American

Philosophical

Quarterly

Volume 34, Number 3, July 1997

WHY IT IS BETTER NEVER

COME INTO EXISTENCE
David

Benatar

future possible
people that,
one
no wrong
does
being equal,
into
existence
by bringing
people whose
as?
on
balance.
This
lives will be good
rests

being brought
life prospects)

on another,
into existence

ment,

is a benefit

turely deceased
the last.) None

though

without

gue that
erroneous.
not

argument.

the underlying

Being brought
a benefit
but always

people will

I wish

existent.

is
is

happen

a harm. Many

might

be resistant

to it.

suffer

the non?

harm.
story.

Thus,

into being
a benefit.

of empirical
fact, bad things
to all of us. No life is without hard?

this conclusion

difference

between

live a life of poverty

over

much of their lives with some disability.

such a life is, on this view,

is because

which

live

with

However,
low. This

ship. It is easy to think of themillions who

or of those who

this befalls

the cheerful
will
say, we
of
life
the
pleasures
against
weigh up
the evils. As long as the former outweigh
the latter, the life is worth
living. Coming

a matter

happen

of
existers

must

II
As

(Only the prema?

spared some but not

only to those who exist. Pleasures,

can be had only by
and satisfaction

joys,
existers.

find this deeply unsettling

people

they
that at least

sure

Not only bad things but also good things

claim to be counter-intuitive
and will wish
to dismiss
I propose
it. For this reason,
not only to defend
the claim, but also to
suggest why

are

form

severe

Only
Of course I have not told the whole

to ar?

assumption
into existence

what

predict
take or how

be, but we can be

some of them will occur.

(with decent
(even

cannot

will

harms

will

not being born is not a harm). All this is

assumed

the harms that

child: pain, disappoint?

grief and death. For any

anxiety,
child we

given
these

that

namely

death.1 We

await any new-born

all things

sumption

face

all

infrequently contemplate
in the

assumption

about

literature

We

of frailty.

years

is a common

here

TO

the advantages
non-existence2
hollow

fol?

is a crucial

there
harms

not

does
and

makes

benefits

of existence
but

the disad?

real. Consider
vantages
pains and pleasures
as exemplars
of harms and benefits.
It is

of us are lucky enough

to be spared
these fates, but most
of us who do none?
at some
suffer
theless
ill-health
stage
is ex?
the suffering
during our lives. Often
Some

uncontroversial
1) the presence

to say that:
of pain

is bad

and that

even if it is only in our final

cruciating,
are condemned
Some
to
days.
by nature

2) the presence

of pleasure

345

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is good.

346 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

such a symmetrical
However,
does not apply to the absence
for:
pleasure,
3)

evaluation
of pain

if that

whereas

My

view

about

the asymmetry

3) and 4) is widely
reasons
First,

is the best

to support

this.

explanation

for

the commonly held view that while there

is a duty to avoid bringing suffering people
is no duty to bring
into
In other words,
happy people
being.
the reason why we think that there is a duty
not to bring suffering people
into existence
there

into existence,

those

positive
that amongst

think

who

do

think
a few

duties

only
is a duty
into existence.
For
these

is preferable

second

support for my claim about the

between
3) and 4) is that,
asymmetry
it seems strange to give as a rea?
whereas
son for having
a child that the child one
has will

shared. A number of

can be advanced
this view

between

of

have

to bring happy people

this reason, my explanation
to the alternative.
A

the absence of pleasure is not bad unless

there is somebody
for whom
this ab?
sence is a deprivation.

4)

even

However,
that we
also

is good, even
by anyone,

the absence of pain

good is not enjoyed

and

sometimes
thereby be benefited,
a child
do avoid bringing
into exist?
ence
of the potential
child's
because

we

If having

interests.

were

children

done

the purpose of thereby benefiting

then there would
children,
reason
for at least many
more children.
In contrast
cern

for

who

would

the welfare
suffer

be greater moral
to have
people

to this, our con?

of potential
children
is taken to be a sound

not

for deciding

for

those

to have

is that the presence

of this suffering would
be bad (for the sufferers)
and the absence

basis

of the suffering is good (even though there

whether

to enjoy the absence

of suffer?
is nobody
we
to
contrast
that there
In
think
this,
ing).
is no duty to bring happy people
into ex?
their pleasure would
istence because, while

having children
not seem odd. And
if it were not the case
that absent pains are good even where
they
are not good for anybody,
then we could

be

(given
would

that

not

would

its absence

good,

be bad

be nobody

there would

be deprived
of it).
It might
be objected
that there

ternative

explanation

procreational
to my
peal

who

is an al?
about our

for the view

duties, one
claim
about

absent

not ap?
the asymmetry

that does

between 3) and 4). Itmight be suggested

that the reason why we have

a duty

to avoid

bringing suffering people into being, but

not a duty to bring happy people
is that we have negative
istence,

into ex?
to

duties

harm, but no corresponding

positive
duties to bring about happiness.
Judgments
duties are thus like
about our procreational
avoid

judgments
those who
duties,

about

deny
this would

explanation

all other
that we
indeed

to the one

duties.

Now

for

have

any positive
be an alternative

I have

provided.

not

say

were

pleasures
they were

the child.

bad

If
of

irrespective
then
for anybody,
for their own sakes would

that

bad

it would

be

children

bringing

to avoid
good
into existence.

suffering
can be
for my
claim
support
Finally,
drawn from a related asymmetry,
this time
in our retrospective
judgments.
Bringing
as
as
to
well
into
existence
failing
people
can be regret?
into
people
only bringing
can be regretted for the sake of

bring people
ted. However,
existence

into existence

the person whose

on our decision.
not having
the children
been

had
which

existence

was

contingent
about
might
grieve
but not because
children,
One

one could

of existence.

have had have

Remorse

deprived
not having children is remorse
sorrow about having missed

about

for ourselves,

child-bearing
we
and child-rearing
However,
experiences.
a
into existence
do regret having brought
we
and
child with an unhappy
life,
regret

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WHY IS ITBETTERNEVER TO COME INTOEXISTENCE / 347

sake, even if also for our
own sakes. The reason why we do not la?
ment our failure
to bring somebody
into
are
is because
absent pleasures
existence
it for the child's

and one

exists.

along
can be represented

mentioned,

(B) in which X never

the views
with
already

I realize that the judgments that underlie

body

even

pleasure
of

deprived

if there were
On

that pleasure.

3)

Presence

if that would

'

Presence

(Good)

the view

reject

about

the asymmetry

of 3) and 4). Positive utilitarians who are

to the asymmetry

sympathetic

a distinction between

could

(i) promoting
or will

of people
(that exist,
happiness
ist independently
of one's
choices)
(ii)

increasing

people.

They

(Good)

4)

Absence

of Pleasure

<t>

(Not Bad)

increase

be manifest

if that would
lead to a net increase
being
of happiness,
others. This
by benefiting
utilitarians
is not to say that all positive
must

of Pain

Absence

<t?

of Pleasure

their

utility.
as a duty
Usually
to bring happy people
into existence.
How?
the duty
ever, under certain circumstances
into
could be to bring a suffering
person
this would

of Pain

(Bad)

view there is a duty to bring people into

existence

(X never exists)

1)

no?

Scenario

(X exists)

are not universally

this asymmetry
shared.
?
For example,
who
utilitarians
positive
are interested not only in minimizing
pain
?
would
but also in maximizing
pleasure
tend to lament the absence
of additional
possible

diagramatically:

Scenario A

not bad.

This,

draw

the
ex?
and

by making
happiness
with
could
then, consistent

It is uncontroversially
the case that 1) is
in accordance
bad and 2) is good. However,
with

the intuitions

good

even

though
the good,
but 4)

above, 3) is
to en?
is nobody
is not bad because

there is nobody who

is deprived of the

joy

absent

mentioned
there

pleasures.
on my

Drawing

defense

earlier

of

the

we should note that alternative

asymmetry,
to
of
ways
3) and 4), according
evaluating
and
which a symmetry
between
pain
plea?
sure is preserved,
must
fail, at least if
common
preserved.

are

important
judgments
The first option
is:

to be

positive utiliarianism, judge only (i) to be

a requirement
erable version
one

of morality.
of positive

This

is the pref?
If

utilitarianism.

of
(ii) also to be a requirement
one
then
would
be
morality,
regarding per?
sons merely
as means
to the production

l)Bad

3) Good

2) Good

4) Bad

took

of happiness.
If my arguments

so far are sound, then

the asymmetry
between
is widespread
and the
pain and pleasure
dissenters
few. My argument will proceed
by showing how, given this common view,
it follows
that it is better never
to come
the view

about

into existence.
to compare
this, it is necessary
one
X exists
in
which
scenarios,
(A)

To show
two

to preserve
the absence
Here,
symmetry,
of pleasure
(4) has been termed "bad." This
is too strong because
if the ab?
judgment
sence

in scenario
of pleasure
rather than "not bad" then we

is "bad"

should

have

to regret that X did not come into existence.

But we do not think that it is regrettable.

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348 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY
The

second

evaluation

a symmetrical
and pain is:

to effect

way

of pleasure

determine

the

disadvantages
never coming

relative

of coming
to be, we

and

advantages
into existence

and

to compare

need

1)with 3), and 2) with 4). In the first com?

we

parison

3) Not Bad

l)Bad

preferable
real one.

see

that

to existence.
In the second

is

non-existence
The

is a

advantage

comparison,

how?

the pleasures
of the existent,
although
over
non
are
a
not
real
good,
advantage
of
the
absence
because
existence,
pleasures
is not bad. For the good to be a real advan?
ever,

4) Not Good

2) Good

in this case,
the
preserve
symmetry
of pain (3) has been termed "not
absence
and the absence
bad" rather than "good,"

To

of pleasure
(4) has been termed "not good"
rather than "not bad." On one interpreta?
to "good" and
tion, "not bad" is equivalent
to "bad." But this
"not good" is equivalent
is operative
which
is not the interpretation
not
would
if
it
it
in this matrix,
for
were,
from, and would have the same short?
"Not bad"
as, the previous matrix.
comings
means
"not bad, but not good either." This
a suffering
is too weak. Avoiding
bringing
differ

is more than merely

child into existence

"not bad."

the absence

It is good. Judging
to be "not good"

of pleasure
in that
weak

too

is also

not say enough.

Of
is not what
of pleasure
we would
the impor?
call good. However,
tant question, when the absence of pleasure
no deprivation
is
for anybody,
involves
course

it does

the absence

whether

it is also

is "bad." The

"not bad"

answer

but not bad either"

but bad." Because

or whether

it

is that it is "not good,

rather than "not good,

"not bad"

is a more

com?

than "not good," that is the

plete
even those who wish
one I prefer. However,
to stick with "not good" will not thereby
evaluation

a symmetry.
If pain is
in restoring
is good, but the absence of
bad and pleasure
pain is good and the absence of pleasure not
between
then there is no symmetry
good,
succeed

pleasure

and pain.

rejected
Having
tions, I return to my

alternative
original

evalua?
diagram.

To

it would
tage over non-existence,
were
be the case that its absence

have

to

bad. To

existent

an analogy which,
this, consider
the comparison
of two
it involves
unlike
is
the
people
comparison

between

existence

illustrate
because

and non-existence

in this

may be instruc?
way, but which nonetheless
tive. S is prone to regular bouts of illness.
for him, he is also so consti?
Fortunately
tuted that he recovers
quickly. H lacks the
for quick

capacity

recovery,

but he never

gets sick. It is bad for S that he gets sick

it is good for him that he recovers
It is good that H never gets sick,
quickly.
but it is not bad that he lacks the capacity
and

to heal

for quick
capacity
a
for
S, is not a
recovery,
good
although
over H. This is because
the
real advantage
speedily.

The

is not bad for H

of that capacity
worse
not
H
he would have
is
off
than
(and
been had he had the recuperative
powers
of S). S is not better off than H in any way,
absence

even though S is better off than he himself

would

have

been

had he lacked

the capac?

ity for rapid recovery.

the relative
We can ascertain

advantages
and non
of existence
and disadvantages
in my
still
in another
existence
way,

original matrix, but by comparing (2) with

(3) and (4) with (1). There are benefits both
It is good that
to existing
and non-existing.
It is also
their
existers
pleasures.
enjoy
are
avoided
through non
good that pains
existence.
picture.

that is only
However,
there is nothing
Because

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part of the
bad about

WHY IS ITBETTERNEVER TO COME INTOEXISTENCE / 349

never

into existence,
coming
about coming
bad
something

ence,

all

considered

things

but

is

there

into exist?

about

cannot

the realizations

and never

of existence

the cheerful

we want

The

analy?
because
it

existing.
is mistaken

If

the wrong comparison.

making
to determine whether non-existence

is preferable
then we must

or vice

to existence,
the

compare
sides of the diagram,
right-hand
resent the alternative
scenarios
exists

and in which

paring

the upper

X does
and

left-

versa,
and the

which

rep?
in which X

not exist.

the lower

how

Understanding

good

or bad a life X's

is.

it

holds no ad?
existence
that, although
over non-existence,
some lives
vantages
over others. Not all cases
have advantages
are equally
dis?
of coming
into existence
clear

The more
the positive
advantageous.
of a life outweigh
the negative
features
so the less
the
better
the
and
ones,
life,
so
is. But
existence
disadvantageous
long as there are some
the life is not preferable
come
into existence.

aspects,
negative
to never having

from this, there is a difference

Following
between
saying that it is better not to come
into existence
it is to come

are that we

and saying how great a harm

So far I have
into existence.

and greater
count ourselves

ers, we
should.

At

the

should

not

lose

it is better

we

into

not

be a benefit.

They would have far less difficulty ex?

tending this judgment to all lives, if they
saw how great
really
all people
suffer.
Take

the harms

are

that

death

for example,
because
it is
we
a
all
We
that
face.
consider
something
death at forty as tragic, but tend to be pretty
casual about a death at ninety. Clearly,
the
to the
latter person's
life is far preferable
former's
(all other things being equal), but
that does not detract from the intrinsic harm
of a death

at ninety. Imagine how different

our evaluation would be of a death at ninety

if people commonly lived to one hundred

and twenty
time when
til

forty

others

there was a
contrast,
rarely lived until their

By

was

not

It becomes

living un?
as such a

regarded
clear how flexible

evaluations

are

about

our

which

are serious

all deaths
bus.

years.

people
I take it that at that time

fifties.

deaths

that

time, however,
of how serious

lives may

quality

person to person, but Iwant to suggest now

that the harm is very substantial
for every?
must
it
be
stressed
that the
body. However,
view

so we

lucky. And

to my conclusion
into exist?
that coming
ence is not a benefit. Many
have
people

tragedy.3
common

to come

same

live longer and with

comfort
than oth?

the
sight
we
are.
harms
all suffer
That people do tend
to lose sight of this is one important psy?
reason why many feel resistance
chological

argued only for the first claim. The mag?

nitude of the harm of existence
varies from

never

If we

to others.

less ill-health

poor

quadrants

this difference makes

to forget how great the harms

all suffer. There
is a strong ten?
our lives go
to consider
how well

tend

very little difficulty seeing why relatively

Com?

on the left, tells us something quite differ?

ent; namely,

to non-existence.

We

dency
relative

ing as a comparison between the desirability

is not great, one

that that existence
is pref?

infer from

erable

which

one weighs
up (1) the pleasures
whereby
of life against (2) the evils ?
is unconvinc?

involves

and yet deny that

if one thinks
Similarly,

is great.
that the harm of existence

emerges
so far is that
from some of the reflections
of the cheerful ?
the cost-benefit
analysis

sis of

the first view

the harm

Ill
of

how

can endorse

non-existence

is preferable.

One

is logically distinct from my view

is. One
great a harm existence

existence

How

harms. My view is that

are serious harms, ceteris pari
the harm
is relative
to
great

or to the current

norm

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(which

itself

350 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY
of others)
by the life-span
a
is
serious
intrinsic
there

is determined
can

but

vary,
tragedy in any death. That we are born des?
tined to die is a serious harm.
Not

share

all

this

One

see death as
would
perspective
to pre-conception
non-existence.

opposing
equivalent
Those who

have

is a harm.

death

of death.

view

that my

will

this outlook

even

They may
view suffers

deny
seek

that
to

contradiction

suggest
in that I think non-existence

also

a harm?

be

answer

The

is

this.

or
pre-conception
who
of possible
the non-existence
people
never
is not something
become
actual
to anybody,
death (the ces?
which happens
non-existence

sation

of

happens

existence)
to somebody.

who

is something
It happens

that
to the
is cor?

dies. Whereas

person
rect that where

Epicurus
death is, I am not and where
that I
I am, death is not, it does not follow
to regard my death as a
have no reason
of me
harm. It is, after all, the termination
and

is something

that prospect

regret

that I can

intensely.

existence
ence

objection
between

to the compari?
into
coming

X's

not coming
into exist?
to compare
it is not possible
It is said that
and non-existence.
and X's

is that

existence

any state in which

so it is not possible
or worse
than existence.

is not

non-existence

can be and

somebody
for it to be better

jection.
noted4
with

to this ob?
responded
has
Joel
Feinberg
example,
X
of
the
existence
that comparing

have

Others

already

For

the non-existence

or advantageous
for the non-existent.
The
are not, and so things cannot
non-existent
literally be better for them or to their ad?
I say that non-existence
is
terms
that
made
in
is
preferable,
judgment
of the interests
of the person who would
When

or has otherwise

come

to exist.

The

claim

or
is that for any person
(whether possible
the alternative
scenario
of never
actual),
is better.5 It is because
existing
in terms of
tion is always made
that would
(or does) exist (that
son in scenario A) that my view
has

been

though
affairs

the evalua?
the person
is, the per?
is not what

even
"impersonalist,"6
a state of
is with
the comparison
called

(scenario
of a person.7

B)

and not with

the state

V
That

is a harm may be a hard

to swallow. Most people do not

existence

conclusion

are happy
regret their very existence. Many
to have come into being because
they en?
are
joy their lives. But these appraisals

IV
One important
son I have made

to" or "has an
than," "preferable
am not com?
I
over"
existence,
advantage
to saying that it is better, preferable,
mitted
is "better

vantage.

to

preferable
of ex?
but then see the cessation
existence,
into existence
istence as a harm. If coming
is a harm, how can going out of existence
Whereas

in which X does
(scenario B, inmy schema)
not exist. Such a comparison
is possible.
I say that non-existence
Note
that when

of X is not

to com?

or states of
conditions
pare two possible
the existence
X. Rather
it is to compare
an alternative
state of affairs
of X with

I have
the reasons
for precisely
fact that one enjoys one's life
better than
not make one's existence

mistaken

The

outlined.
does

because

non-existence,
into existence

if one had not come

there would

have

been

no?

body to have missed the joy of leading that

life and so the absence
bad. Notice

of joy would not be

sense
that itmakes
by contrast,
come
be?
into existence
having

to regret
cause one does
if one

not enjoy one's life. In this

into existence
had not come

case,
the life
then no being would have suffered
one leads. That is good, even though there
would

be nobody

who would

that good.

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have

enjoyed

WHY IS ITBETTERNEVER TO COME INTOEXISTENCE / 351

Now

be objected
that one cannot
one's
be mistaken
about whether

it may

possibly
existence
be

might
mistaken

to non-existence.
is preferable
said that just as one cannot
one

about whether

cannot

be mistaken
to have

glad
to have been

about

is in pain,

It
be
one

one

whether

is

if "I am glad
a proposition
to which

been

born. Thus

born,"
is equivalent
assent,
many
people would
to "It is better that I came into existence,"
then one cannot
existence

be mistaken

is better

about whether
The

than non-existence.

problem with this line of reasoning is that

whether

one currently
is glad to have been
it does not follow
that one cannot be

born,
mistaken
came

are not equivalent.

about
be mistaken

two propositions
if one cannot

these
Even

about whether

into existence.

it is better

that one

can imagine some?

at one stage in his life,
We

body being glad,

that he came to be,
in the midst
perhaps

and

then

(or earlier),
of extreme agony, re?

come
gret his having
it cannot be the case

into existence.
that (all things

Now
con?

sidered) it is both better to have come into

existence

and better

never

to have

come

that is exactly what we

would have to say in such a case, if it were
true that being glad or unhappy
about hav?
come
were
to
into
existence
ing
equivalent
into existence.

But

that one
its actually
being better or worse
came into being. This is true even in those
cases in which people
do not change
their
are
to
minds
about whether
be
they
happy
have

been

to some of the most

antagonistic
seated and powerful
human drives,
deeply
ones.
In evaluating
the reproductive
sharply

born.
VI

to have children we
it is wrong
aware and suspicious
must be acutely
of
these features of our constitution,
for they
to bias us in their
immense powers
possess
whether

favour.

At

the same

the
time, to embrace
is wrong
after fail?

view

that procreation
to
the moral
consider
ing
significance
these drives would
be rash.
cannot

Children
ence

for

children
serve

their

own

for other
their own

of

be brought
into exist?
sakes. People
have

reasons,

most

of which

Parents
satisfy
to
procreate.
They find
biological
fulfillment
in nurturing
and raising chil?
an insurance
are often
dren. Children
interests.

desires

for old age. Progeny

policy
some
ents with
form
of

provide

par?

immortality,
the genetic material,
and
values,
through
ideas that parents pass on to their children

and which

survive in their children and

after the parents themselves

grandchildren
are dead. These
are all good reasons
for
none
want
to
to
but
have
children,
people
of them show why having
children
is not
one's own interests
is not
Serving
bad. It is often good,
but where
harm on oth?
doing so inflicts
significant
ers, it is not usually
justified.

wrong.

always

the having of
then, to defend
way,
even
one
if
children,
accepts my view that
existence
is a harm,
is to deny that that
then argue that
harm is great. One could
One

the harm is outweighed by the benefits to

the parents. However,
son to think that even

there
if one

is some
takes

rea?

the extra

If what I have said is correct,

then there
can be no duty to bring people
into exist?
ence. Does
it also show that it is actually
to
or is procreation
have
children,
wrong

is a great
that existence
agrees
not
still
be immoral to have
harm, it
might
I hasten to add that, for reasons
children.
I

neither obligatory nor prohibited? Is it the

shall make

case

that our duty not to bring people

into
not
to
who
those
only
applies
to others, but to all possible
suffer relative
answer would
An affirmative
be
people?
existence

step

and

clear,

I am not

convinced

of

this. I offer the possible defense of having

not because
I think that this activity
be acceptable ?
is
perhaps existence
so bad that it is wrong
to have children ?

children
must

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352 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY
as pro?
as valued
something
creation must not be condemned
lightly.
most
It is morally
that
people
significant

but because

lives

whose

see

do not

well

go relatively
as a harm. They do not regret
their
having come into existence. My arguments
that these views may be less than
suggest
rational, but that does not rob them of all
lives

their moral
who

people

most
Because
significance.
live comfortable
lives are

to have

happy

come

into existence,
pro?
of such people are justified

spective parents
in assuming
that, if they have children,
too will feel this way. Given
their children
not
to obtain consent from
that it is
possible
to their existence

to bring

them

people prior
this presumption
into existence,
might play
a key role in a justification
for having chil?
we can presume
that those
dren. Where
we

whom

into

will

existence

not

bring
the argu?
mind
that we do, we are entitled,
to our
ment might
go, to give expression
these
inter?
interests.
Where
procreational
either a child
by having
or
a relatively
with a relatively
good life
if the parents
be wrong
bad life, it would
even
into
latter
the
existence,
brought
ests

can be met

where

that child would

also

not

regret

its

if the prospec?
is because,
This
existence.
tive parents are to satisfy their procreational
interests, they must do so with as little cost
as possible.
into being,

The
the

(such as where
a sub-minimally
that they would
interests.
ents'

less bad the life they bring

less the cost. Some costs
the offspring
decent
life)
always

would

lead

are so great
the par?

override

turn
cases in which
Those
the offspring
are exceedingly
out to regret their existence
tragic, but where parents cannot reasonably
foresee
this, we cannot
say, the argument
to fol?
that they do wrong
suggest,
in having
interests
their important
how different
children.
things
Imagine,
or even a sizeable
would be if the majority

would
low

minority

of people

regretted

coming

into

existence.

such

Under

circumstances

this

possible justification for having children

be doomed.

certainly would
The argument

to have

immoral

For
worrying.
form has been

not be
it might
for why
is somewhat
children

example,

its paternalistic
criticized
in other

widely
to rule out
of its inability
because
contexts,
in people's
those harmful
interferences
lives

as indoctrination)
of
endorsement

(such

subsequent
ences.
I am not
is because

of

the harmful

of bring?
is distinct
from
action

into existence

ing people
the factors
proval
this way

interfer?

so sure that this objection

in the context of having children.

has force
This

that effect
the

that cause
that action

it appears

the subsequent
by the offspring.

different

from

ap?
In

the harm

of indoctrination.
other

However,
Coming
trinated

similar

to endorse

concerns

the views

one

remain.
is indoc?

is one

to hold

form of adaptive
a
interfer?
preference,
paternalistic
ence comes to be endorsed. However,
there
are other kinds of adaptive
of
preference
where

we

which

are

which

goods
to be desired

also

prove

suspicious.
unattainable

Desired
can cease

The reverse
("sour grapes").
true. It is not uncommon
for people
to find themselves
circum?
in unfortunate
is also

to feed on lemons)
(being forced
to suit their
their
adapt
preferences
If coming
lemons").8
("sweet
predicament
stances

and

is as great a harm as I have

and if that is a heavy psycho?
suggested,
to bear,
then it is quite
burden
logical
we
in a mass
be
could
that
engaged
possible
into existence

about how wonderful

things
self-deception
are for us. Some may find this suggestion
a few
should consider
They
implausible.
matters.
how

First,

of
is the phenomenon
evaluations
quality-of-life
there

people's
and change.

Amongst
people with?
or disability
it is
out any serious disease
are
suf?
often thought that such conditions
never
to make
harms
serious
ficiently

differ

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WHY IS ITBETTERNEVER TO COME INTOEXISTENCE / 353

coming to exist preferable
such harms. Sometimes

to existence

with
is even

the claim

to exist is preferable
stronger, that ceasing
to continued
with such diseases
existence
or disabilities.
Very often, however,
people
conditions

or acquire
these same appalling
to
them
and prefer exist?
adapt

ence with

these conditions

who

have

to never

existing

argued, that the threshold in judgments

a minimally

constitutes

decent

is set too high. However,

with
compatible

quality-of-life

the
the

is equally

and

to the
that my conclusion
be false. What
the adaptive
concern
shows is that the mere

therefore

must

contrary
preference

belief that one has been benefited

to show

sufficient

to exist). This might

(or ceasing
suggest,
as some disabilities
advocates
have
rights
about what

people do not regret having come

reason
into existence
provides
compelling
to think that their lives are a benefit to them

that most

his slavery as conclusive

very is in his interests.
argument

siasm

pity on our species

with

and see the disap?

and
grief,
pain,

he was

why

it).The latter is exactly the judgment which

imagine would be made by an ex?
with a charmed
tra-terrestrial
life, devoid
of any suffering or hardship.
It would
look

ben?

is rational. We
appraisal
take a slave's
endorsement
of

not

enslavement,
his enthusiasm

can

is not

has been

or that one's

efited
would

phenomenon
is set too
threshold
claim that the ordinary
low (so that at least some of us should pass
we

that one

evidence

that sla?
of an

In the face
not benefited

we would

by his

view with

suspicion
for his own enslavement.
We

enthu?
do the same about people's
for their having come into existence.
if having
Even
children
is not immoral

should

we might
be en?
the presumption
(given
at
titled to make), my argument
suggests,
the very least, that it is not morally
desir?

anguish,
marks every human life and
that
suffering
our
as we
existence,
judge
(relatively

our potential
able. Although
offspring may
not regret coming
into existence,
they cer?
not
not
would
into
regret
tainly
coming

healthy and able-bodied humans) judge the

existence.

Since

interests

to come

desirable

course

pointment,

existence
worse

of bedridden

than the alternative

Our

to be

quadriplegics,
of non-existence.

of what

constitutes

accept?
rooted
can we

judgments
are deeply
limits of suffering
in the state of our well-being.
How

able
be

so confident

that we

self-deception?
But why
should

are not

guilty

such

of
be

self-deception
is the strong
explanation
we
reasons
why
evolutionary
might be dis?
our
as
a
to
view
lives
benefit.
Such
posed
so pervasive?

One

a view

facilitates
survival,
and the species.
These issues merit more
ment

than

I am able

of the individual

to offer

here.

treat?
I am

is that it
of my view
to die
be preferable
for our species
out. It would be better if there were no more

would

but not I, find such

people. Many
people,
a prospect
intolerable.
inherently
a non
that everybody
entered
Imagine
an
or even without
pact
on
acted
the
agreement
non-procreation
come into
ideal. No more children would

procreation

and

age
chance

unsure,

comes

argument

have

whether
the suggested
therefore,
for the permissibility
of (some?
children
is
sound.
However,
times) having
the worry that adaptive preferences
may be

operative
objection

does
some

provide
critics

one response
to an
raise, that the fact

of action

in their

the morally
is to ensure that

they do not.
One
implication

the world
substantial

not

it is actually
into being,

and the human

then become

would
population
extinct. There
is no

this occurring.
If our species
an
to
end, it will not be because we
to bring
chosen
this about
freely
of

(though it may result from other freely

chosen

actions). Nevertheless
is one which
must
be

ity
because

it is a theoretical

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the possibil?
considered

implication

of

354 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY
my

view.

I agree that there would be some

of the demise
which
of humans

aspects
to die
would be tragic. The last generation
out would
in which
the
live in a world
structures

down.
had broken
society
be no younger working
gen?
the crops,
eration
growing
preserving
and homes for the
order, running hospitals
and
the
dead.
The situation
aged,
burying

There

of

would

is a bleak
whether
would

one

to know

It is hard

indeed.

the suffering

of

the final

people
be any greater than that of so many
in each generation.
I doubt that it

people
but
would,
the moment.

let us imagine

people to make
that all others

If we do not object
unpleasant.
in other contexts,
sacrifice
why
to it when
it would
should we object
pre?
vent any further suffering?
extremely
to heroic

But what
children
then we
thing

I have suggested (with some trepidation)

that having children might not always be
Assume

immoral.

first

that

this

correct. What
the permissibility
if, despite
acted on the
of having
children,
people
ideal, forwent having children and suffered
How
ideal?

the demise

of humanity,

think

that the demise

itself would

be un?

to provide
fortunate would be hard-pressed
an explanation
of this in terms of the in?
terests of those who could have come into
would
there be to suffer the
being. Who
end of homo
sug?
sapiens? One possible

The first thing to note is that itwould be

gestion is that it would affect the people

an outcome

as a result?

tragic about

that

tremendously
be acceptable

as a moral

if the assumption
that having
is permissible
is mistaken?
Even
see that if there is some?
should

it is not the demise itself but the suffering

that heralds it. I believe that people who

is

view

to spare possible
future
That would
of existence.

themselves

the harm
people
even though
to be admired
be something
the consequences
for the heroes would
be

for

the opposite

be

would
upon

when they knew

(especially
were making
it too). They
additional
accepting
suffering

which

a generation
would
accept

(albeit fearfully)
in the name of the moral
a supererogatory
College

ideal.

or heroic

could

willingly
upon itself
It would

decision

who

knew

it was

be

ever, that would

of the suffering

for

of human

going

to happen. How?
be another feature

simply
that foreshadowed

the end

life.9

of Charleston
Received

October

21,

1996

NOTES
1. Only extremely
rarely, if ever, is death
life is unbearable.
where continued

a good,

although

it is often

the lesser of two evils

It is applicable
to those who never exist
is multiply
2. The term "non-existence"
ambiguous.
and to those who do not currently exist. The latter can be divided further into those who do not
to
yet exist and those who are no longer existing. In the current context I am using "non-existence"
denote those who never exist. Joel Feinberg has argued that the not yet existent and the no
longer existent can be harmed. I embrace that view. What I have to say here applies only to the
never

existent.

that of the developed

countries
3. Today, in poorer parts of the world, life expectancy matches
in these poorer
in former centuries. Notice
that we view the shortness of the lives of people
countries (and sometimes also of people in earlier times) as tragic, but precisely because we are
their life spans with the life spans to which we are accustomed.
comparing

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WHY IS ITBETTERNEVER TO COME INTOEXISTENCE / 355

4. Joel Feinberg, "Wrongful
p. 19.
Fulfillment,

Life

and the Counterfactual

Element

in Freedom

in Harming"

and

can be drawn from considering

5. Some support for such comparisons
the difference between X's
a
even
and
X's
non-existence.
find
this
miserable
life
Many people
living
comparison
troubling,
but others will have sympathy for the idea that non-existence
is preferable
for X who would
otherwise exist. For them, this kind of comparison might be the thin edge of the wedge,
leading
to the other comparative
scenarios I am suggesting.
6. See Derek
7. I defend

Parfit, Reasons
this claim more

and Persons,

chapter

17.

fully elsewhere.

8. Often, although not always,

can be internalized.

this will

start out as a way

to save face, but even then it eventually

9. I am grateful to APQ reviewers for copious and insightful

to this paper.
make significant
improvements

comments

which

have helped me

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to