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Irrational
Free Mar
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Ed
Never
Wrong
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L. li
Copyright; Martin A, Armstrong A l l Eights Reserved
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M a i l Qsrmenbs a Suggestions t o :
M a r t i n A, Armstrong
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#12518-050
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The
Irrational
Free Markets
That are
Never
Wrong?
We Must Be P r a c t i c a l
Economics i s no d i f f e r e n t . I f we can't
he reasonable and p r a c t i c a l , forget i t - We
can f i n d no example t h a t those who claim
t h a t " f r e e markets" don't work and we must
c o n t r o l a l l aspects o f the economy by the
s t a t e , a r e i n any way c o r r e c t . Both China
and Russia adopted the same Marxist theory
and demcnstrated t h a t a c e n t r a l l y planned
economy cannot be achieved.
8-J
J_
KARL MARX
More speaks o f a m i t i g a t i o n of e v i l
r a t h e r than a cure, and accepts t h a t human
nature i s indeed f a l l i b l e . Utopia deals with
penology, s t a t e - c o n t r o l l e d education, divorce
and women's r i g h t s , and r e l i g i o u s p l u r a l i s m .
Tt was t h i s work t h a t gathered a reputation
as being a "HunHnist" f o r Utopia was even
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o most European languages. I t
was t h i s Utopia t h a t created a vrtiole new
l i n e of philosophy, By the time we come t o
Marx about 300 years l a t e r , t h i s Utopian
philosophy becomes not a m i t i g a t i o n , but
the cure f o r everything.
,
i
Thomas J e f f e r s o n
(1743-1826)
Declaration
"
When ^i^c^^i^c^EaSnn
I
I n order t o understand how these key
ideas emerged and are s t i l l d e p r i v i n g us o f
Freedom and L i b e r t y today, we must r e a l i z e
the economic e v o l u t i o n t h a t was t a k i n g place
between 1300 an 1900. We were emerging from
the Cerk Ages created by the c o l l a p s e of Rome
i n 476AD. The r i s e i n debt and taxes t h a t
began during the 3rd Century of Rome, s e t i n
motion the suburbanization o f c i v i l i z a t i o n
where people migrated away from the c i t i e s .
This eventually gave way t o Feudalism as
t a x a t i o n consumed v i r t u a l l y a l l wealth o f
the i n d i v i d u a l . People s o l d themselves and
t h e i r f a m i l i e s t o "landlords" and Europe
f e l l i n t o a new age o f agrarianism. The
r i s e of the Arabs cut o f f a l l trade by the
c o n t r o l of the Southern European ports and
the sea. The V i k i n g s kept pressure frcm the
North and thus Europe became landlocked. I t
was t h i s i s o l a t i o n frcm world trade t h a t had
created the Dark Age.
M i l t o n Friralnan
i:
I:
HEISENBERG
voill A l w a y s UI/KI /
'Dncertanty P r i n c i p l e
11
Thomas J e f f e r s o n wrote h i s b e l i e f s
t h a t the United States would not l a s t . He
b e l i e v e d t h a t Revolutions were a n a t u r a l
course o f events and t h a t the Tree o f L i b e r t y had t o be refreshed with the blood of
both t y r a n t s and p a t r i o t s , J e f f e r s o n saw
c y c l e s i n h i s t o r y and d i d not expect t h a t
the United States would l a s t much beyond
the year 1900.
The loud cry o f the new Progressive
Democrats who shed the l a b e l s o f " l i b e r a l "
o r "Marxist" r e p l a c i n g i t with t h i s new and
b e t t e r v e r s i o n o f the same o l d b u l l s h i t ,
that the theory o f "Free Markets" i s dead
as demonstrated by the current economic
d e c l i n e , are indeed d r i n k i n g t h e i r own bath
water- They are c l e a r l y Ignorant o r perhaps
v o l u n t a r i l y b l i n d t o h i s t o r y , but they can
no more defeat the "Free Markets" t h a t i s
best portrayed as Smith's " I n v i s i b l e Hand"
today, than they were i n China, Russia, o r
at any point i n h i s t o r y .
Werner Heisenberg
(1901 - 1976)
Mo matter what we a r e l o o k i n g a t be i t
the Universe, our Earth, our r e a l world f a c t s
and events, or the microscopic world, there
i s a Grand U n i f i e d Theory that a l l systems
larges and small f u n c t i o n based upon the s e t
s t r u c t u r a l design. J u s t as we have a lm il l
that pumps blood c a r r y i n g oxygen t o v i t a l
organs, so does a dog, r a t , and a goat* The
s t r u c t u r a l design i s the same and the f a c t
t h a t l i f e e x i s t s based upon c e r t a i n design
s t r u c t u r e s i s evidence t h a t there i s some
master plan j u s t as DNA i s a code shared by
us as w e l l as dinosaurs.
Classical
This i s a profound r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t i s
applied w i t h i n the complex g l o b a l economy.
We can p r e d i c t a economic d e c l i n e w i l l take
place even at a p a r t i c u l a r time, but since
there are b i l l i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s (atoms)
the best we can do .is p r e d i c t the o v e r a l l
trend while the i n d i v i d u a l r e t a i n s the free
w i l l t o r e a c t o r not (emit a gamma r a y ) .
Mechanics
Quantum Mechanics
eisenberg's i d e a can be demonstrated
mathematically where only macroscopic systems
are involved, the p r e d i c t i o n s of Quantum
mechanics d i f f e r from those of classical
mechanics by amounts which are far too small
t o even measure. The c l a s s i c a l mechanics
i n v o l v e systems o f r e a l world siae t h a t are
mathematically s i m p l i s t i c i n comparison. Yet
where there are systems o f atomic dimensions
involved, the p r e d i c t i o n s o f quantum mechanics d i f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y from those i n the
classical mechanics.
1,
1
f'
1
The assumption t h a t everyone has made
ever since Marx, w i t h the sole exception o f
Friedman, has been t h a t v-e even have the raw
power t o manipulate the economy. What i f that
very idea i s dead wrong? What i f the complex
nature i s indeed t o o vast? We may end up j u s t
importing one spieces t o solve one problem
as they d i d i n A u s t r a l i a , that ends up k i l l ing o f f native species d i s r u p t i n g the e n t i r e
ecology.
A l l we can do i s m i t i g a t e the d e c l i n e ,
we cannot cure i t . We have t o stop t h i s p l a i n
i n s a n i t y and t r y t o make t h a t next step i n
the e v o l u t i o n of economics, STop the same o l d
b u l l s h i t about c r e a t i n g Utopia. I t does not
e x i s t and More used i t as a pun meaning "no
place,
We a r e i n the middle o f no place, with
nowhere t o go* We a r e s t i l l caught i n t h i s
b a t t l e o f words and s e l f - i n t e r e s t that can
only lead t o war, bankruptcy, and sheer d i s aster.
We cannot p r e d i c t w i t h c e r t a i n t y the
c l o s e of the Dow every day. That does not mear
we cannot p r e d i c t the broader trends and when
they w i l l change, we a r e on the verge of a
major change i n trend economically. Watch
13 gold, f o r i t w i l l explode w i t h uncertainty.
The New
Practical "Laws"
of Global Economics
Why Taxes are the only tool remaining!
by Martin A. Armstrong
former Chairman o f Princeton Economics T n t ' l , Ltd,.
Copyright Nov,
26th, 2008
end
The
the
and
than
a
they
have
Most theories i n economics are not p r a c t i c a l because they are based upon
assumptions that are not r e a l . The same problem has wiped out the Investment
Bankers because (1) they create models by young students who do not understand
market dynamics, and (2) they assume there i s always a market and f a i l t o map
those pesty periods when the mcdel would f a i l such as the Great Depression.
This is'"aJcOTto"making ^'the assumption'"that we w i l l " liv^TfoTgver.^Tt i s Lhe o l d
d i f f e r e n c e between the o p t i m i s t and the pessimist who both are blown o f f the
top o f the Empire State B u i l d i n g . The Pessimist says immediately - "Oh my God
1 am going t o d i e i " The o p t i m i s t can be heard while passing the 4th f l c o r "Well so f a r so gocdl"
LAW #1 - C a p i t a l Moves To Avoid Danger G l o b a l l y
This law would seem t o be s e l f - e v i d e n t . We have a l l heard o f the " f l i g h t t o
q u a l i t y " where i n a domestic economic d e c l i n e , c a p i t a l f l e e s stocks and p r i v a t e
assets moving t o the best q u a l i t y that may he Government short-term paperHowever, c a p i t a l reacts the same way g l o b a l l y and those reasons are not
always apparent domestically.
(1) c a p i t a l w i l l f l e e a war o r threat o f war. During World War I and n ,
the c a p i t a l flowed t o the United States. By the end o f World War I I ,
the u n i t e d States had 76% o f the world gold reserves. During the Sues
Canal c r i s i s , the d o l l a r rose on c a p i t a l f l e e i n g Europe as they once
again perceived a r i s k , although i t was very b r i e f . Yet during t h e
Cuba M i s s i l e C r i s i s , c a p i t a l f l e d the opposite t o Europe. The same
was t r u e f o r c a p i t a l began t o f l e e i n advance o f various middle east
wars.
(2) c a p i t a l takes f l i g h t when i t fears unstable economic conditions that
can be caused by i n f l a t i o n , t a x a t i o n , n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , g e o p o l i t i c a l ,
or negative perceptions i n p o l i t i c s and the economy a l t e r i n g confidence.
EXAMPLE:
The Great Depression was made f a r worse by p o l i t i c i a n s who d i d not understand
g l o b a l c a p i t a l flows t o q u a l i t y . I n Herbert Hoover's Memoirs, he has a l l o f
the documentation that revealed World War I I began w i t h the f i n a n c i a l markets
i n the 1930s t h a t l e d t o nations a t t a c k i n g t h e i r bond markets that l e d t o t h e
wholesale c o l l a p s e o f European debt. Even B r i t a i n went i n t o a moratorium on i t s
debt suspending a l l payments. These d e f a u l t s sent c a p i t a l f l e e i n g t o the United
States causing the d o l l a r t o r i s e , and i n t e r e s t r a t e s t o f a l l i r r e s p e c t i v e o f
Fed p o l i c y . P o l i t i c a n s o n l y viewed the r i s e i n the d o l l a r and responded w i t h
protectionism - Smoot-Hawley i n June 1930 destroying i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a c e and
sending the economy back i n t o a feudal s t a t e o f economic dark ages. Had t h e r e
been the understanding o f the " f l i g h t t o q u a l i t y " t h a t can emerge f o r a host
o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l reasons t h a t swamp the domestic conditions, perhaps there
may have been scarte hope.
The 1967 Crash was caused by the formation o f the G-5 i n 19B5 and the p e r s i s t e n t
t a l k about lowering the value o f the d o l l a r by 40% t o reduce the trade d e f i c i t .
The Japanese, who had bought up t o 33% o r so o f the n a t i o n a l debt and loads o f
r e a l e s t a t e l i k e R o c k e f e l l e r Plaza i n New York, were being t o l d i n d i r e c t l y t h a t
whatever investments they made were going t o be devalued by 40%. The 1987 crash
tcok place w i t h everyone befuddled because there was no change i n the domestic
fundamental conditions o f the economy or corporate- earnings. The f l i g h t o f
c a p i t a l by the Japanese caused by the G-5, l e d t o the c a p i t a l concentration
i n Japan w i t h f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s l o o k i n g a t a r i s i n g yen & assets c r e a t i n g the
1969 high,
:
The
New
Practical "Laws"
of Global Economics
There are other "Laws" that now e x i s t a l s o w i t h i n our new Global Economy.
However, l e t us s t i c k to these f i r s t two Laws f o r they alone a l t e r every theory
i n economics to date. The " p r a c t i c a l " side o f these two r e a l i z a t i o n s i s that
the e n t i r e f i e l d o f economics changes much, l i k e what G a l i l e o d i d to dogma. I f
the planets revolve around the sun r a t h e r than the sun around the planet, then
where i s up and where i s down? Translate t h i s i n t o heaven and h e l l , and you can
see why he was imprisoned f o r l i f e .
Suddenly, how we manage our economy i s no longer autonomous. The theory o f
chaos you might r e c a l l was explained t h a t the f l a p o f the wings o f a b u t t e r f l y i n
A s i a could set i n motion changes to the winds i n the Americas. Although extreme,
the p r i n c i p l e remains the same - kind o f l i k e a s c i - f i movie - "We are not alone!"
Indeed, the a c t i o n s of one w i l l have an impact upon a l l others. We cannot escape the
consequences of our own a c t i o n s . I t i s j u s t impossible.
In my g l o b e - t r o t t i u g running between
nations and g e t t i n g to see f i r s t hand what
was taking place,, my eyes opened l i k e never
before. This i s what M i l t o n perhaps saw i n
me before I myself r e a l i z e d the f u l l scope
o f what I had f a l l e n i n t o . They d i d not
teach global c a p i t a l flows i n school. They
d i d not even teach hedging and f l o a t i n g
exchange r a t e s . This was a f i e l d t h a t justemerged more a k i n t o being an apprentice.
But what I observed g l o b a l l y was the grand
I n v i s i b l e Hand o f Adam Smith (1723-1790),
y e t on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l - The image i n
my mind was each nation formed a gear i n
one giant machine we c a l l the economy o f
nations. Turn one, and there w i l l be an
e f f e c t i n a l l others - We are a l l connected.
How do we create a p r a c t i c a l theory? K a r l Marx (1816-1883) saw the collapse
i n c a p i t a l i s m as a c l a s s struggle between labor and employer assuming the l a t e r
would e x p l o i t labor t o the p o i n t they could no longer consume. He ignored Smith
and paid no mind to money supply and the bocm bust economic c y c l e . He destroyed
(1) personal l i b e r t y p l a c i n g i t i n the hands of.government f o r the greater-gocd,
and (2) ignored the s e l f - i n t e r e s t o f the s t a t e to also expand i t s personal powerI t was Ivan IV (1533-S4) "the T e r r i b l e " who s e i z e d land o f h i s enemies. and_gave'.it
to h i s supporters yet r e a l i s e d i f the workers l e f t , the l a n d became worthless.
He enacted a law t h a t the workers (serfs) could not leave l a y i n g the seeds f o r
the Russian r e v o l u t i o n i n 1917. C l e a r l y , other r u l e r s saw the problem, but d i d
nothing t o c o r r e c t i t . Alexander I (1777-T325) came to power i n 1801 and spoke about
reform, but then Napoleon invaded p u t t i n g an end to t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y . So Marx
was wrong. I t was not l i m i t e d to employers, but could a l s o be the s t a t e t h a t i n
f a c t e x p l o i t e d the people. Handing a l l the assets to the state and destroying the
l i b e r t y o f i n d i v i d u a l s , was not the answer. To f i x what i s wrong, requires a c l e a r
working knowledge of what we are t r y i n g to f i x . Bad t h e o r i e s and assumptions have
l e d to the deaths of m i l l i o n s . We need " p r a c t i c a l " econcmics - not t h e o r i e s .
5
i n Times k i k e
Present
Should W Fcdlow Keynes o r Friettnan?
Oj. po we Weed a Ne- Theory Altogether?
^ j e r s t a n d i n g Keynes and Friedman may mean the d i f f e r e n c e between s u r v i v a l
or economic d e s t r u c t i o n that leads always t o war. The Monetarists accused Keynes
o f i g n o f ^ ^ ironey. This i s t r u l y a c r i t i c a l point t h a t must be understood. By
advocating, two t o o l s i n t e r e s t r a t e s and taxes, Keynes i s approaching the economy
i n d i r e c t l y * I n other words, t o stop some behavior the government does n o t l i k e
i n you, i * d i r e c t l y a t t a c k i n g your wife i n hopes she w i l l cause a change i n
your bJ
" Japan was i n a very bad economic depression, i t lowered i n t e r e s t
r a t e s t o * tenth-of-one percent tQ.1%), i t was v i r t u a l l y zero. A l l t h i s d i d was
cause c a P ^ ^ l t o seek i n t e r e s t r a t e p r o f i t s elsewhere and d i d nothing t o r e l i e v e
the a c o r * * ^ downturn i n Japan. The f i n a l lew may come i n 2009 a f t e r the 1989
high. wsi tlri 9 f o r a p o s s i b l e low 20 years l a t e r , i s not acceptable f i s c a l p o l i c y . ,
Economlo d e c l i n e s can be very prolonged. From the 1S73 Panic i n the United States,
the e c o n ^ " ^ d e c l i n e l a s t e d o v e r a l l u n t i l 1396 - 23 years l a t e r . That i s a waste
of geneT& y / 3 r d o f everyone's l i f e t i m e .
1
iavio,:
11
S u
r f
115
r a t e
1 2 : T
&
Thi-5
very narrow view o f money. I t does not include stocks, bonds, and
r e a l e s t a t e - three major areas where c a p i t a l Can r e s i d e and i s considered t o be
'"wealth" by every r a t i o n a l person. Where problems a l s o enter I s the assuDptlon o f a
perfect-world- i f the v e l o c i t y i s constant, then I f the c e n t r a l bank can t r u l y
manipula
money supply ( v e l o c i t y ) , they would have a d i r e c t t o o l that i s
f a r t e t t e r than i n t e r e s t rates ano" taxes. Hcwever, i f the v e l o c i t y can f l u c t u a t e
widely according t o the "confidence" of the people, then manipulating the money
supply wrjuld a l s o be reduced t o an I n d i r e c t t o o l . Here i s where the forces o f
Keynes S ^ Friedman c l a s h , Keynes argues t h a t the v e l o c i t y i s unstable, whereas
Friedman ^ u l d take the opposite p o s i t i o n .
te
t h e
t D
i
. The invention of money brought with i t t h e n a t u r a l consequence o f the i n e v i t able c o u n t e r f e i t i n g . However, c o u n t e r f e i t i n g has never r e s u l t e d i n widespread
i n f l a t i o n even when used f o r the m i l i t a r y purpose o f undermining the currency o f
one's opponent used by England against the American c o l o n i e s d u r i n g t h e Revolution
as w e l l as during WW XTThe s i n g l e g r e a t e s t threat t o the money supply has
aJ.way3_c.0me from t h e i s s u i n g government i t s e l f .
o o
UJ -IN
It
c-i
i^c^r^
I.
I .1
M'O
- r ^ o i
co-d- Q
The above chart i l l u s t r a t e s the metal content of the Reman Monetary System.
I t was the steady debasement of the s i l v e r content of the Roman Denarius t h a t
f i n a l l y l e d t o an a l l out c o l l a p s e during t h e T h i r d Century AD. For c e n t u r i e s ,
government s have sought t o expand t h e i r money supply by debasing the currency. I n
other itords, reducing the content of precious metals t o enable the same amount
o f gold and s i l v e r t o create more coinage. The economic a d v i s o r t o Queen E l i z a b e t h I
c o r r e c t l y observed the response t o such p r a c t i c e s among the population. Et was
one of the e a r l i e s t Economic T ^ W S e s t a b l i s h e d - Bad money d r i v e s good money o u t of
c i r c u l a t i o n - S i r Thomas Gresham (1519^1579
. The economic hardships that
E l i z a b e t h faced during her r e i g n between 1533 and 1603 i n c l u d i n g the defeat o f
the Spanish Armada put great economic pressure t h a t was seen i n t h e debasement
o f coinage, indeed, Gresham's Law proved t o be c o r r e c t during the 1960s whan
s i l v e r was taken out of mcdern coinage being replaced with n i c k e l and copper.
The s i l v e r coins q u i c k l y disappeared and were worth a premium t o the "bad" money
t h a t entered the world economies.
r
Th* notion about watching the rrtvTey has been around f o r a long time - f a r
longer than Keynesian theory. The famous economist of t h e Great Depression e r a
I r v i n g F i s h e r (1367-1947) derived a formula i n 1911 i n s p i r e d by John Stuart M i l l ' s
a n a l y s i s c r e a t i n g the "quantity theory" of money being MU = PQ. The "V" i s t h e
v e l o c i t y o f "w" money supply where the "PQ" represents GDP ("P" being the p r i c e
l e v e l , and "Q" being the quantity of gccds * s e r v i c e s produced) _ This equation
can be reduced bo e x p l a i n the Monetarist theory i n i t s most s i m p l i s t i c form, t h a t
a manipulation o f "W (mcnev supnly) w i l l create a d i r e c t e f f e c t i n "P" ( p r i c e s )
that we i n s t i n c t i v e l y view a3 " i n f l a t i o n " defined as (too much money chasing t o o few
goods). H i s t o r i c a l l y , i t was always the supply o f money and i t s q u a l i t y that had the
impact upon the economy of mankind.
7
Keynes disagreed w i t h the Monetarist's tiewthat money supply was the key.
Keynes a c t u a l l y began w i t h a focus upon money supply and evolved i n t o the p o l i c y
theory of i n t e r e s t rates and tax manipulation, whereby M i l t o n began w i t h the
Keynesian model a ^ reverted back t o study money supply concluding t h a t Keynes would
create massive new spending that would only lead t o i n f l a t i o n . Was he c o r r e c t ?
13
M i l t o n broadened h i s v i e w
t o support the idea t h a t the demand f o r money and
v e l o c i t y was s t a b l e by t u r n i n g t o the long-term f a c t o r s o f education, h e a l t h and
income o f the family o r i n d i v i d u a l over decades - the saving f o r retirement approach.
M i l t o n a l s o attacked Keynesian ideas t h a t consumption rose and f e l l along with the
short-term inccme, M i l t o n argued t h a t people took a longer-term view t o t h e i r l i f e
and finances. M i l t o n was c o r r e c t , f o r there would be no market f o r L i f e Insurance
i f the view o T Ine' ^ i a i v i d u a l or~famiIy was""e3rtremeTy-short
viewed that consumption would he a l s o s t a b l e f o r t h e long-term expectations o f the
family o r i n d i v i d u a l .
I f we look a t the events o f the Great Depression, i t i s hard t o see how
Keynesian economics would have r e a l l y worked. I n t e r e s t r a t e s collapsed f o r three
primary reasons with no economic e f f e c t ; (1) the Fed d i d lower r a t e s , (2) there
was a f l i g h t t o q u a l i t y f o r c i n g short-term rates t o near zero as we have seen
r e c e n t l y , and (3) there was c a p i t a l f l i g h t from Europe during the e a r l y stages
due t o the widespread d e f a u l t s o f European government debt that a l s o impacted
domestic p o l i c y f o r c i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e s lower even i f the Fed d i d not want t o see
such a d e c l i n e . The Fed could not lower i n t e r e s t r a t e s t o stimulate the economy.
That w i l l o n l y help during b u l l markets where there i s "confidence" t o i n v e s t
f o r a p r o f i t i n any event. Lowering taxes d i d not r e a l l y matter because there was
no p a y r o l l tax u n t i l a f t e r World War I I and the r i c h were l o s i n g money p r o f u s e l y .
I f i n d i t hard a f t e r j u s t reading the memiors of Herbert Hoover and the serious
dbcumentation a v a i l a b l e t o prove t o me that Keynes would have helped. The massive
runs on banks took place on rumors t h a t FDR was going t o c o n f i s c a t e gold. He denied
that as absurd the night o f the e l e c t i o n . But the rumor p e r s i s t e d and l e d t o
massive hank runs. Hoover could not stop i t f o r i t was not a " c r e d i t " c r i s i s as
much as I t was a sheer f l i g h t t o q u a l i t y . The m a j o r i t y of banks f a i l e d a f t e r the
e l e c t i o n of FDR and h i s inauguration. Hcover wrote l e t t e r s to FDR pleading w i t h
him t o reassure the people he had no such plan. But FDR remained s i l e n t . Had the
Fed provided cash loans t o the banks, i t would have been f r u i t l e s s .
M i l t o n viewed the Great Depression frcm a money perspective. He was c o r r e c t ,
the fears and uncertainty o f the times l e d to hoarding o f gold. This no doubt
contributed t o what M i l t o n saw as a c o l l a p s e o f one-third of the money supply
during the Great Depression. I t i s hard t o imagine promising t o lower taxes
and i n t e r e s t rates would have much impact when the world seems t o be ending..
I b e l i e v e i t was Abe L i n c o l n who argued t h a t yon can f o o l sane o f the people
satis o f the time, but you cannot f o o l a l l o f the people a l l of the time. This i s
c l e a r l y a lesson p o l i t i c i a n s need t o l e a r n . The people do look t o the f u t u r e and
w i l l spend more of t h e i r income i f they " f e e l " t h a t t h e i r heme i s r i s i n g i n value.
When housing p r i c e s d e c l i n e , savings r i s e , because people do i n f a c t respond t o
t h e i r longer-term expectations. This brings us t o the guestion of t a x c u t s and
do they even work? i n 1964, a t a x cut was made and t h i s was viewed as a permanent
cut i n p a y r o l l taxes. The econcmy exploded and there was the great boom i n
mutual funds that l e d t o w i l d s p e c u l a t i o n with the h i g h i n 1966. By the time
we see the c o l l a p s e , there was f e a r about i n f l a t i o n due t o the spending f o r
the Vietnam War. i n 1968 Congress passed what i t marketed as a temporary t a x
surcharge t o stop i n f l a t i o n . True, consumers spent l e s s , but they drew down
savings to maintain t h e i r consumption, i n 1975, there was then a temporary
tax rebate t o s t i m u l a t e the econcmy going i n t o the Steep d e c l i n e f o r 1976.
None o f these changes i n temporary taxes d i d anything s i g n i f i c a n t . Where
the 1964 p a y r o l l tax cut took p l a c e and was perceived as permanent, there
we f i n d a surge of investment planning f o r the long-term as Friedman expected.
The e m p i r i c a l evidence suggests t h a t one-time rebates w i l l not s t i m u l a t e the
economy because the people are q u i t e f r a n k l y - not stupid' The o n l y h i s t o r i c a l
evidence of a t a x cut s t i m u l a t i n g the economy i s a permanent change not one-offs*
10
We are not concerned with the absurd arguments that the average person dees
not weigh the budget d e f i c i t when he i s buying eggs. These s o r t s o f c r i t i c i s m s
malign the i n t u i t i v e nature of the people as a whole. For example, when Paul
Volker r a i s e d i n t e r e s t rates t o unheard of l e v e l s t o f i g h t i n f l a t i o n i n the
e a r l y 1930s, my mother and her s i s t e r ran out and bought CDs f o r 10 years a t
' oariKs wTEn"" Interest' "rates^t^~abcufr"lT "percent".'She-did riot aslo me "any a d v i c e s
She i n s t i n c t i v e l y knew t h i s was a deal, o f a l i f e t i m e . For the next decade, they
made a fortune. D i d they weigh i n f l a t i o n r e l a t i v e t o the i n t e r e s t rate? Perhaps.
But they c l e a r l y d i d not see i n f l a t i o n as r i s i n g f a s t e r than the r a t e of i n t e r e s t
or they would have h e s i t a t e d as was the case d u r i n g the German H y p e r i n f l a t i o n .
Did they have a model? No! D i d they make some i n s t i n c t i v e d e c i s i o n based upon
personal observation without empirical data? a b s o l u t e l y . Sorry, t r y i n g t o impute
knowledge t h a t must be somehow q u a n t i t a t i v e on a professional l e v e l t o the
general p u b l i c , makes no sense. Sometimes we f o r g e t , t h a t i f enough l i t t l e o l d
l a d i e s run out and s h i f t t h e i r demand deposits t o long-term f i x e d r a t e s , they
do cause a c o n t r a c t i o n i n M1 as we c a l c u l a t e our world.
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(Gresham's law)
While Gresham"s Law was based upon a Gold Standard and t h a t by debasingthe precious metal content causes the hoarding o f higher content coinage,
i n a f l o a t i n g exchange r a t e system, i t s t i l l works by d r i v i n g r e a l wealth
out of a nation f l e e i n g t o another currency by c r e a t i n g excess currency.
Law #4 Only Permanent Reductions i n Taxes Produce Economic S t i m u l a t i o n
The average person may not understand fancy s t a t i s t i c s , but they w i l l a l s o
not be induced by f a l s e s t a t i s t i c s . The average person reacts according t o
t h e i r own personal view o f the econcmy, which i s why one-off t a x reductions
w i l l not have an econcmic impact but w i l l be hoarded f o r the r a i n y day
unless the average parson "sees" and ''expects" economic changes.
i n t e r e s t Rates - Taxes - Money Supply
So i s t h a t the Best We have Got?
As much as I respect M i l t o n Friedman, I must be honest. There are no p l a i n
assumptions t h a t we can t o l e r a t e , we cannot assume that v e l o c i t y w i l l remain a
constant because people w i l l hoard and f e a r spending i n times of econcmic d e c l i n e .
Likewise, l e t us not k i d ourselves t h a t r a i s i n g and lowering i n t e r e s t r a t e s w i l l
have any meaningful e f f e c t upon the econcmy o r the behavior of i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s .
11
S e t t i n g aside the accolades, the government could not help but lower i n t e r e s t
r a t e s during an econcmic d e c l i n e . C a p i t a l w i l l f l e e to government debt as long
as i t perceives the r i s k t o be i n the private- sector. Hence, c a p i t a l w i l l move
to the government debt bidding higher i n p r i c e f o r c i n g y i e l d s { i n t e r e s t rates)
to d e c l i n e . So Keynesian theory does not work.. I t i s assuming government has
soi^"efiS^
interest "rates s o
. a r t i f i c i a l l y high, p r i v a t e econcmic ccmnerce w i l l c o l l a p s e and government expenditures would r i s e sharply due s o l e l y t o i n t e r e s t r a t e s causing both the money supply
and econcmy t o c o l l a p s e . Lowering i n t e r e s t rates below world l e v e l s as d i d Japan
i n the 1990s, f u e l s c a p i t a l f l i g h t t o higher y i e l d s preventing domestic increases
i n money supply defeating any intended s t i i n u l a t i o n package.
_
a 15% tax r a t e that was lower than the r e s t of the world- There a r e those who
would assume t h a t i f government p r i n t e d the money i t needed t h a t that would be
i n f l a t i o n a r y . This i s a matter of d e f i n i t i o n . They forget that we i s s u e t r i l l i o n s
of d o l l a r s through our borrowing i n the form of bonds. However, i f bonds, stocks,
r e a l e s t a t e and d e r i v a t i v e s a r e outside of our d e f i n i t i o n o f money, then t h i s 18th
century t h i n k i n g makes sense. Sorry. I n the r e a l world a bond i s s t i l l money.
Between 1986 and 2006, the n a t i o n a l debt rose from about $2.1 t r i l l i o n t o
$8,5 t r i l l i o n . This tcok p l a c e not i n p r i n t i n g money, but i n bonds, i n f a c t , we
were forced t o issue more debt j u s t t o pay the i n t e r e s t on debt. The i n t e r e s t
payments f o r t h i s 20 year period was $6,141 t r i l l i o n . Had we p r i n t e d the d e f i c i t
between t a x a t i o n and spending (excluding i n t e r e s t ) , t h a t would have amounted- t o
only $259 b i l l i o n a f a r c r y from the b a i l o u t s . I f we a r e already committing b i l l i o n s
i f not beyond 1 t r i l l i o n f o r rescue, we cannot a f f o r d t o borrow oh top o f t h i s .
The very idea that we borrow money rather than p r i n t i t i s somehow l e s s i n f l a ^ t i o n a r y i s absurd and a throw-back t o the Gold Standard when nature c o n t r o l l e d the '
quantity o f money. Spain borrowed h e a v i l y on the g o l d i t expected from America. When
i t s treasure ships didn't show up and i t l o s t the Spanish Armada against England, the
d e f a u l t destroyed the bankers i n Venice and relegated both Spain and I t a l y to- almost
t h i r d world s t a t u s . The Spanish I n q u i s i t i o n merely caused the jews t o f l e e to Holland
t r a n s f e r r i n g henkinq to_ Northern Europe.- We. cannot a f f o r d the same mistakes. Borrowing
i s ; a'ahcient t r a d i t i o n when there was ho other choice .
The Gold Standard fi Cronic Shortage of Money
They say h i s t o r y i s biased - f o r i t i s w r i t t e n by the v i c t o r . But we can a l s o
remember things o f days long since past with rose-colored glasses. Some see gold as
almost a r e l i g i o n - the s a v i o r t h a t w i l l d e l i v e r us from the e v i l of i n f l a t i o n . That
i s j u s t not true. The boom-bust c y c l e existed i n ancient times as w e l l and always we
f i n d no matter what system i s i n place, there is- someone who .always spends too much:.
The Gold Standard was a world that was not so s i m p l i s t i c . I n ancient times,
i t provided the incentive f o r war - the best way t o increase money supply. I n
f a c t , one of the reasons there a r e so many ancient coins that have survived i s
there was the p r a c t i c e of burying the p a y r o l l before b a t t l e so t h a t the other
s i d e was denied the s p o i l s o f war.
The Gold Standard also meant t h a t the way t o create more money was through
reducing the metal content - debasing the q u a l i t y o f the metal. Those who were
l o o k i n g t o be dishonest had two options - f1) c o u n t e r f e i t i n g , o r (2) c l i p p i n g .
Take a c o i n out of your pocket and you w i l l see reeding on the edges of an
American dime o r quarter f o r example. This was an o l d a n t i - c l i p p i n g devices t h a t
was t o prevent those who would shave a l i t t l e o f f of every c o i n - c o l l e c t i n g a
p i l e o f scrap metal. This gave r i s e t o banks i s s u i n g notes t o a t f i r s t guarantee
the payment i n the proper amount of precious metals o f good currency meaning
u n d i p p e d coinage.
However, the greatest problem with the Gold -Standard was the i n a b i l i t y t o
create money other than war, a l t e r i n g contents, o r changing the r a t i o of s i l v e r
t o g o l d as the s i l v e r Democrats t r i e d i n the l a t e 1800s. The money supply was
i n the hands o f nature and thus was subject 'to boom and bust cycles based a l s o
upon t h e discovery of metal. The C a l i f o r n i a Gold Rush of 1349 contributed to the
econcmic boom t h
^
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a t
l e d
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P a n i c
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T4
needs. Going back t o the Gold Standard i s not the answer t o long-term econcmic
growth nor would i t solve the current economic c r i s i s . In f a c t , i t would create
an econcmic contraction that would end f l e x i b i l i t y t o even deal with the problem.
This i s separate and d i s t i n c t i n s o f a r as gold p r o v i d i n g a p r i v a t e source of
wearth- that iemains a: stone o l tfalun.The resscgr-gold emerged- as meney-because I t
was a valued ccnmcdity and recognizable In a l l lands* They use gold f o r jewelry
i n India and China the same way they use i t i n Hussia, Europe, o r the Americas.
I t i s a scarce commcdity that there would not be enough o f i f every person i n the
world wanted j u s t 1 ounce f o r themselves. Whether o r not gold i s the " o f f i c i a l "
monetary u n i t o r the check against f i s c a l i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s of no importance.
In the s p i r i t Of l i b e r t y , allowing gold to remain as the p r i v a t e s t o r e of wealth
i s f a r b a t t e r . That was the very i s s u e that Rcosevelt sought t o eliminate - the
a b i l i t y t o hoard gold as a hedge against government. This i s a l s o why Rcosevelt
confiscated gold so he could devalue the d o l l a r r e l a t i v e t o gold thereby any such
p r o f i t would d e f a u l t t o the government - not the i n d i v i d u a l hoarding the gold.
A l l th problems with the Gold Standard emerged- frcm the i n a b i l i t y t o
create money when needed. M i l t o n argued that the d e f i c i t spending advocated by
Keynes w u l d lead t o only i n f l a t i o n r a t h e r than econcmic growth. Ineed, Keynes
himself did not advocate perpetual d e f i c i t spending year a f t e r year. Once the
government received h i s b l e s s i n g , they J u s t r a n w i t h the b a l l , but the goal-post
was past decades ago. Locking at the Federal budget since 1936, th<> only years
i n which there was not a d e f i c i t were far and few between:
1947, 1948, 1949, 1951, 1956,
1996,
During the 72 years between T 536 and 200S, there were only 11 yaars that produced a budget surplus. This i s not a very gocd record f o r Keynesian economics.
Once the concept of d e f i c i t spending was introduced by Keynes, i t was s e r i o u s l y
abused. But the problem was not so much the d e f i c i t , but the f a c t t h a t a t the same
time there was the pretense of maintaining a Gold' Standard at a f i x e d quantity of
d o l l a r s t o an ounce of gold while the supply o f d o l l a r s was being increased and
the g o l d supply was d e c l i n i n g . This oulminated In the f i r s t break with the two-tier
Gold Standard whereas gold began to trade on the London exchanges f r e e l y , that was
followed by the c l o s i n g of the gold window in 1971 wnen t h e r e were more d o l l a r s
than g o l d to redeem them. Hp r e a l i t y Of perpetual d e f i c i t spending under the Gold
Standard came home with shocking f o r c e .
The Bottom Line
A r b i t r a r y spending even on i n f r a s t r u c t u r e w i l l do nothing but create perceived
i n f l a t i o n before i t even h i t s the econcmy. The work programs o f the Great Depression
made sense only because there was a n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r i n the form of the .Dust 13owI
that l a s t e d 7 years. I t i s true t h a t unemployment rose t o 25%. However, i t was only
8.9% i n T93Q deep i n t o the s t a r t of the Depression. I t reached above 20% only when
the Dust Bowl destroyed jobs given we were s t i l l 40% agrarian i n our work f o r c e .
Unemployment began t o d e c l i n e w i t h the WPA, 1935 20.3%, T936 16.9%, 1937 14.3%, 1938
19% and 1939 17.2%, but as you can see, we have a s e l e c t e d memory f o r what r e a l l y
worked and what d i d not. unemployment i n 1940 stood a t 14.6% end a t the end o f
World War IT, i t was 1.9%. I t was not the WPA that changed the economy, i t was the
war. T h i s has l e d t o some c l a i m i n g a l s o s e l e c t i v e l y t h a t war i s good f o r the economy.
We began the f i r s t peacetime d r a f t i n 1940 t h a t was approved on September 14, T940
but i t was P e a r l Harbor on December 7th, 1941 that o f f i c i a l l y s t a r t e d the war f o r
Americana then declared war against Japan on December 8th followed by a d e c l a r a t i o n
against Germany and I t a l y on December 11th, 1941.
15
and cannot create money as the f e d e r a l government can do. Unless we now consider
a 21st Century d e f i n i t i o n & s o l u t i o n , then the 18th Century theories w i l l cover
the speculative losses f o r investment banks, not Wall S t r e e t , and create only work
prcgrams f o r stock brokers and programmers t o learn how t o f i x bridges and roads.
That seems one way t o lower s k i l l s opposite o f the p o l i c y of the WPA i n 1935.
-";gy >^gl^f^^^^g^^d^^^^TOpa:^^
:
Armstrong
ArmstrcngEccnoJ7iics@GMail .com
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