American Philological Association

Aristotle's Conception of Moral Virtue and Its Perceptive Role

Author(s): William W. Fortenbaugh
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 95 (1964),
pp. 77-87
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/283784 .
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Vol. xcv]

Aristotleon Moral Virtue

77

Aristotle's Conception of Moral Virtue

and Its Perceptive Role
WILLIAM

W. FORTENBAUGH

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Among Aristotelianscholarsthereis no disagreementthat good

deliberate choice (proairesis)requires both moral virtue (arete)
and practical reason (phrone'sis).1 But in respectto the roles performedby these two perfectionstherehas been and stillis controversy. At present scholars are tending to minimize the role of
moral virtue in guaranteeing correct deliberate choice. For
example, R. Gauthier and J. Jolifin theirrecentcommentaryon
the NicomacheanEthics have argued that moral virtue's role is
merelyto help keep practicalreasonfocusedon thegoal and to help
realize the goal in action by controllingdesire.2
This tendency3 to minimizethe role of moral virtueis, I think,
unfortunate;and it will be the task of this paper to take a first
step toward the rehabilitationof moral virtue. We shall begin
by focusingour attentionon two Greek verbs,poieinand krinein,
which have not been adequately studied and which are important
for understandingthe fullrole ofvirtuein insuringcorrectchoice.
Three timesin the Nicomachean
EthicsAristotlemakes moral virtue
the subject of the verb poiein: moral virtuemakes the goal correct
(EN 1144A, 8), moral virtue makes the choice correct (EN
1144A, 20), and moral virtue makes (the agent) do the end (EN
Gauthier and Jolif have felt that to say moral
1145A) 5-6).
virtue makesthe end correct is misleading, and looking to the
text for help they found the expanded statement: moral virtue
makes(the agent) do the end. They conclude that moral virtue
is necessary because it controls desire and can thereforemake
effectivethe commands of practical reason.4
1 I must expressmy great debt to ProfessorGlenn R. Morrow who has been a
carefuland helpfulcriticof the argumentspresentedin thispaper.
2 R. A. GauthieretJ. Y. Jolif,L'Ethique
a Nicomaque
(Louvain 1959) 2.557, 577.
3 For anotherexample see D. J. Allan, " Aristotle's
Accountofthe OriginofMoral
Principles,"Proceedings
oftheEleventh
International
Congress
ofPhilosophy
12 (1953) 120-27.
4 Gauthierand jolif (above, note 2) 2.577
95
4+T.P.

78

William W. Fortenbaugh

[1964

The method employed by these scholars is faultless,but their

search forexamples ofpoieinwith moral virtueas subject has been
unfortunatelylimited to the NicomacheanEthics. In order to
extend their search we should look to the EudemianEthics,Book
3.5 Aristotleasserts that courage which is a moral virtue will
make the possessorendure the formidablebecause it is noble to
do so. Thereforehe will not act throughignorance,forcourage
rathermakes (poiei) him judge (krinein)correctly(EE 1230A, 31).
This concise assertionlooks back to an earlierpassage (EE 1229B,
21-26) which will help to make Aristotle'sthought clear. The
earlier passage states that cowards and rash personsare deceived
because of their own characters. To the coward what is not
formidable appears formidable,and what is slightlyformidable
appears exceedinglyformidable. For the rash person appearances are reversed. But to the courageous man things appear
as theyreally are, so that a man is not courageous if he endures
the formidablethroughignorance.
Taking the two passages togetherwe can see that what courage
does is to insure a correct perception of a particular situation.
Courage makes (poiei) the possessorjudge (krinein)a formidable
situation as formidable and prevents him from acting through
ignorance. Courage makes the agent perceptiveor critical.
What Aristotlesays about courage is a particularapplication of
a general truth about moral virtue. It is moral virtue which
makes us discern correctly the particular situation. We may
illustratethe generalityof this truthabout moral virtue by citing
another virtue. Talking about magnanimity,Aristotlesays that
it is laudable to judge (krinai) correctlygreat and small goods
(EE 1232A, 32-33). The virtue concerned with each thing
judges (krinei)correctlythe greater and the smaller (EE 1232A,
35-36).6 We can conclude that virtuenot only makes the possessor act (EN 1 145A, 5-6) but also makes the possessor perceive
correctlya given situation.
Before pursuing furtherthe critical power of moral virtue, it
5 The role of moral virtueas stated in the EudemianEthicswill be foundto agree
Ethics. The previouslyunnoticedevidence
withthe role as statedin the Nicomachean
in doctrinebetweenthetwoEthics,
Ethicsis notevidencefora difference
in theEudemian
but ratherforagreementbetweenthe two Ethics.
6 The subsequenttextis difficult
and perhapscorrupt. But what I have quoted is
clear enough: moral virtue makes a man critical, able to discern the particular
situation.

Vol. xcv]

Aristotleon Moral Virtue

79

would be well to note that the verb krineinis not confinedto a

single usage by Aristotle. There is a different
use which must be
pointed out in order that no confusionmay arise between the
two uses. Because krineinhas the general meaning to make a
judgment 7, it is used sometimesto signifya deliberatejudgment
and not a perceptualjudgment. This is the case at EN 11 13A, 12,
where Aristotleassociated krinein
with the decision appropriateto
deliberate choice.
But sometimeskrinein
signifiesthejudgment of appearances and
does not presuppose deliberation. This use may be seen at EN
1113A, 30. Just as what is truly healthful appears so to the
healthy man, so what is truly good appears so to the morally
good man. For the morallygood man judges (krinei)each thing
correctlyand in each thing the good is apparent to him. It is
in thissense signifying
perceptualjudgment that krinein
is used by
Aristotleto describe moral virtue. A functionof moral virtueis
correct perceptual judgment so that a morally good man can
perceive and discerncorrectlyparticular situations.
Because moral virtue enables one to judge correctlythe particular situation, the morally good man will be the standard for
all such judgments. In his discussion of pleasure, in Book 10
of the Nicomachean
Ethics,Aristotlemakes this very clear. What
appears to the morally good man is really the case. If this is
true, as it seems to be, then in each case the measure is moral
virtue and the morally good man, qua such (EN 1176A, 17-18).
It is not loquacity which stimulatesAristotleto add "qua such."
Rather he wishes to emphasize that it is the perfectman in one
aspect only who is the measure. Every perfectman possesses
both moral virtueand practical reason but it is only as a possessor
of moral virtuethat he is a measure. The same point is made in
the thirdbook of the Nicomachean
Ethics. The morallygood man
is especiallydistinguishedby seeing (horan)the truthin each thing,
just as ifhe were a ruler (kan8n)and measure (metron)
of each thing
(EN 11 13A, 32-33).
That the morallygood man is called the rule and the measure
suggeststhat he possessessome standard with which to judge the
particular object or situation. The suggestionis correct,forit is
the morally good man to whom the true goal or good appears
I

See De an. 432A, 16.

80

William W. Fortenbaugh

[1964

(EN 1113A, 25). Because he has a correct apprehension of the

good he can judge particulars good or bad.8 It is noteworthy
Ethicsbegins by asking
that Chapter 4, Book 3 of the Nicomachean
whetherthe goal which is the object ofwish is the real or apparent
good. But beforethe chapter is concluded Aristotlehas shifted
his attention from the general good to particular goods (EN
1113A, 29-B, 2). The shiftis perfectlynatural. The real good
appears to the morally good man who therebyhas a standard
against which to judge the particular case.
We are now in a positionto analyze more preciselyhow virtue
makes the possessorjudge correctly. First, it makes the good
apparent. If thereare several componentsof the good, it makes
thesegoods apparent,supplyingthe virtuousman witha standard.
Secondly,it controlsthoseemotionswhichupsetcriticalperception
(Somn.460B, 3-1 1; EN 1147B, 9-17). The courageous man does
not act throughignorance (EE 1229B, 25-26) because he knows
what kind of situationcalls forbrave action. He and all morally
good men are like doctors who possess a standard to which they
referwhen judging bodies healthy or sick (EE 1249A, 21-22).
These functionsof moral virtue are incorporatedinto practical
deliberation. Not only does virtue control the emotions but it
governsthemotiveforce,appetite. By makingthe good apparent,
it supplies a goal for deliberation and by making the possessor
judge the particular situationit supplies a particular premise for
the syllogismof deliberate choice. The morallygood man must
possess a goal or standard before he can deliberate correctly
about actionsand acquisitions(EE 1249A,24-B, 1). In thecase
of actions, the goal may be courageous action. It is this very
idea of courageous action which allows him to judge correctlya
particular practical situation. Given the goal and the particular
judgment, his practical reason can complete the syllogism of
deliberate choice. In the case of acquisitions, the goal is the
promotion of contemplation (EE 1249B, 16-19), and this is also
the standard by which he judges and obtains a particularpremise.
Supplied with goal and particular premise, practical reason
issues a command (EE 1249B, 14-15) which is the conclusion of
deliberate choice. Because moral virtue is already involved in
8 Of coursehe may also have a correctknowledgeof the bad to aid in judging a
particularbad thing. But it is not necessary. For the bad can be recognizedby
knowingits opposite,the good, De an. 430B, 22-23.

Aristotleon Moral Virtue

Vol. xcv]

81

deliberate choice by supplying the goal and the particular

in seeing why action followschoice.
premise,thereis no difficulty
The motiveforce,appetite,is controlledby virtuewhich is already
functioningin deliberatechoice. It just keeps on functioning,and
appetite moves the agent to action. There is no gap between
decision and action because moral virtuebridgesdeliberatechoice
and action.
Deliberate choice involves several functionsof moral virtue.
Indeed as a perfectedstate of character,moral virtueis inclusive.
Aristotlehas not assigned a differentstate of character for every
function. Moral virtue unites functions,therebycontributingto
the unityofcharacter. It is because moral virtueunitestheseseveral functionsthat it is so importanta perfectedstate of character.
The identityof the apparent good and the goal of deliberate
choice and their mutual dependence upon moral virtue is reflected in a mixing of vocabularies. In Book 3 of the NicomacheanEthics,Chapter 5, Aristotleaskswhethereach man's apparent
good is not determinedby nature over which he has no control.
What sort of character a man has determineswhat appears good
to him. If he is personallyresponsibleforhaving this character,
then he is responsiblefor his idea of the good. But if he is not
responsiblefor his character, then he cannot be held responsible
for actions based on a wrong idea of the good. If character is
determinedby nature, then those fixedstatesof character,virtue
and vice, are equally involuntary. For the good and forthe bad
man the goal is apparent and is laid down by nature or in some
other way. To this goal men relate whatever else they do (EN
1114B,

13-16):

IOTE
vOraii oITa
OPOCCOS, TZ ayaG Kat Tq) KaKLp, T0 TEOS
cpaLVETatKat KELTcL, Ta 83E AOt& ITP0S TOVTO7aVa9'EpOVTES
7TpaTTOVft&V

C4L9o Vyap

07TWUTOOr8TOTE.

There is a real mixing of vocabularies in this passage. The

morally good man knows the apparent good which appears
(pacVETat)

to himwhenhe wishesto makea perceptual

judgment.

To this standard, the apparent good, he relates (7Ip6gTOUTO

avaipEpovrEs) the particular situationsand acts accordingly. For
the man making a deliberate choice the descriptionis different.
For him the goal is laid down (KE?Tcu).
When other terms are
related to the goal (rpos TOV-TO), he makes a decision and acts.

William W. Fortenbaugh

82

[1964

In the lines preceding this passage the emphasis had been on

the appearance of the good or bad and on critical judgment:
But at line 1114B, 15 the
KptVEZ (EN 1114B, 7).
EXoVT a
_OwV
word KELTXt turns our thoughts toward deliberation. At the
chapter's close Aristotleseems more concerned with deliberation,
forhe says again that according to our characterwe lay down the
goal: TC1J7TOwOt TVES ElvXt To' TrEAog Trotov3E TGEjLtkEG(x (EN 11 14B,
23-24). The shiftis real, but it is only a shiftin point of view.
When Aristotleuses the verbs KpWvEl and gnlVETrat, he is thinking
of moral virtue as a critical perfection. When he uses the verbs
KELTXt

and

TrtGEJLEGXa,he

is thinking of the same perfection, but as a

perfectioninvolved in deliberate choice.9

This differencein point of view is importantbecause it helps
explain why Aristotlegives two differentdescriptionsof moral
(EN 1106B,
virtue. It is a hexisdescribed sometimesas proairetike'
1
22, 30).
109A,
15-16,
1106B,
(EN
36) and sometimesas stochastikU
of
state
a
as
perfected
virtue
When Aristotle thinks of moral
it
he
calls
proairetike'.
then
in
characterinvolved deliberate choice,
When he thinksof its critical performance,he calls it stochastike'.
can judge the given
The man who possesses a hexisstochastike4
I
have
as
above, requires a
argued
His
judgment,
situation.
He possesses
the
to
particular.
which
judge
standard against
to express
used
is
often
and
the
stochazesthai
verb
this standard,
"aiming at" the good. For example, Aristotleopens his Politics
some
with the statementthat all associations aim at (stochazontai)
is
If
1
approEN
stochazesthai
cf.
13).
4;
1252A,
(Pol.
160A,
good
priate to express "keeping an eye on" the universal good, it is
also appropriate to express a critical perception of the particular
Aristotlediscusses the effecta gnomic
situation. In the Rhetoric
statementcan have if it catches the particular prejudice of the
hearer. It is necessary,says Aristotle (Rh. 1395B, 10-11) that
the orator hit upon (stochazesthai)what sorts of prejudices the
audience holds. It appears that the descriptionof moral virtue
is appropriate to its critical function. The
as a hexisstochastike'
virtuousman has his eye on the good or on some standard against
which he can judge the particular situation.
This interpretationis substantiatedby the second book of the
9 For additional examples of KEcTa&,see EE 1226B, 10, 29. For 01a0atsee EN
1112B, 15, EE 1214B,7. In syllogisticlanguage, one lays down or positsthe middle
term: APr. 49A, 30, 37.

Vol. xcv]

Aristotleon Moral Virtue

83

Ethics. In Chapter 4, Aristotledistinguishesbetween

Nicomachean
doing a just act and doing an act justly. The lattercase involves
threethings:knowingthe particularsituation,10choosing,having
an established disposition (EN 1105A, 31-33). Among these
three, knowledge of the particular is least important. Firmness
of disposition and deliberate choice are the important factors.
In the following Chapter 5, Aristotle continues this emphasis.
Moral virtue cannot be an emotion because we rage and fear
without deliberately choosing to do so. Moral virtue on the
otherhand is some choice or not withoutchoice (EN 1106A,2-4).
Chapter 6, however,contains a change of emphasisfromchoice
to the particular judgment. After discussing the trainer's
knowledge concerning the diets of Milo and a novice, Aristotle
draws the parallel with moral virtue. Every science performsits
task well by looking toward the mean and referringits work to
it (EN 1106B,8-9). Since moral virtueis more accurate than any
technical skill,it too, would be able to hit (stochastike')
the mean
(EN 1106B, 15-16). The analogy is clear. Like the technician,
the morallygood man keeps his eye on a good standard to which
he continually refers the particular situation. Because he
possessesthisgood standard,he can judge the particularsituation
and realize the mean or the good in particular action. In the
performanceof thiscriticaljudgment the morallygood man is not
deliberating but perceiving, so that his virtue is appropriately
described as stochastike.
Afterintroducingthe descriptionofvirtueas stochastike,
Aristotle
repeats it a few lines later (EN 1106B, 28). It is not, however,
disturbing that Aristotle suddenly shiftsdescriptions and calls
virtue proairetike
(EN 1106B, 36). Deliberation is the province
of practical reason perse, and perceptionis the province of moral
virtue per se. But the two provinces are united in deliberate
choice. For practical reason must have a conception of the goal
and a judgment concerningthe circumstancesbeforeit can performthe syllogisticmoves appropriateto it. By its critical ability
and its capacity to control appetite moral virtue helps to make
choice possible. Part of being proairetike'is to be stochastikeF.
10 That the knowledgemeant is that of the particularis shown by the parallel
passage in Book 5, EN 1134A, 20. Tryingto make precisehow a man acts unjustly
but is notyetunjust,Aristotlegivestheexample ofknowingwithwhomone has intercoursebut not actingfromchoice. The knowledgeis of a particularwoman.

[1964

William W. Fortenbaugh

84

Neither the goal nor the particular are objects of deliberation

(EN 1112B, 33-11 13A, 2). It is because of the apprehensionsof
moral virtue that practical reason knows them. Through the
judgments of moral virtue, practical reason possesses both a
universalpremiseand a particularpremise. Given both premises
practical reason can performa syllogismupon them."
Aristotlenowherein the Ethicssays that practical reason makes
the possessorjudge (krinein)correctly,but he does say that moral
virtue makes the possessorjudge correctly. Properlyunderstood
moral virtue is a perfectedstate of character which enables the
possessorto apprehend both the goal of deliberate choice and also
the particular situation. Neverthelessthere are passages which
have been thoughtto contradictthe view that moral virtuemakes
man criticallyperceptive. For in these passages practical reason
seems to be called perception and the eye of the soul. I shall
deny that thereis any contradiction,not always arguingoriginally
but recalling the work of previous scholars. In the light of
abundant evidence suggesting that moral virtue makes one
perceptive, the interpretationsof these scholars should be reconsidered and used to deny that practical reason is perceptive.
In one of these passages (ENJ 1142A, 25-30) Aristotleis comparing and contrastingnouswithphronesis:
OE1V yap
,,

voVS

EUTTtV E71TtaT7-q

OTt TO EV TOtS

Ti-6v

t_'0w

WV OVK

JpV,

aAA

aLXU7tLS,
ATtKOZS

XAA'av'71 juAAov a7tOV7oLS

EC1Tt

OVK

fAXTOV

X7 OpOVITLS',

Ao'yos',

)c'
s, I

TWV

Tpt

,VOV

EKElVI4S

froT
~ TOV

SE

LOl'V,

\ fi

XcTOV,

0 L9
eX'AA'

' cr-g-Ert

OV OVK
/

ctUUavOLEU

yap

K&KEZ.

CAo EtlOSo

In the nineteenthcenturyTeichmuller forcefullyargued that

forwhich neither
Wahrnehmung
Aristotleconceived of a phronetische
educated nor philosophical discourse could supply an adequate
label.12 To make clear his notion of a perceptive practical
reason, Aristotle satisfied himself by stating its genus aistheUsis
(EN 1142A, 27) and then by distinguishingtwo species of perception: particular sensation (EN 1142A, 27) and mathematical
perception (EN 1142A,28-29), neitherof which can be identified
with moral perception. There must remain another species
Wahrnehm(EN 1142A, 30) of perception,namely the phronetische
ung, which supplies the minor premise of deliberate choice.
1
12

For thepossessionofbothpremisessee EN 1141B, 14-22,especially1141B, 2 1-22.

(Halle 1869) 1.253-62,
Forschungen
Teichmiiller,Aristotelische

Vol. xcv]

Aristotleon Moral Virtue

At the turnof thecenturyBurnetarguedthatTpov4

85
JEwgSshould

be supplied with EKElJrV7S' (EN 1142A, 30).13 He described

phron&sisas "practical intuition." If these scholars are correct,
then Aristotle recognizes two kinds of perception, neither of
which is to be identifiedwith the particular senses. One kind
can be illustratedby a mathematician's perception of particular
figures. The other kind is the moral perception of practical
reason. Althoughmathematicalperceptionis in some way more
of a perception than moral perception,neverthelessphrone'sisis a
perceptive or intuitivestate of character. Practical reason, not
moral virtue,is the perfectedstate of characterwhich enables the
possessorto apprehend the particular moral situation.
An alternativeview has been developed by L. H. Greenwood.14
Rather the
ppov7orEWS' is not to be understood with EKElV)S'.
T)V lalv &tOV EaS'.
demonstrative pronoun means Tr
15
Aristotlesays that the type of perceptioninvolved in both mathematical and moral deliberation is differentfromthe perception
of the particular sensibles. It is the perception of the sensus
communis
which perceives both the ethical and the mathematical
minorpremiseand which in ethical deliberationsupplies practical
reason with the minor premise. Because both practical reason
and moral perceptionare correctlysaid to be concerned with the
particular, one might erroneouslyidentifythe two. To avoid
this Aristotlestates that the perception is the operation of the
sensuscommunis
rather than practical reason: 'cAA'av' -q joWAov
a'iu%rts' ') ppovt/ns' (EN 1142A, 29-30). For completeness'
sake he adds that the perceptionof the sensuscommunis
is different
in species fromthat of the particular senses: EKEIV)S' 88'aAAO (>OS9
(EN 1142A) 30). The work of practical reason presupposes
perception,but the percipientis not phrone'sis
itself.'6
Burnet,TheEthicsofAristotle
(London 1900) 274.
L. H. Greenwood, Aristotle,
Ethics,Book Six (Cambridge 1909)
Nicomachean
196-200.
15
Stewart,Noteson theNicomachean
Ethics(Oxford 1892) 2.77, anticipatedGreenwood on thispoint.
16
Greenwood'sbrilliantnote freesus fromidentifying
practicalreason with perceptual excellence. It has not, however,explained the passage by opposingmoral
virtueto practicalreason but ratherby introducingthe sensuscommunis.This introduction is correctfor the perceptionwhich moral virtuemakes correctis the perception of the sensuscommunis.The relationbetweenthe sensuscommunis
and moral
virtueis a lengthysubjectwhich I hope to treatfullyin a subsequentpaper.
4*
13

14

William W. Fortenbaugh

86

[1964

In a discussionconcerningthe relationshipbetween cleverness

and practical reason, Aristotlesays that clevernessis the ability
to achieve any given goal. Practical reason is not this ability
but presupposesit. The differencebetween the two is made by
moral virtue. For without moral virtue the perfectedstate of
practical reason is not acquired by the eye of the soul: 7} S"E'elS
(EN 1 144A,
bVX7,S OVK avev apeT7s
T7)&
TOVTq)
ylVETat
TX O/lkaTt
29-30). The deliberative capacity seems to be called an eye,
which is a description more appropriate to moral virtue in its
critical function(EN 1114B, 7).
The correct interpretationof this passage has been given by
I. During.1?

The

rov15rTcis

a signal for the reader that Aristotle

is referringto that memorable passage from Plato's Republic

(533D)

where the eye of the soul (Tro''-q7

oa)
bvX^!g

is sunk in a

barbarian bog. Aristotlehere is not concerned with an appropriate description of the deliberative capacity. Rather he disregards such considerations and introduces a reminiscence of
Plato's Republic.18
As a final passage alleged to illustrate the perceptive power
of practical reason we may consider EN 1 140B, 7-11:
we thinkthatPericlesand men likehim are phronimoi,
Wherefore
thegood forthemselves
because theyare able to consider(theorein)
and formankind;and such is our conceptionof masterhouseholdersand politicians.
Mr. Ando translates theorein(EN 1 140B, 9-10) by the verb
because
"to see." 19 Men like Pericles are consideredphronimoi
they are able "to see" what is good forthemselvesand formankind. In connectionwith thispassage, Mr. Ando citesEN 111 3A,
29-B, 2, whichwe have discussedabove. The good man correctly
judges, krinei(EN 1113A, 30), and sees, horan(EN 1113A, 33), the
truth in everything. Both passages are meant to concern the
moral estimationofparticularsby practical reason and to illustrate
Wahrnehmung.
the importance of the phronetische
The two passages, however, do not illustrate the perceptive
powers of practical reason. Indeed the two passages are not so
(Louvain 1955) 94.
d'Aristote
"Aristotlein the Protrepticus,"Autour
The likelihoodofa Platonicreminiscenceis increasedby the suspicionthatonly
lines below (EN 1144B, 9) Aristotleintroducesa reminiscenceof Plato's Meno,
fifteen
88B. See Gauthierand Jolif(above, note 2) 2.554.
(Kyoto 1958) 287.
ofPracticalCognition
Theory
19T. Ando, Aristotle's
17

18

Vol. xcv]

Aristotleon Moral Virtue

87

similar in thought that they can be used without caution to

explain one another. At EN 1113A, 29-33, it is the morally
good man and not the man possessing practical reason who is
said tojudge well and to see the truth. Justas moral virtuemakes
the goal and universalgood appear to the virtuousman, so moral
virtue makes the virtuousman judge and see correctly. At EN
1140B, 7-11 Aristotleis not consideringthe good man qua virtuous
but quaphronimos.Nor does he say that men like Periclesare able
"to see." He says that theyare able "to study" or simply"to
consider" what is good formen. This use of the6rein
at EN 1140B,
9-10 is similarto that at EN 1140B) 11-12. To practise a craftis
"to study" or "to consider" how somethingmay be generated.
Similarly the master house-holders and politicians (EN 1 140B,
10-I1) are able "to consider" the good formankind,discovering
what constituteseupraxia(EN 1140B,7) and how it can be realized.
Whole states may benefitfrom this exercise of practical reason.
But in any particular circumstance the individual moral agent
must see and judge the situation. In this particular critical
judgment he must depend upon moral virtue and not upon
practical reason.