We have repeatedly stressed that social justice or any justice for that

matter is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a

pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the
balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor
simply because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are rich, for
justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the
mandate of the law. (Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608, 616) (cited in Victor G.
Valencia vs. CA, G.R. No. 122363; April 29, 2003)
In Ceneze vs Ramos G.R. No. 172287: January 15, 2010, the Court is
guided by the principle that tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent
on what the alleged tenant does upon the land; it is also a legal relationship. 1 A
tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove the
presence of all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent
by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvest. 2 The absence of one element
does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, its cultivator or planter, a de
jure tenant.3
While it may be true that officers of DAR attested that an agrarian dispute
exists, it is noteworthy to consider the pronouncement of the Court that, the
certification or findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (or of an authorized
representative) concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship
between the contending parties are merely preliminary or provisional in
character; hence, such certification does not bind the judiciary.4
In any case, the fact alone of working on a landholding does not give rise
to a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence
requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing
can be established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough
to
prove
the
element
of
sharing. 5
The Court in Mateo vs Court of Appeals G.R. NO. 128392, April 29,
2005, reiterated its ruling in in Duremdes v. Duremdes6 that:
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a
tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to
take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable
elements, to wit:
1 Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007, 518 SCRA 202,
210.

2 Heirs of Rafael Magpily v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 167748, November 8, 2005, 474 SCRA 366, 373374.

3 Reyes v. Joson, G.R. No. 143111, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 365, 373.
4 De Jesus v. Moldex Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 153595, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 316, 322.
5 Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals, supra note 11, at 214.
6 G.R. No. 138256, November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 684, 697 citing Morta v. Occidental, G.R. No.
123417, June 10, 1999, 308 SCRA 167, and Laguna Estates Development Corporation v. CA, G.R.
No. 119357, July 5, 2000, 335 SCRA 29.

That the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that
the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.
These requisites for the jurisdiction of DARAB have been reiterated by the
Court in a number of cases.
Since there is no proof of tenancy relationship, and in view of absence of
the necessary elements enumerated in Duremdes v. Duremdes, the DARAB
does not have jurisdiction over the present case. The MTC, therefore, had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and hence properly exercised jurisdiction over
the case.

Meanwhile, in the similar case of Heirs of Rafael Magpily vs

Herminigildo De Jesus G.R. No. 167748 November 8, 2005 which likewise
involves a complaint of ejectment reveals that he was the owner of a 10,000
square meter land planted with fruit bearing trees and tenanted by Nazaria Tope.
Sometime in July 1978, upon the request of the latter, Magpily allowed Nazarias
nephew, herein private respondent to construct a house of light materials on a
portion of the land and to gratuitously occupy the same. Their relationship,
however, turned sour when private respondent interfered with the gathering of
coconuts and other fruits in the lot. Magpily requested private respondent to
vacate the premises but the latter refused, prompting him to file the instant
ejectment suit.
In
his
answer, private
respondent
contended
that
he
is
a bonafide agricultural tenant of Magpily for 15 years. He alleged that his
grandparents, succeeded by his aunt, Nazaria, were the former tenants of
Magpily. When Nazaria died in 1979, he performed all the duties of a tenant by
cultivating the land and sharing in its produce. Private respondent claimed that
the instant case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter because it involves a tenancy dispute under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
The Court rules in the negative, and held that in Sumawang v. De
Guzman, it was ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or
reliefs sought therein. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action cannot be made
to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for,
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the
defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the
litigation. The MTC does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the
simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of
a tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is the duty of the court to
receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. If after hearing, tenancy
had, in fact been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction.

Tenants are defined as persons who in themselves and with the aid
available from within their immediate farm households cultivate the land
belonging to or possessed by another, with the latters consent; for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or
money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it
was held that the fact alone of working on anothers landholding does not raise a
presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. There must be substantial
evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing.
In sum, private respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that
he was an agricultural tenant of Magpily and that the instant case involves an
agrarian dispute cognizable by the DARAB. The MTC thus lawfully took
cognizance of the present controversy which involves the gratuitous occupation
of anothers property which became unlawful by virtue of the owners withdrawal
of consent or tolerance to such occupation.
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such
possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to
vacate upon demand made by the owner. A person who occupies the land
of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon
demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, in the case of Department of Agrarian Reform vs Paramount
Holding Equities Inc. G.R. No. 176838 June 13, 2013, the Supreme Court
cited, consistent with the aforequoted legal provisions, and as emphasized in
Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario that the jurisdiction of the PARAD
and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes, including
incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. Section 3(d) of R.A.
No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this manner:
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under R.A. 6657 and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner
and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
Basic is the rule that the "jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial
office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or
complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of
the relief prayed for irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is
entitled to any or all such reliefs."
In in this case, it is easily discernable that the cause of action of the DAR
sufficiently established a suit for the declaration of the sale of the subject
landholdings null and void (in violation of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1989). Obviously, it does not involve an agrarian suit, hence, does not fall under
the jurisdiction of the DARAB. It must be emphasized that, "(t)here must be a

tenancy relationship between the party litigants for the DARAB to validly
take cognizance of a controversy." (Suarez vs. Saul, 473 SCRA 628). Also, it
is necessary that the controversy must relate to "tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements," (Section 3 (d), Chapter I in relation
to Section 50, Chapter XII, R.A. 6657 and Section 1, Rule II, DARAB Rules of
[Procedure]). Here, an allegation to declare null and void a certain sale of a
landholding does not ipso facto make the case an agrarian dispute.
In Arcadio Dandoy et al vs Zacarias Tongson et al December 16, 2005
G.R. No. 144652 the Court ruled that, the fact that Lot No. 294 is an agricultural
land does not ipso facto make it an agrarian dispute within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB. For the present case to fall within DARAB jurisdiction there must exist a
tenancy relationship between the parties. An allegation that an agricultural
tenant tilled the land in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute.
Again, in order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is
necessary that the following indispensable elements are established: 1) that the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is
to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. It is not enough that
these requisites are alleged; these requisites must be shown in order to divest
the regular court of its jurisdiction in proceedings lawfully began before it.
It must be emphasized that the complaint filed by petitioners is one for the
declaration of nullity of the agricultural leasehold contracts. Petitioners stance is
that the contracts are not valid based primarily on the ground that respondents
are not the lawful owners of the property subject of the contract. On the other
hand, respondents contend that there exists a tenancy relationship between
them and petitioners. Thus, the question whether or not there exists an
agricultural tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondents arises. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to first hear and receive evidence for the purpose
of determining whether or not there was indeed a tenancy relationship. Thus,
in David vs. Rivera, the Court held that where the very issue determinative of the
question of jurisdiction is the real relationship existing between the parties, it is
necessary that evidence be first presented by the parties before the question of
jurisdiction may be passed upon by the court. Once its existence is established,
the trial court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. But if it is shown
that there was no tenancy relationship, then the trial court properly has
jurisdiction over the case, and the next logical step is to determine whether the
agricultural leasehold contracts are invalid.
The element that the parties must be the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee, on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement
depends, is absent in this case. Tenancy relationship can only be created
with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the owner,
lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land, and not thru the acts of
the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the
tenancy.

Verily, in its Decision this appellate court cited the case of DAR v.
Cuenca that "[a]ll controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or
constitutional in nature."
However, in said case, it was noted that the main thrust of the allegations
in the Complaint was the propriety of the Notice of Coverage - the annulment of
the DAR' s Notice of Coverage." The Supreme Court thus held that:
To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the
first necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under the
CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the
implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction
of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the
simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal
dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.
Hence, DAR vs Cuenca is not squarely applicable in this case, for it
involves different set of facts. The latter is a case mainly for ejectment of unlawful
occupants of a private property which is now subject of Notice of Coverage under
CARP, while former case questions propriety of DARs Notice of Coverage. In
fact, a separate case is now pending with the Office of the Sectary of DAR
challenging the Notice of Coverage, to which plaintiff-appellant was already
directed to submit a draft decision.
The appellate court failed to consider the case of of Sps. Jesus and
Evangeline Pasco vs. Pison-Arceo Agricultural and
Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 165501 (March 28, 2006), which is the one applicable in
the instant case, to wit:
A Notice of Coverage (NOC) does not automatically make an ejectment
case an agrarian dispute over which the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 1 of 2009
DARAB Rules of Procedure. The issuance of a Notice of Coverage is merely a
preliminary step for the States acquisition of the land for agrarian reform
purposes and does not automatically vest title or transfer the ownership of the
land to the government.
On one final note, it may not be amiss to stress that laws which have for
their object the preservation and maintenance of social justice are not only meant
to favor the poor and underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those who,
notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of
protection from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights
of the rich in the guise of defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is
being committed against them.
As the court of last resort, our bounden duty to protect the less privileged
should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to landowners
whenever truth and justice happen to be on their side. For in the eyes of the
Constitution and the statutes, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW remains the
bedrock principle by which our Republic abides.7
7 HEIRS OF NICOLAS JUGALBOT vs COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OFVIRGINIA A. ROA,
G.R. No. 170346 March 12, 2007