in him and
d istributed by him , in to all things that are after them an d w hich through these
causes retu rn to h im again.96
This som ew hat obscure concluding description o f the three m otions
suggests th at by th e ir interaction they recapitulate w ith in the soul the procession
and retu rn of n a tu re th ro u g h its various divisions. E riugena develops this
suggestion into an explicit com parison later, in his longer treatm ent o f the three
m otions.
formatur et est ipsa phantasia quae proprie sensus exterior consueuit nominari.
96 PP 2 :573D-574A: Dum uero tertius ille motus phantasias rerum uisibilium
deserit nudasque omni imaginatione corporea rationes ac per se simplices pure intelligit
ipse quoque simplex simpliciter, hoc est uniuersales uniuersaliter rationes uisibilium
omni phantasia absolutas inque semet ipsis purissime ac uerissime perspectas, per
medium motum primo m otui renuntiat. Ipse uero primus motus quodcunque ex tertio
per medium et ex ipso medio immediate in moderationibus rerum creatarum percipit per
se ipsum immediate incognito quidem quid est, cognito uero quod causa omnium est
principiisque omnium rerum, hoc est prindpalibus causis ab eo et in eofactis et a se
distributis, refert hoc est a deo per ipsas in omnia quae post se sunt procedere et iterum
per ipsas in ipsum intelligit recurrere.
141
2.221
The tw o paths o f sense know ledge

Before considering th a t treatm ent, how ever, it w ill be useful to expand the
discussion o f 'p h an tasies' by surveying a relevant portion of Book 3 in w hich

Eriugena describes the descent o f num bers from the M onad. There he notes tw o
w ays of distinguishing betw een 'p h a n ta sy ' and 'phantasm '. N ot o n ly does this
passage em phasize th e distinction betw een interior and exterior dim ensions of
sense know ledge, b u t also calls atten tio n to the sources of his thought.
N ow these p h antasies are taken either horn the n atu re of m em ory,
th at is, from th a t p a rt o f th e soul w hich is assigned to th e form ing of
im ages, o r extrinsically from the surfaces of bodies through th e exterior
senses. But those th a t com e extrinsically are properly called "phantasies,"
w hereas those from the m em ory are called "phantasm s"....
H ere it should b e n o ted , if w e follow A ugustine, th at p h antasm is
bom only from phantasy. For it is, as he him self says, an im age o f an
im age, th at is, an im age w hich is bom o f another im age.... T he G reeks
understand differently w h at a phantasm is. For they say th a t a phantasm
is a notion, w hich is in th e soul, received from sensible n atu res through
phantasies of those n atu res.97
The context of this q uo tation goes furth er in shedding light o n E riugena's
understanding of the relation betw een interior and exterior sense. It is a long
argum ent in w hich E riugena d raw s an analogy betw een the w ay in w hich
num bers are both eternal and m ad e in the M onad and the w ay in w hich the
universe is eternal and m ade in th e W ord of G od. All num bers by th eir reasons
97 PP 3 :659B-D: Ipsae autem fantasiae aut de natura memoriae hoc est de ea

parte animae quae formandis imagirtibus est attributa aut extrinsecus ex superficie
corporum per sensus exteriores sum untur. Sed quae extrinsecus ueniuntfantasiae
proprie appellantur, quae uero ex memoria fantasmata....
Ubi notandum si sanctum sequimur Augustinum quod fantasma non aliunde
nisi ex fantasia nascitur. Est enim u t ipse ait imago imaginis, hoc est imago ex alia
imagine nascens.... Nam Greci aliter quid sit fantasma intelligunt. Dicunt enim
notitiam quae in animo est de sensibilibus naturis perfantasias earum susceptam
fantasma esse. Cf. A ugustine, De musica 6.11.32; an d M aximus, Am b. 15,21-35.
142
subsist etern ally in the M onad, b u t in th e ir progressions an d m ultiplications they

d epart in a certain w ay from the M onad a n d are th u s said to be "m ade" in their
m ultiplications.98
N um bers exist causally, b y "force an d pow er" (vi et potestate), in the
M onad. T hese num bers are n o t oth er th an those num bers th a t flow by "act and
operation" (actu et opere) into the genera an d species of intelligible num bers, b u t
there is a difference in the m anner o f being. T heir 'fo rce' is the "substantial
virtue by w hich th ey subsist eternally a n d im m utably in the M onad." Their
'pow er' is "th e possibility by w hich they are able to be m ultiplied and becom e
m anifest to intellects" by various differences. T heir 'a c t' is the m otion of the
m ind as it reg ard s them m ost purely, in th e ir ow n n atu re an d w ithout any
im agination, "above all quantity and qu ality and places an d tim es." Their
'operation' is th e m otion of the sam e m in d as it considers them w ithin itself,
consigning th em to th e m em ory, em bodied as it w ere by corporeal phantasies, to
set them in o rd e r and m ore easily deal w ith th eir reasons; from there it also can
convey them b y signs to the corporeal senses of others.99 Thus, num bers are
98 PP 3 :652B-655B. The w hole passage relies heavily, and explicitly, on

"the books o f th e g reat Boethius de M athesi" (=De arithmetica).
99 PP 3 :657C-658A: Vis est ut aestimo substantiate eorum uirtus qua
aetemaliter et immutabUiter in monade subsistunt, potestas uero est possibilitas eis insita
qua in genera et species possunt multiplicari et intellectibus manifestifieri certis
terminorum distinctionibus quantitatum diuersitatibus interuallis differentiarum
proportionum proportianalitatumque mirabtli aequalitate et insolubili consonantia.
Actus est motus animi procedentium numerorum ex monade in diuersa genera inque
species differentes multiplicationem contemplantis in se ipso et in se ipsis priusquam in
fantasias cogitationis ueniant, hoc est simpliciter in incorporea natura omni imagine
carente purissimo intellectus oculo ipsos numeros supra omnem quantitatem et
qualitatem et loca et tempora considerantis, et u t breuiter diffiniam: Actus est motus
animi purissimos in sua natura numeros absque ulla imaginatione intuentis. Opus vero
est eiusdem anim i motus purissimos numeros quos in se ipso considerat phantasiis ueluti
143
eternal in the M onad, w hence they are m ade in the intellect by different stages o f
descent, descending from them selves into intellect, from intellect into reason,
from reason in to m em ory, from m em ory into corporeal senses, and from sense
into visible figures.100
The "em bodim ent" o f num bers in corporeal p h antasies raises an
interesting qu estio n ab o u t the role of m atter in th e process of d escen t101 Does
their existence as phantasies w ithin m em ory a n d sense require com position w ith
some kind o f m atter? A ccording to E riugena, it does not.
Phantasies are n o t m ade from the m atter of sensible things b u t from th eir
'appearances' (species), th a t is, their sensible form s, w hich are in them selves
incorporeal. M atter is n o t required because intellectual num bers are them selves
the source of these phantasies, com ing to exist in the m em ory in tw o ways:
either from w ith in by descending through in tellect into reason and from reason
into m em ory, o r from w ithout, as w hen the m em ory takes its form from the
phantasies conveyed to it by m eans o f corporeal senses. In this case the
phantasies are n o t fashioned b y reason b u t d eriv e from th e "num erosity" of
sensible form s in sensible things, w hich nu m erosity derives from the intelligible
num bers them selves. These sensible form s are n o t d erived from m atter b u t are
the m eans by w hich m atter becom es perceptible. So, w h ether num bers descend
by the internal p a th o r b y the external p ath , th ey are m ad e by them selves.
quibusdam corporibus incrasatos memoriae commendantis ibique eos ordinantis
eorumque rationes fa d lius tractantis forasque quibusdam signis corporalium sensuum
significatos in aliorum notitiam tradentis.
100 PP 3 :658C-659A.
101 The question arises a t PP 3 :660A because the A lum nus stum bles,
saying th a t in m em ory an d sense th e num bers a re m ade ex quadam et in quadam
materia. The N u trito r quickly corrects this erro r.
144
Flow ing from th e ir etern al u n ity in the M onad th ey com e together in the m em ory
in w hich they are form ed as m any. The m ultiplicity o f these num bers does n o t
depend on com position w ith m atter b u t proceeds h o rn the num bers them selves.
Thus, num bers p ro v id e a n analogy o f how , on th e o n e han d , all things th at are
from G od are b o th eternal an d m ade, and, on th e o th er, how G od is b oth M aker
and m ade.102
A lthough E riugena does not consider it p ro p e r to say th at num bers are
"m ade o u t o f and in a kind o f m atter," he does allow th e expression, "as if in
kinds of bodies."103 M ateriality and bodiliness are d istin ct notions.
102 PP 3 :660A-661A: Phantasiae nanque quas de memoria in memoria uel sensu

de sensibili acdpiunt u t in eis appareant non ex quadam materia fiu n t sed ex
incorporalibus incorporates nascuntur. Non enim ex materia corporalium rerum
efficiuntur sed ex specie quae procul dubio incorporea est et ex coloribus qui non corpora
sed circa corpora intelliguntur, ac per hoc nil est conuenientius ac naturalius quam ut
intellectuales numeri in rebus incorporeis et ex incorporalibus sumptis uirtutem suam
ostendant et modo quodam ineffabili in generationem senstbilem facti procedant.
Perspectisque rerum rationibus non temere quis dixerit ipsas phantasias in quibus
numeri se interioribus numerantium oculis patefaciunt non aliunde nisi ab ipsis
intelligibtlibus numeris prouenire. Nam si numerositas formarum sensibUium in quibus
materia continetur u t senstbus possit percipisiquidem per se ipsam inuisibilis est atque
informis ab intellectualibus numeris originem ducit, et ex ipsa, formarum uidelicet
numerositate, per corporeos sensus memoria phantasiis conformatur, nil aliud restat nisi
ut intelligamus numeros intellectuales ex monade duplici modo fluere et in memoria
factos acie mentis multiplicari diuidi comparari colligi uniri. A u t enim ut praediximus
per intellectum in rationem et ex ratione in memoriam descendunt, aut per species rerum
uisibilium in sensus corporeos iterumque ex ipsis in eandem memoriam confluunt, in qua
phantasticas accipientes formas fiu n t interioribusque senstbus succmbunt, ac per hoc
quoquo modo numeri patiantur perspid non aliunde nisi a semet ipsis apparitiones suae
occasionem percipiunt. Proinde et in monade aetemi su n t et a se ipsis in quacunque
naturae parte apparuerintfacti, hoc est siue in intellectu siue in ratione absque ullis
imaginationibus, siue in memoria ex speciebus rerum senstbilium formata phantasias
quasdam in quibus appareant uelutifacti de se ipsis facientes.
103 PP 3 :661C: The A lum nus asks: Sed quomodo res incorporeae et non solum
a senstbus uerum etiam ex memoria omnique imaginatione prae nimia suae naturae
excellentia remotae in memoria sensibusue, hoc est in imaginibus uisibilibusque figuris,
145
Eriugena explains this distinction by pointing o u t the various w ays by

w hich spiritual things com e w ithin the m ind's grasp, som e o f w hich w ays are
m arvelous and ineffable. The appearance o f M oses an d Elias during the
T ransfiguration, for exam ple, and the appearance o f Sam uel to Saul are exam ples
of the m arvelous. H ow ever, even the m ost obvious an d o rdinary w ay, the w ay
in w hich the form s a n d colors o f things are know n, is m arvelous in its ow n rig h t
H ow can form s and colors, w hich are incorporeal in them selves, be subject to
corporeal senses?104
Eriugena rejects th e id ea th at such incorporeals can no t appear through
them selves b u t only in som e m atter. M atter w ithout form o r color is invisible. It
w ould be better to say th a t m atter becomes m anifest in colors and form s rather
than the other w ay ro u n d . Recalling the earlier discussion of bodies and their
com position found in Book 1, Eriugena observes th at q uantities and qualities
come together to pro d uce form less m atter, to w hich shapes and colors are added
to produce various bodies. Like num bers, then, the occasions o f bodies
quantities and qualities, shapes o r species, colors, dim ensions of length, breadth,
and height, and places an d tim eare incorporeals m anifested in bodies. Indeed,
bodies are bo m by th e com ing together of these bodiless things, w hether
universal bodies, th at is, the four elem ents, o r particu lar bodies com posed of the
elem ents.105
Thus, Eriugena dissociates the notion of 'b o d y ' from m ateriality. 'B odies',
or num bers appearing "as if in bodies," are entirely the effects of incorporeal
ueluti quibusdam corporibus possunt apparere non satis uideo.
104 PP 3 :661C-662C.
i5 p p 3. 662C-663B. See the discussion of this doctrine in chapter 1.
146
things. W hether they come to b e in th e m em ory through th e intern al o r the

external p ath , they are im m aterial. This m ove to im m aterialize bod y is crucial to
E riu gen a's understanding o f in terio r sense and spiritual body.
2.222
A closer lo o k at the three m otions o f the soul

A fter his sum m ary o f M axim us' doctrine of the th ree m otions and his
digression on the tw o kinds of phantasies, Eriugena gives a m ore extended

account of each motion.
W hen A ugustine discusses reason, interior sense, a n d exterior sense, he
does no t se t ap art intellect for special treatm ent, h i E riugena's G reek sources,
intellect is acknow ledged to belong p rop erly to angels. N atu rally , th en , the first
question E riugena takes up in h is m ore detailed treatm ent o f the first m otion is
w h ether or n o t intellect belongs to hum an as w ell as to angelic n atu re. H e gives
th ree reasons for his affirm ative answ er: the first is th at m an w as created in the
im age of G od; the second, th at in C hrist hum an nature is deified; and the third,
th a t C hrist prom ises in the G ospels th a t after the resurrection m en w ill be as the
angels in heaven. Eriugena in terp rets this prom ised state as "p ertain in g to a
sh ared dignity o f nature an d eq uality of im m ortality an d to th e fact th a t they w ill
lack all corporeal sex and all corruptible generation."106 M oreover, this prom ised
elevation of hum an n ature is sim ply a retu rn to its original statu s; for, m an, like
the angels, w as created w ith intellect b u t, by his failure to exercise it, "w ithdrew
for aw ay from the angelic d ig nity an d fell into the calam ity o f this m ortal life."107
i6 p p 2: 575A: Quod autem post resurrectionem omnium generaliter omnibus

hominibus dominus promittit: "Erunt sicut angeli dei in caelo," de condignitate naturae
deque inmortalitatis aequalitate et quod omni sexu corporeo omnique corruptibtli
generatione carebunt intelligendum arbitror. Cf. M t 22:30; M k 12:25; Lk 20:34-36.
107 PP 2 :575B: ... longe ex angelica dignitate recessit inque mortalis huius uitae
147
T his notion of the Fall raises a n acute difficulty w ith respect to intellect.
As a n essential m otion of th e soul, intellect corresponds to ouoia in the triad
oucia-SuvafiLg-eiêpYeia, the im m utable foundation of every ratio n al o r
intellectual nature. Yet, according to E riugena, in his fallen state m an is alienated
h o rn th is function o f his n atu re an d recovers it only w hen the so u l h as been
"p urg ed b y action, illum inated b y know ledge, perfected by theology."108 H ow ,
given th a t the soul subsists in its m otions an d its m otions su bsist in it, an d given
th at "it is sim ple an d indivisible b y n a tu re an d divided only by th e substantial
differences o f its m otions."109h ow is it possible for it to exist n o w in alienation
from its ow n substantial being?
A t th e beginning of Book 1 E riugena distinguishes five m odes in w hich
w e p redicate being and nonbeing. T he fifth, he says, is th at by w hich w e say th at
hum an n a tu re in th e state of sin "is n o t."110 There, as w ell as in the p resent
context, he declares th at it is from th is state of nonbeing th at C h rist saves m an.
In C hrist hu m an n ature is renew ed, resto red to its original and p ro p er state of
being. The first essential m otion o f th e soul, then, is one th at is recovered
through th e purification, illum ination, and perfection of their fallen n atu re
w rought b y C hrist.
calamitatem cecidit.
108 p p 2 :574A: Animae igitur purgatae per actionem, illuminatae per scientiam,
perfectae per theologiam motus quo semper circa deum incognitum aetemaliter uoluitur
ire p p 2; 574B: Non enim aliud est animae essentialiter esse et substantialiter
moueri. Ipsa siquidem in motibus suis subsistit suique motus in ipsa subsistunt.
110 PP 1 :445C: Quintus modus est quern in sola humana natura ratio intuetur,
quae cum diuinae imaginis dignitatem in qua proprie substetit peccando sederuit merito
esse suum perdidit et ideo dicitur non esse.
148
M oreover, this dependence o f in tellect o n grace pertains n o t m erely to

m an 's recovery from the effects o f sin, b u t h olds generally for both angelic and
h um an n a tu re . For, if intellect is a m otio n o f th e soul th at surpasses th e n atu re of
the soul itself, how can this self-transcendence com e about except th ro u g h grace?
In this p a rt of theory w hich d isp u tes about intellectual an d rational
substances, w hen one arrives a t considering how created n a tu re can
ascend outside itself so as to be able to adhere to the creative n atu re, every
investigation of the exam iners in to th e potency of n atu re fails. For here
one beholds n o t a reason o f n atu re, b u t th e ineffable an d
incom prehensible height of div in e grace. Indeed, in no created substance
is th ere naturally p resent such p o w er as to enable it to su rp ass its ow n
n a tu re an d reach God him self directly in him self. This p ertain s to grace
alone an d to no pow er of nature.... T herefore, just as it surpasses all
u n d erstan d in g how the W ord o f G od descends into m an, so it surpasses
all reason how m an ascends in to G od.111
W hat is evid ent here is th at alth o u g h E riugena acknow ledges a distinction
betw een n a tu re and grace, he does n o t separate the w ork of creation from th at of
grace. Intellect is a w ork of grace because it elevates the creature beyond the
lim its o f its ow n nature; b u t it w as for such a grace th at such a n atu re w as created
and, in m an 's case, redeem ed. A w ork o f grace, intellect is nonetheless an
essential an d substantial m otion of th e soula t least, in those w ho hav e been
m ade w o rth y .112
111 P P 2 :576A-C: In hoc parte theoriae quae de intellectualibus rationalibusque

substantiis disputat dum peruenitur ad considerandum quomodo natura areata extra se
ipsam potest ascendere u t creatrici naturae ualeat adhaerere omnis de potentia naturae
ratiocinantium inquisitio deficit Non enim ibi naturae ratio sed diuinae gratiae
ineffabilis et incomprehensibilis altitudo conspicitur. NuUi siquidem conditae
substantiae naturaliter inest uirtus per quam possit et terminos naturae suae superare
ipsumque deum immediate per se ipsum attingere. Hoc enim solius est gratiae, nullius
uero uirtutis naturae.... V t ergo superat omnem intellectum quomodo dei uerbum
discendit in hominem ita superat omnem rationem quomodo homo ascendit in deum.
112 It w o u ld be interesting to confront E riugena's doctrine of intellect w ith
the controversy over nature and grace th a t surrou n ded de Lubac's Sumaturel.
149
O ne finds in intellect a perplexing instance o f created n atu re surpassing

itself th ro u g h grace, b u t one finds in th e oth er tw o m otions an equally striking
identification of these m otions w ith d ie act of creation itself. The soul is no t
m erely a p ro d u ct of, nor does it reflect in a m erely passive w ay, th e creative
process o f procession and return; it is itself creative, albeit in a creaturely m ode.
R eason is begotten of intellect. A s an artist foreknow s and precreates in
him self w h at h e desires to m ake,113 so the intellect, w hich m oves ab out G od and
the p rim o rd ial causes of things as they exist in G od, gives b irth to reason, w hich
im presses a certain cognition of them o n the soul. This process by w hich the
things above the n atu re of the soul are m anifested w ithin it produces
'th eo p h an ies', and is analogous to the process by w hich im ages of sensible
things, w hich are below it, are im pressed o n the soul as 'p h antasies'.114 The
m anifestation from above is not only a m anifestation of G od and th e prim ordial
causes b u t of th e intellect itself; for the latter, like the form er, is unknow n in itself
as to w h a t it is, b u t through its effects is know n th at it is. Reason is the 'fo rm ' of
intellect b y w hich it is m anifested both to itself and to others.115 This
A lthough the scholastic categories of th e latter are foreign to the form er, the
encounter m ight deepen one's appreciation o f both. For de L ubac's account of
the controversy, including texts of som e of the pertinent review s o f Sumaturel,
see his Memoire sur I'occasion de mes ecrits, translated into English as A t the Service
o f the Church.
113 PP 2 :577A-B. W erner Beierw altes, "N egati Affirm atio: W elt als
M etapher; Z u r G rundlegung einer m ittelalter lichen A esthetik d u rch Johannes
Scotus E riugena," in Jean Scot Erigene et ITiistoire de la philosophic, ed. Roques,
263-276, explores th e influence o f E riugena's theophanic conception o f creation,
w hich is w orked o u t here in term s of th e so u l's three m otions, on later m edieval
view s reg ard in g the artist's im itation o f th e divine art.
114 PP 2 :576D-577A.
115 PP 2:577B-C.
150
m anifestation is a creative a c t The m anifestation o f G od in theophanies, w hich

coincides w ith the m anifestation of the intellect in reason, is creation. Thus the
creation o f the prim ordial causes eternally in the W ord both transcends the
n atu re o f th e soul and finds its parallel w ithin the n atu re o f th e soul. The created
soul is an im age of its creator even w ith respect to th e act of creation.
Sense, the th ird m otion, m oves around the reasons (rationes) o f particular
things w hich reason considers in universal m ode in the prim o rd ial causes in
w hich th ey exist sim ply an d as a w hole. This is a different account of sense than
w as given in the earlier sum m ary, w hich stressed the reception of phantasies
from w ithout. H ere E riugena explains th a t although this m otion is prom pted by
phantasies of external things, it is in itself a descending m otion w hich divides the
m ost p ro p er reasons of things, beginning w ith the m ost general an d w orking its
w ay dow n to the m ost specific and individual.116
The tw ofold character of sense, receptive and distributive, corresponds to
the no tio n of tw o paths by w hich the intellectual num bers contained in the
M onad descend into m em ory and sense, either internally from th e M onad
through intellect into reason and from reason into m em ory, o r externally through
the sensible form s of corporeal things into the m em ory by m eans o f phantasies.
The receptive function o f sense presented in the earlier sum m ary o f the three
m otions corresponds to the external descent of num bers, w hile th e distributive
function corresponds to the internal d escen t In the presen t context, how ever,
116 PP 2 :577C-D: Tertius itaque restat motus qui circa singulas singularum
rerum rationes quae simpliciter, hoc est uniuersaliter, in primordialibus causis conditae
sunt uersatur et cum ex sensibilium rerum fantasiis per exteriorem sensum sibi nuntiatis
motus sui substantialis sumat exordum ad purissimam rerum omnium discretionem per
rationes proprias in essentias generalissimos inque genera generaliora, deinde in formas
speciesque specialissimas, hoc est in numeros innumerabiles infinitosque immutabilibus
tamen naturae suae analogiis finitos, peruenit.
151
E riugena is d e a r th at the p ro p er dynam ic o f the third m otion is a descent from

general to p articularfrom g enus to sp ed es to individualand do es n o t depend
for its p ro p er character on its receptive contact w ith external things.
2.223
Eriugena's so lu tio n to the problem o f recep tiv ity

A ugustine m akes a d istinctio n betw een angelic and h u m an m odes of
know ing th a t provides an instructive parallel to E riugena's d istin ctio n betw een
the receptive an d distributive functions of sense. In De Genesi ad litteram,
A ugustine holds th at if o u r know ledge of created things w ere like th a t of the
angels, know ing things by the reaso n s o f them w hich are in G od, "w e w ould
know h o w m any, how big, o f w h a t kind they are, even if w e d id n o t see them
th ro u g h th e senses of the body,"117 w e w ould know "the w hole array o f creatures
arranged in hierarchical order."118 W hereas A ugustine reserves th is m ode of
know ledge to the angels, E riugena seem s to regard it as p rop er ev en to the
hum an soul. A lthough he adm its th a t m an 's distributive m otion d ep en d s on the
receptivity o f the senses as p ro v id in g the occasion from w hich it gets its start, he
sum m arizes the relationship betw een the three m otions of the so u l in a w ay th at
ignores th e receptive function altogether.
Indeed, everything w hich intellect im presses on its art, th a t is, reason,
from its gnostic intuition o f th e prim ordial causes, it divides b y m eans of
its sense, w hich proceeds from it an d is called its 'o p eratio n ', into the
p ro p er reasons of the in d iv id u al things th at are created p rim o rd ially and
117 GL 5.16: istorum autem pleraque remota sunt a mente nostra propter
dissimilitudienem sui generis, quoniam corporalia sunt, nec idonea est ipsa mens nostra,
in ipsis rationibus, quibus facta sunt, ea uidere apud deum, ut per hoc sciamus, quot et
quanta qualiaque sint, etiamsi non ea uideamus per corporis sensus.
118 GL 5.5: Hunc omnem ordinem creaturae ordinatae dies ille cognouit. Cf. PP
2 :544C-D. For m ore on this reference to angelic know ledge as dies ille, see
section 3.4211.
152
universally in th e causes. T he essences all together are in reason as one

thing, b u t in sense th ey are distin g u ish ed into different essences.119
From intellect reason receives a sim ple an d unified know ledge o f th e
prim ord ial causes, sense divides th is know ledge into the diverse genera an d
differentiae an d particular things. T his breaking-up by sense does n o t destroy
th e unified know ledge of reason, th a t is, sense does n o t displace reason; rath er,
reason retains its grasp o f th e w hole a t th e sam e tim e that sense distinguishes the
p arts. They are tw o n aturally d istin g u ish ed an d com plem entary o p erations of
th e soul, b o th consubstantial w ith th e soul, bo th proceeding from the ouaia of the
soul, w hich is intellect.120
As he concludes his discussion o f th e three m otions, E riugena m akes clear
the correspondence betw een the m otions o f the soul and the threefold d ivision of
n atu re (G od, causes, effects) an d the tw ofold process of procession from and
retu rn to G od. The trinity o f consubstantial m otions in the soul recapitulates
w ith in the soul the three divisions o f n atu re as it proceeds from and retu rn s to
G od. M oreover, it does so in a w ay th a t reflects th e roles of the Three Persons of
the D ivine T rinity in the creative process.
It is creation, of course, th a t m akes G od know n outside him self. B ut since
he transcends all that he creates, m ere creation as effect is insufficient to m ake the
T rinity know n, unless am ong created things there is som ething th a t is n o t m erely
created b u t also creates, hold ing a relatio n to the creative process analogous to
119 PP 2 :577D-578A: Omne siquidem quod intellectus ex primordialium

causarum gnostico contuitu arti suae, hoc est rationi, imprimit per sensum suum ex se
procedentem eiusque operationis nomine appellatum in proprias rationes singularum
rerum quae primordialiter in causis uniuersaliterque creatae sunt diuid.it. Cunctae
quidem essentiae in ratione unum sunt, sensu uero in essentias differentes discem untur.
120 PP 2 :578A.
153
th a t o f th e divine natu re. Because h u m an n a tu re participates in a creatu reiy w ay

in th e act o f creating, an d does so in a w ay th a t m irrors the relationships o f the
different persons o f the Trinity to creation, it m akes the Trinity know n w ith in
creation.
The likeness o f th e Father shines m o st openly in the m ind; of th e Son, in
reason; an d o f th e H oly Spirit, in sense.... As th e Father, the om n ipotent
w o rk er o f all created all together an d a t once, prim ordially, causally,
uniform ly, universally, w hatever is in h is a rt, w hich is his w isd om an d
p ow er, in his W ord, in his only beg otten Son, and divided it th ro u g h the
H oly Spirit, w ho proceeds from him self an d th e Son, into th e innum erable
effects o f the prim ordial causes, w h eth er they have flowed into intelligible
essences and differentiae, w hich su rp ass every bodily sense, o r flow ed
fo rth into the adorned m ultiplicity an d variety o f this sensible w o rld ; so
too, the intellect, th a t is, the p rincipal m otion of the soul form ed from the
gnostic contem plation of intelligible th ing s, w hatsoever it creates and
reposes in the a rt of reason, divides it th ro u g h the interior sense o f the
so u l into the separate and unconfused know ledge of individual thin g s
w h ether intelligible or sensible. For all th a t the intellect considers in
reason universally, it separates p articu larly through sense into th e discrete
cognitions and definitions of all th in g s.121
E riugena solves the problem o f receptivity by an account of the so u l's
n atu re th a t seem s to involve the receptivity o f th e senses only accidentally, going
w ell beyond G regory, beyond even th e m ore differentiated psychology fo und in
121 PP 2 :579B-D: Patris siquidem in anim o,filii in ratione, sancti spiritus in

sensu apertissima lucescit similitudo.... V t autem pater opifex omnium omnipotens
quaecumque in arte sua quae est ipsius sapientia et uirtus in uerbo suo in unigenitofilio
sim ul et semel primordialiter causaliter uniformiter uniuersaliter condidit per spiritum
sanctum ex se filioque procedentem in primordialium causarum innumerabiles effectus
diuid.it, siue in essentias intelligibiles differentiasque omnem sensum corporeum
superantes manarint siue in huius mundi sensibilis uarium multiplicemque om atum
locorum temporumque discretionibus uariabilem profluxerint, ita intellectus, hoc est
principalis animae motus ex intelligibilium rerum gnostica contemplationeform atus,
omne quodcunque in arte rationis creat et reponit per sensum animae interiorem in
singularum rerum siue intelligibilium siue sensibilium discretam inconfusamque diuidit
cognitionem. Omnia enim quae intellectus in ratione uniuersaliter considerat
particulariter per sensum in rerum omnium discretas cognitiones diffinitionesque
partitur.
154
the passage o f M axim us from w hich he b uilds. Even w hen prom pted by th e
stim ulus o f external objects, the interior sense o f them w ithin th e soul depends
upon the hierarchical m otions w ithin the soul. T hat interior hierarchy is so selfsufficient th a t essentially it requires contact o nly w ith w hat is above it, nam ely,
the divine n atu re. Indeed, the soul constitutes a p erfect im age of w hat is above it.
So perfect, in fact, is the created im age o f the divine, creative sovereignty
th at E riugena m u st now show in w hat respect th e im age differs from its
archetype.
2.224
T h e s u p e ra d d e d b o d y
The only tru ly perfect image of the invisible G od, an im age w ith ou t any
dissim ilarity, is th e only-begotten W ord of G od, a fact w hich E riugena

underscores by distinguishing being the im age of G od (proper to the W ord) from
being made in th e im age of G od (which p ertain s to hum an nature).122 T here m u st
be som e dissim ilarity betw een the divine T rinity an d its created im age, b u t how
does it play itself o u t w ith respect to the dynam ic of creation?
A t th is p o in t E riugena reintroduces th e q uestion of the sou l's relation to
the body w hich w as set aside during the discussion of the soul's three essential
m otions. The p o in t of dissim ilarity betw een th e tw o trinities is the fret th a t the
created im age, ev en in its creative aspect, dep end s on som ething w hich it does
not itself create, w hereas G od creates everything ex nihilo. 'T o r it is the p ro p erty
of the divine G oodness to call out of nonexistence into existence w hat it w an ts to
be m ade."123
122 PP 2 :580A-B.
123 PP 2 :580C: Proprium enim diuinae bonitatis est ex non existentibus in
existentia quae u ult fieri uocare.
155
The C reator calls everything th at subsists natu rally into being o u t of

noth ing th ro u g h a fivefold m otion. "For som e are called to subsist only
essentially, som e to subsist and to live, in som e sense is add ed to their sub stantial
life, in som e reason is ad d ed to the vital sense, an d in som e intellect is further
added for th e perfection of the natural m otions already m entioned."124 By this
fivefold m otion th e divine T rinity m anifests its goodness and creative operation.
The so u l's ow n creative operation is tw ofold b u t includes an im age of this
fivefold m otion. The first creative operation o f th e soul is found in its three
essential m otions: Intellect observes the things created by the C reator from
nothing and deposits them "in the innerm ost seats of its reason"; w hat it know s
is eith er g athered together into a unity by reason, o r divided and distributed by
sense to the p articu lar things to w hich they p ertain. This is the created im age o f
the Trinity, "th e principal and highest activity o f the rational nature."125
124 PP 2 :580D-581A. Cuncta siquidem quae naturaliter subsistunt de nihilo in

essentiam a conditore uocata sunt per quinquepertitum uniuersalis creaturae motum.
Quaedam namque uocata sunt u t solummodo essentialiter subsistant, quaedam ut
subsistant et uiuant, in quibusdam substantiali uitae sensus est additus, in quibusdam
uitali sensui ratio cumulatur, in quibusdam ad praedictorum naturalium motuum
perfectionem intellectus superponitur. This division of being is the sam e one used
by G regory o f N yssa, and its use here suggests th a t w hereas Eriugena follow ed
M axim us in h is exploration of the sim ilitude o f th e created to the uncreated; for
the dissim ilitude he tu rn s to G regory's De imagine.
125 PP 2 :581A-B: Ea uero trinitas quae in nostra natura ad imaginem creatoris
est condita nihU creat de nihilo, illud enim solius dei est et nullius creaturae. Duplex
uero eius actio uidetur. A u t enim ea quae de nihilo suus creator cond.id.it rationabUibus
intellectualibusque suis motibus inuestigatet quae in natura rerum puro intelligentiae
contuitu cognoscit in intim is rationis suae sedibus disponit omniumque rerum quas
potest cognoscere cognitiones aut in unum colligit... aut multipliciter diuidit, singulas
cognitiones singulis rebus quorum cognitiones sunt distribuens,... et haec est prindipalis
summaque rationalis naturae operatio. C om pare w h at E riugena says reg arding th e
m ultiplication o f intellectual num bers a t PP 3 :658A.
156
The second creative operation o f the so u l is th e creation o f the body,

w hich is ev id en t in th e control the soul exercises over its ow n body. E riugena
rem inds the read er o f th e doctrine developed in Book 1 (and furth er expan d ed in
Book 3) reg ard in g the com position of bodies.126 "The soul bonds together
incorporeal qualities into one thing and, by takin g u p from quantity a kind o f
subject for the qualities them selves and placing it u n d er them , it creates for itself
a body in w hich to m anifest its h idd en actions w hich in them selves are
invisible."127 H aving acquired its m atter from th e qualities of sensible th in g s, it
gives form an d v ital m otion. In this w ay, the so u l "both anim ates and nourishes
th at m atter an d d raw s it forw ard through the num bers o f places and tim es as the
body grow s to its perfect stature." Finally, the soul ad d s exterior sense, w hich is
responsible for th e reception of phantasies from external things, as w ell as fo r
dream ing an d fo r fashioning im ages from o th er im ages.128
126 PP 2 :580B: ...ut iam in priori libro disputatum est et adhuc dum ad
considerationem actionis primordialium causarum peruentum fuerit diligentius
inuestigabitur. See chapter 1.
127 PP 2 :580B: Anima nanque incorporates qualitates in unum conglutinante et
quasi quoddam subiectum ipsis qualitatibus ex quantitate sumente et supponente corpus
sibi creat in quo ocultas suas actiones per se inuisibiles manifeste aperiat inque
sensibilem notionem producat.
128 PP 2 :581B-C: Primo siquidem materiam eius ex qualitatibus rerum
sensibilium accipit eique nullo temporali spatio interposito formant uitalemque motum
accommodat quo ipsam materiem et uiuificat et n u trit inque augmenta perfectae staturae
per numeros locorum et temporum prouehit. Sensum quoque exteriorem ei praestat per
quern omnium rerum quas extrinsecus attingit phantasias recipit... He also attrib u tes
to exterior sense th e distrib ution of bodily n o urishm ent through w hat "the
G reeks" call poroi o r arterial In reference to dream s, E riugena seem s to allu d e to
the physiological m aterial in Im ag. 13, w here G regory describes how the
nutritive p a rt o f th e soul w orks d u rin g sleep, p ro v id in g nourishm ent b u t also
echoing in dream s w h at h ad been im pressed u p o n it b y the senses d u rin g
w aking hours.
157
T hus, th e soul brings the body into contact w ith its ow n inner essential
m otion an d in so doing reproduces, in relation to its ow n body, its ow n
m anifestation o f th e C reato r's fivefold m otion.
2.225
The d istin ctio n betw een m ortal and spiritual body

E riugena has alread y said th at the v ital m otion and exterior sense w ere
sup eradd ed to the soul on account of the m ortal body and so are n o t am ong its
essential m otions. A lthough his account of exterior sense and vital m otion here
depends on G regory an d reflects G regory's th ree levels of soul (nutritive,
sensitive, an d rational), he does not retract h is earlier position. R ather, E riugena
seem s to have ad opted G regory's trip artite division and m odified it, first, by
incorporating th e m aterial from M aximus on th e three m otions so th at G regory's
single "m ind" becom es a trinity, and, secondly, by exaggerating the distinction
betw een m ind and the so u l's low er functions.
This exaggeration ow es m uch to G regory's account of the ad d itio n of
sexual difference to the divine image as a p rovision for procreation after th e fall.
The exaggeration seem s to be an attem pt to clarify a subject w hich G regory treats
w ith som e am biguity. In m any places G regory treats the present body-soul
com position o f m an as if it w ere norm al, w hile in others he em phasizes m an's
"original" eq uality w ith angelic nature, w hich is incom patible w ith his p resen t
anim al nature.
E riugena denies th a t th e soul precedes th e body tem porally. "Indeed only
by dignity a n d excellence of nature does soul precede body, n o t in place o r tim e.
For all together an d a t once in that one m an w ho w as m ade in the im age o f G od
158
w ere created the reasons o f all m en w ith respect to body and soul."129 Both o f
these points are em phasized by G regory. O ver against those w ho teach the
preexistence o f souls h e h olds th a t body an d soul are created together a t the
sam e tim e.130
h i his ow n version o f this doctrine, how ever, Eriugena ad d s a d istinction
n o t found in Gregory, th e distinction betw een the spiritual body created by G od
and the m ortal body created by the soul.
In th a t general an d universal m an m ade in the im age o f G od all m en w ith
respect to body a n d soul all together an d a t once in possibility only w ere
established and in him a ll have sinned before they proceed sp iritu ally like
the angels into th eir p ro p er substances, th at is, before each one appears
according to an angelic m ultiplication in his ow n separate difference in a
rational soul and a sp iritu al bodyw hich body, m oreover, w o u ld have
adhered eternally an d coetem ally to the soul had he n o t sinned, in w hich
bod y all m en w ill b e resurrected, and w hich is n o t said to be created by
the soul.131
129 PP 2 :582A: Sola siquidem dignitate excellentiaque naturae praecedit anima

corpus non autem loco uel tempore. Sim ul enim ac semel in Ulo uno homine qui ad
imaginem deifoetus est omnium kominum rationes secundum corpus et animam creatae
sunt.
130 O H 28; cf. Im ag. 28. See earlier discussion of G regory's view .
131 PP 2 :582B: In ipso quippe generali et uniuersali homine ad imaginem dei
facto omnes homines secundum corpus et animam simul et semel in sola possibUitate
conditi sunt et in ipso omnes peccauerunt priusquam in proprias substantias spiritualiter
sicut angeli prodirent, hoc est antequam unusquisque secundum angelicam
multiplicationem in sua discrete differentia in anima rationali et spirituali corpore
appareret quod uidelicet corpus incorruptibile aetemaliter et coaetemaliter animae
adhaereret si non peccaret, in quo omnes homines resurrecturi sunt, ab anima creari
dixisse. See Sheldon-W illiarris' note 369 regarding die proper reading of this
sentence w hich has been d isto rted by enlargem ents in successive revisions of the
text.
159
T urning to him self, before he tu rn ed to G od, m an fell, and so a corruptible and

m aterial body "has been created an d is d aily being created as though by som e
p ro p er action o f the soul."132
A t this point, Eriugena encounters difficulties concerning G od's causal
relation to the m ortal body. Scripture declares th a t G od m ade for m an a body
from the clay o f the earth, b u t Eriugena insists th a t this m ust be understood
properly. Everything m ade by creatures is encom passed by the divine
Providence and can therefore be attrib u ted to G od, b u t not in the sam e w ay as
things th at he creates directly.133 Fallen m an, "adm onished b y divine
Providence," creates for him self the fragile, m ortal body in w hich to dw ell. The
divine intention is to chasten m an th u s an d b rin g him back to his original
condition.134 The story of A dam and Eve sew ing fig-leaves together to cover
th eir nakedness signifies the m aking o f the fragile, corruptible, and sexually
differentiated m ortal body.135 The creation o f these bodies can be attrib u ted to
G od only in the sense that it w as done by his design for the sake of m an's
salvation.
132 PP 2 :582C: Prius enim ut arbitror ad se ipsum quam ad deum conuersus est
atque ideo lapsus, hoc uero corpus corruptibile ac materiale quod ex limo terrae
assumptum est u t superius diximus post peccatum merito peccati ad exercitandam in eo
negligentem animam erga mandatorum custodiam suasque operationes reuelandas ueluti
quadam propria actione animae et creatum fuisse et cotidie creari afftrmare non haesito.
133 PP 2 :582C-D.
134 PP 2 :583B-C.
135 There is no parallel to this u se o f th e fig leaves and, later, of the tunics
of skinthe TrepiCwjiaTain De imagine. O n G regory's interpretation of d ie
tunics of skin elsew here in his w ritings, see D ani& ou, Platonisme et theologie, 55 ff.
160
W hy th is need to distance G od from d ie creation of the m ortal body?

There seem s to be a parallel here to the passage in P lato 's Timaeus w here the
D em iurge creates d ie souls for m ortal anim als b u t assigns the m aking o f their
bodies to th e lesser gods.136 Indeed, E riugena invokes th e sam e principle as
Plato: G od is im m ortal and w hatever he him self m akes is im m ortal. "D oes it
not seem m ore credible to y o u /' the N u trito r asks d ie A lum nus, "to say th a t
m ortal m an has m ade for him self flesh th an th a t G od him self created it directly
and th at G od only perm itted and advised it?" This principle extends n o t only to
m an's m ortal body, b u t to the "fragile and tran sito ry " state of the w hole sensible
w orld.137 T he w hole m ortal, sensible w orld shares w ith m an's m ortal b o d y the
status of a su p erad d itio n to nature as G od h im self h ad created it.
E riugena illustrates the relationship betw een G od's original creation and
its actual tem poral unfolding w ith the exam ple o f a seed 's grow th. "T hat vital
m otion w orks in seeds so th at they m ay th ro u g h generation proceed into visible
form s, no rig h t thinking philosopher d o u b ts." B ut this m otion does n o t alw ays
w ork w ith eq u al effect. W ithin the tem poral o rd er in its fallen state, the n atu ral
course of developm ent is often hindered, "eith er because of certain accidents
w hich do n o t su it th e seeds and are bom of contrary qualities, or on account of
adverse pow ers w hich fight against the n atu ral m otion."138
136 Timaeus 41a-d.

137 PP 2 :584A-B: Et num tibi uidetur credibtlius dicendum mortalem hominem
mortalem sibi camem fecisse quam ipsum deum per se creasse sed tantum permisisse et
admonuisse? Deus enim immortalis est et quodamque per se ipsum facit immortale est.
Omne siquidem mortale quodcunque in hoc sensibili mundo esse uidetur etfragile et
transitorium aut nos ipsifacimus nostris irrationabilibus motibus errantes aut propter
delictum nostrum ad usum mortalis uitae nostrae et exemplum fieri sin itu r...
138 PP 2 :584B: Vitalem nanque motum in seminibus agere ut per generationem
161
H e also uses th is analogy to clarify the relation betw een the sp iritu al body
created b y G od an d th e m o rtal bod y created by th e soul after sin. The sp iritu al
body is n o t ab sen t b u t " it lies h id d en in the secret folds of hum an natu re, a n d
w ill appear in th e fu tu re ag e w hen the m ortal bo d y w ill be changed into it an d
'th is corruptible b o d y w ill p u t on in co rru p tio n / H ear the Apostle: T h e anim al
body is sow n, the sp iritu a l b o d y springs fo rth ../" W ith the rising of the sp iritu al
body "the w hole p rim o rd ial n atu re w ill be restored as one w ith th at w hich has
been ad d ed to it."139
E riugena's u se o f th e seed analogy is very close to G regory's. G regory,
toOr uses it to arg u e th a t b o th body and soul d erive from a single cause a n d are
n ot opposed to each o th er, n o r does one precede the o th er in time; rather, th ere is
both a h id d en an d a visible dim ension to hum an n atu re, created together, one
m anifesting itself in th e o th er in the course of tim e. G regory, too, uses the
m etaphor to explain th e co ntin u ity betw een w hat m an is now and w hat h e w ill
be id his resurrected state. E riugena's 'sp iritu al b o d y ' seem s, in fact, to be a
developm ent o f th a t p erm an en t form of the body w hich is im pressed on th e soul,
to w hich G regory refers; alth o u g h Eriugena goes fu rth er th an G regory in
opposing th at perfect form to its p resen t m ortal expression.
in formas uisibiles procedant nullus recte philosophus philosophantium dubitat; sed ipse
uitalk motus non semper aequaliter in singulis generibus actionis suae uirtutem
manifestat siue propter quaedam accidentia quae seminibus non conueniunt et ex
contfariis qualitatibus nascuntur siue propter aduersas ut diximus uirtutes quae naturali
motui.
139 PP 2 :584C-D: In secretis humanae naturae sinibus adhuc latet, in futuro
autem Saeculo apparebit quando mortale hoc in illud mutabitur et "corruptibile hoc
induttUr incorruptionem." A udi apostolum: "Seminatur corpus animate, surget corpus
spirituflle.../' .... Tota siquidem natura primordialis cum sibi superadditis in unum
repatabUur. Cf. 1 C or 15:35-58, esp. 42-45.
162
2.226
Spiritual b ody and interior sense

Eriugena's distinction betw een spiritual and m ortal body is parallel to the
distinction betw een interior an d exterior sense; o r rather, to p u t it in the form of a

proportion, spiritual b o d y is to interior sense as m ortal bo d y is to exterior sense.
This correlation can p erh ap s b est be illustrated by an appeal to some comments
Eriugena makes in Book 3 regarding the difference betw een hum an and angelic
nature.
Eriugena's difficulty in th at context is to find a n adequate point of
distinction. O ne th at h e tries is the conventional form ulations by which the life
of angels is called 'intellect' a n d th a t of men, 'soul'. This usage he regards as
m isleading because the possession o f body im plied in the notion of 'soul' is not
peculiar to man. "Since angels possess their ow n celestial bodies, in which they
often appear, I do n o t know w h a t stands in the w ay of speaking of their life as
'soul.'"140 Moreover, even the differences betw een h u m an and angelic bodies as
they now exist"angelic bodies are simple and spiritual and lacking all exterior
sense," w hereas h u m an bodies are composed of the four elem ents which provide
the indispensable foundation for sense perception141 are only temporary, and
w ith them, the m odes of know ledge that currently characterize them. At present,
m an receives know ledge o f sensible things through phantasies, but the angels
140 PP 3 :732D: Non enim alia ratio mihi occurrit quae prohibeat angelicam
uitam animam uocari rationalem quemadmodum non prohibet humanam rationalem
intellectum, praesertim dum angeli caelestia sua corpora in quibus saepe apparent
possident ac per hoc, si corpora habere perhibentur, quid obstat, ne illorum uita anima
dicatur, quomodo et angelos ad imaginem deifactos non dubitamus.
141 PP 3 :733B: ... sensum animalibus distributum non posse subsistere nisi in
corpore ex quattuor elimentis constituto.... Corpora uero angelica simplicia
spiritualiaque sunt omnique exteriori sensu carentia.
163
"do not receive the notion of sensible things th ro u g h phantasies, but in a

spiritual w ay perceive every bodily creature in its spiritual causes, as w e shall see
w hen w e are changed over into an equality w ith th eir nature."142
N ot only does Eriugena dissociate the notion o f body from materiality, b u t
he gives body a firm place in the intellectual sphere: body is th at form through
which one being m anifests itself in the m ind o f another. This manifestation
depends on the receptivity of the senses only provisionally, only for as long as
the essential trinity o f the hum an soul, including sense in its distributive
function, is crippled by the fall and encum bered b y the m ortal body. This is a
m uch more radical solution than Gregory gives to the problem s of the soul's
relation to the body an d the receptivity of sense know ledge.
2.23
In com preh en sib ility o f im age and archetype

The preceding discussion about the superaddition of the mortal body
emerged from the N utritor's and A lum nus' a ttem pt to locate the elem ent of
dissimilarity in the created image. The basic answ er is th at the divine Trinity
w hen it manifests itself does so through m eans w hich it creates from nothing,
whereas the created trinity manifests itself in and th ro ugh th at which it has
received from the Creator; w hich is to say, one trinity is uncreated and the other
is created. This essential p oint of difference is overlaid at present by other
dissimilarities resulting from m an's mortal condition, b u t it rem ains the only
essential and perm anent point of dissimilitude. M an isth at is, is intended by
God to bea created subject of the divine nature. "W e believe," says Eriugena's
142 PP 3: 733C: Non enim sensibilium rerum notitiam perfantasias corporum

accipiunt, sed omnem corporalem creaturam in causis suis spiritualibus spiritualiter
perspiciunt, quemadmodum uisuri sumus cum ad aequalitatem naturae eorum
transmutabimur.
164
Nutritor, "that m an w as m ost perfectly m ade in the im age and likeness of G od

and th at in paradise before his sin he departed in no w ay from it, except by
reason of subject."143 This is very close to the form ulation given by Gregory:
A nd just as the Gospel calls the stam p on th e coin the image of Caesar, b y
w hich w e learn th at while according to its figure the likeness of the filing
form ed is th a t of Caesar, there is a difference in the underlying m aterial
[tcD irrroKeipLewu TTju 6ia<J>opdi/]; so also, analogously, w hen, in file place of
the stam p o n file coin, w e consider the things w hich are contemplated in
both the divine nature and in the hum an, in w hich there is the likeness, w e
also find a difference in the underlying n a tu re [t<S irrro K e ig e v b ) t t j i /
8iu<f>opdvJ, the difference seen betw een the uncreated and the created.144
For his p a rt Eriugena explains this difference "in subject" as follows: G od
is anarchos, w ithout beginning, while m an has a beginning both in the prim ordial
causes and in time; all the other aspects of Essence, w hich G od possesses by
nature, are present also in his image by grace.145 H e then draw s four parallels
between prototype and image: 1) The prototype is invisible an d
143 PP 2 :585A: Hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem dei perfectissime factum

et in nullo defecisse in paradiso ante peccatum credimus excepta ratione subiecti.
144 O H 16:184D: Kai akrrrep t o u erri t o u x<*XkoO Xa PaKTnPa Kaiaapog eLxova
Xeyei t o EudyyeXiov,* Si' ou p.dv0duoiiei/ Kara pev t o rcpocrxnp.a t t | i / opoiwaiv i u u l
t o u neiiofxjxopivou irpos Kaiaapa, ev 8e t<5 inTOKeipeuu) n ju 8ia<J>opdt' exeiu* o u tc o
kuL k o t o t o u TTdpovTd \6yov, o v t L xotpdKTTipoju T<i eTTt0euipou(ievd Tfj T c 9eid tfucrei
Kdi Tfj duGptaTTiuT) KdTduoijCTduTe?, ev ol? T| opoLOTqs ecrriu, ev t w urroKeip.euq) t t | i /
8ld<}>0pdU eeUpLCTKOp.l/, TjTlS ev TO) dKTLOTOJ Kdl TW KTUTTCii Kd0OpdTdl. * M t 22:2021; Mk 1216-17; Lk 20:24r-25.
Cf. Imag. 17; 235,4-9: ac sicut in aere caractere caesaris imaginem euangelium
dicit per quod discimus iuxta quidem figuram similitudinem essejbrm ati ad caesarem in
subiecto uero dijferentiam habere, sic etiam secundum praesentem rationem
imaginationum quae considerantur in diuina natura, in Humana etiam cogitantes in his
in quibus similitudo est, in subiecto dijferentiam inuenimus quae in non creato et creato
consideratur. For as im portant as this passage seem s to be to Eriugena, his
translation is rem arkably obscure.
145 PP 2 :585B: ...caetera omnia quae de deo dicuntur et intelliguntur per
essentialem excellentiam omnino in imagine eius perspiciuntur per naturam et gratiam.
165
incomprehensible: the hum an intellect is n o t know n as to what it is; 2) the

prototype is diffused through all things giving them essence: the soul pervades
all things form ing know ledge of them in itself; 3) the prototype penetrates all
things dividing a n d distributing to them his gifts: m an surveys all giving glory
to the Giver; an d 4) the prototype created his im age to m anifest himself: his
image creates its o w n im age (the body) to m anifest itself.146
It is im m ediately after this sum m ary th a t Eriugena directs the interested
reader to consult G regory's De imagine for fu rth er insight into the sim ilitude of
the image.147
Only one p o in t remains: to underline the incom prehensibility of b o th
image and prototype. The Alum nus asks th e N utritor, "Does it seem to y o u th at
the difference is sm all betw een that nature w hich know s of itself both th a t it is
and w hat it is, an d th at w hich knows only th a t it is b u t does not understand
w hat it is?"148 H e thus reveals a m istaken n otion about God's know ledge of
himself, as though G od w ere incomprehensible to us b u t not to himself.
A long discussion of the Divine Ignorance follows, in w hich E riugena
argues that in fact G od does not know what h e is. According to the account of
definition, which w as introduced in Book 1 a n d is m aintained throughout the
Periphyseon, to say that G od knows w hat he is w ould be to confine him w ith in the
limits of tim e an d place. G od's ignorance ab o u t his o w n nature is in tru th the
146 PP 2 :585C.
147 PP 2 :585D: caeteraque quae de similitudine imaginis intelligenda et
pronuntianda sunt, de quibus quisquis plenius scire uoluerit legat librum sancti Gregorii
NYCE1 de Imagine.
148 PP 2 :586A: Num. tibi uidetur parua differentia inter tllam naturam quae
cognoscit se ipsam et esse et quid sit et Ulam quae tantum cognoscit se esse non autem
intelligit quid sit?
166
highest w isdom , a knowledge beyond know ledge o f a being beyond being. This
doctrine of divine ignorance is sim ply a radical and consistent application of
apophatic theology.
Finally, w hen this question is exhausted, Eriugena returns to the likeness
betw een the creative Trinity and its im age an d gives this conclusion (the N utritor
is speaking to the Alumnus):
You understand well, and I see th at you perceive that concerning
such things reason persuades p urely a n d beyond doubt, nor do you now
discern, I think, any difference of im age and archetype besides the reason
of subject. Indeed, the highest Trinity subsists substantially through itself
an d is created from no cause, b u t the trinity of o u r nature is m ade from
nothing b y th at w hich through itself is eternal an d in the image and
likeness o f it. A nd if any difference of im age and archetype besides this
should be discovered, it proceeds n o t from nature, b u t comes to be from a
transgression, n o t from envy of the creative Trinity b u t from the fault of
its created image. For everything th a t is said or understood about God,
regarding the pow er of his essence, can be both said and understood
about his im age in those in w hom it is purged, illum inated, and perfected,
regarding the grace of creation in it, as w e have saidexcept th at the
divine n atu re is G od by the excellence of its essence, whereas hum an
n ature is G od b y the gratuity of divine grace, and that the creative nature
is created by nothing, while the other is created by it and creates those
things below itself that adhere to its nature, nam ely, this m ortal body
added the soul after sin, w hich is called the image of the image (as we
have often said). For inasmuch as G od created the soul in his im age so the
soul fashions the body as a certain instrum ent in som e w ay like itself.149
149 PP 2 :598B: Recte intelligis et quod de talibus ratio suadet pure ac

indubitanter te perspicere sentio nec iam cem is u t opinor ullam differentiam imaginis et
principalis formae praeter rationem subiecti. Summa siquidem trinitas substantialiter
per se ipsam subsistit et ex nulla causa creata est, trinitas uero nostrae naturae de nihilo
facta est ab ipsa quae per se ipsam aetema est ad imaginem et similitudinem suam. Et si
aliqua dissimilitudo praeter hoc imaginis et principalis exempli repertafuerit non ex
natura hoc processit sed ex delicto accidit, neque ex creatricis trinitatis inuidia sed ex
creatae imaginis culpa. Totum nanque quod de deo dicitur uel intelligitur secundum
essentiae uirtutem de eius imagine in his in quibus purgatur illuminatur perficitur et
d id et intelligi potest secundum creationis gratiam eo u t praediximus excepto quod
diuina natura deus est excellentia essentiae, humana uero deus est diuinae gratiae
167
In this passage Eriugena beautifully sum m arizes his doctrine of body, soul, and
image and d e a rly reveals the extent of his d eb t to Gregory.150
2.3
C onclu sion
For both G regory and Eriugena a theory of the hum an soul m ust in d u d e
an account of m an as m ade in the image and likeness of God. Since God is

incorporeal his im age an d likeness in m an cannot pertain to m an's bodiliness b u t
to the soul. This contrast between body and divinity establishes the fundam ental
problematic of the relation between body a n d soul. Both of them m ust account
for the soul's functions w ith respect to the body in such a way that the
m ultiplidty of these functions does not com prom ise the essential unity,
simplirity and im passibility of the soul. The latter particularly, the im passibility
of the soul, requires a careful account of the unity of body and soul. Both
struggle against the Platonic tem ptation of regarding the soul's em bodim ent as
an intidental a n d tem porary state.
By em phasizing the difference betw een m an's present m ortal condition
and the state originally intended for hum an nature by God while nonetheless
affirming the natural, perm anent union of body and soul in that original
intention, G regory and Eriugena are able to appropriate the Platonic insight
w ithout accepting a doctrine of preexistence o r denying the doctrine of
largitate et quod ilia creatrix sit et a nullo creata, ista uero ab ilia creata est et ea quae
suae naturae infra se adhaerent creat, corpus hoc mortale dico post peccatum animae
adiunctum, quod etiam imago imaginis uocatur u t saepe diximus. Nam quemadmodum
animam ad imaginem suam deus creauit ita anima corpus ueluti instrumentum quoddam
quodam modo sui simile efficit.
150Cf. PP 4: 786D-787A, w here Eriugena sum m arizes perhaps even m ore
clearly his dependence on Gregory for his understanding of the soul's diversity
of motions b u t sim plicity of nature.
168
resurrection. To d o so, however, they m u st posit a n unim aginable m ode of

bodily existence very different from th at o f em pirical man. Gregory does this
w hen he suggests th a t h a d God not foreseen the Fall and provided gendered
animal bodies an d the attendant m ode o f procreation, m an w ould have
propagated in a n angelic mode, w hatever th a t m ight be. Eriugena goes further
than G regory by developing a notion of spiritual bo d y that sets aside m ost of the
features m o st com m only associated w ith corporeality.
This "going further" is typical of E riugena's thought as com pared w ith
Gregory's. W here, for example, Gregory is content to appeal to the
incom prehensibility of soul's nature to defend the soul's simplicity while
acknow ledging the m ultiplicity of its activities w ith respect to the body, Eriugena
adopts M axim us' discussion of the three m otions.151 These three essential
motions no m ore com prom ise the unity a n d sim plicity of the soul than the
Trinity o f D ivine Persons compromises the sim plicity and unity of divinity.
Moreover, these m otions themselves contain a m ovem ent from unity to
multiplicity, from reason to sense. The com bination of unity and m ultiplicity
becomes fundam ental to his account of b o th h um an and divine nature. Thus,
Eriugena provides a m ore reasoned alternative to G regory's apophatic appeal to
incom prehensibility.
Such is the p attern of Eriugena's dependence o n Gregory. Eriugena draw s
his distinction betw een spiritual and m ortal body from positions taken by
Gregory, b u t ventures to articulate a cogent theory w here Gregory is content
151 Just h o w m uch Eriugena's going further a t various points depends on

M aximus' advances o n those points m ust, w ithin the confines of this study,
rem ain unclear. H ow ever, some indication of E riugena's originality w ith respect
to Maximus w ill be found in the next chapter, in section 3.4212 which considers
Eriugena's u se of M axim us' division of being.
169
w ith vague indications. W hen he takes u p the them e of incom prehensibility he

does so w ith characteristic radicalness in the doctrine of the divine ignorance. To
this pattern can b e ad d ed Eriugena's doctrine's o f creation ex nihilo and of b o d y
as a concourse o f incorporeal qualities, exam ined in chapter 1. Eriugena owes
fundam ental debts to G regory b u t only as investm ent capital to w hich his ow n
philosophical ingenuity adds a substantial return.
170
CHAPTER
"LET U S M A K E M A N "
Gregory of Nyssa's influence o n Eriugena is m ost evident in Periphyseon,
Book 4, where the exposition of the Sixth D ay comes to a climax w ith a cluster of
quotations from De imagine. These quotations pertain to m any of the issues
discussed in the previous chapterthe nature of the divine image, the sim plicity
of the soul, and so onbut set them w ithin a broader context. Eriugena's
exposition of the Sixth Day in Book 4 is prim arily concerned w ith u nderstanding
m an's paradoxical relation to the rest o f creation, rather than w ith the relation
betw een body and soul, which p rovided the focus for the discussion of hum an
nature in Book 2.
On the one hand, m an stands w ithin the genus of animals, and, o n the
other, he is m ade in the image of God. M an's creation with an anim al bo d y and
the attendant division of hum an nature into m ale and female constitute a
problem for both Gregory and Eriugena precisely because this anim al
constitution seems contradictory to the divine image. Closely related to this
difficulty is Eriugena's persistent concern, again shared w ith Gregory, to find an
adequate account of the original and final equality between hum an and angelic
nature. Gregory's thought and authority have a decisive role in Eriugena's
exposition of the Sixth Day and seem to underlie Eriugena's ow n thought on
m an's relation to both angels and beasts.
171
This chapter will look closely at Eriugena's understanding of m an's place

w ithin the structure of created nature. This task requires the gathering of
material from various parts of the Periphyseon, 1 b u t the key themes around
which to organize this m aterial are provided by the conceptual fram ework
governing his interpretation of the biblical narrative of m an's creation. After a
brief sum m ary of that interpretation and of Gregory of N yssa's role w ithin it, the
three major themes that m ost clearly reveal the kinship betw een the
anthropologies of Gregory and Eriugena will be exam ined in some detail.
3.1
Eriugena's ex p o sitio n o f the Sixth Day

Eriugena's treatm ent of the Genesis account of m an's creation is extrem ely
long and risks appearing like a m eandering stream, or worse yet, like one w hose
main channel disappears into the confused flow of a m arsh, reappearing only
sporadically. The logic of Eriugena's exposition seems to be dictated by
philosophical and theological, rather than exegetical, concerns.2 Nonetheless, it
does follow the Genesis text, at least in broad outline:
1 For a good sum m ary of the im portant anthropological portions of the

Periphyseon, see Stock, "Philosophical Anthropology."
2 Mark Zier, "The G row th of an Idea," in From Athens to Chartres, ed. H. J.
Westra (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), 71-84, argues that the original logic of Book 4 has
actually been rew orked (and even obscured) by em endations and additions
made by Eriugena on the basis o f the doctrine of the reditus which he developed
as he wrote Book 5. H e makes his argum ent from an analysis of the m anuscript
evidence for successive revisions of the Periphyseon. While I find Zier's approach
interesting, I have for the purposes of this study contented myself w ith w orking
w ith the final form of the text as a n integral whole.
172
O utline of E riugena's Exposition of the Sixth Day

(Periphyseon 4 : 741C-814A)3
1.
Preface to Books 4 & 5 (741C-744B)
1.1.
Review of the Divisions of N ature (741C-743C)
1.2.
Simile of Reason setting sail in the dangerous Ocean of Divinity (743C744B)
2.
Genesis 1:24-25 (744C-750A)
2.1.
Theological Exposition of the W ords Producat terra animam viventem

(744C-748C)
2.2.
"Physiological" Exposition of The Same W ords (748C-750A)
3.
Genesis 1:26 (750A-786C)
3.1.
M an as Animal & Image (750A-761B)
3.2.
Q uestions regarding the A nim ality of H um an Nature in its Original

an d Final States (761B-764C)
3.3.
H ow All Things are Created in M an, and Subsist in Him (764C-772B)
3.4.
M an's Distinctive Priority in Creation, esp. in relation to Angels (772B781C)
3.5.
H ow M an Contains All of the W orks of the Six Days (781D-786C)
4.
Genesis 1:27 (786C-814A)
4.1.
G regory of Nyssa's Doctrine (786C-799C)
4.1.1.
The constitution of m an (786C-793B)
3 In constructing this outline I used the questions posed by the Alum nus
to identify th e basic units of the text. For m ost of the discussion of the Sixth Day,
these questions are reliable markers of transitions from one topic of discussion to
another. The passages distinguished in this w ay w ere then grouped into the
larger unities represented in the outline.
173
4.1.2.
The superaddition of sexual difference (793B-799C)
4.2.
The Original State o f H um an N ature (799C-814A)
4.2.1.
In his first creation m an d id n o t have a mortal anim al body (799C803A)
4.2.2.
Response to A ugustine w ho seem s to teach otherw ise (803B-807A)
4.23.
M an spent no time in Paradise before the Fall (807A-814A)
This interpretation of the Sixth Day forms a long but im portant transition
from the treatm ent of the Third Division of N ature, undertaken in Book 3, to his
prom ised treatm ent of the Return of all things into the Fourth Division. The
discussion of the Return is so long a n d difficult because the natural process of
procession and return has been com plicated by the unnatural consequences of
the Fall an d to this difficulty is added the further challenge of reconciling the
teachings of the various Fathers.
From 744C to 748C, Eriugena glosses the w ords "Let the earth bring forth
the living soul" (Gn 1:24) w ith a curious string of scriptural quotations4 that
pulls these w ords into the context of C hrist's suffering in the flesh and his
sending forth of his Spirit at the m om ent of his death. Christ suffers in his
hum anity on account of the things su peradded to "earth" (i.e., nature) as
p u nishm ent for sin; having died to them , he then sends forth his Spirit to renew
universal nature to its original integrity.
From 748C to 750A, Eriugena explains the m eaning of Genesis 1:24-25 in
term s of the physica speculatio of philosophers. First, he considers the "genus-
4 M t 26:41; Lk 23:46 (cf. Ps 30:6 [Vulg.]); Col 3:5; Ps 103:35 (Vulg); Ps 1:3; 1
Cor 10:11; Ps 1:4; Ps 145:4 (Vulg.); Eph 4:8; Jn 12:24-25 (cf. 1 Cor 15:36); Ps 103:30
(Vulg); Jn 19:30.
174
species" language and its relation to dialectic. Next, he connects the "earth" of
the Sixth Day a n d the "w aters" of the Fifth Day (w . 20-23) and interprets them as
signifying the universal nature com m on to all things which had been established
on the Third D ay (cf. also w ith his interpretation of "earth" and "abyss" in v. 2).
A t 750A ff., the creation of m an in verse 26 comes into view w ith the
question, w hether m an too is brought forth from this universal n atu re as p art of
the genus of living beings. Yes, b u t m an is also set apart from other anim als by
his creation in the im age of God. This duality in the creation of m an on the
one hand, anim al; on the other hand, im age of God sets up the problem atic for
the subsequent discussion: H ow can m an both be and not be a n anim al?
A m ajor shift in the argum ent occurs a t 764C f., w here the relationship
betw een m an and universal nature (including the genus of anim als) is
completely reversed. The question is no longer how man, as both im age and
animal, fits into the w hole of creation; rather, the question becom es how the
whole universal creature is established in him.
In the course of answ ering this question, other questions em erge
regarding the relationship betw een hum an and angelic nature. A t 781A-782B,
Eriugena expands A ugustine's interpretation of Day One, as the creation of
angelic intelligences, to include m an. Eriugena then reviews the w orks of the
rem aining days and show s how they are contained in man. C reated coessential
with the angels on the First Day in virtue of reason and intellect, m an also
contains all of the physical elem ents (the firm am ent of the Second Day); the
solidity of substance, fluidity of accidents and vital motion (the d ry land, waters,
and nourishing principle of grasses and tw igs, respectively, of the T hird Day);
the three m odes of exterior sense (sun, m oon, a n d stars of the F ourth Day); and
sensitive life w hich he shares w ith the other anim als (Fifth and Sixth Day).
175
After this conclusion, he adds a sum m ary of the manifestation of the

Trinity in the Six Days, by way of transition to further consideration of the image
of G od in connection w ith verse 27.5
In a series of extensive quotations from De imagine (786C-803A), Eriugena
presents and adopts Gregory's bifurcation of verse 27: m an m ade in the image of
God pertains to the universal m an, the plerom a of hum an beings, in his
intellectual nature; the division into m ale a n d female is a likeness to irrational
beasts superadded to the image by G od in foreknowledge of the Fall, in order to
provide for the propagation of the h u m an plerom a under the conditions of sin.
As a preface (786C-787A) to these quotations Eriugena summarizes the doctrine
of the soul's m otions in the terms w orked o u t in Book 2, which were examined
above.
The rem ainder of Eriugena's treatm ent of the Sixth Day argues that the
distinction betw een m an's creation in the im age of God and the superaddition of
his m ortal and gendered animal body is n ot a tem poral one. Temporally m an
has never lacked the consequences of his sin. This position leads him into a
discussion of A ugustine's espousal of a literal, tem poral Paradise. In this way,
the transition is m ade from the Sixth D ay to Paradise, which Eriugena takes up in
earnest at 814B ff.
Thus, Eriugena's exposition of the Sixth Day follows roughly the order of
the scriptural text.
5 PP 4: 786A-C.
176
3.11
G regory o f N yssa's place in Eriugena's exposition

In relation to this outline of Eriugena's exposition of the Sixth Day,
Eriugena relies little on any explicit citation of G regory of Nyssa until he comes
to portions devoted to verse 27 (he only explicitly d te s him twice in the sections
covering verses 24-26). A t verse 27 Gregory receives a dom inant place w hich he
holds for the rem ainder of the exposition (19 explicit citations).6 This is perhaps
not surprising since Gregory does not deal directly w ith verses 24-25 in De
hominis opificio. In fact, although this treatise is offered as a supplem ent to Basil's
unfinished exposition of the Six Days, G regory begins w ith Genesis 2:4. In his
second chapter, how ever, he takes u p the question, w hy m an was created last,
which takes him back to 1:26.
Eriugena seem s to be little interested in G regory's interpretation of this
verse. Gregory m akes a great deal of m an's dom inion over the animals, m ainly
in term s of m an's present state. Eriugena does quote Gregory once on this point,
but quickly a dds that m an's dom inion w ould have been different if he had not
sinned. For the m ost part, Eriugena is m ore interested in the question of m an's
ontological priority over all other creatures, and this is the line along which he
develops his o w n interpretation of verse 26.
G regory's interpretation of the image of G od in m an starts out w ith the
sovereignty m an possesses over the rest of creation, b u t moves from there to a
discussion of the ruling p a rt in man, to which the im age of God most properly
belongs, nam ely, m ind. As p art of his investigation into the nature of the image
of God in m an, as well as in his later discussion about the resurrection o f the
6 See Table 1 in the Introduction.
177
body, Gregory gives considerable attention to the constitution o f man. Eriugena

draw s heavily on this m aterial, especially at 787D-792D.
Most im portant to Eriugena, however, is G regory's teaching regarding the
twofold creation of m an: first, in the image of God, and secondly, as divided into
m ale and female, according to the likeness of irrational beasts.
W hen one considers the unfolding of Eriugena's anthropology, however,
Gregory's influence is already im portant m uch earlier than the clustering of
explicit citations w ould indicate. A lthough Gregory's authority is brought in to
resolve the crisis provoked by the questions raised concerning the relation of
m an's anim ality to his original and final states, the very questions raised
presuppose three crucial assum ptions which Eriugena shares w ith Gregory.
The sum m ation th at Eriugena himself gives of G regory's doctrine
emphasizes six m ain points: (1) that the image of God in m an pertains only to the
m ind and its innate pow ers; (2) that all m en were created a t once and together in
the first m an w ho w as m ade in G od's image; (3) that in him all m en were
expelled from Paradise by his fall; (4) that the division of sexes is a superaddition
to the image only on account of sin; (5) that this division w ill not exist in m an's
resurrected state; and (6) th a t this division w as superim posed on the image in
order to provide a m ode of propagating the w hole plerom a of hum anity under
the conditions of sin.7
The three crucial presuppositions that Eriugena's shares w ith Gregory,
and which are central to unfolding of his anthropology in Book 4 even before he
d te s Gregory, are: (a) that the final state of m an given in the resurrection will be
a return to the original state of hum an nature as it was intended by God, (b) that
PP 4 :799B-C.
178
this final state will include equality w ith angels, and (c) th a t anim ality is
incom patible w ith this equality. E riugena m ust defend his application of these
presuppositions to the text o f G enesis against the w eighty authority of
A ugustine. Gregory (and his com m entator Maximus) is a valuable ally in this
controversy, which dom inates the latter part of Eriugena's exposition of the Sixth
Day an d continues in the treatm ent of Paradise.
A closer exam ination o f each of these three principles w ill be m ade in the
following pages. Sections 3.2 a n d follow ing look a t the question of the
perm anence of being, a perm anence th at in Eriugena's view underlies both the
tem poral unfolding of creation th ro u g h the process of generation and the final
retu rn of nature to its true a n d eternal state. Sections 3.3 a n d following consider
G regory's teaching on m an's kinship w ith the irrational na tu re of the beasts and
how this teaching is reflected in E riugena's thought. Sections 3.4 and following
take up the meaning of m an's equality w ith the angels especially in relation to
m an 's microcosmic role w ithin creation w hich often serves Eriugena as the only
m eans for distinguishing h u m a n and angelic nature.
3.2
G e n u s , s p e c ie s , a n d p le r o m a
The identification of eschatology w ith protology in G regory's thought
receives systematic justification in Eriugena's ontology, or perh ap s better, his

ousiology. Ovaia is an inseparable w hole com prising all genera, species, and
individuals that come to be by generation; genera cannot subsist ap art from their
species n or species from their genera, and the same relation holds for species and
individuals. Ovaia contains differentiae, b u t unlike body suffers no separation of
parts. It is therefore im m utably itself.
To understand E riugena's teaching on this point and ho w it relates to
doctrines espoused by G regory, it is necessary to step back from the Sixth Day to
179
the Fifth. In his exposition of the Fifth Day, Eriugena d raw s on Gregory's
doctrine of the relation between the hum an soul and the dissolved body, and of
the division of different kinds of soul, to develop a notion of the relation betw een
universals an d particulars w hich implies the im perishability of all individual
beings, a notion w hich he then sets against Gregory a n d Basil's teaching that
souls of irrational anim als perish w ith the dissolution of their bodies. This is a
remarkable transform ation of G regorian m aterial.8
Behind this transform ation lies the conviction th a t the tem poral unfolding
of nature brings about by generation w hat has always been by creation and that
all creatures are both eternal and m ade. Gregory expresses this same conviction
when he w rites that the end of tem poral becom ing w ill be the restoration of all
things, b ut especially of hum an nature, to the condition originally intended for it
by God. Eriugena accepts this principle, b u t also d raw s on other of Gregory's
ideas as he elaborates his view of the nature of oiicria.
The following pages will review G regory's ideas o n the divisions of soul
and on the h um an pleroma, and then look m ore closely at several contexts in
8 Gangolf Schrimpf, "V ita-A nim a-Corpus Spirituale: Ein Vorschlag zur
Interpretation von Periphyseon HI cap. 36-39 und V col. 978B-994B," in From
Athens to Chartres, ed. Westra, 195-224, m akes a rigorous analysis of the notions
of soul and bo d y at w ork in Eriugena's interpretation of the Fifth Day, but seems
not to appreciate the essentially G regorian foundation from w hich Eriugena
works here. See also Schrimpf's "D er Begriff des Elements in Periphyseon HI," in
Begriffund Metapher: Sprachforms des Denkens bei Eriugena. Vortrage des VII.
Intemationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums, W emer-Reimers-Stiftung Bad Hamburg, 2 6 29. ]uli 1989, ed. W erner Beierwaltes (Heidelberg: Carl W inter;
Universitatsverlag, 1990), 65-79, and his Das Werkdes Johannes Scottus Eriugena im
Rahmen des Wissenschaftsverstandnisses seiner Zeit: Eine H infiihrung zu Periphyseon,
Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic u n d Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue
Folge, 23 (Munich: Aschendorff, 1982). Schrimpf's strength lies in his ability to
situate Eriugena in his Carolingian intellectual environm ent; he is generally less
helpful w hen it comes to probing the Greek background of Eriugena's thought.
180
w hich Eriugena develops his view of the eternal correlative relation between
genera and species, species and individuals, causes an d effects. The most
im portant of these contexts is the argum ent for a universal life which he gives in
his exposition of the Fifth Day of creation in Book 3. O ther im portant
elaborations of the correlative nature of the hierarchy o f being are found in
portions of Book 5.
3.21
The human plerom a and the d iv isio n s o f b ein g

The previous chapter considered how Gregory, taking as his basis the
o rd er of the Scriptural account of creation, presents a theory of different levels of

soul: vegetative soul observed in plants, which is responsible for the
nourishm ent and growth; the soul proper to irrational anim als, w hich adds sense
and perception to nourishm ent and growth; and the perfect bodily life proper to
a rational (that is, hum an) nature, "which is nourished and sensitive, and
partakes of reason, and is adm inistered by intellect."9 By the order of his
narrationplants, animals, m anMoses delivers this teaching in a hidden way.
Gregory sum m arizes this teaching w ith a division m ore typical of
philosophical discourse: O f existing things, some are intellectual, som e are
corporeal; of corporeal things, som e are devoid of life, som e share in vital energy;
of living bodies, some are w ithout sense, some w ith it; o f those having sense,
som e are irrational, and som e rational. Each level provides a foundation for the
next higher level. The final level, that of rational nature, involves the blending of
sense w ith (noncorporeal) intellect. Thus, man, w ho is the highest level of
9 O H 8 :145A: H 8e TeXeia ev crdifiaTL u)f| ev Tfj Xoyucrj, rfj dvGpajmvr) Xeyw,

KaGopaTou <f>uaei, Tpe<J>opevri Te teal atoGavopevri, icai Xoyou peTexoiKxa, ical vai
SioiKouiievq.
181
corporeal being, is a m ixture of every kind of soul and is so represented in the

Mosaic account of creation; he is the final step in the ascent of sensible nature, its
perfect form.10
As the previous chapter noted, Gregory also argues th at only the rational
soul of m an can properly be called soul. The im m ediate context for that claim is
the denial of a m ultiplicity of souls w ithin man. In m an the nutritive, sensitive,
and rational all have one a n d the sam e source, the one soul. This unity is not just
one of the varieties of soul, b u t its perfect form; anything less than this perfection
is not truly soul. Only in m an can the presence of vital activity properly be called
a soul.11
10 O H 8 : 145A-B: revoiTo 8' av ftp.lv Toiaurn Tig f| to u Xoyou SiaipecrigTdiv ovtujv t o pev t l vo^tov, t o 5e acopaTiKOv TravTcug ecrrlv.' AXXa to u pev votitou
irapeiaGcj vuv f| irpog Ta oixeta to pip ou yap toutojv o Xoyog.
Tou 8e awpaTiKOu t o pev apoipov KaQoXou
to 8e p e T e x ^ CajTiKrrig
evepyeiag. ndXiv to u ojtikou acopaTog t o pev aiaGriaei ouCfi, t o Be apoipel Tfjg
aiaGtiaeajg. Exra t o aLaGTyriKOv TepveTai ttoXlv eig XoyiKov Te Kal aXoyov. Aid
to u to Trpdrroi/ peTa ttjv aipuxov uXtû otov irrroPaGpav Tiva TTjg tw v epi|ruxojv ISeag
Tfiv<j>uaiicf|v tovtt\v (i)f|v aucrTf|vai Xeyei o vopoGerqg, ev rfj t<I>v (pvruv pXacrrr]
npovTroardaaw elG ouTcug e n d y ei rdiv kcit' alaGqatv SioiKOupevwv Tqv yevecriv.
Kai eTretSf| k o to rf|v au rf|v aKoXouGlav twv 8 ia aapKog t t |v t)f|v elXTixoTwv
Ta pev aiaGTiTiiori, Kal 8 lx a Tfj? voepag 4>uaeu)g e<f>' eaimDv elv ai Bvvarat, to Be
XoyiKou ouk av erepwg yevoiTo ev aaipaTi, e l pf) tw aLoGrynli auyKpaGeliy 8 ia to u to
TeXeuTalog peTa Ta pXaaThpaTa Kal Ta poTa KaTeaKeuaaGri o avGpamog, oSw tiv i
Trpog t o TeXeiov aKoXouGog Trpoioucrqg Trjg <f>uaeci>g. Aid TrdaTjg y ap iSeag rQv tyuxwv
KaTaKipuaTai t o XoyiKov to u to C<3ov o dvQporrrog. Tpe<f>eTai pev yap KaTa t o
cjjucriKou rps- ipuxhs elSog- Tfj Be aufnTiiqj Suvapei f| aiaGtiTiKa Trpoae<{)UTi. pecrwg
exouaa KaTa tt|v iSlav <{>uaLv Trig Te voepag Kal Tf^g uXajSearepag ouaiag- toctoutu)
TTaxup.epeaTepa to u ttis , oou> KaGapuTepa eKelvTig. EiTd Tig ylveTai irpog to Xe-rrrov
Kal (j)ioTOi8eg TTjg aiaGr|TiKiig <J>uaeu)g f| T^g voepag ouaiag oiKelcxxlg Te Kal
avaKpaaig, cog ev Tpial Touroig to v avGpajtrov tt|v auoT aaiv e x e iv
Of course, this w ay of dividing beings was traditional and other versions

w ould have been available to Eriugena, in the works of Boethius, for example (cf.
Boethius, Contra Eutychen (Loeb) 2, p. 82-83; and Porphyry's Isagoge, 1.10).
On G regory's understanding of this division, see Balas, METOTSIA EOT,
34-53.
11 Cf. this discussion of the proper m eaning of soul w ith G alen's in On
Natural Faculties, 1.1.
182
The previous chapter also drew attention to G regory's suggestion that the
creation of the rational nature, the blending of intellect an d anim al, is not in fact
p a rt of the original intention for h u m an nature, b u t a providential device to
insure the propagation of the h u m an pleroma. Quite ap art from the issues
su rro u n d in g the difference betw een original intention and present conditions,
G regory's notion of the hum an plerom a merits closer scrutiny. H e argues that
the m an w hose creation is narrated in Genesis 1:27 is the universal m an
u nderstood as comprising, rather than abstracted from, all particular men. In
this w ay he combines tw o notions of 'hum anity': hum anity as a com m on form
an d as a collective whole.
W hat then do w e think about these matters? T hat the passage that
says, "God m ade m an," indicates all hum anity by the indefiniteness of the
expression; for, here A dam is n ot synonym ous w ith w h a t is created, as the
narrative will say further on; the created m an is nam ed not as some one
m an b u t as the universal. Therefore we are led by use of the universal
term for the nature to surm ise some such view as th at by the divine
foreknowledge and pow er all hum anity was com prehended in its first
constitution.
For it is fitting to think that to God nothing in w h at is m ade by him
is indefinite, b u t that there is som e lim it and m easure for each of the
things that are, w hich are circumscribed by the w isdom of the Maker.
Therefore, just as any m an is confined by die quantity of his body, and the
m easure for him is the m agnitude of his person, w hich is comm ensurate
w ith the m anifestation of the body; so I think that the w hole fullness (Gr.
TrXTipajfia, Lat. plenitudo) of hum anity was encom passed, as if in one body,
w ith foreknowing pow er b y the G od of all, and that this is w hat the
passage teaches which says that "God made m an; according to the image
of God he m ade him ." For not in p a rt of the nature is the image, nor in
som e one of the things know n to pertain to the image is the grace, but
such pow er pervades the w hole genus equally.
A token of this is th a t m ind is implanted in all alike: all have the
pow er of understanding a n d deliberating, and all other things from which
the divine nature is represented in him that is m ade according to it. The
m an w ho was presented in the first constitution of the w orld and the one
w ho w ill be after the consum m ation of the All are alike; equally between
them selves do they bear the divine image. For this reason the whole is
term ed one man, because in the pow er of God there is neither w hat has
past, n o r w hat is to come; b u t w hat is foreseen as w ell as w hat is present is
183
contained in the com prehensive activity of the All. Therefore every nature
w hich persists from first to last is an image of Being; b u t the
differentiation of the genus into masculine and fem inine w as added lastly
to w hat w as fashioned, for such a cause, I think, as follow s.12
This cause, which the next chapter of Gregory's text expounds, is the need to
preserve the divinely appointed lim it and m easure of hum anity un d er the
conditions imposed by sin. A sexual m ode of procreation is ad d ed to the divine
image "lest the m ultitude (nXpGog) of hum an souls be dim inished, foiling from
that m ode by which angels are increased in m ultitude."13
12 O H 16:185B-D: Ti t o i v u v ecrriv, o nepi t o u t w v SievopGppev; Einwv o

Xoyog o t i enoipaev o 0eog t o v avGpujnov, xdi dopicrrtp Tpg crppaaiag anav
evSeixvirrai t o dvGpdinivov. Ou yap cruvwvopdaGp t w xTiapaTL vuv oA8ap, xaGcog ev
Tolg e(j)epg p IoTopia 4>paiv- aXX' ovopa tw xnaGevri avGpoina) oux o rig, aXX' o
xaQoXou ecrriv. Ouxouv Tfj xaOoXLxfj Tpg 4>ucreiDg xXpcrei t o l o u t o v t i imovoeiv
evayopeGa, o n Tfj Geia npoyvciaei t c xai SuvapeL nacra f| dvOpanroTpg ev Tfj npcdrp
xaxaaxeup nepieiXpnTai. Xpf| yap 0edi ppSev dopicrrov ev xolg yeyevppevoig trap'
auTou vopieiv aXX' exacrrou t g j v o v t o j v etvai t l nepag xai pexpov, Tfj t o u
nenoipxoTog ao<f>ia uepipeTpoupevov. "Qcrnep Toivuv o Tig avGpcunog tu> xaTa t o
aclipa ttoctcu nepieipyexai, xai peTpov aurai Tijg unoardoecog f| npXixoTpg ecrriv, p
auvanapTiopevp Tfj enclave La. t o u acopaxog- ourwg olpai xaGanep ev evi acipaTi
oXov t o xfjg dvGpGjndTT]Tog nXrjpcupa t t ) npoyvuxmxfj Suvapei napa t o u 0eou to jv
oXcjjv TrepLoêGfjuaL, xai t o u t o SiSdaxeiv t o v Xoyov t o v einovTa, o t i xai enoipaev o
0eog t o v avGpojnov, xai x o t eixova 0eou enoipaev avrrov. Ou yap ev pepei Tiig
4>uaeojg p eixwv, ouSe ev t l v i tcD v xaG' airrov Gecopoupevcjv p xapig- aXX ec{> anav t o
yevog eniapg f| Toiaurp Sipxei Suvapig. Zppelov Se, o t i naaiv uKrauTiog o voug
eyxaGiSpvrai' navTeg t o u SLavoeiaGaL xai npo(3ouXeueiv niv Suvapiv exouai, xai Ta
aXXa navTa, 5 l <Lv f| GeCa 4>uaig ev tc 5 x o t airrpv yeyovoTi aneixoviCeTai. Opoiwg
exeL o Te Tfj npcLfrp t o u xoapou xaTaaxeufj auvavaSeixOei? dvGpanrog, xai o xaxa
t t ( v t o u navTog auvTeXeiav yevpaopevog, eniapg ecf) eavrdiv <{>dpouai -rpv Geiav
eixova. Aid t o u t o elg dvGpanrog xaTojvopaaGp t o nav, o t i Tfj Suvapei t o u 0eou
ouTe t i napcpxpicev, oure peXXeL, aXXa xai t o npoaSoxwpevov eniapg t w napovTi t t j
nepiexTixrj t o u navTog evepyeia nepixpaTeiTai. ridcra Toivuv f| c{>ucrig p ano to j v
npaiTCiJV pexpi t w v eaxaTiov Snixouaa, pia Tig t o u ovTog eaTiv eixajv* f) Se npog t o
appev xai QriXu t o u yevoug Sia<ôpa npoaxaTeaxeuaaGTi TeXeirraiov t u j nXaapaxi, Sia
t t ) v aiTiav, dig dipai, TauTpv.
For Eriugena's Latin translation, see note 78 below.
13 O H 17:189C-D: d)g av pf| xoXoPioGeip to tujv tjnp^div Tdiv dvGpconivcjv
nXpGog, exireaov exeivou tou Tponou, xaG ov oi ayyeXoi npog to nXpGog pu^pGpaau.
Cf. Imag. 18:237,29-30: ... ne animarum humanarum m ultitudo minueretur,
cadens ex illo modo per quem angeli ad multitudinem aucti su n t
184
The notion that the m easure an d lim it of hum an propagation, the

plerom a, is som ehow essential to 'h u m an ity ' universally considered, is striking.
A m ore Aristotelian view (and one m ore accessible to common sense) w ould
regard the num ber of actual m en as accidental to 'hum anity' universally
considered. 'H um anity' thus considered m ight refer either to the form shared by
an indefinite num ber of individuals or to the group of individuals constituted by
such a sharing, b u t in neither case is the num ber of individuals an intrinsic
elem ent of the 'hum anity' itself. M uch m ore central to the notion of m an w ould
be the prom inent features of his form , including such things as the reproductive
structures which allow the form to b e reproduced in new individuals, structures
w hich by their nature may have lim ited reproductive capacity in any one
individual but which by their very n a tu re provide the possibility for a n indefinite
num ber of generations. Gregory has said, in effect, that these open-ended
reproductive structures are not as essential to m an as the actual num ber of
individuals produced by means of them , that in fact other, angelic structures
w ould have served the same end, h a d m an not sinned. Although G regory does
n ot say that to hum an reason the num ber of m en is essential to the definition of
'm an ', he does suggest that som ething like this is the case for G od's idea of man.
Such an 'idea' would be closer to a Platonic 'num ber' than an Aristotelian
'definition'.14 From the latter perspective "tw o men" are not one thing b u t two
things sharing the same definition, 'm an '; from the former, "two m en"
designates not only a plurality of like units b u t the unity constituted in that
14 See Part I of Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin o f
Algebra (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968; repr., NY: Dover, 1992). Balthasar has a
helpful consideration of the theory of num ber that he thinks lies behind
M axim us' view on the transcendent u n ity of the Trinity, Kosmische Liturgie, 104ff.
185
plurality b y th e num ber two. T w o ' has an intelligible distinctness from 'th ree'
or 'four' w hich is com parable to the intelligible difference between logical species
such as 'm an ' a n d 'ox'. Gregory's hum an plerom a not only suggests such a
comparison betw een form and num ber, but dem ands their inseparability, a t least
in the foreknow ledge of God, such that the plurality of m en encompassed b y the
idea of 'm an ' is as determ inate as the plurality of units designated by the num ber
two. A tw o w hich lacks or gains a unit is no longer a two. A hum anity that lacks
any of its foreseen individuals is no longer the hum anity created by God.
Such a close association betw een 'num ber' and 'definition' suggests th at
the relation betw een genera and species, or betw een species and individuals, is
one of whole to p a rt rather than m atter to form. In the former, a genus and its
species are correlative. In the latter, they are not, because the m ovement from
genus to species is represented as an addition of a delim iting notion; and, in
reverse, the m ovem ent from species to genus is conceived as one of subtraction;
consequently, a species depends on its genus b u t genus does not depend on its
species.15 The correlative, whole-part view is the one taken by Eriugena not only
15 Such is the standard view to be found in the art of logic as presented, for
example, by P orphyry's Isagoge, ed. Adolfus Busse, Com mentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca, 4 ( 1 ) (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1 8 8 7 ) , p. 1 5 : Ilepi r f j g 8ia< {> opds t o u y e v o u g x a i
T o u g e i S o u s . A i a ^ e p e i 8 e rj t o p e v y e v o s n e p i e x 61- t q l e t S t i , T a 8 e 6 l 5 t | i r e p i e x e T a i
x a i o u T re p ie x e i- t u y e v T y e i r l TrX etov y a p t o y e v o s - t o u e i S o u s . c t l T a y e i/r j
T rpouT roxetoO aL Set x a i 8 ia p o p 4 > u )0 e v a T a T a l s e i S o r r o i o l s S t a ^ o p a t s a ir o T e X e lv T a
e i 5 r |, 6 0 e v x a i i r p o T e p a t t | <J>uaei. T a yevr\. x a i c r u v a v a L p o u v T a , aXX ou
a u v a v a i p o u p e v a , x a i e i 8 o u s p e v o v t o s ir a v T c jg e c m x a i y e v o g , y e v o u s 8 e o v t o s o u
TravTcu^ e c m xai t o e l 8 o g . "Concerning the difference betw een genus and spedes.
They differ in th a t genus contains spedes, b u t sp ed es do n ot contain genera; for

genus i s greater th an spedes. Moreover, genera m ust be presupposed: they are
formed by specifying differences to derive sp ed es (whence genera are also prior
by nature); and they take away, but are not taken away; and when there is a
spedes there is alw ays a genus, but w hen there is a genus there is not always a
spedes, too."
186
for the universal m an b u t for oucria itself and all the genera, species, and
individuals com prehended w ithin it.16
Does Eriugena ow e his view to Gregory's notion of the hum an plerom a?
If so, he does n o t acknow ledge the debt. In fact, h e uses the correlative, w holepart view to criticize G regory's view that 'soul' (and its imperishability) pertain
only to w hat is rational an d hum an. This criticism occurs in the discussion of
universal life found in Eriugena's comments on the Fifth D ay of creation.
3.22
U niversal life
Eriugena begins his exposition of the Fifth D ay (PP 3 :727Dff.) w ith the
search for an explanation to the fact that although the creation of plants and trees
is related earlier, there is no earlier m ention of 'soul'. One m ight infer from this
that the elem ents of the w orld, and even plants an d trees, lack not only soul b u t
any life w hatever. A lthough the great com m entators on Scripture acknowledge
that trees and plants live, Eriugena himself wishes to defend for life an even
more extensive role: all m otion, even of apparently lifeless bodies, is governed
by soul. That there is no body that lacks life, that there is a general life, and that
16OiKjia has a special w hole-part relation w hich incorporates the m atterform type; for, oixria as whole is also entirely present w ithin each of its parts.
Moreover, in the ordinary part-whole relation the definition of the whole cannot
be predicated o f the p a rt as th at of the genus can of its species. Contrast
M artianus C appella, Marriage o f Philology and M ercury, in Martianus Capella and
the Seven Liberal A rts, Vol. 2, ed. S. H . Stahl et al. (NY: Colum bia Univ. Press,
1977), Bk 4, p. 114: "A whole is that which som etim es lends its name bu t never its
definition to tw o o r m ore p arts w ithin itself. This is found only in individuals."
187
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
life, both general an d specific, is called 'so u l', is the view of "the greatest of
philosophers," Plato, an d his followers.17
3.221
The argum ent for a u niversal life

To reconcile this view w ith the Scriptural account, Eriugena m ust show
both its reasonableness a n d its agreem ent w ith authority. W hen that is done, he
gives an account of the intention of Scripture in speaking as it does. H e defends
the reasonableness o f his v iew by the following a rg u m e n t
For if there is no m atter which can produce a body without a species and
no species subsists w ithout its ow n substance, b u t no substance can exist
apart from th e vital m otion which contains it and makes it to subsistfor
everything th a t is naturally moved takes the principle of its m ovem ent
from som e life, it follows necessarily that every creature either is life in
itself or is a particip an t of life and lives in som e manner: either the
m ovem ent o f life appears manifestly in it o r does not appear, although the
sensible species itself indicates that it is adm inistered hiddenly by life....18
For as there is no b o d y which is not contained by its own species, so there
is no species w hich is n o t governed b y the pow er of some life. Therefore,
if all bodies n atu rally constituted are adm inistered by some species of life
and every species seeks its genus, b u t every genus takes origin from the
m ost general substance, it is necessary th at every species of life, w hich
17 This universal life, Eriugena explains, is called by the wise of the w orld
the Universal Soul, w hich governs everything w ithin the heavenly sphere
through its various species. Those who contem plate divine wisdom call it sim ply
the common life (PP 3:729A); see PP 3, n. 74, w here Sheldon-Williams notes the
ambivalence of earlier C hristian thinkers, especially Augustine, to the notion of a
w orld soul.
18 The argum ent in the text as it stands is interrupted at this point b y the
insertion (m ade in a subsequent revision) o f a quotation from A ugustine's On
True Religion th at show s the intim ate connection betw een life and being. See De
vera religione 11.21-22; Augustine: Earlier writings, selected and translated w ith
introductions by John H . S. Burleigh, Library o f C hristian Classics: Ichthus
Edition (Philadelphia: W estm inster Press, 1953), 235-236.
188
contains the num erosity of divers bodies, recurs to some m ost general life,
of w hich it is m ade a species by participation.19
The first p a rt of this argum ent depends on the account of body given in
Book 1 and the exposition of the Third Day: body is n o t an ouaia b u t a concourse
of incorporeal qualities grounded in substantial form and adm inistered by life.
The second part, arguing from the plurality of living forms to a single universal
form in w hich the various species participate, depends on a theory of
participation.
3.2211
B o d y , o u a ia , a n d life
To understand Eriugena's assertion that no body can exist w ithout some

participation in life, it is necessary to recall the opposition between body and
ouaia which he m akes in Book l .20 The leading characteristic of body is
extension in length, breadth, and depth; a corollary is divisibility or separability.
Because ouaia is not extended, neither is it quantitatively divisible. Bodies are
not ouaicu; they are the effects of the concourse of the quantity and qualities
w hich inhere in substances. The m ost evident difference between body and
19 PP 3 :728B,D-729A: Si enim nulla materia est quae sine specie corpus efficiat
et nulla species sine substantia propria subsistit, nulla autem substantia uitali motu, qui
earn contineat et subsistere fddat, expers esse potest amne enim quod naturaliter
mouetur ex uita quadam motus sui principium sum it, necessario sequitur, ut omnis
creatura aut per se ipsam uita sit out uitae particeps et quodam modo uiuens, siue in ea
motus uitae manifeste appareat siue non appareat ueruntamen latenter administrari per
uitam species ipsa sensibilis indicat....
V t enim nullum corpus est quod propria specie non continetur, ita nulla species
est quae cuiuspiam uitae uirtute non regitur. Proinde si omnia corpora naturaliter
constituta quadam specie uitae administrantur omnisque species genus suum appetit,
omne autem genus generalissima substantia originem ducit, omnem speciem uitae quae
diuersorum corporum numerositatem continet ad generalissimam quondam uitam
recurrere necesse est, cuius participatione specificatur.
20 PP 1 :489B ff.
189
ouaia pertains to divisibility. It is because ouaia cannot be divided as body can

that it rem ains wholly and eternally itself.
A t PP 1 :492A-D, Eriugena contrasts the logical division of ouaia into
genera a n d species w ith the extension and separation observable in bodies. Body
is separated as w hole into parts, whereas ouaia is divided into genera and
spedes. Body is not whole in its parts but is greater in the sum of its p arts, less in
the p arts singly; w hereas ouaia is whole in each of its forms and spedes an d is
n o t greater in their sum or less in their separation, is n o t fuller in the m ost
general genera nor less in individuals (e.g., ouaia is n ot greater in all m en than in
one m an, nor greater in animal than in ox o r horse). Moreover, body can be cut
into parts, thus destroying the whole (e.g., w h en the body is resolved into the
elem ents, it no longer exists in act or operation as a whole, though it can still be
thought as a whole);
b u t ouaia, although it is divided, by reason only, into its genera, spedes,
an d num bers, nonetheless by its natural pow er remains undivided and is
segregated by no act or visible operation; for the whole all at once and
alw ays subsists eternally and unchangeably in its subdivisions and all its
subdivisions all at once and always a re in it one inseparable thing. A nd
therefore even if the body, which is n othing other than the quantity of
ouaiaor, to speak more truly, not quantity b u t a quantum , is
segregated into diverse parts by act a n d operation or certainly by the
vulnerability of its fragility, it itself, the ouaia, that is, of which the body is
a quantum , by its own natural pow er rem ains immortal and inseparable.21
21 PP 1 :492C-D: A t uero OYCIA cjuamuis sola ratione in genera sua speciesque

numerosque diuidatur sua tamen naturali uirtute indiuidua permanet ac nullo actu seu
operatione uisibili segregatur; tota enim simul et semper in suis subdiuisionibus
aetemaliter et incommutabiliter subsistit omnesque subdiuisiones sui simul ac semper in
se ipsa unum inseparabile sunt. Atque ideo etsi corpus, quod nihil aliud est quam
OYCLAE quantitas et ut uerius dicam non quantitas sed quantum, actu et operatione uel
certe suae fragilitatis passione in diuersas segregetur partes, ipsa per se, id est OYCIA
cuius est quantum corpus, immortalis inseparabilisque sua propria naturalique uirtute
perdurat.
190
Ouaia and bo d y although opposed are nonetheless connected. Bodies could not
possess such existence as they do if they w ere no t grounded in their p ro p er
oucriai, in their ow n substantial forms. Bodies are produced w hen qualitative
forms w hich derive from the incorporeal accidents that inhere in substance, give
shape to the formlessness of matter.
In PP 3, d u rin g the exposition of the Third Day, Eriugena recalls and
elaborates the discussion of substantial and qualitative forms found in Book 1,
reviewing and elaborating the distinction first articulated there. In the Genesis
text, the dry land, w hich is exposed w hen the low er w aters are gathered
together, signifies the substantial forms, the ouaiaL, of things; while the w aters
themselves represent the visible qualitative form s by which bodies are
constituted o u t of the four elements. "Substantial form is that through
participation in w hich every indivisible species is formed, and one is in all and
all in one, neither m ultiplied in the things th at are m ultiplied nor dim inished in
the things that are reduced."22 Qualitative form, on the other hand, "th a t form
The difference between 'separation' and 'division' operative in this
contrast is sim ilar to a distinction used by G regory in OCM 8. For both the
A ugustinian and M aximian background to the notion ofouaia that E riugena
presents here, see Stephen Gersh, "Om nipresence in Eriugena: Some reflections
on A ugustino-M axim ian elements in Periphyseon," in Eriugena: Studien zu seinen
Quellen , ed. Beierwaltes, 55-74. Cf. Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 154-155.
22 PP 3: 703A: Substantiate forma est ipsa cuius participation omnis indiuidua
species formatur, et est una in omnibus et omnes in una, et nec multiplicatur in
multiplicatis nec m inuitur in retractis. Eriugena gives hum an nature as a n exam ple
of the difference betw een substantial and qualitative form. The substantial form
'm an ' "is no greater in the indefinite m ultiplication of hum an nature th ro u g h its
individual species than in that one and first m an w ho w as m ade the first
participant in it, nor w as it less in him than in all whose bodies are m ultiplied
from him , but it is one a nd the same in all a n d equally whole in all, receiving in
none any variation or dissimilarity." (Non enim maior est forma ilia uerbi gratia
dicitur homo in infinita humanae naturae per indiuiduas species m ultiplication quam in
191
which adheres to m atter for the constitution of body is ever varied and m utable
and dispersed am ong diverse differences according to accident."23
Thus, the divine com m and that the w aters be gathered and d ry land
appear is addressed to anyone who can use reason to separate the m ultiplicity of
qualitative forms, w hich are external to the substantial form, from the substantial
forms them selves, and to gather the qualitative form s into one place "so th a t the
illo uno et primo homine qui primus particeps illiusfactus est, nec minor in illo erat
quam in omnibus quorum corpora ex illo multiplicantur, sed in omnibus una eademque
est et in omnibus tota aequaliter, in nullis ullam uarietatem uel dissimilitudinem
recipiens.)
23 PP 3: 703B: Forma uero ilia materiae adhaerens ad constitutionem corporis
uaria semper atque mutabilis inque diuersas differentias secundum accidens dispersa.
The text continues: 'T o r not from natural causes does the manifold
differentiation of visible forms in one and the sam e substantial form proceed, but
it happens from w ithout. Indeed, the dissim ilarity am ong men, in face, in the
quantity and quality of their individual bodies, also the variety of custom s and
ways of life, are n o t from hum an nature, which is one and the sam e in all in
w hom it is and is m ost like itself, receiving no variation, but comes to be from
those things w hich are understood around it, nam ely, from places and tim es,
from generation, from the quantity and qualtiy of the foods, of the regions, and
of the things am ong w hich someone is bom , and, to speak generally, from all
those things that are understood around the substance and are not the substance
itself." (Non enim ex naturalibus causis uisibilium formarum multiplex differentia
procedit in una eademque substantialiforma, sed extrinsecus euenit. Hominum
siquidem inter se dissimilitudo in uultu in quantitate et qualitate singulorum corporum,
morum quoque et conuersationum uarietas non ex humana natura, quae una eademque
est in omnibus in quibus est et sibi semper simillima nullam uarietatem recepiens, sed ex
his quae circa earn intelliguntur contingit, ex locis uidelicet temporibusque ex
generatione ex quantitate et qualitate alimoniorum regionum rerum in quibus quisque
nascitur et, ut uniuersaliter dicam, ex omnibus quae circa substantiam intelliguntur et
non ipsa substantia sunt. Ipsa enim simplex et uniformis est nullisque uarietatibus seu
compositionibus obnoxia.)
Eriugena's view as expressed here is th at the substantial form is o p en to
an indefinite m ultiplication of individuals, w ithout change to itselfa view
which seems to be a t odds w ith the one given later in the exposition of the Fifth
Day. Note, how ever, that although he does n o t explain how substantial form is
m ultiplied, he seem s to suggest that this m ultiplication does not depend on the
dissim ilarity w ith w hich individuals differ at the level of qualitative form.
192
h id d en substantial form around w hich seethe the w aves of accidents m ay clearly

shine o ut to intellectual eyes that discern the natures of things."24 This happens
w hen the m in d encom passes the m ultiplicity of appearances within one
definition.25
But the T hird Day does not end w ith th e appearance of dry land; it also
hears the e a rth com m anded to bring forth th e m any varieties of plant life. This
p art of the text, according to Eriugena, speaks of the vis sentinum, the vital pow er
planted w ithin the earth ('earth' signifying substantial form) that links the
substantial form to its external qualitative forms.
[I]n [it] th a t species of soul, w hich is custom arily called 'nourishing' an d
'grow th-giving' by the holy Fathers, exercises its activities, namely,
adm inistering the generation of seeds, nourishing w hat is generated,
distributing grow th to them through th e num bers of places and times;
and, since everything that appears visibly in the nature of things receives
the original causes of its generation n o t otherw ise than from the hid d en
folds of th e natural and substantial f o r m ..., it is therefore written:
Germinet terra herbam uirentem.26
Through the vis seminum w hat was created n o w proceeds through generation
into sensible form s and species, w hatever subsists causally and invisibly in the
24 PP 3: 703D: ... ut occulta substantial forma circa quam accidentium fluctus

exaestuant intellectualibus oculis naturas rerum discementibus clare perluceat.
25 PP 3: 704A. The N utritor identifies this operation of gathering w ith the
act of definition described in Book 1 (cf. PP 1 :483C ff.).
26 PP 3: 704C-D: Virtutem herbarum lignorumque in primordialibus causis
conditam per haec uerba propheta commemorat, quae uirtus uis seminum a sanctis
patribus solet appellari, in qua species ilia animae quae didtur nutritiua et auctiua
operationem suam exercet, generationem uidelicet seminum administratis et quae genita
sunt nutriens incrementaque eis per numeros locorum et temporum distribuens et,
quoniam omne quod in natura rerum uisibiliter apparet non aliunde nisi ex occultis
naturalis et substantialis formae sinibus... originates causas generationis suae recipit,
propterea scriptum est: "Germinet terra herbam virentem."
193
genera and spedes breaks forth through generation into quantities and qualities
and becomes know n to the bodily senses.27
In sum , according to Eriugena the Genesis account of the Third Day
teaches that the m utability of acddents (waters) is distinguished from the
stability of substance (earth), and that the m ultiple pow er of substance, w hen it
breaks out visibly, is adm inistered, in accordance w ith the divine decree, by life
(typified by plants a n d trees).28 The administrative role assigned to 'life' is an
im portant addition to doctrine of corporeal nature as a concourse of acddents. It
links the im m utability of substance to the changing concourse of quantities and
qualitative forms w hich produces bodies. Insofar as they are bodies, all sensible
things receive their m atter from the m utual concourse of the qualities of the four
elements, which come together in a single form. W ithout the substances of
things, w ithout their genera or spedes, w ithout the vital m otion that animates
and nourishes them, there w ould be no bodies; the concourse of elemental
qualities that produce bodies depend on prindples beyond body.29
Eriugena's conviction that even apparently lifeless bodies are governed by
some spedes of life is an extension of his position that bodies are not oim ai but
the effects of the concourse of the acddents of q u o -l c u . The life, however, which
27 PP 3: 704D-705A: Vis seminalis herbarum et lignorum, quae in intimis

substantiarum rationibus causaliter creata est, in formas et species sensibiles per
generationem procedat, quae processio primordialium causarum in effectos suos
sequentibus scripturae uerbis explanatur: ... Videsne quemadmodum diuina scriptura
genera et species manifestissime declarat, in quibus causaliter et inuisibiliter subsistunt
quaecunque per generationem in quantitatibus et qualitatibus in notitiam corporalium
sensuum erumpunt?
28 PP 3: 709D-710A.
29 PP 3: 713D-714A.
194
adm inisters this concourse seems to be a pow er of the oixria and to suffer the
sam e generic, specific, and individual divisions (w ithout separation) as ouaia
itself. Hence the argum ent from a plurality of species of life to one universal life
is a function of his doctrine of participation.
3.2212
Participation
Eriugena's theory of participation is given m ost fully in the treatm ent of

the divine nam es and prim ordial causes at the beginning o f Book 3. "Everything
th at is either is a participant o r a participated or a participation, or both a
participated and a participant at the same tim e."30 T hat w hich is only
participated is God; those that only participate are composite, sensible bodies;
and between these extrem es is a hierarchy of things th at participate in w hat is
above them and are participated in by w hat is below . W ithin this hierarchy
Eriugena distinguishes tw o m ain divisions, the prim ordial causes, which
participate im m ediately in God, and the essences w hich follow after them and
subsist by participation in them. This latter division itself contains m any orders
of genera and sp ed es.31
All the levels of this hierarchy are linked by 'p a rtid p a tio n ', a relation
which Eriugena com pares to proportion am ong num bers. Through this
hierarchy of natural orders linked by relations of partidpation, the divine gifts
and graces32 are distributed from the higher to the low er ranks, such gifts as
30 PP 3 :630A: Omne quod est aut participans aut participatum aut participatio
est aut participatum simul et participans.
31 PP 3 :630A-C.
32 PP 3 :631D: "Between 'dationes' and 'donationes' there is this
difference: 'dationes' are, and are properly called, the distributions by which
195
goodness, life, sense, reason, wisdom and so on, though not all of these gifts
extend to the low est levels of the hierarchy. 'T o r bodies do not live through
themselves n o r are they life but they receive the act of living through the order
superior to them , w hich order is constituted in the nourishing and growth-giving
life and thrives in seeds."33
A lthough this hierarchy is the m eans o f distributing the divine gifts and
graces to everything that in some w ay is, it is also the m eans by which all things
that are are harm onized and proportioned a n d unified w ith each other.
Participation is the relation that holds betw een w hat participates and w hat is
participated.
For as betw een term s of num bers, that is, betw een num bers themselves
w hen brought together by the sam e ratio, there are like proportions, so
betw een all natural orders from the highest to the low est there are like
proportions by w hich they are joined; a n d in the w ay there are
proportionalities between proportions o f num bers, that is, similar ratios of
proportions, in the same way the w isdom creative of all things established
in the participations of the natural o rders m arvelous and inexpressible
harm onies, by which all come together into one actual concord or
friendship or peace or love or w hatever term can be used to signify the
unification of all things. For just as the concord of num bers receives the
nam e of proportion, b u t the bringing together of proportions, that of
proportionality, so the distribution of natu ral o rder receives the nam e of
participation, b u t the joining together of distributions, that of universal
every nature subsists, b u t 'donationes' are the distributions of grace by w hich
every subsistent natu re is adorned. So nature is given (datur), grace is granted
0donatur). Every creature is m ade perfect from n ature and grace." (Inter dationes
autem et donationes talis differentia est. Dationes quidem sunt et dicuntur proprie
distributiones quibus omnis natura subsistit, donationes uero gratiae distributiones
quibus omnis natura subsistens omatur. Itaque natura datur, donatur gratia. Siquidem
omnis creatura perfecta ex natura constat et gratia.) See the discussion of Eriugena's
doctrine of nature and grace in section 3.251.
33 PP 3 :631C: Non enim corpora per se ipasa uiuunt uel uita sunt sed per
superiorem se ordinem uiuere redpiunt, qui ordo in nutritiua et auctiua uita constitutus
est inque seminibus uiget.
196
love, w hich draw s all things together into one thing by a certain ineffable
friendship.34
E riugena likens this hierarchy of participations to the circulation of a great
river th at flow s forth from its source (the divine goodness) dow n into the
prim ordial causes, n o t m erely filling them b u t causing them to be, and through
them d ow n th ro u g h the orders of natural things, from highest to lowest; and
then returns b y secret w ays back tow ard its source.35 Perhaps this return is w hat
Eriugena has in m ind, in his argum ent for the existence of a universal life, w hen
he says th at "every species seeks its ow n genus" (omnis species genus suum
appetit). Receiving one's origin from above a nd seeking that which is above are
two sides of one coin. The return upw ard ends because the whole process has
some highest source from w ith the descent begins. In the case of life, all species
and genera p o in t u p to that universal life w hich is the first created participation
in the divine life.
The parallel betw een the orders of num bers and of natures suggests that
Eriugena, for this reason alone, m ight be disposed to G regory's notion of the
hum an plerom a, in which the individual units o f 'm an ' compose a whole
34 PP 3 : 630D-631A: V t enim inter numerorum terminos, hoc est inter ipsos

numeros sub una ratione constitutos, similes proportiones, ita inter omnes ordines
naturales a summo usque deorsum partidpationes similes sunt quibus iunguntur; et
quemadmodum in proportionibus numerorum proportionalitates sunt, hoc est
proportionum similes rationes, eodem modo in naturalium ordinationum
participationibus mirabiles atque inejfabiles armonias constituit creatrix omnium
sapientia quibus omnia in unam quondam concordiam seu amicitiam seu pacem seu
amorem seu quocunque modo rerum omnium adunatio significari possit conueniunt.
Sicut enim numerorum concordia proportionis, proportionum uero collatio
proportionalitatis, sic ordinum naturalium distributio participationis nomen,
distributionum uero copulatio amoris generalis accepit, qui omnia ineffabili quadam
amicitia in unum colligit.
35 PP 3 :632B-C.
197
num ber, 'm an '. In term s of explicit references, how ever, Eriugena's theory of
participation is dom inated by the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius. Later, w hen he
argues for the indissoluble bond between genera a n d their species, he quotes
Pseudo-Dionysius, "O n the Perfect and the One," C hapter 13 of De divinis
nominibus.
3.2213
In sep arab ility o f nature
A lthough E riugena's argum ent for the existence of a universal life rests on
foundations laid elsewhere, he does not expect it to be so self-evident as to
require no further explanation. He is particularly concerned to show that "even
bodies that to o u r senses appear as dead are not entirely abandoned by life."36
To substantiate this position he draw s on two exam ples th at seem to reflect
Gregory of N yssa's account of the soul's relation to the parts of the body after its
dissolution, w hen they return to the comm on store o f elementsb u t he does not
d te Gregory at first; he appeals only to right reason.
The first exam ple of life controlling a dead body is that of a seed. The vis
seminum governs the process by which the seed, planted in the ground, is first
dissolved and th en quickened to become a new plant. T hroughout this process
one and the sam e life is at work; it is not itself affected by the composition,
decomposition, a n d recom position that takes place in the corporeal parts of the
seed. The vital force at w ork in the seed is distinct from the form which is
separated from m atter at the point w hen the seed dies in the ground .37
36 PP 3 :729B: Nam et corpora quae nostris senstbus uidentur ueluti mortua non
omnino uita relinquuntur.
37 PP 3: 729B-C.
198
The second exam ple is the indissolubility o f h um an nature even w hen the
parts of the m an are separated by death. For, although the parts of the body can
be spatially separated, they retain their logical relations to one another and to the
whole: "The intelligible principle of the relation (ratio relationis) can never
perish."38 Even w hen divided, spatially and to the perception of the senses, they
remain inseparable to thought. The nature of the m an is indivisible.
For the h u m an b o d y w hether living or d ead is the body of a man.
Likewise the hu m an soul, whether it rules its body collected all together
or ceases to rule w hen the body is dissolved into parts (as it seems to the
senses), it does n o t cease to be the soul of a m an, and one is thereby given
to understand, by a higher intimation, th at it does n ot adm inister less the
body dispersed am ong the elements than a body united in one com plete
articulation o f its m em bers, as true reason undeniably teaches.39
Gregory's doctrine, as expressed in De imagine, C hapter 27,40 is very close
to this, although G regory does not emphasize the part-w hole relation in the way
Eriugena does. Both affirm an abiding relation betw een the soul and its bodily
parts, even after their dissolution, and both affirm the imm utability of the nature
that gives form to the h um an body; but in this context Eriugena has d ro p p ed the
m etaphor of the seed w hich oriented Gregory's discussion; consequently, his
argum ent has a different complexion. Within G regory's account it is difficult to
determine how the theory of body as a concourse o f incorporeal qualities relates
38 PP 3: 729D: Relationis siquidem ratio nunquam potest perire.

39 PP 3 :730A: Nam et corpus humanum siue uiuum siue mortuum corpus
hominis est. Similiter anima humana siue corpus suum simul collectum regat siue in
partes dissolutum, ut uidetur sensibus, regere desinat, anima tamen hominis esse non
cessat ac per hoc datur intelligi altiori rerum intimatione non minus earn administrare
corpus per elimenta dispersum quam una compagine membrorum coniunctum, quod uera
ratio indubitanter edocet.
40 See section 1.31, w here this portion of G egory's text is sum m arized.
199
to the m ore atom istic theory of the elem ents suggested in his example of m ingled
herds. For his o w n part, Eriugena has recast G regory's account of the soul's
continued relation to the parts of the body w ith his ow n developed account of
ouaia and body.
3.2214
S p iritu a l b o d y
The argum ent from the inseparability o f nature is followed by a closely

related discussion of spiritual bodies. The soul's continued governance of the
dissolved body is fitting because the corporeal parts, w hen they return to the
elements, do n ot become "altogether nonbodies, b u t they become spiritual bodies
as are the elem ents them selves."41 This argum ent, in turn, leads to an
examination of the m ore spiritual parts of a living body, which sheds som e light
perhaps on w hat Eriugena means here by a spiritual body.
Within living bodies, there are the thick, bulky parts like bone and flesh
and the more subtle parts, like the sensesn o t the instrum ents of sense, eyes and
ears, but the senses themselves, sight and hearing. N ot only are these p arts of
the body m ore subtle than the others, b ut they have a certain extension that the
others do not. Sight and hearing and even sm ell extend beyond the limits of the
grosser parts, m ingling w ith colors a nd sounds and odors that lie outside the
body.
This discussion leads naturally into a n account of theôul's placelessness
and its relation to the senses. Eriugena's account of sensation draw s on G regory
41 PP 3: 730B: Non enim credendum est corporeas partes ex compagine spissi

corporis dissolutas in ipsis elimentis in quibus saluantur crassitudinem suam non
deserere et non in ipsorum elimentorum leuissimas spiritualesque qualitates transire,
non ut penitus non corpora, sed ut spiritualia corpora sicut et ipsa sint elimenta.
200
and Augustine. H e offers a n elaboration of the "eig h t orders of num bers" and
uses the m etaphor of the city. Those who w ish fu rth er knowledge, he says at the
end of his account, should "read the great A ugustine in the sixth book of De
musica and in the books o f Confessiones, and the great G regory of N yssa in
Sermone de imagine."42
A t the en d of this discussion, Eriugena concludes th at we should not be
surprised that the soul continues its control over the bod y in a hidden w ay after
death, "w hen in the body w hich as yet lives and is gathered together (as it seem s
to the senses), it exercises the pow er of its control, n o t only in the mass of
members, b u t also in the senses which extend far beyond it."43 There is another
aspect to this notion of the senses extending for bey o n d the corporeal mass,
namely, the im plied independence of sense from body; b u t this takes on
significance only later w hen Eriugena finally isolates the defining characteristic
of life as such. The discussion now moves on to th e different species to be found
w ithin universal life.
3.222
S p e c ie s o f u n iv e r s a l l if e
Eriugena is interested to determine the m ain divisions of universal life, its
species, paying special attention to the similarities and differences between
42 PP 3: 731B732A: De quibus omnibus quisquis plenius scire desiderat legat

magnum Augustinum in sexto De musica et in libris confessionum magnumque
Gregorium Nyseum in Sermone de Imagine. Cf. De musica 6.6; Confessiones 10.12.19;
OH 10:152B ff.
43 PP 3: 732B: Quid ergo mirum, si anima rationalis post solutionem corporis sui
in partibus eius per elimenta dijfusis aliquid agat acculta naturali administratione
omnique corporeo sensu remota, quandoquidem et in uiuente adhuc corpore simulque
collecto, quantum sensibus uidetur, non solum in cumulo membrorum, uerum etiam in
sensibus longe ab ipso porrectis regiminis sui uirtutem exercet?
201
angelic and hum an nature. The m ovement is from the top dow n, from universal
created life to the particular kinds of life. The first division of life is between
rational and irrational. Rational life, since it is found in angels and men, divides
into 'intellectual' a n d the 'rational proper'. This distinction, however, says
Eriugena, is m ore verbal than actual since "both in angels and in men it is
intellectual and rational; and therefore intellectual a n d rational life is predicated
of them in com m on."44 A nother conventional distinction is to call the life of
angels 'intellect' and th a t of m en 'soul', b u t this too is m isleading because the
possession of body im plied in the notion of 'soul' is n o t peculiar to man. "Since
angels possess their ow n celestial bodies, in w hich they often appear, I do not
know w hat stands in the w ay of speaking of their life as 'soul.'"45 Even the fact
that Scripture says only of m an that he is created in the image of God does not
suffice; "for w here there are reason and intellect, there I w ould believe the image
of God to be in no w ay absent." Nonetheless, the term s 'rational soul' and
'image of G od' serve as conventional m eans to distinguish hum an nature from
angelic.46
44 PP 3: 732C: ... sed in angelis ueluti specialis significationis causa intellectualis

dicitur, in hominibus uero rationalis, ueruntamen consulta ueritate et in angelis et in
hominibus intellectualis et rationalis est, ideoque communiter de eis praedicatur uita
intellectualis et rationalis.
45 PP 3: 732D: Non enim alia ratio mihi occurrit quae prohibeat angelicam uitam
animam uocari rationalem quemadmodum non prohibet humanam rationalem
intellectum, praesertim dum angeli caelestia sua corpora in quibus saepe apparent
possident ac per hoc, si corpora habere perhibentur, quid obstat, ne illorum uita anima
dicatur ignoro, nisi sola u t praediximus, uocabulorum differentia, quomodo et angelos ad
imaginem deifactos non dubitamus.
46 PP 3: 732D: Vbi enim est ratio et intellectus, ibi imaginem dei deesse nullo
modo crediderim, solum tamen hominem ad imaginem dei factum manifeste perhibet
202
Irrational life, of course, divides into those beings that participate in sense
and those that do n o t 47 This division is unproblem atic except for a question,
alluded to earlier, nam ely, w hether the souls of irrational animals survive death,
to which Eriugena prom ises to return.48
There is an aw kw ardness in Eriugena's division. H e has distinguished
four species of living beings (angels, men, beasts, plants) using four
corresponding differentiae (intellectual, rational, sensitive, nutritive). The
awkwardness comes because he has so far failed to find clear means of
differentiating m an and angel, since in neither is there any separation of
intellectual and rational. It w ould seem that the differentiae of life are really only
three: intellectual/rational, sensitive, and nutritive. W ith respect to life w hat
meaningfully distinguishes m en from angels? W hat justifies positing four
species? Eriugena does not raise the problem so explicitly as this, but it is there
and he answers it, b u t his answ er has a skew ing effect on the whole logical
framework. M an is that species of the genus life w hich is differentiated from the
others by alone possessing all the others.
Of the four species of life man has a share in all; that is why, says
Eriugena, he is called the 'w orkshop'49 of creation, "because in him the universal
scriptura.... A d differentiam ergo humanae naturae ab angelica substantia relictae sunt
hae significationes, anima uidelicet rationalis et imago dei.
47 PP 3: 733A.
48 PP 3 :732B.
49 Officina. Eriugena adopts this term from M aximus Confessor's division
of nature, which transform s the traditional idea o f m an as 'microcosmos'. See
203
creature is contained."50 But is this role unique to m an? Is it not also true of
angels? W ith this question Eriugena is able to address the difference betw een
hum an and angelic nature. Although m en and angels do not differ w ith respect
to their rational a n d intellectual nature, or even w ith respect to possessing a
body, yet they do differ: "Angelic bodies are sim ple and spiritual and lacking
every exterior sense."51 H um an bodies, on th e other hand, are com posed of the
four elements w hich are the foundation for sense. This means that whereas m an
receives know ledge of sensible things through phantasies, the angels "perceive
every corporeal creature spiritually in its spiritual causes, as we shall see w hen
we will be changed into an equality w ith their nature."52 In the meantime,
possessing a corporeal body and exterior sense, m an is the workshop of creation
and the angels are not.53
3.223
What is life?
W hen Eriugena at last returns to the original questionW hy Scripture
makes no m ention of soul until the Fifth Dayhe gives an answer that draw s
together the various threads of the intervening discussion. The fourth sp ed es of
life, the irrational an d senseless life found in plants w hich were created on the
50 PP 3: 733B: A c per hoc non immerito dicitur homo creaturarum omnium

officina quoniam in ipso uniuersalis creatura continetur.
51 PP 3: 733B: Corpora uero angelica simplicia spiritualiaque sunt omnique
exteriori sensu carentia.
52 PP 3: 733C: Non enim sensibUium rerum notitiam per fantasias corporum
accipiunt, sed omnem corporalem creaturam in causis suis spiritualibus spiritualiter
perspiciunt, quemadmodum uisuri sumus cum ad aequalitatem naturae eorum
transmutabimur.
53 More on this in section 3.423.
204
Third Day, is treated as though it w ere n o t soul because it is the low est level in
the hierarchy of life an d does no t clearly m anifest the true character of life.
Rational a n d intellectual life exhibits this m ost clearly, but even sense surpasses
to some extent the confines of the corporeal body. O nly in plants is life confined
w ithin corporeal lim its,54 which obscures life's true character. For this reason,
Scripture excludes this form of life from its treatm ent of living soul.
The defining character of life is independence from body; perfect life has
the pow er to exist independently of bodies.55
Properly speaking, the vital m otion of plants is a species of the universal
life. O f this Eriugena has no doubts, b u t since m any do not share this conviction,
and since it cannot be corroborated directly from Scripture, his A lum nus asks the
N utritor for "som e w eighty authority w ho w ould pronounce openly th at plants
and trees are adm inistered by some species of life."56 This the N utritor does
w ith quotations from Basil,57 Gregory,58 an d A ugustine.59 The quotations from
54 "... and for this reason divine authority decreed that [plant life] should
be num bered rather w ith corporeal num bers than w ith vital" (PP 3: 734C: ... ac
per hoc plus inter corporales numeros quam inter uitales connumerandam diuina sanxit
auctoritas).
55 PP 3 : 734D-735A: ... uerum quoniam extra corpus nil agere praeualet nec
perfectae uitae corporibusque absolutae uirtutem in se manifestat in numeris corporalis
naturae potius quam in speciebus generalis uitae diuina, ut praediximus, auctoritate
deputata e s t...
56 PP 3: 735B: ... tuam praedictam de hac re disputationem graui quadam
auctoritate uelim roborari, quae aperte pronuntiaret herbas arboresque qualicunque
specie uitae administrari.
57 Hexaemeron 7.1 (PG 2 9 :148C; SC 26bis: 392).
58 This citation is the first in w hich E riugena explicitly confuses G regory of
Nyssa w ith G regory Nazianzen: "Gregory of Nyssa, w ho is also called
Nazianzen, brother of Basil" (PP 3 :735D: Gregorius item Nyseus qui etiam
205
Gregory are those, considered in the previous chapter, in w hich he makes his
threefold division o f soul.60
As com pared w ith G regory's division of beings, E riugena has radically
altered the relationship betw een life and corporeality. T rue soul can exist
independently of the body, b u t no body can exist ap art from som e governing
species of life. The crux of this alteration is Eriugena's denial th at bodies are
ouaiai.
G regory's division begins, "Of beings, some are noetic, and some are
bodily." H e th en sets aside the noetic division and proceeds w ith the bodily, "Of
the bodily, som e are entirely devoid of life, and some participate in vital energy"
and so on .61 P orphyry's sim ilar division in the Isagoge is even m ore clearly at
odds w ith Eriugena: "Oucria is itself a genus; u nder th at is body, and under body
is anim ate body, u n d e r w hich is animal; under anim al is rational animal, under
w hich is m an ..." 62 Boethius echoes this: "O f substances, som e are corporeal,
some incorporeal. N ow , of corporeals some are living, som e not; of living some
Nazanzenus uocatur praedicti Basilii germanus frater in Sermone de Imagine...). See
the Introduction.
59 De vera religione 55.109-110.
60 O H 8 : 144D-145A; 15:176C-177A.
61 O H 8 : 145AB. See note 10 above for text.
62 Isagoge (ed. Busse), p. 4,2124: fj ouaia e o n p.ev teal aurf| yevog, irrro Se
TauTT|i' ea riv aaip.at icai irrro to adSp.a e|ii|ux0l/ auip.a, u<J>' o to a)Ou, irrro Se to uiov
Xoyixoi/ Cujou, W> o o auQparrros, irrro Se tou avGpanroi' EwKpdnig icai nXdTaiu icai ol
Kara jiepo? duGporrroi.
206
are sensitive, som e not; of the sensitive some are rational, some irrational."63 All
of these divisions proceed from the assum ption th a t bodies are ouaiai.
For Eriugena life is n o t a body, nor a differentia am ong bodies; it pertains
to ouaia.64 Ironically, Eriugena developed his nonessential account of bodies
using G regory's theory of concourse of qualities, a n account which now sets him
apart from Gregory. If Eriugena differs w ith G regory over the essentiality of
bodies, it is not surprising that he would come into conflict with him on other
points as well.
3.23
Survival o f species
A lthough Eriugena has answered the question w ith which his exposition
of the Fifth Day began, there are other issues to explore. The first one raised is
his puzzlem ent at the opinion of some of the Fathers that the souls of irrational
animals perish w ith the dissolution of their bodies. H e quotes a passage in
which Basil reduces the life of irrational animals to blood, and blood to earth,-65
and he follows it w ith a passage horn Gregory in w hich Gregory argues that
63 Contra Eutychen (Loeb) 2: Sed substantiarum aliae sunt corporeae, aliae

incorporeae. Corporearum vero aliae sunt viventes, aliae minime; viventium aliae sunt
sensibiles, aliae minime; sensibilium aliae rationales, aliae inrationales.
64 Since nonliving bodies are not ouaia, are ouaia and life coterminus
genera? Probably the four elements would be classed, by Eriugena, as nonliving
essential bodies, b u t they are quite different from the m ortal bodies composed of
them. H e w rites of the four elements as a m ean betw een living essences and
their corporeal effects.
65 Hexaemeron 8.2 (PG 2 9 :165D-168A; SC 26bis: 435).
207
where the low er tw o divisions of soul appear alone, w ithout m ind, as in plants
and irrational anim als, 'so u l' is used equivocally: only rational soul is true soul.66
The passage from Basil does dearly deny that the souls of beasts survive
death; G regory's im plies th at beasts have no souls. W hat troubles Eriugena in
both passages is th a t by m aking such a radical distinction betw een rational and
irrational souls, G regory and Basil both m ake life ' an equivocal term and so
contradict the division of universal life that Eriugena has just expounded and for
the substantiation of w hich he drew on their authority. "But if it is as they w ould
have it, w hy is the p rin d p le division of general life the division into rational,
intellectual soul a n d soul lacking reason and intellect?"67 Both rational and
irrational are species of life. By equivocating as they do regarding irrational life,
the Fathers im ply that 'rational' and 'irrational' are opposed to each other in the
way that 'life' an d 'd e ath ' are, that is, as lia b itu s' and privation; whereas in truth,
according to Eriugena, the distinction betw een 'rational' and 'irrational' is not a
contradiction b u t a 'difference' between sp ed es of the sam e genus.68
Eriugena then argues, from the nature of the relation between genera and
species, that if even one of the spedes perishes so w ill the genus.
If therefore after the dissolution of the body one sp ed es remains while
another perishes, how will their genus preserve itself whole? For, as w hen
a genus perishes, it is necessary that every one of its spedes perish, so too
w hen its sp ed es are destroyed, reason understands the genus destroyed.
66 OH 15:176C.
67 PP 3: 737A-B: Sed si ita est ut illi uolunt, cur generalis uitae principalis
diuisio est in animam rationalem et intellectualem et in animam ratione et intellectu
carentem? Obviously, this "prindpal division" does n o t quite tally with the
division offered by Gregory.
68 PP 3: 737B.
208
For a genus is saved in its species an d species in genus. Moreover, if some

of the forms o r species constituted u nder one genus can die and do die,
b u t som e cannot die n o r do so, w hy do w e speak of their genus? Will it
both perish in som e and not perish in others? For w hat suffers som e of its
parts to perish cannot rem ain whole, and for this reason w ould not be a
genus, b u t th e w reck of a genus_
For since a genus is the substantial unity o f m any forms or species,
how will it stand w here the substantial unity o f those m any forms or
species does n o t remain? That m any species are one thing in genus, St.
Dionysius teaches in the chapter, "O n the Perfect an d the One," saying:
'T o r there is no m ultitude which does not participate in one thing, bu t
w hat is m any in the parts is one thing in the w hole, and w hat is m any in
accidents is one thing in the subject, and w h at is m any in num ber or
pow ers is one thing in species, and w hat is m an y in species is one thing in
genus."69
Therefore, if all species are one thing in genus, how will that one
thing in p a rt perish and in part remain? A nd if th at one is a substantial
one, how w ill it perish, since in every creature these three remain
incorruptibly w ithout increase or decrease:70 substance, pow er, and act?71
69 There is a certain am biguity in Ps-Dionysius' text. Cf. DN (Eriugena) 13:

PL 122:1169D-1170A: Et sine quidem uno non erit multitudo, sine autem multitudine
erit unum: sicut et monas ante omnem numerum multiplicatum, et si omnibus omnia
unita quis posuerit, omnia erunt toto unum. Sed itaque et hoc cognoscendum, quia
secundum unum uniuscujusque praecogitata est species, unire dicitur unita, est omnium
est unum exemplar, et si interimas unum, neque universitas, neque pars, neque aliud
aliquid existentium erit: omnia enim in seipso unum uniformiter praeambit et
circumprehendit. Ipsa igitur theologia totam thearchiam, ut omnium causam, laudat
unius vocabulo, et unus Deus pater, et unus Dominus Jesus Christus, unus autem et
ipse spiritus, per super excellentem totius divinae unitatis impartibilitatem, in qua omnia
singulariter connectuntur, et superuniuntur, et adest superessentialiter. O n the one
hand, the One does n o t depend on a m ultitude for its existence; and on the other,
since everything depends on it (there is no other source of being apart from or in
combination w ith it), the O ne m ust in some m anner precontain in itself all that
comes from it. Thus, Ps-Dionysius' m onism seems to entail a relation between
the One and all that comes from it which is correlative, yet at the same time
wholly asymmetrical: all participate in the One, the O ne participates in none.
70 D N 4.23 (PG 3: 724C-725A).
71 PP 3 :737B-C: Si ergo post solutionem corporis una species manet altera perit,
quomodo earum genus totum suum seruabit? V t enim pereunte genere omnis species
illius perire necesse est, ita intereuntibus speciebus illarum genus interire ratio cogit.
209
For Eriugena, the unity of species in their genera is not m erely notional, it is
substantial. The genus-spedes relation is a correlative one, analogous to the
w hole-part relation; the w hole subsists in its p arts a n d the parts subsist in the
whole; parts a n d w hole subsist together in a substantial unity, or not at all.
Therefore, if m an exists together w ith other species in the substantial unity of the
genus 'anim al', ho w will he survive if the others perish? Consequently,
w hatever was said about the survival of the h u m an soul after its body has
returned to the elem ental qualities from w hich it is com posed, m ust also be true
for the souls of the inferior animals.
W hy, then, do the Fathers m aintain the contrary? Eriugena says th at he
does n o t m ean to overthrow their opinion; rather, h e hopes to find a m ore
reasonable w ay o f understanding them .72 In this case, the m ore reasonable way
is suggested by G regory himself. His reason for asserting so strongly the
Genus enim in suis speciebus saluatur et species in genere. Si autem formarum seu
specierum sub uno genere constitutarum quaedam quidem mori possunt et moriuntur,
quaedam uero non possunt mori nec moriuntur, quid de ipsarum genere dicemus? A n et
ipsum in quibusdam peribit, in quibusdam non peribit? Non enim integrum potest
permanere quod quasdam suas partes patitur perdere, ac per hoc non erit genus, sed
generis ruina.... Cum enim genus multarum formarum seu specierum substantialis
unitas sit, quomodo stabit genus, ubi multarum formarum specierumue substantialis
unitas non permanet? Quod autem multae species unum sint in genere sanctus
Dionysius edocet in capitulo de perfecto et uno dicens: "Neque enim est multitudo non
participans unius, sed multa quidem in partibus, unum in toto, et multa accidentibus,
unum in subiecto, et multa in numero aut uirtutibus, unum specie, et multa speciebus,
unum genere."
Proinde si omnes species in genere unum sunt, quomodo illud unum ex parte
peribit ex parte permanebit? Et si Ulud unum substantiate unum est, quomodo periret,
cum in omni creatura haec tria incorruptibiliter sine incremento uel detrimen to
permaneant: substantia uirtus operatio?
72 PP 3: 739A: Sed nemo existimet nos talia dicere ueluti sensum sanctorum
patrum destruentes, sed potius, quid de his rationabilius tenendum pro uiribus nostris
quaerentes ...
210
distinction betw een rational an d irrational souls is th a t too m any men are ready
to live their lives in im itation o f the beasts. A lthough natural reason is d e a r that
every life or soul receives its subsistence from the prim ordial life in which it
partidpates and does so w hether its activity is evident in a body or not;73 still, for
the sake of exhortation it is perhaps not unreasonable for the Fathers to
exaggerate the difference betw een m an and beast
w hich G regory him self openly adm its in chapter 16 of De imagine. For
after he said th at irrational soul is not truly soul, he ad d s a little later: "Let
the lovers of the flesh leam not to bind intelligence so strongly to things
visible to sense, b u t to attend to the privileges o f souls, because true soul is
observed in m en, w hereas sense is held equally w ith irrational anim als."74
Thus, w ithin his exposition of the Fifth Day, Eriugena devdops his genusspedes doctrine w ith Ps-Dionysius' authority and over against Gregory's
distinction betw een rational and irrational soul. It is n onethdess tem pting to
think that this view of the relation between genus and sp ed es reflects a
generalization of G regory's doctrine of the hum an plerom a. To verify such a
hypothesis w ould require a fuller examination of the doctrine of partidpation
73 PP 3 :739B: ... omnis uita siue anima corpus regnans participatione unius
primordialis uitae seu animae participatione animam subsistere seu uitam acceperit,
quam participationem siue in amministratione corporum sit siue non sit omnino deserere
naturalis non sinit ratio.
74 PP 3 :739C: quod ipse Gregorius in xvi capitulo de Imagine plane aperit. Nam
postquam dixit irrationabilem animam non esse uere animam, paulo post subiunxit:
"Discant amatores camis non ualde uisibilibus secundum sensum alligare
intelligentiam, sed in animarum obseruationibus uacare, uera quippe anima in
hominibus considerantur, sensus uero etiam in irrationabilibus aequaliter habetur."
Cf. O H 15:177A: naiSetxrdTw t o u t o t o u ? <j>i\o(7dpKous, pi| ttoA i) t o l ? k c lt'
aicj0T)CTiv 4>aivo|i6voig TrpoaSpap.eiv t t | v Siavoiav, aXX ev ro ts i J j u x i k o l s TrpoTepf||iacn.
TTpoaaaxoXeloQai, a>? T T js aXriQoOg
t o u t o i ? 0ecjpoup.evTis, th s Se aiafhiCTeujs
xal ev ro ts aXoyois t o lc to v exouatis.
211
and p rim ordial causes as derived from Ps-Dionysius, which falls beyond the
scope of this work.
3.24
S p e c ie s a n d in d iv id u a ls
An argum ent for the plausibility of this hypothesis, however, can be m ade
beginning from the fact that in Eriugena's tho u g h t the species-individual relation
in m an,75 the genus-spedes relation generally, and the whole cause-effect
dynamic, all exhibit a correlative relation betw een higher and lower levels o f the
dialectical hierarchy of ouaia such that n o t only the lower would perish w ithout
the higher, b u t the higher without the low er, as well. Eriugena treats these three
relations analogously; he develops the individual-spedes relation with explicit
reference to G regory's doctrine; therefore, it seem s possible that he extended his
Gregorian doctrine of the one analogically to the others. To say that Eriugena
depends solely on Gregory for this doctrine, how ever, is difficult not only
because of Ps-Dionysius' contribution to Eriugena's doctrine of participation, but
even m ore because of Maximus' contributions to b oth his anthropology and his
Christology.76
The im portance of the hum an plerom a to Eriugena is evident from its role
in w hat is perhaps the central problematic of his eschatology: the problem of
dam nation. This role can be seen in a passage from Book 5, which argues th at
Christ did certainly assum e and restore to its proper condition the whole of
75 The difference between the individual-spedes and spedes-genus

relations is n o t as great as for other thinkers (Porphyry, Boethius). He frequently
refers to individuals as "the most specific sp ed es." Likewise 'num bers', w hich
Boethius w ould reserve for the level of individuals, seems for Eriugena to apply
to genera and sp ed es as well.
76 See section 3.4212.
212
hum an n a tu re an d that, therefore, in the dam ned it cannot be their recovered

hum anity th a t is punished b u t something else. The foundation for the argum ent
is laid principally by a long quotation from Gregory77 the passage about the
plerom a quoted above.78 'H um anity' as foreknow n b y G od is not merely a
comm on form shared by an indeterm inate num ber of individuals. H um an
nature is, to be sure, common, the same in all w ho participate in it; but as a
common form , 'hum anity' also constitutes a whole th at comprises and subsists in
a determ inate num ber of individuals. Like the genus-spedes relation in the
77 The G regory passage, however, is introduced b y one from Origen.

78 PP 5 :923A. Cf. Imag. 17:235,22-236,9: Quid ergo est quod de his
cogitamus[?] [S]ermo qui dicit, fecit deus hominem infinita significatione omnem
humanitatem ostendit, non enim nunc cognominatur creaturae adam, sicut in
sequentibus istoria dicit, sed nomen creato homini non aliud quoddam uniuersaliter est
Non igitur uniuersali naturae uocatione tale aliquid suspicari introducimur, quia in
diuina praescientia et uirtute omnis humanitas in prima constitutione comprehensa est.
Oportet enim nil deo infinitum in his quae ah eo facta sunt aestimare sed uniuscuiusque
eorum quae sunt finis et mensura circumponderans factoris sapientia est
Quemadmodum igitur aliquis homo corporis quantitate coartatur, et mensura sibi
substantiae magnitudo est quae in superficie corporis perfidtur, sic arbitror ueluti in uno
corpore totam humanitatis plenitudinem prognostica uirtute a deo omnium
comprehensam fuisse, et hoc docet sermo qui dicit, quia fecit deus hominem secundum
imaginem dei fecit eum. Non enim in parte naturae imago neque in quodam eorum quae
secundum ipsam considerantur gratia est, sed in totum genus aequaliter talis peruenit
uirtus. Signum uero est omnibus similiter animus collocatur dum omnes intellegendi et
consiliandi uirtute habeant, et alia omnia ex quibus diuina natura in eo quod secundum
ipsam factum est imaginahir similiter habet, e ipse in prima mundi constitutione
ostensus homo et post uniuersitatis consumationem futurus aequaliter inseipsis diuinam
ferunt imaginem, propterea unus homo nominatum est omne, quia in uirtute dei nihil
praeterit, nihil instat, sed et quod spectatur aequaliter praesenti comprehensiua
uniuersitatis operatione continetur. Omnis itaque natura quae a primis usque nouissima
peruenit, una quaedam uere existentis imago est. Ipsa uero in masculum et feminam
generis differentia, nouissime constitutioniformationis adiecta est, ob hanc causam ut
arbitror. For the G reek text, see note 12 above.
213
discussion of universal life, the spedes-individual relation is correlative, neither

term subsisting ap art from the other.
There is a crucial am biguity in how Eriugena speaks of "the whole of
hum an nature": the w hole nature as participated in b y each individual, and the
whole as constituted by m ultiple individual participations, th at is, the m ultitude
of individuals united b y the fact that each participates in the w hole nature. For
'hum anity' itself to fare differently in any of the individuals w hich participate it
w ould be a contradiction. To say that Peter's hum anity is saved but that Paul's is
dam ned is to say th at A is both A and not A. There is only one hum anity in Peter
and Paul. This conception does n o t make the num ber of individuals
participating in hum anity p a rt o f our definition of hum anity, b u t it does require
that hum anity m ust exist in all the individuals that in fact participate it and that
none of these individuals m ay perish. This "in fact" does n ot pertain to the realm
of generation (by w hich substances are manifested sensibly to created m inds
through the concourse of accidents) but to the realm of creation (by which the
substances them selves are created within the W ord). Both the species 'hum anity'
and the individual T e te r' are equally ovaia. If hum anity unfolds into this
plurality of individual m en it is because that plurality o f individuals was created
in the unity of the species from the beginning. Oiicria is one and whole.
Consequently, for Eriugena, the universal restoration and liberation of
hum an nature extends to h u m an nature in every h u m an individual. If the
wicked are punished, it is not inasm uch as they are h u m an substances. No part
of the nature w hich C hrist assum ed will be abandoned to sin an d its torments.
"For in none does G od d am n w h at he made, but w hat h e did n o t make he
214
punishes."79 To reconcile the universal restoration of h u m an nature w ith the

eternal punishm ent o f the wicked is, he adm its, a difficult task. Vice is neither a
substance nor a natural accident b u t som e lack of w h at ought to be; how can
such a thing receive punishm ent while the subject in w hich the vice exists is not
punished? It is a difficult notion to grasp.80
79 PP 5 :923C: ... in nullo enim damnat Deus, quod fecit, sed quod non fecit,
punit.
80 PP 5 :940B-D. Eriugena is grappling here w ith the problem of how to
account for the reality of evil (and its punishm ent) w ithout supposing some
ultim ate principle or cause of evil over against the principle and cause of good
just as there can be no eternal m atter over against the Creator. But in the case of
m atter, Eriugena w as able to appeal to the Formlessness of the Wordthe Form
beyond formas the principle of m utability in m utable things. But in no way
does he w ant to m ake G od the principle of evil. Evil m ust arise within the
creature and in such a w ay that the w ork of the C reator cannot be made
responsible for its rise.
Eriugena distinguishes between nature and will. The m otion of rational
nature is distinguished from other natures by the presence of will. Good will is a
m otion in accord w ith nature, but not sim ply reducible to nature; the m otion of a
good will, while rooted in nature, adds som ething to the nature. An evil will
robs the nature of such goods as a good will adds b u t does n ot take aw ay such
goods as belong to the nature as such. Likewise, w hen the evil w ill is punished,
the nature itself is unharm ed. W hat G od punishes is "the irrational m otion of a
perverse will in a rational nature" (PP 5 :944B: Punitur itaque irrationabilis motus
peroersae voluntatis in natura rationabUi... For a fuller account of the sources of sin
w ithin hum an nature, see PP 5 :975A-976B.) Thus, although an evil will cannot
exist as a separate subject of being, as a substance ap art from its nature, it can be
a distinct subject of punishm ent.
The m ortal condition superim posed on h u m an nature because of the first
sinhum an w eakness, ignorance, fragm entation, and m utabilitywill be
rem oved and its original goods restored to all the individuals w ho share in it.
W ith respect to n ature all m en will fare the same, the goods of nature are pure
gift, prior to any m erit (PP 5 :946A-B); the differences come w ith respect to will.
The m otions of good w ill will be rew arded and those of evil will, punished.
215
3.25
Causes and effects

Elsewhere in Book 5 Eriugena's interlocutors, the N utritor and Alumnus,
take u p the question, "W hether the resurrection of bodies is according to grace,
o r according to nature, o r by both w orking together."81 The Alum nus complains
th a t few writers have addressed this question. The N utritor agrees saying that
he h ad found little in the w orks of Latin authors to guide him on this point, so
th at on the basis of his o w n speculation he had come to the conclusion that the
resurrection was entirely the w ork of graceuntil, th at is, he read the Greek
authors, Gregory of N yssa and Epiphanius.
Therefore w hen I thought about this by myself for a long while,
nothing else occurred to m e besides the view th at there w ould be no
resurrection of the dead generally, both good a n d evil, except only by the
grace of the Redeemer of the world, w ith no natural pow er cooperating,
such that if God the W ord had not become flesh, and had not lived among
m en, and had no t assum ed the whole hum an nature, in which he suffered
and resurrected, there w ould be no resurrection of the dead. And as I so
understood, I w as d raw n to w hat he said: "I am resurrection and life;" as
if through his incarnation alone the hum an race w as to receive this general
gift (donum), w ith nothing excepted, namely, the resurrection from the
dead, that is, the restitution and reintegration of the w hole nature of man,
which is constituted in body and soul. A nd if the W ord of God had not
assum ed hum an nature, and had not resurrected in it from the dead, no
one at all w ould have the grace of resurrection, but, like cadavers of other
animals, hum an bodies w ould rem ain perpetually in earthly dust. This
also I thought w hen I heard the Apostle saying th at "God the Word is the
first-born of the dead."
This was m y opinion regarding the resurrection of the dead. But
after I read the Ancoratus, or Sermone defide, of St. Epiphanius, bishop of
Constantia [Salamis] in Cyprus, and the great G regory the Theologian's
disputation De imagine, I changed m y m ind so that, consenting to their
81 PP 5 :898D-899A: Utrum vero resurrectio corporum secundum gratiam, an

secundum naturam, an utraque concurrente sit, quaerendum ...
216
authority and m aking light of m y ow n opinion, I conceded that the

resurrection of the dead w ill be w ith natural pow er.82
The perm anence of true substance, the insubstantiality o f body, the
vocation of hum an nature as "w orkshop" o f creation, and the sublim ation of
low er natures into the higher are all features of nature that m ake the resurrection
a n atu ral event and not one d ependent solely on the grace of the Incarnation.
The perm anence of substance is of prim ary concern here.
Eriugena has aired the provocative suggestion that the resurrection of the
d ead is a m erely natural event, the opposite of w hat he seems to regard as the
traditional Latin view, in w hich the resurrection depends solely on grace.
Nevertheless, the N utritor and A lum nus, after considering the natu re of miracles
generally, quickly settle on a synergistic view in which "the resurrection will be
perfected by both coagents, nature and grace."83 This leads to an exam ination of
82 PP 5:899A-C: Ideoque dum diu per me ipsum de hoc cogitabam, nil aliud
mihi occurrebat, praeter quod resurrectio mortuorum generaliter bonorum malorumque
non nisi sola Redemptoris mundi gratia futura sit, nulla naturali virtute cogente, in
tantum, ut si Deus Verbum caro factum non fieret, et inter homines conversatus non
esset, et totam humanam naturam non reciperet, in qua passus est et resurrexit, nulla
mortuorum resurrectio foret. Et ut sic intelligerem, eo quod ipse dixit, attractus eram:
Ego sum resurrectio et vita; ac si per solam incamationem ipsius generale hoc donum,
nullo excepto, genus humanum acceperit, resurrectionem videlicet a mortuis, hoc est
restitutionem et redintegrationem totius hominis naturae, quae corpore et anima
constituta est. Si autem Dei Verbum humanam naturam non susciperet, et in ea ex
mortuis non resurgeret, nullus omnino resurrectionis gratiam haberet, sed, sicut
ceterorum animalium cadavera, in terreno pulvere perpetualiter humana corpora
permanerent. Hoc etiam putabam, audiens Apostolum dicentem, quod D eus Verbum
sit prim itiae m ortuorum . Haec erat mea de resurrectione mortuorum opinio. Sed
postquam sancti Epiphanii, episcopi Constantiae Cypri, Ancoratum seu sermonem de
Fide legi, magnique Gregorii Theologi de Imagine disputationem, mutavi sententiam, ut
illorum auctoritati consentiens, meamque opinionem parvipendens, resurrectionem
mortuorum naturali virtute juturam esse concederem.
83 PP 5 :902D: Ambabus itaque cooperatricibus, ipsa quidem natura et gratia,
resurrectio perficietur.
217
nature and grace, which in th e end restructures the conceptual m atrix used for
casting the question. The Incarnation of the W ord, and all th a t follows from it,
w as in the first fram ework w holly associated w ith grace; in th e second, the
Incarnation itself pertains to b o th nature and grace. This is n o t so surprising if
one remembers the central p aradox of Eriugena's thought, nam ely, th at in
creation the W ord both creates and is created; that is to say, creation by the Word
and incarnation of the W ord are different perspectives on the sam e creative,
theophanic process. W hat seem s to have been rejected by E riugena after his
encounter w ith the Greeks is a certain, characteristically Latin way84 of
conceiving nature and grace.
3.251
Nature and grace

The resurrection of C hrist is the suprem e miracle, the archetype of which
natural phenom ena are prefigurations.85 From Epiphanius, Eriugena takes a list
of natural types of the resurrection, from the cycle of day and night, daw n being
each day a resurrection from the death of night; to the life cycle of plants, the
seed dying and buried rising again in new life; to the exotic cycle of the phoenix,
84 Eriugena's rhetoric is quite careful, as one m ight expect rem em bering

the pelting he took in the controversy over predestination. In P P 5, he returns
better arm ed to the sam e conceptual field on which the earlier battle had been
pitched. (See Eriugena's De divina praedestinatione liber.) Eriugena m akes his
approach obliquely: surely the Rom an authors had not overlooked such
im portant questions, only their w ritings on this subject had n o t com e into his
hands, so that had h ad to learn from others. (PP 5:899A: Nec ego recorder, me in
latinis codicibus legisse, non quod fortassis de hac quaestione tractatum a quodam nobis
adhuc incognito non sit, ut opinor; non enim putandum est, Romanae linguae auctores
hanc magnam quaestionem intactam praetermisisse, aut notatam non tractasse: sed quod
in manus nostras, si quid inde definitum est, non pervenit.)
85 PP 5 :902C.
218
b o m again of its ow n ashes. These regular natural occurrences m ake plausible,

at least, the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. W ith such types creation,
"m anifesting daily the form of resurrection,"86 rebukes those w ho doubt.
To the examples of Epiphanius, Eriugena adds the argum ent developed in
the exposition of the Fifth D ay regarding the universal life. If a natural pow er is
at w o rk in such natural restorations, "w hy is it surprising if a vital and natural
pow er, w hich never abandons the substance of hum an bodies, w ould be so
pow erful that by his activity the bodies themselves w ould be restored to life and
to the integrity of the whole h u m an n atu re."87 For, although all sensible bodies
pass aw ay and the vital m otion th a t gave them life ceases to operate, still that
vital m otion does not abandon their substances, that is, their substantial forms.
Hence the future resurrection, by Eriugena's account, w ill h appen "by the
effective potency of natural causes controlled by the divine w ill."88 Certainly, he
is n o t disposed to view the resurrection or any miracle as som ething contrary to
nature.
For w e read that G od w orks no miracle in this w orld against nature; but
the divine history relates th a t such theophanies of pow ers are done by the
86 PP 5 :899D-900C: Ipsa enim creatura plane eos redarguit, manifestans

quotidie resurrectionis formam.
87 PP 5 :900C-D: Si ergo in restaurandis rebus humanique corporis partibus
naturalis vis operatur, inque animalibus irrationabilibus resuscitandis, ut praefati
auctoris approbant exempla: quid mirum, si vitalis et naturalis virtus, quae nunquam
substantiam hutnanorum corporum deserit, in tantum praevalet, ut ipsius operatione
ipsa corpora ad vitam restituantur, et ad totius humanae naturae integritatem?
88 PP 5 :902C-D: ... ex causarum naturalium effectiva potentia divinae voluntati
subdita...
219
m oving com m and of G od through efficacious, adm inistrative natural

causes.89
At this point, A lum nus and N utritor come to their conclusion that the
resurrection is b rought about by the cooperation of nature and grace.
The account o f this cooperation so far, however, seem s to b lur any
distinction betw een n atu re and grace. W hat p a rt of this divine adm inistration of
natural causes w ould one call "grace"? The Alum nus therefore asks to
understand the distinction better. A t this point the N utritor replaces the naturegrace fram ew ork w ith a m ore adequate account, one that begins w ith the
recognition th at everything is grace inasm uch as everything is a gift given by the
diffusion of the divine goodness.
In this branch of theory we m ust behold three things: first, the
inexhaustible a n d infinite diffusion of the divine goodness through and in
the things th at have been made; then, the general, tw ofold bubbling forth
of its division, into those things which are given (dantur) and those things
which are given as presents (donantur). Thus, three things m ust be
considered: goodness (bonitas), its gifts (data), its presents (dona)?0
89 PP 5 :902C-D: DISC. ... Nullum enim miraculum in hoc mundo contra

naturam Deum fecisse legimus: sed causis naturalibus administrativis et effectricibus,
jussu Dei movente,factas esse quascunque virtutum theophanias, divina narrat historia.
Et si miraculum miraculorum est generalis mortuorum resurrectio, cujus maximum
exemplum praecessit in Christo, in tantum, ut cetera fere omni naturalia argumenta in
praefiguratione ipsius facta fuisse recte intelligantur: num veritati putandum est non
convenire, nos existimare, ex causarum naturalium effectiva potentia divinae voluntati
subdita ipsam, resurrectionem dico,futuram? MAG. Ambabus itaque cooperatricibus,
ipsa quidem natura et gratia, resurrectio perficietur.
90 PP 5 :903A: In ea siquidem theoriae parte tria quaedam intueri debemus: et
primo inexhaustam divinae bonitatis infinitamque per ea et in ea, quae facta sunt,
diffusionem, deinde ipsius divisionis generalem bipertitamque scaturiginem in ea, quae
dantur, et ea, quae donantur. Tria itaque sunt consideranda, bonitas, ijusque data, et
dona...
220
A lthough Eriugena can appeal to James 1:17 to sanction the distinction

betw een datum and donum?1 both term s m ean "som ething given." W hatever
shade of m eaning m ay separate these synonyms, E riugena's goes beyond it; the
seeming arbitrariness of his distinction serves, though, to em phasize the
underlying unity of the divine goodness. Datum and donum are b u t two modes,
the twofold stream , of the divine giving. The divine is operative in both as both
giver and given.
The datum of the divine goodness is the foundation of the universe as a
whole and the distribution to each creature w ithin it according to generic and
specific reasons. It is the gift by w hich everything is brought into existence.92
Moreover, this gift to all nature is an eternal one. Since every essence and
substance depends entirely on the superessential and supersubstantial goodness
for its being, only a w ithdraw al of the gift could return it to nonexistence. But
the gift is given eternally.
A nd not only does the superessential goodness give all things to be, but
also to be eternally. Every essence and substance is and subsists in no
other w ay except from this superessential and supersubstantial goodness,
which through itself truly is and subsists. For nothing substantial or
essential is good through itself, besides that alone, participation in which
gives (dat) to all to be good, a nd gives as a present (donat) only to the elect
91 Omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a

Patre luminum.
92 PP 5 :903A-B: Datum itaque divinae bonitatis est universitatis substitutio, et
secundum generales et speciales rationes cunctarum creaturarum distributio, quam
superessentialis bonitas, quae Deus est, universaliter omnibus largitur a summo usque
deorsum, hoc est, ab intellectuali natura, quae summa omnium creaturarum est, usque ad
corporalem, que imum et extremum universitatis possidet locum. Summa igitur bonitas
dat universae conditae naturae esse, quoniam ipsam ex non existentibus in existentia
adduxit. N ot surprisingly, this passage is followed im m ediately by a quotation
from Ps-Dionysius (CH 4).
221
to be deified. For no essence o r substance is created by th e divine

goodness, which does not rem ain eternally and unchangeably. Those
things, moreover, which cannot last forever, are accidents superadded to
substances, which are gathered together around them an d will be turned
back into them. Thus, every nature is a datum of the divine goodness,
w hich is brought into essence and perpetually guarded, lest it perish.93
T he im perishable and unchangeable character of oixxta w hich has been discussed
elsew here is here show n here to have the character of an irrevocable, and
therefore eternal, gift.
Being (esse) and etem al-being (aetemaliter esse) are com plem ented by a
th ird , well-being (bene esse).94 This last m em ber of the triad is also necessary for
perfect being. Just as everything th a t truly is m ust be always, so if a thing is truly
to be an d alw ays be then it m ust be well. This well-being, however, is n o t given
as a datum; it is rather "a donum of the divine goodness, added to the free and
good m otion of the will of the intellectual and rational creature," so that well
being is produced by both, free w ill and w hat Scripture calls 'grace' (gratiam).95
93 PP 5 :903C-D: Et non solum superessentialis bonitas dat omnibus esse, verum

etiam aetemaliter esse. Omnis quippe essentia et substantia non aliunde et est et
subsistit, nisi ab ea superessentiali et supersubstantiali bonitate, quae per se vere est et
subsistit. Nullum namque substantiate vel essentiale bonum per se est, praeter ipsam
solam, cujus participatio dat omnibus bona esse, solis electis donat deificari. Nulla enim
essentia vel substantia est divina bonitate condita, quae non aetemaliter et
incommutabiliter permaneat. Ea siquidem, quae perpetuo perseoerare nequeunt,
accidentia sunt substantiis superaddita, et circa eas conglobata, inque eas reversura. Est
itaque datum divinae bonitatis natura omnis, quae in essentiam ducta est, et
perpetualiter custoditur, ne pereat.
94 Cf. Maximus Confessor, Am b. 6.3 (also cf. Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie,
95, an d Sheldon-Williams, "Greek Christian Platonist Tradition"). See PP 3, n. 7.
95 PP 5 :904A: ... ilia insita medietas, hoc est bene esse, donum divinae bonitatis
est, libero ac bono voluntatis intellectualis et rationalis creaturae motu adjuncto. His
enim duobus efficitur bene esse, libera videlicet voluntate, donoque divino, quod gratiam
sacrosancta vocat Scriptura.
222
This donum is distinguished from datum, first, w ith respect to the extent of
its diffusion. It is n o t given universally to all beings but only to m en and angels;
and even to m en an d angels it is not bestow ed on them qua m an o r angel, b u t
insofar as they b u m w ith love for their C reator.96 Secondly, this donum gratiae is
distinguished from datum w ith respect to efficacy, for it accomplishes w hat no
created natu re can, "b u t produces its effects superessentially and beyond all
n atural created reasons."97 This diffusion o f the Goodness is n ot determ ined in
either its extent o r efficacy by the limits of nature.
The datum of being is a delim ited participation in the divine goodness, it is
goodness diffused and ordered through genera and species; b u t the gift of grace
is n o t determ ined by this schema of limitations. It is not given to all creatures or
even to all creatures of a certain genera or species, so the extent of its diffusion
does n o t d epend on such limits; nor is it lim ited by the natural pow ers of those to
w hom it is given, th at is, it is not limited by th at m easure of participation w hich
makes the thing to be and be w hat it is. Its extent and efficacy are determ ined by
a principle other than the nature of the one to w hom it is given. Yet, it is not
entirely divorced from the nature or being of the creature; for, in conjunction
w ith the free w ill of the creature it produces w ell-being.98 In this conjunction the
twofold stream seem s to be unified in its effect as well as at its source.
So w here does the resurrection fit am ong the three, goodness, datum, and
donum? T hat it is a gift of goodness is clear, b u t in w hich mode? Eriugena's
96 PP 5 :904A-B.
97 PP 5 :904B: ... sed superessentialiter et ultra omnes creatas naturales rationes
effectus suos peragit.
98 See note 80 above regarding the relation betw een nature a n d will.
223
N utritor is reluctant to restrict it to one o r the other. H e does n o t w a n t to deny

the perm anence o f the gift o f being by ascribing the resurrection entirely to the
gift of grace. N or does he w ish to deny the faith in Christ, w ho said o f himself, "I
am the resurrection and the life."
Thus, w ith sound faith w e can attribute the pow er of resurrection both to
the 'd a tu m ' of divine goodness according to natural, effective pow er and
to the 'd o n u m ' of this sam e goodness according to the grace w hich far
surpasses all natures.99
'N ature' is the datum w hich takes creatures from nonexistence to existence, the
giving of substance; 'grace' is the donum which takes the elect beyond all
existents into G od him self.100
3.252
S aving the effects, sa v in g the causes

The Incarnation of the W ord is involved in both kinds of gift. The W ord
by his Incarnation n o t only m ediates betw een m an and God, uniting hum anity
and divinity and divinizing those w ho are w orthy, b u t also m ediates betw een the
eternally created causes of the creature a n d its unfolded effects. The totality of
creatures is created in the W ord. W ithin it they exist and live eternally; for,
although the creature is n ot coetem al w ith its Creator, there never w as a time
when the Creator w as n ot the Creator.101 Since the Creator-creature relation is
99 PP 5 :904C: Sana itaque fide possumus attribuere resurrectionis virtutem et

dato divinae bonitatis secundum naturalem effectivam potentiam, et dono ejusdem
bonitatis secundum superexcellentem omnes naturas gratiam.
100 PP 5 :905A: Ut igitur breviter concludamus: natura est datum, gratia vero
donum: natura ex non existentibus in existentia adducit, donum vero quaedam
existentium ultra omnia existentia in ipsum Deum evehit.
101 PP 5 :908B-C. Cf. Augustine, De civitate dei (CD) 12.16, w hich Eriugena
quotes at this point.
224
correlative, and since creation is not an accident to the Creator, the Creator and
creature cannot be separated. The creature thus shares in the eternity of its
C reator.102
Properly speaking everything lives w ithin the W ord, for outside him there
is nothing.103 Nonetheless, a distinction can be made.
For w e say that the universal creature is both w ithin him and outside him
for this reason, that the causes and reasons of things are said to be within
him on account of their similarity a n d simplicity, b u t the effects of these
causes and reasons are said to be outside him on account of a certain
dissimilarity; for they vary in places and times, and are distinguished by
genera and species, properties and accidents.104
Thus, w hile the causes are created eternal in the W ord, their effects, as
differentiated in the process of generation, d e p art from the simplicity of the
W ord and in that sense are outside it.
W hat happens to these effects? Do they sim ply pass away once they have
filled their places and times? Do the causes alone abide forever? To answer
these questions one m ust consider the distinction betw een effects that are
intelligible and those that are sensible. The question of permanence seems to
pertain only to the sensible world; about the intelligible w orld, there seems to be
no doubt: the intelligible world does not perish because it is not susceptible to
102 PP 5 :908D-909A. The creature is n o t coetem al w ith the Holy Trinity

because it is not ampxo? (909B).
103 PP 5 :907B-908B. This is E riugena's interpretation o fjn 1:3: Omnia per
ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est: in ipso vita erat.
i4 p p 5. 907D-908A: Nam et intra ipsum et extra ipsum universam creaturam
dicimus esse, ea ratione, ut intra ipsum dicantur causae rerum et rationes propter
similitudinem earum et simplicitatem, extra vero ipsum effectus earum causarum et
rationum propter quondam dissimilitudinem; locis enim et temporibus variantur,
generibus et speciebus, proprietatibus et accidentibus discemuntur.
225
dissolution and corruption.105 Moreover, it h as been created within the everliving W ord in w hich all is life.106 Thus, the eternity of the causes and of the
intelligible effects seem to be secure because o f their creation in the W ord.
But w hat o f the sensible world? Here there is a curious twist in the
argument. In o rd er to save the sensible effects, the W ord takes flesh and
descends into the sensible world. However, as it turns out, the salvation of the
sensible effects is necessary for the preservation o f the causes themselves.
Thus, G od the W ord of God, in w hom all things are m ade and subsist
causally, according to his divinity descended into the effects of the causes
which subsist in him , that is to say, into this sensible world, receiving
hum an natu re in which every visible a n d invisible creature is contained....
W hy did he descend?... For no other cause, I think, than that he m ight
save according to his hum anity the effects of the causes which according
to his divinity he held eternally and unchangeably; and that he m ight
recall them to their causes, so that in a n ineffable unification w ith them the
effects, as also the causes themselves, m ig h t be preserved. That is to say, if
the W isdom of God had not descended into the effects of the causes w hich
live in him eternally, the reason for the causes perishes: for if the effects
perish no cause w ould remain, just as if the causes perish no effects w ould
remain; for these, by reason of being correlatives arise at the same time,
and fall at the sam e time, or at the sam e tim e and forever remain.107
105 PP 5 :910B.
106 PP 5 :910C.
i7 p p 5: 911D-912B: Deus itaque Dei Verbum, in quo omnia facta sunt
causaliter et subsistunt, secundum suam divinitatem descendit in causarum, quae in ipso
subsistunt, effectus, in istum videlicet sensibilem mundum, humanam accipiens
naturam, in qua omnis visibilis et invisibilis creatura continetur.... Quare descendit?...
Non aliam ob causam, ut opinor, nisi ut causarum, quas secundum suam divinitatem
aetemaliter et incommutabiliter habet, secundum suam humanitatem effectus salvaret,
inque suas causas revocaret, ut in ipsis ineffabili quadam adunatione, sicuti et ipsae
causae, salvarentur. Ac si aperte diceret: Si Dei sapientia in effectus causarum, quae in
ea aetemaliter vivunt, non descenderet, causarum ratio periret: pereuntibus enim
causarum effectibus nulla cause remaneret, sicut pereuntibus causis nulli remanerent
effectus; haec enim relativorum ratione simul oriuntur, et simul occidunt, out simul et
semper permanent.
226
Creation and Incarnation are two sides of the sam e coin. Creation eternally in
the W ord and generation tem porally in genera and species are the two
dimensions o f created being. W hat light does this shed on the earlier discussion
of nature and grace in relation to the resurrection?
Insofar as the Incarnation is necessary for the preservation of beings, it is
not a w ork of grace, b u t an integral m om ent in the datum of naturebeing and
being always. The Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ, of course, are also the
source of the donum, of the grace that cooperates w ith free will to achieve the
creature's being well, above all, the grace o f deification.
3.26
C onclu sion
By reason of being correlatives (relativorum ratione) causes and effects exist
or perish together. Therefore, to save the causes, the effects, too, m ust be saved.
Likewise, the parts of hum an nature even w hen spatially separated are b o u n d to
each other by a logical relation (ratio relationis). For this reason, one can assum e
the im perishability of the substance and life of that nature. This kind of
correlative relation is fairly easy to grasp.
It is less clear w hat kind of correlative relation exists betw een individuals
and their species and betw een species and their genera. Eriugena seems to
suggest that a differentia logically unites the species differentiated by it, so th at if
one of the differentiated species were to d isappear so w ould the other. This is
less clearly the case betw een individuals. A lthough Eriugena som etim es refers to
individuals as "m ost specific species" they seem n o t to be differentiated b y a
differentia b u t only in num ber. Their unity and indivisibility seem to derive
from the fact th a t substantially they all share the sam e species, by virtue o f this
com m union w h a t happens to each qua substance m u st happen to all. Is this w hat
227
Eriugena has in m ind w hen he also speaks of a genus as the substantial unity of its
species?
A lthough Eriugena does n o t claim the sam e logical correlativity betw een a
species and the precise num ber of individuals participating it, he seem s to accept,
as G regory does, that th at num ber is determ inate, p re-encom passed in the
species, so that species and individuals, genera and species, have a quasi-partw hole relation.
G regory's hum an plerom a m ay not be the only influence o n E riugena's
view ,108 b u t Eriugena's notion of universals subsisting only in a determ inate set
of particular subdivisions or individuals suggests an extension of G regory's
plerom a to the whole of ovaia. This extension however has both a n
anthropological and a Christological dim ension that m erits further consideration.
"G od the W ord of God, in whom all things are m ade and subsist causally,
according to his divinity descended into the effects of the causes w hich subsist in
him , th at is to say, into this sensible w orld, receiving hum an n ature in which
every visible and invisible creature is contained."109
In his exposition of the Fifth Day, Eriugena can find no adequate
differentia to distinguish the species of life, 'm an ', and the species, 'angel'. W hat
does distinguish m an is not a differentia b u t the fact that he contains within
him self all differentiae. This m akes hum an nature itself akin to the genus within
108 The m ost obvious other influence to consider is Maximus. Balthasar

designates M axim us' ow n concept o f the reciprocity of univeral a n d particular as
the m ost im portant concept in his w hole thought. "Der Gedanke des
Gleichgewichts und der Gegenseitigkeit von Universal u n d Partikular ist
vielleicht d er bedeutendste in M aximus' gesam tem Denken" (Kosmische Liturgie,
158).
109 PP 5:91 ID. Q uoted above.
228
w hich it is supposed to be a species. Moreover, as a consequence of this unique

relation betw een hum an nature an d the rest o f creation, the W ord o f G od need
only becom e a m an in order to take u p and save all the created effects of the
created causes which are all together and at once in him. O r perhaps one could
say th at hum an nature is the substantial unity of creation as such, of the whole
diffusion of the divine goodness; an d that the union of God and m an in Christ is
not other th an the completed act of creation. The permanence of oiioCa m erely
exhibits the simplicity, inner coherence, and once-and-for-all-ness of this act.
The next two sections consider different aspects of the complex relation
betw een h um an nature and the genera and species contained w ithin this act.
3.3
Man's kinship w ith the anim als

The actual mutability, transience, and sufferings of m an's present, m ortal
life stand in striking contrast to the vision of perm anence which Eriugena says
lies behind the veil. Indeed, Eriugena readily acknowledges that som ething has
gone w rong and that the true nature of reality is obscured by unnatural additions
and irrational motions. The unruliness of this w orld and of empirical m an,
however, does not destroy their true nature, and indeed their true n ature will
once again be apparent. Gregory provides Eriugena w ith a beautiful schem a for
understanding the dynamic involved in m an's (and the world's) creation, fall,
and restoration. It is the description he gives of m an's acquired kinship w ith the
beasts.
This acquired kinship constitutes the fundam ental problematic for
Eriugena's exposition of the Sixth Day. One elem ent of that problem atic pertains
to the opposition between the divine im age of w hich m an is supposed to be the
image and the irrational nature of animals: H ow can m an be both anim al and
image of God? The other elem ent is the very fact of acquiring such a kinship.
229
Since ouaia is one and whole and ever the sam e, how can man be m ade in the
genus anim al if he is n o t destined to rem ain in it?
3.31
G regory on man's kinship w ith the beasts

C om pared w ith his notion of the hum an plerom a or his allusions to an
angelic m ode of propagation, Gregory's teaching on m an's kinship w ith the

beasts is blessedly straightforward. W hen m an receives the animal m ode of
propagation, he also acquired other aspects of irrational nature; above all, he
becomes susceptible to the passions. The presence of the passions obscures the
divine image. W hen the reason which m an has as bearer of the image is used in
service of the passions new evils arise unknow n to irrational nature, the evils of
hum an vice. W hen, however, reason asserts control over the passions, the latter
are transform ed into virtues which once again m anifest the beauty of the divine
image. Nevertheless, the dow nw ard m otion is m ore common, so that only in
such exceptional m en as order their lives aright does one catch a glimpse of
divine beauty.
M an received the animal m ode of procreation because God foresaw that
his will w ould incline tow ard the material w orld. This link to bestial existence
became a spring from which flow the various passions that fill his life, passions
w hich are m anifestly sim ilar to those that move the beasts. A sexual mode of
generation entails this m ore general susceptibility to passion because sexuality is
an integral elem ent of the irrational animal nature w hich exists in the w orld
independent of and prior to m an's participation in it.
In place of angelic greatness of nature, [God] im planted in hum anity the
bestial and irrational mode of succeeding each other. Thence it seem s to
me the great David, lamenting the miseries of m an, bemoaned his nature
230
w ith such w ords as "Man being in h o n o r d id not understand"m eaning

by "honor" his equality w ith the angels. Therefore, he says, 'lie w as
com pared to the unintelligent beasts an d m ade like them ."110 For truly
bestial did he become, who b y n ature inherited this flowing generation
because of his preference for w h at is m aterial. [Chapter break] For, I
think that from that same principle the passions pertaining to it, having
been spread o u t as from some spring, flood into hum an life. Proof of this
reasoning, is the kinship betw een the em otions manifested equally in us
and the irrational animals. For it is n o t w orthy of hum an nature to ascribe
the first principles of its passionate condition to that which was form ed
according to the divine form. But since the life of irrationals preceded him
into this w orld, m an, too, for the cause already mentioned, had som ething
of his nature from it, namely, his m ode of generation, and through this
shared together also in the rest of w h a t is contemplated in that n atu re.111
110 Ps 48:13 LXX. This verse is used often by Eriugena w ith this sam e
interpretation.
111 O H 17-18:189D-192B: ... cxi/tL TTjg dyyeXudjg (leyaAoûiag rou icnr|yu>8T|
Kai aXoyov rfjs
dXXiiXuiy 8ia8ox% Tporrov ep<{>VTeGcrag Tfj ayQpcjTrornTi.
' EurevQev pot S o k c l Kai o peyag Aa(3i8 KaToiKTt6peyog to G dvGpurrrou rr\v
dSXioTTyra, Toiouroig Xoyoig KaTaSpqyacrai rrp' 4>uaiv o n 'AyQponrog ev Tipfj aiy ou
avvf\Ke' Tipf|u Xeywy, Tf|v rrpog ToGg ayyeXoug opoTipiay. Aid t o u t o , <J>Tpi,
Trapacrwe{3Xfi9r| ro ts KTrjyeai rots dyorjToig, Kai (GpoicGQri aGroig. OvTojg y a p
ktt|iaG8tis eyevero o rrp/ poaj8r) rairroy yeveaiv Tfj <j>Gcrei napaSefdpeyog, 8ia Tfjy
trpog t o GXuiSeg pomjy. [Chapter break] O ipai yap c k Tfjg apxijg Taunts Kai Ta Ka0
eKaoTOv TraOr), oloy c k Tiyog TTTiyfjg auvSoGevTa TrXTjppupely ev Tfj dyGparniyq Cwfj.
TeKpfjpioy 8e TiLy Xoyojy, f| rdv Tra&TipdTa)y ovyyeveia, KaTa t o laoy f|ply Te Kai
T o l g aXoyoig ep<|>aiyopevr|. OG yap 8f| Qepig Trj dyQpojTriuT) <J>Gaei, Tfj k o t o t o Belou
eiSog pepop4)ojpUT), Tij? eprraGoGg SiaGeaecjg rrpoapapTupeiy Tag rrpwTag apxag.
AXX' eneiSr) TTpoeicrfjXGey eig Toy Kocrpoy ToGroy f| rQ>v aXoyaiy ajf|, ecrxe 8e t i 8ia
TT|y eipripevniy aiTiay Tfjg eKeiGey <{>Gaeojg Kai o ayGpamog, t o Kara Tf|y yeveaiv
Xeyu, cnjppeTecrxe 8ia t o u t o u Kai Tdiy Xonrcjy Taiy ev eKeivvt Geaipoupeyojy Tfj 4>Gaei.
Cf Imag. 18-19:237,32-238,11: ... pro angelica magnificentia pecudalem et
irrationalem ex se inuicem successionis modum hunumitati inserens, hinc mihi uidetur
naturam quia homo in honore dum esset non intellexit. Honorem dicens aequalem
angelis reuerentiam propterea comparatus set iumentis insipientibus. Uere enim
pecorinus factus est, qui animalem hone generationem accepit propter ad materiale
inclinationem. [Chapter break] Arbitror enim ex hoc principio etiam singulas
passiones ueluti ex fbnte quodam inundationem in humana uita conditas, confirmat
autem rationem ipsa passionum cognatio aequaliter et in nobis et in irrationabilibus
manifestata. Non enim iustum est in humana natura ad diuinam speciem formata
passibilis affectus perhibere principia, sed quoniam praecessit in hunc mundum
irrationabilium uita, habeat autem aliquid propter causam praedictam ex uita quae ibi
t
231
Irrational anim ality has its ow n integrity w ith in the created order, and hum anity,
for the sake of the procreational element, becom es entangled in that nature as a
w hole. Sexuality cannot be isolated and abstracted from the broader context o f
anim al nature.
W ithin the context of animal life, passions have positive value. Only
w h en transferred into the hum an context do th ey becom e problematic; indeed,
only then do they deserve their pejorative designation as "passions." Gregory
has in m ind such m otions as in the hum an context are called anger, lust, greed,
fear, an d so on.
These, therefore, hum an nature draw s u p o n itself from its irrational part.
For w ith them irrational life w as secured for the preservation of itself, b u t
w hen these sam e things are participated in for the sake of hum an life, they
become passions. For w ith anger the flesh-eaters are preserved; love of
pleasure saves those animals prolific in offspring; cowardice saves the
weak, and fear, those w ho are easily taken by the stronger, and gluttony,
those w ith m uch flesh. Moreover, to the irrational anim als falling short of
anything th at gives pleasure is an occasion of pain. All these things, and
their like, enter in together with the constitution of m an through his
bestial genesis.112
est, etiam homo quod secundum generationem dico propterea etiam reliqua quae ibi
considerantur naturae comparticipauit.
112 O H 18:192B-C: Tairra toiuvv etc tou aXoyou p.epoug f| di/Qperrrti/Ti cfuaig
rrpog eairrfji/ eifeiXtcuCTaTO. Oig yap f| aAoyog a)f| -rrpog cmmjpTicrii/ eairrfjg
f|CT(faXLcr9T], Tairra rrpog rov ai/Gpanru/oi/ p.eTei/ex0i/Ta Plou, rra&n eyeveTo. Oup.cI>
fiei/ yap crwrqpeLTaL Ta u>p.oP6pa tfiXTiSoiaa 8e Ta rroXiryoi/oOt/Ta r&v Cdxnv aoiCei*
to u dvaXKiv T) SeiXLa, xai to v eiiaXwTov Totg IaxvpoTepotg o <J>c>Pog, T6v; Se
rroXuaapKOV' f) XaL|iapyta. Kai to StapapTelu oimvocrovv Tail/ xaG' f|8ovr|i/, Xurrpg
irrroGeaig ev Toig aXoyoig ecrrl. Taura rravTa Kai Ta Toiaura Sia Tfjg KTqi/wSoug
yeveaecog crweicrfjXGe Tfj to o avGpdirrou KaTaaKeufj.
Cf. Imag. 19:238,15: haec itaque ex irrationabili parte humana natura ad
seipsam attraxit. In his enim irrationabilis uita ad conseruationem suam munita est haec
ad humanam uitam transducta passiones factae sunt, furore enim conseruantur came
uescentia. Uoluptatis uero amorfaecunda animalia saluat infirmum formido
expugnabilem ex fortioribus timor, corpulentum edacitas et reiectio, a nullo itaque eorum
quae secundum libidinem sunt tristitiae materies in irrationabilibus est. Haec omnia et
his similia ex pecudali generatione in constitutionem hominis cointrauerunt,...
232
There is nothing blameworthy in the ferocity of a lion, the constant grazing of the
elephant, the timidity of the rabbit, and so on. Only in man do these motions
become blameworthy; for, although he has acquired the devices by which the
irrational nature is established and preserved in the world, he is still bound to
live according to reason; these devices should not be allowed to supplant that
device proper to his own nature.
"Man bears a twofold likeness to opposite things,"113 God and beast. This
contradiction within him must be resolved in one direction or the other. Either
reason yields to and serves his irrational impulses, or it masters and controls
them.
Often reason is alienated because of the preference and disposition toward
the irrational, the better is covered over by the worse. For when someone
has dragged the reasoning activity down to those things, and has forced
the rational part to become the servant of the passions, the good
impression is perverted into an image of the irrational, as the whole
nature is remodeled to it, the reason, as it were, cultivating the beginnings
of the passions and out of a few increasing them into a multitude.114
113OH 18:192C: outcj p.oi Sotcei SurXfju 4>epeiv o dvGpoyrros irpos Ta evavria
T fjv 6 p .o io T T y r a \..
Cf. Imag. 19: 238,26-27: sic mihi uidetur homo duplicem ad contraria ferre
similitudinem...
114 OH 18:192D: IToXXaKis Se Kai o \oyos dTrotcniiADimii 8ia Tfjs Ttpos to
akoyov poTrrjs tc Kai SiaGeaecos, oiryKaXvrrraji' to KpelTTOi' rtp xelpovi. ETTeiSdv yap
Tis rrpos' Tairra t t | i ; Siai/OTiTucrjv evipyeiav Ka0eXid;aT|, Kai irrrripeTTiu yeveaQai tcDu
traQdii/ tov Xoyiagdv eK{SidaTyrai, -rrapaTpo-rni tis ytveTai tou a y a 0ou xapaicriipos
TTpog tt]i/ aXoyoi/ eiKOva, TTdcrqs irpo? touto p.eTaxctpaaaop.evai? rfjs <j>uaeo)9 ,
KaGarrep yetopyouirro?
TrXfj0O9 6Trauôirro9.
too
XoyLap.oC Tas Tali' TraGTip.drwi' apxds, Kai Si oXlyaji' ei?
Cf. Imag. 19: 238,29-36: Saepe autem ratio perimitur ab ipsa inclinatione et
affectione ad irrationabile quod id quod melius est, in deteriori abscondit. Nam cum quis
ad haec intellectualem operationem adtraxerit ministramque fieri passionum
cogitationem coegerit. Conuersio quaedam fit boni caracteris ad irrationabilem
imaginem, omni intellectuali operatione ad hoc transfigurata, dumque ueluti agricola
233
Thus, for exam ple, the irrational impulse of anger is cultivated into malice, envy,
hatred, conspiracy, and so on; and similarly for other passions. In the beasts an
im pulse flares up and dies away, only w ith reason do they become sustained and
nourished, so th at "all the things that arise horn each of the irrational im pulses of
the beasts, through the evil use of them by the m ind, becom e vices."115
The above description of rational nature taking on the im age of the
irrational repeats in different terms the truth expressed by Gregory's m etaphor of
the m ind as a m irror. Properly oriented toward G od, it shines w ith divine
beauty; but if it turns itself tow ard the lower nature, w hich it is its proper destiny
to illumine w ith the divine beauty, then it reflects not beauty, b u t the ugliness of
the naked m aterial and irrational nature. The present description, perhaps even
more than the m etaphor of the mirror, emphasizes the perversion of nature as
the source of evil: vice is not the ugliness of a lower nature sim ply, but of a
higher nature corrupting itself w ith the likeness of the lower.
The tension w ithin m an m ay be resolved otherwise, though not often, so
strong is the dow nw ard pull. The upw ard path, how ever, is the one m an m ust
take, if his true nature is to be apparent. The m ost striking thing in Gregory's
view of the u pw ard p ath is the claim that the irrational im pulses can have a
positive value even though they are naturally opposed to reason.
If the reasoning p a rt should assume control o f such m otions, each of them
is changed over into a form of virtue. For anger m akes manliness,
tim idity safe conduct, and fear obedience, hatred produces a turning away
cogitatio passionum prindpia et deliberationum cooperationem apud seipsam in
multitudinem coauget ...
115 O H 193B: Kai Ta K a0 eKaaTov trdvra Tfjs KTqi/ujdous- aXoyiag
d<t>opfj.Ti8evTa, 8ia Tfjs -rrovTipd? tou uoO xpn^cu? xaxia eyivero.
Cf. Imag. 19:239,8-10: per singula omnia pecudalis irrationabilitatis occasione
per malignum animi usum malitia facta est.
234
from vice, a n d the affectionate pow er the longing for w hat is truly
beautiful. The p ro u d part of character rises above the passions, and
willfulness preserves one unenslaved by vice A nd so one finds that
every such m otion, being raised up together w ith the loftiness of reason, is
configured w ith the beauty of the divine im age.116
M an's secondary passionate nature, then, is like another material
distinguishing the im age from its prototype, b u t capable nonetheless of receiving
the stam p of the im age. The image can be restored in m an even in com bination
w ith his superadded irrational nature. The low er w hen properly subordinated to
the higher is lifted up together with the higher, sharing its form and destiny.
Gregory's brief description of the sublimation of passion into virtue has an
im portant place w ithin Eriugena's account of the sublim ation of lower levels of
nature into higher as effects return into the stability of their causes.
3.32
Eriugena on man's kinship w ith the beasts

As noted earlier in the sum m ary of E riugena's interpretation of the Sixth
Day, Eriugena begins w ith a theological interpretation of the words, "Let the
earth bring forth living soul." 'Soul', he says, signifies by synecdoche the w hole
116 O H 18:193B-C: eifrep o Xoyiapos Tail/ toioOtoji/ Kii/Ti|idTa)i/

dvTipeTaXdpoL to icpaTos, els apeTfjs elSog eicacrroi/ toutgji/ di/TLpe0icrraTai. rioiet
yap o pei/ 0upos tt|i/ ai/Spiai/, to Se SeiXoi/ tt|i/ d<7<f>dXeiai/, Kai o <j>6(k)S tt|i/
evneLGeiav, to plaos Se tt)v tt^s Kaiaas dmxrrpo<t>f|i/, t\ Se dyaTnyriKT| Suvapi? tt)v
rrpos to dXT]0d)s KaXoi/ emQupiai/. To Se yaupoi/ too Tj0ou<r irrrepaipei rQv
rra0T|pdTaii/, Kai aSouXarrot/ irrro too kokoO StaûXdcraeL to <J>p6i/npa.... Kai ouTaig
earn/ eupeti/, o tl t o v to toloutoi/ Kii^pa tw vr|>t|Xcp Tfjg Siai/oias oui/eTraipopevoi/,
t w k o t o TT|i/ 0elav eiKOi/a KaXXei aoaxripaTiCeTaL.
Cf. Imag. 19:239,10-: Similiter igituret hoc iterum cogitatio talium motuum
potentiam in contrarium receperit in uirtutis speciem unumquodque talium
transmutabitur,facit enim furor fortitudinem,formido tutelam, timor credulitatem,
odium ex malitia reditum, amatoria uirtus ueri boni concupiscentiam, elatio morum
superat passiones, ac liberam a malo custodit sapientiam ... Ac sic est inueniendum, quia
semper altitudo intelligentiae per seipsam mota confinitatem pulchritudini quae est
secundum diuinam imaginem conformat,...
235
living animal, body and soul. A nother exam ple of synecdoche is the statem ent,
"The W ord became flesh," w here 'flesh' signifies the whole hum anity o f Christ,
a s it does also in the statem ent "the spirit is w illing b u t the flesh is w eak."
Because the W ord took o n the w eakness of flesh, he was able to suffer the
Passion of the Cross. The 'sp irit' referred to is the Holy Spirit w hich he
com m ended to the Father as he died.117 These examples, introduced to elucidate
a rhetorical figure, introduce a long quotation from Epiphanius on ho w the
W ord, though impassible by nature, w as able to suffer by virtue of the hum anity
h e had taken to himself. H is spirit w hich he com m ended to the Father from the
cross w as the Holy Spirit, sent forth to renew the face of the earth.118
In one of the higher m eanings of the text, Eriugena explains, 'e a rth ' can be
taken to signify the solid, substantial totality of nature, both visible a n d invisible,
to w hich has been added certain other m em bers as a consequence of sin. These
additions to nature m ust be m ortified before nature can be restored to its original
state. This restoration is com pleted by Christ, w ho w as sinless, through his death
a n d Resurrection. By the sending forth of the Holy Spirit, the purification
accom plished in the H ead will be accomplished in the whole universal creature
a t the general resurrection of all things.119
H aving said this m uch about the eschatological return of creatures to their
tru e nature, Eriugena then turns to a closer consideration of this universal nature
signified by 'earth'. This universal nature is a hierarchical, dialectical order.
117 PP 4: 744B-745A.
118 PP 4 :745A-746C; E piphanius, Ancoratus 92 ff. & 69 (Madec, Jean Scot et
ses auteurs, 38).
119 PP 4 :747A-C.
236
H ence the text says, "Let the earth bring forth living soul in its genus, and beasts
of b u rd en and reptiles and beasts of the earth according to their species."
H e p u ts the genus first, because in it all species both are contained and are
one. A nd it is divided and m ultiplied in them through general forms a n d
m ost specific species; which he show s b y saying, "and beasts of burden
and reptiles and beasts of the earth according to their species." By this it is
understood th at th at art which divides genera into species, and resolves
species into genera, which is called SLoXeicTiiav is not m ade by hum an
contrivances, b u t is established in the n a tu re of things by the author of all
arts th at are truly arts, and are discover b y the wise, and used for utility
by a skillful investigation of things.120
The principal exegetical and philosophical question of Eriugena's
exposition of the Sixth Day is, W hether or not m an is included in the genus of
living soul o r stands apart from it. The text says, "A nd G od made the beasts of
the earth according to their species and the beasts of b u rd en and every reptile of
the earth in its genus, and God saw that it w as good and said, 'Let us make m an
in o u r image and likeness.'" It would seem th at m an is not m ade in the genus of
anim als since he is distinguished from all the oth er anim als as being m ade in the
im age and likeness of G od.121 Nonetheless, Eriugena reads the text as saying that
m an w as indeed established in the genus of anim al, b u t that as a spiritual being
he also transcends this genus. Man has a twofold creation.
12 p p 4. 748D-749A: Primo genus posuit, quoniam in ipso omnes species et

continentur et unum sunt, et in eas dividitur et multiplicatur per generales formas
specialissimasque species. Quod etiam ostendit dicens: Jum enta et reptilia et bestias
terrae secundum species suas. Ac per hoc intelligitur, quod ars ilia, quae dividit
genera in species, et species in genera resolvit, quae SiaAeKTifcq diciter, non ab humanis
machinationibus sit facta, sed in natura rerum, ab auctore omnium artium, quae vere
artes sunt, condita, et a sapientibus inventa, et ad utilitatem solerti rerum indagine
usitata.
121 p p 4; 750D.
237
W hat is like to the animals was created w ith the animals, but w h at is like
to the spiritual creatures, through itself and absolutely, w as created w ith
the spiritual creatures. Do not be disturbed b y this, that I said th at m an
was p roduced from the earth w ith the other anim als in one and the same
genus, a n d also that beyond the nature of all animals he was m ade in the
image an d likeness of God.122
H ow is this duality to be understood? The problem is similar to that
encountered in the exposition of the Fifth D ay w hen Eriugena sought a logical
differentia to distinguish m an and angel in the rational/intellectual species of
universal life, only here it is the hum an-anim al relation that is in question.123
The N u trito r and Alum nus explore various possibilities as they search for
a p roper articulation of m an's duality and his relation to the genus 'anim al'.
Does this duality m ean that man has two souls, an anim al soul and a soul m ade
in the image o f God? Perhaps the hum an soul, though one, is composed of
diverse parts? No. Like Gregory, Eriugena is uncom prom ising in his affirmation
that the soul is absolutely simple; although possessing a plurality of motions, it is
122 PP 4: 753C: Quid igitur mirum, si duplex hominis conditio intelligatur, cum
ipse quodammodo duplex sit? Et quod animalibus simile est, cum animalibus, quod
autem spiritualibus per se et absolute, cum spiritualibus creari. Ac per hoc non te turbet,
quod dixi, hominem cum ceteris animalibus in uno eodemque genere de terra productum,
et ultra omnium animalium naturam ad imaginem et similihidinem Deifactum.
123 In his exegesis of the Sixth Day, Eriugena does not repeat the division
of the genus life w hich he developed in connection w ith the Fifth Day. Here no
attem pt is m ade to include angels in the discussion; the animals under
consideration are all of the corporeal sort. 'A nim al' does not have as broad a
sense as the t o u io u m ight in Greek. Eriugena is precise in his use: "an anim al is
the connection of body and soul with sense" (est enim animal corporis et animae
cum sensu connexio) (PP 4 :751C). He does devote m uch space to the relation
betw een h u m an and angelic nature, b u t anim al and angel are always clearly
opposed; no effort is m ade to gather them again into a common genus.
238
everywhere a w hole.124 The whole soul is created in the genus of the anim als,
and the w hole soul is created in the image o f G od.125
H ow is it, then, th at m an is both an anim al and not an animal? For surely
one cannot hold th at anim als are m ade in the im age of God. As for G regory the
opposition betw een G od and irrational nature is absolute. Eriugena m akes two
observations. First, "am ong the wise it is held that the universal creature is
contained in m an."126 The division of the w hole creature is fivefold: corporeal,
living, sensitive, rational, and intellective. All of these divisions are contained in
man: together w ith the anim als he is corporeal, living, and sensitive; by reason
and intellect he shares in the celestial essence. This insight provided the solution
to the difference betw een m an and angel in the exposition of the Fifth Day, and
assumes crucial im portance here, as well. U nfortunately, it is not easy to
reconcile w ith the earlier statem ent that m an is wholly m ade in the genus anim al
and wholly m ade in the im age of God, since following this microcosmic
approach to h um an nature, he says that in intellect "he is entirely lacking in
animality. In th at p a rt of him he is m ade in the image of God, to w hich alone
God speaks in m en w ho are receptive."127
124 p p 4; 754A-754D.
125 PP 4 :754D-755A.
126 PP 4 :755B: Constat enim inter sapientes, in homine universam creaturam
contineri.
127 PP 4: 755C: Communicat autem eis, in quantum corpus est, et vita corpus
regitans, et sensus, et memoria rerum sensibilium phantasias tractans: in quantum vero
divinae caelestisque essentiae particeps est, non est animal, ratione autem et intellectu
aetemorumque memoria caelestem participat essentiam. Jbi igitur omnino animalitatis
expers est. In ilia siquidem parte sui ad imaginem Dei facta est, ad quam solam in idoneis
239
Eriugena's second observation seeks to m itigate this difficulty som ewhat.

While providing no citation, it comes close to the position suggested by Gregory
in De opifido hominis. Animality, properly integrated w ith intellect, does not
necessarily threaten the divine image; there is a n am biguity in saying that m an is
an animal: the term m ay refer to his n ature or to his w ay of life. Insofar as
animality refers only to his nature, m an m ay be both anim al and spiritual, but
inasmuch as it refers to his w ay of life, he is either anim al or spiritual.
Even in this life, before the whole, w hich in m an is animal, is turned into
the spiritual, and everything th at is com posite in him is unified in an
ineffable sim plicity, the whole m an can be m ade both anim al and
spiritual. H e becomes animal by free w ill alone, b u t spiritual by free will
together w ith grace, w ithout w hich the natural pow er of the will in no
w ay suffices to change m an into spirit. Therefore m an became and is
called anim al, w hen the m otions w hich m ove according to reason and
intellect around the knowledge of C reator and creature were abandoned
and he fell by a su d d en appetite into the irrational m otions by w hich the
brute anim als are move around desires o f the body, so that with deadly
pleasures he gorges his whole consciousness w ith tem poral and fragile
things that tend tow ard nonbeing: but he becomes spiritual when,
inflamed b y the fire of divine live, his w hole w ay of life is changed tow ard
the better, w hen the world and every m anner of flesh are spum ed and all
anim al m otions are abandoned, and as a w hole he is transform ed into the
likeness of the celestial essences, so that w h a t will be in him as an
unchangeable substance, begins in him as the quality of a life adorned
w ith the virtues.128
hominibus loquitur Deus. This is followed im m ediately by a quotation from
Augustine, CD 11.2.
128 pp 4 . 755D-756B: Et notandum, quod etiam in hac vita, priusquam totum
quod in homine animale est, vertatur in spirituale, et omne, quod in eo compositum est,
in ineffabilem adunetur simplititatem, potest totus homo et animalis fieri et spiritualis;
sed animalis sola libertate arbitrii, spiritualis veto et libero arbitrio simul et gratia, sine
qua naturalis potentia voluntatis movere hominem in spiritum nullo modo suffidt.
Animalis igitur homo et f it et didtur, quando, relictis motibus, qui secundum rationem et
intellectum sunt area cognitionem Creatoris et creaturae, in motus irrationabiles, quibus
animalia bruta area corporis desideria moventur, spontaneo appetitu deddit, ita ut totam
suam intentionem temporalium fragiliumque rerum et ad non esse tendentium letiferis
240
Thus, as in Gregory's account, m an 's anim ality can b y transform ed by virtue in a

condition compatible w ith the divine image, even before his eschatological
transform ation.
These observations, how ever, do not deal w ith th e dialectical problems
associated w ith m an's peculiar w ay of belonging to the genus anim al. After a
discussion about the difference betw een differentiae, w hich distinguish species
w ithin, an d therefore coexist w ithin, a genus, and contradictories, which cannot
sim ultaneously exist in the sam e subject,129 the A lum nus again asks how it can
be that "m an is an animal" an d "m an is not an anim al" are both true, since for
other anim als "they are anim al" is entirely true and "th ey are n o t anim al" is
entirely false?130
H ere the N utritor gives the astonishing answ er th at, as the image of God,
m an transcends the law of noncontradiction.
W hat therefore is so am azing if concerning m an, w ho alone among the
o th er animals is m ade in the image of God, it can be said a t the same time
th at he is an animal an d th at he is not an anim al? By this, if for no other
reason, w e understand th at that animal is m ade specifically in the image
of G od, concerning w hich assertions contradictory to each other when
delectationibus ingurgitet: spiritualis vero, dum mutata omni conversatione in melius,
divini amoris incendio inflammatus, mundo et came ontni modo spretis, omnibusque
animalium motibus relictis, ad caelestium essentiarum similitudinem totus
transformatur, ut, quod eifuturum est secundam inconversibilem substantiam, hoc in eo
praecedat secundum vitae virtutibus omatae qualitatem.
129 Eriugena's thought seem s to be that the subject of differentiae for
species w ithin a genus is the genus. The genus can sim ultaneously be the subject
of diverse differentiae as long as they are not m utually contradictory because the
sam e subject cannot be and n o t be in the same respect a t the sam e time. This
seem s to be Eriugena's understanding of the law of noncontradiction. The divine
nature an d its created image, how ever, transcend its application.
130 PP 4: 757B-C: Et cur hoc in homine solo, in ceteris vero animalibus nullo
modo, in quibus omnino verum est, animal esse, animal autem non esse omnino falsum.
241
applied to oth er anim als are predicated truly a n d a t the sam e time.
Furtherm ore, w hat w onder, if affirmations a n d negations of the divine
essence are fitting, since he surpasses all things w hich are m ade by him
and of w hich he is the cause, to w hom it is n o t perm itted to spy out?
N egations a n d affirmations of his im age and likeness, w hich is in m an, are
likewise fitting, since he surpasses other anim als, am ong which he is
created u n d e r one genus, and for the sake of w hich they are created. For
w ho of the w ise is rightly ignorant that this visible w orld w ith all its parts,
from the highest to the lowest, w as m ade on account of m an, so that he
m ight rule it, and have dom inion over all visible things? This St. Gregory
teaches in De imagine w ith these words: ..-131
(Here Eriugena appeals to a passage of De imagine concerning the special rank
assigned to m an as one intended to rule over the w hole creation.132)
M an's likeness to the superessential God results n o t only in paradoxes of
predication, b u t in deeper, paradoxical m odes of existence, such as God has. Just
as God is w holly im m anent in the world, as a w hole a n d in its parts, and yet
wholly transcends it; so also m an, in his ow n sphere, is w hole in the whole and
whole in the parts, w hile also transcending the whole. H um an nature even
transcends itself inasm uch as it is able to cleave to its C reator (although it cannot
131 PP 4: 758A-B: Quid igitur mirum, si de homine, qui solus inter cetera
animalia ad imaginem Dei foetus est, vere simul possit praedicari, homo animal est, non
est animal homo, ut per hoc saltern intelligamus, ad imaginem Dei illud animal
specialiter esse conditum, de quo pugnantia sibimet in aliis animantibus proloquia vere
simul praedicantur? Porro si propterea divinae essentiae affirmationes et negationes
conveniunt, quoniam superat omnia quae ab eafacta sunt et quorum causa est, cui non
liceat prospicere, negationes et affirmationes imagini et similitudini ejus, quae in homine
est, unanimiter convenire, quandoquidem superat cetera animalia, inter quae sub uno
genere conditus est, et cujus causa condita sunt? Quis enim recte sapientium ignorarit,
hunc mundum visibilem cum omnibus suis partibus, a summo usque deorsum, propter
hominem essefactum, u t ei praeesset, et dominaretur omnium rerum visbilium? Quod
sanctus Gregorius in sermone de Imagine his verbis edocet:...
132 pp 4: 758C; cf. O H 3 : 133C-D; Imag. 3: 212,41-213,8.
242
do so in the conditions of m ortal life).133 This sphere, in which hum anity is

w holly present, is none other than the whole universal creature referred to
earlier, "because in him every creature is established, an d in him it is bound, and
into him it reverts, and through him it is to be saved." For in m an there is every
kind of creature: m ind, reason, sense, life, and b o d y b u t not the body as w e
know it.134
Up to this point Eriugena's exposition discussion has only occasionally
referred to the state of m an before the fall; for the m ost p a rt he has addressed
him self to hum an nature as w e know it. Now, how ever, Eriugena breaks off and
focuses on the misery w orked in hum an nature by sin.
The rational a n d intellectual nature, although it did not wish to be
tricked, was nonetheless able to be deceived, especially w hen it had n o t
yet received the perfection of its formation, w hich it w ould have received
by the m erit of obedience in being transform ed in theosis, that is,
deification. Therefore w e ought not to judge hu m an nature according to
w hat appears to bodily senses, and by m erit of falsehood as a penalty is
b o m tem porally and corruptibly into this w orld through copulation o f the
sexes in the likeness of the irrational anim als; b u t according to w hat w as
created in the image of G od, before he sinned, w hich moreover
incomprehensibly flees every bodily sense a n d every m ortal thought
because of the ineffable dignity of its nature, bu t w as deceived and fell,
blinded by the shadow s of his own crooked will, an d handed over itself
and its Creator to oblivion.
And this is his m ost miserable death, an d deepest subm ersion into
the fog of ignorance, the longest distance from itself and its Creator, an d
its near and m ost disgraceful similarity to irrational and m ortal animals;
from which again no one could redeem, recall, lead back and restore it to
its pristine state from w hich it had fallen, b u t the W isdom of God, w hich
created it, and received it into unity of substance w ith himself, so that he
133 p p 4 : 759A-C, 759D.

134 PP 4 :760A: Humana siquidem natura in universitate totius conditae naturae
tota est, quoniam in ipsa omnis creatura constituta est, et in ipsa copulata est, et in
ipsum reversura, et per ipsum salvanda.
243
m ight thus save it, and has freed it from all misery.... Everything th at its
C reator created in it primordially, rem ains whole and integral, though
h idden till now , awaiting the revelation of the sons of God.135
This attention to the miseries of m an's present condition, as well as the
rem inder th at the future elimination of these m iseries is sim ply a return to the
original state of his nature, brings new questions to the fore. The prim arily
exegetical question, W hether one should read the sacred text to say that m an was
created in the genus of animals, is set aside for others: Was m an an anim al
before he sinned? W ould he have been an anim al if he had not sinned? In other
w ords, is all anim ality in m an a consequence of sin? The exegesis of the Sixth
Day so for indicates that he was an anim al quite apart from sin, b u t w hy then
does the Psalm ist treat m an's likeness to the other animals as a disgrace resulting
135 PP 4: 760D-761B: Natura siquidem rationalis et intellectualis, quamvis

noluit falli, potuit tamen detipi, praesertim cum nondum fbrmationis suae perfectionem
acceperit, quam merito obedientiae esset acceptura in theosin, deificationem dico,
transformanda. Non ergo debemus de Humana natura judicare, secundum quod
corporeis sensibus apparet, et merito praevaricationis poenaliter ad similitudinem
irrationabilium animalium per copulam sexuum in hoc mundo nastitur temporaliter
corruptibiliterque, cujus finis mors est, verum secundum quod ad imaginem Dei,
priusquam peccaret, condita est. Quod etiam omnem sensum corporeum, omnemque
mortalem cogitationem pro ineffabili naturae dignitate incomprehensibiliterfugit, sed
decepta et lapsa, pravae suae voluntatis tenebris obcaecata, et seipsam et Creatorem sui
oblivioni tradid.it. Et haec est miserrima mors ipsius, profundissimaque in caligine
ignorantiae submersio, et a seipsa et a Creatore suo longissima distantia, irrationabilibus
vero mortalibusque animantibus proxima turpissimaque similitudo; ex qua iterum nemo
earn potuit redimere, revocare, reducere, et ad statum pristinum, de quo cetiderat,
restaurare, sed Dei sapientia, quae earn creavit, eamque in unitatem sibi substantiae
accepit, ut sic earn salvaret, cuncta liberavit miseria....
Omne siquidem, quod in ea conditor suus primordialiter creavit, totum
integrumque manet, adhuc tamen latet, revelationem filiorum Dei expectans.
244
from his fall? "M an w hen he was in honor, d id n o t understand, and w as

com pared to the unintelligent beasts, and w as m ade like them."136
Like G regory Eriugena again m oderates this opposition: M an's m ere
likeness to anim als in itself is not his disgrace, b u t his participation in their
irrationality is, and especially that evil choice b y w hich he abandoned the beauty
of the divine im age for the form of the beasts th at are below him .137 This m ore
neutral evaluation of m an's animality, how ever, is still underm ined by the
prospect of m an 's state after the resurrection w hen he w ill be equal to the angels.
But w h a t sane w ise m an w ould believe th at the future transform ation of
m an is, as it w ere, from an inferior anim al to a superior animal, from
earthly to heavenly, from tem poral to eternal, from mortal to im m ortal,
from m isery to happiness, b u t rather th at all the things that are
understood or perceived to be comm on betw een holy m en and anim als,
will be transferred by some ineffable m utation into that celestial and
incom m unicable essence lacking all anim ality, w hich would also have
been m an 's if he h ad not sinned? W hy therefore was m an created in the
genus of anim als w hich are produced from the earth, in which genus he
will n o t rem ain forever?138
This passage, w hich sum m arizes, even as it dism isses, a certain traditional
approach to understanding the progress of hum an nature through its creation,
fall, and redem ption, highlights the three im portant presuppositions which
136 p p 4; 761B-C (=Ps 48:13): Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit,
comparatus est jumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis.
137 PP 4: 761D-762B.
138 PP 4: 763A-B: Quis autem sanum sapiens futuram hominis
transmutationem crediderit veluti ex animali inferiori in animal superius, ex terreno in
caeleste, ex temporali in aetemum, ex mortali in immortale, ex misero in beatum, sed
potius omnia, quae in hac vita in hominibus sanctis ceteris communia animalibus seu
intelliguntur seu sentiuntur, in illam essentiam caelestem et incommunicabilem omnique
animalitate carentem ineffabtli quadam mutatione transferri, quod etiam homini, si non
peccaret, futurum erat? Quare igitur homo in genere animalium, quae de terra producta
sunt, creatus sit, in quo semper non manebit?
245
Eriugena shares w ith Gregory: first, th a t m an's final state is a return to his
original state; secondly, that m an's final state is one of equality w ith the angels;
an d thirdly, th at anim ality is incom patible w ith this equality w ith angels. The
em ergence of these principals into the discussion occasions a re-exam ination of
m an's relation to the universal creature, his ow n essential constitution, and the
superadditions to his nature w hich are a consequence of sin.
The tables are turned. It is not m an w ho is created in the universal
creature, b u t the universal creature w hich is created in man. The question is no
longer, w hether m an belongs to the genus 'anim al', but how all things are m ade
in him. "It is not m an who is brought forth in the genus of the anim als: rather
every genus of anim als is brought forth in m an from the earth, that is, from the
solid p a rt o f nature; and not only every genus of animals, b u t the w hole created
universe is m ade in m an."139 The idealist position which Eriugena advances at
this pointnam ely, that every creature has its substance in m an's conception of
it, that the know ledge of all things w hich is coessential with the h um an m ind in
its pristine condition (though hidden from it in its present blindness) is the
substance o f those things140leads to several questions regarding the
relationship betw een m an and angels w hich w ill be considered further in the
discussion of Eriugena's understanding o f the difference betw een h u m an and
angelic nature. Before leaving the Sixth Day, how ever, to look at som e passages
139 PP 4: 774B: ... ut non immerito dicamus, non hominem in genere animalium,
sed magis omne genus animalium in homine de terra, hoc est, soliditate naturae
productum, et non solum omne genus animalium, verum etiam universitatem conditam
in homine factam,...
140 See PP 4: 768D-769C. H um an n atu re is also in some w ay the locus of
their m anifestation in external sense and com posite body. See below.
246
in Book 5, it will be useful to give an example of how , according to Eriugena, the

natures of irrational anim als in particular are contained w ithin hum an nature
even now.
Eriugena interprets the scriptural designations, ''beasts of burden,"
"reptiles," and "beasts o f the earth," as signifying the irrational motions as they
exist w ithin m an, three aspects of irrational nature as it relates to reason. The
first, "beasts of burden," signifies the bodily senses insofar as they serve reason;
"for, [this motion] serves as no small help to the rational soul for contemplation
of the tru th of all sensible things, being, once all falsehood is rem oved, a true and
sincere knowledge."141 By its docility and assimilation to m an's rational nature,
this m otion is not strictly "irrational," nor is it found in irrational animals, but
only in man. Anger and lust, however, are irrational in th at they resist reason.
A lthough these terms do not properly apply to beasts, insofar as in their hum an
context they represent inordinate desire and so imply the m easure of reason,
they nonetheless "are inserted in hum an nature from irrational animals"; they
are therefore signified by "beasts of the earth."142 The third m otion is the
141 PP 4: 751C-D: Qui motus non irrationabiliter jumentum dicitur; non enim
parvum adjutorium rationabili animae praestat ad contemplationem veritatis sensibilium
omnium, cuncta falsitate remota, vera sinceraque notitia.
142 PP 4 :752A: Quosdam vero ex inferiori natura sumptos recte dixeris
irrationabiles, hoc est rationi resistentes, ut est furor, et cupiditas, inordinatique
corporalium sensuum appetitus, in abusionem attributos sensibilibus creaturis. Et
quoniam hi notus ex irrationabilibus animalibus humanae naturae inserti sunt, non
incongrue bestiarum appellatione significantur,... Like Gregory, Eriugena does not
wish to im ply th at the passions in their proper context, that is, w ithin irrational
animal nature, are in any w ay evil. Also, com pare the phrase, ex irrationabilibus
animalibus humanae naturae inserti sunt, used here, w ith Imag. 18:237,32: pro
angelica magnificentia pecudalem et irrationalem ex se inuicem successionis modum
humanitati inserens. This is a sm all indication that on this subject Gregory's text is
always in the background, even w hen Eriugena does not explicitly allude to it.
247
unconscious nutritive activity of the soul, w hich governs the grow th and
adm inistration of the body without disturbing the m ind; such are the
"reptiles."143
This exegesis of the three species of living soul created with m an fits well
w ith the approach taken b y Gregory in his account of m an's kinship w ith the
animals. Im planted w ithin hum an nature are m otions w hich have their original
and proper place w ithin lower, nonhum an natures. Some of these, the "beasts of
the earth," becom e problematic insofar as they resist reason and are the source of
inordinate desire.
Eriugena's broader discussion of m an's anim ality, a nd especially the
conclusion th at the universal creature is m ade in m an suggests a notion not
found in G regory's account of the origin of passions through kinship with the
beasts. The notion that m an is only incidentally included w ithin the genus
'anim al' is one th a t Eriugena and Gregory share, b u t in Gregory's view the
animals have a n independent place w ithin the original order of creation, owing
to which h u m an nature is able to borrow from it w h at it needs for its fallen
existence. In E riugena's view animality is not independent of humanity; even if
man had not needed to be m ade in the genus 'anim al', the genus itself would, it
seems, still exist in him.
143 PP 4: 752B: Sunt praeterea in animali rationabili occulti quidam motus,

quibus maxime corpus sibi conjunctum administrat, et sunt in auctiva et nutritiva parte
animae constituti. Qui quoniam naturalifacilitate sua peragunt offida, et quasi latenter,
quia animae intentionem nullo modo sollidtant atque perturbant, si tamen integritas
naturae incolumis extiterit, silenti quodam meatu corporalem harmonium penetrantes,
reptilium appellationem non irrationabiliter meruere.
248
3.321
T h e r e t u r n o f th e w h o le s e n s ib le w o r l d in m a n
A full treatm ent of Eriugena's doctrine of the retu rn lies beyond the scope
of this dissertation;144 it w ill suffice to indicate those elem ents of it which relate to
Gregory of N yssa's influence. By this point in the Periphyseon, Eriugena no
longer distinguishes betw een Gregory Nyssen and G regory Nazianzen.
Actually, it is the latter, together w ith Maximus, w ho is the m ore im portant
source for E riugena's teaching regarding the sublim ation of low er natures into
the higher. G regory of N yssa's influence consists principally in Eriugena's use of
his doctrine of b o d y as a concourse of incorporeal qualities and of the
transform ation o f passions into virtue. By means of the form er Eriugena is able
to explain the first tw o stages of the return, and the latter provides a general
illustration of ho w a low er nature can be sublim ated into a higher. The
discussion that follows focuses on the aspects of Eriugenas doctrine of the return
that hinge on m an 's kinship w ith the beasts.
At the beginning of Book 5, as Eriugena takes u p his discussion of the
return of tem poral creation into its eternal causes and final rest, he locates the
starting point of th at return (which also equals the farthest extent of the
procession of creatures) by referring again to Psalm 48:13 and by quoting the first
few sentences from G regory's chapter on m an's kinship w ith the beasts. After
144 For m ore com plete treatm ents of Eriugena's doctrine of the return, see
especially, Stephen Gersh, "The Structure of the R eturn in Eriugena's
Periphyseon," in Begrijfund Metapher, ed. Beierwaltes, 108-125; Tullio Gregory,
"L'Eschatologie d e Jean Scot," in Jean Scot Erigene et Ihistoire de la philosophie, ed.
Roques, R., 377-392; Paul A. Dietrich and Donald F. D u d o w , "Virgins in
Paradise: Deification and exegesis in T eriphyseon V ,'" in Jean Scot ecrivain, ed.
Allard, 29-49.
249
Gregory's w ords concerning the transfer of irrational m otions into hum an

nature, he sum m arizes the full im port of this change.
That m an fell into these irrational m otions, w hich are present naturally in
bestial life, b u t by passion in hum an life, none o f the w ise doubts, and
from these, in tu rn , he is corrupted in the d eath an d dissolution of the
body. For it is n o t possible to fall low er th an this. Indeed, in the nature of
things there is no th in g low er than the life th at lacks reason and sense; and
the lowest of all is corruptible body. Because no n atu re is perm itted to
return to nothing, a n d w here [nature] has placed the en d o f its ruin, from
there it has begun to return. But the end of ru in is the dissolution of the
body. Thus, from the dissolution of the body the return of nature set
forth.145
The five basic stages of the return of h um an nature are: first, the
dissolution of the body; second, the resurrection of the body; third, the
sublim ation of the body into spirit; fourth, the return of spirit into its prim ordial
causes; and fifth, "w hen this n a tu re w ith its causes is changed into God, as air is
changed into light."146 E riugena's doctrine is m uch m ore complicated than this,
for there are distinctions to be m ade betw een various natures and individuals.
W hile hum an nature in all m en, for example, returns to its prim ordial causes,
145 PP 5 :875B-C: In hos itaque irrationabiles motus, qui bestiali vitae

naturaliter, humanae vero passibiliter insunt, hominem cecidisse nullus sapientum
ambigit, et ex his iterum in mortem corporis et solutionem corruit. Neque enim plus
inferiusve ruere potuit. Siquidem in natura rerum nihil inferius est vita, ratione, et
sensu carente; infimum autem omnium corpus corruptibile, quoniam ad nihilum redire
nulla natura sinitur, et ubi ruinae suae finem posuit, inde iterum redire inchoavit. Finis
autem ruinae solutio corporis e s t Ex solutione itaque corporis reditus naturae
proficiscitur;...
146 PP 5 :876A-B: Prim a igitur humanae naturae reversio estr quando corpus
solvitur, et in quattuor elementa sensibilis mundi, ex quibus compositum e st revocatur.
Secunda in resurrectione implebitur, quando unusquisque suum proprium corpus ex
communione quattuor elementorum recipiet. Tertia, quando corpus in spiritum
mutabitur. Quarta, quando spiritus, et, ut apertius dicam, tota hominis natura in
primordiales causas revertetur, quae sunt semper et incommutabiliter in Deo. Quinta,
quando ipsa natura cum suis causis movebitur in Deum, sicut aer movetur in lucem.
250
only the elect enjoy the full grace of deification w hich is included in the fifth
stage.
Later on, Eriugena tells us th at nonrational natures"which T ruth itself
created not for the contem plation of itself b u t that through them the
contemplative virtues m ight praise it"although ineligible for deification, will
attain a rest beyond place an d time. The w orld of generation and corruption will
disappear. The m ultiplicity of tim es and places and substance and accidents will
be left behind,
for all things w ill be sim ple, lacking any composition of substance and
accidents, so that, as one m ight say, there w ill be a sim ple unity and a
m ultiple unification of all creatures in their reasons and causes, b u t of
causes and reasons them selves, in the only-begotten W ord of G od, in
whom all things both are m ade and subsist.147
H um an nature is itself the locus of this reunification. One of the recurring
difficulties in Book 5 is articulating an adequate understanding of the relation
between all sensibles generally and hum an nature: H ow can there be "a
resurrection not only of hum an nature, but also of all sensible things, w hich are
147 PP 5 :905D-906B: Ceterae vero naturae, quas condid.it ipsa veritas non ad se
contemplandam, sed ut per eas contemplativae virtutes ipsam laudarent, in suis
ordinibus et semper sunt et erunt quietae, absque locali circumscriptione et temporali
mutabilitate. Finito namque mundo qui localibus spatiis et temporalibus motibus
ambitur, quid erit localiter circumscriptum out temporali mutabilitati subjectum? Erunt
enim omnia quieta, quando nihil per generationem in mundum veniet, nihil per
corruptionem in mundum resolvetur. Mundus quippe peribit, nullaque ipsius pars
remanebit: ac per hoc neque totum. Transibit enim in suas causas, ex quibus processit,
in quibus neque loca sunt, neque tempora, sed locorum temporumque simplices
sinceraeque rationes, in quibus omnia unum sunt, neque ullis accidentibus discemuntur.
Omnia enim simplicia omni compositione substantiarum accidentiumque carentia, et ut
sic dicam, unitas simplex, et multiplex adunatio omnium creaturarum in suis rationibus
et causis, ipsarum autem causarum et rationum in Verbo Dei unigenito, in quo et facta
sunt et subsistunt omnia.
251
contained w ithin boundary of this world?148 The answ er alw ays returns to the
macrocosmic position assigned to m an in the exposition of the Sixth Day, which
entails that "all tilings are created in m an, visible an d invisible, and after this will
be resurrected" in him .149
M an's fulfillment of his macrocosmic role, of course, w ould be impossible
apart from Christ. The Incarnation is integral to the w hole process of creation
and the achievem ent of the final return of all things.150 The Incarnation, as the
assum ption and restoration of hum an nature's p ro p er cosmic function, effects the
preservation, the "salvation," of every division o f created naturebody, vital
motion, sense, reason, and intellect.151
The A lum nus finds this suggestion incredible. Do w e really w ant to say
that the whole sensible w orld will be saved on account of the Incarnation?
Are the irrational animals, and even trees an d plants, and all the parts of
this w orld from the highest to the lowest, are restored in the Incarnation of
the W ord of God?... Will bodily masses, extended in space, and composed
of m any diverse parts, as well as visible species, by w hich these masses
are separately contained, lest they run together into one, be resurrected in
the general resurrection of man?152
148 PP 5 :906D: Adhuc tamen haesito, quoniam non tarn dare contemplor,
quomodo non solum humanae naturae resurrectionem, verum etiam omnium rerum
sensibilium, quas hujus mundi ambitus comprehendit, videris asserere.
149 PP 5 :907A: saepe concesseris, omnia in homine creata esse, visibilia dico et
invisibilia, ac post hoc resurrectura.
150 See the section 3.252.
151 PP 5 :913B.
152 PP 5 :913B-C: Quid itaque dicturi sumus? Num irrationabilia animalia,
ligna etiam et herbae, omnesque hujus mundi partes ad summo usque deorsum in Verbo
Dei incamato restaurata sunt?.... Corporeae igitur moles, localibus spatiis distentae,
multis diversisque partibus compositae, nec non etiam visibiles species, quibus moles
252
W hat possible form could such a resurrected corporeal n ature have?

In his reply the N utritor relies on the distinction betw een the substance of
sensible things a n d those quantities and forms by w hich they are corporeally
sensible- His view of the resurrection of the sensible w orld is not that
the m asses a n d species of visible and sensible bodies w ill be resurrected,
b u t ... that in the resurrection of m an, w ith m an an d in m an, they will be
returned to their causes and reasons, w hich are m ade in man, in which
causes all anim als are to be called animals, even m ore than those bodily
and sensible effects. For where they subsist, there they truly are animals.
One should understand likewise concerning all sensibles, whether
heavenly o r earthly. Indeed, all things which are varied by places and
times, and succum b to bodily senses, are not to be understood to be the
substantial and existent things themselves, b u t the images and
consequences of the truly existing things.153
The life and existence of irrational animals, as well as still low er creatures, does
not depend u pon their corporeal condition, that is, as m anifested in places and
times, b ut derives from their participation in "the general and the special and
particular life."154 Thus, in the resurrection they return n o t to their corporeal
condition b u t to the true causes of their substance, from w hich they originally
ipsae, ne fluant in unum, continentur, resurrecturae sunt in generali hominum

resurrectione?
153 PP 5 :913D-914A: Visibilium et sensibilium corporum moles et species
resurrecturas non dicimus, sed, ut saepe inter nos convenerat, in zvuas causas et rationes,
quae in homine factae sunt, in resurrectione hominis cum homine et in homine
reversuras, in quibus plus animalia omnia dicenda sunt animalia esse, quam in ipsis
ejfectibus corporeis ac sensibilibus. Ubi enim subsistunt, ibi veraciter animalia sunt.
Similiter de omnibus sensibilibus, sive caelestibus sive terrenis intelligendum. Omnia
siquidem, quae locis temporibusque variantur, corporeisque sensibus succumbunt, non
ipsae res substantiales vereque existentes, sed ipsarum rerum vere existentium quaedam
transitoriae imagines et resultationes intelligenda sunt.
154 PP 5 :915A. This point is argued with a quotation from Ps-Dionysius,
DN 6. Com pare w ith the discussion of universal life above.
253
If the causes of all sensible creatures are created in hum an nature, their
resurrection is a return into m an. N aturally, the N utritor acknowledges,
som eone is going to ask how irrational and insensible natures can pass into the
n atu re of man? H e offers tw o exam ples to render such a position plausible. The
first is the w ay in which lower natures presently exist w ithin m an. Corporeal
sense, nutritive power, and body, w ithin hum an nature, correspond to the
divisions of sensible natures which, corporeally external to m an now , w ill in the
resurrection be w ithin hum an nature. The m anner of unification then will be
analogous to w hat exists now .155
The other example is the w ay in w hich the unnatural, irrational passions,
w hich w ere superadded to h um an nature after sin, are transform ed into natural
virtues. U nnatural lust becomes intellectual longing; pleasure becomes innocent
delight; irrational fear becomes a rational precaution; and sorrow becomes
repentance.156 In such cases it is not m erely a m atter of the lower being
transform ed into the higher, b u t of evil, into good. 'I f then w e do not deny th at
vices can be changed into virtues, although they are contraries of each other, w hy
should w e deny that by a w onderful unification lower natures can be
transform ed into higher natures, w hich are in no w ay contrary to each other?"157
Eriugena uses this doctrine of G regory's not only to account for the retu rn
o f low er into higher natures, b u t also as a w ay to understand how divine
155 PP 5 :916A.
156 PP 5 :916B.
157 PP 5 :916C-D: Si itaque vitia in virtutes, cum sibi invicem contraria sint,
moveri non negamus: cur naturas inferiores in naturas superiores, dum sibi nullo modo
adversantur, mirabili quadam adunatione transfundi negaverimus?
254
providence brings good out of the evils done in the w orld. E riugena exults in the
beauty of the harm ony which is th u s brought about in the w hole of nature.
A nd now , if I am not m istaken, y o u understand th a t n o t only everything
th a t is created by the one G od, b u t also everything th a t is contrived by the
irrational motions of the rational an d intellectual creature, is contained
even now within the order o f divine providence, an d then after the return
of the universal creature into its causes and into G od him self w ho so
orders it, when the fullest b eau ty of the whole created universe will be
perfected.158
This harm o n y includes not only all things th at are, b u t also those that are not,
both those th at transcend being an d those that fall short of it. Even the
correction, and, if need be, punishm ent, of unruly wills contributes to this
h arm ony.159
E riugena then dtes the doctrine of Dionysius and G regory the Theologian
(Nyssa, here), w ho teach that even the irrational passions w hich are unlaw ful in
m an a re not in themselves evil. The ferocity proper to a lion, w ithout w hich it
could n o t be a lion, is, to be sure, forbidden to a rational nature, b u t it is not evil.
158 PP 5: 965B: Et jam, ni fallor, intelligis, non solum omne, quod ab uno Deo
creatum est, verum etiam omne, quod irrationabilis motus rationabilis et intellectualis
creaturae supermachinatus est, et nunc intra ordinem divinae providentiae contineri, et
tunc post universalis creaturae in suas causas reditum inque ipsum Deum ordinandum
fore, quando totius universitatis conditae plenissima perficietur pulchritudo.
159 PP 5 :966B-967A. In this passage the Alum nus goes so far as to argue
"that th e im pulses of perverted w ills are n o t evil, b u t unruly." The argum ent is
that since the freedom of the rational nature was created by G od to be the image
of G od, n othing really evil can come from that freedom. W hen the creature sins
and becom es enslaved by its irrational im pulses, "the result is not an evil, but
som ething w hich requires correction by the divine justice, a n d redem ption by the
divine clem ency, if the free will becom es subm itted to that correction and that
redem ption." If it persists in its lust, it is prevented from attaining w hat it wants.
"A nd this is all that is m eant by the p unishm ent of the perverted free will,
nam ely, the prohibition imposed u p o n its unruly impulses w hich prevents it
from satisfying its lusts."
255
It is the disorder in m an that is evil.160 Yet, in the end and, for those w ho can see,
even now , nothing escapes the ordering o f divine providence. The evil deeds of
creatures do n o t escape this o rder o r thw art the goodness of w hat G od has
created. H is punishm ents affirm this order and work to preserve w h at he has
m ade. The w hole universe is perfect and beautiful.161 H e uses the
transform ation of the irrational passions w hich virtuous m en achieve as an
exam ple of how w ithin the order o f providence evil is m ade good. It is an
exam ple that Eriugena has used several times and it derives from G regory of
Nyssa.
H um an nature's shame, teaches Gregory, is that it is overrun by an
anim ality th at should never have been its ow n, an animality that obscures its
creation in the image of God. Yet, it is precisely in relation to those anim al
passions that virtue manifests even now the divine image. On the one hand,
w h e n thought colludes with the passions it gives rise to such actions as cannot be
found anyw here in the animal w orld; on the other, w hen reason rules over the
passions the divine beauty is once again apparent in its image. According to
E riugena, it is in this w ay that the law s an d justice of God bring about good from
evil.
See how m uch adornm ent and praise is prepared for the virtues of perfect
souls w hen they control and contain the vices w ithin themselves, and
tam e and subject them to their dom inion, and order them by divine laws,
lest these vices plunge the souls, w hich they try to corrupt, into the depths
of malice. Often they extinguish them completely, the vices, I mean, often
transform ing them in themselves, so that even the vices are turned into
virtues. Reason teaches this, not th at vices are entirely evil, b u t illicit. For
if they w ere evils, never could they be changed into virtues, and the
160 PP 5 :967B-C.
161 PP 5 :967C.
256
others are similar, w hich though they appear to rise up against nature
from the perverse motions of abuse by free w ill of a rational nature
enslaving itself freely, nonetheless they are n o t allowed to harm the
ordering o f the universe, but rather are forced to adom it by the eternal
law s of divine providence and the boundary of judgm ent.162
Both the glory of the virtuous and the punishm ents of the wicked have their
place in the restored hum anity, established in the Incarnate W ord of G od.
3.33
C onclusion
By his description of passions transm uted into virtues, Gregory gives
Eriugena the m eans for harm onizing the fact of anim ality superadded to divine
image w ith the return of hum an nature to its prim ordial constitution- This
example of transform ation is im portant because it m eans that the superadditions
to nature, th at is, all that takes place w ithin the history of the world m anifested
under the conditions of sin, need not be annihilated in order for the w orld to be
restored to the pristine unity of its causes, they can be sublimated.
G regory's teaching on m an's acquired kinship w ith the beasts is n o t the
only conceptual elem ent at work in Eriugena's solution to the problem of m an's
creation in the genus animal. The other m ajor com ponent is the view of m an as a
microcosm, o r even the macrocosm, containing all creation w ithin himself. In
virtue of the unique relationship betw een m an and the whole universal creature,
162 p p 5; 972A-B: Vide quantum omamenti laudisque perfectarum animarum

virtutibus comparatur, dum intra se vitia coambiunt atque coartant, suoque dominatui
subigunt ac rejraenant, legibusque divinis ordinant, ne in profundum malitiae animas,
quas conantur corrumpere mergant. Saepe etiam penitus ea, vita dico, extinguunt, saepe
in semetipsas transfundunt, ita ut et vitia in virtutes vertantur. Quae ratio docet, non
omnino vitia mala esse, sed illicita. Si enim mala essent, nequaquam in virtutes mutari
possent, ceteraque similia, quae cum contra naturam ex perversis motibus abusionis
libera voluntate rationabilis naturae seipsam sponte sua captivantis videntur insurgere,
universitatis tamen ordinationibus non sinuntur nocere, magis autem omare eas
coguntur aetemis legibus divinae providentiae atque judicii ambita.
257
the W ord o f G od has to become incarnate only in hum an nature in order to save
the w hole sensible w orld. The microcosm them e comes m ost clearly into focus
w hen view ed in relation to m an's equality w ith the angels.
3.4
Man's equality w ith the an gels

A lready, frequent reference has been m ade to the view held by both
Gregory an d Eriugena th at m an's destiny is to be equal to the angels and th a t his

destiny is the sam e as his origin, h i his exposition of the Fifth Day, Eriugena
failed to identify a clear logical differentia b y w hich to divide the rational/
intellectual species o f universal life into m an and angel; that which does
distinguish m an from angel, namely, the fact th at he contains w ithin his ow n
nature all the species of life, tends to lift m an from the species level of the
division to the genus level. The process becom es m ore evident in the exposition
of the Sixth Day, w hen the issue changes from how m an is made in the genus
animal to how all things are m ade in man. Precisely in that same context the
question, H ow m an differs from the angel, comes again to the fore and receives
its fullest developm ent. The claim is repeated th at everything exists in m an in a
m anner in w hich it does not in the angels. H ow does this difference of m anner
bear on the original and final equality of h u m an and angelic nature?
3.41
G regory's rejection o f m icrocosm ism

In De opificio hominis Gregory of N yssa show s a certain ambivalence about
m an's place w ithin the sensible cosmos. In his Oratio catechetica magna, he
positions him as the m ediator betw een the intelligible and sensible worlds. In
other works, he calls him a microcosm that reflects in its ow n nature the structure
of the w hole creation. In De opificio hominis, how ever, Gregory rejects micro
cosmism as being incom patible w ith the C hurch's doctrine of man: m an's glory
258
lies in being die im age of G od, not in b eing the image of the w orld. Nonetheless,
despite this rejection, he continues to em phasize certain microcosmic features of
hum an nature.
'M icrocosm ism ', as used in the p resen t analysis, is sim ply th e doctrine
that m an, although a p art of the w orld, contains w ithin himself the elem ents and
order of the whole: m an is a littie cosm os, a n im age of the big cosmos. In De
opificio hominis G regory mocks m icrocosm ism for its view that m an is m ade up of
all the four elem ents, a truth th at h a rd ly distinguishes man.
Let u s take u p again the divine w o rd , "Let us make m an in o u r im age and
likeness." H ow sm all and u n w o rth y of the nobility of m an's nature are
the things im agined by som e w h o are outside [the Church], w ho magnify
hum anity, as they think, by a com parison w ith this world! For they say
that m an is a littie w orld (pncpov icoapov), composed of the sam e elem ents
as the universe. For those w ho g ive to hum an nature such praise by the
boast of a nam e, have forgotten them selves, boasting of m an by properties
that p ertain to the gnat and the m ouse; for, also in those, too, there is a
m ixture of these four, because certainly, w ith respect to anim ate beings,
some greater or lesser portion o f each elem ent is found in them , w ithout
w hich it is not natural for any of those that participate in sense to subsist.
W hy is it great therefore that m an be thought to have the characteristics
and likenesses o f the w orld, since the heaven is turning around, the earth
is being changed, and all th at is in them is passing aw ay together, being
governed by the course of th at w hich com prehends it? But in w hat does
the h um an greatness consist according to the ecclesiastical account? N ot
in this likeness to the created w orld, b u t in being m ade according to the
im age of the nature of the C reator.163
163 O H 16:177D-180A: AXX eiravaXdpopev iraXu/ nju Geiav <j>iui/r|i/,

"nouicraJixei/ ai/Gpurrrot/ tear eixoi/a teal opoLOKnv f|peTepav." 'Qs pucpa re teal avaîa
Tfjg toO avQparrrou peyaXoûias- r&v egojOev rives e<t>avrdo6rfCTav, Tfj trpog tov
Kocrpov toutov cmyKpicrei peyaXui/oi/res, ti>s (poin-o,* to di/Qpojiru/oi/. <t*aai yap
pucpoi/ elvai xocrpoi/ rbv ai/Gpumoi/, ex tcuv airriiiv tcD-rravri otolxclcji/ aui/eonixoTa.
O l yap rtp Kopmi) toO ovopaTos toloutov etraivot/ rrj dvQpcuTui/q xapiCopeuoi <t>0aei,
XeXijGaaLv eavrovs ro ls trepi tov Kan/anra xai tov pui/ iSiuipacri aepi/oTroioui/Teg tov
ai/6punrov. Kai yap xaxeivoi? ex twi/ Teaaapcuu toutoji/ f| xpaats ecm, Siotl trdi/Tws
exderrou Tail/ ovruiv rj trXeiwv fj eXaTTan/ t i s polpa trepi to ep<|>vxov GeojpetTai. uv
a vev cnjOTfjvai ti tcji/ aia0T]aea>s peTexovnuv, 4>iiai.v oux exci.** Ti ouv peya,***
xocrpou xctpuxTfjpa xai opoiaipa i/opiaGfji/ai tov avGpurrrov; oupavou toO
259
M icrocosmism has a richer tradition than G regory adm its and cannot be
reduced m erely to this elem entaristic variety.164 Consider, for exam ple, his ow n
teaching th a t the hum an soul exhibits all the species of vital activity: n o t only is
his body com posed of the four elements, b u t his soul m anifests itself in nutritive,
sensitive, a n d rational operations. Thus, according to G regory's ow n account,
m an encom passes w ithin him self all the elemental and psychic dim ensions of the
sensible w orld. M oreover, by his participation (as rational) in the noetic world
he joins the tw o great divisions o f creation w ithin his ow n nature. W hether
Gregory w ishes to allow the nam e or not, his m an is a m icrocosm in the
traditional sense and in a m uch greater w ay than could be plausibly claimed for
a gnat or m ouse. W hy should he w ish to deny this?
rrepiepxopev'ou, yfjg Tfjs dXXoioupei/Tig, trdvTcui/ rdv ev ro u ro ig n'epucpaToupevun/ rfj
rrapoSa) toO nepiexoi'Tog aupTrapepxopei'wi'; AXX ev rivi K<rra to v exicXTiCTiacmicdi'
Xoyov t o ivOpaimvov' peyeGog; Ouic ev Tfj irpog rov k tio to v xoapou opourrnTi, tiXX
ev tu> Kar' eiKOva yeveoQai Tfjg toO KTicrai/rog cf>ucrecug.
Cf. Im ag. 17:232,5-21: Sed rectpiamus iterum diuinam uocem faciamus

hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Quomodo parua et indigna
magnanimitate hominis ex his quae extra sunt quidam imaginauerunt, comparatione ad
hunc mundum, quasi in ipso existeret, homine magnificantes. Dicunt enim hominem
paruum mundum esse ex hisdem quibus uniuersum elementis consistens. Nam qui
omamento nominis talem laudem humanae donant naturae, obliti sunt semetipsos in
proprietatibus quae circa eulieem et murem sunt, uenerabilem hominem facientes, etenim
et in illis ex his quatuor concretio est, eo quod omnino in uno quoque existentium, aut ex
pluribus aut minoribus quaedam portio circa animatum consideratur eorum sine quibus
consistendi, aliquid ex his quae sensum participant naturam non habet. Quid igitur post
mundi charactera et similitudinem arbitrandum esse hominem caelo praetereunte, terra
mutata omnibusque quae in his comprehenduntur cum transitu comprehendentis
praetereuntibus, sed in quo iuxta eclesiasticam rationem humana magnitudo est. Non in
ipsa ad creatum mundum similitudine, sed in ipso quod secundum imaginem naturae
creatoris factus est,... *Note E's m isreading of wg wovro as wg <L bvro , quasi in ipso
existeret. **Note his overly literal rendering of this clause containing the idiom,
cKktiv exeL, "it is natural that."
seems to read peTct for peyu.
164 See R udolf Allers, "Microcosmus," Traditio 2 (1944), 319-407; George P.
Conger, Theories o f Macrocosms and Microcosms (New York: Russell and Russull,
1 9 67); M. Spanneut, Permanence du Stoicisme (Gemblaux: D uculot, 1973).
260
The reason he gives is that to focus m an's dignity on his microcosmm acrocosm relation w ith the sensible w orld, ignores the true dignity of m an as
the im age and likeness of God. But is that all that is going on here? In other
works, G regory uses microcosmism precisely as a m eans to illustrate the divine
image in m an.
If the orderly arrangem ent of the w hole universe is a kind of
m usical harm ony whose m aker and artist is G o d ,... and if m an him self is
a microcosm, then, he, too is an im itation of H im Who fashioned the
universe. It is, therefore, reasonable to assum e that the m ind finds in the
m icrocosm the same things that it discovered in the case of the macrocosm
... Thus all the harm ony that is observed in the universe is rediscovered
in the microcosm, that is, in hum an nature, and it corresponds to the
w hole by virtue of its parts, as far, at least, as the whole can be obtained
b y the parts.165
In De anima et resurrectione Gregory again uses this argum ent. Just as the
harm ony of the physical world leads us to a know ledge of its Creator, since the
contrary m otions of the sensible cosmos are harm onized and ordered by the
divine pow er; so in the microcosm, man, the order and harm ony of the body
leads us to know ledge of a spiritual and self-existing soul. M an is a "little
w orld," containing all the elements of the universe. In body he is like the
sensible w orld, but he also possesses an incorporeal soul that orders and sustains
his body, as the incorporeal divinity sustains the whole cosmos.166
In neither of these texts does the microcosm interfere with the doctrine o f the
divine im age and likeness, why should it do so in De opificio hominis ?
165 In Psalmos 1.3, as translated by Johannes Q uasten, Patrology (UtrechtA ntw erp: Spectrum Publishers, 1975), 3:292.
166 AR 28B: M .' H Se, A e y e T a i ,
<(>TicrL, i r a p a
K o a p o s - o dvQ pcoT ros, T a u r a t r e p i e x ^ v e v ea u T cL r a
rail/ crcxpoju p u c p o g t i s elvai

o r o i x e t a , o l g to -rrav
cmpTT-eTrXTipojTaL.
261
The answ er seems to lie in the fact th a t the microcosmic-macrocosmic

analogy can only identify part of hum an n atu re as m ade in the image and
likeness of G od, the soul or m ind. If h u m an nature contains an image o f the
relation betw een God and creation, that is, betw een God and w hat is n o t God,
then w ithin itself it is in part like God and in p art unlike God. In other w ords,
for h um an n atu re to be a microcosm it cannot be m ade in its entirety in the im age
of God. T hat is not all, as noted in chapter 2, Gregory has difficulty reconciling
m an's present m ortal condition w ith the doctrine that m an is m ade in the divine
image. Insofar as he shares the elements an d order of this mortal sensible w orld,
to that extent he is not the image of God.
3.411
Sex and the angelic life
The contrast betw een m an mortal condition and the perfection of the
divinity leads Gregory to his doctrine of the twofold creation, which he finds in
Genesis 1:27: "So God created m an in his ow n image, in the image of G od he
created him ";refers to the first dim ension of m an's creation, to w hich is
added"m ale and female he created them ."167
These tw o being opposed to each other as extremes, hum anity is the
m ean, betw een the divine and incorporeal nature, on the one hand, and
the irrational and bestial life, on the other. For it is possible to
contem plate the p a rt of each of the m entioned in the hum an m ixture; of
the divine, w hat is rational and reasoning, which does not proceed
according to the difference betw een m ale and female; and of the irrational,
the bodily constitution and form ation w hich is divided into m ale and
female. For each of these [i.e., the rational and irrational] is certainly in all
that participates in hum an life.168
167 RSV translation. OH 16:181A-B.

168 O H 16:181B-C: To 8e 8oyp.a t o l o O t o u ecnv Auo tiv u v Kara, t o
dxpoTaTou rrpog aAAr|Xa S tecm iK O T W i', \iiaov ecrrl t o auQpcmvoi', rx\g re 0iag xai
262
G regory's evaluation of the godlike p a rt of m an and his am bivalence tow ard

the com posite, microcosmic m an, derive, m oreover, from a certain
u nderstanding of evangelical soteriology: In the resurrection m en w ill be like the
angels. G regory's com m ents o n Luke 20:34-36169 provide the key to
u n d erstanding his am bivalence tow ard microcosmism.
The grace of the resurrection announces nothing else to us than the
restoration of those w ho have fallen to their original state. For the lookedfor grace is a certain retu rn to the first life, leading back to Paradise the
one w ho looked aw ay from i t If, then, the life of those who are restored is
akin to th at o f the angels, clearly then the life before the transgression w as
an angelic one; w herefore also die return to the original condition of our
life is likened to the angels.170
d c rw p d T O u 4>uct u)s , ic a i T r j s aXoyov ic a l K rq v u iS o u g C w ijs . E s c o r t y a p e t c a T e p o u tg jv
e i p q p e v w v e v t <5 d vQ pojirtvco c r u y K p ip a T i Q e u p f j a a i t t | v p o l p a v - t o u p e v Q e io u t o
X o y ix o v T e ic a i S ia v o r iT tK o v , o t t | v K a r a t o a p p e v K a i dfjXu 6i.a<{>opdv o il T rp o a ie T a L
t o O 5 e aXoyov -rfp / ac o p aT iK T iv K a T a a tc e u f iv te a l S i d t r X a a i v e l g a p p e v T e K a i QfjXu
p e p e p i a p e v r i v . E x d T e p o v y a p T o trrc o v e c rri. T r a v r a jg e v i r a i m t <L p e T e x o v r i -rfjg
dv0pa)iTLVT|g C ^TjS- A X X a T rp o T e p e O e iv t o v o e p o v ,...
Cf. Imag. 17:233,33-234,7: Talis autem doctrina est duorum cfuorundam per
extremitatem a se inuicem distantium medium est humanitas diuinae uidelicet
incorporalisque naturae, et irrationabilis pecudalisque uitae. Licet enim utrumque
praedictorum in humana comparatione considerari, portionem quidem dei quod
rationabile est, atque intellectuale quod iuxta masculum et feminam differentiam non
admittit. Irrationabilis uero corporalem constitutionem et duplicationem in masculum et
feminam partitam. Utrumque horum est omnino in omnibus humanam uitam
participantibus, sed prius esse intellectuale ab eo qui humanam generationem in ordine
percurrit didicimus.
169 "The sons of this age m arry and are given in marriage; but those w ho
are accounted w orthy to attain to that age and to the resurrection from the dead
neither m arry n o r are given in m arriage, for they cannot die any more, because
they are equal to angels and are sons of God, being sons of the resurrection"
(RSV). (o'l u l o i t o O a i u i v o g t o u t o u y a p o O a i v K a i y a p t o x o v T a i , o i 8 e K a T a io j0 e v T e g
t o O a i u i v o g e K C iv o u T u x e i v K a i r f j s d v a c r r a c r e u j g T rig k veK poiv o u t c y a p o t k n v o u t c
y a p i C o v T a i * o u 5 e y a p a t r o O a v e i v i n S u v a v T a i , L c ra y y e X o i y a p e i c n v K a i u 'lo l e i a i v
0 e o u -rfjg a v a c r r d a e c o g u l o i o v T e g . )
170 O H 17:188C-D: H 8e rfjg avacrrdaeojg xdptg ouSev eTepov f|piv

enayyeXXeTai, q t t | v eig t o apxdiov t u j v TreirrojKOTCjv dTroKOTdcrraaiv. EtrdvoSog
yap Tig ecm v eiri -nf|v Trpojrriv ujr|v f| TrpoaSoKcopevq xP*-5> Tov aTropXr|0VTa t o o
263
Gregory concedes th at in the beginning m an w as created male and female, b u t

insists th at this initial state w as already a d ep artu re from the more original
intention of God; the division into m ale and fem ale w as an accommodation
m ade to the foreseen transgression, to provide m ankind w ith a means of
reproduction after its fall from the angelic life. M an's original condition w as
modified by G od him self w ith his final return in view.
For, in relation to tins I think o u r theory, presented earlier, is useful. For
he w ho leads all things into existence, and w ho also formed the whole
m an in his o w n will to the divine im age, does n o t w ait to see the num ber
of souls be b rought to its fullness (TrXnpa)p.a) by the gradual addition of
those w ho are bom ; b u t observing every hum an nature all together in its
fullness through his foreknowing activity, and cherishing its final destiny
as equal to the angels, since he foreknew w ith perceptive pow er that the
choice w o u ld not go unsw ervingly tow ard the good, and for this reason
w ould fall aw ay from the angelic life; so that the m ultitude of hum an
souls m ight n o t be cut short, w hen it fell from that m ode by which the
angels have increased to their m ultitudefor this reason, he instituted in
nature the m ethod of increase appropriate to those who have sunk into
sin; in place o f the angels' greatness of nature, he implanted in hum anity
the bestial a n d irrational m ode of succeeding one another.171
TTapaSeLcrou ttoXli/ els' airroi/ enai/ayoucra. El toIuvv f| tQ v diTOKa0L<rrap.ei/uH/ W|
Trpdg tt|i/ t(Dv a-yyeXan/ oiKeia/g ex^L, SriXoi/on o rrpo Tfjs Trapa3aaeojg piog
dyyeXixog Tig rji/* 810 icai f) trpog to apxalov Tfjg Canig f|p.aii/ eiravoSog Tolg
ayyeXoig cupoia/rai.
Cf. Imag. 18:236,35-237,4: Resurrectionis autem gratia nihil aliud nobis
promittit, quam in antiquitatem cadentium restitutionem. Est enim reditus quidam in
primam uitam ipsa spectanda gratia expulsum paradyso iterum in ipsum reducens, ipsa
igitur restitutorum uita ad earn quae proprie angelorum habetur, profecto ante ruinam
angelus quidam erat propterea etiam ipse ad antiquitatem uitae nostrae reditus angelis
assimulatur.
171 O H 17:189C-D: Ilpog t o u t o yap d>r||XL xptioxpoi/ eiwu t o T rp o S iT iu u ap .ei'O i/
f|pii/ 0wpTip.a. O yap Ta trdiTa trapayayaii/ eig t o eli/aL, icai oXou kv rai ISlq)
0Xqp.aTt tov dvQpbunov trpdg t t | i / Qeiav eiKoi/a 8iapop<J)oiaag, ov Taig k o t oXtyoi/
TrpoaOiiKaig rdv emyn/op.evan/ ai/epeu/ev LSeii/ eiri t o l S l o u frXqpiopa t o i / dpi0p.di/
Tail/ ijjuxdii/ TeXeioup.evov aXX aOpotog airroi TrXTipu>|iaTt Tracrai/ tt|i/ di/0pa)mi/Tii/ ((mail/
8ia Trjg Trpoyi/axmKfjg evepyelag KaTai/o^crag, icai rrj wJnjXiri re Kai iaayyeXa) X êi
Tip.qoag, erreiSfi trpoelSe Tfj opaTncfj 8uvd|xei p.f| edOurropouaav rrpog to KaXoi/ tt)v
rrpoaipeau/, Kai 8ia touto Tfjg ayyeXucng u)fjg dTroTUTiToiKTai/- ag ai/ p.f| KoXo(3cj0eir|
to Tail/ (iiuxdii/ Tail/ di/0pojm i/aii/ rrXfjOog, eiareaov eiceii/ou tou Tpoirou, Ka0 01/ ol
264
Only a p urely noetic creature can be entirely like God. Such are the
angels. Thus, the axis for discussing m an's participation in the divine image
becomes the opposition betw een angels and irrational beasts. Insofar as man is
like one, he is unlike the other; and insofar as he is unlike the angels, he is unlike
God. W hat m an shares w ith the beasts is above all his sexuality.
If sexual difference is a nonessential addition to m an's nature, how much
more of m an's physical life is also accidental to his nature? Is m an's position as a
mean betw een G od and the irrational beasts a m erely accidental role? What
about the other aspects of his relation to the physical universe? Just how much
like the angels w as m an really meant to be? H ow does the resurrection of the
body fit in w ith m an's equality with the angels?
A lthough G regory affirms that m an's nature is composite, m ade up of
body and soul, an d even that he is the apex of creation, the sovereign for whom
the whole sensible w orld is prepared as a kingdom , suited by his physical
structure and endow m ents for his unique position w ithin creation; he wants
nonetheless to m aintain that essentially m an belongs to the noetic world, that
ayyeXoi trpos to TrXqQos qufqOqcray 6ia touto tt)i/ KaTaXXqXov to! ? e is dpapTiau
KaToXLaOqaacn. rfjs au^qaeaig emi/oiai/ ycaTaaiceudCei Tfj <t>ucri, dim tt\s
ayyeXudjs p.eyaXoûiag tou KTquaidq tc Kai aXoyov Tfjg
dXXqXwu SiaSoxijs
Tpotrou epcjjuTeuaag tt) duQpamoTqTi.
Cf. Imag. 18:237,21-33: Ad hoc enim dico utilem esse prius perfectam a nobis
theoriam, qui enim omnia adduxit in esse totumque in sua uoluntate hominem ad
diuinam imaginem formauit. Non paulatim adiectionibus futurorum moras fedit sciendo
in suam plenitudinem animarum numerum perficiendum, sed cumulatim in ipsa
plenitudine omnem humanam naturam per prognosticam operationem intellexit et in
excelsitudine et in coaequali angelis quiete, honorificauit, quoniam uero praeuidit
contemplatoria uirtute non recte euntem ad bonum uoluntatem, atque ideo ex angelica
uita recedentem, ne animarum humanarum multitudo minueretur, cadens ex illo modo
per quern angeli ad multitudinem aucti sunt. Propterea conuenientem in peccatum
anullatis incrementi excogitationem in natura conformauit, pro angelica magnificentia
pecudalem et irrationalem ex se inuicem successionis modum humanitati inserens,...
265
besides being m ade in the image of God, m an is also equal to the angels, at least
in the original intention of God. Consequently, w hile Gregory glorifies m an's
royal position w ithin the sensible world,172 he also underm ines this position by
envisioning for m an an angelic life which excludes m em bership among the ranks
of sensible creatures, or a t least among the ranks of m ortal anim als. In any case,
the notion of h u m a n life as essentially angelic goes a long w ay tow ard
weakening the im portance of m an's place within creation.
3.42
M an a n d a n g e l in the P e r i p h y s e o n
The relationship betw een m an and the angel is one of the m ost important,
recurring them es in the Periphyseon. Like Gregory he affirms that man is

essentially, that is, originally and finally, icrdyyeXos, equal to the angels. In fact,
Eriugena's difficulty in finding a proper differentia for distinguishing hum an
and angelic nature w as discussed above, in the treatm ent of his exposition of the
Fifth Day. As seen there, w hat finally distinguishes m an is that he is a
microcosm, containing w ithin himself all the divisions of nature, especially those
pertaining to his earthly, m ortal existence. But here is the difficulty: Those
divisions of nature, by containing which m an is differentiated from the angels,
are precisely those th a t have been superadded on account of sin, which implies
that m an is only tem porarily differentiated from the angels.
To fully appreciate and evaluate this possibility, it is necessary to review
more generally E riugena's views on the divisions an d causes of differentiated
nature as com pared w ith those of Augustine and M aximus. Eriugena seems, on
the one hand, to assim ilate hum an nature to A ugustine's understanding of the
172 A lthough h e qualifies even this. Cf. OH 21.
266
m ediating role o f angelic nature (and the O ne Day) betw een God and tem poral
creation, and, o n the other, to transform this m ediating role in terms of M axim us'
understanding of m an as the epyacmipioi/, officina, o r "w orkshop" of creation.
This assim ilation and transform ation render even m ore difficult the distinction
betw een h u m a n an d angelic nature. To resolve this difficulty it will be necessary
to look closely at the discussion in Book 4 w here Eriugena gives his m ost detailed
treatm ent of this question in relation to w hich microcosmism and equality w ith
the angels are so tightly interwoven.173
3.421
D i v is io n s and cau ses o f n atu re

The follow ing pages compare Eriugena's division of nature into four
species w ith the divisions offered by two of his m ost im portant patristic sources,
A ugustine a n d M axim us the Confessor. This com parison highlights certain
features of E riugena's distinctive doctrine regarding the prim ordial causes w hich
will illum inate his understanding of the relation betw een hum an and angelic
natures. This illum ination will allow a fuller appreciation of Eriugena's relation
to the doctrine of G regory of Nyssa.
The scope of E riugena's Periphyseon is the investigation of all the things
th at are and all the things that are not, which Eriugena gathers under the single
term 'n atu ra'. 'N a tu re ' is the notional category that encompasses at the outset
everything th at Eriugena m ay w ish to discuss in the course of his investigations.
173 D onald F. Duclow, "Isaiah Meets the Seraph: Breaking Ranks in

Dionysius and Eriugena," in Eriugena: East and West, ed. McGinn and Otten, 233252, argues th at E riugena's revises the hierarchy of angels and m en found in
Dionysius due to im portant differences in anthropology and Christology. This is
undoubtedly true; it is these differences that are explored here, although not in
contradistinction from Ps-Dionysius. The prim ary aim rem ains to compare
Eriugena's tho u g h t w ith that of Gregory.
267
M ore concretely, Eriugena understands this everything in traditional C hristian

term s of G od a n d creation. The Creator and his creatures together comprise all
the possible objects o f investigation. C onsequently, the Creator-creature relation
is at the heart o f his notion of the all-encom passing 'nature'.
Part o f E riugena's strangeness (as com pared w ith other m edieval Latin
authors) lies in the m anner in which he com bines these two perspectives on the
Everything. G od an d creature are first brought together into a notional unity
called 'n a tu re ' an d then this notional unity is treated as a logical genus divided
into logical species. The differentiae of the division are provided by the active
and passive m om ents of the Creator-creature relation, namely, 'creating' (creans)
and 'created' (creatum). But instead of a sim ple return to the twofold division
that preceded the notional unity, that is, C reator and creature, Eriugena gives us
a fourfold division in w hich each of the species is differentiated according to its
relation to b o th term s of the creative relation. Thus, a species will be either
creating or noncreating and either created or noncreated. This leads to four
logically possible com binations of term s and so to four species of the genus
nature: the first is "th at w hich creates b u t is n o t created" (quae creat et non
creatur); the second is "th at which both is created and creates" {quae et creatur et
creat); the third is "th at w hich is created b u t does not create" (quae creatur et non
creat); and the fourth is "th at which neither creates n or is created" {quae nec creat
nec creatur).
H aving thus, by an intellectual contem plation, brought God and creature
together into a universal "genus" and divided th at genus into species according
to the differentiae im plicit in the creans-creatum relation, Eriugena is then able to
consider the various logical relations of opposition, similarity, and difference th at
lie betw een the species. But Eriugena is n ot finished. For, it is never enough
268
merely to divide things u p, one m ust also bring th e divided things back together.
The process of 'division' m u st be complem ented b y the process of 'analytik'.
The process o f division aim s at exploring th e possible relations between
terms at the logical level. Analytik aims at som ething different.174 Analytik is
not merely division-in-reverse, that is, the logical m ovem ent from species to
genus following a m ovem ent from genus to species; analytik, rather, looks for
the 'principle' of the division, it is a 'reductio' to th a t one thing which "remains
inseparably in itself an d from w hich the division itself takes its origin."175 It is
here that the relative im portance of the various species and relations discovered
in the course of division becom e m ore than logically significant.
In the first step in the analytik of nature's species, the four species are
reduced to two pairs. The first species (that w hich creates b u t is not created)
pertains to the beginning of all things. The fourth species (that which is neither
created nor creates) pertains to the end of all things, the term inus of the creative
process. Both refer to G od w ho alone is both the beginning and end of creation.
Because in God there is no real difference betw een being the beginning of all
174 PP 2 :526A-B: ANAAYTIKHa uerbo ANAATOdiriuatur, id est resoluo uel

redeo; ANA enim re,AYQuero soluo interpretatur. Inde etiam nomen nascitur
A N AAYZIZquod in resolutionem uel reditum similiter uertitur. Sed ANAAYZIZ
proprie de solutione propositarum quaestionum didtur, ANAAYTIKHuero de reditu
diuisionis fbrmarum ad principium eiusdem diuisionis. Omnis enim diuisio, quae a
Graecis MEPIZMOZ didtur, quasi deorsum descendens ab uno quodam diffinito ad
infinitos numeros uidetur, hoc est a generalissimo usque ad spedalissimum, omnis uero
recollectio ueluti quidam reditus iterum a specialissimo inchoans et usque ad
generalissimum ascendens ANAA TTIKH uocatur. Est igitur reditus et resolutio
indiuiduorum in formas, formarum in genera, generum in OYZIAZ, OYZIArum in
sapientiam et prudentiam ex quibus omnis diuisio oritur in easdem que finitur.
175 PP 2 :526A: ... donee perueniatur ad illud unum inseparabiliter in se ipso
manens ex quo ipsa diuisio primordium sumpsit.
269
things and being their end, the kind of difference betw een the first and fourth
species of nature is notional only, a difference of rational contemplation only, not
a difference w ithin G od himself.176
Similarly, since species tw o and three (that w hich is created and creates
and that w hich is created b u t does not create) are both found only in the creature,
these species are brought together. Here, however, the difference between the
spedes is not m erely a distinction in contemplation. They differ from each other
really as cause and effect. These tw o spedes "not only come to be in our
contemplation b u t are also found in the nature of created things itself, in which
causes are separated from effects and effects are united to causes because in a
single genus, I m ean the creature, they are one thing."177
The next step of the analytik is to bring the tw o genera, G od and creature,
produced in the previous step, into a still higher genus. If analytik were sim ply
division-in-reverse w e w ould arrive at the all-encom passing universal genus,
'natura'. Eriugena, how ever, comes to a different condusion.
W hat if you should join the creature to the C reator so th at you understand
nothing else in it except him w ho alone truly is for outside him nothing
is called truly essential since all that are from him are nothing else,
inasmuch as they are, b u t a partidpation of him w ho from himself alone
subsist through him self, you w ould not deny th a t C reator and creature
are one thing?178
176 PP 2 :528A. Cf. the discussion of the categories "action" and "passion"
at the end of PP 1.
177 PP 2:528A: ... non solum in nostra contemplatione gignuntur sed etiam in
ipsa rerum creatarum natura reperiuntur, in qua causae ab effectibus separantur et
effectus causis adunantur quoniam in uno genere, in creatura dico, unum sunt.
m p p 2; 528B: Quid si creaturam creatori adiunxeris ita ut nil aliud in ea
intelligas nisi ipsum qui solus uere est nil enim extra ipsum uere essentiale didtur quia
270
Thus the tw o genera, God and creature, are reduced to the single term , God.
By virtue of the causal relation of participation, b y w hich creatures share
in the being of the Creator, G od both stands over against the creature and at the
sam e tim e encompasses the creature w ithin himself. Consequently, after the
analytik consideration of nature's species, Eriugena arrives, not back at the
notion of a universal logical genus 'n atu re', but at God w ho alone is the principle
of n atu re in all its species. "Thus the universe, which is contained in God and
creature, divided before into four, as it were, forms, is brought back again to one
undivided thing, which is principle and cause and end."179
This is the division and analytik of nature, the twofold dialectical process
by w hich one moves from notional unity to difference and from difference back
to p rin d p ia l unity. There is, how ever, another twofold dynam ic crucial to
E riugena's understanding of the divisions of nature, nam ely, the 'procession' of
causes into their effects and the 're tu rn ' of effects into their causes. God, who
creates b u t is not created, creates the prim ordial causes, w hich both create and
are created, and the effects, which do not create b u t are created. This is the
m ovem ent of procession. In the retu rn the effects return to their causes and the
causes rem ain in God.
These pages do not do justice to Eriugena's teaching on the procession and
return of creatures, but will serve to draw attention to the threefold schema
inherent in that teaching: there is G od, there are the prim ordial causes, and there
omnia quae ab eo sunt nil aliud sunt in quantum sunt nisi participatio ipsius qui a se
ipso solus perse ipsum subsistit, num negabis creaturem et creaturam unum esse?
179 p p 2: 528B: Vniuersitas itaque quae deo et creatura continetur prius in
quattuor uelutiformas diuisa iterum ad unum indiuiduum, principium quippe
causamque finemque reuocatur.
271
are the effects of those causes. G od is the beginning of the procession and the end
of th e return, the effects are the e n d o f the procession and the beginning of the
retu rn , and the prim ordial causes are the m ean between the tw o. h i relation to
G od these prim ordial causes are divine nam es and theophanies. In relation to
their tem poral effects they are the 'prim ordial exemplars', the 'predefinitions',
the 'divine volitions', the 'ideas', the 'im m utable reasons' of everything that
com es to be in places and times.
Eriugena distinguishes betw een the eternal creation of these causes in the
divine W ord, and the process of generation by which these causes proceed into
their tem poral effectsthe w orld w e see around us. In the prim ordial causes
everything is created all together an d at once; in their effects everything is
distributed in places and times.
The w orld we see around u s is not only in the process o f coming from its
p rim ordial causes but of returning to its prim ordial causes. Creation does not
have its term only in the tem poral succession of effects that m anifest the eternal
causes, b u t the tem poral m otion of these effects themselves from one state to
another has as its term the stable existence and reality of causes. As w ith
division and analytik, procession a n d retu rn are not entirely sym m etrical: the
end of the return is not exactly the sam e as the beginning of the procession.
M oreover, not only are tem poral effects in the state of proceeding and
returning, b u t of proceeding b adly and having trouble returning. Sin has
d isru p ted the pristine flow of causes into effects and blocks the retu rn of effects
into their causes. The w orst disru p tio n lies in man. Man, who in his causes is
the im age of God, is as an effect a m ortal anim al that little resem bles his Creator.
To the intellectual image intended b y G od has been added a m ortal, anim al body
including the sexual division of m ale and female with its attendant anim al m ode
272
o f procreation. Ignorant and liable to passions, empirical m an is unable to return

to his prim ordial and ideal existence.
To rem edy this situation the W ord becomes flesh, assum ing h u m an nature
in its m ortal, animal, and sexually differentiated existence. By his d eath and
Resurrection Christ purifies h u m an nature of its obscuring superadditions and
returns it to its pristine state. T hrough C hrist the effects are saved and returned
to their prim ordial causes.
Accounting for the superadditions to hum an nature and the final return of
h um an nature to its originally intended state is one of the central problem atics of
the Periphyseon. Many of the questions and difficulties inspired by this
problem atic lie beyond the possibilities of this investigation, b u t certain
fundam ental lines can be traced b y com paring Eriugena's account of the
procession and return of creatures, and its accompanying threefold schem e of
God, prim ordial causes, and effects, w ith the accounts of creation available to
him from Augustine and M axim us the Confessor. Of the two Fathers,
A ugustine's influence seems to b e m ore fundam ental to E riugena's threefold
scheme, while Maximus' is m ore evident in Eriugena's doctrine of procession
an d return.
3.4211
A u g u stin e 's d iv i s i o n o f n atu re
According to Eriugena's fourfold division, the creature is not only

distinguished from its Creator, b u t also exhibits w ithin itself a distinction
betw een cause and effect. As established in its causes, creation is created all
together and a t once; as it proceeds into its effects, it is m anifested in a succession
o f places and times. This teaching of Eriugena's is very close to that of
A ugustine in De Genesi ad litteram. For A ugustine creation has tw o aspects:
creation proper, which is com pleted all together and at once in the one sixfold
273
d ay narrated in Genesis 1, and the related activity by which G od sustains and

governs the unfolding of creation in time.
By means of this distinction A ugustine explains the difference betw een the
tw o accounts of creation given in Genesis. In the first account, for example, earth
is said to have brought forth plants and trees on the Third Day (Gen 1:12).; yet at
the beginning of the second account Augustine's text reads, "W hen day was
m ade, G od m ade heaven and earth, and every green thing of the field before it
appeared above the earth, and every grass before it sprang up."180 H ow could
every green thing be m ade w ith heaven and earth and yet not have appeared
above the earth? And how does this statem ent relate to the previous account of
their creation in the first chapter of Genesis?
Augustine's answer is th at the first creation account relates the creation of
plants and trees in their causes; the second narrates the order in w hich the causes
unfold their effects. "Causally, therefore, w as it then said that the earth
produced herb and tree [Gen. 1:12], that is, it received the pow er of producing
them . In it already as in roots of times, as I would say, those things were m ade
w hich w ould come to be through times."181 W hatever comes to pass in time has
its roots and causes in that one, prim ordial day of creation w hen all things were
m ade together and at once. G od's creative act is complete w ith th at one day, and
he rests from it. G od's governing activity in time and history is m erely the
180 Gen. 2:4-5. De Genesi ad litteram (GL) 5.4: cum factus est dies, fecit deus
caelum et terram et omne uiride agri antequam esset super terram, et omnefenum
antequeam exoriretur.
181 GL 5.4: Causaliter ergo tunc dictum est produxisse terram herbam et lignum,
id est producendi accepisse uirtutem. in ea quippe iam tamquam in radicibus, ut ita
dixerim, temporum facta erant, quae per tempora futura erant.
274
u nfolding of that One Day. In th at O ne Day God foreknows all that will be come
to be in tim e, all that secondary causes w ill bring about and all that H e will do in
relation to them .182 Included in this All are the sins of m en an d angels and God's
response to them . Although A ugustine speaks of G od's causal relation to such
evils in term s of "foreknow ledge" and "permission," he does not shrink from
placing those evils within the original w hole of creation.183
But w here does this first and sim ultaneous creation take place? Is it
sim ply the divine intention for creation? N ot according to A ugustine. Between
creation as it exists in the divine m ind, that is, in the W ord o f God, and creation
as it is m anifested in time, stands the intervening Day of angelic knowledge.
A ugustine not only makes a distinction between the tem poral unfolding of
creatures in tim e and the m ode of their existence in the roots of time, but also
betw een the created roots of tim e and the eternal archetypes of creation as they
exist in the W ord of God. "For those things that are in the W ord of God prior to
every creature, certainly are not m ade; these however were m ade w hen Day was
m ade, just as the w ords of Scripture declare, but m ade nonetheless before they
appeared above the earth, before they sprang forth, which is said of the green
things and grass of the field."184 We m ust, he says, make a threefold distinction:
These are the unchangeable reasons of all creatures in the W ord of God exist in
182 GL 6.17-18.
183 O n the reasons for perm itting evil, see GL 11.7-8 ff.
184 GL 5.4: Si ergo cum factus est dies, non utique antequam fieret dies, ac per
hoc non in uerbo, quod patri coaetemum est, antequam dies, antequam omnino aliquid
fieret, sed cum factus est dies, nam Ula, quae in uerbo dei ante omnem creaturam sunt,
non utique facta sunt; haec autem facta sunt, cum factus est dies, sicut scripturae uerba
declarant, sed tamen antequam essent super terram et antequam exorerentur: quod de
uiridibus et feno agri dictum est.
275
o n e way; those of his w orks from which he rested on the seventh day; and those
th at are w rought from them u p till now .185
The burden of De Genesi ad litteram. Book 4, is, in fact, to show that the six
days o f Genesis 1 refer to the know ledge of creation given to the angels. This
sixfold d ay of angelic know ledge constitutes a creative m om ent distinct both
from the existence th at created things have in the W ord and the existence they
h av e in themselves in time. T here is, then, an intim ate connection between the
creation of all things causally a n d the angelic know ledge of those things, a
know ledge very different from hum an knowledge. H u m an knowledge of
creatures depends on the unfolding of creation in time; angelic knowledge looks
to their existence in the W ord an d knows the whole hierarchical order of creation
before creatures appear in tim e.186
Although it is hard to overestimate Eriugena's d eb t to A ugustine for his
o w n doctrine of the relation betw een the prim ordial causes and their temporal
effects, there are also points w here he sharply diverges from Augustine. For
E riugena there exists a deep tension between the original order and ideal
procession of creation and its actual historical unfolding. W hile he w ould agree
w ith Augustine that all natures, as originally m ade by G od, are created all
together and at once, he nonetheless excludes from th at O ne D ay sin and all the
superadditions to nature th a t follow from it. A ugustine also posits an original
difference between angelic an d h um an nature, and their respective modes of
185 GL 5.12: Cum ergo aliter se habeant omnium creaturarum rationes

incommutabiles in uerbo dei, aliter eius ilia opera, a quibus in die septimo requieuit,
aliter ista, quae ex illis usque nunc operatur, ...
186 Hunc omnem ordinem creaturae ordinatae dies ille cognovit (GL 5.5). See
especially GL 5.4. Also, GL 5.19.
276
knowledge, that Eriugena regards as one of the consequences of sin. W ith

respect both to the consequences and to the original equality of angelic and
h u m an nature, Eriugena follows m ore closely the thought of the Greek Fathers,
especially M aximus th e Confessor.
Eriugena's threefold schem e of God, prim ordial causes, and effects is
closely parallel to the threefold distinction m ade by A ugustine, b u t Eriugena's
notion of procession a n d retu rn seems to owe m ore to M aximus. Procession and
return are im portant elem ents in Augustine's account o f the creation and
form ation of angelic intelligence, b u t they do not figure prom inently in his
presentation of the relation betw een the angelic Day a n d the tem poral unfolding
of creatures: causes proceed into their effects, but there is no talk of tem poral
effects returning to th eir causes.
3.4212
M a x im u s' d iv is io n o f nature
At the beginning of Periphyseon, Book 2, preparatory to his detailed

investigation of the prim ordial causes, Eriugena gives a detailed account of
M axim us' division of n ature, explaining it in term s of his ow n fourfold division
of nature and the threefold schem e of God, prim ordial causes, and tem poral
effects. M aximus first divides the created nature from the uncreated nature.
This general created natu re, says Eriugena, is that w hich w as m ade all a t once,
the prim ordial causes.187 M axim us' second division is o f the general creature
into intelligibles and sensibles. This, according to Eriugena, corresponds to his
ow n distinction betw een prim ordial causes and their tem poral, sensible effects.
A fter this, notes Eriugena, M axim us adds three divisions not represented in the
187 p p 2: 530B ff. Eriugena quotes extensively from Am b. 37.
277
threefold scheme. Sensible things are divided into heaven and earth, and earth is
d iv id ed into Paradise and the inhabited globe. The fifth division is that of m an
into m ale and female. These last three divisions, according to Eriugena, are
divisions within the order of effects that derive from sin.
Eriugena, however, seem s to have skewed M axim us' doctrine by
im posing his ow n threefold schem e on it. M aximus' ow n set of divisions has a
som ew hat different logic. It describes the process of generation by which each
substance receives its ow n separate existence. Heaven is divided from earth,
w ithin earth Paradise is divided from the inhabited globe. These are natural
divisions that set the stage for m an. M an appears a t the end of this process as the
"w orkshop" of creation (its offitina or epya<rnjpia). H e is that nature which
contains all the others and is the place where they are bro u g h t together into an
actual unity. Created in the last division with a nature th a t potentially contains
the rest, m an is given the task of retracing the steps of generation. A t each step,
acting as the mean betw een the extremes, he joins the low er to the higher until
the w hole creation is led back to its uncreated Cause. Because of sin, however,
h u m an nature itself becomes divided (into male and female) to provide for the
p ropagation of m an under the conditions of sin. H um an nature is no longer able
to unify creation in itself because of sexual difference a n d all the differences that
com e w ith it. In order to rem edy this situation and renew the whole creation, to
restore h um an nature to its intended unity and then fulfill the hum an task of
unifying nature, God became m an. Through his Resurrection and Ascension
C hrist accomplishes this restoration and reunification.
Eriugena clearly w ishes to adopt M aximus' m an-centered and Christcentered scheme of procession and return and to harm onize it w ith his own
division of nature; b u t in so do in g he distorts it. None of the pairs within
278
M axim us' division exhibits the cause-effect relation that holds betw een
E riugena's second and third divisions of nature. E riugena's identification of
M axim us' intelligibles w ith his ow n prim ordial causes a n d M axim us' sensibles
w ith his ow n effects is forced. As a consequence, Eriugena expands the impact of
sin from the division of h um an n atu re into male and female to include the
divisions of heaven from earth and Paradise from the inhabited globe. Thus,
E riugena reduces Maximus' fivefold scheme to a threefold schem e by expanding
th e sphere w ithin which sin conditions the process of generation. Moreover, for
M axim us the balance of procession and return is fundam ental, the return is
presented as a reunification of divisions; on Eriugena's reading the return is a
retu rn of effects into their causes.
Despite these distortions, it is clear that Eriugena finds and embraces in
M axim us a view very different from th at of Augustine, the view , nam ely, that
the perfection of hum an nature is obscured by the superaddition of sexual
difference to hum an nature and that, consequently, the perfection restored by
C hrist leaves behind m uch that presently characterizes h u m an nature for the
sake of restoring it to its original divine intention. Besides this, M axim us' view
o f m an as the workshop of creation, the nature in w hich all other natures are
unified am ong themselves and w ith their creator, gives to h u m an nature a more
exalted place than it receives from Augustine.
In Eriugena's hands this view gives to hum an nature a decisive and
fundam ental role in both the procession of causes into their effects and the return
of effects into their causes. H um an sin conditions n ot only the tem poral
existence of m an but the whole procession of the general creature into its
tem poral effects, and the restoration of hum an nature to its original state,
w ro u g h t by Christ, restores the w hole creation to its eternal causes.
279
In Eriugena's view hum an nature is not merely established in the third

division of nature, that is, am ong the tem poral effects, but also in the second
division, that of the prim ordial causes. Consequently, it has a position analogous
to the angelic nature of A ugustine's account. Just as the O ne D ay of angelic
n atu re is the locus of creation-proper in Augustine's account, so in Eriugena's
account, w orking from that of M aximus, hum an nature is the w orkshop of
creation, the m ean between that w hich creates b u t is not created and th at which
is created but does not create.
3.422
K n o w le d g e a n d e x is te n c e
The paradox of the sam e creature being both cause and effect is
heightened by the question, "W hether or not the principles of things w hich are
called by the nam es of prim ordial causes understand themselves before they
come forth into those things of w hich they are the causes?" In Book 2, Eriugena
asks an d answ ers this question w ith tantalizing brevity. Yes, he says, "for it is
not to be believed that in the divine w isdom anything unw ise an d ignorant of
itself h as been createdbut these things are to be considered m ore carefully
elsew here."188 The implications of this answ er are perplexing, b u t w h at
Eriugena seems to be suggesting is that m an as an effect am ong the other effects
of the third division of nature, achieves a t the end of the tem poral process
w hen h e returns to his prim ordial causes, w hen he returns to the all together and
at once of creation a state of existence causally prior to his ow n tem poral
188 PP 2 :552A-B: A . ... sed nosse uelim utrum principia rerum quae
primordialium causarum nominibus appellantur se ipsa intelligunt priusquam in ipsas
res quorum causae sunt profluant necne. N . ... Non enim credendum est in diuina
sapientia aliquod insipiens et se ipsum ignorans conditum fuisse. Sed de his diligentius
alibi considerandum.
280
em ergence from nonbeing into being, he returns for the first tim e to being w hat
he has alw ays been.
In Book 4, Eriugena finally gives a fuller account of w h a t he m eans. There
the question is whether a m an receives his knowledge in the prim o rd ial creation
or o n ly w hen, in the course of tem poral generation, he em erges into this life.
In b o th ...: in one w ay, generally and latently in the causes, in the other,
specifically and m anifestly in the effects. For in th at p rim o rd ial and
general creation of the w hole h um an nature no one know s him self
specifically, nor begins to have his ow n knowledge, for there thought of
all is one and general, a n d know n to God alone. For there all m en are one,
th at one indeed m ade in th e im age of God and in w h o m all are created.
For as all forms o r species, w hich are contained in one g enus, are n o t at
th at point accessible th ro u g h differentiae and properties to intellect or
sense, b u t just as a certain unity subsists and is never d iv id ed , until each
intelligibly and sensibly receives its property and differentia in its
individual species: so everyone in the communion of h u m a n nature
discerns neither him self n o r his consubstantials in his o w n thought, before
he proceeds in this w orld w ith his times, according to w h a t is established
in die eternal reasons.189
Even after their generation in tim e, m en are ignorant of them selves, and of
h u m an n ature generally, because of the effects of sin. This ignorance is the
189 p p 4- 776D-777A: MAG. Die mihi, quando notitiam sui accipit homo,
utrum in ilia conditione, in qua omnes homines universaliterfacti su n t in primordialibus
causis ante tempora secularia, an in ipsa generatione, qua in ordine temporum, Deo soli
cognito et praedefinito, in hanc vitam procedit? DISC. In utrisque, u t arbitror: in una
quidem generaliter in causis latenter, in altera vero specialiter in effectibus manifeste.
Nam in ilia primordiali etgenerali totius humanae naturae conditione nemo seipsum
specialiter cognoscit, neque propriam notitiam sui habere incipit; una enim et generalis
cognitio omnium est ibi, solique Deo cognita. Illic namque omnes homines unus sunt,
ille profecto ad imaginem Deifactus, in quo omnes creati sunt. Ut enim omnes formae
vel species, quae in uno genere continentur, adhuc per differentias et proprietates
intellectui vel sensui cognitae non succumbunt, sed veluti quaedam unitas nondum
divisa subsistit, donee unaquaeque suam proprietatem et differentiam in specie individua
intelligibiliter vel sensibiliter accipiat: ita unusquisque in communione humanae naturae
nec seipsum nec consubstantiales suos propria cognitione discemit, priusquam in hunc
mundum suis temporibus, juxta quod in aetemis rationibus constitutum est, processerit.
281
principal wretchedness of m an in his present condition. Nonetheless, through

the purification w rought b y C hrist, hum an nature returns to its prim ordial state
of perfect knowledge and bliss.190
This last quotation involves a curious connection betw een the subjective
and objective aspects of know ledge, ow ing to the m utual im plication of existence
and self-awareness. This relationship between the existence of a thing and its
being know n bears directly o n E riugena's notion of m an as w orkshop of creation.
The them e is m uch richer th an the following remarks are likely to suggest, but a
full appreciation w ould not be possible within the confines of this study.191
190 PP 4: 777A ff.

191 See especially, Brian Stock, "Intelligo me esse: Eriugena's 'C ogito'," in
Jean Scot Erigene et Ihistoire de la philosophie, ed. Roques, 327-335, and Bernard
McGinn, "The Negative Elem ent in the Anthropology of John the Scot," in the
sam e volume, 315-325.
Willimien O tten's w o rk o n Eriugena's anthropologyprincipally, The
Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena, but also articles as "The Universe of
N ature and the Universe of Man: Difference and Identity," in Begriffund
Metapher, ed. Beierwaltes, 202-212justifiably takes the identity of m an's being
and his understanding as the A rchim edean point of Eriugena's anthropology.
I have not, however, been able to make m uch use of her w ork in m y own
analysis because of w hat appears to m e as a skewing tendency of her w ork to
interpret that identity in term s of the rational strivings of em pirical m an (as
exemplified especially in the Periphyseon itself) rather than by reference to the
unchangeable ouCTia-buvafiLs-evepyeia of m an eternally created in the W ord. The
identity of being and know ledge m eans that insofar as m an is at present
ignorant, he also lacks being (which is the fifth mode of interpreting 'to be' and
'n o t to be'see PP 1 :445C). H um an knowledge m ay be the m easure of all that
'is', b u t only that knowledge w hich is natural to hum an nature as restored in
Christ, that is, as it will be for all in the return. I would not, therefore, separate
E riugena's Christology and eschatology from his anthropology as O tten does
(see, for example, Otten, Anthropology, 151).
Also, it seems to me th a t she does not sufficiently account for the
implications of Eriugena's insistence, shared with Gregory, th at m an is
ioayycXos.
282
3.423
How the w orld exists in man and in angel

To understand Eriugena's appropriation of M axim us' notion of
epyacmipia, it is necessary to return to Book 1 of Periphyseon, to the discussion of

'place'.192 That discussion begins w ith the juxtaposition and identification of
w h at to a more conventional understanding appear as tw o rather different
notions, 'place' and 'definition': Place "is constituted in the definitions of things
th at can be defined. For place is nothing else b u t the circumference by which
each thing is enclosed w ithin fixed limits."193 There are as m any species of place
as there are things that can be circumscribed. For exam ple, all bodies are
circumscribed within the definition of 'body'. The definition of body"a certain
com posite of the qualities of the four elements com bined under a single
sp e d e s"194contains all bodies consisting of form an d m atter. Likewise, all spirits
are encompassed by the definition of 'spirit': "an incorporeal nature lacking
form through itself and m atter."195
Otten's w ork deserves a m ore substantial engagem ent than these brief
rem arks give, but, unfortunately, a full critique lies beyond the scope of this
study.
192Jorge J. E. G rada, "Ontological Characterization of the Relation
Between Man and Created N ature in Eriugena," Journal o f the History of Philosophy
16,2 (1978), 155-166, rightly points to containment as the leading theme in
Eriugena's understanding of m an's relationship to the rest of creation; b u t it is
no t d e a r to me that the author has properly understood the distinction between
the ousia and the definition of a thing. See below.
193 PP 1:474B: Locus ... in diffinitionibus rerum quae diffiniri possunt
constituitur. Nil enim aliud est locus nisi ambitus quo unumquodque certis terminis
concluditur.
194 PP 1 :574B: Corpus est composito quaedam quattuor elementorum
qualitatibus sub una quadam specie conglobata.
195 PP 1:474C: Item spiritus est natura incorporea forma per se atque materie
carens.
283
Eriugena presents his notion of place/definition as a generalization of the

'topics'196 found in the art of Dialectic. There are m any definitions contained
within the arts an d even the arts themselves are contained by their proper
definitions. Thus, the arts are contained w ithin definitions, the arts contain
definitions, and these definitions contain innum erable things. Indeed, the
definitions of everything are in the liberal arts, an d if the liberal arts themselves
are found now here else b u t in a m ind, then everything has its place in the mind.
A striking conclusion.197
In a m ore careful consideration that follows som ew hat further on in the
text,198 Eriugena advances the position that all things after God exist and are
known to exist in a n d u nder place and time. G regory the Theologian's view, he
says, is that apart from God, w ho alone is truly beyond being, everything is
understood in place, w ith w hich time is also alw ays associated. N othing that
receives being through generation can be conceived except as being both local
and temporal. N othing that possesses being after G od possesses it simply but in
some m annerthis is to exist in place. Moreover, for som ething to be in some
m anner, and not sim ply, m eans that it once w as not b u t has received being and
so now isthis is to exist in time. Furthermore, citing A ugustine's De musica
196 In dialectic a topic is something in the n atu re of things in which an

argum ent is found th at produces belief about a doubtful m atter. (PP1:474D:
Nam tarn late paten dialectici loci ut undecunque dialecticus animus in natura rerum
argumentum quod rei dubiae facit fidem reppererit locum argumenti esse describat seu
argumenti sedem.) Cf. Boethius on the topics.
197 PP 1 :475C.
198 PP 1 :481B-483C.
284
(and equating A ugustine's 'm easure' w ith his ow n 'place'),199 Eriugena argues
that the m easure o r place of w hat is created is logically prior to its creation; and
likewise, origin a n d beginning are logically prior to w h a t begins and is bom .
Place and time are created bu t w ith a logical priority to the things under them.200
The beatitude of deification201 lies precisely in the fact that the creature
transcends the tim e and place within and u n d er w hich it w as m ade, and becomes
like Melchisedec, w ithout beginning or end. Such a transcendence of natural
limits does not involve the destruction o f the nature in question because there is
a distinction betw een the eternal reasons of a nature a n d its local and temporal
199 Eriugena cites A ugustine, b u t in fact his prim ary source for his
understanding of tim e and place seems to be M aximus. The references to
Melchisedec and the exam ple of light perm eated by air, w hich follow, are clear
indications that he has Amb. 6.19-20 in m ind. O n M axim us' doctrine of time and
place, see Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 132-141.
200 PP 1 :482B-C.
201 As w e saw in section 3.251 above, m an's deification and the
transcendence of n atu re which it involves are w orks o f grace accomplished by
the Incarnation a n d Resurrection of Christ, in w hom h u m an nature is deified to
the superlative degree. The elect participate in this divinized hum anity, but
never to that sam e degree. The proper recognition of deification as a w ork of
grace and the hierarchy of partidation in it are m issing from D erm ot M oran's
"'O ffidna om nium ' or 'notio quaedam intellectuals in m ente divina aetem aliter
facta': The problem of the definition of m an in the philosophy of John Scottus
Eriugena," in L'homme et son univers au Moyen Age, ed. C hristian W enin (Louvainla-Neuve: Editions de lTnstitut Superior de Philosophic, 1986), 1:195-204, with
the consequence th a t his interpretation of m an's self-know ledge is som ewhat
skewed. H e tends to treat it (in its paradoxical fullness) as som ething man
accomplishes rather than w hat the divine achieves in h u m an nature through its
deification in Christ. Carlos Steel's contribution to the sam e volum e, "La
creation de 1'univers dans l'hom m e selon Jean Scot Erigene," provides a
balancing perspective to M oran's by beginning w ith the biblical foundation on
w hich Eriugena builds.
285
lim its.202 N ature does not perish w hen G od alone and not its ow n lim its are
m anifested in it, anym ore than air perishes w hen light is m anifested in it.
Place is nothing else b u t the natural definition and m ode a n d position of
each creature w hatever, w hether general o r specific; in the sam e w ay, time
is nothing else b u t the beginning of the m otion from nonbeing to being of
things through generation and fixed dim ensions of this m otion of m utable
things until the stable end w ill arrive in w hich all things will stand
unchangeably.203
Thus, w ords like 'place', 'lim it', 'term ', 'definition', 'circum scription' all signify
the sam e thing: ambitum finitae naturae, the circumference of a finite nature, its
essential definition.204
202 Cf. PP 1 :487A-B w here Eriugena defends the position th a t even w hen
defined, essence remains incom prehensible. The doctrine of the incom prehen
sibility of created ousiai had been introduced and discussed earlier in Book 1, on
the authority of Gregory the Theologian (Nazianzen). That ousiai can be defined,
Eriugena claims, does not contradict their incom prehensibility. O usia in itself
cannot be defined as to what it is, but w hen it receives being through generation
in tim e an d place, it becomes know n that it is. Just as God, as the C ause of all
things, is not know n what he is from the things he causes, yet from these things it
is k n o w n that he is. A nd although he can justly be called and know n by the
nam es of the things he causes, yet he is n ot tru ly any of them and so he rem ains
u n k n o w n as he is in himself. Similarly w ith ousia, its m anifestation in tim e and
place m akes know n that it is b u t does not give knowledge of w hat it is in itself.
The essence of a thing always transcends the m ode and origin of being it receives
th ro u g h generation.
203 PP 1 :483B-C: Ac per hoc concluditur nil aliud esse locum nisi naturalem
diffinitionem modumque positionemque uniuscuiusque siue generalis siue specialis
creaturae, quemadmodum nil aliud est tempus nisi rerum per generationem motionis ex
non esse in esse inchoationem ipsiusque motus rerum mutabilum certae dimensiones
donee ueniat stabilis finis in quo immutabiliter omnia stabunt.
204 PP 1 :483C: Ac per hoc datur intelligi siue locum quis dixerit siue finem siue
terminum siue diffinitionem siue circunscriptionem unum idipsumque significare,
ambitum uidelicet finitae naturae. Quamuisque multae diffinitionum species quibusdam
esse uideantur, sola ac uere ipsa dicenda et diffinitio quae a Grecis YZIAAEZ, a nostris
uero essentialis, uocari consueuit. Aliae siquidem aut connumerationes intelligibilium
partium YZIAE aut argumentations quaedam extrinsecus per accidentia aut
286
Essence is one thing and its definition, another, for th at w hich is contained
su rely differs from that w hich contains. According to E riugena the definition
containing a n essence is the act o f a m ind. For example, the lim its of geometrical
figurespoints, lines, and surfacescan be grasped only by the intellect. Even
in n atu ral bodies which are com posed o f form and m atter, the form th at contains
the m atter is incorporeal and the m atter itself is composed o f incorporeal
qualities, so th at the limits even o f natural bodies are perceptible to the intellect
alone.205 Moreover, such circum scription of a nature can be m ade only by a
rational or intellectual nature su p erio r to it. Irrational natures are defined by
m an and angels, and these, in tu rn , together with the natures they com prehend,
are defined by God. If a nature can be comprehended and defined only by a
su p erio r nature and the act of the higher nature is definition of the lower, then
clearly definition and the essence defined are different. That w hich
circum scribes and defines is different from that which is circum scribed and
defined.206
But w h at is the relationship betw een definition and the defining mind?
E riugena's answ er involves a consideration of the relationship betw een the
liberal arts and the soul. First, he identifies dialectic as the art of defining. The
pro p erty of dialectic is to divide, join, and discern the natures of all things that
are knowable. For this reason, he says, the wise call it "true contem plation of
qualescunque sententiarum species sunt, sola uero TITAAFX id solum recipit ad
diffiniendum quod perfectionem naturae quam diffinit complet ac perficit.
205
Pp 1; 484B-C.
206 PP 1:485A ff.
287
things."207 Next, recalling the triad, oikria-6uvap.is-evepYi.a, from the w orks of

Dionysius,208 he locates the liberal arts in the evepyeia of the soul. For the
philosophers have rightly discovered, he says, that the arts are both eternal and
imm utably attached to the soul. They are n o t m ere accidents but natural pow ers
and actions of the soul that derive from the soul itself. Indeed, so closely are the
soul and the arts related that it is difficult to determ ine which confers
immortality on the other. Thus, definitions, the places of things, w hich are
distinguished from the otioCai or essences whose natures they lim it a n d define,
are, while also distinguished from the ouaia of the superior defining nature,
nonetheless grounded in it as its natural acts.209
W hat of self-knowledge? A n intellect that understood itself w ould be its
own place. Eriugena excludes this possibility.
A nd he w ould not speak absurdly w ho says [that a nature can define
itself], if any intellect after G od, w ho is called the intellect of all things, can
understand itself. But if every intellect besides God is circumscribed not
by itself b u t by a superior, no intellect is its ow n place but will be situated
w ithin w hat is superior.210
207 PP 1 :486B: Sed quoniam uidemus aliud esse constitutas in anima liberates
artes, aliud ipsam animam quae quasi quoddam subiectum est artium, artes uero ueluti
inseparabilia naturaliaque animae accidentia uidentur esse, quid nos prohibet dijfiniendi
disciplinam inter artes ponere, adiungentes dialecticae cuius proprietas est rerum
omnium quae intelligi possunt naturas diuidere coniungere discemere propriosque locos
unicuique distribuere, atque ideo a sapientibus uera rerum contemplatio solet appellari?
208 DN 4.23.
209 Hence Eriugena's definition of m an as a certain intellectual concept
formed eternally in the m ind of G od. (PP 4 : 768B: Possumus ergo hominem definire
sic: Homo est notio quaedam intellectualis in mente divina aetemaliterfacta.)
210 PP 1 :486A: A. Aliud esse uideo; sed intellectus qui se ipsum intelligit
quoniam se ipsum diffinit suimet locus esse uidetur.
288
E riugena takes up this account of how all things are com prehended by the
defining act of a higher nature again in Book 4, d u rin g the exposition of the Sixth
Day. O ne of the m ore interesting clarifications he m akes there pertains to the
m utual know ledge of m an and angel.
If y o u look intently into the reciprocal coupling and unity of intellectual
an d rational natures, you will certainly discover th at angelic essence is
constituted in the hum an and the h u m an in the angelic. In each indeed,
w hatever p u re intellect knows m ost perfectly is m ade and is effected as
one thing in him. Such too w as the association of h u m an and angelic
n ature (and it w ould still be so, if the first m an had n o t sinned), that both
w ould be effected as one. W hich thing also in the highest men, of w hom
the first are in the heavens, begins to be done. Both angel is made in m an
thro u g h the understanding of angel w hich is in m an, and m an in angel
thro u g h the understanding of m an constituted in angel. For, someone
w ho, as I have said, understands purely, in him w hat he understands is
m ade. Thus, the angelic intellectual and rational nature w as made in the
h u m an intellectual and rational nature, in the sam e w ay the hum an was
m ade in the angelic through the reciprocal know ledge by which both the
angel understand m an and m an the angel.211
N. Nec hoc absurde quis dixerit si ullus intellectus post deum, qui intellectus
omnium dicitur, se ipsum potest intelligere. Si autem omnis intellectxis praeter deum
non a se ipso sed a superiori se circunscribitur, nullus intellectus suimet locus erit sed
intra superiorem se collocabitur...
211 PP 4 : 780A-B: Si intentus intellectualium et rationabilium naturarum
reciprocam copulationem et unitatem inspexeris, invenies profecto et angelicam
essentiam in humana, et humanam in angelica constitutam. In omni siquidem,
quodcunque purus intellectus perfectissime cognoscit,fit, eique unum ejficitur. Tanta
quippe humanae naturae et angelicae societas fuerat, et fieret, si primus homo non
peccaret, ut utraque unum efficeretur. Quod etiam in summis hominibus, quorum
primitiae in caelestibus sunt, fieri incipit. Et angelus quidem in homine f it per
intellectum angeli, qui in homine est, et homo in angelo per intellectum hominis in
angelo constatutum. Qui enim, ut dixi, pure intelligit, in eo, quod intelligit,fit. Natura
itaque intellectualis et rationalis angelica in natura intellectuali et rationali humana facta
est, quemadmodum et humana in angelica per reciprocam cognitionem, qua et angelus
hominem intelligit, et homo angelum.
289
This view finally depends on the radical unity of the subjective and objective
dim ensions of essence. "For we are not one thing a n d o u r intellect another; but
indeed o u r highest essence is intellect formed by contem plation of truth."212
If the ouCTica, as oucxiai, that is, as substantial a n d n o t m erely as defined,
were g ro u n d ed in the superior defining nature, their definition w ould be a
partial act of self-knowledge (i.e., self-definition) on th e p a rt of the one who
contains them substantially. Such seems to be m an's relation to the universe
that is, h e contains them "not only according to know ledge of them , but also
according to the things themselves."213 Angels, it w o u ld seem , contain the
universe only according to knowledge. And yet Eriugena backs aw ay from this
distinction, o r at least reduces the distance involved b y a rguing th at a thing
exists m ore truly in the knowledge of that which defines it than in itself.
For reason teaches that w hat understands is b etter th an w h at is
understood. For if knowledge of all things subsists in the divine wisdom,
n o t w ithout reason I w ould pronounce that it is incom parably better than
all the things of which it is the knowledge. A nd if this is so, such order, I
suppose, proceeds from divine providence th ro u g h the universal creature
as every nature which com prehends its concept o f w h a t follows, not only
is better and superior, b u t even the concept itself, b y the dignity of the
n atu re in w hich it is, precedes by far that of w hich it is a concept. And for
212 PP 4: 780C: Non enim aliud sumus, aliud nosfer intellectus; vera siquidem ac
summa nostra essentia est intellectus contemplatione veritatis specificatus. The next
sentence is interesting. Quod autem intellectus non solum coessentialibus sibi naturis,
verum etiam inferioribus conformari possit, dum eas amando intelligit seu sentit, sermo
docet apostolicus, intellectuale nostrum diligere visibiles formas prohibens, dicendo:
Nolite conform ari huic seculo. This recalls the definition given in Book 1 of a
spirit: spiritus est natura incorporea forma perse atque materie carens (PP 1 :474C).
Intellectual spirits are given form by turning tow ard the W ord of God, irrational
spirits receive form from sensible phantasies. While m a n 's true "self" lies in
know ing the truth, it is possible to be conformed to a lesser reality.
213 PP 4: 782B: ... omnia, quae post lucis constitutionem narrantur, in homine
creata esse, non solum secundum eorum cognitionem, verum etiam secundum res ipsas...
290
this reason I w ould say m ore easily that the concept of intelligible things is
p rio r to the intelligible things themselves.214
W hat is striking in E riugena's account of definition is the claim that the
essential m om ent of the m anifestation of oiioiat in times a n d places is a "mental"
event.215 The further m anifestation o f beings in external sense and the bodily
m ode of existence associated w ith it a d d nothing to their real existence unless it
is a certain eclipse of their intelligible procession for m inds encum bered by
external sense; elsewhere E riugena likens bodies to "shadow s" cast by oucriai216
The tru e existence of things is n o t their projection in the realm of exterior sense
b u t their procession into reason and interior sense. If this is so, the microcosmic
function that distinguishes m a n from angels is not one th at gives m an some
advantage over the angels; he is sim ply the place where the shadow s are
m anifested along with the beings from which they derive. The tragedy of hum an
nature is that it is itself projected outside the intelligible realm ; ceasing to be the
sim ple com prehending whole, he becomes a part of the m ortal and corporeal
w orld.
214 PP 4 : 766B: Quod m int intelligit, melius esse, quam quod intelligitur, ratio
edocet. Nam si rerum omnium cognitio in dixrina sapientia subsistit, meliorem esse
incomparabiliter earn rebus omnibus quorum cognitio est, non temere pronuntiarim. Et
si ita est, talis ordo, ut rear, ex divina providentia per universam creaturam procedit, ut
omnis natura, quae sequentis se notitiam comprehendit, non solum melior et superior sit,
verum etiam et ipsa notitia dignitate naturae, in qua est, praecedit earn longe, cujus
notitia est. Ac per hocfacilius dixerim, notitiam intelligibilium rerum antiquiorem esse
ipsis intelligibilibus rebus.
215 The whole procession takes place in the three essential m otions of the
soul described by Eriugena in Book 2 and examined in chapter 2 of this
dissertation.
216 See section 1.32 in chapter 1. Cf. PP 1:501B-C, 503A-B.
291
Eriugena expresses this doctrine in a recapitulation of the Six Days at the

end of his treatm ent of the Sixth Day. M an and angel are created sim ultaneously
on th e First Day; for, the light w hich G od m ade first is the intellectual nature.
A ugustine, whom Eriugena cites,217 refers this light specifically to the angels, but
Eriugena, w orking from the fact that the sacred text does not explicitly identify
this light w ith the angels, argues that w h a t is signified is the intellectual nature
generally and not only its angelic variety.
This recapitulation of the Six Days begins w ith the question, W hy m an, if
he surpasses the whole creation and encom passes it within himself, should have
his creation related last. Gregory of N yssa's answ er to this question, as has been
n o ted and discussed elsewhere, is that m an is created last to show his kingship
and the excellence of his soul. Gregory, how ever, does not interpret the Six Days
as m om ents of knowledge as Augustine does. M an's appearing last m ight mean
that w hile he is the last and m ost perfect p a rt zvithin the creation as revealed to
the angels, he in no way shares their privileged knowledge. A ugustine interprets
the six days, each with an evening and a m orning, as six m ovem ents of the
angelic knowledge beginning w ith the "d ay " of its ow n creation.218 In his
reading, however, the angels com prehend a n d encompass the creation w ithin
their o w n m inds, while m an is merely one o f the things com prehended.
Eriugena, in his reading, maintains th at m an, too, is included in the
creation of light, and so contains all that follows; but that owing to his sin he is
also included w ithin creation. Mem m ay have been intended to contain the rest
of creation in a w ay different from the angels, b u t there is som ething unnatural
217 Pp 4: 781c . Cf. CD 11.7 & 9 and GL.

218 See CD 11.7.
292
in his being num bered am ong the parts o f the sensible cosmos. Instead of ruling
the w hole sensible creation, m an is him self a p a rt ruled w ith that whole.
For m an, if he had not sinned, w o u ld n o t be administered am ong the parts
of the w orld, but w ould adm inister the whole of the world as completely
subject to himself, nor w ould h e use these corporeal senses in the m ortal
body for that rule; b u t w ithout any sensible m otion either spatial or
tem poral, by rational insight alone into its natures and interior causes, by
an easily use of a right will, he w ould govern eternally and w ithout error
according to divine laws, w hether in the adm inistration of parts or in the
adm inistration of the whole.219
As m an contains the intellectual light of the First Day, so he contains the
firm am ent of universal elements of the Second, as well as the vital m otion,
exterior sense, and all the other general parts of creation, w hich are m ystically
n arrated in the rem aining days.220 If this w as m an's original relation to the
w orld, it is n o t surprising that his fell w ould have such drastic consequences
both for him self and the sensible cosmos contained within him.
3.43
C o n c lu s io n
M an as p a rt is a microcosm, b u t he has fallen from his more excellent
destiny as the macrocosm. Like G regory Eriugena proves to be am bivalent

tow ard microcosmism, but not for the sam e reason. Microcosmism, the doctrine
that m an , although a part of the w orld, contains w ithin himself the elem ents and
219 PP 4: 782C: Non enim homo, si non peccaret, inter partes mundi
administraretur, sed ejus universitatem omnino sibi subditam administraret, nec
corporeis his sensibus mortalis corporis ad ilium regendum uteretur, verum sine ullo
sensibili motu vel locali vel temporali, solo rationabili contuitu naturalium and
interiorum ejus causarum, facillimo rectae voluntatis usu, secundum leges divinas
aetemaliter ac sine errore gubemaret, sive in administratione partium, sive in
administratione universitatis.
220 PP 4: 782D-786A.
293
order of the whole, is for Gregory a com parison unw orthy of him w ho w as
created in the im age of God. For Eriugena, m an's role as encom passing the
elem ents an d order of the cosmos has been assim ilated to A ugustine's doctrine of
the angelic D ay and M aximus' "w orkshop" of creation. Yet for both G regory
and Eriugena the key to understanding their ambivalence and am biguities about
m an's cosmic role rem ains their conviction th at m an was and will be equal to the
angels.
In term s of knowledge, and the tru er existence which things have in the
know ledge of superior natures than they have in themselvesaccording to
Eriugena, it w ould seem that m an and angel alike are macrocosms; for, both,
w hen their o w n natures are perfected, contain w ithin themselves, as the
energeia, the natural activity, of their substance, the whole hierarchy of creation.
Even betw een m an and angel there is a m utual knowledge such that each can be
said to be m ade in the other by virtue of th a t knowledge.
N onetheless, m an's distinguishing m icrocosmism is not of this kind, not
of know ledge, b u t of the fact that in him the sensible creation receives an external
m ode of existence. Angels have interior sense and even celestial bodies,
according to Eriugena, but they do not possess the bodies m ade from the
qualities of the four elements and the exterior sense which depends on such
bodies. A lthough the possession of these b y m an serves to distinguish him from
angels, it h a rd ly brings him honor. Indeed, his chief disgrace is that he has lost
sight of his tru e nature and that deeper know ledge of the cosmos which is
connatural to him and has become m ired d o w n in the fogs of exterior sensation
and the irrational m otions that depend on it. The process by w hich m an returns
to him self is the sam e process by w hich the w hole sensible w orld returns to unity
294
w ith its intelligible causes, as shadows, driven aw ay b y the light, return into the
bodies from w hich th ey proceed and in which they latently exist.
M an will again be equal to the angels. W hat difference will then serve to
distinguish hum an from angelic nature? N one, unless w h at has been but should
n o t have been is som ehow preserved w ithin w h at alw ays has been and w ill be,
in the same w ay th at the irrational impulses of the beasts are preserved in
transm uted fashion w ithin the virtues of the saints.
It should n ow be clear to w hat extent E riugena's shares w ith G regory the
three convictions, th a t the final state of m an given in the resurrection will be a
return to the original state of hum an nature as it w as intended by God, that this
final state will include equality with angels, and th at anim ality is incom patible
w ith this equality. The next chapter will show Eriugena defending these
presuppositions against the weighty authority o f A ugustine, relying on the
authority of the com posite Gregory and his com m entator Maximus.
295
CHAPTER 4
R E T U R N TO P A R A D I S E
Eriugena's interpretation of the Sixth D ay leads him into a confrontation
w ith the teachings of Augustine regarding th e validity of a literal, tem poral
interpretation of Paradise. Here the consolidated authority of Gregory the
Theologian (Nyssen and Nazianzen) comes to the fore. "After the holy Apostles
there has been none among the Greeks of greater authority in the exposition of
divine Scripture than Gregory the Theologian, and none am ong the Romans,
than A urelius A ugustinus."1 This chapter w ill exam ine the controversy with
A ugustine and isolate the elements which Eriugena draw s from De imagine.
As w as noted in section 3.251 of the previous chapter, at one point in his
exposition of the return of nature to God, Eriugena asks w hether the resurrection
of all flesh is a w ork of nature or of grace. Form erly, he tells us, having had only
the w orks of Latin writers to guide him, he h a d held th at it was entirely the work
of grace. "B ut after I read the serm on De fide b y Epiphanius ... and the
disputation De imagine of the great Gregory the Theologian, I changed m y
opinion."2 As one w ould by now expect, for G regory and Eriugena, beginning
1 PP 4 : 804C-D: post sanctos Apostolos nullum apud Graecos fuisse in

expositionibus divinae Scripturae majoris auctoritatis Gregorio theologo, nullum apud
Romanos Aurelio Augustino.
2 PP 5 : 899C: Sed postquam sancti Epiphanii, episcopi Constantiae Cypri,
Ancoratum seu sermonem de Fide legi, magnique Gregorii Theologi de Imagine
296
and end are closely related. Thus, the issue concerning the roles of nature and
grace in the resurrection, which in the previous chapter w as tied to the necessity
of die Incarnation, can also be expressed in the question, W hether the end of m an
is a return to the original state of his nature o r a grace superadded to that nature.
The previous chapter has looked at the contribution m ade by Gregory's notions
of the hum an plerom a and of the transm utation o f passion in virtue, to
Eriugena's understanding of the return; this chapter w ill look at Gregory's
argum ent for the inevitability of m an's return to h is prim ordial and natural state.
A t the end of his exposition of the Sixth Day, Eriugena calls upon Gregory
of Nyssa to confirm his exposition of the biblical w itness concerning hum an
nature. W ith long quotations from De imagine, reproducing in some cases w hole
chapters, he presents G regory's views on the sim plicity and invisibility of the
soul3 and its relation to the body. Regarding to the latter he quotes many of the
passages exam ined in chapter 2 on the body as a m irror of a mirror,4 on the flux
of materiality,5 a n d on the body as instrument.6 H e then quotes almost in their
entirety the chapters that deal w ith the nature of th e divine image,7 m an's
original and final equality w ith the angels, and his present assimilation to the life
disputationem, mutavi sententiam, u t ... resurrectionem mortuorum naturali virtute
futuram esse concederem.
3 PP 4: 788B-789A; Imag. 11; 220-221; cf. O H 1 1 :153C-156B.
4 PP 4: 789A-790B; Imag. 13; 224-225; cf. O H 1 2 :161C-164C.
5 PP 4: 791C-792A; Imag. 14; 226; cf. O H 13:165A.
6 PP 4: 792A-D, 792D-793A; Imag. 15-16; 230-231; cf. O H 14-15:173D178C.
7 PP 4: 793C-797C; Imag. 17; 232-236; cf. O H 1 6 :177D-185D.
297
of irrational anim als for the sake of sinful m an's propagation.8 Finally, he quotes
De imagine 27 w here G regory presents his theory of an abiding form of the body
which is im pressed in the soul and w ill be u sed to reconstitute the body in its
resurrection.9 From all of this Eriugena concludes that mem was not originally
created w ith a m aterial, anim al body.
Therefore, this spiritual form [described b y Gregory] is the spiritual body,
m ade in the first creation of m an. But there is no do u b t that w hat is from
m atter, th a t is, from the qualities and quantities of the four elements of the
sensible w orld combined with this qualitative form (concerning w hich w e
have disputed in prior books), since they suffer both to be increased and
decreased, pertains to the composition o f the superadded, and, as it were,
superfluous, body.... For the exterior and m aterial body is the seal of the
interior, in w hich the form of the soul is expressed and is therefore
reasonably called its form. A nd do not think that I teach that there are
two natural bodies in one man. For one is the body, with which, being
joined connaturally and consubstantially to the soul, m an was created.
Indeed, th at m aterial body, which is superadded, is more rightly
interpreted as a certain mutable and corruptible garm ent of the true a n d
natural body, than as the true body. For w h at does not remain alw ays is
not true, an d as St. Augustine says, "W hat begins to be w hat it w as n ot
and ceases to be w hat it is, already is not."10 Hence it is that this m ortal,
corruptible, earthly, animal body is distinguished, by ever existing
compositely and w ith some addition, from that sim ple body w hich w as
first created in m an and will be in the future.11
8 PP 4: 797D-799A; Imag. 18; 236-237; cf. O H 17:188C-192A.

9 PP 4 :801A-C, 802C; Imag. 27; 252-252; cf. O H 2 7 :225C-228B.
10 Madec, Jean Scot et ses auteurs, 118, suggests the following sources for
this quotation: De uera religione 49,97 (PL 34:165); In loh. euang. tr. 38,10 (PL
35:1680); Sermo 7,7 (66).
11 PP 4 :801D-802A, 802D-803A: Ipsa igitur forma spiritualis spirituale corpus
est, in prima conditione hominis factum: quod autem ex materia, hoc est, ex qualitatibus
et quantitatibus quattuor elementorum mundi sensibilis cum ipsa forma qualitativa, de
qua in prioribus libris disputavimus, quoniam et augeri et minui patiuntur, ad
compositionem superadjecti ac veluti superflui corporis pertinere non dubium est.... Est
anim exterius et materiale corpus signaculum interioris, in quo forma animae
exprimitur, ac per hoc forma ejus rationabiliter appellatur. Et ne me existimes, duo
298
The N u trito r's quotation of A ugustine here is perhaps ironic, because this
view regarding th e body, which the quotation serves to support, is precisely not
that of A ugustine, an d the A lum nus is quick to p o in t this out.
W hat then w ill be answered to d ie m ost holy and m ost divine
theologian, A ugustine, who it seem s is contradicted by these reasons? For
in nearly all his books he unhesitatingly asserts that the body of the first
m an before sin w as anim al, earthly, m ortalthough he w ould n ot have
died if he h a d n o t sinnedand actually dead b y sinning.12
He then quotes a passage from Augustine's De baptismo parvulorum in w hich
Augustine outlines the probationary character of m an 's first constitution. M an
was created w ith a n anim al and earthly body, b u t one in which m ortality was
suspended until h e show ed him self obedient o r disobedient. "If A dam h a d not
sinned, he w ould n o t have been despoiled of his body, b u t w ould have been
overlaid {supervestiendus) w ith imm ortality an d incorruption, so that the m ortal
would be absorbed b y life, th at is, that he w ould cross over from anim al to
spiritual."13 He notes that A ugustine m aintains the sam e position elsewhere,
especially in De Genesi ad litteram and De civitate dei.
corpora naturalia in duo homine docere. Unum enim est corpus, quo connaturaliter et
consubstantialiter enimae compacto homo conficitur. Ulud siquidem materiale, quod est
superadditum, rectius vestimuntum quoddam mutabile et corruptibile veri ac naturalis
corporis accipitur, quam verum corpus. Non enim verum est, quod semper non manet,
et, ut ait sanctus Augustinus: Q uod in d p it esse qu o d no n erat, et desinit esse quod
est, jam non est. Inde fit, quod semper non simpliciter, sed cum additamento aliquo
ponitur corpus hoc mortale vel corruptibile vel terrenum vel animale, ad discretionem
ipsius simplicis corporis, quod primitus in homine conditum est, et quod futurum est.
12 PP 4 :803B: Quid ergo respondebimus sanctissimo divinissimoque theologo,
Augustino videlicet, qui praedictis rationibus refragari videtur? Nam fere in omnibus
suis libris incunctanter asserit, corpus primi hominis ante peccatum animale fuisse,
terrenum, mortale, quamvis non moreretur, si non peccaret, peccando veto mortuum.
13 PP 4 :803D: Proinde si non peccasset Adam, non erat expoliandus corpore, sed
supervestiendus immortalitate et incorruptione, ut absorberetur mortale a vita, id est ab
animali in spirituale transiret.
299
It is m ost clear, that he teaches nothing else about the body of the first
m an before sin, than that it w as anim al and mortal. For if he had n o t been
m ortal, how could he have been com m anded to eat from the fruits of
paradise so th at he m ight n o t fail a n d from the tree of life so th at he m ight
not g ro w old? For, as he often asserts, the first men before the deception
are reported to have eaten bodily from the fruits of paradise.14
So w h a t is the true and abiding n a tu re of man? Is he, as A ugustine
teaches, a m ortal anim al set in a special, provisional state in w hich his m ortality
was suspended by access to the tree of life and to w hich imm ortality and
spirituality w ould have been superadded as a rew ard for obedience? O r is it the
case, as G regory of N yssa holds, that his anim ality is the superaddition and that
in his true n atu re m an is the image of G od, reflecting the incorruptibility,
immortality, an d blessedness of his M aker? W hich is superadded to which, the
godlike to the anim al or the anim al to the godlike?
These tw o different anthropological starting-points, represented by
Gregory and A ugustine, have profound theoretical ramifications, for exam ple, in
how one construes the distinction betw een nature and grace or, perhaps, w hat
spiritual significance one attributes to gender. W hat is at stake for Eriugena is
hinted at by the earlier brief quotation of A ugustine, "W hat begins to be w hat it
was not and ceases to be w hat it is," is n o t true being. The identification of the
first state of m an w ith his last state, w hich Eriugena affirms along w ith Gregory,
bears directly on w h a t it means "to be", th at is, to be a substance; protology and
eschatology are finally, for Eriugena, m atters of ousiology.
14 PP 4: 804C: et maxime de Genesi ad literam et de Civitate Dei,

manifestissimum sit, nil aliud docere de corpore primi hominis ante peccatum, quant
animale atque mortale fuisse. Si enim animale non fuisset, quomodo defructibus paradisi
comedere juberetur, ne deficeret, et de ligno vitae, ne senesceret? Nam ut ipse saepe
asserit, primi homines ante praevaricationem de fructibus paradisi corporaliter comedisse
perhibentur.
300
W hile G regory's view has certain m etaphysical advantages, A ugustine's

has the m erit of preserving a m ore straightforw ard literal and historical reading
of the Genesis account of Paradise. This fact com bined w ith A ugustine's great
authority constitutes a serious obstacle for Eriugena and his readers. To give an
ahistorical or spiritualized reading of the Paradise narrative in the face of such an
authoritative historical reading w ould, it seem s, be impossible w ithout som e
counterbalancing patristic authority. H ence the im portant role given to G regory
in this portion of the Periphyseon. But this role m ust be played w ith som e
delicacy.
Let it be sufficient and pleasing to y ou and me, to read the judgm ents of
the holy Fathers on the constitution of m an before sin, and to inquire by
cautious and diligent investigation w h at each of them meant. But it is not
for us to create a quarrel betw een them , either to agree here, or disagree
there, know ing as we do that after th e holy Apostles there has been none
am ong the Greeks of greater authority in expositions of divine Scripture
than Gregory the Theologian, and none am ong the Romans, than A urelius
A ugustinus.15
Eriugena goes on to suggest that in broad term s there is agreem ent
betw een the two Fathers, since Gregory does not deny that to the divine im age
was added, by a second creation, as it were, in foresight of sin, bu t presum ably
before sin, the anim al body divided into m ale and female, while A ugustine, of
course, teaches that m an and w om an w ere alike created in the image of G od.16
15 PP 4: 804C-D: Quisquis vult et potest, respondeat: mihi autem et tibi, si

placet, sufficiat, sententias sanctorum Patrum de constitutione hominis ante peccatum
legere, et quid unusquisque eorum voluit, cauta ac diligenti inquisitione quaerere. Lites
autem inter eos constituere, non est nostrum, aut hunc constituere, hunc autem refellere,
scientes, post sanctos Apostolos nullum apud Graecos fuisse in expositionibus divinae
Scripturae majoris auctoritatis Gregorio theologo, nullum apud Romanos Aurelio
Augustino.
16 PP 4 :804D-805A.
301
Nonetheless, there rem ains, for Eriugena as for Gregory, the conceptual difficulty
of reconciling the notion of animality and divinity, which in themselves seem to
be opposites, especially when, as in m an, they can coexist only by one o f them
dom inating the other. T hat such a contradiction w ould be constituted in nature
itself is, for Eriugena, unthinkable.
There rem ains, however, the scriptural text which, on the surface a t least,
suggests th at m an in his Erst state w as anim al and earthly and that he ate as
bodily food the fruits of Paradise.
4.1
G regory on Paradise and man's return

A t the en d of his chapter on m an's kinship w ith the beasts, in w hich he
describes how the passions either dom inate reason, leading to vice, or are
m astered by reason, m aking virtues in w hich the divine image once again shines,
Gregory acknowledges the objection of som e w ho, w hatever moral achievem ents
the virtuous m ay be able to attain, w ould still feel sham e at m an's anim al
dependence on corporeal food. Surely that is not w orthy of one m ade in the
image of God! G regory answers that indeed the kingdom of God is not m eat and
drink17 and that m an shall in that kingdom live not by bread but by the w ord of
God,18 and that as had already been show n, m an can look forward to an equality
with the angels th at w ould certainly exclude the need for bodily food. B ut to
this, he fears, his objectors m ay reply that if th at is so, then m an's resurrection
will not be a return to his original state, for in Paradise he ate food.19
17 Rom. 14:17.
18 Matt. 4:4.
19 O H 1 8 :196A-B.
302
4.11
The trees o f Paradise

Thus does G regory introduce his interpretation of Paradise. Scripture, he
notes, often speaks of W isdom as bread and drin k for the soul.20 In the
im portant b u t difficult passage that follows, h e applies such a m eaning to the
food of Paradise. There w ere tw o sources o f food set before man, the fruit of
wisdom , w hole a n d integral, and the mixed fruit of deceptive appearance.
Therefore, it is fitting to understand the fruit as something w orthy o f the
planting o f G od w hich is in Eden (Eden m eans delight') and not d o u b t
that m an w as nourished by it, and n o t a t all to understand any such
passing a n d flowing nourishm ent as pertaining to the w ay of life of
Paradise. "From every tree," it says, "w hich is in the paradise, you m ay
eat for food."21 W ho w ill give to one w h o has a healthy hunger that tree,
20 E.g., Prov. 9:5; Is. 12:3; Amo. 8:11; John 7:37.

21 The follow ing is an overly literal translation of the parts of the
Septuagint text th at pertain to the trees of Paradise: "A nd the Lord God p lanted
a paradise in E den to the east and put there the m an w hich he made. A nd G od
raised up from the earth every tree suitable for sight and good for food, a n d the
tree of life in the m iddle of the paradise and the tree for beholding the
knowledge of good and evil And the Lord G od took the man, which he m ade,
and p u t him in the paradise to work and g u ard it. A nd the Lord God
com m anded A dam , saying, T ro m every tree w hich is in the paradise, for food
you m ay eat, b u t from the tree for knowing good and evil, do not eat from it; on
the day you eat from it, w ith death you will d ie / ... A nd the serpent said to the
woman, 'W hy d id G od say, "Do not eat from every tree which is in the
paradise"?' A nd the w om an said to the serpent, T ro m tree-fruit of the paradise
w e eat, b ut from fruit of the tree which is in the m iddle of the paradise, G od said,
"Do not eat from it no r touch it, lest you die."' A nd the serpent said to the
wom an, 'You shall not die w ith death; for G od know s that on the day you eat
from it, your eyes w ill be opened, and you w ill be as God, knowing good an d
evil.' A nd the w om an saw the tree was good for food and that it was pleasant to
behold w ith the eyes and w as suitable for com ing to know, and taking som e of
its fruit she ate; a n d she gave also to her m an w ith her, and he ate. A nd the eyes
of the two w ere opend, and they knew that they w ere naked, and they sew ed fig
leaves and m ade for them selves garments.... A n d the Lord God m ade for A dam
and his w om an skin tunics, and clothed them. and G od said, 'Behold, A dam
has become as one of us by knowing good and evil, and now may he never reach
out his hand and take of the tree of life and eat and live forever.'"
303
w hich is in Paradise, w hich is inclusive of every good, for w hich the nam e
is "the W hole," of which reason [o Xoyog] graciously gives m an a share?
For, in the general and superior definition [Xoyog] every idea of
good things is hom ogeneous w ith itself, an d the w hole is one thing. W ho
will separate m e from the taste of the m ixed an d ambiguous tree? For, it
is entirely clear to the insightful, w h at th a t w hole is, of which the fruit is
Life, and again, w h at that m ixed one is, o f w hich the end is Death. For he
who offers w ithout envy the enjoym ent of the whole, separates m an from
the share o f the comm on things by a certain w ord [Xoyog] and foresight
alone.
A n d it seem s to me th at I should take the great David and the w ise
Solomon as teachers of the interpretation of this text. For, both
understand the grace of the perm itted delight to be one, the true good
itself, w hich is also all good: D avid says, "Delight in the Lord," and
Solomon calls W isdom itself, which is the Lord, the Tree of Life.
Therefore the W hole Tree is identical w ith the Tree of Life, of w hich the
w ord gives food to the one fashioned by God.
O pposed to this tree is the other tree, of w hich the food is
know ledge of good and evil, not bearing separately each of the signified
opposites in part, b u t putting forth a certain m ingled and mixed fruit
com bining opposite qualities, the food o f w hich the originator of life
forbids, b u t the serpent proposes, so that he m ight prepare an entrance for
death. A nd the proposer is persuasive, h aving w rapped the fruit w ith a
(Gen. 2:8-9,15-17; 3:1-7,21-22: Kai eûreucrev Kupiog o 0eog TrapdSeicrov
ev ESep Kara avaToXag Kai eGeTO exei tov dvGpurrrov, ov etrXaaev. Kai efaveTeiXev
o Geog e n ck Tfjg yrjg ttav uXov ijpaiov eig opaaxv Kai koXov eig Ppukjii/ Kai to
CuXov Tfjg Cooing ev pecrip Tip trapaSeiacp Kai to fuXov tou eiSevai yvaxrrov koXou Kai
Toi/ipoO.... Kai eXa{3ev Kupiog o Geog to^ dvGpcjtrov, ov etrXaaev, Kai eGeTO airrbv ev
Tip trapaSeiaip epydeaGai airrov xai <j>uXdaaeiv. Kai eveTeiXaTo tcupiog o Geog Tip
ASap Xeywv Atrd travTog uXou tou ev Tip trapaSeiaip Ppoxrei <J>ayfl, arro Se tou uXou
tou yiyaxTKeiy koXov Kai trovripov, ou iJidyeaGe atr avrov- rj 8 ay f|pepg <fdyT|Te air
airrou, QavaTtp drroGavetaGe.... Kai eltrev o <k|>ig Tfj cbuvaiid. Tl o ti eiTrev o Qeog Ou
pf] 4>dynT atro iTayTog uXou tou ev Tip trapaSeiaip; Kai eltrey f| yuyf| Tip ckjrei Atro
Kaptrou uXou tou trapaSeiaou ijjayopeQa, atro Se Kaptrou tou uXou, o ecmv ev peaip
tou TrapaSeiaou, eltrev o Geog Ou i^dyeaGe atr airrou ouSe pf| dijrnaGe airrou, iva pfj
cnroGdyTiTe. Kai eltrev o ckfig Tfj yuvaiid Ou GavaTip dtroGavelaGe- fjSei yap o Qeog
o ti ev fj av ijpepa cfdynTe atr airrou, SiavoixGijtrovTaL upiDv oi o<j>6aXpoi, Kai eaeaGe
cjg Qeoi YivokrKovTes koXov Kai trovripov. Kai eiSev f| yuvf| o ti koXou to uXov eig
Ppaknv Kai o ti apeaTov Tocg 6<{)GaXpotg LSeiv Xao cupaiov eaTiv tou KaTavofjaai, Kai
Xaôuaa tou Kaptrou airrou e<j>ayev Kai eSuiKev Kai Tip avSpi airrfjg peT airrrjg, Kai
ecjrayov. Kai SiriuoixQiiaav oi oifGaXpoi Tiliv 8uo, Kai eyvwaav o tl yupvoi rjaav, Kai
eppaijjav <j>uXXa auKtjg Kai eiroiaav eauTOig rrepiCujpaTa.... Kai etrot.T)aev Kupiog o
Geog Tip ASap Kai Tfj yuvaud airrou xLTidvag SeppaTivoug Kai eveSuaev airroug.
Kai eltrev o Qeog ISoir ASap yeyovev ag etg e f|pt5y tou yivwaKeiv koXov Kai
trovripoy, Kai vuv ptj-rroTe eKTeivT] njy xeipa Kai Xd^T) tou iiXou Tfjg Cajfjg Kai <f>ayT)
xai tjaeTat eig to v aiuiva.)
304
certain superficial goodness and pleasure, so that it m ight appear pleasant

and provoke the desire for a taste.22
22 O H 1 9 :196D197B:
O u k o u v Tqg t o u 0 e o u <t>urelag Tfjg e v ESep. (rpixpfi 5e
t| E 6 e p eppT]UUTai) a f i o v T tv a t o v Kaptrov e w o fja a L rrpoariKei, Kai Tpe<f>eaGai 8 ia

t o u t o u |if| ap<J>ipdXXeiv t o v avGpwrroi/- Kai pr| travT w g -nf|v rrapo8iKT|v Kai dtroppuTov
TauTT)v Tpo<|)fiv e trl Tfjg t o u TrapaSeiaou 8 iay w y fjg e w o e tv . " Atro travTog, cprjcrl,
fuXou t o u e v Tqi rra p a S e la w Ppwaei <tdyT)." T ig 8 w a e i t w iryieivw g rreiv w v n t o u X o u
eKelvo, t o e v Tdi rra p a S e la w , t o rravTog ayaG ou rrepiX nrrriK ov, <L o v o p a e c m t o rrav,
ou x ap iC ^ T ai t w avGpwtrw -rijv p eT o u a la v o Xoyog; t w y a p yeviKw Te Kai
urrepKeipevw Xoyw t r a a a t w v ayaGwv L8ea rrpog e a u rr jv aup<f>uwg e x e i, Kai ev t l t o
oXov e o n . T ig 6 e p e r f \g a u p p iy o u g Te Kai erap<i>oTepiCouar|s t o u u \ o u y eu aew g
dTToaTqaei; TravTwg y a p o u k aSTjXov Tolg S io p anK w T epoig, t I t o rrav eKeivo, ou
Kapirog f| w ti, K ai traX iv, tl t o errlpiicrov t o u t o , o u rre p a g o QavaTog. 'O y a p t o u
rravTog t t ) v arro X au aiv a<{>66vwg TrpoGeig, Xoyw t i v I rravTw g Kai TrpopT]0eig T rig t w v
erriKoivwv p e T o u a ia g a rre ip y e i t o v dvGpwrrov. K a i p o i S o k c I t o v p e y a v A apiS, Kai
t o v ao<j)6v ZoXopwvTa SiSaaKaXoug n i g t o u Xoyou t o u t o u rrapaX aPeiv e fn y g a e w g .
Ap<t>OTepoi y a p r r jg auyK ex^pripevTig Tpix{>Tig p i a v iV youvrai t t [ v x d p iv , a irro t o
ovrcug ayaG dv, o 8f| Kai rrav e a n v ayaG dv. A a p i8 p e v Xeywv, 'TCaniTpu<j>T|aov t o u
Kuplou*" SoXogwv 8e t t | v ao<|)lav a u n |v , " ij n g e a n v o K upiog, uXov C ^ g ovopdw v.
O u k o u v t o u t o v e o n t w Tfjg Coring GXw t o rrav uXov, ou t t | v Ppw aiv t w k o t o 0 e o v
rrX aaG evn o Xoyog 8 l8 w a iv . A v n S ia ip e iT a i 8e t w p3Xw t o u t w eTepov uXov, ou f|
Ppw aig k o X o u K ai k o k o u y v w a lg e a n v , o u k i8iadvT w g exaT epov t w v k o t o t o
e v a v n o v O T |paivopevw v e v p e p e i KapTnxfiopouvTog* aXXa T iv a auyK exvpevov k o 'l
auppncTOv Kaptrov eâvG ouvrog T alg e v a v n a i g a u y x eK p ap ev o v rro io rn a iv , ou KwXuei

p ev t t | v P pw aiv 6 dpxTjydg n i g Cwfjg, aupPouXeueL 8e o o<J)Lg, iv a t w GavaTw
KaTaaKeuaar) t t | v e la o S o v . K a i rriGavog y lv e T a i a u p P o u X eu aag , e u x p o la n v i Kai
f|Sovfj t o v Kaptrov rrepixpw crag, wg a v 6<{>GeiT| Te f|8ew g, Kai t t | v opeiv rrpog n j v
y e u a iv irrrepeQ laeiev.
Cf. Im ag. 20:240,16-241,8: Numquid ergo platationis dei in eAem deliciae

autem ipsa eAem interpretatur, dignum quendam conuenit fructum intellegere, ac per
hoc comedisse hominem non dubitare, et non omnino transitoriam fluxilemque hanc
escam in paradisi conuersatione intellegere hoc ab omni ligno quod est in paradyso
cybum comedere. Quis dabit sanando sic esurienti lignum illud quod est in paradyso
quod omne bonum comprehendit, cui nomen est omne, cuius participationem homini lex
donat generali enim et supereminenti ratione omnis bonorum forma apud seipsam
connaturaliter habet totum et unum est. Quis me commixto et utroque ligni gustu
segregabit, omnino enim non est perspicatoribus obscurum? Quid omne illud cuius
fructus uita? et iterum quid hoc mixtum? Nam qui ab omni usum copiose proponit
ratione quadam omnino et prouidentia promiscuorum participatione hominem prohibet et
mihi uidetur magnus dauid et sapiens Salomon magister huius legis expositionem
suscepisse, uterque enim concessae escae unam intellegunt gratiam ipsum bonum quod
uere est, quod etiam omne est bonum. Dauid quidem dicens. Delectare in domino.
Salomon autem ipsam sapientiam quae est dominus, lignum uitae nominans. Non ergo
idipsum est uitae ligno omne lignum, cuius cibum secundum deum formato lex dat, e
contrario autem separatur ab hoc ligno alterum lignum cuius cibus boni et mali scientia
305
This passage holds two special difficulties for the translator. The first is
the flexibility of the G reek w ord, irdg, toera, irav, which runs throughout
G regory's text b u t m ust be rendered variously as "every," "all," and "w hole" in
English, depending on num ber, position, and presence of the article.
Consequently, G regory's interpretation of "every tree" seems less tortured
(perhaps) in G reek than in English. The gist of G regory's reading is th a t God, by
m aking available to m an every good (symbolized b y m any trees), gives him
access to the w hole Good (the one Tree of Life). W hat is truly good, w hether
apprehended in p a rt or in whole, is good through and through, so th at the
hom ogeneity o f the good stands in contrast w ith the mixed fruit of the other tree.
The second difficulty is how to render the w ord, Xoyog, in the following
two instances.
Who w ill give to one who has a healthy hunger that tree, w hich is in
Paradise, w hich is inclusive of every good, for which the nam e is "the
W hole," of w hich reason [o Xoyog] graciously gives m an a share? For, in
the general and superior definition [Xoyog] every idea of good things is
hom ogeneous w ith itself, and the whole is one thing.
The m ore n atural translation for the first instance w ould perhaps be, "text" or
"passage" or "com m and" (Eriugena in fact has lex in this case), were it not
followed by the next sentence which seems to refer to the simplicity and
hom ogeneity o f specific ideas as com prehended w ithin their generic idea (the
definition [Xoyog] of the genus belongs equally to all its species). The intention
here seems to be the view that m an has access to the Whole by virtue o f his m ind
est, dum non specialiter alterutrum e contrario significatorum in parte fructificet, sed
quendam confusum mixtumque fructum pullulat contrariis qualitatibus concretum,
cuius escam prohibet dux uitae consilium uero dat serpens ut morti praepararet
introitum et suasor foetus est consilium dans, bona quadam pulchritudine ac delectatione
fructum circumcolorans ut delectabiliter uideretur ac desiderium ad gustum
superponeretur.
306
which gives h im access to the Xoyog that com prehends and unifies all things.
This reading fits well w ith the subsequent interpretation of the m ixed
"know ledge" of good and evil as sensual desire, hi any case, the general
intention of the passage as a w hole is clear: the source of nourishm ent p ro p er to
man, and signified in the Genesis text by the Tree of Life or the A ll Tree, is the
divine W isdom.
"W hat then is th at which has the mixed knowledge of good and evil,
decorated w ith pleasures through sense?"23 Gregory begins his answ er by first
considering the nature of the knowledge in question. Again, as in the case of
'food', G regory com pares the various w ays in which Scripture elsew here uses the
term. He concludes th at yvuxng "does not everywhere signify su re and exact
knowledge, b u t a disposition w ith respect to w hat is agreeable."24 M ore
specifically, the know ledge of good and evil pertains to the com m on disposition
of m en tow ard the things of sense.
Since therefore the m any judge the good to be in that w hich pleases the
senses, a n d there is a certain hom onym ity between that w hich is and that
which seem s to be good; due to which, the emergent desire for w hat is evil
23 O H 2 0 :197C: Ti
exei
tt|v
o u v e K e iv o e c m v , o
k o Xo u
re
kcu kciko O
C T u y K e x p a p .e v r|v
y v w c n v , T a t g 8 i a l a O r i a e a j g f |8 o v a ! g c ir r i v O ia p e v o v ;
Cf. Im ag. 21: Quid ergo est illud quod bono ac malo commixtam habet
scientiam, delectationibus quae secundum sensum sunt insitum.
24 O H 2 0 :197D: 'H 8e yvwcrig ov navraxpv t t | v eirianjiiTiv Te tcai rr\v
eiSriaiv iK b riy eL T ai KCLTa t o CTjip.aLvoM.evov', aXXa t t | v irpdg t o tcexapi.CTM.evov SidQeoiv
Cf. Imag. 21:241,10-21: Scientia uero non ubique disciplinam et peritiam illius quod
significatur sed ad id quod gratia donatum est affectum,... As exam ples of this use of
"knowledge," G regory offers 2 Tim. 2:19 (Num . 16:5); Ex. 35:12; M att. 7:23. He
also contrasts the "know ledge of good and evil" with the "distinguishing of good
from evil" w hich the Apostle praises as a m ark of the m ature believer. (Heb.
5:13-14: irag yap o p-CTexwv yaXaxTog aireipog Xoyou Sucaiocruvrig, vrjmog yap
eoriv* TeXeiiov 8e ecm v fj crreped Tpocjnj, t w v 8ia t t | v eiv Ta aiaGiyrnpia
yeyup.vaCTM.eva exovTwv irpog SiaKpLcnv xaXou Te Kai k o k o u .)
307
as though for w hat is good, is called b y Scripture, knowledge of good and

evil, 'know ledge' m eaning a certain inclination and blending.25
This m ixing of good and evil is crucial, for unm asked evil w ould entice no
one; only u n d e r the appearance of good is evil attractive. Because the forbidden
fruit h a d a certain beautiful appearance an d prom ised a certain sensual pleasure,
the serp ent w as persuasive. "A nd the w om an saw the tree was good for food
an d th at it w as pleasant to behold w ith th e eyes and w as suitable for com ing to
know , an d taking som e of its fruit she ate; an d she gave also to h er m an w ith her,
an d he ate" (Gen. 3:6).26 This fruit m ixed o f seem ing goodness and deadly evil
poisoned m an 's nature w ith a disposition inclined tow ard the pleasures of sense,
obscuring the divine image w ith the m iseries o f m an's present, passible
conditionthe know ledge of good and evil.
G regory's reading of the Paradise narrative as a figurative representation
o f m an's original orientation to and dependence on the pure and unm ixed tru th
o f divine W isdom and his subsequent fall, being deceived by the m ixture of evil
w ith the ap p aren t good of sensual pleasure, preserves the original equality of
25 O H 2 0 :200B: E7rei8f| tolvuv oi rroXXoi to xaXov ev tw Tag aiaQfjaeig

eu<J>paivovTi xpivouoi, Kai Tig e a n v op.wvup.ia to u re ovrog xai tou Soxouvrog elvai
xaXoir to u to u xdpLu f| -rrpog to xaxdv wg rrpog t o ayaOdv yivopevr] emSupia, xaXou
xai xaxou yvwaig vmo Tfjg rpa<j>fjg wvop-doQ-n, auv8id9eaiv Tiva xai avaxpaaiv
epp-Tiveuouaqg Tfjg yvwcrewg.
Cf. Im ag. 21:242,9-13: Quoniam igitur m ulti illud in quo sensus delectantur
bonum iudicant, et quia cognominatio existentis boni, et ipsius boni quod uidetur esse,
huius rei gratia ipsa ad malum ueluti ad bonum facta concupiscentia boni et mali scientia
a scriptura nominata est, dum coaffectationem quandam et concretionem interpretetur
scientia.
26 O H 2 0 :200C-D: ... aXXa 5ia Tivog wpag to <{>aiv6p.evov ayXaiaag, xai Tiva
xaTa t t ) v aiaOriaiv f|8ovf|v eyyor|Teuaag rrj yeucrei, mBavog e<t>avTi Tfj yuvaixi,
xaGwg 4>T]aiv f| rpatfjTj- "Kai ei6e yap f| -yuvij ..."
Cf. Im ag. 21: ... sed per quandam speciositatem apertum declarauit,
quandamque delectationem secundum sensum seducens, gustuique suadens mulieri
manifestauit, sicut ait scriptura, et uidet femina ...
308
m an w ith the angels. This equality, in G regory's m ind, is threatened if the

narrative is understood m ore literally to m ean th a t m an even then drew from the
trees of Paradise the corporeal nourishm ent w hich he now requires to sustain his
m ortal body. Thus m otivated by this theoretical n eed "to understand the fruit as
som ething w orthy of the planting of God," G regory appeals to Scripture as a
whole, w here the notions of nourishm ent and know ledge are used in just such
w ays as harm onize w ell w ith his figurative reading of the trees in Paradise.27
4.12
N ecessity o f the return to Paradise

The parasitic n atu re of evil, em phasized b y the need to be mixed w ith an
appearance of good in o rd er to tem pt m an, is of course not peculiar to Gregory,

b u t he does draw a striking conclusion from it in connection with m an's return to
Paradise, which he does in the very next chapter o f his text.28 Man's original,
natural condition rem ains his likeness to the divine nature and his equality w ith
the angels, w hatever the miseries be that resulted from his eating of the
poisonous fruit. N ature is m ore abiding than the superadded state of corruption
because nature depends o n the w ill of God, w hich is imm utable.
27 The w eak p o in t in G regory's reading, how ever, is that his interpretation

of the "knowledge of good and evil" cannot be applied consistently w ithout
implying som ething u nw orthy of G od himself w ho, tow ard the end of the
narrative, says, "Behold, A dam has become as one o f us by knowing good and
evil, and now m ay he n ever reach o u t his hand an d take of the tree of life and eat
an d live forever." (Gen. 3:22 [LXX]: xai eltrev o Geos ISou ASap. yeyovev tug eig e
f|p.uiv tou yivukrxeiv xaXdv xai trovTipov, xai vuv pujtroTe exTeivrj tt|v xetpa xai Xa|3r]
tou uXou Tfjg Cwfjg xai <t>ayT| xai CqaeTai eig to v aluiva.)
28 "Chapter 21: T hat the Resurrection is reasonably hoped for, not so
m uch f r o m the Scriptural preaching, as from the necessity itself of things." (OH
21:201A: KEOAAAION KA\ "On ij dvdoTaoxg o u toctoutov e x tou x t |p u y [ i a T o g
tou r pa<|>ixou, o a o v e a u T f j g T fjg a v a y x T ig twv n p a y p .d T w v ax o X o u G w g e X tr l e T a i..
Cf. Imag. 22: Caput XXII. Quia resurrectio non tantum ex praedicatione scripturae
quantum ex ipsa rerum necessitate speratur.)
309
N ot so pow erful is vice that it will overcom e the pow er of good; and not
m ightier and m ore steadfast than G od's w isdom is the thoughtlessness o f
o ur nature. For it is not possible that w h at is changed and altered be m ore
conquering a n d steadfast th an that w hich is ever the sam e and fixed in the
good; b u t the divine will is wholly and alw ays unchangeable, while the
m utability of o u r nature does not even rem ain firm in its evil.29
N ot only does th e im m utability of G od's w ill contrast w ith the intervening
state of m an's present likeness to the beasts, it also contrasts w ith that m utability
which characterizes creatures as such. H um an n atu re is forever in motion. In
relation to the unendingness of this motion as well as to the infinity of the divine
Goodness, evil is finite, both lim ited and eventually overcom e by the
surrounding im m ensity of the Good. The infinite creaturely m otion tow ard the
Good is a corollary of the infinitude of the Good itself; the eventual departure
from the sphere of evil30 is likewise a consequence of the finitude of evil.
For w hat is ever and alw ays in motion, if it has its procession tow ard the
good, because of the unlim itedness of the thing traveled through, will
never cease from carrying onward. For it w ill n o t find any limit of w hat it
seeks, w hich having been reached it w ill then cease its movement. But if it
w ould be inclined tow ard the opposite, w hen it finishes the course of vice,
and has arrived at the highest measure of evil, then w hat is ever moving
29 O H 21:201A-B: AAA. oux oimog ecrriv Icrxupov f| icaida, wg Trig ayaGfjg

urrepiaxdcxai Suvapewg* ouSe kpclttw v Kai povLpwTepa Trig 0eoii (Kxjaag f) Tfjg
<j)uaeiug rpwv dpouAla. OiiSe yap ecrrt SuvaTov to rpejropevov re Kai dAoioOp.gvov,
toO del waaurwg exovTog, Kai ev tw ayaGw TreTrnyoTog, etrtKpaTecrrepdv Te Kai
povipwTepov elvai aAA f| pev Gela PouAf| Trdirrq Te Kai Trdirrwg to dperdGeTov exeu
to Se TpeTiTov Tfjg <{>ucrewg f|pwv ovSe ev tw kokw Trayiov pevei.
Cf. Imag. 22:243,9-14: Sed non sic est fortis malitia ut bonitatis uincat
uirtutem, neque melius neque singularius est, naturae nostrae inconsultum quam dei
sapientia. Non enim possibile est conuerstbile atque mutabile potentius esse atque
singularius quam quod semper similiter habet in homo faciens. Sed diuinum quidem
consilium semper et ubique immutabile habet. Conuerstbile autem nostrae naturae non
in malo fixum manet.
30 Gregory gives the astronomical exam ple of the conical shadow of the
earth: the rays from the sun, w hich is so m uch greater than the earth, finally
converge and so set a lim it to the shadow (OH 21:201D).
310
by impulse finding no natural stop, w hen it rim s through the distance

w ithin vice, necessarily turns its m otion tow ard the good. For vice not
proceeding limitlessly, but being com prehended by necessary boundaries,
it follows that the succession of good lies on the other side of the
boundary of vice. A nd so, as I said, w h a t is ever-m oving of our nature
again at last turns its course back to the good, being m ade w iser by the
m em ory of the form er misfortunes so th a t never again will it be ensnared
in the same things.31
This is the metaphysical basis of Gregory's fam ous teaching on the
cnroKaTacrraaig 32 He does not disregard the Scriptural testim ony regarding the
31 O H 21:201B-C: To yap del Trdvrws mvoupevov, ei pev irpos t o k o Xo v exoi

irpooSov, Sia t o aopicrrov t o u SiefoSeuopevou trpaypaTos ouSerroTe kiêi t h s
etrl Ta -rrpoaoj <f>opag. OuSe yap euprjcrei CnToupevou irepag oufiev, ou 8paapevov
cmiaeTai t o t c tt\s tavrjaecus. Ei 5e TTpos t o evavriov t t |v poirf|v ctxoCti, eireiSav
SiavuoT) rrjs icaKiag t o v 8 popov, Kai etri t o dxpoTaTov t o u k o k o u peTpov d({)LKiyraLTOTe t o t t i s oppfjs aeiKLi/riTov ouSepiav e< <f>uaea)s crrdaiv eupioKov, eireiSdv
8ia5papT) t o ev Katcta Sidcmipa, k o t avayKTiv eiri. t o ayaGov rpeirei t t | v Kivr|criv.
Mf| yap irpoioucTTis Kaxiag eiri to aopiaTov, aXX avayKaioi? Trepaai KaTeiXTippevTis,
aKoXouGcjs n tou ayaGou 8ia8oxfi to irepa? r q s Kaxias exSexeTai. Kai outgj, KaGui?
eipr)Tai, to aencivriTov ripcDv Trig <t>uaeajs ttoXiv ucrraTov eiri tt|v ayaGf|v dvaTpexei
Tropeiav, tt) pvqprj twv T r p o S e S u a r u x n p e v w v Trpos to pf| TrdXiv evaXaivai Toig iaois
<7ux}>povi6pevov.
Cf. Imag. 22:243,14-26: Quod enim semper omnino mouetur, siquidem ad
bonum processionem habuerit propter eximietatem rei perquirendae, numquam desinet ab
ipso qui sursum est meatu. Non enim inueniet terminum quaesiti. Nihil non
nanciscentis stabilitabit umquam motum susceperit, cum uero cursum malitiae peregerit,
et in sublimissimam mali mensuram peruenerit, tunc quod semper impetu mouetur,
nullum ex natura statum inueniens, dum spatium quod in malitia est transcursum
fuerit, secundum necessitatem in bonum conuertit motum. Nam dum malitia in
infinitum non progrediatur sed necessariis finibus comprehenditur. Consequenter boni
successio finem malitiae excipiet. Ac sicut dictum est, semper mobile nostrae naturae
iterum firmiter in bonam recurret uiam, dum ex memoria priorum calamitatum ad
essendum iterum in his quae recta sunt compescitur.
t t |v
32 Although G regory's doctrine is rem iniscent of A ugustine's exclamation

that "our hearts are restless until they rest in Thee," it is quite different from
A ugustine's view of the w ill, which m aintains th at having once perverted itself
the will cannot be turned again toward G od unless God intervenes, from outside
as it w ere, to redirect it tow ards himself. Even G regory's restlessness is not quite
like A ugustine's inasm uch as the heart rem ains ever in motion. Such "rest" as it
does attain in God is n ot a cessation of its striving, b u t a combination of
perpetual satisfaction and ever-expanding desire for more. On Gregory's
311
resurrectionon the contrarybut it w ould seem that in his m ind the finitude of
evil an d its parasitic relation to the im m utable Good are enough to ground the
ho p e th at hum anity w ill be restored to its original and natural likeness to the
divine nature.
So I think w e m ust think in regard to ourselves, th a t w hen w e have passed
beyond the lim it of vice, w hen w e come to the en d of the shadow s of sin,
w e shall again live in lightas the nature of good things surpasses m any
thousand-fold the m easure of vice; there will again be Paradise, again
th at tree which is the tree of life, again the grace o f the image, and the
dignity of the beginning.33
The necessity of m an 's return to Paradise, then, rests on three pillars: the
im m utability of the divine w ill, the infinity of the Good, an d the constant motion
of h u m an nature. Here is G regory's idea of an eternal m otion in and tow ard an
infinite G ood which is often referred to as his doctrine of errexTacng (a term
w hich does no t appear in De opificio hominis). This doctrine is one of the m ost
striking features of G regory's m ystical theology, the eternal progress of the soul
into the divine goodness. H e does n o t develop it in that direction in this context,
concentrating instead on its connection w ith his doctrine o f the restoration of all
doctrine of errexTaaig, see Danielou, Platonisme et theologie, 291-305, an d
Balthasar, Presence et pensee, 123-132.
33 O H 2 1 :201D204A: ovTwg oljiat 5eci/ xai irepl f|p.aii/ SiavoetoOaL, o ti
8ieeX06i/Teg rov Tfjg xaxlag opoi/, eTreiSav ev tw axpw yei/wp.e0a Tfjg icaTd tt|i/
dp.apTiav crxiag, ttXlu ev 4>ojtL (3iotuoojiv\ wg iccrra to dtreipotrXdaiov rrpog to Tfjg
Kaidag perpov Tfjg Tail/ dya0ah/ cfmcrewg TrepiTTeuoucn^g. ndXiu oil/ o rrapdSeioog,
rraXii/ t o uXoi/ exeli/o, o 8f| xai Cwfjg ecrri frjXov, rrdXiu Tfjg elxovog f| xdpig, xai f)
Tfjg dpxfjg a^la.
Cf. Im ag. 22:243,35-244,3: Sic arbitror oportere etiam de nobis intellegere, quia
transeuntes malitiae terminum cum in summitate umbrae peccatifuerimus iterum in
lumine conuersabimur secundum infinitam multipiicationem quantum ad malitiae
mensuram bonorum natura abundante. Iterum ergo paradysus, iterum ergo omne illud
lignum quod etiam uitae est lignum iterum imaginis gratia et principii dignitas.
312
creation to its pristine relation to the Creator, the doctrine of aTroicaTdcrraais 34

Eriugena's ow n account of the R eturn takes up this teaching, b u t stresses the
imm utability of nature, w hich depends on God's im m utable w ill for nature,
rather than the elem ent of constant m otion. In any case, this account of the
return to Paradise reaffirm s the view th at Paradise, insofar as it is the beginning
of hum an nature, is also its end.
4.2
Eriugena on the Paradise and return o f human nature

Eriugena quotes G regory's chapters on the food and trees of Paradise in
their entirety a t PP 4 :819A-821D. The significance of these quotations for him is

captured nicely in the exchange betw een N utritor and A lum nus that
immediately follows the quotations.
NUTR. C onsider w h at kind of paradise and w h a t kind of trees and
w hat kind of fruit this theologian construes.
ALUM. I do consider, and I see clearly: indeed, the kind is
spiritual and non-spatial. Nonetheless, I w ish for those things which are
expounded m ore obscurely by him to be explained openly and briefly by
you.
NUTR. W hoever w ould diligently consider the w ords of this
theologian, w ould, I think, find th at nothing else is u rged than that hum an
nature m ade in the im age of G od is signified by divine Scripture, using a
figurative m anner of speaking, w ith the w ord, "Paradise." For the true
plantation of G od is that nature w hich he created in his im age and
likeness, that is, in im age entirely like to himself, except by reason of
subject, as has been said, in Eden, that is, in delights o f eternal happiness,
34 The strong connection betw een mutability, m ateriality, and

creatureliness, w hich one observes in De opificio hominis, is also characteristic of
Origen's doctrine. W hile G regory's doctrine of eiretH-auis provides an answer to
O rigen's view that the original noetic henad fell from its union w ith God through
satiety, it rests on the sam e grounds as th at view. It is not surprising, then, that
w ith respect to the dTOKaTdoraaig G regory finds himself am ong the followers of
the great A lexandrian m aster.
313
and in the beatitude of the divine likeness, greater and better than the
whole sensible w orld, not in bulk, b u t in dignity of nature.35
This seems like a bold extrapolation from G regory's text, perhaps arising from
Gregory's identification of the "knowledge of good and evil" with "the em ergent
desire for w hat is evil as though for w hat is good," a desire which surely em erges
within m an him self a n d not in some external n atu re.36
The obscurities w hich Eriugena seeks to displace by his own
amplifications focus o n how the two trees can be understood as having been
established w ithin hum an nature. He first clarifies G regory's basic interpretation
of the meanings of those trees, before addressing the m anner and origin of their
presence within hu m an nature. Thus, he begins by adopting and strengthening
Gregory's identification of the "All Tree" w ith
the W ord and W isdom of the Father, O ur Lord Jesus Christ, who is the
fruit-bearing A ll Tree, planted in the m idst o f the Paradise of hum an
nature in a twofold m anner: first, according to his divinity, by which
35 PP 4 :821D-822A: [MAG.] Animadverte, qualem paradisum, et qualia ligna,

et quales fructus praefatus astruit Theologus. DISC. Animadverto, clareque perspicio:
spiritualem profecto et illocalem. Velim tamen aperte ac breviter ea, quae ab ipso
obscurius explicata sunt, a te aperiri. MAG. Quisquis diligenter praefati Theologi verba
perspexerit, nil aliud, ut opinor, in eis reperiet suaderi, quam humanam naturam ad
imaginem Dei factam paradisi vocabulo,figuratae locutionis modo, a divina Scriptura
significari. Vera enim plantatio Dei est natura ipsa, quam ad imaginem et similitudinem
suam, hoc est, ad imaginem omnino sibi similem, praeter rationem subjecti, ut
praedictum est, creavit in Eden, hoc est in deliciis aetemae felicitatis, et beatitudine
divinae similitudinis, major et melior omni sensibili mundo non mole, sed dignitate
naturae.
36 As becomes apparent later in the text, Eriugena is viewing Gregory
through the lens of A m brose's clear teaching (in De paradiso) that paradise
represents the first state of hum an nature itself and n o t som e external
environm ent of hum an nature. H e has earlier quoted Ambrose at 815B. After his
brief exposition of G regory's two chapters, he returns to Ambrose so as not to
give the impression th at he follows only the Greeks and ignores the Latins
(830C).
314
creates a n d contains our nature, and nourishes and vivifies and illum ines
and deifies and moves and makes it to b e ;... b u t secondly, by the m anner
in w hich h e has adjoined o u r nature, so th at he m ay save it and recall it to
its pristine state, to the unity of his o w n substance, so that he w ould
subsist in tw o natures, divine and h u m an .37
In this way, G od the W ord Incarnate is the w hole and comprehensive good of
hum an nature, such th at to be truly hum an m eans to participate in his life.38 But
man turned aw ay from the Tree of Life and chose instead to eat of the mixed, fruit
of the other tree.
Eriugena also adopts Gregory's em phasis on the mixed character of the
fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good a n d Evil: "the yvoxrroi/ is ... the evil
colored in the phantasy of good, present in the senses of the body."39 "Thus
'know ledge' in this place does not signify som e doctrine of thought and
judgm ent of natures, b u t an illicit m otion and confused appetite for desiring evil,
that is, sin, w hich for the sake of seducing is colored w ith the false species of the
37 PP 4: 823B-C: Et est irav v\ov, hoc est, om ne lignum paradisi Verbum et

Sapientia Patris, Dominus noster Jesus Christus, qui est omne lignum fructigerum, in
medio humanae naturae paradisi plantatum, duplici videlicet modo: primo quidem
secundum suam divinitatem, qua nostrum naturam et creat, et continet, et nutrit, et
vivificat, et illuminat, et deificat, et movet, et esse facit; in ipso enim vivimus et movemur
et sumus: secundo veto, quo nostrum naturum, ut sulvuret earn, et in statum pristinum
revocaret, in unitatem substantiae sibi adjunxit, u t in duabus naturis subsisteret, divina
videlicet atque humana.
38 PP 4 :824A-B: Plane video, et nil aliud, ut arbitror, praeter Deum Verbum
hominem factum omne bonum totius paradisi, hoc est totius nostrae naturae, et non aliud
praeter ipsum subsister, de quo comedere, hoc est, pio intellectu eum percipere seu fide
credere vita aetema est et incorruptibilis sanitas, ignorare vero vel negare mors aetema
est et infinita corruptio.
39 PP 4 :824B: Et est quidem yvcixrrov juxta praefatum magistrum, cujus
sententiam de paradiso et sequimur, et aperiendae obscuritatis gratia recapitulamus,
malita in phantasia boni colorata, corporis sensibus insita, ligno priori, quod est toi/,
omnino contrarium.
315
likeness of good."40 Just as the All Tree is the source of all good for m an, so this
second tree is the source of all his evils.
Eriugena follow s Gregory's interpretation on the trees w ith only m inor
elaboration. Such elaborations as he does introduce further o n are a function of
the general extrapolation th at Paradise equals pristine hum an nature. G ranting
this m eaning and G regory's interpretation of the trees, w hat does it m ean to say
that the two trees are planted in the m idst of h u m an nature? A nd are w e to
understand G od to have planted the Tree of the Know ledge o f Good and Evil,
the source of all evil in m an, in hum an nature? Is he thus the author of hum an
sin?
To explain "the m idst of Paradise," w here the two trees are planted,
Eriugena recalls a n d sum m arizes his teaching regarding the structure of hum an
nature and especially the distinction betw een the interior trinity and its exterior
additions. M an has a sixfold structure, a com position of tw o triads, the threefold
division of intellect, reason, and interior sense, an d the threefold division of
exterior sense, vital m otion, and body.
But the three th at are know n in the inferior p a rt of m an are corruptible
and liable to dissolution; the triad of the superior part, which is
constituted in the soul alone, entirely and absolutely, is incorruptible and
indissoluble and rightly eternal, since in it the im age of the divine nature
is expressed 41
40 PP 4; 827A: Scientia itaue in hoc loco non doctrinam quondam cognitionis et

dijudicationis naturarum, sed illicitum motum atque confusum appetitum ad
concupiscendum malum, hoc est, peccatum similitudinis boni falsa specie seducendi
gratia coloratum significat.
41 PP 4 :825B-C: Videsne igitur senariam humanae naturae discretionem? Est
enim, et vivit, et sentit per corpus, sentit extra corpus, ratiocinatur, intelligit Sed ilia
tria, quae in inferiori parte hominis cognoscuntur, corruptibUia sunt solutionique
obnoxia; temarius vero superioris partis, qui in sola anima omnino absolute constitutus
316
M ind and body a re the extrem es of this nature, below m ind and above body are
reason and vital m otion,
and in the v ery m iddle of nature, as in the m id st of Paradise, are the two
senses, nam ely, the exterior, w hich adheres to vital m otion and body, and
interior, w hich is conjoined inseparably and consubstantially to reason
and m ind. Therefore in these tw o senses, as if in tw o places of the m iddle
of the Paradise o f h um an nature, those tw o intelligible trees, nav and
yvoKJTov, a re u n d e rsto o d ;... For in the interior m an dwell truth and every
good, w hich is the W ord of God, the only-begotten Son of God, our Lord
Jesus C hrist, outside whom there is no good, since he is himself every true
and substantial good and goodness.... But th e pro p er dom ain of falsity is
bodily sense. For no p a rt of hum an nature receives the error of falsity
except exterior sense, and through it interior sense and reason and even
intellect are very often deceived.42
This deception results w h en a n actual evil is m ixed w ith the appearance of good,
w hen a n evil is cloaked u n d er a sensible form of good and so is able to confuse
and m islead the soul. External sense delights in the pleasant appearance, not
discerning the evil beneath. W hen the m ind consents to this pleasure, hum an
nature is ruined.43
est, incomiptibilis et insolubilis et aetemns merito, dum in eo imago divinae naturae
expressa est.
42 PP 4: 825D-826B: Intuere etiam media ejusdem naturae, et invenies infra
animum superius rationem, supra corpus inferius vitalem motum, nutritivam dico
vitam; et iterum in ipsa medietate naturae, veluti in medio paradisi, duos sensus,
exteriorem videlicet, vitali motui corporique adhaerentem, et interiorem, rationi
animoque inseparabiliter et consubstantialiter conjunctum. In his igitur duobus
sensibus, veluti in quibusdam duobus locis medii humanae naturae paradisi, duo ilia
intelligibilia ligna, t t c l v videlicet et yvoxrrov, intelligunter:... In interiori enim homine
habitat veritas et omne bonum, quod est Verbum Dei, Filius Dei unigenitus, Dominus
noster Jesus Christus, extra quern nullum bonum est, quoniam ipse est omne verum et
substantiate bonum et bonitas.... Propria autem falsitatis possessio est sensus corporeus.
Nulla enim alia pars humanae naturae falsitatis errorem recipit praeter sensum
exteriorem, siquidem per ipsum et interior sensus, et ratio, ipse etiam intellectus
saepissimefallitur.
43 PP 4 :826C-827A.
317
Having so interpreted Paradise and its trees, it is natural that Eriugena's

N utritor and A lum nus should be disturbed by the im plication th at God planted
evil in the m idst of h u m an nature. Eriugena responds to this difficulty by
arguing, first, that the scriptural account does not unam biguously assert that
G od himself planted the Tree of the Knowledge of G ood an d Evil; secondly, that
the form w ith w hich evil cloaks itself is not in itself an evil b u t the phantasy of a
good; thirdly, that the h id d e n evil which mixes w ith the good phantasy derives
not h orn the sensible object itself, b u t from the disposition of the one who
beholds it.44
Thus, two m en m ay observe the sam e gold or silver vessel; the one refers
its beauty to the glory o f G od and no evil is mixed w ith the sensible phantasy;
the other bum s w ith covetousness.
Do you not see th a t the phantasy of the one vessel is in both of them good
and beautiful? B ut in the sense of the wise m an, it is sim ple and natural,
and no evil is p resen t in it; in the greedy one, how ever, it is double and
mixed from the contrary evil of desire, w hich is m ixed w ith [the
phantasy], and is form ed and colored by it, so th a t it seem s to be good,
when it is the m ost venom ous evil. Therefore, evil is n o t planted in
hum an nature, b u t is constituted in the perverse an d irrational motion of a
rational and free w ill; w hich motion is not w ithin nature, b u t outside, and
is perceived as bein g taken from bestial intem perance, b u t is mixed and
tinged w ith good b y the counsel and cunning of the ancient enemy, for
deceiving the libidinous affections of the carnal senses, and by this
destroying w ith d e a th .45
44 PP 4 :827B-828C.
45 PP 4 :828C-829A: Videsne unius vasis phantasiam in utroque bonam et
pulcram? Sed in sapienti sensu simplex est et naturalis, nullaque ei malitia subest; in
avaro autem duplex et mixta ex contrario malo cupiditatis, quae ei miscetur, et ab ea
formatur et coloratur, ut videatur esse bonum, dum sit venenosissimum malum. Non
ergo in natura humana plantatum est malum, sed in perverso et irrationabili motu
rationabilis liberae que voluntatis est constitutum. Qui motus non intra naturam, sed
extra, et ex bestiali intemperantia sumptus perspicitur, miscetur tamen bono ac tingitur
318
This account of sin is very close to Gregory's account o f the origin of

passions considered in the last chapter. Irrational m otions, w hich in irrational
natures are the m eans of self-preservation, become vices w h en transferred to the
rational nature of m an. B ut w hat, according to Gregory, is the origin of this
contact betw een rational and irrational nature w ithin m an? This, too, has been
discussed in previous chapters. Foreseeing the hum an inclination tow ard
materiality, w ith the atten d an t fall from angelic status, G od clothes the divine
image w ith anim ality in o rd e r to provide a means for propagating the whole
hum an pleroma. W ith this anim al m ode of procreation com es the rest of the
passionate impulses. W hat is the exact role of these passionate im pulses in sin?
Could m an actually sin w ithout these promptings?
4.21
A o n c e a n d f u t u r e P a ra d is e ?
The logical difficulty should be obvious. If actual h u m an sin depends on
the irrational m otions superadded to the divine image, th en it w ould seem that
sin is a consequence of m an 's m ixed nature. Yet, Gregory holds that the mixing
of anim ality w ith image is itself a consequence of sin, albeit foreseen sin. This
foreseen sin m ust, then, have been one that was independent of m otions of a
bestial origin, or one ends u p w ith a circle: m an actually sins because of his
mixed naturew ith the im plication that m an w ould not have sinned w ithout his
mixed naturebut m an only receives his mixed nature because he w as going to
sin.
Gregory's notion of an antecedent consequence to a foreseen sin plays
havoc w ith any purely linear account of m an's fall. Even th e sim ple circularity of
antiqui hostis consilio et astutia, ad decipiendos camalium sensuum libidinosos affectus,
ac per hoc morte perimendos.
319
G regory's portrayal of the restoration of hum an nature as a return to m an's

original condition is skewed by th e fact th at because of his foreseen sin m an's
original tem poral state was already a departure from the m ore original divine
intention for him . This insight is one of G regory's m ost im portant contributions
to Eriugena's ow n thought regarding Paradise and the Fall. Going beyond it, b u t
starting from it, Eriugena concludes th at m an spent no actual time in Paradise,
that in term s of actuality it is a w holly eschatological category, while logically it
rem ains priorthe beginning to w hich m an returns at the end.
This argum ent is introduced at PP 4 :807D. The various superadditions to
hum an naturethe mortal anim al body, sexual division, sexual procreation, the
need for bodily nourishm ent, bodily grow th and decay, and so on"are," says
Eriugena, "consequences of sin on account of sin, before sin was comm itted,
[added] b y him whose foreknowledge is n o t deceived, in m an and w ith m an as
outside m an and superadded." H ad m an not sinned, he w ould have rem ained
free of these additions, just as he w ill be free of them in the future. "I say this,
following G regory of Nyssa and his expositor Maximus, but w ithout rejecting
other holy Fathers of spiritual teaching, inasm uch as they seem to think
otherwise, saying that all these pertain to the first and substantial creation of
m an."46
46 PP 4 : 807D-808A: Haec autem sunt consequents peccati propter peccatum,

priusquamfieret peccatum, ab eo, cujus praescientia non fallitur, in homine et cum
homine veluti extra hominem ac superaddita: animale quidem corpus atque terrenum et
corruptibile, sexus uterque ex masculo et femina, bestiarum similitudine procreationis
multiplicatio, indigentia cibi et potus indumentique, incrementa et decrementa corporis,
somni ac vigiliarum altema inevitabilisque necessitas, et similia, quibus omnibus
Humana natura si non peccaret, omnino libera maneret, quemadmodum libera futura est.
Hoc autem dico Gregorium Nyssaeum sequens, expositoremque ipsius Maximum, non
autem alios sanctos Patres spiritualis doctrinae, qualiter videntur sensisse, refellens, haec
omnia ad primam et jubstantialem hominis creationem pertinere autumantes.
320
W hy God w ould introduce consequence prior to the act they are supposed
to follow, is, according to Eriugena, a problem introduced by o u r lim ited,
tem poral m ode of knowing
For w hen we say "before" a n d "after sin," w e display the m utability of
o u r thoughts, since w e are n o w subject to times; but to God the
foreknowledge of sin and its consequences were sim ultaneous. Indeed, to
m an, not to God, w as sin future, and the consequences of sin precede sin
in m an, since even sin itself precedes itself in this same man: a n evil will,
w hich is hidden sin, precedes the taste of the poisonous fruit, w hich is
open sin.47
Eriugena confirms this point w ith a significant quotation from A ugustine:
This even m aster A ugustine him self teaches,... saying: "Evils begin to
exist in secret in order to w o rk disobedience in the open. For unless an
evil will had preceded, it w o u ld not have arrived at an evil w ork.
M oreover, w hat could the beginning of an evil will be except pride? For
p ride is the beginning of all sin."48
A nd from this he draws the striking conclusion "that man has never lacked sin;
ju st as it is understood that never has he subsisted w ithout a m utable will. For
even this irrational mutability of free will, since it is the cause of evil, m u st itself
be som ething evil."
Paradise, then, is the state m an w ould have enjoyed if he had n o t fallen
aw ay from it before actually enjoying it. A lthough Augustine him self speaks of
47 PP 4 : 808A-B: Nam cum dicimus ante et post peccatum, cogitationum

nostrarum mutabilitatem monstramus, dum adhuc temporibus subdimur: Deo autem
simul erant et peccati praescientae ejusdem consequentia. Homini siquidem, non Deo,
fu tu ru m erat peccatum, et consequentia peccati praecessit peccatum in homine, quoniam
et ipsum peccatum praecessit seipsum in eodem homine. Mala quippe voluntas, quod est
peccatum occultum, praecessit vetitifructus gustum, quod est peccatum apertum.
48 PP 4 :808C: Hoc etiam ipse magister Augustinus edocet in praefati libri tertio
decimo capitulo de primis hominibus dicens: In occulto autem m ali esse coeperunt,
u t in apertam inobedientiam laberentur. N on enim ad m alum opus perveniretur,
nisi praecessisset voluntas mala. Porro m alae voluntatis initium quid p o tu it esse
nisi superbia? Initium enim om nis peccati superbias est. Cf. CD 14.13.
321
m an as having been in Paradise, Eriugena interprets him as using the "inceptive"

tense, that is, w here A ugustine says that m an was in Paradise, he really means
th at m an was beginning to be in Paradise, a coming to be th at w as interrupted by
the Fall.49 As forced as this reading m ay seem, E riugena justifies it on the basis of
A ugustine's ow n account of the fall of Satan. The devil did n o t fall away from an
original state of blessedness actually enjoyed, b u t refused to receive the original
state for w hich he w as in ten d ed .50 The scriptural locus classicus for Christian
reflection on the devil's exalted state from w hich he fell is the lam entation over
the king of Tyre, Ezekiel 28:11-19. Like the Eden narrative of Genesis, it assumes
possession of beatitude p rio r to the falling aw ay from it. "If, then, concerning the
devil such things are said using a mystical change of tim es, a nd Scripture is not
rightly understood otherw ise; w hat prevents, if in the sam e m anner it is spoken
concerning m an that he h a d been am ong the delights o f Paradise before sin?"51
Maximus, "in the 28th chapter of his expositions of the w ords of Gregory,"
further supports this interpretive approach to the Paradise narrative when he
construes the Fall as consisting as m uch in a refusal to e a t from the Tree of Life as
in the eating from the forbidden tree. In fact, the refusing of one and the
choosing of the other represents the single, fateful choice by w hich m an chose to
tru st his ow n senses rather them the W ord of God. By so choosing, m an refused
the paradisiac state w hich he w as intended to occupy, a n d fell into the mortal
49 PP 4: 808C-809A.
50 PP 4 :809D-810A; cf. GL 11.23, from which Eriugena gives a lengthy
quotation.
51 PP 4 :810B: Porro si de diabolo mystica mutatione temporum talia
pronuntiantur, et nec aliter Scriptura recte intelligitur: quid obstat, si eodem modo de
homine praedicetur, in deliciis paradisifuisse ante peccatum, quod, si non peccaret,...?
322
and irrational form of life in which he now appears.52 Nonetheless, that intended
state w hich he refused is his true "first" state, established in the will of God, to
which he will return.
4.22
U n ifica tio n o f nature

The identification of Paradise w ith pristine h u m an nature, on the basis of
Gregory's interpretation of the trees of Paradise, a n d the conclusion that hum an

nature did not exist in its pristine state for any p eriod of tim e, based on
Gregory's talk of the consequences of foreseen sin, are the two points at which
Eriugena's interpretation of Paradise is m ost indebted to De imagine. Eriugena is
further indebted to "Gregory" insofar as Maximus provides further commentary
on other aspects of the Paradise narrative and m an's fall. O w ing to the
identification of the two Gregories, Nyssen and N azianzen, this additional
material significantly increases the authoritative resources w hich Eriugena can
draw upon in o rd er to construct a spiritualizing interpretation of Genesis able to
stand up to the m agisterial weight of A ugustine's m ore literal, temporal and
spatial Paradise.
To this coalition of Gregory-Gregory-Maximus is added Ambrose.
Ambrose's De paradiso adopts the same spiritualizing line on the Paradise
narrative as do the Greeks. This alliance allows Eriugena to claim a certain
ecumenical base for his work: he is not m erely a partisan of the Greeks. Even
Augustine him self can be enlisted as an ally. A lthough Eriugena's attempts to
harm onize A ugustine's understanding of Paradise w ith th at of these other
Fathers can som etim es lead him into a tortured reading of certain of Augustine's
52 PP 4 :813A-C; cf. Amb. 6.28,979-983.
323
texts,53 his more m etaphysical borrowings are m uch less forced. Hence at the
end of Book 4, Eriugena can justly claim to have draw n his convictions in a
reasonable w ay "from the judgm ents of the holy Fathers, I m ean, o f Ambrose
and Augustine, and also o f the venerable Gregory Nazianzen, w ho is also called
Nyssen, and his expositor, nam ely, the monk Maximus."54
Nonetheless, one cannot escape the impression th at Eriugena has found
himself taking sides in a controversy which often arrays his G reek authorities
over against the Latins. In the context of protology, that is, the doctrines
pertaining to m an's origin and first state, the controversy centers on contrary
assessments of m an's anim al body. In eschatology the sam e controversy
continues, but now focuses o n w hether or how far body can be spiritualized. As
in the form er context A ugustine maintains a more positive assessm ent of m an's
animality, so also in the latter he is less willing to have body absorbed into soul.
The doctrine that in the R eturn body is changed into soul is defended by
Eriugena on the authority of G regory the Theologian. A lthough the m ain textual
53 For example, the claim that A ugustine's use of the p a st tense in relating
m an's tim e in Paradise should be understood as a use of the "inceptive" tense is
perhaps the m ost egregious (cf. PP 4 :808C-809C).
John J. O'M eara, "E riugena's Use of Augustine in his Teaching on the
Return of the Soul and the Vision of God," in Jean Scot Erigbie et Vhistoire de la
philosophie, ed. Roques, 191-200, argues that in fact A ugustine w as m ore
am bivalent on these m atters, even as late as the City of God, th an is generally
recognized, and that E riugena's efforts to reconcile A ugustine w ith the Greeks
and Am brose represent a sincere, filial devotion rather than calloused distortion.
O 'M eara perhaps pushes too hard for an esoteric/exoteric split in Augustine, but
his th ru st regarding Eriugena's intention seems to me well placed.
54 PP 4 :860A: [NUTR.] Sed eligat quis quid sequatur: ego autem, quod mihi
verisimilius visum est, ex sanctorum Patrum sententiis, Ambrosii dico et Augustini,
necnon et venerabilis Gregorii Nazianzeni, qui et Nyssaeus dicitur, expositorisque ejus,
Maximi mdelicet monachi, ratiocinationis occasionem sumens, tibi interroganti
partimque exponenti protuli.
324
su p p o rts for this view derive not from De imagine but from M axim us' Ambigua,
G regory of N yssa's account of h o w passions become virtues as w ell as the
account of body as a concourse of incorporeal accidents strengthen Eriugena's
case. The combined authority o f G regory of Nyssa, Gregory of N azianzus, and
com m entator Maximus, rem ains a potent force throughout Periphyseon, Book 5.
Eriugena's doctrine of the R eturn hinges on a conception o f the unification
o f nature in which lower natures are sublim ated to higher levels w ith o u t being
destroyed; they pass into the higher nature b u t do not, strictly speaking, pass
aw ay. O ne of his m ost com m on im ages for this kind of transform ation is that of
a ir illum ined and suffused w ith lig h t only the nature of light is m anifest, but the
n atu re of air does not perish.55 A nother example he gives is that of a knowing
subject w hich as it knows its object m ore perfectly becomes one w ith it. Thus, in
the highest stage of the Return, w h en hum an nature contem plates m ost perfectly
th e divine nature, it becomes one w ith it; the nature of the subject yields to the
m anifestation of the object, so th at only God is manifest, bu t neither the subject
n o r its nature is destroyed.56
The basic stages of the Return are 1) death, w hen the m ortal body is
resolved into the elements, 2) resurrection, w hen each receives again its body
from the store of elements, 3) the change of body into soul, 4) the change of soul
into its prim ordial causes, and 5) the absorption of the spirit w ith its causes into
55 PP 5 :876B, 879A.
56 PP 5 :876B: Si enim omne, quod pure intelligit, efficitur unum cum eo, quod
intelligitur, quid mirum, si nostra natura, quando Deum facie ad faciem contemplatura
sit, in his, qui digni sunt, quantum ei datur contemplari, in nubibus theoriae ascensura,
unum cum ipso et in ipso fieri possit?
325
G od. E riugena adm its th at such a schem e is controversial, o r at least horn stage
three on.
W e d o n o t say this refuting the m eaning of those w ho say that no body
can be changed into life, n o r any life be changed into body, especially
since h o ly Father A ugustine seem s to teach this, b u t th a t in this
d isp u tatio n concerning the retu rn of nature w e follow G regory the
Theologian, and his expositor M aximus, and also Saint Am brose in his
explanation of the Gospel according to Luke.57
Bodily d eath a n d resurrection are universally professed, b u t the kind of
transm utation o f substances involved in the later stages is a m atter of dispute.
For m an y discuss only the dissolution of body into elem ents and its return
at the m om ent of resurrection in its proper state, and d o not seem to
ascend further, since they set the end of their discussion at the quality of
bodies after the resurrection; b u t the transfusion of bodies into souls, and
of souls into causes, and of causes into God some deny entirely, others
d o u b t cautiously, to the extent th at even they do n ot d are say that the
h u m an ity of Christ has been turned into divinity. A nd since their
au th o rity is not to be passed over, w e ought to briefly recall w hat they
th o u g h t about this.58
H e then gives quotations from b o th A ugustine and Boethius th a t indeed contain
rejections of su ch transm utation. "La the w ords of these authors nothing else is
57 PP 5 : 876C: Nec hoc dicimus, illorum sensum refellentes, qui dicunt, nullum
corpus posse mutari in vitam, neque ullam vitam mutari in corpus, praesertim cum
sanctus Pater Augustinus hoc docere vedeatur, sed quod in hac disputatione de naturae
reditu Gregorium sequimur Theologum, ejusque expositorem Maximum, nec non et
sanctum Ambrosium in explanatione Evangelii secundum Lucam...
58 PP 5 : 876D-877A: M ulti enim de solutione solummodo corporis in elementa,
deque ejus reditu resurrectionis momento in suum proprium statum disputant, et neque
plus ascendere videntur, quoniam in qualitate corporum post resurrectionem
disputationis suae finem constituunt; transfusionem veto corporum in animas, et
animarum in causas, et causarum in Deum quidam penitus negant, quidam caute
dubitant, in tantum, ut etiam humanitatem Christi in divinitatem conversam fuisse
dicere non audeant. Et quoniam illorum non est praetermittenda auctoritas, quid de hoc
sentiant, breviter commemorare debemus.
326
given to be understood than that no bodily n ature can be changed into an

incorporeal one."59
N onetheless, Gregory the Theologian, Maximus, and Ambrose teach
otherwise. The critical quotation is taken from a passage of Gregory N azianzen's
Funeral O ration for his brother Caesarius {Oratio 7), quoted in M aximus'
Ambigua.
But a little later, the soul, w hich w ill also receive its kindred flesh, together
w ith w hich is pursued the things beyond, from the earth which had both
given an d been entrusted w ith it, in a m anner which God, who both joins
and su n d ers them , knows, will co-inherit w ith this [flesh] its glory
beyond; and just as it shared in [the body's] hardships through
cogeneration, so also it w ill share its ow n delights, and will absorb the
w hole [body] into itself, having becom e w ith it one thing, spirit and m ind
and G od, w hat is mortal and flow ing having been completely set aside by
life.60
To this quotation Eriugena adds M axim us' com m entary on it and a supporting
text from A m brose, "lest someone perhaps think that w e could find no author of
59 PP 5: 877B-C: In his verbis praedictorum auctorum nil aliud datur intelligi,

quam nullam corpoream naturam in incorpoream posse mutari.
60 Ambigua (Grk): PG 9 1 :1249D1252A: Mucpov 8e ikrrgpou icai t o cruyyevescrapKiou diroXaPouaa ... <STa exeiGev awetfaXoao^qcre, -rrapa TTj? ical Sowttis xai.
TTurreuGeicnis
Tpotrov ov oiSev o Toura auvSqaras teal SiaXucras 0eos, t o u t w
crvyxXqpot'op.el Tijs exetBev S o l t i s , xai xaGdrrep t w u p.oxQilpon' airrou p.Teaxe 8ia
Tf|u cnj(i<j)ULau, o u t c j xai twv repTmwv eairrij? |ieTa8C8oxTLV, oXov eig eaunju
avaXdxracra, xai yevop.eur\ ovv t o u t c o ev, xai -nveSp.at xai i/oCg, xal 0eos,
KaTaTToGeurog irrro rfjs
to O G i ^ t o i ; t c xai peovro?.
Cf. PP 5 : 877C-D (cf. Amb. 17,167173): Paulo post autem, inquit, et
congenitum, camale corpus videlicet, receptura est anima, cum quo, quae illic sunt, hoc
est, in futura vita, philosophata est, per ipsam et datam et creditam terram, camem
profecto, in modum, quern novit, qui ea collegavit et dissolvit, Deus, huic cohaereditabit
illic gloriam: et quemadmodem laborum ejus, animae videlicet, per congenerationem
participant corpus, sic ex jucunditatibus suis tradet totum in seipsam corpus scilicet,
consumptura, et futura cum ipso unus et spiritus, et animus, et Deus, absorpto a vita et
mortali et fluenti. (Eriugena's translation is m ore obscure than the Greek.) Cf.
also, "O ration VH: Panegyric on his Brother Caesarius," LNPF2 7:236-237.
327
the Latin tongue, who has favored this account of the unification of nature, that
is, concerning the return of the inferior into the superior."61
The difficulty w ith this view of th e unification is to find a w ay of
expressing the sublimation of the low er into the higher that does not suggest the
destruction of the lower.
But w e ought not to so understand this m ost excellent master, A m brose, I
m ean, as though he w ished to teach a confusion or transm utation of
substances, b u t that he m ost evidently taught a certain ineffable and
incom prehensible unification o f o u r substances. Certainly, in h u m an
nature nothing subsists which is n o t spiritual and intelligible. F o r also the
substance of body even is intelligible, and therefore it is not unbelievable,
nor resistant to reason, that intelligible substances are united w ith
them selves, so that they are one a n d yet each does not cease to possess its
ow n property and substance, though in such a way that the inferior is
contained by the superior.62
The nuances of Eriugena's view cannot be adequately treated here, w here
the aim is to discern Gregory of N yssa's influence (although m any of the
im portant elem ents of that view have been exam ined in previous chapters).63 To
Eriugena's defense of the doctrine of the unification of nature as a sublim ation of
lower into higher, throughout Book 5, De imagine makes only an auxiliary
61 PP 5: 878A-B: Et ne quis forte nos existimet, nullum latinae linguae

auctorem, qui huic rationi adunationis naturae, hoc est, de reditu inferiorum in superiora
faverit, posse invenire, beati Ambrosii sententiam introducere convenit...
62 PP 5: 878D-879A: Sed non ita hunc excelsissimum, Ambrosium dico,
magistrum debemus intelligere veluti substantiarum confusionem, vel transmutationem
velit suadere, sed adunationem quandam ineffabilem atque inintelligibilem nostrarum
substantiarum evidentissime docuisse. In humana siquidem natura nil subsistit, quod
spirituale et intelligibile non sit. Nam et substantia corporis profecto intelligibilis est,
atque ideo non est incredibile, nec rationi resistens, intelligibiles substantiae sibi invicem
adunari, ut et unum sint, et unaquaeque proprietatem suam et subsistentiam habere non
desistat, ita tamen, ut inferiora superiorbus contineantur.
63 See section 3.321 and following.
328
contribution; the m ain support comes from the texts of Gregory of N azianzus,
transm itted and expounded by Maximus. The m ain contribution from De
imagineG regory of Nyssa's account of th e transm utation of passions into
virtuesw as exam ined in Chapter 3, Section 2. h i fact, only one significant
N yssen contribution remains to be considered, the view that m an's retu rn to his
p roper state is to be expected from the v ery nature of things.
4.23
T h e n e c e s s ity o f th e r e t u r n
C hapter 3, Section 1, has already looked a t Eriugena's discussion, in Book
5, of the question, "W hether the resurrection of bodies is according to grace, or

according to nature, or by both w orking together."64 His interlocutors com plain
that they have found little in the works o f Latin authors to guide him on this
point. Reading only Latin authors one comes to the conclusion that the
resurrection was entirely the work of grace.
This w as m y opinion regarding the resurrection of the dead. But after I
read the Ancoratus, or Sermone defide, of St. Epiphanius, bishop of
C onstantia [Salamis] in Cyprus, a n d the great Gregory the Theologian's
disputation De imagine, I changed m y m ind so that, consenting to their
authority and making light of m y ow n opinion, I conceded that the
resurrection of the dead will be w ith naoiral pow er.65
Beginning w ith Epiphanius' exam ples of various natural types of the
resurrection, Eriugena launches a long investigation into nature and grace, the
64 PP 5 :898D-899A: Utrum vero resurrectio corporum secundum gratiam, an

secundum naturam, an utraque concurrente sit, quaerendum...
65 PP 5 :899C: Haec erat mea de resurrectione mortuorum opinio. Sed postquam
sancti Epiphanii, episcopi Constantiae Cypri, Ancoratum seu sermonem de Fide legi,
magnique Gregorii Theologi de Imagine disputationem, mutavi sententiam, ut illorum
auctoritati consentiens, meamque opinionem parvipendens, resurrectionem mortuorum
naturali virtute futuram esse concederem.
329
Incarnation, m an 's macrocosmic relation to sensible nature, as these b ear on the

inevitability of the resurrection. A lthough G regory's contribution thro u g h o u t
m ost of th a t discussion is not explicitly acknow ledged, it is nonetheless
profound as, again, portions of the last chapter tried to make clear. O nly at the
end of the investigation does Eriugena finally tu rn to Gregory's testim ony.
But since concerning this, that the resurrection o f bodies w ill b e by natural
pow er, w ith divine grace cooperating, through the Savior of the w orld's
becom ing m an, w e have brought in the testim ony of blessed E piphanius,
necessarily, I think, w e should also bring in the judgm ent of the great
theologian G regory on this issue.66
There follows a quotation of nearly the w hole of De imagine, C hapter 22, in
which G regory lays out the bases of his confidence th at hum an n ature w ill be
delivered from its present evil condition, and th a t "w e shall again live in light
as the nature of good things surpasses m any thousand-fold the m easure of vice
there w ill again be Paradise, again that tree w hich is the tree of life, again the
grace of the image, and the dignity of the beginning."67
Eriugena's comm ents on the passage a d d little. The bases of G regory's
hope are, h e explains, first, that only Good is infinite an d imm utable w hile evil is
variable a n d lim ited; secondly, that hum an nature is ever-moving, searching
always for the Good. He does allow him self to elaborate on the evil shadow , in
which m an a t present w anders b u t from w hich he w ill eventually em erge.
Evil is the intellectual soul's forgetfulness of natural goods, the failure of
operation w ith respect to the end of the innate pow ers of nature, and the
irrational m otion of natural potentials, through an erring judgm ent,
66 PP 5 :916D-917A: Quoniam vero de eo, quod resurrectio corporum naturali

virtute, divina gratia cooperante, per Salvatoris mundi inhumanationem futura sit, beati
Epiphanii testimonium introduximus, necessarium arbitror, magni quoque theologi
Gregorii sententiam de eadem ratione introducamus.
67 O H 21:201D-204A. As quoted above.
330
to w ard som ething other th an the endthe end, I m ean, o f those things
w hich are, the cause w hich all things naturally seek. Furtherm ore, w hen
this irrational m otion itself, w hich is the cause and plenitude of the whole
b ad an d evil, is circumscribed an d entirely bounded by th e am plitude of
goodness, hum an nature w ill reasonably, according to the n atural powers
innate to itself, move u pw ard tow ard lofty things, ever seeking its cause,
an d returning to paradise, b y w hich I m ean the delights o f virtue, w hich
th o u g h naturally inherent in itself it lost by sinning, and ardently desiring
the food of the Tree of Life, nam ely, contemplation of the W ord o f God,
an d hastening to receive the dignity of the divine image in which it was
m ad e .68
E riugena explains the unendingness of the search in term s o f the
paradoxical know ledge of God given in theophany. In its theophanies the divine
nature b oth is found and is not found; for, although God m anifests him self in the
beauty and o rder of the species of creatures, still it is never know n what he is,
only that he is. There follow two passages from Dionysius that describe the
darkness o f the divine light;69 and the exposition of Gregory's testim ony ends
w ith the affirm ation that even the hum anity of Christ is so exalted by its union
w ith his divinity in the one person th a t it too is incomprehensible to every
creature.70 Hence God is ever sought even by those who have found him.
68 PP 5 : 919B: Malitia namque est animae intellectualis naturalium bonorum

oblivio, et ad finem insitarum naturae virtutum operationis defectus, naturaliumque
potentiarum per fallentem judicationem in aliud praeter finem irrationabilis motus.
Finem veto dico eorum, quae sunt, causam, quam naturaliter appetunt omnia. Proinde
ipso irrationabili motu, qui totius mali et malitiae et causa et plenitudo est, bonitatis
amplitudine circumscripto penitusque terminato, rationabiliter secundum insitas sibi
naturales virtutes Humana natura movebitur, sursum versus erecta, causam suam
semper appetens, et in paradisum, delicias dico virtutum, quas naturaliter sibi insitas
peccando perdiderat, rediens, escamque ligni vitae, Dei videlicet Verbi contemplationem,
ardenter desiderans, divinaeque imaginis, ad quam facta est, dignitatem recipere
festinans.
69 PP 5 :920A-C; Ps-D, To Dorotheus & To Gaius.
70 PP 5 :920D-921B: "I unhesitatingly follow in the footsteps of those who
fearlessly announce the hum anity of o u r Lord Jesus Christ united to his divinity
331
O n the whole, however, E riugena's eschatology is rather different from

Gregory's. Eriugena's doctrine of theophanies tends to be more static than
G regory's etreKTCKTiS'. In Gregory's view the soul w ould move from theophany to
theophany, each m ore expansive than the one before, each still infinitely distant
from the fullness of the divine nature. Eriugena generally gives the impression
that each m an o r angel will receive a particular level of theophany (or phantasy
in the case of the wicked) as its eternal rew ard. N ot all who return to the
Paradise of hu m an nature restored to its pristine state will eat of the Tree of Life
w hich is in its m idst.
Later in Book 5, Eriugena gives a striking depiction of Paradise, which he
compares to the Temple of Solomon w ith its hierarchical arrangem ent of
porticoes, courts, holy place, and H oly of holies.
C onsider that divine Scripture does not sim ply testify that the Tree of Life
is in Paradise, but more expressly, in the m idst of Paradise, so that you
so as to be one, save for the distinction of natures, in it and with it, since the
hum anity an d divinity of Christ are one substance, o r to speak m ore customarily,
one person. A nd just as his divinity surpasses all understanding, so also the
hum anityw hich is m ade superessential and exalted above the universe of
visible and intelligible creatures, above all places and times, above all
circumscription and definition, above all the heavens, above all pow ers and
authorities, above all that is said and understood, above all that is after Godis
incom prehensible and uninvestigatable to every creature." (PP 5 :921A-B: Ego
autem incunctanter vestigia eorum sequor, qui non temere praedicant humanitatem
Domini nostri Jesu Christi suae divinitati unitam, ita ut unum, salva naturarum ratione,
in ipsa et cum ipsa sit, quoniam una substantia est, et ut usitatius dicam, una persona
humanitas Christi et divinitas. Et quemadmodum divinitas ejus omnem superat
intellectum, ita et humanitas, quae super universalitatem visibilis et inielligibilis
creaturae, super omnia loca et tempora, super omnem circumscriptionem et definitionem,
super omnes caelos, super omnes virtutes et potestates, super omne, quod dicitur et
intelligitur, super omne, quod post Deum est, exaltata est et superessentialis facta, est
omni creaturae incomprehensibilis et ininvestigabilis.) It w ould be interesting to
compare E riugena's m anner of expression on such points w ith that of Maximus
to determ ine w hether the former fails to m ake distinctions that the latter, for
whom the m onophysite tem ptation w ould have been ever in view, does not.
332
m ay understand by the w ord "paradise" the whole hum an nature, which

all m en both good an d b a d share, b u t by the signification o f its m idst, the
m ost secret and inner folds of this nature, in which the im age and likeness
of G od is expressed, w here the Tree of Life, that is our Lord Jesus Christ, is
planted, the contem plation o f w hich no one is perm itted to enjoy except
the m ost purified by faith and action, the most illum inated b y knowledge,
and the m ost perfected b y w isdom an d understanding of the divine
mysteries. A nd this, I think, is prefigured in the mystical edifice of
Solomon's Temple.71
For everyone had access to its o u ter precincts, b u t as one moves inw ard, each
area is restricted to a narrow er class of persons, until one reaches the H oly of
holies w here only the high p riest w as perm itted and then only once a year. At
the center is the Ark, the prefigurem ent o f Christ, who is "the redem ption and
salvation, purification, and illum ination, and perfection of the w hole hum anity in
all and in each, around w hich C herubim move, that is, the orders of angels,
through w hich he disposed and orders visible and invisible things."72 H e is the
Tree of Life which "in an ineffable m anner above all essence and pow er and
71 PP 5 :980D-981A: Attende, quod divina Scriptura non simpliciter lignum

vitae in paradiso esse testatur, sed expressius in m edio paradisi, ut vocabulo paradisi
totam humanam naturam, quam omnes homines et boni et mali participant, intelligas,
medii vero ejus signification secretissimos intimosque ejusdem naturae sinus, in quibus
imago et similitudo Dei expressa est, ubi lignum vitae, hoc est Dominus noster Jesus
Christus, plantatum, cujus contemplation nemo nisi purgatissimus fide et action, et
illuminatissimus scientia, et perfectissimus sapientia et divinorum mysteriorum
intelligentia frui sinitur. Et hoc, ut arbitror, in mystica Salomonis templi aedificatione
praefiguratum est.
72 PP 5 :981D: ... quoniam ipse est redemptio et salus, purgatio, et illuminatio, et
perfectio universae humanitatis in omnibus et singulis, circa quern Cherubim, ordines
videlicet angelorum discurrunt, per quos visibilia et inrnsibilia ordinat atque disponit.
333
operation dw ells in inaccessible light, beyond and w ithin the nature m ade in the
image of G od."73
Everyone w ill enter Paradise as into th e Temple, each according to his
rank.
In the Paradise of hum an nature each w ill possess his place according to
the proportion of his conduct in this life, som e further out, as in the outer
porticoes, som e further in, in the m ore interior halls of divine
contem plation, some in the m ost am ple tem ples of divine mysteries, som e
in the innerm ost theophanies beyond all nature in him and w ith him w ho
is superessential and supernatural. Blessed are they who enter the inner
sanctum of w isdom , which is Christ.74
Paradise as a w hole represents the original im m ortal and incorruptible state of
hum an nature w hich is restored for all w ho share hum an nature, b u t w ithin th at
restored im m ortality there are a variety of rew ards. "One for all is the com m on
nature, diverse is the grace; where all are together, and are not together, they are
together in likeness of substances, and not together in dissimilarity of
conditions.... O ne essence joins those who are divided by different rew ards."75
73 PP 5 :982A-B: ... in quo Dei Verbum, quod est lignum vitae, ineffabili modo
super omnem essentiam et virtutem et operationem in luce habitat inaccessibili, ultra et
intra naturam ad imaginem Deifactam.
74 PP 5 :983A: In paradiso itaque humanae naturae unusquisque locum suum
secundum proportionem conversationis suae in hoc vita possidebit, alii exterius veluti in
extremis porticibus, alii interius tanquam in propinquioribus atriis divinae
contemplationis, alii in amplissimis divinorum mysteriorum templis, alii in intimis super
omnem naturam in ipso et cum ipso, qui superessentialis et supematuralis est,
theophaniis. Beati sunt, qui adyta intrant sapientiae, quae est Christus;...
75 PP 5 :983B,C: ... una omnibus communis natura, diversa autem gratia; ubi
omnes simul sunt, et simul non sunt, simul sunt similitudine substances, simul non
sunt dissimilitudine affectuum.... Una siquidem essentia jungit, quos meritum dissimile
dividit.
334
It is striking th at here at the end, after h aving so consistently chosen to

follow the great G regory a n d his com m entator M axim us, Eriugena follows no
further. H e ad o p ts G regory's argum ent for the inevitability of the hum an
nature's return to Paradise, an argum ent founded o n the imm utability and
infinity o f God a n d the ceaseless m otion o f h u m an nature, the doctrine of
eTreicTacTLsv b u t he does n o t follow the full developm ent of that argum ent as it
leads G regory to a doctrine o f aTroKaTacrraais in w hich all are finally purified of
sin and freed from its punishm ents. Eriugena produces a remarkable blend of
Gregorian and A ugustinian eschatologies, in w hich the whole pleroma of hum an
nature is restored to its pristine state b u t in such a w ay th at space is left w ithin
that Paradise for the distribution of rew ards distributed according to the m erits
of one's conduct in this life.
4.3
C on clu sion
G regory's influence on Eriugena's doctrine of m an's return to Paradise is
essential. A part from the substantial points th at d ep en d clearly on De imagine,

such as likeness o f the first m an to the angels, the spiritualizing interpretation of
the trees o f Paradise, and the inevitability of the return, Gregory also functions as
an authoritative center around which to collect o th er such patristic voices. This
consolidation is achieved largely by the confusion of the tw o Gregories, N yssen
and N azianzen, an d once complete it perm its De imagine to be interpreted and
elaborated contiguously w ith the Ambigua. The tw o texts function as a single
body of doctrine anchored to the single authority of "th e Theologian."
This chapter has indicated those borrow ings th at depend directly on the
real Gregory of N yssa, b u t it has also tried to illustrate h ow the other Gregory
has had his ow n im pact. Indeed, there are other doctrines besides the
sublim ation of bo d y into soul that Eriugena ow es to G regory of Nazianzus.
335
Until the e n d of Book 3, however, Eriugena m aintains strict consistency of

reference, so th a t the texts of one Gregory are n ever attributed to the other.
W hether E riugena w rote the earlier books w ith d o u b t about the identities of the
two, a doubt w hich w as resolved by m istaken prosopographical information that
came too late in the w riting of Periphyseon, or w h eth er the rhetorical advantages
of identifying them as the same person overcam e his earlier scruples, there can
be little d o u b t th at the confusion gave him a certain confidence to follow another
p ath than th a t m arked o u t by the great A ugustine, particularly in regard to the
protological a n d eschatological issues and exegesis th at touch on m an's present
likeness to the anim als and future equality w ith the angels.
Eriugena, how ever, w as not content m erely to oppose one Father against
another, or the Greeks against the Latins. A m brose w as for him a confirming
voice w ith w hich he could reassure his readers th at he was staying within the
am bit of the Catholic faith. H e never sim ply dism isses Augustine but always
draw s, w hen possible, on his magisterial insights. Eriugena's eschatological
depiction of Paradise is a clear testimony to the synthetic potential of his
devotion to the Fathers and his philosophical ingenuity.
336
CONCLUSION
The w hole preceding discussion has sought to b e as transparent as
possible to the texts o f G regory an d Eriugena. The p rim ary task of this thesis, in
both its expository an d its argum entative portions, h as been to uncover and
display G regory's influence on Eriugena through th e analysis of specific
passages and th e philosophical and theological them es th at em erge from them
and link them one to another. T hus, the com parison of G regory and Eriugena
has been prim arily a m atter of translating and elucidating those parts of De
imagine w hich E riugena explicitly cites in his Periphyseon and those parts of the
Periphyseon w hich m ost clearly betray a debt to G regory.
Secondarily, the discussion has turned to other ancient texts and authors,
but only as often as they helped draw out the significance of the prim ary texts
and them es or heightened the contrasts and correspondences betw een G regory
and Eriugena. The Introduction d id survey such m odem secondary literature as
was relevant eith er for fram ing th e broader significance of the project o r for
providing a w orking basis from w hich this dissertation could proceed (the latter
category being chiefly occupied by the w ork o f M aiuel C appuyns, Edouard
Jeauneau, and I. P. Sheldon-W illiam s); but because little of w hat has been argued
in this dissertation is controversial, further discussion o f m odem secondary
literature has been k ep t to the notes.
The tim e h as now come to speak briefly and directly to the issue of
G regory's influence on E riugena, sum m arizing as succinctly as possible the
central point aro u nd w hich all the explorations of the preceding pages have
337
circled. T hroughout the Periphyseon E riugena's account o f m an's bodily existence

depends profoundly o n G regory's De imagine. E riugena's doctrine o f body as a
concourse o f accidents, his notion o f the sp iritu al body as th e abiding form o f the
body borne by th e soul, and his understanding o f how th e soul creates and
governs its m ortal b od y are all essential elem ents of his account of bodily
existence and are all d raw n directly from the pages of De imagine. That is n o t to
say th at E riugena does n o t elaborate and m odify and m ark them w ith the stam p
of his ow n genius, on the contrary; nonetheless, even in his elaboration of them
their G regorian character an d origin rem ain evident. As im portant as E riugena's
debt in this area is, beh in d itbehind all the doctrines th a t pertain to m an 's
corporealitylies th e m ore im portant conviction th at m an's tru e life is an angelic
one. This conviction is G regory's m ost significant contribution to E riugena's
thought.
The conviction th at m an is created LodyyeXo? is one of the governing
principles of E riugena's thought, as integral to th e w hole of his thought as th e
notions of participation, theophany, and divine superessentiality, w hich he takes
from Pseudo-D ionysius; o r o f creation as being m ade all together and at once
w ithin the W ord, w hich he takes from A ugustine; o r the C hristocentric
understanding of procession and return, w ith its atten d en t notion of m an as the
officina, w hich he takes from M aximus. W hile E riugena's reading o f De imagine
is often conditioned by these other ideas, it is equally tru e th at his appro priatio n
of these ideas is conditioned by the idea o f m an's original and final equality w ith
the angels.
C onsider how integral the notion o f hierarchy is to Pseudo-D ionysius'
vision of m an's initiation an d participation in the revelation o f the O ne w ho is
beyond being. The no tio n of the divine superessentiality derives m uch of its
338
force from the im m ense v a u lt th at opens u p betw een God and m an as m an

strains to scale w ith h is sig h t th e g reat cascade o f angelic hierarchies th a t connect
him w ith the One beyond. A lthough E riugena retains th ro ug h ou t the
Periphyseon Pseudo-D ionysius's hierarchical approach to being an d th e divine
transcendence, he ignores o r a t least relativizes to this m ortal life, m an 's
dependence on the celestial hierarchy.
Even A ugustine, w ho clearly teaches th a t no creature intervenes betw een
the soul and God, still assigns angelic n atu re a m ediating position b etw een the
eternal G od and the spatio-tem poral realm of w hich m an is a p a rt. A ngels have a
noetic relation to the w orld different from m an's. M an m ust w ait to k now other
creatures until they em erge into sensible effects, w hereas the angels received
their hierarchical know ledge of the w orld an d its history in one sixfold D ay.
Eriugena again relativizes the presen t difference betw een the hum an a n d angelic
state. It is a tem porary difference deriving n o t from nature b u t from sin . By
n ature, as rational and intellectual, m an w as created w ith the angels o n th a t first
day and possesses as his n atu ral act such know ledge as A ugustine attrib u tes to
the angels, even though now such know ledge is obscured by m an 's u n n atu ral
ignorance.
M axim us the C onfessor's idea of m an as m icrocosm and m ed iato r w ould
seem to give m an an exalted position w ith in creation, different from th a t o f the
angels and carrying its o w n distinctive glory. Eriugena readily ad o p ts th is idea
of m an as the w orkshop o f creation, b u t th en by a curious im plication m u tes the
celebration of the glory th a t m ight attach to it; for, the shadow y existence w hich
things receive w hen m anifested in exterior sense and m ortal body cann o t
com pare w ith their tru e substance, defined an d contained w ithin th e n atu ra l
intellectual activity w hich m an and angel b y n atu re share. M an is, to be sure,
339
distinguished from the angels by his m icrocosm ic function, b u t that distinction is

n o t his glory. H is glory is to be created in and resto red to equality w ith the
angels.
N one of E riugena's other sources, at least as h e him self presents them ,
places as d e a r and consistent an em phasis on m an 's angelic dignity as does
G regory of N yssa in De imagine. G regory's account o f m an's bodily nature
assum es the critical role it does w ithin E riugena's tho u gh t precisely in function
of this p rin tip le. N either G regory n or E riugena w ishes to break w ith the
C hristian tradition regarding m an's com posite n a tu re an d bodily resurrection;
b u t neither is content, as A ugustine finally w as, to define m an as a rational
anim al to w hich im m ortality and beatitude are ad d ed by grace. For them the
scriptural affirm ation th a t m an is created in the im age of G od m eans m uch m ore
than that he has reason and free will. For them creation in the divine im age
im plies th at hum an n atu re bears all the divine attrib u tessovereignty,
incorruption, im m ortality, bliss, and so onexcept insofar as creatureliness,
createdness, entails a difference. The scriptural affirm ation of m an's creation in
the divine im age is confirm ed and interpreted fo r them by the evangelical
prom ise th at in the resurrection m en w ill be like th e angels. The m ore purely
noetic existence of the angels offers a m uch clearer reflection of divinity than any
sensible, corporeal creature.
This em phasis on the noetic, w ith its distinction over against the sensible
and bodily, obviously p u ts both G regory and E riugena in line w ith the Platonic
and N eoplatonic trad itio n of pagan philosophy. C hapters 1 and 2 explored their
complex relationship to th at tradition, especially as m anifested in their handling
of creation ex nihilo, the Platonic problem atic reg ard in g the com posite nature of
m an, and the m eaning of bodily resurrection. A lthough both G regory and
340
Eriugena enter the fray and take positions on the recurring issues w ithin this
philosophical trad itio n , G regory is m uch quicker to excuse him self from
philosophical controversy by an appeal to faith in the biblical revelation and
C hristian dogm a, w hile Eriugena goes further in h is philosophical analysis and
speculation. T hus, w here Gregory m arks a philosophical possibility, as in the
argum ent for b o d y as a concourse o f qualities, E riugena provides a w hole
philosophical theory.
Indeed, one of the m ore im portant differences betw een G regory and
Eriugena is the w ay in w hich they receive the ancient philosophical tradition.
Eriugena know s som e pagan philosophers directly, b u t his m ost exciting,
challenging, an d sophisticated philosophical sources are C hristianthe w orks of
A ugustine, Pseudo-D ionysius, G regory of N yssa, and M axim us. The
transm ission of the philosophical tradition w as n o t for him , as it w ould have
been for G regory, largely through sources from o u tsid e the C hurch. G regory is
aw are of a m uch clearer line to be draw n betw een revelation and the
speculations of th e philosophers, than is E riugena, w hose philosophers are also,
by and large, Fathers w hose philosophical speculations are also m editations on
revelation.
This difference in relation to a philosophical trad ition outside the C hurch
should not be exaggerated. Eriugena is as sensitive as G regory to the fact of
heresy. W hether one becom es unorthodox th ro u g h too close a follow ing of
pagan w riters o r thro ug h too m uch freedom in o n e's ow n speculations, the evil is
the sam e. W hen, as often happens, especially, for exam ple, in connection w ith
A ugustine's in terpretation of m an's original state, E riugena departs from the line
taken by an u nd isp uted ly orthodox w riter, he takes care to tie his own view to
341
th at of other orthodox authorities. For both G regory an d E riugena, Scripture and

the Catholic faith m ark th e boundaries beyond w hich one dare n o t pass.
Despite this caution, how ever, the assessm ent o f G regory and Eriugena by
the subsequent O rthodox and Catholic traditions, respectively, has been that in
fact each in his ow n w ay d id step o u t of bounds. Both struggled, it w ould seem ,
w ith the Platonic tem ptation to regard the soul's em bodied state as an accidental
o r tem porary one. W hile affirm ing the natural and original union of body and
soul and the resurrection o f the body, they nonetheless em phasize the difference
betw een m an's p resen t m ortal, anim al existence and his o rig in al/fin al state, so as
to render that original m ode o f existence unim aginable by com parison w ith
em pirical m an. G regory suggests a sexless hum anity p rop agatin g in an angelic
m anner and E riugena a d d s the notion of a spiritual body th a t sets aside m ost of
the features com m only attrib u ted to corporeality, and to w hich such corporeality
is added as a consequence of sin.
Furtherm ore, com bined w ith the spiritualizing in terp retatio n of Paradise
w hich both adopt, this radical disjunction betw een m an 's creation in the im age of
God and his creation in th e likeness of irrational anim als, brings into question the
character of the Fall as an event; certainly for Eriugena it is no longer historical in
the ordinary sense, though it retains a certain tem poral character inasm uch as it
is prio r to and determ inative of conditions in the historical order. A ugustine's
account of m an's first state, in w hich m an possessed a gendered anim al body but
had the m ortality p ro p er to his anim ality suspended by v irtu e o f an initial
probationary state, entails less disjunction in the conception of hum an nature
itself before and after the Fall. To A ugustine, and to the com m on sense of m ost
traditional W estern C hristians since, hum an nature has alw ays been pretty m uch
w hat it now appears to be. The disruption caused by sin is understood m ore as a
342
loss o f health, both physical a n d m oral, and a loss of grace, than as the kind of
restru ctu rin g o r concealing o f m an 's tru e nature w hich G regory and Eriugena
seem to envision. There is a fear, p erhaps, in C hristian orthodoxy of positing too
g reat an im pact o f sin on the p resen t historical and cosm ic ord er, lest one fall into
a M anichaean dualism or an O rigenian Platonism .
N either Gregory n or E riugena could be accused o f dualism , b u t the h int of
O rigenism is strong. In fact, th e p o in t at w hich the trad itio n has judged Gregory
to have fallen short is in a doctrine o f dtroKaTdcrraaLs too like O rigen's. His
conviction th at m an w as created for an angelic life tends also in an O rigenian
direction, except that he excludes th e possibility, for both the first m an and all
subsequent m en, of a pre-existence o f the soul separate from the body. Even in
the case of the tw o creations o f m an, as im age and as anim al, it is only by
reference to the original in tention of G od, revealed by the fu tu re hope of an
angelic life, th at one can d isting u ish betw een true hum an n a tu re and hum an
n atu re as G od first created it in foreknow ledge of sin. E riugena is even m ore
explicit th at hum an nature n ev er existed tem porally w ith o u t the effects of sin.
This exclusion by both G regory an d Eriugena of a tem poral, incorporeal pre
existence of the hum an soul do es not, how ever, elim inate (or exhaust) their
affinity w ith O rigen.
O rigenism has a long an d com plex history to w hich th is dissertation adds
nothing, except to call attention to th a t history as a fitting context for further
stu d y o f E riugena's relation to h is G reek sources, both philosophically and
theologically. The great post-C halcedonian struggle in the East w ith
m onophysitism seems to be an o th er context in w hich to place and assess
E riugena's thought and his ap p ro p riatio n of his G reek sources. The tw o are not
u nrelated. The relation of body to soul in the com posite n atu re o f m an, the
343
relative value and in tegrity of each w ith respect to the w hole, a n d so on, are
issues w ith C hristological analogies. Eriugena, for exam ple, explicitly links the
question of the bo dy 's su blim ation into soul w ith the extent of th e divinization of
C h rist's hum anity.
Such issues have p ro fo u n d im plications on the field of ecum enical
theology. W hile both E ast a n d W est h ad both O rigenist and C hristological
controversies, and even sh ared the p ertin en t dogm atic definitions, in fact the
m anner o f living w ith and rem em bering these controversies, th e clim ate of
opinions and attitudes d efin in g the issues as they continued to ferm ent w ithin
the tw o sp iritual and theological traditions, m ay have been q u ite different. In the
W est, on m atters of protology and eschatology, one m ight say th a t A ugustine
constituted in him self the o rthodox consensus, at least by the tim e E riugena
w rites. A ugustine's De dvitate Dei and De Genesi ad litteram effectively
represented the response of W estern orthodoxy to the threats p o sed by O rigen
and O rigenists. Significantly, except for G regory of N yssa's deficiency on the
question o f final universal salvation, the G reek Fathers to w hom E riugena
appeals as he departs from A u g u stin e's line are all orthodox F athers, them selves
p rov id ing Eastern answ ers to the challenge o f O rigenism . The fact th a t Eriugena
can so often "prefer to follow " the G reeks points to the differences already
existing betw een Eastern an d W estern orthodoxies. H ence the significance of
E riugena for ecum enical stu d y .
344
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbreviations
Am b.
E riugena's translation o f M aximus C onfessor's Am bigm . See

M axim us C onfessor below .
Am b. (Grk) M axim us C onfessor's Ambigua. PG 91.

AR
G regory of N yssa's De anima et resurrectione. PG 46.
CD
A ugustine's De civitate dei.
CH
[Pseudo-JD ionysius' De caelesti hierchia.
DN
[Pseudo-]D ionysius' De divinis nominibus.
GL
A ugustine's De Genesi ad litteram.
Im ag.
De imagine. E riugena's translation of G regory o f N yssa's Ilepi

KaTacnceuTfe dv0porn-ou. See C appuyns, Dom M aieul below .
LNPF2
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OH
Deopificiohominis. G reek text of G regory of N yssa's Ilepi

KaTacnceuTfc aiÔpaiTrou. PG 44.
OCM
G regory of N y ssa's Oratio catechetica magna. PG 45.
PG
Patrologia Graeca.
PL
Patrologia Latina.
PP 1 ,2 ,3
lohannis Scotti Eriugenae Periphyseon (De Diuisione Naturae). Books Im . E dited and translated by I. P. Sheldon-W illiam s (w ith L. Bieler).
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P P 4 ,5
De divisione naturae. E dited by H. J. Floss. PL 122.

345
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356

Influence of Nyssa On Eriugena

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INFORMATION TO USERS

BODY, SOUL, AND IMAGE:

Subm itted to th e G raduate School

Joel Irving B arstad, B.A., M.A., M.M.S.

Stephen G ersh, D irector

UMI Number: 9806436

UMI Microform 9806436

300 North Zeeb Road

BODY, SOUL, A N D IMAGE:

Joel Irving B arstad

To m y d ear w ife, Leslie,

1 Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae Periphyseon (De Diuisione Naturae), Books I-IH,

KaTaotcevfis avQpumou (De opificio hominis) w hich he cites, in h is ow n translation,

focused o n w h at Eriugena ow es to the tex t of De imagine rath er th an on w h at he

G en era l a p p roach es to E riu g en a 's u se o f p a tr istic

on E riugena's place w ithin th e history o f Latin-B yzantine relations,10 th at

10 Introduction to Eriugena: East and W est Papers o f the Eighth International

spokesm an for "th e G reeks" and, m ore particularly, as a counterpoise to the

11John M eyendorff, "Rem arks on Eastern P atristic T hought in John

12 M eyendorff, "R em arks," 66.

22 C appuyns, Jean Scot.

to determ ine the relative v alu e o f th eir interpretations o f Scripture;25 bu t even in

E riu g en a's choices fall to w ard the G reeks, especially, D ionysius,

W hen M oran turns to the influence o f G reek C hristian w riters, he

36 Ibid., 116-117: "It w ould be an im possible task to sift through

38 This is th e direction taken by O tten, Anthropology: "Thus E riugena's

interpretation offered by C appuyns, an d refined in a recent article by G iulio

Eriugena's G reek patristic sources

43 Jeauneau, "Pseudo-D ionysius," 139; Sheldon-W illiam s, "G reek

by H ilduin, A bbot o f Saint-Denys, w hen Louis the Pious received a codex of

46 G reek te x t PG 91; E riugena's translation: M aximi Confessoris Ambigua

th at E riugena's confusion arose from the m isleading prosopographical d ata a t his

52 See T able 1 below .

counterbalance th e gzeat w eight of A ugustine. This a t least is the im pression one

56 Sheldon-W illiam s, "G reek Sources," 6.

M ethod and o u tlin e o f this study

Gregory o f N yssa in De opificio hominis /De imagine w ith those found in

58 Sheldon-W illiam s, "G reek Sources," 10.

G regory's text w hich p la y th e m ost direct role in th e Periphyseon; the latter, to

59 O 'M eara, Eriugena, C hapters 5-8.

2cf. Im ag. 10-11

T heo/[N ys] +Max

The types of citations are as follows:

Jeau neau's introduction to A m b., pp. bood-lxxxiii.

M an's original an d final eq u ality w ith the angels

Chapter 1: M atter and Body. The doctrine th a t bodies are produced by a

of the body-soul relation in De opificio hominis w ith E riugena's, concentrating on

exposition o f the Sixth D ay an d seem to underlie E riugena's ow n thought on

60 PP 4 :804C-D: post sanctos Apostolos nullum apud Graecos fuisse in

This ch ap ter identifies the points in E riugena's theory o f bodily nature

m eans th e absence o f th e w hole o f essence, an d th at w h en one says th at God

4 PP 3 :636C-D: De infbrmi materia quam Graeci HLHN uocant nullus in

7 PP 3 :637B: Nos autem sanctae scripturae ueritatem inspicientes diuinorumque

G regory's defense o f creation ex n ih ilo

11 O H 2 3 :209C: Kcutoi irepi rroXXwy f||uv o \6yog diropeti' wreTiOeTO, oi>

none o f w hich can be observed in the divine n a tu re w h at device extracts

13 O H 2 3 :209D211A: Ei airXoOs o 0eo<r rfj <J>ucTi, Kal aiiXos, airoios re xal

w hich is itself incorporeal. If one begins stripping aw ay these intelligible

151 suppose G regory has in m ind som e kind of pantheistic im m anence or

itself is unable to achieve certainty on this point. C onsequently, it is best n o t to

Behind th e problem atic w hich G regory addressesindeed, fundam ental

18 D anielou, L'Etre et le temps, 75-94, describes G regory's problem atic,

OCM 6: Sraw ley 29:2-12: