Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ARRT
STRASBOURG
12 juillet 2016
PROCDURE
1. lorigine de laffaire se trouve une requte (no 56324/13) dirige
contre la Rpublique franaise et dont un ressortissant tunisien, A.M. ( le
requrant ), a saisi la Cour le 4 septembre 2013 en vertu de larticle 34 de
la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de lhomme et des liberts
fondamentales ( la Convention ). Le prsident de la section a accd la
demande de non-divulgation de son identit formule par le requrant
(article 47 4 du rglement).
2. Le requrant, qui a t admis au bnfice de lassistance judiciaire, a
t reprsent par Me E. Mauriac-Lapalisse, avocat Bayonne. Le
gouvernement franais ( le Gouvernement ) a t reprsent par son
agent, M. F. Alabrune, directeur des affaires juridiques au ministre des
Affaires trangres.
3. Le requrant allgue que sa rtention administrative a mconnu
larticle 5 de la Convention.
4. Le 4 aot 2014, la requte a t communique au Gouvernement.
EN FAIT
I. LES CIRCONSTANCES DE LESPCE
5. Le requrant est n en 1976 et rside Kairouan (Tunisie)
6. Il quitta son pays au moment de la rvolution tunisienne et entra
irrgulirement en France au mois de fvrier 2011.
tre men bien. Chaque tat membre fixe une dure dtermine de rtention, qui
ne peut pas dpasser six mois.
6. Les tats membres ne peuvent pas prolonger la priode vise au paragraphe 5,
sauf pour une priode dtermine nexcdant pas douze mois supplmentaires,
conformment au droit national, lorsque, malgr tous leurs efforts raisonnables, il
est probable que lopration dloignement dure plus longtemps en raison :
a)
b)
des retards subis pour obtenir de pays tiers les documents ncessaires.
Article L. 551-1
moins quil ne soit assign rsidence en application de larticle L. 561-2,
ltranger qui ne peut quitter immdiatement le territoire franais peut tre plac en
rtention par lautorit administrative dans des locaux ne relevant pas de
ladministration pnitentiaire, pour une dure de cinq jours, lorsque cet tranger :
1o Doit tre remis aux autorits comptentes dun tat membre de lUnion
europenne en application des articles L. 531-1 ou L. 531-2 ;
2o Fait lobjet dun arrt dexpulsion ;
3o Doit tre reconduit la frontire en excution dune interdiction judiciaire du
territoire prvue au deuxime alina de larticle 131-30 du code pnal ;
4o Fait lobjet dun signalement aux fins de non-admission ou dune dcision
dloignement excutoire mentionne larticle L. 531-3 du prsent code ;
5o Fait lobjet dun arrt de reconduite la frontire pris moins de trois annes
auparavant en application de larticle L. 533-1 ;
6o Fait lobjet dune obligation de quitter le territoire franais prise moins dun an
auparavant et pour laquelle le dlai pour quitter le territoire est expir ou na pas t
accord ;
7o Doit tre reconduit doffice la frontire en excution dune interdiction de
retour ;
8o Ayant fait lobjet dune dcision de placement en rtention au titre des 1o 7o,
na pas dfr la mesure dloignement dont il est lobjet dans un dlai de sept
jours suivant le terme de son prcdent placement en rtention ou, y ayant dfr,
est revenu en France alors que cette mesure est toujours excutoire.
Article L. 552-1
Quand un dlai de cinq jours sest coul depuis la dcision de placement en
rtention, le juge des liberts et de la dtention est saisi aux fins de prolongation de
la rtention. Le juge statue dans les vingt-quatre heures de sa saisine par ordonnance
au sige du tribunal de grande instance dans le ressort duquel se situe le lieu de
placement en rtention de ltranger, sauf exception prvue par voie rglementaire,
aprs audition du reprsentant de ladministration, si celui-ci, dment convoqu, est
prsent, et de lintress ou de son conseil, sil en a un. Ltranger peut demander au
juge des liberts et de la dtention quil lui soit dsign un conseil doffice.
Toutefois, si une salle daudience attribue au ministre de la justice lui permettant
de statuer publiquement a t spcialement amnage proximit immdiate de ce
lieu de rtention, il statue dans cette salle.
Article R. 552-17
Ltranger en rtention qui demande, hors des audiences prvues aux
articles R. 552-9 et R. 552-15, quil soit mis fin sa rtention saisit le juge des
liberts et de la dtention par simple requte adresse par tout moyen au juge.
peine dirrecevabilit, la requte est motive et signe de ltranger ou de son
reprsentant, et accompagne de toutes les pices justificatives.
Il est procd comme il est dit la section 1 du prsent chapitre. Toutefois, le juge
peut rejeter la requte sans avoir pralablement convoqu les parties sil apparat
quaucune circonstance nouvelle de fait ou de droit nest intervenue depuis le
placement en rtention administrative ou son renouvellement, ou que les lments
10
EN DROIT
I. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLGUE DE LARTICLE 5 4 DE LA
CONVENTION
24. Le requrant considre quil a t priv de tout accs effectif un
juge contrlant la lgalit de sa dtention. Il rappelle, en effet, quil a t
renvoy vers la Tunisie avant la saisine du juge des liberts et de la
dtention et avant que le tribunal administratif ne se prononce sur la lgalit
de la mesure de placement en rtention. Il souligne galement le caractre
partiel du contrle exerc par le juge administratif, celui-ci nayant aucun
pouvoir pour apprcier les conditions de son interpellation. Il invoque
larticle 5 4 de la Convention, ainsi libell :
Toute personne prive de sa libert par arrestation ou dtention a le droit
dintroduire un recours devant un tribunal, afin quil statue bref dlai sur la lgalit
de sa dtention et ordonne sa libration si la dtention est illgale.
A. Sur la recevabilit
25. Le Gouvernement reproche au requrant de navoir pas puis les
voies de recours internes sagissant de lun des volets de son grief. En effet,
sil a critiqu devant les juridictions administratives labsence deffet
suspensif de la mesure dloignement de son recours, il ne sest pas plaint
devant elles des conditions de son interpellation.
26. Le requrant fait valoir que le juge administratif ne se prononce que
sur la lgalit de larrt de placement en rtention et quil ne peut contrler
les conditions de linterpellation ayant abouti la rtention. Le requrant
explique, par ailleurs, que le seul juge comptent pour examiner un tel grief,
le juge des liberts et de la dtention, ne peut tre saisi avant lexpiration
dun dlai de cinq jours.
27. La Cour rappelle que cest au Gouvernement qui excipe du nonpuisement des voies de recours internes quil appartient de prouver que le
11
requrant na pas utilis une voie de recours qui tait la fois effective et
disponible (Dalia c. France, 19 fvrier 1998, 38, Recueil des arrts et
dcisions 1998-I, McFarlane c. Irlande [GC], no 31333/06, 107,
10 septembre 2010). Il nest contest par aucune des parties que le juge
administratif na pas comptence pour statuer sur les irrgularits de la
procdure antrieure au placement en rtention administrative. Le
Gouvernement ne produit dailleurs devant la Cour aucune jurisprudence
tendant dmontrer que linvocation dun tel grief aurait eu une chance de
prosprer devant le juge administratif. La Cour observe, par ailleurs, avec le
requrant quun recours devant le juge des liberts et de la dtention ntait
pas envisageable, la privation de libert ayant dur moins de cinq jours. Il
convient donc dcarter lexception dirrecevabilit du Gouvernement.
28. La Cour constate, en outre, que la requte nest pas manifestement
mal fonde au sens de larticle 35 3 a) de la Convention et quelle ne se
heurte par ailleurs aucun autre motif dirrecevabilit. En consquence, la
Cour la dclare recevable.
B. Sur le fond
1. Thses des parties
29. Le requrant soutient que linterversion de lordre dintervention du
juge des liberts et de la dtention et du juge administratif dans la procdure
de contrle de la rtention administrative conduit une absence totale de
contrle juridictionnel de la privation de libert pour une dure pouvant
aller jusqu cinq jours.
30. Il rappelle que le juge des liberts et de la dtention ne peut se
prononcer sur le maintien de la rtention administrative qu lissue de
lcoulement du dlai de cinq jours. Sa rtention ayant dur moins de
cinq jours, le requrant na donc pas pu saisir le juge des liberts et de la
dtention, pourtant seul comptent, selon lui, pour contrler la lgalit de la
privation de libert.
31. Le requrant explique que le contrle du juge administratif est
partiel : il ne porte que sur la lgalit de la dcision fondant le placement en
rtention et non sur les conditions de son interpellation et sur les conditions
du droulement de la privation de libert. De plus, il argue de lineffectivit
de ce contrle en raison de son absence deffet suspensif. Il fait ainsi valoir
quil a t expuls avant mme que le juge administratif ne se soit prononc
sur son recours.
32. Le requrant soutient enfin avoir puis toutes les voies de droit
utiles sa disposition. Se fondant sur un avis du Conseil dtat, il affirme
que le recours form contre larrt de placement en rtention est exclusif de
toute autre procdure. Il rappelle que la Cour a considr que la procdure
de rfr-libert, qui na pas deffet suspensif, ntait pas une voie de droit
12
13
14
15
Claudia Westerdiek
Greffire
Angelika Nuberger
Prsidente
A.N.
C.W.
16
La traduction en franais de cette opinion spare sera intgre dans la version HUDOC ds quelle sera
disponible.
1
Code de lentre et du sjour des trangers et du droit dasile, hereafter CESEDA.
2
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 December 2008, on common
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (the Returns
Directive), OJ L 348/98.
3
See, as regards the former, Avotis v. Latvia [GC], no. 17502/07, judgment of 23 May 2016 and, as regards the
latter, the examination of the compatibility of both returns decisions and administrative detention with the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and, indirectly, the ECHR, in, inter alia, Mahdi, C-146/14 PPU,
EU:C:2014:1320; J. N. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, C-601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, and Celaj, C290/14, EU:C:2015:640.
17
subjected in the light not only of the requirements of domestic law but also
of the text of the Convention, the Court must understand what exactly the
requirements of the former are and, where necessary, the provisions and
functioning of domestic law in conjunction with and pursuant to EU law.
Requirements of Article 5 4
5. The following general principles, concerning both the scope of
application and the general requirements of an Article 5 4 review, are
established in the case-law:
See X v. Sweden, no. 10230/82, Commission decision of 11 May 1983, Decisions and Reports (DR) 32, p. 304;
A.K. v. Austria, no. 20832/92, Commission decision of 1 December 1993, unpublished; Stephens v Malta (no. 1),
no. 11956/07, 102, 21 April 2009; Fox, Hartley and Campbell v. United Kingdom, nos. 12244/86, 12245/86,
12383/86, 45, 30 August 1990, and Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, 157, 9 October 2003.
5
See, inter alia, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, no. 13178/03, 12 October 2006, 112.
6
See, inter alia, Chahal v. United Kingdom, no. 22414/93, 15 November 1996, 127, Reports 1996-V.
7
See Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009/05, 123, ECHR 2008.
18
See Bouamar v. Belgium, judgment of 29 February 1988, Series A no. 129, p. 24, para. 60; Chahal, cited above,
127-129; Dougoz v Grce, no. 40907/08, 61, 6 March 2001; Tabesh v Grce, no. 8256/07, 26 November
2009, 61; S. D. v Greece, no. 53541/07, 72, 11 June 2009.
9
See Chahal, cited above, 130.
10
Ibid., 128.
19
See, as regards the interpretation of the CESEDA, the Council of State factsheet on the administrative judge and
immigration law, 15 June 2015. See also Article 13 of Directive 2008/115.
12
See also the provisions of article L. 511-1 of the CESEDA on when an obligation to leave French territory can
be imposed. It includes situations where a previous order of this nature has not been executed.
13
See 27 of the majority judgment.
20
call into question the circumstances of his interception or contest that he had
arrived in France illegally, from Italy, with no identity document.
9. As regards the second point, the majority judgment makes no reference
to the urgent interim procedure, said by the Government to constitute an
effective remedy, so it is difficult to know of what that procedure consists,
whether it is effective and, if not, why not.14
10. A further issue concerning the admissibility of the applicants
complaint stems from the fact that the applicant had been released, albeit
pursuant to an expulsion decision executed on 11 October 2011, before the
administrative judge had ruled on the lawfulness of his detention. As
regards the application ratione materiae of Article 5 4 of the Convention,
the latter is said to have no application for the purposes of obtaining, after
release, a declaration that a previous detention was unlawful. The majority
judgment does explain, albeit briefly, why this Slivenko/Fox, Hartley,
Campbell principle does not, in the instant case, apply. The applicant had
been deprived of his liberty for 83 hours and the length of his detention is
thus the basis and reason for the Courts Article 5 4 examination to
proceed.15 Nevertheless, if the duration of an applicants deprivation of
liberty is the criterion which determines the applicability of Article 5 4
despite his release, it is important to indicate somehow or sometime what
the cut-off point is. Neither in this judgment nor in the previous ones cited
in paragraph 5, first indent, of this opinion, has the Court made this clear.
Merits
11. As indicated previously, I agree with the majority decision that an
Article 5 4 review, in circumstances such as this, does not suspend
execution of the expulsion order. The applicant was not, it should be
emphasized, an asylum-seeker.16 I also agree with the preliminary statement
in paragraph 41 of the majority judgment to the effect that the deprivation of
liberty must respect the aim of Article 5 1 (f). In other words, the
detention of the applicant must have been with a view to his expulsion.
Given the circumstances of the case and the execution of the expulsion
order while the administrative court was considering his request for review
of the legality of his detention, the speediness of the review and respect for
this aim or purpose can hardly be questioned. The expulsion proceedings
were prosecuted with due diligence.
14
See article L-521-2 of the code of administrative justice, cited in paragraph 23 of the majority judgment.
See also onka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, judgment of 5 February 2002, 55, where the deprivation of liberty
lasted five days.
16
That status would prevent, at least until the first decision on an asylum application was taken, execution of a
return or expulsion decision. See the relevant provisions of the CESEDA; Article 2(1) and recital 9 of the Returns
Directive and paragraph 49 of the CJEU decision in Arslan, C-534/11, EU:C:2013:343.
15
21
12. Turning to the key point on which I have difficulty subscribing to the
majority judgment the limited scope of review exercised by the French
administrative judge paragraph 41 of the majority judgment refers to a
series of judgments of this Court, primarily against Greece, in which a
violation of Article 5 4 was found. Those judgments were based either on
the fact that the provisions of national law then in force did not separate the
detention order from the expulsion order, so that even a successful review of
the legality of the latter did not lead to the automatic lifting of the
administrative detention (Tabesh v. Greece and S.D. v. Greece, cited above)
or on the fact that, even when amended, they still did not permit a review of
any Article 3 complaint relating to the conditions of detention (R.T.
v Greece, cited above). Concluding that the French system in force between
2011 and 2016 violates Article 5 4, paragraph 42 of the majority judgment
rejects the scope of review exercised by the administrative judge and
establishes that the Article 5 4 judge should be able to review the
circumstances in which the third country national was intercepted by the
police and the regularity or lawfulness of all acts preceding that persons
detention and leading to his expulsion. The means of interception which led
to the placement of an individual in administrative detention must be in
accordance with Article 5 1, which is to protect individuals from
arbitrariness. In my view, in judging the review provided by the
administrative judge to be unduly narrow, the Court diverges from existing
case-law and represents domestic law in a manner different to that done in
other similar cases.
13. As regards the provisions of domestic law, the majority judgment
explains in some detail the different, related, but separate, jurisdiction of the
administrative and judicial judges under French law17:
17
This description, it is important to remember, is of the regime applicable between 2011 and 2016 before law n
2016-274 accorded exclusive jurisdiction to the JLD to assess the lawfulness of a detention measure (see
paragraphs 18-21 of the majority judgment).
22
14. In many French cases examined with reference to Article 5 1 (f) and
4, and relating to the same provisions as those applicable in the instant case,
the Court has expressed no criticism of this interaction between the
administrative judge and the JLD, with the former intervening speedily
within 72 hours of the detention and the latter if there is a prolongation of
detention after five days. Nor has the jurisdiction and scope of review by the
French administrative judge caused problems as such.19
15. As regards the coherence of the present judgment with existing caselaw on Article 5 4, as indicated previously, in Chahal v. United Kingdom,
the Court specifically held that, in cases of detention with a view to
deportation, Article 5 [ 1 f)] provides a different level of protection from
Article 5 [ 1 c)]. (...) Article 5 4 does not demand that the domestic
courts should have the power to review whether the underlying decision to
expel could be justified under national or Convention law.20 The problems
See also paragraph 11 of the majority judgment and the decision of the Council of State (Conseil dtat) in the
instant case which explains that L-512-2 CESEDA established a special procedure allowing the administrative
judge to decide rapidly on the legality of the measures relating to the expulsion of third country nationals
when the latter are placed in administrative detention or confined to their residence, as well as on the legality of
decisions placing them in such detention.
19
See variously, the judgments in R.M. and Others. v. France, no. 33201/11; A.M. and Others v. France, no.
24587/12; A.B. and Others v. France, no. 11593/12; R.K. and Others v. France, no. 68264/14 and R.C. and V.C.
v. France, no. 76491/14, all pronounced on this day. None of these judgments identify a problem either with the
sharing of jurisdiction between the administrative judge and the JLD or with the manner in which the former must,
in principle, exercise his jurisdiction. Where a violation of Article 5 4 is found in these cases it is due to a failure
to seek, where possible, a less restrictive measure than detention while the families in question, with minor
children, awaited execution of return decisions. An assessment of the last resort nature of the administrative
detention of the applicant in our case did, however, occur. See also, Popov v. France, nos. 39472/07 and
39474/07, 122-123, 19 January 2012, for another uncontroversial examination of the separate but related
reviews by the administrative judge and JLD.
20
See Chahal, cited above, 112 and 128. Two cases which could stand out, under Article 5 4, are onka v.
Belgium and Mubilanzila, both cited above. In the former, 53, the Court held that the review by the commitals
division under Belgian law did not satisfy the requirements of Article 5 4 because that body carried out a very
18
23
which led to findings of violations in the Greek cases are not mirrored in the
French system applicable in 2011, as the description, in paragraph 13 above,
of the jurisdiction and powers of the administrative judge reveals. While
French law has since been amended, with the JLD now exclusively
competent to review the lawfulness of the detention order and decide on its
prolongation within 48 hours, that fact alone is not a grounds for requiring,
on the basis of the Convention, the enlarged scope of judicial review which
results from paragraphs 41 and 42 of the majority judgment.
Conclusion
16. As indicated previously, the complexity of the French legal and judicial
framework at issue in the instant case may mean the above presentation of
domestic law, which is based on the information in the case file and the
submissions of the parties, contains errors. In addition, the terms of
paragraph 42 of the majority judgment could be read as applying uniquely
to France. In that case, this judgment identifies what is now a historical
violation of the Convention as French law has since changed.
17. However, if, as the terms of the judgment suggest, it defines the scope
of the judicial review of administrative detention orders which must now,
pursuant to Article 5 4, be provided, its wider impact must be considered.
The risk is that paragraph 42 of the majority judgment, which reflects the
French legislative choice to confer jurisdiction on the JLD in 2016, becomes
the required minimum in all Council of Europe Member States, not least
those subject to Directive 2008/115.21 This should be a cause for concern. It
might be that the Court should carefully re-examine its existing case-law on
Article 5 4 with a view to determining whether the nature and scope of the
limited review of detention orders, limited to their procedural lawfulness and without regard to the proportionality
of detention in the individual case. However, the facts in onka, which led to recognition of the first collective
expulsion, were very particular, and the scope of review at issue was quite different to that done by the French
administrative judge, who expressly engaged in a proportionality review. In Mubilanzila, 113, the Belgian
authorities made arrangements for the second applicants deportation the day after she lodged an application with
the chambre de conseil for release, that is to say, even before the latter body had delivered its decision. However,
the detainee in that case was a five year old child, detained on her own. In addition, under Belgian law, a stay
applied and had not expired when she was deported, and, furthermore, the Court found that there was no link
between her deportation and the exercise of the remedy or the fact that it was granted. Neither the review
exercised by the French administrative judge in the instant case, nor the circumstances of the case, are comparable.
21
A choice is what Article 15(2)(a) and (b) of Directive 2008/115 appears to provide Member States bound by this
directive. As an aside, it is worth remembering the rationale and functioning of the Returns Directive, explained
recently by the CJEU in the following terms: [T]hird-country nationals who, (), have entered the territory of
a[n EU] Member State illegally and who, on that basis, are regarded as staying there illegally () must be the
subject of a return procedure, the order of whose stages corresponds to a gradation of the measures to be taken in
order to enforce the return decision and which permits, so far as concerns deprivation of liberty, at the very most
detention in a specialized facility, a measure which is, however, strictly regulated, pursuant to Articles 15 and 16
of Directive 2008/115, in order to ensure observance of the fundamental rights of the third-country nationals
concerned (See the judgment of the CJEU of 7 June 2016, Affum v. Prfet du Pas-de-Calais, C-47/15,
EU:C:2016:408, paragraphs 61-62). For a detailed examination of judicial review of administrative detention in
EU Member States, see Section 2.3 of the European Commission report, Evaluation on the application of the
Return Directive, 22 October 2013. See also, the 2010 report of the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU,
Detention of Third Country Nationals in Return Procedures.
24
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011, is illustrative of the more extreme cases.
See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on EU Return Policy, COM (2014) 199 final, p. 3, which reports that there is a considerable gap between the
persons issued with a return decision (approximately 484,000 persons in 2012, 491,000 in 2011 and 540,000 in
2010) and those who, as a consequence, have left the EU (approximately 178,000 in 2012, 167,000 in 2011 and
199,000 in 2010). See also the 2015 report of the French Council of State, which estimates that cases under the
CESEDA represent over 32 % of those brought before the administrative courts, 44 % before the administrative
appeal courts and 15 % of those before the Council of State itself.
23