G.R. No.

L-37051

August 31, 1977

ANITA U. LORENZANA, petitioner,

vs.
POLLY CAYETANO and COURT OF APPEALS respondents.
FACTS: Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad Company (later from
the Bureau of Lands). She later purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had the property be
rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases
against her tenant. On the other hand, Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to
that of Lorenzanas land. Cayetano was renting the same from the Bureau of Lands. The lower
court granted Lorenzanas ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a writ of execution to
forcibly eject her tenants but she included to eject Cayetanos property. Cayetano was not a party
to the ejectment cases so she prayed for the lower court that her property be not touched. The
lower court denied Cayetanos petition. The CA, upon appeal, favored Cayetano. Lorenzana
averred that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment cases as she already brought herself to the
Courts jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetanos right to due process has been violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. It must be noted that
respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had
been issued; she did not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment
cases. Cayetano only went to court to protect her property from demolition after the judgment in
the ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said
ejectment cases, Cayetano remains a third person to such judgment, which does not bind her;
nor can its writ of execution be informed against her since she was not afforded her day in court
in said ejectment cases.

G.R. No. 171182 : August 23, 2012

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN,
RUBEN P. ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S.
ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R. LICUANAN, Petitioners, v. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80,
STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction of its buildings in its
Los Baos campus. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third billing
worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA).
Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then
on January 16, 2002, the RTC filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion.
The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco) of the
UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of
the UP but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course
to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of
Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and
executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC their motions for execution despite their
previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already
issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003
(although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently,
the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the
release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA but the CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the UPs funds can be validly garnished?
Whether or not the UPs appeal dated June 3, 2002 has been filed out of time?

HELD: The petition for review is meritorious.

FIRST ISSUE: UPs funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.
POLITICAL LAW: garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a chartered institution
performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government
instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and
accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced
from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No.
714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act
1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP,
including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution,
constitute a special trust fund, the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the
UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of
the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from
the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its
institutional
objectives.
The Constitution strictly mandated that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. The execution of the monetary judgment against
the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and
executory decision already validated the claim against the UP. The settlement of the monetary
claim was still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final decision of the
RTC
having
already
SECOND ISSUE: Period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon
counsel of record.
REMEDIAL LAW: doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; fresh-period rule; service
of judgments; computation of time
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally
garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based on the
supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002.
It is true that a decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court
as the highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been
absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors;
(b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments;

and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its
execution unjust and inequitable.
We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional power to
disregard the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the
UPs right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the
UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of
record of the UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client that the service should be
made. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly
made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that where a party has appeared by
counsel, service must be made upon such counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second
paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: If any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon
the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall
only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that
the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would
still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter
due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of
the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period
resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and
the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule
that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, viz: to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution, is
impervious to any serious challenge. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the
denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of
the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the

UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal,
conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
GRANTED.

Marcos v. Garchitorena
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's First Divisiondenying petitioner's motion for leave to travel
abroad for medicaltreatment.
The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she
filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seekdiagnostic tests and treatment by
practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening
medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied. Then she
again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis
and treatment in China. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her
doctor Roberto Anastacio.
Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of
several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here.
The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the
Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary
medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all
of the motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice
President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of
twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to
travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the
involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or
orders or any judicial action of respondent court.
Issue: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel
Abroad because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party
asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings (3) said that there
was no necessity to get medical treatment abroad.
Held: No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the
latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent
court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her
physician. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in
resolving her request for permission to travel. What would be objectionable would be if
respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in
deciding a case against them.

In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad.
It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in
several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending
reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was
on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek
medical treatment in foreign countries.
On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states
that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the expertise
and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The heart ailments
of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio.
Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for
leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an
event the determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical
specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.

G.R. No. 177807 & G.R. No. 177933 October 11, 2011
Subject Matter:
Constitutional Law
Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City
G.R. No. 177807Petitioners: Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired) Respondents: City
Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development AuthorityG.R. No.
177933Petitioners: Metro Manila Development Authority Respondents: Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco (Retired)
Facts:
Retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcelof land located EDSA,
Quezon City. A few years later, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled
"An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be
Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and
Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof. It required the relevant property owner to construct an
arcade along EDSA. An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor
projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians
against rain or sun. It bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city
council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of
the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this
particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the
wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the
building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby
creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of
the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes. The
ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, Justice Gancayco sought the
exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of
Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property. The City
Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request subject to the condition that upon notice
by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said
arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands. "The MMDA then sent a notice of
demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National
Building Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not comply with the
notice. The MMDA then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground floor structure. The
City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police
power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled
that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs decision and
ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote
the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers.

Issue
: Whether Ordinance No. 2094 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held
: Yes, it is a valid delegation of Police Power
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by
the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. In the
exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government. For this reason, when the conditions
so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police
power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on
the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of
the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. It is clear that the primary objectives
of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the
construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion
of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the
convenience. At the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code
enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited
the city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their
jurisdiction.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR

OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN
DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of the RTC of Valenzuela
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Facts: Private respondent San Diego thrice flunked the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT). Upon application again, herein petitioner rejected the application due to MECS Order
No. 12, Series of 1972 which contains the rule: A student shall be allowed only three (3)
chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to
take the NMAT for the fourth time. Private respondent went to the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, to compel his admission to the test. Respondent Judge granted the petition, and held that
the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.
Issue: Whether there was improper exercise of police power
Held: No.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education.
The court found no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar.
The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged
at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule.
The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power
is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor
is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
The petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is reversed.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R. No. 23794 February 17,
1968]
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign
countries. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against
the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of
uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal
protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?

Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
3) the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions
substantially identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong
to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet
them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company,

Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.

JESUS C. GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for
herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
CONCURRING OPINIONS
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
ISSUE: Constitutionality of RA 9262
WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private respondents.
Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual
relations to the household help. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their
quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their
daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt suicide on
December 17, 2005 b y slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner left the
house. He never visited her when she was confined for seven (7) days. He even told his motherin-law that respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with
his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would
take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued
legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair,
he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their
businesses.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence
against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO)
ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber
firearm and a Walther PPK.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for

making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to wives/women and not
to husbands/men.
He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it means violence by men against women.
The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and other
women.
He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies
under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal violence. The said remedies
are discriminatory against the husband/male gender.
There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, the
equal protection guarantee is violated.

Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:

1. Safeguard Human Rights,
2. Ensure Gender Equality and
3. Empower Women

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and
fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.
It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United Nations human rights treaties
such as the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention Against Torture, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
UDHR
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion of universal
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, keeping in mind the
standards under the Declaration. Among the standards under the UDHR are the following:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
xxxx
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation
of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Declaration of Policy in RA 9262

enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the governments obligation to
safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by providing effective remedies
against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by
the husband, partner, or father of the victim.
The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure gender
equality, which is quoted as follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
HELD:
RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.

1.

RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW

It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously
inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men." RA 9262
can be viewed therefore as the Philippines compliance with the CEDAW, which is committed to
condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay, all
appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in
practice.
CEDAW
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most
comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW, in its
preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination against women, and
emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect for human
dignity.

2.

Philippines obligation as state-party to CEDAW

The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and advancement for the
improvement of their position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality with men. The
CEDAW, going beyond the concept of discrimination used in many legal standards and norms,
focuses on discrimination against women, with the emphasis that women have suffered and are
continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of their biological sex.
The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, which
includes promoting gender equality and empowering women, as mandated not only by our
Constitution, but also by commitments we have made in the international sphere, are
undeniably important and essential.

RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of
violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a
husband or a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
3.

The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is Substantially Related to the Achievement

of Governmental Objectives
Historical Perspective:
A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of
women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,
Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal Code: all
"assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of male
superiority."
18th century legal expert William Blackstone, reflected the theological assumption that:
husband and wife were one body before God; thus "they were one person under the law, and
that one person was the husband," a concept that evidently found its way in some of our Civil
Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continues. Men are expected to take
on the dominant roles both in the community and in the family. This perception naturally leads to
men gaining more power over women power, which must necessarily be controlled and
maintained. Violence against women is one of the ways men control women to retain such
power.
In ancient western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if
she endangered his property right over her.
Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit
the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb,
which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
Statistics:
The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases involving violence
committed against women in the Philippines.
In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969 cases
involving violence against women were filed under RA 9262.
From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked first among the different categories of
violence committed against women. The number of reported cases showed an increasing trend
from 2004 to 2012,
The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and children
are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal intervention. On the

other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a conclusion that men need legal
protection from violence perpetuated by women.
4.

Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and cultural
differences
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women and men
prescribe that they be treated differently under particular conditions in order to achieve
substantive equality for women. Thus, the disadvantaged position of a woman as compared to a
man requires the special protection of the law, as gleaned from the following recommendations
of the CEDAW Committee:
The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by
an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women
treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address
such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy
aimed at overcoming under representation of women and a redistribution of resources and power
between men and women.
Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality. These results
may be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying their rights in various
fields in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying the same income levels, equality in decisionmaking and political influence, and women enjoying freedom from violence.
The governments commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres of her life are
parallel to that of a man, requires the adoption and implementation of ameliorative measures,
such as RA 9262. Unless the woman is guaranteed that the violence that she endures in her
private affairs will not be ignored by the government, which is committed to uplift her to her
rightful place as a human being, then she can neither achieve substantive equality nor be
empowered.

5.

RA 9262 justified under the Constitution

The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively undertake
ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities experienced by
women and children brought about by years of discrimination. The equal protection clause when
juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate for the government to combat such
discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."
RA 9262 is THE ameliorative action
In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action that would address the evil
effects of the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply embedded in the societys
subconscious, on Filipino women and children and elevate their status as human beings on the
same level as the father or the husband.

R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of discrimination against
women. It is an ameliorative measure, not a form of "reverse discrimination" against.
Ameliorative action "is not an exception to equality, but an expression and attainment of de facto
equality, the genuine and substantive equality which the Filipino people themselves enshrined as
a goal of the 1987 Constitution." Ameliorative measures are necessary as a redistributive
mechanism in an unequal society to achieve substantive equality.
Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive equality
In the context of womens rights, substantive equality has been defined by the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which requires
that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to
achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that
of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between
women and men must be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical
treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such differences.
Womens struggle for equality with men has evolved under three models:
1. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded and treated as the same. But this model
does not take into account biological and socially constructed differences between women and
men. By failing to take into account these differences, a formal equality approach may in fact
perpetuate discrimination and disadvantage.
2. Protectionist model this recognizes differences between women and men but considers
womens weakness as the rationale for different treatment. This approach reinforces the inferior
status of women and does not address the issue of discrimination of women on account of their
gender.
3. Substantive equality model this assumes that women are "not vulnerable by nature, but
suffer from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these imposed disadvantages were eliminated,
there was no further need for protection." Thus, the substantive equality model gives prime
importance to womens contexts, realities, and experiences, and the outcomes or results of acts
and measures directed, at or affecting them, with a view to eliminating the disadvantages they
experience as women.

6.

The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
(application of the substantive equality model)
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified
to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the
equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally
endowed differences between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women

and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives.
Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The genderbased classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in
the 1987 Constitution.

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its

National President (BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A.
Pagulayan,Petitioner, v. HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335. RA [No.] 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with
constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioners
directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents.
BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their
adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort to this
Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC employees are
in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the
law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their
respective families prejudice.
Respondents countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due process and
right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the guarantee of
security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A.
No. 9335 and its IRR provided a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee
which is germane to the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that
an employee may only be separated from the service upon compliance with substantive and
procedural due process. The OSG added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality.
In Abakada, the Court declared Section 12of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the principle of
separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A. No.
9335 was upheld pursuant to Section 13of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the
contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and effective even without the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEAs members to: (a)
equal protection of laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process?
HELD: Ruling in Abakada is adopted.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative agencies
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of nondelegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest,
which means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based on the
ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another. However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous
exceptions, one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Board in this case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection clause
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in
a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental
objective.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW:

due

process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative

proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side. BOCEAs apprehension of
deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The
concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue collection and
capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to
all
relevant
factors
that
may
affect
the
level
of
collection.
As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper action on
these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the
enactment of this law remains within the domain of the Legislative branch. We merely interpret
the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the
manifest intendment and language thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor

the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative. We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR
are
constitutional.
DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 189028 : July 16, 2013

NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR
LITERATURE BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS
(PAINTING) BENEDICTO CABRERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS
(SCULPTURE) NAPOLEON ABUEVA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS
(PAINTING AND SCULPTURE) ARTURO LUZ, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR PRODUCTION
DESIGN SALVADOR BERNAL, UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR EMERITUS GEMINO ABAD,
DEAN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN (UP COLLEGE OF LAW), DEAN DANILO SILVESTRE
(UP COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE), DEAN ROLAND TOLENTINO (UP COLLEGE OF
MASS COMMUNICATION), PROF. JOSE DALISAY, DR. ANTON JUAN, DR.
ALEXANDER CORTEZ, DR. JOSE NEIL GARCIA, DR. PEDRO JUN CRUZ REYES,
PROF. JOSE CLAUDIO GUERRERO, PROF. MICHAEL M. COROZA, PROF. GERARD
LICO, PROF. VERNE DE LA PENA, PROF. MARIAN ABUAN, PROF. THEODORE O. TE,
DR. CRISTINA PANTOJA-HIDALGO, PROF. JOSE WENDELL CAPILI, PROF. SIR
ANRIAL TIATCO, PROF. NICOLO DEL CASTILLO, PROF. HORACIO DUMANLIG, PROF.
DANTON REMOTO, PROF. PRISCELINA PATAJOLEGASTO, PROF. BELEN
CALINGACION, PROF. AMIEL Y. LEONARDIA, PROF. VIM NADERA, PROF. MARILYN
CANTA, PROF. CECILIA DELA PAZ, ROF. CHARLSON ONG, PROF. CLOD MARLON
YAMBAO, PROF. KENNETH JAMANDRE, PROF. JETHRO JOAQUIN, ATTY. F.D.
NICOLAS B. PICHAY, ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX ANGELES, MR. FERNANDO JOSEF, MS.
SUSAN S. LARA, MR. ALFRED YUSON, MS. JING PANGANIBAN MENDOZA, MR.
ROMULO BAQUIRAN, JR., MR. CARLJOE JAVIER, MS. REBECCA T. ANONUEVO, MR.
JP ANTHONY D. CUNADA, MS. LEAH NAVARRO, MR. MARK MEILLY, MR. VERGEL O.
SANTOS, MR. GIL OLEA MENDOZA, MR. EDGAR C. SAMAR, MS. CHRISTINE
BELLEN, MR. ANGELO R. LACUESTA, MS. ANNA MARIA KATIGBAKLA CUESTA, MR.
LEX LEDESMA, MS. KELLY PERIQUET, MS. CARLA PACIS, MR. J. ALBERT GAMBOA,
MR. CESAR EVANGELISTA BUENDIA, MR. PAOLO ALCAZAREN, MR. ALWYN C.
JAVIER, MR. RAYMOND MAGNO GARLITOS, MS. GANG BADOY, MR. LESLIE
BOCOBO, MS. FRANCES BRETANA, MS. JUDITH TORRES, MS. JANNETTE PINZON,
MS. JUNE POTICAR-DALISAY, MS. CAMILLE DE LA ROSA, MR. JAMES LADIORAY,
MR. RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., and CONCERNED ARTISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CAP), Petitioners, v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE CULTURAL CENTER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND THE ARTS, MS.
CECILE GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, MR. CARLO MAGNO JOSE CAPARAS,MR. JOSE
MORENO, MR. FRANCISCO MANOSA, AND ALL PERSONS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE,
ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, DIRECTION, CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL ARTIST
AND THE RELEASE OF FUNDS IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE
HONORS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE ORDER OF NATIONAL ARTISTS ON
RESPONDENTS GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, CAPARAS, MORENO AND MANOSA,
Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1001and, upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines (CCP), created the category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be
awarded to Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters. In the same
issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first National Artist.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It established the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the
development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and the
Filipino cultural heritage.
CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote, develop
and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized to give awards to
deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies decided to team up and jointly administer the
National
Artists
Award.
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87 nominees were considered
during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist of 32 names was compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the
preliminary shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was conducted by the 30member Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA
Board of Commissioners and the living National Artists.From the 13 names in the second
shortlist, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos,
Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents,
the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on
Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various
sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile
Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Masa and Jose Moreno. The
Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited resource
persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.
Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National
Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824
to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and private
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
This was subsequently announced to the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita on July 29, 2009.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners
and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National
Artists and to set the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this
petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying
that the Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the

Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno be

enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the
Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation
Panels. According to petitioners, the Presidents discretion to name National Artists is not
absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the
absence of or against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by former President
Arroyo
HELD: Yes.
Political Law- Legal Standing
The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must have
a direct and personal interest. They must show not only that the law or any governmental
act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some
indefinite
way.
In this case, the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or privilege to which
they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a result of the conferment of
the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno. In particular, they
will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of National Artists.
Political Law- equal protection
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated
for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and
Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not
included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and
considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the
NCCA and
the
CCP
and
conferred
the
Order
of
National
Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny.No real and substantial distinction between
respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws,
guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.
The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted
the law and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into
effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is
entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there
was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial
enough to confer him standing in this case.

Political Law- Limits of the Presidents Discretion

The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made."
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the President may or
may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other
words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the Presidents discretion.
Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of
the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The Presidents power must be exercised in
accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful
execution of the laws by the President
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be
exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful
execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a
separate grant of power.
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection with
the conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive issuances were institutionalized
by two laws, namely, Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No.
7356. In particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board
as the National Artists Awards Committee and tasked it to "administer the conferment of the
category of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the
rules
to
guide
its
deliberations
in
the
choice
of
National
Artists".
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the conferment of the
National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to work together and jointly
administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed the guidelines for the nomination,
selection and administration of the National Artist Award. An administrative regulation
adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. Thus, the rules, guidelines and
policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees
and the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of
law. Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies,including
the President himself/herself as chief executor of laws.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence
of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the
matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have considered
conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not considered and
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper import of the provision
of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the
President on the conferment of the Order of National Artists." Applying this to the instant
case, the former President could not have properly considered respondents GuidoteAlvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA
and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and meticulous

screening process be rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP
Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer the conferment of Order of National
Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and implement
policies and plans, and undertake any and all necessary measures in that regard will also
become
meaningless.
Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming respondents Cecile
Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Masa, and Jose Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists are declared INVALID and SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.