1.

Executive Summary
Project myki is a smart-card ticketing system that was designed and implemented for the
public transport system in Victoria. It was one of the most complex smart ticketing
systems in the world. In 2005, a budget of $1 billion was approved to develop myki and
operate it by 2007.

Project myki experienced numerous challenges throughout its life cycle. It was
ambitiously planned to deliver one of the most complex ticketing systems in the world
within an extremely short time frame of two years. This time frame was in fact less than
half the time achieved with similar ticketing projects around the world. This resulted in
the project being delivered 55% over budget ($550 million) while taking seven years
more than planned.

A combination of issues led to the time and cost blowout including: unclear division of
responsibilities, lack of expertise and knowledge in the field of the project, vague system
specification requirements, compromised scope as well as a poor working relationship
between the contractor and the transport authority.

This report analyses the management process throughout the project lifecycle, the issues
that arose, and the underlying reasons. A number of recommendations are suggested
based on project management best practice. These recommendations can be adopted to
avoid similar issues in future projects.

2. Project Background
An effective and well designed ticketing system is the key for the functionality of
Victorias public transport. It allows users to efficiently use and access public transport.
On the other hand, it provides key usage information for the transport department to
assist in managing and improving public transport.

Project myki is a smart-card ticketing system that was designed and implemented
for the public transport system in Victoria. Myki provides a ticketing system that
allows reloadable contactless ticketing. It was one of the most complex smart
ticketing systems in the world. [SAME AS EXEC?]
Myki was planned to replace the ageing Metcard system whos contract was due to expire
in 2007. A budget of $1 billion was approved to develop myki and operate it for 10 years.
This investment decision was based on the expectation that myki would deliver
significant benefits to Victorias population including more efficient, reliable, and
attractive system for commuters. Myki was considered be the best value solution at the
lowest whole-of-life cost.
Project Myki experienced significant schedule delays and cost blowouts that have
compromised it meeting the original business objectives. The time taken to deliver
project myki was four times as long as planned, where it took more than 8 years as
compared to the overly ambitious 2 year target. As a result, the project costed the state an
additional $550 million dollars, which was a cost blowout of 55% to the original budget.
Poor front end planning resulted in the scope and the contract to be vaguely specified
with over ambitious technical expectations. This resulted in crucial delivery risks that
were poorly managed due to lack of experience in the governing agencies.

2.1 Concept stage

The conceptualization stage of the New Ticketing Solution project began prior to the
establishment of the Transport Ticketing Authority (TTA), in November 2002. The
Minister for Transport released a statement, offering commuters to visit the concourse at
Flinders Street Station to offer feedback on a range of ticketing system issues and
equipment from around the world. It was noted by the Bracks Government, that instating
a new ticketing system for such a large city would be complex requiring multiple
stakeholders and research.
The TTA was established in April 2003 specifically for the management of the change in
ticketing system, and had two main roles; to manage the existing MetCard ticketing
system and most importantly, to procure and manage a new ticketing system. It was
evident that the Transport Ticketing Authority required an alternative ticketing solution

to keep up with the growing demand from commuters of public transport within Victoria.
The project was initially conceptualized through the use research to identify the
requirements for the project, this was concluded in early 2004, when a business case of
the findings was released, A New Ticketing Solution (27 April 2004), and was approved
by the minister in May 2004. The business case determined what goods and services need
to be provided, along with the potential risks, costs and benefits.
This business case, detailed that to be in line with global trends, a RFID smartcard would
be most suitable as it offers greater durability and ease of use. The case detailed that it
would increase customer satisfaction with public transport ticketing and this technology
was able to fit into the current fare structures for both metropolitan and regional services
though still allowing for the flexibility to adapt to any changes to government policies
and legislation.
From the case study, forums with potential stakeholders and community the New
Ticketing Solution project were deemed a worthy investment that would revolutionize the
use and experience of public transport users within Victoria.

2.2 Planning stage

A smartcard system was chosen, as internationally, they are the new standard in transport
ticketing with successful examples in London (the Oyster card) and Hong Kong (Octopus
card) among others. Specifically to the type of system employed for the myki project, an
open-architecture approach was undertaken. This is not the usual case for similar
systems internationally, but would allow the system to easily benefit from future
technological advances, as well as reducing the dependence of the system on one vendor,
as different brands can replace any of the components. Benefits of the fully operation
myki system were estimated in terms of economic benefits to the state were originally
estimated to be around $6.3 $10.8 million annually (Victorian Auditor General, June
2015).
The myki system was planned to involve components of myki smartcards, devices and
back office and related systems. The devices to be involved were to include, station gates,
drive consoles, fare payment devices and card vending and top up machines.

A Request for Tender for a new fare collection system utilizing smartcard technology
project was issued in July 2004 by the TTA. This tender incorporated responsibilities of
providing and managing the proposed project system. There were four main stages of the
tender:

Market soundings

Registration of interest along with the provision of initial offers

A revised offer stage

A negotiation stage

Market soundings were undertaken in two stages. Market soundings that occurred in
January 2004 concentrated on procurement strategy options as part of the planning stage
of the pre-procurement process. Market soundings from May of the same year were
undertaken with the aim of gauging potential contractors views on the TTAs proposed
financing and procurement approach to the project. Potential contractors were required to
register their interest and pay a fee in order to receive the Request for Tender document
from the TTA. By the closing date for offers, 10 offers had been submitted from six
contractors. The TTA found none of these offers to be satisfactory, and so a revised offer
phase was entered. The pool of potential contractors was reduced as the TTA provided
feedback on the relevant offers of four of the contractors, and invited them to submit
revised solutions. After this stage, the TTA still found than no one offer met all of the
requirements of the Request for Tender, so a negotiation stage occurred. Feedback
meetings were undertaken with two of the potential contractors who were not eliminated
in the revised offer stage, and through a board of five members established to negotiate
on the TTAs side of the process, a recommendation was made for a final contractor. In
July 2005, a subsidiary of Keane, Kamco (Keane Australia Micropayment Consortium
Pty Ltd),partnered with Ascom, ERG Group and Geisecke and Devrient Australasia and
was appointed as the contractor to be involved (Victorian Auditor General, 2007).

2.3 Execution stage

Throughout the execution stage, there were many changes to the time schedule of the
project. The projects original budget also significantly increased compared to the
original budget over the course of the project. This is due mainly to significant and

unexpected costs arising from the extensive time taken to design and deliver the myki
project. These increases in cost and time frame of the project were factors in the
development of a negative public view towards the project.
During the execution stage of the myki project, there were many changes to the scope,
including extensions to areas such as cash collection, card distribution and system
maintenance. There were also many reductions to the scope. Eliminated from the scope
was the implementation of myki on coach services, the development of vending machines
for myki cards in trams and the implementation of short-term disposable tickets. Also
eliminated from the original scope was implementation of the myki ticketing system on
eight regional rail services and 199 regional town bus routes (Victorian Auditor General,
2007).
One of the risks identified during the execution stage was that of the contractor, Kamco,
potentially minimizing or discontinuing their support of the project as it became less
financially viable. This risk was addressed through amendments to the contractors
contract. The scope of the services required by the contractor was reduced (call centre
operations were no longer the responsibility of the contractor), altering the risk allocation,
shifting some responsibilities to the state. Also, the key performance indicators used were
changed, and the new myki contract included the requirement of a monthly operational
report from the contractor on performance across a revised number of 27 performance
indicators (Victorian Auditor General, 2007). Amendments were also made to include
financial incentives and penalties, with the model of the project being moved from a
fixed price arrangement to a cost plus reimbursement model where the contract no
longer had a cap. This ensured that the project was financially viable for the contractor,
and along with the introduction of the right of the TTA to terminate the contract, acted as
an incentive for high quality contractor performance.

2.4 Finalization stage

In the finalization stage, the scope of the myki ticketing system had been reduced to be
functional in only five out of the 13 rail services and 124 out of the 323 regional bus
routes. The final time frame of the project was 9 years, with the project beginning in
2005, with completion time around 2014, more than four times longer than was

anticipated. The capital and operating budget of myki, revised on the 30th of June 2014
was $1 550.5 million. This was is an increase on the original budget for myki to be
operated through to 2016 of 55 per cent. The myki contract is currently in a situation
where it expires in 2016, and there is a possibility that the contract will be extended
further for six months until December 2016. A retender is also currently being planned
for the myki system, which should be completed by November 2016 by Public Transport
Victoria (PTV) (Victorian Auditor General, June 2015).

3. Project Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Myki was a complex and large-scale project from its conception all through its
development and procurement. It is key for such a project to have sound management and
oversight to achieve the objectives of the project within the approved time and budget.
Effective mechanisms must be in place to support timely decision-making and adapt to
emerging challenges as the project matures throughout its life cycle. This includes:
resource allocation management, schedule and risk revisions, scope change control and
clarity of roles and responsibilities.
This part of the report examines the management competencies in each stage of the
projects life cycle. A list of identified problems is provided in appendix XX.

3.2 Concept Stage

3.2.1 Scope Management:

1. Project Selection Model:

The project selection was driven by the situational realities being the outdated existing
system, which is expensive to maintain and support. Furthermore, there was a critical
need to maintain operational functionality, as public transport cannot continue to operate
without a fare collection system.

Therefore, it can be inferred that the project selection method used for this project falls
under the non-numerical selection model in particular the operational necessity. Meredith
and Mantel (Hartley 2014, p. 52) identify this type of project selection to have rushed
and distorted decision-making with a lack of structured checks and balances. This
applies perfectly to this project as the implementation of myki ticketing system suffered
from:
(1) Poorly defined functional performance requirements.
(2) A lack of flexibility to address contractor underperformance.
(3) Unrealistic delivery time frames.
Details of these issues and how they affected the overall deliverability of the project are
mentioned in the following sections.
2. Triple Bottom Line Conformance:
Mike was anticipated to generate around $6.3$10.8 million in annual revenue to the
government and its objectives included: (Victorian Auditor-Generals Report 2015)

[[ FIGURE DETAILS]]
These points capture the impact of the project on the world which is the essence of the
Triple Bottom Line (TBL) approach. It reflects how the projects profitability and
shareholder values are integrated with social, human and environmental opportunities.
(Savitz, 2006)
3.2.2 Procurement Management:
(1) Planning Project Procurement:

As part of the contract tendering process the following steps were undertaken:

All the required plans, processes and administrative arrangements were all prepared when
the myki tender commenced.
(2) Selecting Potential Suppliers:
A two stage evaluation was undertaken:
i. Five advisory teams were setup to evaluate the tenders from the contractors. Tenders
were assessed against both technical and commercial criteria setup in the
evaluation plan.
ii. An evaluation committee reviewed the results of each advisory teams evaluation and
makes the final recommendation to the board.
Table xx, lists the potential supplier assessment criteria suggested by the PMBOK 2012
(as cited in Hartley, p278 ).
The advisory teams had enough personnel to give wise and strategic assessment of the
potential contractor. Each team would be responsible to evaluate against certain criteria
as per table XX.

Advisory teams and their assigned responsibilities (Victorian Auditor-General 2007 )

Overall, the teams were well resourced and well structured and the plans and processes
setup before hand were adequate fort the tendering process. However, in high insight
there was not sufficient expert advice sought to realise the complexity of the project and
the potential risks associated with the overly ambitious planned schedule, budget and
system requirements.
3.2.2 Stakeholder Management:
Stakeholder Engagement:
Identifying the key stakeholders is critical in the early stages of the project. PMBOK
(2012) recommends stakeholder identification to analyse stakeholder expectations and
their interest in the project, and to develop appropriate management strategies for

effectively engaging stakeholders in project decisions and execution. (as cited in Hartley
2014, p.81 )
Stakeholder engagement was evident with the fact that the customer, operator and
government objectives were researched to synthesise a ticketing system that meets the
stakeholder requirements. These objectives were included in the original myki business
case. Stakeholder involvement was achieved through the following steps (Victorian
Auditor-Generals Report 2015):
(1) A review of experience of the previous ticketing systems.
(2) A consultation regarding the stakeholder needs of the new system.
(3) A customer research.
Figure XXsummarises the stakeholder objectives for the proposed ticketing solution.

3.3 Planning Stage

3.3.1 Time Management:
Myki was planned to be fully operational by July 2007 under the terms of the original
contract. A time frame of two years was given to deliver one of the most complex

ticketing systems in the world. This time frame was inconsistent with smart card projects
in other cities as it suggests delivering the system in less than half that achieved
elsewhere in the world. Table XX shows the delivery time frames for transport ticketing
systems around the world (Victorian Auditor-Generals Report 2015).

It is clear that the Authority did not have a strategic approach for setting the time frame
of the project for the following reasons:
The initial project planing did not consider international experience on the
implementation of the ticketing system.
The time frame objective set for the project was not in line with the SMART approach.
The timeframe was not achievable or realistic.
Seeking such a highly optimistic time frame risks the project being delivered to its
objectives and required quality.
3.3.2 Stakeholder and Communication Management:
1. Stakeholder Responsibilities and Interfaces:

Managing the public transport system andmyki was separated into functions under the
Department of Transport (DOT) and the Transport Ticketing Authority (TTA). There was
no clear division of roles and responsibilities between these two parties. Figure xx shows
the communication between the departments involved in the project (Victorian AuditorGenerals Report 2015).
DOT was responsible for ticketing issues and policies while TTA was responsible for
delivering myki. This disjointed structure lead to delays where TTA waited for policy
clarifications from DOT on critical path time, making TTA unable to meet prescribed
project deadlines.
It can be concluded that:
The design and operation of the management structure was ineffective.
Had there been a closer working relationship between DOT and TTA the decision
making would have been smother. For example if DOT had members on the TTA board,
it would have

been quicker for TTA to resolve policy issues.

2. Competency of the Management:

The initial board did not include an individual who had previous experience in managing,
developing and implementing such a complex ticketing system. Neither did any member
had detailed knowledge of the transport ticketing environment (Victorian Ombudsman
2011).
It was not realised that the board lacked the necessary experience. Only after the project
failed to meet its deadline, was a member with strong experience in this field appointed to
the board.
This indicates that a detailed identification of the stakeholder capabilities was not
effectively conducted at the early stages of the project.
Hartley (2014) indicates that the project managers responsibilities are integral to the
projects success. This includes:
i. exert authority over all project work
ii. track, report and control project performance
iii. initiate corrective actions.
As the Authority did not have enough members experienced with this type of project it
was unlikely that the above responsibilities could be fulfilled.

Project Sustainability:

Project sustainability was assessed by using some of Keeble et al. (2003) suggested
indicators. The overall project is considered unsustainable from the economical, social
and environmental perspectives. The table above summarises the results.
The below details how the assessment was made.
Corporate level
1. One of the key core values that the department of transport upholds is Efficiency of
public transport(Auditor-General of Victoria 1998,p.15). Therefore delivering this
project is critical and relevant to the organisation.
2. Two agencies were overlooking the project. There was no clear division of of
responsibility between them. Multiple incidence of lack of clarity of who make decisions
occurred at key milestones in the project.
3. The Transport Ticketing Authority did not have a specific measurements to assess the
contractors underperformance, due to their lack of expertise in this area.
4. Project objectives were set based on results of key stakeholder engagement meetings
and surveys(Victorian Auditor-Generals Report 2015, p.55)

Economic
5. Project cost blow out and project delivery at a 55% over budget.
6. Myki was an innovative project. It was the first ticketing system in the world with an
open-architecture design.

Social
7. Myki received numerous complaints from end users. Issues included slow processing
speeds and overcharging. These complaints made up 35% of the overall public transport
complaints as per below chart.

Execution Stage
Scope Management

The Myki project had an unrealistic scope in relation to planned timeline as well as
budget. The initial scope was not clear, nor specific. As stated by the Auditor General of
Victoria Poor initial planning resulted in Myki's original scope and contract being

vaguely specified and overly ambitious. It was an outcome-based agreement that only
defined the overall objectives of the project and did not include detailed specifications.
For example, one outcome was a damaged or defective Smart-card might be replaced. It
did not define the term of what defective or damaged was, or how it was to be replaced,
plus the might, nor will (Victorian Ombudsman 2011, p.76).
PMBOK (2012) states that Requirements need to be elicited, analysed and recorded in
enough detail to set, not only the scope baseline, but to provide the foundation for the
work breakdown structure, not to mention potential implications for cost, schedule,
quality, risk and procurement process (as cited in Hartley 2014, p.95). Therefor, it is not
surprising to find that the impact of the unclear specifications of myki have had
implications on the project inflated time and cost.

Time Management

Multiple delays, scope changes and cost increases led the project to be operational only
after nine years extension. It was remarkable that the total time of the design and delivery
phase of Myki more than quadrupled from the original timeline of two years. The
Transport Ticketing Authority (TTA) was overly optimistic in believing it could achieve
a two-year delivery of the system: less than half that achieved elsewhere in the world
(Victorian ombudsman 2011). The TTA had to pay an expensive price of these delays. A
significant additional costs of approximately $200.1 million were incurred for operating
the existing system, metcard, in parallel with myki beyond its contracted termination date
in 2007 (VAG 2015, p.6) (Victorian ombudsman 2011, p.23-76).
It can be certainly said that the process of estimating the activity duration was not
strategic. Hartley (2014) suggests that the following factors can make it difficult to give a
reasonable estimation of time:
Having little knowledge about the project.
Having little experience about the field of the project.

Having little knowledge of the strategic estimating techniques.

As it was discussed in the previous sections, the Authority did not have sufficient
members with required knowledge or experience in the field of transport ticketing
systems. That makes Hartleys suggestion in place for the Authority.

Cost Management
The extensive time taken to design and deliver myki had led to significant unplanned
additional costs over the original budget.
On 30 June 2014, the revised capital and operating budget for designing and delivering
myki was $1550.5 million. This reflects an increase of 55 per cent on the initial budget of
$998.9 million (Victorian Ombudsman 2011).
Knowing what you planned to spend and what you have spent is, of course, important
(Hartley 2014, p.157). The following graph reveals the difference between the original
and the revised budget over the life of the project.
Expenditure ($ million)
r

1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Year

Original Budget

Revised Estimate

Graph - Projected and actual cost/timeline (Victorian ombudsman 2011)

Significant changes in budget clearly indicates that the estimated time and cost was not

realistic. The Authority at the end had to pay an expensive price of the overly optimistic
scope and time-frame of the project.
Quality Management
Myki experienced poor quality management throughout its execution stage. It was found
that, none of the agencies responsible for myki had assessed whether it had achieved any
of its expected outcomes and benefits, including providing value for money. Also there
was no scale of achievement defined in the contract of the project. Consequently, there
was no evidence myki had satisfactorily achieved any of its original business case
objectives or not as the auditors mentioned in their report. (Victorian Auditors General
June 2015, p.vii)
This clearly indicated that some of the key elements for quality management were lacked
in the myki project. Some of these elements are listed below (Hartley 2014, p.173):
The quality methodology (or approach) to be followed in managing the project;
Relevant standards, rules or guidelines to be adopted in performing the work;
Review of the product descriptions;
Monitoring and inspection regimes;
Identification of acceptance criteria;
Confirmation of roles and responsibilities;
Process flowcharts, cause-effect diagrams, storyboards, check sheets, Gantt charts,
scatter diagrams, control charts and other quality tools.
Human Resource Management
The required experience and skills of the board to implement a project of the size and
complexity of myki was questionable. Myki lacked continuity in project management and
governance, and that TTA did not possess the capability and capacity needed to
effectively manage it (VAG 2015, p.14)
The key personnel of both the State and the TTA have changed several times throughout
the life of the project. These changes included three Ministers of transport and five

CEOs of the authority. The quality of the project managers employed by the vendor was
also questioned by TTA. Without high quality project management staff and their
continuity of employment, the risks of project overruns significantly increase (Victorian
ombudsman 2011, p.80).

The myki team members were found incompetent for such a complex project in terms of
several key requirements. These requirement are listed below (Hartley 2014, p.198):
The technical competence required to perform the assigned work (or the ability to
acquire this competence).
Demonstrated communication skills, particularly in issuing instructions, conducting
meetings, resolving conflicts and report writing.
The ability to identify key issues, solve problems and implement the solution (while
still being a team player).
Experience and knowledge of project methodology.
Risk management
PTV advised that the TSR project risks and issues are managed in line with its Risk
Management Framework, which is based on the Victorian Governments Risk
Management Framework 2011 and consistent with AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk
Management - Principles and Guidelines. (VAG 2015, p.49)
Despite the risk was managed in line with the international risk management standards.
Myki faced serious risks throughout its life time. These risks are listed below (Victorian
Auditors General June 2015, p.vii)
Unproven vendor was elected by the TTA for the delivery of a significant product.
The unproven operating environment entailed a higher level of risk and was a

contributing factor to the delays.

The open architecture approach was new to the ticketing systems world wide.
The outcome based requirement specification heightened associated risk.
Significant changes to key personnel exposed myki to greater risks.
Finalisation Stage
A brief of the scope after multiple reviews of the project upon the initial scope being
failed to be executed in time within the budget is given below:

the development of software communicating with around 20,000 ticketing-system

devices and an expected million plus smartcards in the medium term and 2 million plus
in the longer term;

an extensive civil works program requiring more than 25,000 hours of work;

establishment of a major retail network;

training for up to 7,000 transport operator staff; and

an extensive public information program.

Recommendations:

risk management
Despite the fact that a risk register was prepared at early stages of the project (Victorian
Auditor-General October 2007, p34), myki project encountered many serious problems
throughout its lifecycle. Many of these problems would have been avoided or at least
reduced in impact if a wise management strategy was taken.

The following steps are recommended for a better risk management plan:
1. At the early stages of the project (concept and planning stages), systematic way
should be undertaken to identify, assess, analyse and respond to tentative risks.
The process of identifying risks should involve all project personnel regardless of
any specific role and should be done with a shared sense of responsibility. The
following techniques are useful in identifying potential risk (Hartley 2014):
SWOT and PESTELG techniques: to identify internal and external risk.
A risk register: to realise the priority ranking of the risk, the planned strategy to
handle it and the stakeholder accounted to monitor it.
Feasibility study: to assess the practicality of a proposed project.
1. During the execution stage and throughout the project lifecycle, continuosmonitoring
and updating are required to the following documents:
The risk register for additional related risks.
The project scope, schedule and cost baselines to reflect any changes after the risk
analysis have been conducted.
Stakeholder management
Myki project failed to meet critical milestones because of the unclear division of
responsibilities between the two main governing agencies. Had the stakeholders been
identified properly and assigned responsibilities clearly, the decision making would have
been smother and time would have been saved.

The following steps are recommended for a better stakeholder management plan:
1. The names, roles, skills and expertise of stakeholders should be identified in the

concept stage. A judgment whether more personnel with required experience are
needed should be made early on.
2. The Authority should have had a management team which is more experienced
in the implementation of a complex transport ticketing system. A stronger
management team would have been able to make sound timely decisions,
realise project challenges early on and implement necessary corrective
actions.
3. Stakeholders should be engaged in planning the objectives and the schedule of the
project.
4.

In the concept stage, a matrix should be used to document the stakeholders details
such as:
Stakeholder name, position and title, responsibilities, type of information required
from them, means of communication with them, frequency of reporting and to
whom the stakeholder should report to (Hartley 2014, p.83).

1. There should be clear division of work and responsibilities in the planning stage. This
can be done through generating the following plans and documents:
Interface document that maps between stakeholders and responsibilities.
Matrix of authority to show who is responsible, who the approver is, who needs to
be consulted, who needs to be informed and who signs off.
1. The stakeholder matrix should be racked and updated as the project progresses.
Scope management
One of the obvious shortcomings of mykis governing agencies was the unclear
specification requirements. This is despite the fact that the original myki contract was
large and complex with over 13,000 pages and 40 schedules (Victorian Ombudsman
2011). It can be noted here that a large amount of documentation is not necessarily a
correct and efficient way of scope definition.
To ensure that strategic steps are taken to correctly justify, investigate, assess and
approve the project the following recommendations are provided (Hartley 2014):
1. A research on other smart-card ticketing systems around the world, and the lessons
learnt from their implementations should be considered.

2. Early in the project initiation and planning, an investigation should be done to make
sure that expectations meet capabilities.
3. In the concept stage, a project charter should be documented with clear
specifications of project deliverables, results and benefits.
4. The project objectives decided in the concept stage should be inline with the
SMART frame work. The stakeholders should make sure that these
objectives are: specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and within a time
frame.
5. A written process for scope control should be documented and approved by key
stakeholders in the concept stage.
6. The scope should be revised and updated throughout the life of the project to cope up
with arising changes.
7. Any changes to the scope should be assessed against all other project variables and
approved by key stakeholders

Time Management
Myki project did not take an unusually long time to deliver by international standards.
However, the original delivery timeframe was over ambitious. Clearly the TTA was
overly optimistic to plan for the delivery of myki in such a short time as was the vendor
contracted to achieve this deadline.

The following steps should be taken for a better time estimation (Hartley 2014):
1. The use of

accepted techniques, in the concept stage, to estimate the time

required. These techniques include:

Expert judgement: an international consultant with experience on similar
smart-card fare ticketing systems should be consulted.
Analogous technique: other ticketing systems in the world with similar
complexity should be taken into account.
Vendor bid analysis: markets estimation through the expression of interest

could be used as well.

1. In the planning stage, the project activities should be defined through the use of a
work breakdown structure. The WBS should be done while considering the
following attributes:
The duration of the activity.
The relationships between activities, e.g. predecessor and successor.
An estimation of possible lead and/or lag time.
The required resources.
1. A network diagram can also be prepared to identify the following:
Work flow throughout the project
Potential bottlenecks.
Critical paths.
1. After setting up the schedule early in the project planning, the schedule should be
promptly updated as any changes occur. The schedule should be effectively
controlled throughout the execution stage through the following steps:
Publish the planned schedule to all stakeholders.
Update the schedule as changes occur.
Continuously compare the status of the project against the publish plan. This helps
to identify progress, status and forecast performance.
re-schedule any delayed activities.
Cost Management
The cost blowout of the myki project was mainly due to the schedule over-runs. The
incorrect time estimation was linked to vaguely defined specifications and lack of
experience with similar projects.

Recommendation:
1. TTA should have closely studied offset ticketing systems from around the world and
the final cost and schedule they were delivered to more accurately estimate the cost
of the project.
2. TTA should have considered

lessons learned from other international ticketing

projects, cash flows and budget measures at the front end planning stage.

Quality Management

The contract set up by TTA with kamco lacked detailed quality specifications and
requirements. This prevented TTA from measuring Kamcos underperforming products
delivered throughout the project stages

Recommendations:
Key performance indicators (KPIs) should have been specified in the contract and in the
planning stage. This would allow measuring the contract performance and holding
them accountable for delivery to specifications
A scorecard should have been set up early on in the concept and planning stages to
identify key technical objectives and score the outcomes of the project at key
milestones.
The contractors previous performance from other projects should have been examined
thoroughly. TTA should have checked references and asked previous clients for
feedback on the contractors performance. Kamco was not sufficiently qualified for a
project of this complexity. (Planning stage - tendering process)
It is crucial to maintain a healthy working relationship with the contract delivering the
project throughout the execution stage. TTAs relationship with Kamco deteriorated
over the life of the project. As the project progressed TTA was less actively engaged
with the contractor. This most likely hindered TTAs ability to maintain continuous
quality assurance and quality checks through the project lifecycle.
TTA should have done a more thorough examination of the contractors experience and
their previous projects delivered, checked references and asked previous client.

Communications Management:
Recommendation:
Progress reports should have been requested by TTA throughout the project from the
contractor undertaking the work. This would help idenity any management concerns or

issues early on, increase transparency and accountability, assist in maintaining

schedule and focus on short term goals and milestone achievements to ensure the
project stays on track.

Project Sustainability
Keeble et al. (2003) suggests to take the following steps at each stage of the project
lifecycle to ensure projects sustainability:
Concept Stage: Raise awareness of sustainable development among stakeholders and
identify show stoppers.
Planning Stage: Set sustainable development targets and choose the project concept
based on which can deliver the best anticipated sustainable development outcomes and
performance.
Execution Stage: Select suppliers that can meet the sustainable development targets with
a track record of doing so.
Finalisation Stage: Measure performance, understand gaps and recommend actions to
improve project sustainability of future projects.

Key Recommendations Summary:

The top 6 recommendations which would have had a significant improvement to the
project are as follows:
1. The Authority should have had a management team which is more experienced in the
implementation of a complex transport ticketing system. A stronger management
team would have been able to make sound timely decisions, realize project
challenges early on and implement necessary corrective actions.
2. The project objectives decided in the concept stage should be in line with the SMART
frame work. The stakeholders should make sure that these objectives are:
specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and within a time frame. A smart
approach would have avoided overly complex technical specifications and
deliverables. In turn this would have saved the project from cost and schedule
overruns that it experienced.
3. The use of accepted techniques, in the concept stage, to estimate the time required.
These techniques include:

Expert judgment: an international consultant with experience on similar smart-card

fare ticketing systems should be consulted.
Analogous technique: other ticketing systems in the world with similar complexity
should be taken into account.
Vendor bid analysis: markets estimation through the expression of interest could be
used as well.
If international experience and subject matter experts were consulted early, a more
realistic timeframe would have been set. This would have saved the contractor from
continuously failing to meet milestone objectives.
1. In the concept stage, a project charter should be documented with clear specifications
of project deliverables, results and benefits. If the requirements were clearly set
for the contractor, this would have reduced the continuous change in scope and
assisted in focusing on the key project objectives.
2. A written process for scope control should be documented and approved by key
stakeholders in the concept stage. This would allow better management of scope
change and limit the effect on project schedule.
3. Take the sustainability assessment steps suggested by Keeble et al. (2003)to ensure
projects sustainability throughout all stages.

Conclusion:

Project myki was ambitiously planned to deliver one of the most complex
ticketing systems in the world within an extremely short time frame of two years.
The target timeframe was less than half the time achieved with similar ticketing
projects around the world. Myki experienced significant challenges throughout the

project lifecycle which resulted in the project being delivered 55% over budget
($550 million) while taking seven years more than planned.

A combination of issues led to the time and cost blowout including: unclear
division of responsibilities, lack of expertise and knowledge in the field of the
project, vague system specification requirements, compromised scope as well as a
poor working relationship between the contractor and the transport authority.

The key recommendations for a future myki projects are to hire an experienced
and qualified management team, set SMART objectives, adopt strategic methods
for time estimation, specify and define technical requirements up from and employ
effective scope management techniques.