On Simonides' Poem to Scopas of Thessaly in the Protagoras

I
The discussion of Simonides' poem is not only confined to those pages where
Protagoras and Socrates spar with each other over the finer points of the interpretation of
poetry. Rather the poem resounds throughout the entirety of the Protagoras. It is integral to an
understanding of the dialogue. The poem presents Socrates with the opportunity to experiment
with a number of philosophical doctrines and moral ideas. The poem is one element in Plato's
exploration of the methods that are suited to ethical and moral inquiry.

II
The central question of the Protagoras is whether virtue can be taught. The dialogue
begins with Protagoras claiming that virtue can be taught, and that he is a teacher of virtue. At
first, Socrates doubts his claim. Protagoras makes a Great Speech, in order to demonstrate to
Socrates and his friend Hippocrates the teachability of virtue. Of course, Socrates is not
completely satisfied with Protagoras' explanation, despite his long-winded speech, and begins
an investigation into what virtue is such that it can be taught. Socrates begins his inquiry by
asking Protagoras whether he thinks 'virtue [is] a single whole, and [whether] justice and selfcontrol and holiness [are] parts of it, or [whether] these [are] all names for one and the same
thing?'1 Protagoras' reply is that virtue is one, and justice, self-control, holiness, wisdom, and
courage are different parts of it. In the following arguments, Socrates merely demonstrates
that some of the virtues are identical or similar to each other, contrary to the view adopted by
Protagoras. First, justice and holiness are shown to resemble each other. Second, wisdom and
temperance are shown identical. The third argument, that justice and temperance are the same,
is interrupted when Protagoras becomes irritated with Socrates questions on whether good
things are beneficial to men. The argument is incomplete or rather incoherent and is never
taken up again. Another sort of argument between Socrates and Protagoras ensues, over long
speeches and discussion, conversation, dialogue and debate. Socrates claims that long
speeches are beyond his scope. Protagoras claims that his competitive edge will be diminished
if he makes allowances for his opponents. In his narration of the dialogue, Socrates points out
that Protagoras 'was dissatisfied with his own performance in the answers he had given and
would not continue in the role of answer.' (Prot. 335a) Socrates threatens to leave the
discussion if Protagoras does not give ground and shorten his answers. The other participants
in the discussion plead with Socrates that he stay and continue their conversation. A
compromise is reached where Protagoras takes up the position of questioner and Socrates will
answer his questions.
Before we can begin to look at Simonides' poem, a few things have to be said about
some of the issues raised in this very brief exposition of the first half of the dialogue, for they
have an important bearing on the rest of this paper. Prior to the discussion of the poem, no
substantial progress has been made into the actual nature of what virtue is for Socrates to be
convinced that it is something that can be taught. However, if we anticipate the results of the
poem's investigation, and what succeeds this investigation, we discover that for virtue to be
able to be taught it must be knowledge. It is none other than Socrates who arrives at this
conclusion. Where and why does Socrates change his mind? Socrates' change of view on the
teachability of virtue takes place during his interpretation of Simonides' poem. For as we
know 'in the earlier three arguments for the unity of virtues [it was not established that they
are knowledge, or what kind of knowledge they could be]; the outcome of the doubtful

reasoning had been only that they are identical.' 2 In what follows we shall see how Socrates'
interpretation of Simonides poem moves the dialogue to its conclusion.

III
Protagoras introduces Simonides' poem to Scopas of Thessaly as a topic for discussion
in order to facilitate the inquiry into whether virtue is something that can be taught. He argues
that 'the most important part of a man's education is to become an authority on poetry. This
means being able to criticize the good and bad points of a poem with understanding, to know
how to distinguish them and give one's reasons when asked.' (Prot.339a). Protagoras then
cites the first few lines of Simonides' poem to Socrates and the rest of the sophists who are
gathered at the house of Callias:
Hard is it on the one hand to become
A good man truly, hands and feet and mind
Foursquare, wrought without blame
Nor do I count as sure the off-quoted word
Of Pittacus, though wise indeed he was
Who spoke it. To be noble, said the sage,
Is hard. (Prot. 339b-c)
Protagoras' only interest in the poem merely concerns its composition, form, harmony, and
beauty. His central question to Socrates is whether he thinks Simonides' poem is 'beautifully
written if the poet contradicts himself?' (Prot. 339b) Protagoras claims that Simonides, in
stating that 'Hard is itto become/A good man truly', contradicts himself when he censures
Pittacus, for 'Pittacussaid the same thing as [Simonides] did himself, that it is hard to be
noble.' Therefore, 'in censuring the man who said the same as he does, he obviously censures
himself.' (Prot. 339d) It is clear that from the kinds of questions that Protagoras has asked
Socrates, nothing could be further from his mind than the investigation into whether virtue is
something that can be taught. This is despite his claim that his questions to Socrates 'will
concern the subject of our present discussion, namely virtue, but transferred to the realm of
poetry.' (Prot.339a) Yet Protagoras, soon after he steered the course of the inquiry away from
that of the theme of virtue, 'gives up leadership in the discussion. He will regain it neither in
the conversation about Simonides nor in the rest of the dialogue.' 3 Socrates, through his
interpretation of the poem, brings the discussion fairly and squarely back onto the theme of
virtue.
In what follows are the different layers of Socrates' interpretation of Simonides' poem,
if the interpretation of the poem had not already begun much earlier in the dialogue, before
Protagoras had introduced it as a subject for discussion. At the outset of our analysis of what
Socrates says about Simonides' poem, we should bear a few things in mind. First, a large
proportion of what Socrates says about the poem cannot be attributed to Simonides, though
some of his interpretation is indeed correct. However, the subject of this paper is not about
the intention Simonides' poem, nor whether Socrates' interpretation is accurate. Second, many
of the moral ideas that are discussed during Socrates' analysis of the poem are doctrines he
firmly holds to, whether he held them previously and introduced into the interpretation, or
whether they are ideas he thinks can be attributed to Simonides. Third, Socrates'
interpretation of the poem reverberates throughout the entire dialogue, for the things which he
claims Simonides might or might not of said in his poem are expanded upon at length in the
remainder of the dialogue.
Citing another poet, Homer, 'Dear brother, let us both together stem the hero's might'
(Prot. 340a) Socrates turns to Prodicus, one of the other sophists present at the discussion, for
help in dismissing the apparent contradiction Protagoras has found in Simonides' poem.

Socrates argues that the contradiction between 'Hard is it to become/A good man truly' and 'To
be noble/Is hard' disappears if we realize that the meaning of become is different from the
meaning of be. To further strengthen his argument that there is a difference in meaning
between become and be in Simonides poem, Socrates cites a second poet, Hesiod:
The gods have put sweat on the path to virtue
The summit's reached,
Hard though it was, thenceforth the task is light
To keep it. (Prot. 340d)
Protagoras objects, not to the difference in the meaning of the words become and be, but to
what Hesiod says about virtue. 'The poet must be very stupid, if he says that it is such a light
matter to hold on to virtue, when everyone agrees that there is nothing more difficult.'
(Prot.340e) Instead of agreeing with Protagoras, at the moment anyway, Socrates, for the
second time, enlists the help of Prodicus and his art 'where you discern the difference between
"wish" and "desire" and make all those other elegant distinctions which we heard just now.'
(Prot.3406). He attempts to demonstrate Simonides takes the meaning of hard to be bad.
Therefore, Simonides censures Pittacus for saying 'To be noble/Is hard 'as if (Simonides)
had heard him saying that it was bad to be noble.' (Prot. 341c) Protagoras protests at such an
absurd reading of the word hard asserting 'that by "hard" Simonides meant what the rest of us
meanwhat is not easy, only accomplished with much effort.' (Prot 3441d) Of course,
Prodicus was only joking when he claimed that Simonides understood hard as meaning bad.
After censuring Pittacus for saying 'To be noble/Is hard', Simonides states:
A god alone can have this privilege (Prot.34le)
Thus, argues Socrates, '[Simonides] does not first say "it is bad to be noble" and then add that
only a god could achieve it, and allot it as a privilege entirely divine. That would mean that
Prodicus is calling Simonides quite unprincipled and no true Crean.' (Prot.34le)
The most important thing Socrates has so far said about the poem is his differentiation
between the meaning of the words become and be. This semantic difference does not carry
any ontological significance in the course of the dialogue. Rather it has an ethical
significance. Socrates is completely serious when he differentiates the sense of become from
be, and he pursues this difference in meaning, from the perspective of its ethical significance,
during the course of his interpretation of Simonides' poem. Furthermore, this is one instance
where some commentators agree that Socrates is correct in claiming that Simonides does
intend that his audience distinguish between the meanings of the words becoming from be.4
However, I want to suggest Plato included Simonides' poem in the dialogue knowing that it,
and specifically the first two lines of the poem 'Hard is itto become/A good man truly',
intersects with the overall theme of the dialogue, whether virtue is something that can be
taught. This proposition will become clear in the course of our investigation.
Now that Socrates has dismissed the contradiction which Protagoras had supposedly
identified in the first few line of the poem, he claims that he is 'ready to tell [the sophists his]
own opinion of Simonides meaning in this song.' (Prot. 341e-342a) Socrates argues that
Simonides had philosophical ambitions in writing his poem to Scopas of Thessaly. One way
in which he could advance his own philosophical ideas is in criticizing Pittacus' wise and
venerable saying hard is it to be noble. The evidence for Simonides' polemic against the
saying of Pittacus, argues Socrates, is the sequence of words 'on the one hand' and the position
of truly in 'Hard is it on the one hand to become/A good man truly.' (Prot.343d1) The 'on the
one hand' implies a retort to Pittacus, who 'said, "Hard is to be noble", and Simonides replied
"No to become a good man is hard truly".' (Prot.343d1) Note that, for Socrates, truly qualifies
the word hard not good, for it would be silly 'if some men were truly good and others good
but not truly so.' (Prot. 343e) Moreover, the position of truly indicates a fortiori that Pittacus
spoke first and Simonides responded second in the following way:

'O men, hard is it to be noble

That is not true, Pittacus: not to be but to become a good man, foursquare
In hands and feet and mind, wrought without blame, that is truly hard
(Prot. 343e-344a)'
It is a remarkable feat truly, for Socrates to have demonstrated that the intention of Simonides'
poem is a refutation of Pittacus' maxim 'To be noble/Is hard' on the basis of 'Hard is it on
the one hand to become/A good man truly'. It should be pointed out that in this case Socrates'
'treatment of the word "truly" is altogether far-fetched, presumably in parody of sophistical
methods of interpretationThe word order requires "It is hard to become truly good" and
excludes "It is truly hard to become good".'5 Yet despite Socrates' curious philology, this
reaffirms his claim that Simonides intended a difference between becoming good and being
good. Thus, he argues, even though Simonides says 'to become a good man is truly difficult,
yet it is possible, for while at least"having become good, to remain in this state and be a
good man - which is what you were speaking of Pittacus - is impossible and superhuman.
This is the privilege of a god alone"' Clearly, Socrates is adamant that Simonides was
attacking the 'memorable dicta' of Pittacus and proposing an alternative ethical maxim.
Moreover, it is Simonides' maxim that Socrates is strongly attracted to. The question is, what
would becoming good involve? What moral doctrine would one have to presuppose in order
that becoming good is a plausible ethical statement?
This is precisely what Socrates fleshes out in his interpretation of the next four lines of
Simonides' poem. Recapping:
Nor do I count as sure the off-quoted word
Of Pittacus, though wise indeed he was
Who spoke it. To be noble, said the sage,
Is hard.
A god alone can have this privilege
whereas:
[Man] cannot but be bad, whom once
Misfortune irredeemable casts down. (Prot.344b-c)
Socrates must start his analyses of these lines of the poem from the opposite end of the moral
spectrum, and from the opposite end of the existential scale. Who becomes bad? Not the bad.
'You cannot knock down a man who is lying on the ground [i.e. the bad man]; you can only
knock him down if he is standing, and put him on the ground [i.e. the good man.]' (Prot.344e)
Socrates' examples are from the stock standard class of craftsmen, the farmer, the steersman,
the physician. Thus 'who is cast down by irredeemable misfortune in the management?
Clearly not the passenger, for he has been down all the timeThe steersman maybe reduced
to helplessness by the onset of a great storm [and] the farmer by a bad season.For the good
may become bad, as another poet has testified in the line
The good are sometimes bad and sometimes noble,
but the bad man cannot become bad, but is so of necessity.' (Prot.344c-e) Obviously, Socrates
is not satisfied with the archaic notion of man's moral worth being determined by his struggle
against cosmic necessity. He hints at this twice in this passage, and suggests an alternative to
assessing man's moral value, that is, according to knowledge / ignorance: 'irredeemable
misfortune may cast down the resourceful.' (Prot.344d) and 'it isthe resourceful and wise
and good, when irredeemable disaster brings him to nought, cannot be but bad.' (Prot.344d) In

the interpretation of the next two lines we are brought to an ecstatic union between
epistemology and morality
For when he fares well every man is good
But in ill faring, evil (Prot.344e)
The identification of knowledge with good and of ignorance with bad is complete. For the
moment Socrates argues that to become good, to attain the good is on the order of knowledge.
It is the mastery of a skill, profession or craft 'Now what is faring well in letters, and what
makes a man good at them? Clearly the learning of them. And what is the faring well that
makes a good doctor? Clearly it is the learning how to heal the sick. But in ill faring, evil.
Who is it who becomes a bad doctor? Clearly the man who is both a doctor and a good doctor;
he might become a bad doctor also. But we who are laymen in medicine could never by faring
ill become doctors or builders or any other kind of technician, and he who cannot by faring
badly become a doctor cannot, obviously, become a bad doctor. Even so the good man may
easily be made bad, by lapse of time or fatigue or illness or some other accident, seeing that
this is the only real ill faring, to be deprived of knowledge. But the bad man cannot be made
bad, for he is so all the time. If he is to become bad, he must first become good.' (Prot.345a-c)
Of course, it is obvious that what Socrates has just imputed Simonides to be saying on the
subject of disaster, faring well and faring ill, is, as far as strict philological practice is
concerned, inconceivable. Yet, philology is not his concern. What he is concerned about is the
moral philosophy behind becoming good.
In the last two strophes of Simonides' poem, Socrates unswervingly advances the thesis
of his interpretation that the rejection of Pittacus' saying is its central theme. The only
comments that Socrates makes here which are of substance to our investigation are on the
following two lines
But all who do no baseness willingly
I praise and love
Socrates argues that we should take 'But all who do no baseness willingly/I praise and love.'
to mean that Simonides willingly praises and loves those who do no base acts. For 'Simonides
was not so ignorant as to say that he praised all who did no evil voluntarily...no wise man
believes anyone sins willinglyThey know very well that all evil or base action is
involuntary.' (Prot.345d-e) In the last part of our exegesis, it will become apparent that denial
of voluntary evil is inseparable from knowledge and its relationship to the good. However,
this is another instance where, as C. C. W. Taylor says, 'Socrates' assimilation of the poet's
thought to one of his own theses involves a blatant perversion of the plain sense of the poem.'6
'Of his own will'7, 'freely'8, 'willingly'9, are all different renditions of the Greek word hekn. It
is impossible to read Simonides except contrary to Socrates. D A. Campbell's translation
demonstrates most clearly that Socrates is being facetious 'No, I commend and love any man
who of own his will does nothing shameful'.10 Here ends our analysis of Socrates'
'interpretation of the mind of Simonides in writing this poem.' (Prot.347a)

IV
Let us suppose for the moment that Simonides' Hard is itto become/A good man truly
guides the final arguments of Protagoras. Let us further suppose that Plato, having given
Simonides' poem a lot of study asked himself the following questions: What would it mean for
someone to become good? How does one become bad? What would it mean for someone to
fare well? What would it mean for someone to fare ill? Well, argues Socrates, if a man lived
out his life to the end with enjoyment we must surely count that as living well. In his poem,
Simonides says 'For when he fares well every man is good.' Thus, 'if a man lived out his life to

the end with enjoyment we must surely count that as faring well, as good.' But if a man passed
his life in pain and vexation then we could call this nothing but living badly. The
corresponding theme in Simonides' poem is 'But in ill faring, evil.' Thus, 'if a man passed his
life in pain and vexation then we could call this nothing but ill faring, evil.' Socrates'
conclusion is that 'to live pleasurably is good and to live painfully is bad.' (Prot. 351c) So far,
the equation between pleasure and good, and between pain and bad, though it appears to be
crude, nevertheless it provides Socrates with a hypothesis of what a good and bad life would
consist of. That is, a hypothesis about the becoming good, about the faring well and faring
badly in Simonides' poem.
In response to Socrates' request for assent to the conclusion that 'to live pleasurably is
good and to live painfully is bad' Protagoras makes the qualification that a life lived in
pleasure is good 'if one's pleasure is in what is honorable.' (Prot. 351c2) Socrates takes this to
be the opinion of the common person, who believes 'that some pleasures are bad and some
pains are good', and reiterates his question to Protagoras '[pleasures], in so far as they are
pleasant, are they not also good, leaving aside any consequences that they may entail? And in
the same way pains, in so far as they are painful, are bad?' (Prot. 351c4-7) Protagoras protests
at Socrates having deduced such a bold conclusion as 'everything pleasant is good and
everything painful is evil' and sides with common opinion. (Prot. 351d) This then, is an
obstacle that Socrates has encountered with his hypothesis that pleasure is good and pain is
bad, or evil, as Protagoras argues. Protagoras suggests that both investigate the proposition
whether good and pleasure appear identical.
Socrates begins the inquiry into whether pleasure is good by arguing that knowledge of
good and evil is sufficient to determine action. If we know what is good we will act in
accordance with that knowledge and do good, or take steps to attain the good. Likewise, if we
know what is evil we will act in accordance with that knowledge and not do evil. This is an
elaboration of one of Socrates' philosophical doctrines that he introduced into his
interpretation of Simonides' poem. There Socrates contended that to become good at
something, say for example, writing, meant to study and know that something i.e. learn and
know how to write. In this investigation of the hypothesis that pleasure is good Socrates is
experimenting with how knowledge is related to the good. Here good is not proficiency in
technical knowledge. Rather the good is a thing that we have knowledge of.
On the other hand, the majority of people believe knowledge 'is nothing strong, no
ruling element.' (Prot. 352b3) Rather, it is the passions that rule us. The common person
maintains 'that there are many who recognize the best but are unwilling to act on it [because
they] are overcome by pleasure.' (Prot. 352d4-7) More precisely, they maintain that it is
common for a man to recognize evil actions as evil, yet commit them, 'under no compulsion
because he is led on and distracted by pleasure' (Prot. 355a-b). Remember that in his
interpretation of Simonides' poem, Socrates imputed to Simonides the moral doctrine that no
one ever does evil willingly. Given that knowledge of good and evil is sufficient to determine
action, Socrates must refute the common belief that people knowingly do evil because they are
overcome by pleasure in order to retain his hypothesis that pleasure is good.
The very beliefs that the majority has about good and pleasure, and evil and pain is in
contradiction with their belief that knowingly do evil because they are overcome by pleasure.
They believe that pleasure in and of itself is good and pain in and of itself is evil. Pleasures
that they consider as being evil are evil on account of their consequences such as disease and
poverty, which in turn result in pain 'and deprive us of future pleasures.' (Prot. 353e8) Things
that produce both pleasure and pain are evil because the total pain is greater than the total
immediate pleasure. Pains that they consider as being good are good because 'in the future
there result from them health, bodily well-being, the safety of one's country, dominion over
others and wealththe cessation or prevention of pain.' (Prot. 354b1-4) Things that produce
both pleasure and pain they consider as being good because the total amount of pleasure is
greater than the total and immediate pain and agony. The fact is the majority holds a
hedonistic view of good and evil. Their 'idea of evil is pain and of good is pleasure [and they]

pursue [the greatest] pleasure [over the whole of their lives] as being good, and shun pain as
evil.' (Prot. 354b1-4)
This hedonistic view of good and evil is in direct contradiction with the belief that some
people know what is evil, and know that they ought not to it, but do the evil anyway because
they are overcome by pleasure. To demonstrate the absurdity of these two contradictory views
Socrates first substitutes good for pleasure and later pain for evil. The claim: there are people
who know what is evil, and who know that they ought not to do it, but indulge in evil
nonetheless because they are overcome by pleasure, is now rendered as: there are people who
know what is evil, and who know that they ought not to do it, but do evil anyway because
they are overcome by good. According to Socrates this means that 'the good is not a match
[for the evil]; otherwise the [people] of whom we speak of as being overcome by pleasure
would not have done wrong.' (Prot. 355d4) The only way in which good is no match for evil
is if good and evil differ from each other in terms of quantity. That is, 'being overcome means
taking lesser good in exchange for greater evil.' (Prot. 355e2) This is absurd in that it
contradicts the view that we pursue the greatest pleasure over the whole of our lives as being
good. If we now replace evil with pain and good with pleasure and we get the claim that there
are people who do 'painful actions, knowing them to be painful, because overcome by
pleasures-pleasures which were not a match for the pains.' (Prot. 355e3-7) How are pleasures
not a match for pains? In no other way than in terms of 'the excess or deficiency of one as
compared with the other.' That being the case, being overcome means taking lesser pleasure
for greater pain. Again, the absurdity of this is that it contradicts the belief that we pursue the
greatest pleasure over the whole of our lives as being good.
In both cases people err in their estimation of the things which produce pleasure (good)
and pain (evil). They believe that the thing that is evil (causes pain) might produce more
pleasure now than the thing that is good (causes the greater amount of pleasure later as a
result of smaller, momentary pains now). Thus, argues Socrates, in every instance of the
pursuit of pleasure, we seek the greatest pleasure and the least pain. Where does the error
arise? It occurs in the perception and calculation of the quantities of pleasure and pain in time.
To attain the maximum pleasure over one's whole life as being good, we must employ a
calculus of pleasure. Socrates concludes his discussion on pleasure by arguing that 'when
people make a wrong choice of pleasure and pains--that is, of good and evil--the cause of their
mistake is lack of knowledge.' (Prot. 359d) Thus, if we presuppose Socrates' doctrine that
knowledge of good and evil is sufficient to determine action, and if pleasure is good, then
faring well is simply a matter of hedonic calculus.
The conversation between Socrates and Protagoras about whether the many virtues are
different parts of the one virtue or whether they different names for one and the same virtue is
taken up for the last time. So far, Protagoras has conceded that temperance, justice, holiness
and wisdom resemble each other very closely but claims that 'courage is very different from
all the rest.' (Prot. 349d) Socrates has already attempted to demonstrate that courage is
wisdom. However, Protagoras was not satisfied with the argument. He claims that, Socrates,
in arguing that 'those who have knowledge are more confident than others who are ignorant'
cannot 'conclude that courage and wisdom are the same thing.' (Prot. 359d) Now, given the
hypothesis that the knowledge sufficient to determine moral action is a matter of the correct
choice of pleasure and pains, Socrates returns for the last time to the question of whether
courage and wisdom are the same. His argument is as follows. All actions aimed at a good i.e.
pleasurable life, are good actions. No one chooses to do what one thinks to be evil. This
proposition is derived from the arguments about pleasure and pain. Fear is the expectation of
evil (pain). Courage then would be 'knowledge of what is and is not to be fear.' (Prot. 360d)
For example, the coward misinterprets a call to defend the empire as involving more pain than
would be the case if s/he simply surrendered to the enemy. S/he lacks the virtue of courage
that would enable her/him to better assess, as far as possibly can be perceived, future
pleasures and pains.
After he has demonstrated that courage is wisdom, Socrates assures Protagoras that his
only desire throughout the entire dialogue has been 'to learn the truth about virtue and what it

is in itself.' (Prot. 360d) The truth is that Socrates, 'by trying to demonstrate that everything is
knowledge', has adopted 'the best way to prove that virtue is teachable', even though at the
beginning of the dialogue he denied that virtue is something that can be taught. 'Protagoras,
on the other hand, who at the beginning supposed [virtue] to be teachable, now on the
contrary seems bent on showing that it is almost anything rather than knowledge, and this
would make it least likely to be teachable.' (Prot. 361b-c) Yet despite this Socrates claims
'when I see the subject in such utter confusion I feel liveliest desire to clear it up. I should like
to follow up our present talk with a determined attack on virtue itself and its essential nature.
Then we could return to the question whether or not it can be taught'. (Prot. 361c) Why does
Socrates not accept the conclusions that they have deduced from the above arguments as
sufficient proof that virtue is teachable?

V
Plato's Protagoras is an aporetic dialogue. Its inconclusive nature is indicated by
Socrates comments at the end of the dialogue. He wants to go back to the investigation of
what virtue is. He is not satisfied by the conclusion of their arguments. Throughout the entire
dialogue he has been experimenting with a number of moral questions, what is virtue?, is it
teachable?, is pleasure good?, how do we become good? Plato is experimenting with the
practice of philosophy. Both experiments intersect in the discussion of Simonides' poem.
The character of Socrates insists that all he desires is to learn the truth. For Plato this
involves conversation, discussion, argument and debate, question and answer. In the dialogue
there are several such philosophical arguments, the arguments for the unity of virtues and
Socrates' denial of voluntary evil. Protagoras, who represents sophism, is not interested in
determining the truth and essence of virtue. He teaches tradition and custom. He is in his
element when he delivers great speeches. In the dialogue, Plato criticizes not only the
methods of the sophists as a way of discovering the truth about virtue, but their very
indifference to the inquiry into the truth and nature of virtue. For Protagoras, Socrates and
Plato 'Texts from the poets passedas the common coin of ethical wisdom. They summed up,
in memorable language an insight that wasmore penetrating than any judgement made ad
hoc was likely to be.'11 Yet when it comes to the poem by Simonides, Protagoras and his
questions are found wanting. As Socrates says, he 'will show [Protagoras] how, in [his]
submission, the respondent should speak.' (Prot. 338d) We saw that Protagoras is not
concerned about what might be involved in becoming good, or why it might be impossible to
remain good. He is only interested in the aesthetic qualities of Simonides' poem, whether the
poet contradicts himself, whether the poem is harmonious. Socrates' interest in Simonides'
poem on the other hand is as a source of ethical wisdom to be investigated and criticized. He
'asks what truths it can be seen to contain or imply.'12 The implication of Socrates
hypothesizing and experimentation is that to teach virtue is a reflection of to become good.
Both apparently involve knowledge of pleasure and pain. So, in showing how dismissive
Protagoras is of what else Simonides' poem contains, Plato can, through Socrates'
interpretation, return to moral inquiry, by questioning the philosophical presuppositions of
Simonides' moral beliefs. However, it is only an experiment, what is virtue? what does to
become good involve? is pleasure good? what is knowledge of good and evil? The dialogue
returns to the questions with which it started, what is virtue? is it a whole? We return,
moreover, to the poem and what it said. Whatever 'violence [Socrates does] to the text' in his
interpretation of Simonides' poem is forgotten when we are admonished by Plato to reconsider
the nature of virtue. We go back and perhaps listen to what Hippias, or anyone else said about
the poem. This, of course, is not subject to Socrates' denunciation of the discussion of poetry.
'No one can interrogate poets about what they say...when they are introduced into the
discussion some say the poet's meaning is one thing and some another, for the topic is one on
which nobody can produce a conclusive argument.' (Prot 347e) Instead, what we have here 'is
no distinction between philosophy and life.'13 Here 'Socrates is all inquirer.'14

Notes

Hamilton, Edith and Cairns, Huntington (eds.) The Collected Dialogues of Plato. (1961) trans. W. C. K. Guthrie,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. Hereafter (Prot. 329c6-330d1)
2

Frede, Dorothea. 'The Impossibility of Perfection: Socrates' Criticism of Simonides' Poem in the Protagoras.'
Review of Metaphysics. 1986 June vol. 39 no. 4 p 742
3

Weingartner, Rudolph H. The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue: The Cratylus, The Protagoras, The Parmenides.
(1973) Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, p 96
4

Leonard Woodbury 'Simonides on .' Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association.
1953 vol. 84 pp.135-163, argues that for Simonides 'Man's being is compromised by his circumstances, his becoming
by his achievement. Only becoming, therefore, can be easy or difficult, and the saying of Pittacus was simply a mistake.
He had, as it were, confused his categories.' p 155 However, 'This distinction from that made by Socrates [who]
conceives necessity as logicalon his view, necessity excludes all change, for all change implies contradiction and the
law of contradiction permits not exceptions.' p 155 Hugh Parry 'An Interpretation of Simonides 4 (Diehl).' American
Philological Association. 1965 vol. 96 pp.297-320, affirms that the 'basic distinction between "being" and "becoming" is
present at the beginning of the poem, althoughPlato has Socrates distort the real implications of what Simonides
says.' p 315 C. C. W. Taylor Protagoras. (1976) trans. C.C.W. Taylor, Clarendon Press, Oxford, in his commentary on
his translation of the Protagoras, writes 'Despite the generally perverse character of Socrates' interpretation, the
distinction [between be and become] is not impossiblethere is some evidence in early Greek of a distinction between
becoming F in the sense of manifesting F-ness for a limited time and being F permanently (e.g. Pind. Pyth. X.21-4)' p
143 However, even if this was not the case it would in no way diminish Socrates' philosophical playfulness in his
reading of Simonides.
5

Plato. Protagoras. (1976) trans. C.C.W. Taylor, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p 145

Ibid., p 146

Campbell, David A. (ed.) Greek Lyric III: Stesichorus, Ibycus, Simonides and Others. (1991) trans. David A.
Campbell, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p 437
8

Plato. Protagoras. (1976) trans. C.C.W. Taylor, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p 146
9

Hamilton, Edith and Cairns, Huntington (eds.) The Collected Dialogues of Plato. (1961) trans. W. C. K. Guthrie,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, p 338
10

Campbell, David A. (ed.) Greek Lyric III: Stesichorus, Ibycus, Simonides and Others. (1991) trans. David A.
Campbell, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p 437
11

Woodbury, Leonard. 'Simonides on .' Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association.
1953 vol. 84 p137
12

Rutherford, Richard. 'Unifying the Protagoras.' Apeiron. 1992 vol. 25 no. 4 p 152
13

Weingartner, Rudolph H. The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue: The Cratylus, The Protagoras, The Parmenides.
(1973) Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, p 134
14

Ibid., p 134

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