[G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991. June 18, 2003.

]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
MICHAEL U. PAGALASAN alias "Mike," RONNIE
CABALO alias "Romy", ALADIN CABALO,
FERDINAND CORTEZ, a JOHN DOE identified
only as FERNANDO, and a PETER DOE
identified only as "Bong," accused, MICHAEL
U. PAGALASAN alias "Mike,"appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant was convicted of two counts of kidnapping for ransom
He was sentenced to double death and hence, this automatic
review.
Appellant and his co-accused wrongfully entered the house of the
Lims and dragged George and his son Christopher out of their
bedroom into the victim's car. They drove out of the house and
cruised along the highway. Later, the police were able to rescue
George, while Christopher remained in the company of the other
kidnappers. Christopher was rescued several days after. The
Court ruled that appellant, in conspiracy with his cohorts, was
guilty of kidnapping Christopher and slight illegal detention of
George. The death penalty imposed for the crime of kidnapping,
however, was not proper as the motive of extortion of ransom
was not established. The death penalty was reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL

DETENTION; ELEMENTS. For the accused to be convicted of
kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the
offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another,
or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is
present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the
victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and it legally detained for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. The essential
elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the victim
under any of the above-mentioned circumstances coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.
There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to
forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent. aTEADI
2. ID.; CONSPIRACY; WHEN PRESENT. Judge Learned Hand once
called conspiracy "the darling of the modern prosecutor's
nursery." There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode
of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and
with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy
need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and
concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.
Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a
common purpose and design. Paraphrasing the decision of the
English Court in Regina v. Murphy, conspiracy may be implied if it
is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a
part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent
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of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative,

indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to
the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
3. ID.; ID.; NATURE AND EXTENT THEREOF. The United States
Supreme Court in Braverman v. United States, held that the
precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined
by reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its
objects. For one thing, the temporal dimension of the conspiracy
is of particular importance. Settled as a rule of law is that the
conspiracy continues until the object is attained, unless in the
meantime the conspirator abandons the conspiracy or is arrested.
There is authority to the effect that the conspiracy ends at the
moment of any conspirator's arrest, on the presumption, albeit
rebuttable, that at the moment the conspiracy has been
thwarted, no other overt act contributing to the conspiracy can
possibly take place, at least as far as the arrested conspirator is
concerned. The longer a conspiracy is deemed to continue, the
greater the chances that additional persons will found to have
joined it. There is also the possibility that as the conspiracy
continues, there may occur new overt acts. If the conspiracy has
not yet ended, then the hearsay acts and declarations of one
conspirator will be admissible against the other conspirators and
one conspirator may be held liable for substantive crimes
committed by the others.
4. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EACH CONSPIRATOR, EXPLAINED. Each
conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates
which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as
one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was
not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a
conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses
incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators
are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by

purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly

produces a prohibited result that they are in contemplation of law,
charged with intending the result. Conspirators are necessarily
liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such act
differs radically and substantively from that which they intended
to commit. The Court agrees with the ruling of the Circuit Court of
Appeals (Second District) per Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Peoni "that nobody is liable in conspiracy except for the
fair import of the concerted purpose or agreement as he
understood it; if later comers change that, he is not liable for the
change; his liability is limited to the common purpose while he
remains in it." Earlier, the Appellate Court of Kentucky in Gabbard
v. Commonwealth held that: The act must be the ordinary and
probable effect of the wrongful acts specifically agreed on, so that
the connection between them may be reasonably apparent, and
not a fresh and independent project of the mind of one of the
confederates, outside of or foreign to the common design, and
growing out of the individual malice of the perpetrator. Equally
persuasive is the pronouncement of the Circuit Court of Appeals
(Second District) in United States v. Crimms, that it is never
permissible to enlarge the scope of the conspiracy itself by
proving that some of the conspirators, unknown to the rest, have
done what was beyond the reasonable intendment of the
common understanding. This is equally true when the crime
which the conspirators agreed upon is one of which they severally
might be guilty though they were ignorant of the existence of
some of its constitutive facts. Also, while conspirators are
responsible for consequent acts growing out of the common
design they are not for independent acts growing out of the
particular acts of individuals.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES;
FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT, RESPECTED. The legal aphorism is
that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of witnesses and of their probative weight, its
conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded high respect by
the appellate court, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique
advantage of the trial court of observing at close range the
demeanor, conduct and deportment of witnesses as they regale
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the trial court with their testimonies. It is true that the appellate
court is not bound by the findings and conclusions of the trial
court if the latter ignored, misunderstood, misapplied or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances, which, if
considered, would change the outcome of the case. This ruling,
however, is inapplicable in the case at bar, since the appellant
failed to establish that the trial court erred in this wise.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IMPAIRED BY INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN
AFFIDAVIT AND TESTIMONY IN COURT. The seeming
inconsistency between the two statements (in affidavit and in
testimony) of the kidnap victim does not discredit his testimony
nor his credibility for the following reasons: (a) it is of judicial
knowledge that affidavits being taken ex parte are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate and are generally inferior to the
testimony of a witness in open court; (b) the credibility of
George's testimony cannot be impeached by the inconsistent
statements contained in his sworn statement because the said
statement was not admitted in evidence; and Section 34, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that the Court shall
not consider evidence which has not been formally offered;
besides, George was not confronted with his sworn statement and
accorded an opportunity to explain the inconsistency; (c) the
inconsistency refers to trivial, minor and collateral matters and
not to the substance of his testimony. Such minor inconsistency
even enhances its veracity as the variances erase any suspicion
of a rehearsed testimony. A truth-telling witness is not always
expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE WITNESS MAY BE

SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. Case law has it that the testimony of
a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction. The law does not require the testimonies
of at least two witnesses for the conviction of an accused for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The prosecution has the
discretion to decide on who to call as witness during the trial, and
its failure to present a particular witness does not give rise to the

presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse

if withheld, where the evidence is at the disposal of the appellant
and is merely cumulative or corroborative.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION; DEATH PENALTY; WHERE MOTIVE IS EXTORTION OF
RANSOM. To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following:
(a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; (c)
motive of the accused, which is extortion of ransom from the
victim or any other person. In kidnapping or serious illegal
detention for ransom, the purpose of extorting ransom is a
qualifying circumstance which must be alleged in the Information
and proved by the prosecution as the crime itself by words and
overt acts of the accused before, during and after the kidnapping
and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual
payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed.
Although kidnapping for a certain purpose is a qualifying
circumstance, the law does not require that the purpose be
accomplished. Ransom employed in the law is so used in its
common or ordinary sense: a sum of money or other thing of
value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of
a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from
captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which
may accrue to the kidnapper or a third person as a condition for
the release of the victim.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY;
ADMISSION BY A THIRD PERSON. Since there is no evidence
that the signatory and sender of the second letter is a coconspirator of the appellant, the latter is not bound by the said
letter, conformably to Section 28, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence which reads: Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. Even if it is
assumed for the nonce that the second letter came from a coconspirator, the same is not binding on the appellant, absent
3

evidence aliunde that he knew of and concurred with the said

ransom demand. It bears stressing that when George received
the second letter on September 6, 1994, the appellant had
already been arrested and detained. The conspiracy forged by the
appellant and his cohorts on or before September 4, 1994 had
already ceased, when on the said date, the appellant was
arrested by the policemen and detained.
10. CRIMINAL LAW; SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION; ELUCIDATED.
The appellant is guilty of slight illegal detention under Article 268
of the Revised Penal Code. While the epigraph or title of the
article mentions only slight illegal detention, kidnapping
committed in connection with the lower offense of slight illegal
detention is also covered by the article. The felony has the
following essential elements: 1. That the offender is a private
individual. 2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other
manner deprives him of his liberty. 3. That the act of kidnapping
or detention is illegal. 4. That the crime is committed without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in Art. 267.
The crime of slight illegal detention is consummated upon the
occurrence of all the elements thereof. "A day," in the last
paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, should be
understood as twenty-four hours, to be counted from the
deprivation of the liberty of the victim until the cessation thereof.
As Cuello Calon put it: "el plazo de los tres dias de veinte cuatro
horas y desde el momento de la privacion de libertad si en que
esta cesare. The rescue or escape of the victim within three days
from his kidnapping and detention is not an exempting
circumstance. The voluntary release by the offender of the victim
within three days from his detention, without the offender having
attained his purpose and before the institution of criminal
proceedings against him for slight illegal detention, is not an
exempting circumstance; it merely serves to reduce the penalty
to prision mayor in its maximum and medium periods and a fine
not exceeding P700.
11. ID.; KIDNAPPING AND SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION; BOTH
COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. Although the appellant and his
co-conspirators kidnapped George and Christopher on the same

occasion and from the same situs, the appellant is guilty of two
separate crimes: kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, and slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code. The appellant and his co-conspirators were
animated by two sets of separate criminal intents and criminal
resolutions in kidnapping and illegally detaining the two victims.
The criminal intent in kidnapping Christopher was separate from
and independent of the criminal intent and resolution in
kidnapping and detaining George for less than three days. In the
mind and conscience of the appellant, he had committed two
separate felonies; hence, should be meted two separate penalties
for the said crimes: one for kidnapping under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code and another for slight illegal detention under
Article 268 of the same code. The felony of slight illegal detention
is necessarily included in the crime of kidnapping for ransom;
thus, the appellant may be convicted of the former crime under
an Information for kidnapping for ransom.
12. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; NOT APPRECIATED IN
DETERMINING PROPER PENALTIES WHEN NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION. The crimes committed by the appellant were
aggravated by dwelling, the victims having been kidnapped in
their house; by the use of motor vehicle, the victims having been
transported by the appellant from their house with the use of
George's car; and by a band, the crime having been committed
by the appellant and three co-conspirators. However, the Court
cannot consider these aggravating circumstances in determining
the proper penalties for the said crimes because the same were
not alleged in the Information as mandated by Sections 8 and 9,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the
said rules took effect after the commission of the crimes by the
appellant, the same is favorable to the appellant; hence, should
be applied retroactively.
13. ID.; KIDNAPPING; PROPER PENALTY. The prescribed penalty
for kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 isreclusion perpetua to death.
There being no aggravating circumstance or modifying
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the proper penalty
4

for the said crime is reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63

of the Revised Penal Code.
14. ID.; SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION; PROPER PENALTY. The
prescribed penalty for slight illegal detention is reclusion
temporal in its full period, with a range of twelve years and one
day to twenty years. To determine the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty, the penalty shall be reduced by one
degree, prision mayor, which has a range of six years and one
day to twelve years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the full range of the penalty at the discretion
of the Court. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, conformably
to Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the
appellant shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of nine years and
four months of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum,
to sixteen years and five months of reclusion temporal in its
medium period as maximum. DcCHTa
15. ID.; KIDNAPPING AND SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION; CIVIL
PENALTIES; PROPER MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. Under
Article 2219, paragraph 5 of the New Civil Code, moral damages
may be recovered. In this case, the prosecution adduced
testimonial evidence that for the crimes committed by the
appellant and his co-conspirators, Spouses George and Desiree
suffered mental anguish, fright and serious anxiety caused by the
kidnapping of George and their son Christopher. Considering the
factual milieu in this case, the Court believes that the said
spouses are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P100,000
for the kidnapping of Christopher, and the amount of P50,000 for
the illegal detention of George. The appellant is also liable to the
spouses for exemplary damages in the total amount of P50,000
for the two crimes conformably with current jurisprudence.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J p:
This is an automatic review of the Decisions 1 of the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City, Branch 35, convicting appellant
Michael U. Pagalasan of two counts of kidnapping for ransom of
George Lim and his 10-year-old son Christopher Neal Lim and
sentencing him to double death.
The Antecedents
The Spouses George and Desiree Lim and their three young
children, one of whom was 10-year-old Christopher Neal Lim,
resided at Villa Consuelo Subdivision, General Santos City. The
spouses hired a security guard, Ferdinand Cortez, from the Valiant
Security Agency to provide security services to the family. On
September 4, 1994, at 11:00 p.m., the spouses and their children
were in the master's bedroom watching television. The couple's
housemaid, Julita Sarno, was in the kitchen. She heard knocks on
the kitchen door. Thinking that it was Ferdinand, she opened the
door. Four men, about 5'5" to 5'6" tall, each armed with
handguns, two of whom were holding hand grenades, barged into
the kitchen. The four intruders wore bonnets over their faces.
With them was Ferdinand, whose hands were tied behind his
back. When asked by the masked men where her employers
were, Julita responded that they were in their bedroom. On orders
of the intruders, she knocked on the bedroom door. When
George's daughter opened the door, three of the masked men
barged into the room, while the fourth masked man remained in
the sala of the house. 2 The three masked men shouted to
George and Desiree: "Walang mangyayari sa inyo basta ibigay
ninyo ang kailangan namin." (Nothing will happen to you provided
you give us what we want.) 3 They ransacked the house, getting
cash and valuables. The masked men gave Desiree a handwritten
note, 4 and dragged George and Christopher Neal Lim out of the
bedroom through the sala to the garage, where George's Nissan
car was parked for the night. George saw Ferdinand in the sala
with his hands tied behind his back. One of the masked men
ordered George to hand over the key to his vehicle, to board the
car and occupy the back seat along with Christopher. Father and
5

son did as they were told. Two of the masked men positioned
themselves on either side of George and Christopher. The third
man drove the car, while the fourth sat on the passenger's seat
beside the driver. The car cruised along the national highway.
When the car was nearing the Gambalan Kitchenette, George and
Christopher were blindfolded. The masked men told them that
they would be brought to Polomolok. After about fifteen minutes,
the car stopped at Sitio Tupi. The two men who were seated at
the back and the masked man seated beside the driver alighted
from the car, bringing Christopher with them. George was
transferred to the front seat beside the driver. George was told
that he would be transported to Maasim.

In the meantime, SPO2 Federico Pao, the duty officer of Police

Precinct No. 2, received a radio report that George Lim and his
son Christopher had been kidnapped. Police investigators were
dispatched to the Lim residence to conduct an on-the-spot
investigation. They brought Ferdinand and Julita to the police
station for investigation. SPO2 Renato Daga-as, SPO2 Datur
Villanueva and SPO1 Alimuddin Timbao were directed to establish
a mobile checkpoint at the intersection of the national highway
and a dirt road (Espina Road). The three policemen boarded a
Tamaraw mobile car and parked it at the said intersection. At
about thirty meters from the checkpoint, the masked driver of the
Nissan vehicle saw the police car. Instead of running the car
through the checkpoint, the driver stopped and switched off its
headlights. He removed his bonnet and George's blindfold,
warning the latter not to make any false move. George looked at
the driver, who turned out to be the appellant Michael Pagalasan.
The three police officers approached the car. Daga-as went to the
right side of the car beside the passenger seat, while Villanueva
went to the left side, near the driver's seat. For his part, Timbao
proceeded to the car's rear end. Daga-as and Villanueva identified
themselves to George and Michael as police officers on the
lookout for a certain George Lim and his son who had been
kidnapped in General Santos City. Daga-as inquired from George
what his name was, and George replied that he was Albert Lim.

The driver identified himself as Michael Pagalasan. George gave a

false first name because he was afraid Michael might shoot him.
Daga-as noticed that George's fingers were trembling. Villanueva
knocked at the door on the driver's side, and tried to open the
same, but it was locked. When Michael himself opened the door,
Villanueva pulled him out of the vehicle and brought him to the
mobile car. Michael was suddenly in the custody of the policemen.
George then identified himself as one of the kidnapped victims.
He also told the policemen that his son was still with the other
kidnappers. The policemen thereafter searched the Nissan car
and found a .38 caliber 5 handgun with six live bullets in its
chamber 6 and a grenade under the driver's seat. 7 The
policemen brought Michael and George to the police station
where Ferdinand was being interrogated by police investigators.
Ferdinand told George that he had nothing to do with the
kidnapping, but before he could explain further, he was whisked
into the investigation room. After giving a sworn statement to the
police investigator, George was allowed to go home. Desiree gave
George the handwritten letter earlier given to her by the
kidnappers before they left the house that evening. In the letter,
the spouses were warned not to coordinate with the military, nor
to take any action in connection with the kidnapping without their
knowledge or consent. They were also informed that the
malefactors would communicate with the couple, whether by
letter or through the telephone only through "MUBARAK II or
2." 8 Julita executed an affidavit in connection with the
kidnapping. 9
Police Inspector Antonio Evangelista ordered SPO4 Recio
Aniversario to conduct a custodial investigation on Michael. Recio
asked Michael if he wanted to execute an affidavit, and Michael
replied that he was going to execute one. The police investigator
inquired if he knew of any lawyer, to which Michael replied in the
negative. The police investigator then suggested Atty. Tomas C.
Falgui, a private practitioner, as his counsel. When Michael
agreed, the police investigator phoned the lawyer, requesting the
latter to assist Michael while undergoing custodial investigation.
The lawyer agreed and forthwith proceeded to the police station.
6

Michael gave his confession under custodial investigation with the

assistance of Atty. Falgui. 10

statement relating to the incidents that happened from

September 4, 1994 to September 10, 1994. 14

In his confession, Michael admitted that upon orders of Ronnie

Cabalo, he and three other men, Aladin (Ronnie's brother), a
Muslim known as Ferdinand, and Bong (a resident of Purok Islam),
had kidnapped George and his son Christopher. Ronnie Cabalo
instructed Michael to use George's vehicle to transport father and
son to the banana plantation where Aladin, Ferdinand and Boy
would alight with Christopher, and to thereafter return George to
his house. Aladin had given him a handgun for his use. Ferdinand
Cortez was in cahoots with them. He was at first reluctant to obey
Ronnie, but relented when he was told not to be afraid and to use
the grenade in case of trouble. George told him that he had
already given money to Aladin, and that Michael's companions
had taken some pieces of jewelry from him and his wife before
they left the Lim residence.

Michael was charged with kidnapping for ransom and violation

of PD 1866 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of General
Santos City. 15

In the light of Michael's confession, farmer Hadji Aladin Malang

Cabalo, Ronie Puntuan and Fernando Quizon were arrested and
detained at Camp Fermin Lira Barracks, General Santos City. In
the meantime, on September 6, 1994, George received another
handwritten letter, ordering the release of Michael and Ronie
Puntuan because they were innocent, and demanding P3,000,000
for Christopher's release. 11
On September 9, 1994, George received another handwritten
letter dated September 9, 1994, this time from "MUBARAK II or 2"
informing him and his wife that the kidnappers did not want the
military to be involved nor innocent people to be prejudiced. The
spouses were also warned that their son would not be released
alive unless Ronie Puntuan was freed in three days. 12 On the
same day at 3:25 p.m., Ronie Puntuan, through counsel, filed a
motion with the MTC praying that he be transferred from the
Camp Fermin Lira Barracks to the General Santos City Jail. 13
In the morning of the following day, September 10, 1994,
Christopher was rescued by policemen without any ransom being
paid. On September 13, 1994, George executed a sworn

During the initial stage of the preliminary investigation by the

MTC on September 6, 1994, Atty. Falgui appeared as Michael's
counsel and testified on what transpired immediately before,
during and after the custodial investigation, including Michael's
execution of his extrajudicial confession. 16 Michael was also
placed on the witness stand and, with the assistance of counsel,
testified on his extrajudicial confession. He affirmed the veracity
of the contents of the said confession. 17 Subsequently, Michael,
through his mother, secured the services of Atty. Emmanuel V.
Fontanilla. On September 12, 1994, Michael executed an affidavit
withdrawing his September 5, 1994 extrajudicial confession, in
which he stated that: (a) he was not assisted by counsel of his
own choice when he executed the extrajudicial confession; and
(b) Ronie Puntuan, who was arrested and detained, was not
Ronnie Cabalo. 18 Michael also executed a counter-affidavit
where he denied the accusations against him, and clarified that
he was forced and intimidated into making his September 5, 1994
confession, and he was not provided with counsel of his own
choice during custodial investigation. His constitutional rights
under custodial investigation were allegedly not sufficiently
explained to him. 19 He filed the said affidavits with the MTC
during the preliminary investigation.
On September 23, 1994, the MTC issued a resolution finding
probable cause for charging the accused with kidnapping for
ransom. The Office of the City Prosecutor conducted a
reinvestigation of the case. On October 4, 1994, the Office of the
City Prosecutor issued a resolution ordering the release of Hadji
Aladin Malang Cabalo on the ground that he was not the Aladin
Cabalo referred to by Michael in his confession. 20
An Information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against Michael
on October 17, 1994 with the Regional Trial Court of General
7

Santos City, Branch 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11062. On

November 3, 1994, Michael, Ronnie Cabalo, Aladin Cabalo,
Ferdinand Cortez, a certain John Doe identified as Fernando, and
Peter Doe were charged with kidnapping for ransom in an
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11098, which reads:
That on or about September 4, 1994, in General
Santos City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnap George Lim, and his tenyear-old son, Christopher Neal Lim, for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the said victims. 21
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court.
When arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11062 for Violation of PD
1866, Michael pleaded not guilty. On February 6, 1995, Michael,
Ferdinand and Fernando Quizon were arraigned in Criminal Case
No. 11098 and pleaded not guilty. 22 Ronnie Cabalo and Aladin
Cabalo remained at-large. On August 24, 1995, the judge hearing
the cases inhibited himself. Both cases were re-raffled, assigned
to, and were tried jointly by Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court.
During the trial, Michael, through counsel, admitted the truth of
the contents of the affidavit executed by Julita Sarno. 23 Michael
also executed an affidavit on December 5, 1995 alleging inter
alia that he was forced at gunpoint by Boy and Aladin to barge
into the Lim residence and drive the latter's car, and that he did
not know Fernando Quizon. 24 After the prosecution had
presented all its witnesses, it filed a formal offer of its
documentary evidence including Michael's December 15, 1995
Sworn Statement and his confession. 25 Michael did not file any
comment or opposition to the said offer. On May 3, 1996, the trial
court issued an order admitting the prosecution's documentary
evidence, including Michael's confession. 26 After the prosecution
had rested its case, Fernando Quizon filed a demurrer to evidence
in Criminal Case No. 11098. On July 2, 1996, the court issued an
order granting the demurrer to evidence of the said accused and
acquitted him of the charge. 27

The Defense and Evidence of the Accused

Ferdinand Cortez denied kidnapping George and Christopher. He
testified that he had been employed as a security guard by the
Valiant Security Agency. He was assigned by the agency to
protect George Lim and his family. On the evening of September
4, 1994, Ferdinand was washing George's car in the garage. The
house was surrounded by a 10-foot wall, and the gate was locked.
Ferdinand was shocked when masked men, armed with handguns,
suddenly arrived. They poked their guns at him, maltreated him,
and tied his hands behind his back. The masked men knocked at
the door of the house and when the housemaid Julita Sarno
opened it, the men dragged Ferdinand towards the entrance, to
make it appear that he was the one knocking. The masked men
then barged into the sala and tied Julita's hands. Ferdinand
claimed he never met any of the kidnappers before September 4,
1994. He was puzzled why he was being implicated in the case.
For his part, Michael testified that he was a Muslim, 19 years of
age, and an elementary school graduate. He made a living as a
conductor of his uncle's jeepney. At night, the jeepney was parked
in Tambler, and it was where he usually slept. On the evening of
September 4, 1994, at about 9:00 p.m., he was in their house at
Purok Islam public market, General Santos City. His friend Bong
arrived, and invited him for a stroll and to accompany the latter to
get a motorcycle. Michael agreed. They took a tricycle and arrived
at the Villa Consuelo Subdivision. Michael was surprised when the
tricycle stopped near the gate of the Lim residence and masked
men suddenly appeared, poking their guns at him. Bong fled,
leaving Michael alone to fend for himself. The masked men
ordered Michael to drive a car, and warned him that if he refused,
he would be killed. Momentarily, one of the men emerged from
the house, with George Lim in tow. George gave the key to his
Nissan car to one of the kidnappers, who in turn handed it over to
Michael. The men forced George and his son Christopher to board
the car. Father and son were seated between two masked men.
Afraid for his life, Michael was forced to drive the car with one of
the kidnappers pointing a gun at him, seated to his right at the
8

passenger's side. The kidnappers ordered Michael to drive the car

towards the direction of Barangay Ligaya.
When the car reached a dark portion of the road in Barangay
Ligaya, three of the men alighted, bringing Christopher with
them. Michael then pleaded to George to bring him first to
Tambler, where the jeepney of his uncle was parked. Michael
wanted to sleep there instead of going home. George agreed, and
drove the car himself through Barangay Makar. George told
Michael that they had to travel along Espina road, a dirt road,
instead of the regular road because they might encounter
policemen, and Christopher might be killed by his kidnappers.
However, the car had to stop at the intersection of the national
highway and Espina Road when George saw policemen and the
mobile police car parked at the intersection.
Michael was arrested by the police, blindfolded, and brought to
the mobile car where he was also mauled. His head was banged
against the sides of the mobile car. At the precinct, Michael was
mauled anew by the policemen. It was only after he had given his
statement to a police investigator that Atty. Falgui arrived and
told Michael, "I am your lawyer." 28 Atty. Falgui instructed
Michael to tell the whole truth. 29 When his mother Camaria
Opong visited him, he told her that he had been blindfolded and
mauled at the station, and that because of this, his body ached.
She saw a big hump in his head. On September 8, 1994, she
secured the services of Atty. Fontanilla as counsel of her son. The
lawyer went to the City Jail and talked to Michael. Michael showed
the lawyer the contusions and bruises on his body, and the
scratches on his neck. Michael told the lawyer that he had been
maltreated by an inmate at the detention cell. He also narrated
that he knew nothing about the kidnapping and that he was only
hired by somebody to drive a car. Michael assured the lawyer that
he was not aware of the purpose of the culprits in kidnapping
George and Christopher. On September 9, 1994, Atty. Fontanilla
executed an affidavit reiterating the information Michael
conveyed to him. 30 On September 16, 1994, Michael filed an
urgent motion for medical check-up, which the court granted. 31

Dra. Virginia Ramirez, Officer-In-Charge of the City Integrated

Health Services, examined Michael on September 22, 1994 and
found him suffering from myalgia residual or muscle pains due to
mauling, which she surmised took place about one week to ten
days before the examination. She issued a medical certificate of
the said examination. 32
On September 24, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment
acquitting Ferdinand Cortez and convicting Michael of kidnapping
for ransom, the decretal portion of which reads:
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused is
hereby sentenced as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 11062 for failure of the
prosecution to prove the accusation against the
accused Michael Pagalasan beyond reasonable
doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
In Criminal Case No. 11098, the accused Michael
Pagalasan is hereby found guilty of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized
under Article 267 as amended by Section 8
of Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying
circumstance to consider, he is sentenced to suffer
the EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH insofar as the
case of George Lim is concerned.
The same penalty of death shall also be imposed
against Michael Pagalasan in the case of
Christopher Neal Lim who was kidnapped on the
same occasion and was released only on the sixth
day after his captivity.
The case of Ferdinand Cortez, for lack of sufficient
evidence to convict him, he is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED. 33
9

The trial court ruled in Criminal Case No. 11098 that with or
without the confession of Michael, the prosecution adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt that he, in conspiracy with three others,
kidnapped George and Christopher. It found the testimony of
George straightforward and positive, credible and entitled to full
probative weight. The trial court sentenced Michael to double
death on its finding that he and his cohorts kidnapped George
and Christopher for the purpose of extorting ransom. It
disbelieved Michael's confession implicating Ferdinand Cortez,
and acquitted the latter for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court likewise acquitted
Michael in Criminal Case No. 11062.
Michael, now the appellant, asserts that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF CHRISTOPHER NEAL
LIM DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF ONE GEORGE LIM
WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AND IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF GEORGE LIM. 34
The appellant is guilty of kidnapping Christopher under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code.
On the first assignment of error, the appellant avers that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond cavil of doubt for the

crime of kidnapping Christopher. George's testimony that the gun

and hand grenade 35 were found in the car, under the seat
beside the driver is inconsistent with his own statement before
the police investigator that the said gun and grenade were found
in the appellant's possession; hence, the testimony of George is
incredible and barren of probative weight. The case for the
prosecution was enfeebled by its failure to present Christopher to
testify on his kidnapping and to corroborate the testimony of his
father. The failure of the prosecution to present Christopher as a
witness raised the presumption that if he had been so presented,
he would have testified on matters adverse to the prosecution.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the
testimony of George, its principal witness, as well as those of its
other witnesses, is sufficient to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
that the appellant conspired with three others in kidnapping
Christopher for ransom. There was no need for the prosecution to
present Christopher to testify on his kidnapping, as his testimony
would be merely corroborative of his father's account of events.
The contention of the appellant is barren of merit.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659 reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted
more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or
if threats to kill him shall have been made.

10

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a

minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence
of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by RA No.
7659).
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is
burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the crime, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter
of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill
him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer. 36 If the victim of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention
is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is immaterial.

The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty

of the victim under any of the above-mentioned circumstances
coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect

the same. 37 There must be a purposeful or knowing action by

the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent. 38
Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy "the darling of the
modern prosecutor's nursery." 39 There is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. 40 Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be
proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as
the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential
features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine
in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing
that they had acted with a common purpose and
design. 41 Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court
in Regina v. Murphy, 42 conspiracy may be implied if it is proved
that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of
each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment. 43 To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. 44 There
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to
the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 45
The United States Supreme Court in Braverman v. United
States, 46 held that the precise nature and extent of the
conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement
which embraces and defines its objects. For one thing, the
temporal dimension of the conspiracy is of particular importance.
Settled as a rule of law is that the conspiracy continues until the
object is attained, unless in the meantime the conspirator
abandons the conspiracy or is arrested. There is authority to the
effect that the conspiracy ends at the moment of any
conspirator's arrest, on the presumption, albeit rebuttable, that at
the moment the conspiracy has been thwarted, no other overt act
contributing to the conspiracy can possibly take place, at least as
11

far as the arrested conspirator is concerned. 47 The longer a

conspiracy is deemed to continue, the greater the chances that
additional persons will be found to have joined it. There is also the
possibility that as the conspiracy continues, there may occur new
overt acts. If the conspiracy has not yet ended, then the hearsay
acts and declarations of one conspirator will be admissible
against the other conspirators and one conspirator may be held
liable for substantive crimes committed by the others. 48
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his
confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a
common design as one of its probable and natural consequences
even though it was not intended as part of the original
design. 49 Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends
to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the
purpose intended. 50 Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in
conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited
result that they are in contemplation of law, charged with
intending the result. 51 Conspirators are necessarily liable for the
acts of another conspirator even though such act differs radically
and substantively from that which they intended to
commit. 52 The Court agrees with the ruling of the Circuit Court
of Appeals (Second District) per Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Peoni 53 "that nobody is liable in conspiracy except for
the fair import of the concerted purpose or agreement as he
understood it; if later comers change that, he is not liable for the
change; his liability is limited to the common purpose while he
remains in it." Earlier, the Appellate Court of Kentucky in Gabbard
v. Commonwealth 54 held that:
The act must be the ordinary and probable effect of
the wrongful acts specifically agreed on, so that
the connection between them may be reasonably
apparent, and not a fresh and independent project
of the mind of one of the confederates, outside of
or foreign to the common design, and growing out
of the individual malice of the perpetrator.

Equally persuasive is the pronouncement of the Circuit Court of

Appeals (Second District) in United States v. Crimms, 55 that it is
never permissible to enlarge the scope of the conspiracy itself by
proving that some of the conspirators, unknown to the rest, have
done what was beyond the reasonable intendment of the
common understanding. This is equally true when the crime
which the conspirators agreed upon is one of which they severally
might be guilty though they were ignorant of the existence of
some of its constitutive facts. Also, while conspirators are
responsible for consequent acts growing out of the common
design they are not for independent acts growing out of the
particular acts of individuals. 56
In this case, the evidence on record inscrutably shows that the
appellant and his three cohorts were armed with handguns; two
of them had hand grenades, and all of them had masks over their
faces. They gained entry into the Lim residence after
overpowering the security guard Ferdinand and the housemaid
Julita, and tying their hands behind their backs. One of the
masked men remained in the sala, while the three others barged
into the bedroom of George and Desiree, and kidnapped George
and his ten-year-old son Christopher. The appellant and his
cohorts forced father and son to board George's car. The
appellant drove the car, dropped off Christopher and his cohorts
at Sitio Tupi, and drove on with George in the car towards the
direction of Maasim.
The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellant
and his cohorts before, during and after the kidnapping constitute
indubitable proof that the appellant and his three companions
conspired with each other to attain a common objective: to
kidnap George and Christopher and detain them illegally. The
appellant was a principal by direct participation in the kidnapping
of the two victims.
The trial court found the testimony of George straightforward and
positive, and entitled to credit and full probative weight. 57 The
legal aphorism is that the findings of facts of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and of their probative
weight, its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded high
12

respect by the appellate court, if not conclusive effect, because of

the unique advantage of the trial court of observing at close
range the demeanor, conduct and deportment of witnesses as
they regale the trial court with their testimonies. 58 It is true that
the appellate court is not bound by the findings and conclusions
of the trial court if the latter ignored, misunderstood, misapplied
or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances, which, if
considered, would change the outcome of the case. 59 This
ruling, however, is inapplicable in the case at bar, since the
appellant failed to establish that the trial court erred in this wise.
George testified that when the policemen found the gun and
grenade 60 inside his car, the appellant was already at the police
station. 61 However, in his September 13, 1994
Affidavit, 62 George stated that the policemen found the gun
when the appellant was frisked, while the grenade was spotted
under the passenger's seat, beside the driver. This seeming
inconsistency between the two statements does not discredit his
testimony nor his credibility for the following reasons: (a) it is of
judicial knowledge that affidavits being taken ex parte are almost
always incomplete and often inaccurate and are generally inferior
to the testimony of a witness in open court; 63 (b) the credibility
of George's testimony cannot be impeached by the inconsistent
statements contained in his sworn statement because the said
statement was not admitted in evidence; and Section 34, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that the Court shall
not consider evidence which has not been formally offered;
besides, George was not confronted with his sworn statement and
accorded an opportunity to explain the inconsistency; 64 (c) the
inconsistency refers to trivial, minor and collateral matters and
not to the substance of his testimony. Such minor inconsistency
even enhances its veracity as the variances erase any suspicion
of a rehearsed testimony. 65 A truth-telling witness is not always
expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory. 66
Neither is the case for the prosecution impaired by the failure of
the prosecution to present Christopher as its witness. It bears
stressing that George's testimony is corroborated by Julita and

the three arresting officers. Besides, case law has it that the
testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient
to sustain a judgment of conviction. 67 The law does not require
the testimonies of at least two witnesses for the conviction of an
accused for kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The
prosecution has the discretion to decide on who to call as witness
during the trial, and its failure to present a particular witness does
not give rise to the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if withheld, where the evidence is
at the disposal of the appellant and is merely cumulative or
corroborative. 68 In this case, the testimony of George is, by
itself, independently of Christopher's testimony, sufficient proof of
the guilt of the appellant. George had personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances of the kidnapping, as he himself had
been kidnapped along with his young son. His failure to testify on
where Christopher was detained after the three cohorts of the
appellant had alighted from the car with Christopher, and the
circumstances surrounding the rescue do not weaken the case of
the prosecution, as the said facts and circumstances had occurred
after the crime of kidnapping had already been a fait accompli.

The prosecution failed to prove that in kidnapping George and

Christopher, the appellant and his cohorts intended to extort
ransom.
The trial court convicted the appellant of kidnapping George and
Christopher for ransom and sentenced him to double death on its
finding that the appellant and his co-accused conspired to extort
ransom for the release of the victims. For his part, the appellant
contends that the prosecution failed to prove the element of
extorting ransom. The appellant argues that he cannot be held
liable for kidnapping for ransom, even if after his arrest on
September 4, 1994 his co-conspirators actually demanded
ransom for Christopher's release. The prosecution failed to prove
that he had knowledge of and concurred with the said demand.
The Court agrees with the appellant. The second paragraph of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
13

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or

detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
The provision is pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1084 approved on
June 15, 1984 derived from the so-called "Lindbergh Law" in
the United States, approved on June 22, 1932, as amended on
May 13, 1934.
To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following:
(a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; (c)
motive of the accused, which is extortion of ransom from the
victim or any other person. In kidnapping or serious illegal
detention for ransom, the purpose of extorting ransom is a
qualifying circumstance which must be alleged in the Information
and proved by the prosecution as the crime itself by words and
overt acts of the accused before, during and after the kidnapping
and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual
payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be
committed. 69 Although kidnapping for a certain purpose is a
qualifying circumstance, the law does not require that the
purpose be accomplished. 70 Ransom employed in the law is so
used in its common or ordinary sense: a sum of money or other
thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for
redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that
releases from captivity. 71 It may include benefits not necessarily
pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper or a third person as
a condition for the release of the victim. 72
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellant conspired with three others to kidnap the
victims. However, it failed to prove that they intended to extort
ransom from the victims themselves or from some other person,
with a view to obtaining the latter's release. The kidnapping by

itself does not give rise to the presumption that the appellant and
his co-conspirators' purpose is to extort ransom from the victims
or any other person.
The only evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the
element of extorting ransom are the three handwritten letters:
the first was received by Desiree on September 4, 1994, while the
second and third letters were received by George on September 6
and 9, 1994, respectively.
The handwritten letter received by Desiree on September 4,
1994, "first letter" for brevity, reads:
Para Sa Inyo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,
Una wag na wag kayong gumawa ng hakbang na
hindi namin alam o gusto, lalong-lalo na sa
pakikipag-usap sa militar o magkoordinate sa
militar ay hindi namin gustong mangyari ang
ganon mga sistem. Ang pangalawa, wag na wag
kayong tumanggap ng negotiator na walang
palatandaan na galing sa amin, pakiusap lang yon
na dapat ninyong sundin, madidisgrasya ang
aming dala kung kayo'y magkakamali ng hakbang.
Maliwanag sana sa inyo ang aming mga salaysay.
Note . . .
Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito
MR. MUBARAK II or 2
Sulat man o telephone 73
The letter received by George on September 6, 1994, "second
letter" for brevity, reads:
Ronie Puntuan
Michael Pagalasan
Mr. G. Lim palayain ninyo ang suspek ninyo. Wala
silang kasalanan bago natin tapusin ang usapan
14

tatlong milyong piso (3,000,000) katumbas ng

kalayaan ng mahal ninyong anak. Paalisin ang mga
sundalo. Kailangan ang Black Out News. Huwag
kang magkakamali Mr. Lim. Kunting sipyot mo
patay ang anak mo. Isang araw lamang ang tagal
namin sa inyo.
(Sgd.) 74
The handwritten letter received by George on September 9, 1994,
"third letter" for brevity, reads:
Para sayo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,

Even then, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that

the second letter demanding ransom in the amount of P3,000,000
for the release of Christopher actually came from the appellant
and his co-conspirators. It bears stressing that in the first letter,
the kidnappers made it clear to the couple that only those
communications, whether by letter or by telephone, bearing the
name "MR. MUBARAK II or 2" came from them:
Note . . .
Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito
MR. MUBARAK II or 2

Mr. Lim, gusto ko lang ipaabot sayo ang maikli

kong kataga. Unang-una, ayaw namin na mga
asong militar na makialam. Pangalawa, ayaw
namin sa grupo na idamay ang tao na walangalam. Alalahanin mo mabuti lahat ng mga kataga
na iniwan ko sayo, Mr. Lim. Ang taong dinampot ng
militar sa purok islam na si Ronie, ang taong yan
walang conection (sic) sa grupo, sa madaling
usapan, Mr. Lim, alalahanin mo ang anak mo sa
oras na tatlong araw na taong yan hindi
makalabas. Ang isipin mo ang anak mo hindi rin
makalabas hanggat sa mabulok sa lupa
(maliwanag).
(Sign)
Palatandaan
MUBARAK II2 75
As gleaned from the three letters, there was no demand for
ransom in exchange for George and Christopher's liberty. While
there is a demand for ransom of P3,000,000 in the second letter,
and a demand for the release of Ronie Puntuan within three days
in the third letter, the said demands are in consideration of
Christopher's release from custody, and not that of George.

Sulat man o telephone 76

The second letter received by George was signed by an
unidentified person. It was not stated that the letter came from
"MUBARAK II-2." That the second letter could not have come from
the appellant and his cohorts is buttressed by the fact that
the third letter, which came from "MUBARAK II-2," does not even
mention any demand for ransom in the amount of P3,000,000 for
Christopher's release.
The Court can only surmise, but it is possible that the signatory
and sender of the second letter could have been acting
independently of the appellant and his co-conspirators in order to
profit from the kidnapping. It bears stressing that the kidnapping
of Christopher and George was already known when the appellant
was arrested on September 4, 1994, and the crime had already
been reported to the police authorities. Persons other than the coconspirators of the appellant could have written the letter.
Since there is no evidence that the signatory and sender of
the second letter is a co-conspirator of the appellant, the latter is
not bound by the said letter, conformably to Section 28, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another, except as hereinafter
provided.
15

Even if it is assumed for the nonce that the second letter came
from a co-conspirator, the same is not binding on the appellant,
absent evidence aliunde that he knew of and concurred with the
said ransom demand. It bears stressing that when George
received the second letter on September 6, 1994, the appellant
had already been arrested and detained. The conspiracy forged
by the appellant and his cohorts on or before September 4, 1994
had already ceased, when on the said date, the appellant was
arrested by the policemen and detained. 77
Neither is the third letter admissible in evidence against the
appellant to prove that he conspired with others to demand the
release of Ronie Puntuan in consideration for Christopher's
freedom. The appellant and his cohorts could not have planned to
demand ransom for the release of Ronie Puntuan as early as
September 4, 1994, the date of the kidnapping: Ronie had not yet
been arrested on this date. The appellant was arrested first, and
Ronie's detention was only to follow. Furthermore, thethird
letter was sent to George on September 9, 1994. At that point,
the appellant had already been arrested by the policemen, and
was already in jail. There is no evidence that while in jail, the
appellant had knowledge of and concurred with the said ransom
demand. It may be reasonably inferred that the appellant's coconspirators could have decided to demand Ronie Puntuan's
release as a consideration for Christopher's liberty, while the
appellant was already languishing in jail. The said demand for
ransom was a new and independent project of the appellant's coconspirators, growing out of their own malice, without any a
priori knowledge on the part of the appellant or his post
facto concurrence therewith. Indeed, the records show that on
September 9, 1994, the very day the co-conspirators sent
the third letter to George, Ronie Puntuan through counsel Atty.
Jose Jerry L. Fulgar, also the counsel for the appellant, filed a
motion with the MTC, praying that he be detained at the General
Santos City Jail:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed that an order be please issued
directing that accused Ronie Puntuan be please

detained at General Santos City Jail with the

instruction that the said accused be separated
from his co-accused as desired by the Police
Officers. 78
That the appellant plotted with his co-conspirators to demand the
release of Ronie Puntuan as a condition for Christopher's liberty is
too far-fetched, considering that Ronie and the appellant had the
same lawyer. Ronie Puntuan himself, through his and the
appellant's counsel, prayed to the court that he be transferred
from Camp Fermin Lira Barracks to the General Santos City Jail.

The appellant is also guilty of slight illegal detention of George

under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.
Aside from convicting the appellant of kidnapping Christopher,
the trial court also convicted him of kidnapping George under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. But the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that the appellant is guilty of another
felony: slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised
Penal Code, because none of the circumstances enumerated in
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present in the kidnapping
and detention of George. The prosecution may have failed to
prove that the appellant and his co-conspirators intended to
extort ransom for George's release; however, as a matter of
substantive law, the appellant may be held guilty of two separate
crimes, although he and his co-conspirators kidnapped George
and Christopher on the same occasion and from the same situs.
As a matter of procedural law, the appellant may be convicted of
slight illegal detention under the Information for kidnapping for
ransom as the former is necessarily included in the latter crime.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. The
appellant is guilty of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of
the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. The penalty
of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any
private individual who shall commit the crimes
16

described in the next preceding article without the

attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated therein.
The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who
shall furnish the place for the perpetration of the
crime.
If the offender shall voluntarily release the person
so kidnapped or detained within three days from
the commencement of the detention, without
having attained the purpose intended, and before
the institution of criminal proceedings against him,
the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods and a fine not exceeding
seven hundred pesos. (As amended by Republic
Act No. 18).
While the epigraph or title of the article mentions only slight
illegal detention, kidnapping committed in connection with the
lower offense of slight illegal detention is also covered by the
article. 79
The felony has the following essential elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
other manner deprives him of his liberty.
3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.
4. That the crime is committed without the
attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in Art. 267. 80
The crime of slight illegal detention is consummated upon the
occurrence of all the elements thereof. "A day," in the last
paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, should be
understood as twenty-four hours, to be counted from the
deprivation of the liberty of the victim until the cessation thereof.
As Cuello Calon put it: "El plazo de los tres dias de veinte cuatro

horas y desde el momento de la privacion de libertad si en que

esta cesare." 81 The rescue or escape of the victim within three
days from his kidnapping and detention is not an exempting
circumstance. The voluntary release by the offender of the victim
within three days from his detention, without the offender having
attained his purpose and before the institution of criminal
proceedings against him for slight illegal detention, is not an
exempting circumstance; it merely serves to reduce the penalty
to prision mayor in its maximum and medium periods and a fine
not exceeding P700.
In this case, the appellant is a private individual. George had been
kidnapped and detained illegally by the appellant and his cohorts,
but only for less than a day. George regained his freedom after
the appellant had been arrested at the intersection of the national
highway and Espina Road. There is no evidence that the appellant
and his cohorts kidnapped George for the purpose of extorting
ransom for his release. There is likewise no evidence that they
inflicted any serious physical injuries on George, or simulated
public authority, or threatened to kill him. Furthermore, there is
no evidence that the appellant and his cohorts intended to detain
the victim for more than three days.
Although the appellant and his co-conspirators kidnapped George
and Christopher on the same occasion and from the same situs,
the appellant is guilty of two separate crimes: kidnapping under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and slight illegal detention
under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. The appellant and
his co-conspirators were animated by two sets of separate
criminal intents and criminal resolutions in kidnapping and
illegally detaining the two victims. The criminal intent in
kidnapping Christopher was separate from and independent of
the criminal intent and resolution in kidnapping and detaining
George for less than three days. In the mind and conscience of
the appellant, he had committed two separate felonies; hence,
should be meted two separate penalties for the said crimes: one
for kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and
another for slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the same
code. 82 The felony of slight illegal detention is necessarily
17

included in the crime of kidnapping for ransom; thus, the

appellant may be convicted of the former crime under an
Information for kidnapping for ransom. 83
PENALTIES FOR THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE APPELLANT
The crimes committed by the appellant were aggravated
by dwelling, 84 the victims having been kidnapped in their
house; by the use of motor vehicle, 85 the victims having been
transported by the appellant from their house with the use of
George's car; and by a band, the crime having been committed
by the appellant and three co-conspirators. 86 However, the
Court cannot consider these aggravating circumstances in
determining the proper penalties for the said crimes, because the
same were not alleged in the Information as mandated
by Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 87 Although the said rules took effect after the
commission of the crimes by the appellant, the same is favorable
to the appellant; hence, should be applied retroactively. 88
The appellant is not entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance under the second paragraph of Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code 89 because he did not voluntarily release
George within three days from the kidnapping. George was
recovered by the policemen at the intersection of the national
highway and Espina Road.
The prescribed penalty for kidnapping under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no aggravating circumstance or
modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, the
proper penalty for the said crime is reclusion perpetua,
conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The
prescribed penalty for slight illegal detention is reclusion
temporal in its full period, with a range of twelve years and one
day to twenty years. To determine the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty, the penalty shall be reduced by one
degree, prision mayor, which has a range of six years and one
day to twelve years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the full range of the penalty at the discretion

of the Court. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be

taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, conformably
to Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the
appellant shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of nine years and
four months of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum,
to sixteen years and five months ofreclusion temporal in its
medium period as maximum.
CIVIL LIABILITIES OF THE APPELLANT
Although the prosecution adduced testimonial evidence that the
appellant and his co-conspirators ransacked the bedroom of the
victims and took cash and valuables, the prosecution
nevertheless failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove
the amount of the said cash and the value of the jewelry. Hence,
Spouses George and Desiree Lim are not entitled to actual
damages.
Under Article 2219, paragraph 5 of the New Civil Code, moral
damages may be recovered. In this case, the prosecution
adduced testimonial evidence that for the crimes committed by
the appellant and his co-conspirators, Spouses George and
Desiree suffered mental anguish, fright and serious anxiety
caused by the kidnapping of George and their son Christopher.
Considering the factual milieu in this case, the Court believes that
the said spouses are entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P100,000 for the kidnapping of Christopher, and the amount of
P50,000 for the illegal detention of George. The appellant is also
liable to the spouses for exemplary damages in the total amount
of P50,000 for the two crimes conformably with current
jurisprudence. 90
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated September
27, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch 35, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Michael
Pagalasan alias "Mike" is found guilty of kidnapping under Article
267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and there being no
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant
Michael Pagalasan alias "Mike" is found guilty beyond reasonable
18

doubt of the crime of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of

the Revised Penal Code and there being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from nine years
and four months of prision mayor in its medium period as
minimum to sixteen years and five months of reclusion
temporal in its medium period as maximum. The said appellant is
ordered to pay to Spouses George and Desiree Lim the total
amount of P150,000 as moral damages; and P50,000 as
exemplary damages in the two cases. ITcCaS

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Pagalasan, G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991, [June 18,
2003], 452 PHIL 341-380)
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO";
JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
"WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAO alias "ALLAN
PAHAK";
ARIEL
BALANSAG;
DAVIDSON
VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG";
JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG"; and
JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM", appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:
For most of the Cebuanos, the proceedings in these cases will
always be remembered as the "trial of the century." A reading of
the voluminous records readily explains why the unraveling of the
facts during the hearing before the court below proved transfixing
and horrifying and why it resulted in unusual media coverage.
These cases involve the kidnapping and illegal detention of a
college beauty queen along with her comely and courageous
sister. An intriguing tale of ribaldry and gang-rape was followed
by the murder of the beauty queen. She was thrown off a cliff into
a deep forested ravine where she was left to die. Her sister was
subjected to heartless indignities before she was also gang-raped.
In the aftermath of the kidnapping and rape, the sister was made
to disappear. Where she is and what further crimes were inflicted
upon her remain unknown and unsolved up to the present.
Before us in an appeal from the Decision 1 dated May 5, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU 45303-45304, finding Rowen Adlawan alias "Wesley,"
Josman Aznar, Ariel Balansag, Alberto Cao alias "Allan Pahak,"
Francisco Juan Larraaga alias "Paco," James Andrew Uy alias
"MM," and James Anthony Uy alias "Wang Wang," appellants
herein, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalties of "two (2) reclusiones perpetua" and
to indemnify the heirs of the victims, sisters Marijoy and
Jacqueline Chiong, jointly and severally, the amount of
P200,000.00 as actual damages and P5,000,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.
The Fourth Amended Informations 2 for kidnapping and illegal
detention dated May 12, 1998 filed against appellants and
Davidson Rusia alias "Tisoy Tagalog," the discharged state
witness, read as follows:
1) For Criminal Case No. CBU-45303: 3
"xxx xxx xxx
19

"That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00

o'clock more or less in the evening, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, all private
individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually
helping with one another, with deliberate intent,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap or deprive one Marijoy Chiong,
of her liberty and on the occasion thereof, and in
connection, accused, with deliberate intent, did
then and there have carnal knowledge of said
Marijoy against her will with the use of force and
intimidation and subsequent thereto and on the
occasion thereof, accused with intent to kill, did
then and there inflict physical injuries on said
Marijoy Chiong throwing her into a deep ravine and
as a consequence of which, Marijoy Chiong died.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
2) For Criminal Case CBU-45304: 4
"xxx xxx xxx
"That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00
o'clock more or less in the evening, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, all private
individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually
helping with one another, with deliberate intent,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap or deprive one Jacqueline
Chiong of her liberty, thereby detaining her until
the present.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
On separate arraignments, state witness Davidson Rusia and
appellants Rowen Adlawan, Josman Aznar, Ariel Balansag, Alberto
Cao, James Andrew and James Anthony Uy pleaded not
guilty. 5 Appellant Francisco Juan Larraaga refused to plead,

hence, the trial court entered for him the plea of "not
guilty." 6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In the main, the prosecution evidence centered on the testimony
of Rusia. 7 Twenty-one witnesses 8 corroborated his testimony on
major points. For the defense, appellants James Anthony Uy and
Alberto Cao took the witness stand. Appellant Francisco Juan
Larraaga was supposed to testify on his defense of alibi but the
prosecution and the defense, through a stipulation approved by
the trial court, dispensed with his testimony. Nineteen witnesses
testified for the appellants, corroborating their respective
defenses of alibi.
The version of the prosecution is narrated as follows:
On the night of July 16, 1997, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline
Chiong, who lived in Cebu City, failed to come home on the
expected time. It was raining hard and Mrs. Thelma Chiong
thought her daughters were simply having difficulty getting a
ride. Thus, she instructed her sons, Bruce and Dennis, to fetch
their sisters. They returned home without Marijoy and Jacqueline.
Mrs. Chiong was not able to sleep that night. Immediately, at 5:00
o'clock in the morning, her entire family started the search for her
daughters, but there was no trace of them. Thus, the family
sought the assistance of the police who continued the search. But
still, they could not find Marijoy and Jacqueline. 9
Meanwhile, in the morning of July 18, 1997, a certain Rudy Lasaga
reported to the police that a young woman was found dead at the
foot of a cliff in Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu. 10 Officer-in-Charge
Arturo Unabia and three other policemen proceeded to Tan-awan
and there, they found a dead woman lying on the ground.
Attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. 11 Her pants were torn,
her orange t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was
pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking
tape. 12
On July 19, 1996, upon hearing the news about the dead woman,
Mrs. Chiong's son Dennis and other relatives proceeded to the
Tupaz Funeral Parlor at Carcar, Cebu to see the body. It was
20

Marijoy dressed in the same orange shirt and maong pants she
wore when she left home on July 16, 1997. Upon learning of the
tragic reality, Mrs. Chiong became frantic and hysterical. She
could not accept that her daughter would meet such a gruesome
fate. 13
On May 8, 1998, or after almost ten months, the mystery that
engulfed the disappearance of Marijoy and Jacqueline was
resolved. Rusia, bothered by his conscience and recurrent
nightmares, 14 admitted before the police having participated in
the abduction of the sisters. 15 He agreed to re-enact the
commission of the crimes. 16
On August 12, 1998, Rusia testified before the trial court how the
crimes were committed and identified all the appellants as the
perpetrators. He declared that his conduit to Francisco Juan
Larraaga was Rowen Adlawan whom he met together with
brothers James Anthony and James Andrew Uy five months before
the commission of the crimes charged. 17 He has known Josman
Aznar since 1991. He met Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag only in
the evening of July 16, 1997. IDCHTE
On July 15, 1997, while Rusia was loafing around at the Cebu
Plaza Hotel, Cebu City, Rowen approached him and arranged that
they meet the following day at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. 18 When they saw each other the next day, Rowen
told him to stay put at the Ayala Mall because they would have a
"big happening" in the evening. All the while, he thought that
Rowen's "big happening" meant group partying or scrounging. He
thus lingered at the Ayala Mall until the appointed time came.19
At 10:30 in the evening, Rowen returned with Josman. They met
Rusia at the back exit of the Ayala Mall and told him to ride with
them in a white car. Rusia noticed that a red car was following
them. Upon reaching Archbishop Reyes Avenue, same city, he
saw two women standing at the waiting shed. 20 Rusia did not
know yet that their names were Marijoy and Jacqueline.
Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed and he
and Rowen approached and invited Marijoy and Jacqueline to join

them. 21 But the sisters declined. Irked by the rejection, Rowen

grabbed Marijoy while Josman held Jacqueline and forced both
girls to ride in the car. 22 Marijoy was the first one to get inside,
followed by Rowen. Meanwhile, Josman pushed Jacqueline inside
and immediately drove the white car. Rusia sat on the front seat
beside Josman.
Fourteen (14) meters from the waiting shed, Jacqueline managed
to get out of the car. Josman chased her and brought her back
into the car. Not taking anymore chances, Rowen elbowed
Jacqueline on the chest and punched Marijoy on the stomach,
causing both girls to faint. 23 Rowen asked Rusia for the
packaging tape under the latter's seat and placed it on the girls'
mouths. Rowen also handcuffed them jointly. The white and red
cars then proceeded to Fuente Osmea, Cebu City.
At Fuente Osmea, Josman parked the car near a Mercury Drug
Store and urged Rusia to inquire if a van that was parked nearby
was for hire. A man who was around replied "no" so the group
immediately left. The two cars stopped again near Park Place
Hotel where Rusia negotiated to hire a van. But no van was
available. Thus, the cars sped to a house in Guadalupe, Cebu City
known as the safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar Group." Thereupon,
Larraaga, James Anthony and James Andrew got out of the red
car.
Larraaga, James Anthony and Rowen brought Marijoy to one of
the rooms, while Rusia and Josman led Jacqueline to another
room. Josman then told Rusia to step out so Rusia stayed at the
living room with James Andrew. They remained in the house for
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes. At that time, Rusia could hear
Larraaga, James Anthony, and Rowen giggling inside the room.
Thereafter, the group brought Marijoy and Jacqueline back to the
white car. Then the two cars headed to the South Bus Terminal
where they were able to hire a white van driven by Alberto. Ariel
was the conductor. James Andrew drove the white car, while the
rest of the group boarded the van. They traveled towards south of
Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.
21

Inside the van, Marijoy and Jacqueline were slowly gaining

strength. James Anthony taped their mouths anew and Rowen
handcuffed them together. Along the way, the van and the white
car stopped by a barbeque store. Rowen got off the van and
bought barbeque and Tanduay rhum. They proceeded to Tanawan. 24 Then
they
parked
their
vehicles
near
a
precipice 25 where they drank and had a pot session. Later, they
pulled Jacqueline out of the van and told her to dance as they
encircled her. She was pushed from one end of the circle to the
other, ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile, Josman told
Larraaga to start raping Marijoy who was left inside the van. The
latter did as told and after fifteen minutes emerged from the van
saying, "who wants next?" Rowen went in, followed by James
Anthony, Alberto, the driver, and Ariel, the conductor. Each spent
a few minutes inside the van and afterwards came out smiling. 26
Then they carried Marijoy out of the van, after which Josman
brought Jacqueline inside the vehicle. Josman came out from the
van after ten minutes, saying, "whoever wants next go ahead and
hurry up." Rusia went inside the van and raped Jacqueline,
followed by James Andrew. At this instance, Marijoy was to
breathe her last for upon Josman's instruction, Rowen and Ariel
led her to the cliff and mercilessly pushed her into the
ravine 27 which was almost 150 meters deep. 28
As for Jacqueline, she was pulled out of the van and thrown to the
ground. Able to gather a bit of strength, she tried to run towards
the road. The group boarded the van, followed her and made fun
of her by screaming, "run some more." There was a tricycle
passing by. The group brought Jacqueline inside the van. Rowen
beat her until she passed out. The group then headed back to
Cebu City with James Andrew driving the white car. Rusia got off
from the van somewhere near the Ayala Center.29
There were other people who saw snippets of what Rusia had
witnessed. Sheila Singson, 30 Analie Konahap 31 and Williard
Redobles 32 testified that Marijoy and Jacqueline were talking to
Larraaga and Josman before they were abducted. Roland

Dacillo 33 saw Jacqueline alighting and running away from a

white car and that Josman went after her and grabbed her back to
the car. Alfredo Duarte 34 testified that he was at the barbeque
stand when Rowen bought barbeque; that Rowen asked where he
could buy Tanduay; that he saw a white van and he heard
therefrom voices of a male and female who seemed to be
quarreling; that he also heard a cry of a woman which he could
not understand because "it was as if the voice was being
controlled;" and that after Rowen got his order, he boarded the
white van which he recognized to be previously driven by Alberto
Cao. Meanwhile, Mario Mioza, 35 a tricycle driver plying the
route of Carcar-Mantalongon, saw Jacqueline running towards
Mantalongon. Her blouse was torn and her hair was disheveled.
Trailing her was a white van where a very loud rock music could
be heard. Manuel Camingao36 recounted that on July 17, 1997,
at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw a white van near a
cliff at Tan-awan. Thinking that the passenger of the white van
was throwing garbage at the cliff, he wrote its plate number
(GGC-491) on the side of his tricycle. 37
Still, there were other witnesses 38 presented by the prosecution
who gave details which, when pieced together, corroborated well
Rusia's testimony on what transpired at the Ayala Center all the
way to Carcar.
Against the foregoing facts and circumstances, the appellants
raised the defense of alibi, thus:
Larraaga, through his witnesses, sought to establish that on July
16, 1997, he was in Quezon City taking his mid-term
examinations at the Center for Culinary Arts. In the evening of
that day until 3:00 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1997, he was
with his friends at the R & R Bar and Restaurant, same city.
Fifteen witnesses testified that they were either with Larraaga or
saw him in Quezon City at the time the crimes were committed.
His friends, Lourdes Montalvan, 39 Charmaine Flores, 40 Richard
Antonio, 41 Jheanessa
Fonacier, 42 Maharlika
Shulze, 43 Sebastian Seno, 44 Francisco Jarque, 45 Raymond
Garcia, 46 Cristina
Del
Gallego, 47 Mona
Lisa
Del
Gallego, 48 Paolo Celso 49 and Paolo Manguerra 50 testified that
22

they were with him at the R & R Bar on the night of July 16, 1997.
The celebration was a "despedida" for him as he was leaving the
next day for Cebu and a "bienvenida" for another friend.
Larraaga's classmate Carmina Esguerra 51 testified that he was
in school on July 16, 1997 taking his mid-term examinations. His
teacher Rowena Bautista, 52 on the other hand, testified that he
attended her lecture in Applied Mathematics. Also, some of his
neighbors at the Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City,
including the security guard, Salvador Boton, testified that he was
in his condo unit in the evening of July 16, 1997. Representatives
of the four airline companies plying the route of Manila-CebuManila presented proofs showing that the name Francisco Juan
Larraaga does not appear in the list of preflight and post-flight
manifests from July 15, 1997 to about noontime of July 17, 1997.
Meanwhile, James Anthony Uy testified that on July 16, 1997, he
and his brother James Andrew were at home in Cebu City because
it was their father's 50th birthday and they were celebrating the
occasion with a small party which ended at 11:30 in the
evening. 53 He only left his house the next day, July 17, 1997 at
about 7:00 o'clock in the morning to go to school. 54 The boys'
mother, Marlyn Uy, corroborated his testimony and declared that
when she woke up at 2:00 o'clock in the morning to check on her
sons, she found them sleeping in their bedrooms. They went to
school the next day at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. 55
Clotilde Soterol testified for Alberto and Ariel. She narrated that
on July 16, 1997, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Alberto
brought the white Toyota van with Plate No. GGC-491 to her shop
to have its aircon repaired. Alberto was accompanied by his wife
Gina Cao, co-appellant Ariel, and spouses Catalina and Simplicio
Paghinayan, owners of the vehicle. Since her (Clotildes') husband
was not yet around, Alberto just left the vehicle and promised to
return the next morning. Her husband arrived at 8:30 in the
evening and started to repair the aircon at 9:00 o'clock of the
same evening. He finished the work at 10:00 o'clock the following
morning. At 11:00 o'clock, Alberto and his wife Gina, Ariel and
Catalina
returned
to
the
shop
to
retrieve
the

vehicle. 56 Alberto, 57 Gina 58 and

Clotilde's testimony.

Catalina 59 corroborated

To lend support to Josman's alibi, Michael Dizon recounted that on

July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he and several
friends were at Josman's house in Cebu. They ate their dinner
there and afterwards drank "Blue Label." They stayed at Josman's
house until 11:00 o'clock in the evening. Thereafter, they
proceeded to BAI Disco where they drank beer and socialized with
old friends. They stayed there until 1:30 in the morning of July 17,
1997. Thereafter, they transferred to DTM Bar. They went home
together at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning. Their friend, Jonas
Dy Pico, dropped Josman at his house. 60
Concerning state witness Rusia, on August 7, 1998, when the
prosecution moved that he be discharged as an accused for the
purpose of utilizing him as a state witness, 61 Larraaga and
brothers James Anthony and James Andrew opposed the motion
on the ground that he does not qualify as a state witness under
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure. 62 On August 12, 1998, the trial court allowed the
prosecution to present Rusia as its witness but deferred resolving
its motion to discharge until it has completely presented its
evidence. 63 On the same date, the prosecution finished
conducting Rusia's direct examination. 64The defense lawyers
cross-examined him on August 13, 17, and 20, 1998. 65 On the
last date, Judge Ocampo provisionally terminated the crossexamination due to the report that there was an attempt to bribe
him and because of his deteriorating health. 66
Resenting the trial court's termination of Rusia's crossexamination, the defense lawyers moved for the inhibition of
Judge Ocampo. 67 When he informed the defense lawyers that he
would not inhibit himself since he found no "just and valid
reasons" therefor, the defense lawyers withdrew en masse as
counsel for the appellants declaring that they would no longer
attend the trial. Judge Ocampo held them guilty of direct
contempt of court. Thus, defense lawyers Raymundo Armovit,
Edgar Gica, Fidel Gonzales, Ramon Teleron, Alfonso de la Cerna
and Lorenzo Paylado were ordered jailed.
23

In the Order dated August 25, 1998, the trial court denied the
motion for inhibition of the defense lawyers and ordered them to
continue representing their respective clients so that the cases
may undergo the mandatory continuous trial. The trial court
likewise denied their motion to withdraw as appellants' counsel
because of their failure to secure a prior written consent from
their clients. On August 26, 1998, appellants filed their written
consent to the withdrawal of their counsel. ASHICc
Thereafter, Larraaga, Josman and brothers James Anthony and
James Andrew moved for the postponement of the hearing for
several weeks to enable them to hire the services of new
counsel. 68 On August 31, 1998, the trial court denied appellants'
motions on the ground that it could no longer delay the hearing of
the cases. On September 2, 1998, the trial court directed the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to act as counsel de oficio for all the
appellants. 69

Trial resumed on September 3, 1998 with a team of PAO lawyers

assisting appellants. Larraaga objected to the continuation of
the direct examination of the prosecution witnesses as he was not
represented by his counsel de parte. The trial court overruled his
objection. The prosecution witnesses testified continuously from
September 3, 1998 to September 24, 1998. Meanwhile, the crossexamination of said witnesses was deferred until the appellants
were able to secure counsel of their choice. On the same date,
September 24, 1998, Atty. Eric C. Villarmia entered his
appearance as counsel for Larraaga, while Atty. Eric S. Carin
appeared as counsel for brothers James Anthony and James
Andrew.
Thereafter, or on October 1, 1998, the defense lawyers started
cross-examining Rusia. The cross-examination continued on
October 5, 6, 12 and 13, 1998.
Eventually, acting on the prosecution's motion to discharge Rusia
to be a state witness, the trial court required the opposing parties
to submit their respective memoranda. On November 12, 1998,

the trial court issued an omnibus order granting the prosecution's

motion discharging Rusia as an accused and according him the
status of a state witness.
On May 5, 1999, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, all the accused Francisco Juan
Larraaga, Josman Aznar, James Andrew Uy, James
Anthony Uy, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao, and
Ariel Balansag are hereby found Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two crimes of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention and are hereby sentenced
to
imprisonment
of
Two
(2)Reclusiones
Perpetua each which penalties, however, may
be served by them simultaneously (Article 70,
Revised Penal Code). Further, said accused are
hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the two
(2) victims in these cases, jointly and severally, in
the amount of P200,000.00 in actual damages and
P5,000,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
damages.
"SO ORDERED."
Hence, the instant separate appeals. Appellants Rowen, Alberto
and Ariel ascribe to the trial court the following errors:
"I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE
UNTRUSTWORTHY,
INCONSISTENT,
CONTRADICTORY AND INCREDULOUS TESTIMONY
OF (DAVIDSON) VALIENTE RUSIA.
''II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES,
NOTWITHSTANDING
THE
FACT
THAT
THE
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT DULY REPRESENTED BY
24

COUNSELS OF THEIR OWN CHOICE DURING THE

TIME THESE WITNESSES WERE PRESENTED.
"III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
"IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE
TESTIMONIES
OF
THE
PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
"V
THE
COURT A
QUO ERRED
IN
DISPLAYING
MANIFEST ANIMOSITY TOWARDS THE DEFENSE'S
WITNESSES
WHICH
CLEARLY
SHOWED
ITS
PREJUDICE AND BIAS IN DECIDING THE CASE.
"VI
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING SOME
DEFENSE WITNESSES TO TESTIFY.
"VII
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING
ROWEN
ADLAWAN
TO
HAVE
WAIVED
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF."
For his part, Josman raises the following assignments of error:
"I
THE
TRIAL
COURT
GRAVELY
ERRED
IN
DISCHARGING DAVID VALIENTE RUSIA AS STATE
WITNESS IN GROSS AND BLATANT DISREGARD OF
THE RULES ON DISCHARGE OF STATE WITNESS.
"II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING

CREDENCE TO RUSIA'S TESTIMONY DESPITE CLEAR
SHOWING THAT HIS CRIMINAL RECORD AS AN
EX-CONVICT, DRUG ADDICT AND GANGSTER
AND HIS SUICIDAL TENDENCIES SERIOUSLY
IMPAIR HIS CREDIBILITY AND INNATE CAPACITY FOR
TRUTH, HONESTY AND INTEGRITY.
"III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING
CREDENCE TO RUSIA'S TESTIMONY REPLETE AS IT
WAS WITH INCONSISTENCIES, FALSEHOODS AND
LIES.
"IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING
CREDENCE TO THE CORROBORATIVE TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
"V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT AZNAR HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
AND IN DEPRIVING HIM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED.
"VI
THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED AZNAR'S RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE REFUSED
TO INHIBIT HIMSELF AND PROCEEDED WITH THE
TRIAL DESPITE GLARING BADGES OF HIS
PARTIALITY AND BIAS FOR THE PROSECUTION.
"VII
THE
TRIAL
COURT
GRAVELY
ERRED
IN
DISCREDITING AND DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE
OF APPELLANT AZNAR.
"VIII
25

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING

APPELLANT
AZNAR
ON
THE
BASIS
OF
PROSECUTING EVIDENCE MAINLY ANCHORED ON
RUSIA'S TESTIMONY WHICH FAILED TO EVINCE
PROOF
BEYOND
REASONABLE
DOUBT
OF
APPELLANT AZNAR'S CRIMINAL LIABILITY."
In his 145-page appellant's brief, Larraaga alleges that the trial
court committed the following errors:
"6.1 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING AND
VIOLATING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED.
6.2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED DAVIDSON RUSIA.
6.3 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING PARTIAL
CREDIBILITY TO THE TESTIMONY OF DAVIDSON
RUSIA.
6.4 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE OTHER WITNESSES.
6.5 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONIES OF OTHER WITNESSES.
6.6 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION
HAS
OVERCOME
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
6.7 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING
AND REJECTING, EVEN AT DIRECT TESTIMONY
STAGE, THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF
ALIBI." EHCaDS
For their part, brothers James Anthony and James Andrew, in their
147-page appellants' brief, bid for an acquittal on the following
grounds:

ANTHONY S. UY AND JAMES ANDREW S. UY THEIR

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT, TO HAVE COUNSEL
OF THEIR OWN CHOICE, TO HAVE AN IMPARTIAL
JUDGE, TO MEET WITNESSES FACE TO FACE, AND
TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE ON THEIR BEHALF;
B) THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS ABSOLUTELY
NOTHING TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF
ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY S. UY AND JAMES
ANDREW S. UY IN THESE CASES THUS THE TRIAL
COURT BELOW SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT RENDERED THE 5 MAY 1999 JUDGMENT
OF CONVICTION AGAINST THEM."70
Appellants' assignments of error converge on four points, thus:
(1) violation of their right to due process; (2) the improper
discharge of Rusia as an accused to be a state witness; (3) the
insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution; and (4) the trial
court's disregard and rejection of the evidence for the defense.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
I. Violation of Appellants' Right to Due Process
Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of
individual freedoms; it is the basic and essential term in the social
compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits
the powers which the State may exercise. 71 In evaluating a due
process claim, the court must determine whether life, liberty or
property interest exists, and if so, what procedures are
constitutionally required to protect that right. 72 Otherwise
stated, the due process clause calls for two separate inquiries in
evaluating an alleged violation: did the plaintiff lose something
that fits into one of the three protected categories of life, liberty,
or property?; and, if so, did the plaintiff receive the minimum
measure of procedural protection warranted under the
circumstances? 73

"A) THE TRIAL COURT BELOW GRIEVOUSLY FAILED

TO OBSERVE, AND THUS DENIED ACCUSED JAMES
26

For our determination, therefore, is whether the minimum

requirements of due process were accorded to appellants during
the trial of these cases.
Section 14, Article III of our Constitution catalogues the essentials
of due process in a criminal prosecution, thus:
"SEC. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for
a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been notified and his failure
to appear is unjustifiable."
Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure casts the
foregoing provision in a more detailed manner, thus:
"SECTION 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled
to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by
counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The
accused may, however, waive his presence at the
trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his

bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by

the court for purposes of identification. The
absence of the accused without justifiable cause at
the trial of which he had notice shall be considered
a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When
an accused under custody escapes, he shall be
deemed to have waived his right to be present on
all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is
regained. Upon motion, the accused may be
allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can
properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but
subject to cross-examination on matters covered
by direct examination. His silence shall not in any
manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a
witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as
part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who
is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise
unable to testify, given in another case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, the adverse party
having the opportunity to cross-examine him.

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure

the attendance of witnesses and production of
other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

27

(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner

prescribed by law."
Of the foregoing rights, what appellants obviously claim as having
been trampled upon by the trial court are their: (a) right to be
assisted by counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (b) right to
confront and cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; (c) right to
produce evidence on their behalf; and (d) right to an impartial
trial.
A. Right to Counsel
Anent the right to counsel, appellants fault the trial court: first, for
appointing counsel de oficio despite their insistence to be
assisted by counsel of their own choice; and second, for refusing
to suspend trial until they shall have secured the services of new
counsel.
Appellants cannot feign denial of their right to counsel. We have
held that there is no denial of the right to counsel where a
counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the
accused's counsel de parte, pursuant to the court's desire to
finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial
system. 74
Indisputably, it was the strategic machinations of appellants and
their counsel de parte which prompted the trial court to appoint
counsel de oficio. The unceremonious withdrawal of appellants'
counsel de parte during the proceedings of August 24, 1998, as
well as their stubborn refusal to return to the court for trial
undermines the continuity of the proceedings. Considering that
the case had already been dragging on a lethargic course, it
behooved the trial court to prevent any further dilatory
maneuvers on the part of the defense counsel. Accordingly, it was
proper for the trial court to appoint counsel de oficio to represent
appellants during the remaining phases of the proceedings.
At any rate, the appointment of counsel de oficio under such
circumstances is not proscribed by the Constitution. An
examination of its provisions concerning the right to counsel
shows that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains

more
aptly
and
specifically
to
a
person
under
investigation 75 rather than an accused in a criminal
prosecution. 76 And even if we are to extend the application of
the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an
accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion is
not absolute as would enable him to choose a particular counsel
to the exclusion of others equally capable. We stated the reason
for this ruling in an earlier case:
"Withal, the word 'preferably' under Section 12 (1),
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey
the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule
were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation, will be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not
available to protect his interest. This absurd
scenario could not have been contemplated by the
framers of the charter." 77
In the same breath, the choice of counsel by the accused in a
criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel
deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded
from appointing a de oficio counsel whom it considers competent
and independent to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel
of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal
prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the
detriment of the eventual resolution of the case. 78
Neither is there a violation of appellants' right to counsel just
because the trial court did not grant their request for suspension
of the hearing pending their search for new counsel. An
application for a continuance in order to secure the services of
counsel is ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court, and
the denial thereof is not ordinarily an infringement of the
accused's right to counsel. 79 The right of the accused to select
28

his own counsel must be exercised in a reasonable time and in a

reasonable manner. 80
In the present case, appellants requested either one (1) month or
three (3) weeks to look for new counsel. Such periods are
unreasonable. Appellants could have hired new lawyers at a
shorter time had they wanted to. They should have been diligent
in procuring new counsel. 81 Constitutional guaranty of right to
representation by counsel does not mean that accused may avoid
trial by neglecting or refusing to secure assistance of counsel and
by refusing to participate in his trial. 82 It has been held that
where the accused declined the court's offer to appoint counsel
and elected to defend himself, the denial of his motion made
toward the end of the trial for a continuance so that he could
obtain counsel of his own choice was not an infringement of his
constitutional rights. 83 While the accused has the right to
discharge or change his counsel at any time, this right is to some
extent subject to supervision by the trial court, particularly after
the trial has commenced. The court may deny accused's
application to discharge his counsel where it appears that such
application is not made in good faith but is made for purposes of
delay. 84
Significantly, parallel to the hearing at the trial court were also
petitions and motions involving several incidents in these cases
filed with the Court of Appeals and this Court. The appellants,
particularly Larraaga, were represented there by the same
counsel de parte. 85 Certainly, it is wrong for these lawyers to
abandon appellants in the proceeding before the trial court and
unceasingly represent them in the appellate courts. Indeed, in
doing so, they made a mockery of judicial process and certainly
delayed the hearing before the court below. In Lacambra vs.
Ramos, 86 we ruled:
"The Court cannot help but note the series of legal
maneuvers resorted to and repeated importunings
of the accused or his counsel, which resulted in the
protracted trial of the case, thus making a mockery
of the judicial process, not to mention the injustice
caused by the delay to the victim's family." aSADIC

Furthermore, appellants' counsel de parte ought to know that

until their withdrawal shall have been approved by the appellants,
they still remain the counsel of record and as such, they must do
what is expected of them, that is, to protect their
interests. 87 They cannot walk out from a case simply because
they do not agree with the ruling of the judge. Being officers of
the court whose duty is to assist in administering justice, they
may not withdraw or be permitted to withdraw as counsel in a
case if such withdrawal will work injustice to a client or frustrate
the ends of justice. 88
B. Right to Confront and Cross-Examine
the Prosecution Witnesses.
Appellants also fault the trial court for depriving them of the right
to cross-examine Rusia and the other prosecution witnesses.
Appellants' assertion has no factual and legal anchorage. For one,
it is not true that they were not given sufficient opportunity to
cross-examine Rusia. All of appellants' counsel de parte had a fair
share of time in grilling Rusia concerning his background to the
kidnapping of Marijoy and Jacqueline. The records reveal the
following dates of his cross-examination:
Lawyers Dates of Cross-examination
1. Armovit (for Larraaga) August 13 and 17, 1998
2. Gonzales (for Larraaga) August 20, 1998
3. Gica (for Josman) August 20, 1998
4. Paylado (for James Anthony August 20, 1998
and James Andrew)
5. De la Cerna (for Rowen, Alberto August 20, 1998
and Ariel)
6. Villarmia (for Larraaga) October 1, 1998
7. Andales (for Josman) October 5 and 6, 1998
8. Carin (for James Andrew and October 5, 1998
James Anthony)
29

9. Debalucos (for Rowen, Cao October 12, 1998

and Balansag)
10. De Jesus (for Rowen, Alberto October 12, 1998
and Ariel)
11. Ypil (for Rowen, Alberto and October 12, 1998 89
Ariel)
That the trial court imposed limitation on the length of time
counsel for appellants may cross-examine Rusia cannot be
labeled as a violation of the latter's constitutional right.
Considering that appellants had several lawyers, it was just
imperative for the trial court to impose a time limit on their crossexamination so as not to waste its time on repetitive and prolix
questioning.
Indeed, it is the right and duty of the trial court to control the
cross-examination of witnesses, both for the purpose of
conserving its time and protecting the witnesses from prolonged
and needless examination. 90 Where several accused are being
tried jointly for the same offense, the order in which counsel for
the several defendants shall cross-examine the state's witnesses
may be regulated by the court 91 and one of them may even be
denied the right to cross-examine separately where he had
arranged with the others that counsel of one of them should
cross-examine for all. 92 In People vs. Gorospe, 93 we ruled:
"While cross-examination is a right available to the
adverse party, it is not absolute in the sense that a
cross-examiner could determine for himself the
length and scope of his cross-examination of a
witness. The court has always the discretion to
limit the cross-examination and to consider it
terminated if it would serve the ends of justice."
The transcript of stenographic notes covering Rusia's crossexamination shows that appellants' counsel had ample chance to
test his credibility.

Records show that the failure of the PAO lawyers to cross-examine

some of the prosecution witnesses was due to appellants'
obstinate refusal. In its Order 94 dated September 8, 1998, the
trial court deferred the cross-examination in view of appellants'
insistence that their new counsel de parte will conduct the crossexamination. So as not to unduly delay the hearing, the trial court
warned the appellants that if by September 24, 1998, they are
not yet represented by their new counsel de parte, then it will
order their counsel de oficio to conduct the cross-examination.
Lamentably, on September 24, 1998, appellants' counsel de
parte entered their appearances merely to seek another
postponement of the trial. Thus, in exasperation, Judge Ocampo
remarked:

"Every time a defense counsel decides to

withdraw, must an accused be granted one (1)
month suspension of trial to look for such new
counsel to study the records and transcripts? Shall
the pace of the trial of these cases be thus left to
the will or dictation of the accused whose
defense counsels would just suddenly withdraw
and cause such long suspensions of the trial while
accused allegedly shop around for new counsels
and upon hiring new counsels ask for another one
month trial suspension for their new lawyers to
study the records? While all the time such defense
counsels (who allegedly have already withdrawn)
openly continue to 'advise' their accused-clients
and even file 'Manifestations' before this Court and
Petitions for Certiorari, Injunction and Inhibition on
behalf of accused before the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court?
"What inanity is this that the accused and their
lawyers are foisting upon this Court? In open
defiance of the provisions of SC A.O. No. 10496 that these heinous crimes cases shall undergo
30

'mandatory continuous trial and

terminated within sixty (60) days'?"

shall

be

Still, in its Order dated October 8, 1998, the trial court gave
appellants' new counsel de parte a period until October 12, 1998
to manifest whether they are refusing to cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses concerned; if so, then the court shall
consider them to have waived their right to cross-examine those
witnesses. During the hearing on October 12, 1998, Larraaga's
new counsel de parte, Atty. Villarmia, manifested that he would
not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses who testified on
direct examination when Larraaga was assisted by counsel de
oficio only. The next day, the counsel de parte of Josman, and
brothers James Anthony and James Andrew adopted Atty.
Villarmia's manifestation. Counsel for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel
likewise refused to cross-examine the same witnesses. Thus, in its
Order dated October 14, 1998, the trial court deemed appellants
to have waived their right to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses.
It appears, therefore, that if some of the prosecution witnesses
were not subjected to cross-examination, it was not because
appellants were not given the opportunity to do so. The fact
remains that their new counsel de parte refused to cross-examine
them. Thus, appellants waived their right "to confront and cross
examine the witnesses" against them.
C. Right to Impartial Trial
Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he
asked questions and made comments when the defense
witnesses were testifying.
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may
properly intervene during trial to promote expeditious proceeding,
prevent unnecessary waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or
clear up obscurities. The test is whether the intervention of the
judge tends to prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the
ascertainment of the truth in the matter where he interposes his
questions or comments.

Records show that the intervention by way of comment of Judge

Ocampo during the hearing was not only appropriate but was
necessary. One good illustration is his explanation on alibi. Seeing
that the appellants' counsel were about to present additional
witnesses whose testimonies would not establish the impossibility
of appellants' presence in the scene of the crime, Judge Ocampo
intervened and reminded appellants' counsel of the requisites
of alibi, thus:
"Well, I'm not saying that there is positive
identification. I'm only saying that in proving your
alibi you must stick by what the Supreme Court
said that it was impossible if they are telling the
truth, di ba? Now with these other witnesses na
hindi naman ganoon to that effect it does not
prove that it was impossible, e, what is the
relevance on that? What is the materiality? Iyon
ang point ko. We are wasting our time with that
testimony. Ilang witnesses and epe-present to that
effect. Wala rin namang epekto. It will not prove
that it was not impossible for him to go to Cebu at
10:30 P.M., of July 16, e, papano yan? We are being
criticized by the public already for taking so long a
time of the trial of these cases which is supposed
to be finished within 60 days. Now from August,
September, October, November, December and
January, magse-six months na, wala pa and you
want to present so many immaterial witnesses."
Surely, we cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding
appellants' counsel of the parameters of alibi to ensure that there
will be an orderly and expeditious presentation of defense
witnesses and that there will be no time wasted by dispensing
with
the
testimonies
of
witnesses
which
are
not
relevant. Remarks which merely manifest a desire to confine the
proceedings to the real point in issue and to expedite the trial do
not constitute a rebuke of counsel. 95
Appellants also decry the supposed harshness of Judge Ocampo
towards the witnesses for the defense, namely: Lourdes
31

Montalvan, Michael Dizon, Rebecca Seno, Clotilde

Salvador Boton, Catalina Paghinayan and Paolo Celso.

Soterol,

With respect to Lourdes Montalvan, Judge Ocampo expressed

surprise on "how a 17-year-old girl could go to a man's apartment
all alone." He said that such conduct "does not seem to be a
reasonable or a proper behavior for a 17-year-old girl to do."
These statements do not really indicate bias or prejudice against
the defense witnesses. The transcript of stenographic notes
reveals that Judge Ocampo uttered them, not to cast doubt on the
moral character of Lourdes Montalvan, but merely to determine
the credibility of her story, thus:
". . . But what I wanted to point out is the question
of credibility. That is what we are here for. We want
to determine if it is credible for a 17-year-old
college student of the Ateneo who belongs to a
good family, whose father is a lawyer and who
could afford to live by herself in a Condominium
Unit in Quezon City and that she would go to the
Condominium Unit of a man whom he just met the
previous month, all alone by herself at night and
specifically on the very night July 16, 1997 . . . That
is the question that I would like you to
consider . . . I assure you I have no doubts at all
about her moral character and I have the highest
respect for Miss Montalvan . . ."
Strong indication of Judge Ocampo's lack of predilection was his
acquiescence for Lourdes Montalvan to clarify during redirect
examination why she found nothing wrong with being alone at
Larraaga's unit. We quote the proceedings of November 19,
1998, thus:
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
Q When you went up you said you were alone.
What was your feeling of going up to that
room alone or that unit alone?
PROS. GALANIDA

We object, not proper for re-direct. That was not

touched during the cross. That should have
been asked during the direct-examination of
this witness, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
We want to clarify why she went there alone.
COURT:
Precisely, I made that observation that does not
affect or may affect the credibility of witness
the fact that she went there alone. And so, it
is proper to ask her, di ba?
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
What was your purpose? Ask her now what was
your purpose?
/to the witness:
Q Will you answer the question of the Court/What
was your purpose or intention in going in
Paco's room that night alone?
WITNESS:
A My purpose for going there was to meet Richard,
sir, and to follow-up whether we will go out
later that night or not. The purpose as to
going there alone, sir, I felt, I trusted Paco.
PROS. DUYONGCO:
May we ask the witness not to elaborate, Your
Honor.
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
That is her feeling.
32

COURT:
That was her purpose. It is proper." 96
Appellants consider as violation of their right to due process Judge
Ocampo's remarks labeling Rebecca Seno's and Catalina
Paghinayan's testimony as "incredible;" 97Clotilde Soterol as a
"totally confused person who appears to be mentally
imbalanced;" 98 and Salvador Boton and Paulo Celso as
"liars." 99
Suffice it to state that after going over the pertinent transcript of
stenographic notes, we are convinced that Judge Ocampo's
comments were just honest observations intended to warn the
witnesses to be candid to the court. He made it clear that he
merely wanted to ascertain the veracity of their testimonies in
order
to
determine
the
truth
of
the
matter
in
controversy. 100 That such was his purpose is evident from his
probing questions which gave them the chance to correct or
clarify their contradictory statements. Even appellants'
counsel de parte acknowledged that Judge Ocampo's statements
were mere "honest observations." 101 If Judge Ocampo uttered
harsh words against those defense witnesses, it was because
they made a mockery of the court's proceedings by their
deliberate lies. The frequency with which they changed their
answers to Judge Ocampo's clarificatory questions was indeed a
challenge to his patience.
A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him to
caution and admonish witnesses when necessary and he may
rebuke a witness for levity or for other improper
conduct. 102 This is because he is called upon to ascertain the
truth of the controversy before him. 103
It bears stressing at this point that the perceived harshness and
impatience exhibited by Judge Ocampo did not at all prevent the
defense from presenting adequately its side of the cases. IcHAaS
D. Right to Produce Evidence

Appellants assail the trial court's exclusion of the testimonies of

four (4) airlines personnel 104 which were intended to prove that
Larraaga did not travel to Cebu from Manila or from Cebu to
Manila on July 16, 1997. The trial court's exclusion of the
testimonies is justified. By an alibi, Larraaga attempted to prove
that he was at a place (Quezon City) so distant that his
participation in the crime was impossible. To prove that he was
not in the pre-flight and post-flight of the four (4) major airlines
flying the route of Cebu to Manila and Manila to Cebu on July 15
and 16, 1997 would not prove the legal requirement of "physical
impossibility" because he could have taken the flight from Manila
to Cebu prior to that date, such as July 14, 1997. According to
Judge Ocampo, it was imperative for appellants' counsel to prove
that Larraaga did not take a flight to Cebu before July 16, 1997.

In the same way, we cannot fault the trial court for not allowing
the defense to continue with the tedious process of presenting
additional witnesses to prove Larraaga's enrollment at the
Center for Culinary Arts, located at Quezon City, from June 18,
1997 to July 30, 1997 considering that it would not also prove that
he was not in Cebu on July 16 to 17, 1997. It is a known practice
of students who are temporarily residing in Metro Manila to return
to their provinces once in a while to spend time with their
families. To prove that Larraaga was enrolled during a certain
period of time does not negate the possibility that he went home
to Cebu City sometime in July 1997 and stayed there for a while.
Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness. 105 It is not error to refuse evidence which
although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the
purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it. 106
To repeat, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides
of the controversy. 107 In the present case, there is no showing
of violation of due process which justifies the reversal or setting
aside of the trial court's findings.
33

II. The Improper Discharge of Rusia as an Accused

to be a State Witness
Appellants argue that Rusia is not qualified to be a state witness
under paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:
"Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state
witness. When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case,
the court may direct one or more of the accused to
be discharged with their consent so that they may
be witness for the state when after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
satisfied that:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Said accused does not appear to be most
guilty;
(e) Said accused has not at anytime been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx"
Appellants claim that Rusia was the "most guilty of both the
charges of rape and kidnapping" having admitted in open court
that he raped Jacqueline. Furthermore, Rusia admitted having
been previously convicted in the United States of third degree
burglary.
It bears stressing that appellants were charged with kidnapping
and
illegal
detention.
Thus,
Rusia's
admission
that
he raped Jacqueline does not make him the "most guilty" of the
crimes charged. Moreover, far from being the mastermind, his
participation, as shown by the chronology of events, was limited
to that of an oblivious follower who simply "joined the ride" as the
commission of the crimes progressed. It may be recalled that he

joined the group upon Rowen's promise that there would be a "big
happening" on the night of July 16, 1997. All along, he thought
the "big happening" was just another "group partying or
scrounging." In other words, he had no inkling then of appellants'
plan to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. Rusia retained his
passive stance as Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and
Jacqueline at the waiting shed of Ayala Center. He just remained
seated beside the driver's seat, not aiding Rowen and Josman in
abducting the Chiong sisters. When Jacqueline attempted to
escape 14 meters away from the waiting shed, it was Josman who
chased her and not Rusia. Inside the car, it was Rowen who
punched and handcuffed the Chiong sisters. At the safehouse of
the "Josman Aznar Group," Rusia stayed at the living room while
Larraaga, James Anthony, Rowen, and Josman molested Marijoy
and Jacqueline on separate rooms. At Tan-awan, it was Josman
who ordered Rowen and Ariel to pushed Marijoy into the deep
ravine. And Rusia did not even know what ultimately happened to
Jacqueline as he was the first to leave the group. Clearly, the
extent of Rusia's participation in the crimes charged does not
make him the "most guilty."
The fact that Rusia was convicted of third degree burglary in
Minnesota
does
not
render
his
testimony
inadmissible. 108 In People vs. De Guzman, 109 we held that
although the trial court may have erred in discharging the
accused, such error would not affect the competency and the
quality of the testimony of the defendant. InMangubat vs.
Sandiganbayan, 110 we ruled:
"Anent the contention that Delia Preagido should
not have been discharged as a state witness
because of a 'previous final conviction' of crimes
involving moral turpitude, suffice it to say that 'this
Court has time and again declared that even if the
discharged state witness should lack some of the
qualifications enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for
that reason alone, be discarded or disregarded. In
the discharge of a co-defendant, the court may
34

reasonably be expected to err; but such error in

discharging an accused has been held not to be a
reversible one. This is upon the principle that such
error of the court does not affect the competency
and the quality of the testimony of the discharged
defendant."
Furthermore, it may be recalled that Rusia was extremely
bothered by his conscience and was having nightmares about the
Chiong sisters, hence, he decided to come out in the
open. 111 Such fact alone is a badge of truth of his testimony.
But, more importantly, what makes Rusia's testimony worthy of
belief is the marked compatibility between such testimony and
the physical evidence. Physical evidence is an evidence of the
highest order. It speaks eloquently than a hundred
witnesses. 112 The presence of Marijoy's ravished body in a deep
ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and handcuffs
on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia's testimony on what
actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the
details he supplied to the trial court were of such nature and
quality that only a witness who actually saw the commission of
the crimes could furnish. What is more, his testimony was
corroborated by several other witnesses who saw incidents of
what he narrated, thus: (1) Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza saw
Jacqueline's two failed attempts to escape from appellants; (2)
Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he bought barbeque and
Tanduay at Nene's Store while the white van, driven by Alfredo
Cao, was waiting on the side of the road and he heard voices of
"quarreling male and female" emanating from the van; (3) Manuel
Camingao testified on the presence of Larraaga and Josman at
Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997; and lastly, (4)
Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the
person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for
hire, on the evening of July 16, 1997. All these bits and pieces of
story form part of Rusia's narration. With such strong anchorage
on the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, how can we brush
aside Rusia's testimony?

Rusia's discharge has the effect of an acquittal. 113 We are not

inclined to recall such discharge lest he will be placed in double
jeopardy. Parenthetically, the order for his discharge may only be
recalled in one instance, which is when he subsequently failed to
testify against his co-accused. The fact that not all the requisites
for his discharge are present is not a ground to recall the
discharge order. Unless and until it is shown that he failed or
refused to testify against his co-accused, subsequent proof
showing that any or all of the conditions listed in Sec. 9 of Rule
were not fulfilled would not wipe away the resulting
acquittal. 114
III. Appreciation of the Evidence for the
Prosecution and the Defense
Settled is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of its
opportunity, not available to the appellate court, to see the
witnesses on the stand and determine by their demeanor whether
they are testifying truthfully or lying through their teeth. Its
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is well-nigh conclusive
on this Court, barring arbitrariness in arriving at his
conclusions. 115
We reviewed the records exhaustively and found no compelling
reason why we should deviate from the findings of fact and
conclusion of law of the trial court. Rusia's detailed narration of
the circumstances leading to the horrible death and
disappearance of Jacqueline has all the earmarks of truth. Despite
the rigid cross-examination conducted by the defense counsel,
Rusia remained steadfast in his testimony. The other witnesses
presented by the prosecution corroborated his narration as to its
material points which reinforced its veracity.
Appellants proffered the defense of denial and alibi. As between
their mere denial and the positive identification and testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses, we are convinced that the trial court
did not err in according weight to the latter. For the defense
of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was in another
place at such a period of time that it was physically impossible for
35

him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at
the time of its commission. 116 These requirements of time and
place must be strictly met. 117 A thorough examination of the
evidence for the defense shows that the appellants failed to meet
these settled requirements. They failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to
be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were
abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman,
Ariel, Alberto. James Anthony and James Andrew were all within
the vicinity, of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.

Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied

the required proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it
was established that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane
from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies
plying the route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that
there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning,
afternoon and evening. Taking into account the mode and speed
of transportation, it is therefore within the realm of possibility for
Larraaga to be in Cebu City prior to or exactly on July 16, 1997.
Larraaga's mother, Margarita Gonzales-Larraaga, testified that
his son was scheduled to take a flight from Manila to Cebu on July
17, 1997 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, but he was able to take
an earlier flight at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Margarita
therefore claimed that his son was in Cebu City at around 6:00
o'clock in the evening of July 17, 1997 or the day after the
commission of the crime. However, while Larraaga endeavored
to prove that he went home to Cebu City from Manila only in the
afternoon of July 17, 1997, he did not produce any evidence to
show the last time he went to Manila from Cebu prior to such
crucial date. If he has a ticket of his flight to Cebu City on July 17,
1997, certainly, he should also have a ticket of his last flight to
Manila prior thereto. If it was lost, evidence to that effect should
have been presented before the trial court.
Indeed, Larraaga's presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997
proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. No less than four
(4) witnesses for the prosecution identified him as one of the two

men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16,

1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at around
7:20 in the evening, she saw Larraaga approach Marijoy and
Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident
reminded her of Jacqueline's prior story that he was Marijoy's
admirer. She (Shiela) confirmed that she knows Larraaga since
she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also
testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00
o'clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at
the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized them as
Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos,
a game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala
Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at
Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela
and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon,
Carcar, declared that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30
in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the
hood of a white van. 118
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses and that
of Rusia, it is reasonable to conclude that Larraaga was indeed
in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes and was
one of the principal perpetrators.
Of course, we have also weighed the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by appellants in support of their
respective alibi. However, they proved to be wanting and
incredible.
Salvador Boton, the security guard assigned at the lobby of
Loyola Heights Condominium, testified on the entry of Larraaga's
name in the Condominium's logbook to prove that he was in
Quezon City on the night of July 16, 1997. However, a cursory
glance of the entry readily shows that it was written at the
uppermost portion of the logbook and was not following the
chronological order of the entries. Larraaga's 10:15 entry was
written before the 10:05 entry which, in turn, was followed by a
10:25 entry. Not only that, the last entry at the prior page was
10:05. This renders the authenticity of the entries doubtful. It
gives rise to the possibility that the 10:15 entry was written on a
36

later date when all the spaces in the logbook were already filled
up and thus, the only remaining spot was the uppermost portion.
Surprisingly, the alleged arrival of Larraaga and his friend
Richard Antonio at the Loyola Heights Condominium in the early
evening of July 16, 1997 was not recorded in the logbook.
Rowena Bautista, a teacher at the Center for Culinary Arts,
Quezon City, testified that Larraaga attended her lecture on
Applied Mathematics on July 16, 1997 from 8:00 o'clock to 11:30
in the morning. 119 This runs counter to Larraaga's
affidavit 120 stating that on the said date, he took his mid-term
examinations in the subject Fundamentals of Cookery from 8:00
o'clock in the morning to 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
With respect to Larraaga's friends, the contradictions in their
testimonies, painstakingly outlined by the Solicitor General in the
appellee's brief, reveal their unreliability. To our mind, while it
may be possible that Larraaga took the mid-term examinations
in Fundamentals of Cookery and that he and his friends attended
a party at the R and R Bar and Restaurant, also in Quezon City,
however it could be that those events occurred on a date other
than July 16, 1997.
Clotilde Soterol, in defense of Ariel and Alberto (the driver and the
conductor of the van) attempted to discredit Rusia's testimony by
testifying that the white van with plate no. GGC-491 could not
have been used in the commission of the crimes on the night of
July 16, 1997 because it was parked in her shop from 7:00 o'clock
in the evening of the same date until 11:00 o'clock in the morning
of July 17, 1997. What makes Soterol's testimony doubtful is her
contradicting affidavits. In the first affidavit dated July 28, 1997,
or twelve (12) days from the occurrence of the crime, she stated
that Alberto took the van from her shop at 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of July 16, 1997 and returned it for repair only on July
22, 1997. 121 But in her second affidavit dated October 1, 1997,
she declared that Alberto left the van in her shop at 7:00 o'clock
in the evening of July 16, 1997 until 11:00 o'clock in the morning
of July 17, 1997. 122 Surely, we cannot simply brush aside the
discrepancy and accept the second affidavit as gospel truth.

Appellants attempted to establish their defense of alibi through

the testimonies of relatives and friends who obviously wanted
them exculpated of the crimes charged. Naturally, we cannot but
cast an eye of suspicion on their testimonies. In People vs.
Ching, 123 we ruled that it is but natural, although morally unfair,
for a close relative to give weight to blood ties and close
relationship in times of dire needs especially when a criminal case
is involved.
Rusia positively identified the appellants. The settled rule is that
positive identification of an accused by credible witnesses as the
perpetrator of the crime demolishesalibi, the much abused
sanctuary of felons. 124 Rusia's testimony was corroborated by
several disinterested witnesses who also identified the appellants.
Most of them are neither friends, relatives nor acquaintances of
the victims' family. As we reviewed closely the transcript of
stenographic notes, we could not discern any motive on their part
why they should testify falsely against the appellants. In the same
vein, it is improbable that the prosecution would tirelessly go
through the rigors of litigation just to destroy innocent lives.
Meanwhile, appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove
that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan,
Carcar was that of Marijoy. We are not convinced. Rusia testified
that Josman instructed Rowen "to get rid" of Marijoy and that
following such instruction, Rowen and Ariel pushed her into the
deep ravine. Furthermore, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, 125 a
fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse
matched those of Marijoy. 126 The packaging tape and the
handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed on
Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained. 127 The
body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was
abducted. 128 The members of the Chiong family personally
identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy 129 which they
eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the
ravine, cemetery and every place which mattered to Marijoy.
Indeed, there is overwhelming and convincing evidence that it
was the body of Marijoy that was found in the ravine.
37

Appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious

illegal detention in two (2) Informations and were convicted
thereof. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 8 of R.A. 7659, reads:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted
more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or
if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a
minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping
or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances above
mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
"When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence
of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed."
The elements of the crime defined in Art. 267 above are: (a) the
accused is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another,
or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the

commission of the offense, any of the four (4) circumstances

mentioned above is present. 130

There is clear and overwhelming evidence that appellants, who

are private individuals, forcibly dragged Marijoy and Jacqueline
into the white car, beat them so they would not be able to resist,
and held them captive against their will. In fact, Jacqueline
attempted to free herself twice from the clutches of appellants
the first was near the Ayala Center and the second was in Tanawan, Carcar but both attempts failed. Marijoy was thrown to a
deep ravine, resulting to her death. Jacqueline, on the other hand,
has remained missing until now.
Article 267 states that if the victim is killed or died as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
In People
vs.
Ramos, 131 citing Parulan
vs.
Rodas, 132 and People vs. Mercado, 133 we held that this
provision given rise to a special complex crime, thus:
"Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity
of RA No. 7659, the rule was that where the
kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by his
abductor, the crime committed would either be a
complex crime of kidnapping with murder
under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, or two (2)
separate crimes of kidnapping and murder. Thus,
where the accused kidnapped the victim for the
purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by
his abductor, the crime committed was the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder under
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as the
kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of
committing the murder. On the other hand, where
the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of
killing him but was subsequently slain as an
afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of
kidnapping and murder were committed.
38

However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The

Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last
paragraph which provides

raped, that Marijoy was killed and that both victims were
subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the death
penalty on the appellants is in order.

When the victim is killed or dies as a

consequence of the detention, or is raped or
is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

Thus, we hold that all the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape in Criminal Case No.
CBU-45303 wherein Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304
wherein Jacqueline is the victim.

This amendment introduced in our criminal

statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively
eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts
between those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim
was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an
afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where
the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought,
the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no
longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated
as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a
special complex crime under the last paragraph of
Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659."
The prosecution was able to prove that Marijoy was pushed to a
ravine and died. Both girls were raped by the gang. In committing
the crimes, appellants subjected them to dehumanizing acts.
Dehumanization means deprivation of human qualities, such as
compassion. 134 From our review of the evidence presented, we
found the following dehumanizing acts committed by appellants:
(1) Marijoy and Jacqueline were handcuffed and their mouths
mercilessly taped; (2) they were beaten to severe weakness
during their detention; (3) Jacqueline was made to dance amidst
the rough manners and lewd suggestions of the appellants; (4)
she was taunted to run and forcibly dragged to the van; and (5)
until now, Jacqueline remains missing which aggravates the
Chiong family's pain. All told, considering that the victims were

A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative.

Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special
complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the
Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, 135 (2)
robbery with rape, 136 (3) kidnapping with serious physical
injuries, 137 (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, 138 and (5)
rape with homicide. 139 In a special complex crime, the
prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they
were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier
mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special
complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No.
CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim
Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her
detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the
occasion thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to
prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be
convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from the
overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct
relation, and intimate connection" 140 between the kidnapping,
killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be considered merely as
an aggravating circumstance but as a component offense forming
39

part of the herein special complex crime. It bears reiterating that

in People
vs.
Ramos, 141 and People
vs.
Mercado, 142 interpreting Article 267, we ruled that "where the
person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether
the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought,
the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under
the last paragraph of Article 267." The same principle applies
here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer
be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crime
but shall be punished as a special complex crime. At any rate, the
technical designation of the crime is of no consequence in the
imposition of the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious
illegal detention if complexed with either homicide or rape, still,
the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.
Anent Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the
victim, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
appellants considering that the above-mentioned component
offenses were not alleged in the Information as required
under Sections 8 and 9, 143 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.Consistent with appellants' right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
these attendant circumstances or component offenses must be
specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information
and proven during the trial. Otherwise, they cannot give rise to a
special complex crime, as in this case. Hence, the crime
committed is only simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no doubt that all
the appellants conspired in the commission of the crimes
charged. Their concerted actions point to their joint purpose and
community of intent. Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy,
direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner by
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of
the accused themselves when such point to a joint design and
community of interest. 144 Otherwise stated, it may be shown by

the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the

commission of the crime. 145 Appellants' actions showed that
they have the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong
sisters. Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline from
the vicinity of Ayala Center. Larraaga, James Andrew and James
Anthony who were riding a red car served as back-up of Rowen
and Josman. Together in a convoy, they proceeded to Fuente
Osmea to hire a van, and thereafter, to the safehouse of the
"Jozman Aznar Group" in Guadalupe, Cebu where they initially
molested Marijoy and Jacqueline. They headed to the South Bus
Terminal where they hired the white van driven by Alberto, with
Ariel as the conductor. Except for James Andrew who drove the
white car, all appellants boarded the white van where they held
Marijoy and Jacqueline captive. In the van, James Anthony taped
their mouths and Rowen handcuffed them together. They drank
and had a pot session at Tan-awan. They encircled Jacqueline and
ordered her to dance, pushing her and ripping her clothes in the
process. Meanwhile, Larraaga raped Marijoy, followed by Rowen,
James Anthony, Alberto, and Ariel. On other hand, Josman and
James Andrew raped Jacqueline. Upon Josman's order, Rowen and
Ariel led Marijoy to the cliff and pushed her. After leaving Tanawan, they taunted Jacqueline to run for her life. And when Rusia
got off from the van near Ayala Center, the appellants jointly
headed back to Cebu City.
Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were
not part of the "conspiracy" as they were merely present during
the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants
therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. 146 There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. 147 Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined
to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but
extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing
out of the purpose intended. 148 As shown by the evidence for
the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely
present at the scene of the crime.
40

Indeed, all appellants, except James Anthony who was

16 years old when the crimes charged were committed, share
the same degree of responsibility for their criminal acts. Under
Article 68 149 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty on James Anthony, by reason of his minority, is one
degree lower than the statutory penalty. This means that he
stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal
Case No. CBU-45303 and twelve (12) years of prision mayor in
its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45304. The penalty for the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom
is reclusion perpetua. 150On the other hand, the penalty for
simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion
perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty
isreclusion temporal. 151 There being no aggravating and
mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on James
Anthony is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. 152
As for the rest of the appellants, the foregoing established facts
call for the imposition on them of the death penalty in Criminal
Case No. CBU-45303 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No.
CBU-45304. It is therefore clear that the trial court erred in merely
imposing "two (2) Reclusiones Perpetua," rationalizing that justice
must be tempered with mercy. We must be reminded that justice
is not ours to give according to our sentiments or emotions. It is
in the law which we must faithfully implement.
At times we may show compassion and mercy but not at the
expense of the broader interest of fair play and justice. While we
also find it difficult to mete out the penalty of death especially on
young men who could have led productive and promising lives if

only they were given enough guidance, however, we can never

go against what is laid down in our statute books and established
jurisprudence.
In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Marijoy and
Jacqueline are entitled to the amount of P100,000.00 in each case
by way of civil indemnity ex delicto. 153 As regards the actual
damages, it appears that the award of P200,000.00 is not
supported by evidence. To be entitled to actual damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the
best evidence obtainable to the injured party. 154Thus, in light of
the recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo, 155 we grant the award
of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in each case, in lieu of
actual damages. There being proofs that the victims' heirs
suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar
injury, we award an equitable amount of P150,000.00 as moral
damages, also in each case. Exemplary damages is pegged at
P100,000.00 in each case 156 to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of the victims and as punishment for those
guilty of outrageous conduct.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN
alias "WESLEY;" ALBERTO CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL
BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM," are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape
and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal
injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN
alias "WESLEY;" ALBERTO CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL
BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM," are found guilty
41

beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and serious illegal

detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY
UY, who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is
likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is
declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period,
as MAXIMUM.
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA
7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the
law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this
Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her
Excellency's pardoning power. aCcHEI
SO ORDERED
||| (People v. Larraaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, [February 3, 2004],
466 PHIL 324-393)

[G.R. No. 175605. August 28, 2009.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y
CAMBA A.KA. JUNIOR; JOEY PAMPLONA A.K.A.
NATO AND JESSIE GARCIA Y
ADORINO, accused-appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
For automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 00765 which affirmed an earlier
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan City, Branch
25 in Criminal Case No. 9440-B, finding accused-appellants Arnold
Garchitorena y Gamba, a.k.a. "Junior", Joey Pamplona, a.k.a.
"Nato", and Jessie Garcia y Adorino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
death and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P16,700.00 as actual damages, P408,000.00 for loss of earning
capacity and to pay the costs of the suit.
The conviction of accused-appellants stemmed from an
Information 3 dated January 22, 1996, filed with the RTC for the
crime of Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about September 22, 1995, in the
Municipality of Binan, Province of Laguna,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Arnold Garchitorena y
Gamba, alias "Junior", Joey Pamplona alias "Nato"
42

and Jessie Garcia y Adorino, conspiring,

confederating together and mutualy * helping each
other, with intent to kill, while conveniently armed
with a deadly bladed weapon, with abuse of
superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one Mauro Biay y Almarinez with the said weapon,
thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the
different parts of his body which directly caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving
heirs.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, accused-appellants, duly assisted by their
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses; namely, Dulce
Borero, elder sister of the victim Mauro Biay and eyewitness to
the killing of her brother; Dr. Rolando Poblete, who conducted an
autopsy on the body of the victim and prepared the post-mortem
report; and Amelia Biay, the victim's widow. The evidence for the
prosecution, as culled from the CA Decision under review, is as
follows:
In the proceedings before the trial court, witness
for the prosecution Dulce Borero testified that on
September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 o'clock in the
evening, she was selling "balut" at Sta. Inez,
Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Binan, Laguna.
Her brother, Mauro Biay, also a "balut" vendor, was
also at the area, about seven (7) arms length away
from her when she was called by accused Jessie
Garcia. Borero testified that when her brother
Mauro approached Jessie, the latter twisted the

hand of her brother behind his back and Jessie's

companions-accused Arnold Garchitorena and Joey
Pamplona began stabbing her brother Mauro
repeatedly with a shiny bladed instrument. Joey
was at the right side of the victim and was
strangling Mauro from behind. Witness saw her
brother Mauro struggling to free himself while
being stabbed by the three (3) accused, until her
brother slumped facedown on the ground. Arnold
then instructed his two co-accused to run away.
During cross-examination, Borero claims that she
wanted to shout for help but nothing came out
from her mouth. When the accused had left after
the stabbing incident, witness claimed that she
went home to call her elder brother Teodoro Biay,
but when they returned to the scene, the victim
was no longer there as he had already been
brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital. They
learned from the tricycle driver who brought Mauro
top the hospital that their brother was pronounced
dead on arrival.cIADaC
Dr. Rolando Poblete, the physician who conducted
an autopsy on victim Mauro Biay and prepared the
post-mortem report, testified that the victim's
death was caused by "hypovolemic shock
secondary to multiple stab wounds". Witness
specified the eight (8) stab wounds suffered by the
victim one in the neck, two in the chest, one
below the armpit, two on the upper abdomen, one
at the back and one at the left thigh and also a
laceration at the left forearm of Mauro. According
to the expert witness, the nature of stab wounds
indicate that it may have been caused by more
than one bladed instrument.
The victim's widow, Amelia Biay, testified that she
incurred burial expenses amounting to P16,700.00
due to the death of her husband. Also, her husband
43

allegedly earned a minimum of P300.00 a day as a

"balut" vendor and P100.00 occasionally as a parttime carpenter.
The accused-appellants denied the charge against them.
Specifically, accused-appellant Joey Pamplona denied that he
participated in the stabbing of Mauro Bay, accused-appellant
Jessie Garcia interposed the defense of alibi, while accusedappellant Arnold Garchitorena interposed the defense of insanity.
Succinctly, the CA Decision summed up their respective defenses:
On the other hand, accused Joey Pamplona denied
that he participated in the stabbing of Mauro Biay.
Joey Pamplona claims that he was seated on a
bench when co-accused Arnold came along. Then
the "balut" vendor arrived and Joey saw Arnold
stand up, pull something from the right side of his
pocket and stab the "balut" vendor once before
running away. Joey Pamplona testified that after
the stabbing incident, due to fear that Arnold might
also stab him, he also ran away to the store of a
certain Mang Tony, a barangay official and related
the incident to Aling Bel, the wife of Mang Tony.
Joey Pamplona said that he stayed at Mang Tony's
store until his father arrived and told him to go
home. cHaDIA
Danilo Garados testified that on September 22,
1995, he was at the store of Mang Tony to buy
cigarettes and saw Arnold and Joey seated on the
bench near the artesian well. Arnold and Joey
allegedly called Mauro Biay and he saw Arnold
stabbing Mauro. Jessie Garcia was not there and
Joey allegedly ran away when Arnold stabbed
Mauro.
Clavel Estropegan testified that on September 22,
1995, around 9:00 p.m. Joey Pamplona entered her
store and told her that Junior or Arnold
Garchitorena was stabbing somebody. She did not

hear any commotion outside her house which is

just four houses away from the artesian well.
However, she closed her store for fear that Arnold
will enter her house.
Barangay Captain Alfredo Arcega testified that he
investigated the stabbing incident and, although he
had no personal knowledge, he found out that it
was Arnold Garchitorena who stabbed Mauro Biay.
Upon questioning Arnold, the latter admitted that
he did stab Mauro. ISCHET
Defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo testified that
on September 22, 1995, he was in his shoe factory
at his house located at 186 Sta. Teresita Street,
Almeda Subdivision, Binan when he heard Mauro
Biay shouting, and so he went out of his house. He
allegedly saw two persons "embracing" each other
near the artesian well. He recognized these two
persons as Mauro and Arnold. He saw Arnold
pulling out a knife from the body of Mauro and the
latter slowly fell down on his side. After Arnold
washed his hands at the artesian well and walked
away towards the house of his aunt, this witness
approached Mauro and seeing that the victim was
still breathing, went to get a tricycle to bring Mauro
to the hospital. When he got back to the area,
there were many people who helped board Mauro
in the tricycle and they brought him to the
Perpetual Help Hospital in Binan.
The other co-accused Jessie Garcia took the stand
and claimed that on September 22, 1995, between
8:00 and 9:00 in the evening, he was still riding a
bus from his work in Blumentritt. He arrived at his
home in Binan only at 11:00 p.m. On September
24, 1995, he was fetched by two (2) policemen and
two (2) Barangay Tanods from his house and
brought to the Binan Police Station for questioning.
Thereafter, he was put in jail and incarcerated for
44

six (6) months without knowing the charges

against him. He was only informed that he was one
of the suspects in the killing of Mauro Biay by his
mother. CTacSE

c) 50,000.00 as and for exemplary

damages

With respect to Arnold Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn

Belen, Medical Officer III and resident physician of
the National Center for Mental Health, testified that
she examined the accused Arnold and based on
the history of the patient, it was found that he had
been using prohibited drugs like shabu and
marijuana for two (2) years prior to the stabbing
incident in 1995. The patient is allegedly suffering
from schizophrenia, wherein he was hearing
auditory voices, seeing strange things and is
delusional. However, Dr. Belen also testified that
the accused Garchitorena had remissions or
exaservation and understands what he was doing
and was aware of his murder case in court. 4

e) 408,000.00 as and for loss of the

earning capacity of Mauro Biay; and

On May 9, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision, 5 as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds
accused Arnold Garchitorena y Gamboa alias
Junior, Joey Pamplona alias Nato and Jessie Garcia y
Adorino GUILTY beyond reasonable of the crime of
"MURDER" as defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
by Republic Act 7659, (Heinous Crimes).
Accordingly, all of them are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH. HcTDSA
Furthermore, all of the accused are hereby ordered
to pay jointly and severally Amelia Biay, widow of
the victim Mauro Biay, the following sums:
a) 50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity
b) 50,000.00 as and for moral damages

d) 16,700.00 as and for actual damages

f) To pay the costs of suit. SECAHa

Likewise, the Provincial Warden of the Provincial

Jail, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, is hereby ordered to
transfer/commit the three (3) accused to the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon
receipt hereof.
Considering that death penalty was meted against
all of the accused, let the entire records of the
above-entitled case be forwarded to the Supreme
Court for automatic review and judgment pursuant
to Rule 122, Sec. 10 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED. 6
Accused-appellants appealed to the CA. Pamplona and Garcia
reiterated their denial of the charge against them. Garchitorena
who never denied his participation in the killing, insisted,
however, insisted that he is exempt from criminal liability because
he was suffering from a mental disorder before, during and after
the commission of the crime. HcSDIE
On May 31, 2006, the CA rendered the Decision 7 now under
review, affirming RTC's Decision in toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the
instant appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
appealed March 9, 2001 Decuision * of the
Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 25, in
Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused45

appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of murder is AFFIRMED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the CA ratiocinated as
follows: CTDHSE
After studying the records of this case, we do not
find any reason to overturn the ruling of the trial
court.
Despite the testimony of defense witnesses that it
was only accused-appellant Arnold Garchitorena
who stabbed the victim Mauro Biay, we find reason
to uphold the trial court's giving credence to
prosecution witness Dulce Borero who testified as
an eyewitness on the circumstances surrounding
the incident and the manner by which the crime
committed.
Defense witness Garados testified that he was at
the store and saw both Arnold and Joey at the
vicinity where the stabbing incident happened,
seated on a bench near the artesian well, when
they called the victim Mauro. Defense witness
Gonzalgo was in his house when he heard the
commotion and went outside to see Arnold and
Mauro "embracing" near the artesian well and the
former pulling a knife from the body of the latter.
On the other hand, prosecution witness Borero was
merely seven arms length away from the incident
and could easily see the victim Mauro overpowered
and attacked by his assailants, Arnold
Garchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia. She
witnessed the stabbing incident in its entirely and
positively identified the accused and their criminal
acts. It is a well-settled rule that the evaluation of
testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is
received on appeal with the highest respect

because such court has the direct opportunity to

observe the witnesses on the stand and determine
if they are telling the truth or not. (People vs.
Cardel, 336 SCRA 144) cSEAHa
Evidence presented by the prosecution shows that
the accused conspired to assault the victim Mauro
Biay. Accused Jessie Garcia was the one who called
the victim and prompted the latter to approach
their group near the artesian well. When the victim
was near enough, accused Jessie Garcia and coaccused Joey Pamplona restrained Mauro Biay and
overpowered him. Witness Borero then saw the two
accused, Jessie Garcia and Joey Pamplona, together
with their co-accused Arnold Garchitorena
instructed his two co-accused to run. Conspiracy is
apparent in the concerted action of the three
accused. There is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit
it (People vs. Pendatun, 434 SCRA 148). Conspiracy
may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from
the acts of the accused which show a joint or
common purpose and design, a concerted action
and community of interest among the
accused (People vs. Sicad, et al., 391 SCRA 19).
Likewise, we affirm the trial court's appreciation of
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength to qualify the crime into murder. "While it
is true that superiority in number does not per se
mean superiority in strength, the appellants in this
case did not only enjoy superiority in number, but
were armed with a weapon, while the victim had no
means with which to defend himself. Thus, there
was obvious physical disparity between the
protagonists and abuse of superior strength
attended the killing when the offenders took
46

advantage of their combined strength in order to

consummate the offense". (People of the Phils. vs.
Parreno, 433 SCRA 591). In the case at bar, the
victim was rendered helpless when he was
assaulted by the three accused. He was restrained
and overpowered by the combined strength and
the weapons used by his assailants. aDHCEA
We do not find improbable Borero's failure to act or
shout for help upon witnessing the stabbing of her
brother Mauro Biay. It is an accepted maxim that
different people react differently to a given
situation or type of situation and there is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange or startling
experience. . . . There is no standard form of
behavior when one is confronted by a shocking
incident. The workings of the human mind when
placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable. (People of the Philippines vs.
Aspuria, 391 SCRA 404)
Accused-appellant Jessie Garcia's denial of any
involvement cannot prevail over Borero's positive
identification. As ruled by the trial court,
allegations that accused Jessie Garcia was
somewhere else when the crime was committed is
not enough. He must likewise demonstrate that he
could not have been present at the crime scene, or
in its vicinity. He also could have sought the help of
his co-worker, employer or anyone in the area to
support his defense of alibi. Indeed, we affirm that
accused Jessie Garcia's allegation that he was
elsewhere when the crime was committed is not
substantiated by evidence. Alibi can easily be
fabricated. Well-settled is the rule that alibi is an
inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused by the

victim. (People of the Phils. vs. Cadampog, 428

SCRA 336) HDTSCc
Finally, the defense of insanity cannot be given
merit when the expert witness herself, Dr. Belen,
attested that accused Arnold Garchitorena was
experiencing remission and was even aware of his
murder case in court. The trial court had basis to
conclude that during the commission of the crime,
Arnold was not totally deprived of reason and
freedom of will. In fact, after the stabbing incident,
accused Arnold Garchitorena instructed his coaccused to run away from the scene. We agree that
such action demonstrates that Arnold possessed
the intelligence to be aware of his and his coaccused's criminal acts. A defendant in a criminal
case who interpose the defense of mental
incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact
that he was insane at the very moment when the
crime was committed. There must be complete
deprivation of reason in the commission of the act,
or that the accused acted without discernment,
which must be proven by clear and positive
evidence. The mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not preclude imputability. Indeed, a
man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and
conclusively prove that he is legally so. (People of
the Philippines vs. Galigao, 395 SCRA 195)
Having found the court a quo's decision to be
supported by the evidence on record, and for being
in accord with prevailing jurisprudence, we find no
reason to set it aside.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the
instant appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
appealed March 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal
Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-appellants
47

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

murder is AFFIRMED in its entirely. *
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. The
People and the accused-appellants opted not to file any
supplemental brief. The respective assignments of errors
contained in the briefs that they filed with the CA are set forth
hereunder.
For accused-appellant Pamplona:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL AND
TOTAL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS DULCE BORERO
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLANT
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN DULY
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
For accused-appellant Garcia:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE ALLEGED
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT GIVEN BY DULCE BORERO,
ELDER SISTER OF THE VICTIM AND PROSECUTION
WITNESS, IN RESPECT OF THE PARTICIPATION OF
THE HEREIN ACCUSED DESPITE GLARING
INCONSISTENCIES, INHERENT IMPROBABILITIES
AND UNRELIABLE DECLARATION ATTENDING THE

SAME; AND, ON THE OTHERHAND, IN

DISREGARDING THE COHERENT, CONSISTENT AND
CREDIBLE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF DEFENSE
WITNESSES ALL IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE
RULES GOVERNING QUANTUM OF PROOF IN
CRIMINAL CASES AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENSE * EXISTING IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED
GARCIA; cTESIa
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY
DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT JESSIE
GARCIA WHO WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THE TIME
AS TO RENDER IT PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM
TO HAVE BEEN AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AND
EVEN IF THE SAME IS SUBSTANTIATED BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT IS, THE
TESTIMONIES OF OITHER * DEFENSE WITNESSES
WHO WERE ONE IN SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT
PRESENT THEREAT;
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A VERDICT
OF CONVICTION FOR JESSIE GARCIA INSTEAD OF
ACQUITTAL WHEN NONE OF THE OTHER ACCUSED,
AFTER HAVING ADMITTED THEIR PARTICIPATION IN
THE CRIME, IMPLICATED HIM;
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED, IN AWARDING MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE THEREFOR.
For accused-appellant Garchitorena:
I
48

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE OVER THE TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT
WITNESS.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED ARNOLD
GARCHITORENA TO HAVE WILLFULLY EXECUTED
THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF.
Accused-appellant Pamplona capitalized on Dulce Borero's
inaction at the time when she had supposedly witnessed the
slaying of her younger brother. He argued that if she really
witnessed the crime, she would have had readily helped her
brother Mauro instead of fleeing. Accusedappellant Garcia anchored his acquittal on his defense of alibi,
while accused-appellant Garchitorena used his alleged mental
disorder, specifically, schizophrenia, as a ground to free himself
from criminal liability.
The core issues raised by the both accused-appellants Pamplona
and Garcia are factual in nature and delve on the credibility of the
witnesses.
Since the accused-appellants raise factual issues, they must use
cogent and convincing arguments to show that the trial court
erred in appreciating the evidence. They, however, have failed to
do so. HSTaEC
Accused-appellant Pamplona contends that the trial court's
decision was rendered by a judge other than the one who
conducted trial. Hence, the judge who decided the case failed to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand so as to
gauge their credibility. This argument does not convince the Court
for the reason it has consistently maintained, to wit:
We have ruled in People v. Sadiangabay (G.R. No.
87214, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 551), that the
circumstance alone that the judge who wrote the
decision had not heard the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses would not taint his decision.

After all, he had the full record before him,

including the transcript of stenographic notes
which he could study. The efficacy of a decision is
not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer
only took over from a colleague who had earlier
presided at the trial, unless there is a clear showing
of a grave abuse of discretion in the factual
findings reached by him. 8 aEcTDI
A perusal of the trial court's decision readily shows that it was
duly based on the evidence presented during the trial. It is
evident that he thoroughly examined the testimonial and
documentary evidence before him and carefully assessed the
credibility of the witnesses. This Court finds no plausible ground
to set aside the factual findings of the trial court, which were
sustained by the CA.
The eyewitness Dulce Borero's testimony clearly established
Pamplona and Garcia's participation and, consequently, their
culpability in the appalling murder of Mauro Biay: 9
"Fiscal Nofuente (To the witness)
Q: Madam witness, do you know Mauro Biay?
A: Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Do you know likewise the cause of his death?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What was the cause of his death?
A: He was repeatedly stabbed sir.
Q: You said that Mauro Biay was repeatedly
stabbed, who stabbed Mauro Biay
repeatedly? AIECSD
A: Arnold Gatchitorena, was stabbing
repeatedly the victim sir.
49

Q: Was Arnold Gatchitorena alone when he stabbed

Mauro Biay?
A: They were three (3) who were stabbing Mauro
Biay, sir.
Q: You said that they were three who were stabbing
Mauro Biay, who are the other two?
A: Jessie Garcia and Joey Pamplona sir.
Q: So that when you said three, you are referring to
Arnold Gatchitorena, Joey Pamplona and
Jessie Garcia?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Now, when [did] this stabbing incident
[happen]? CHEDAc
A: On September 22, 1995 sir.
Q: Do you know what was [the] time when this
incident happened on September 22, 1995?
A: 9:00 o'clock in the evening sir.
Q: Where [did] this stabbing [happen]?
A: At Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz,
Bian, Laguna sir.
Q: Could you tell Madam Witness, where in
particular place in Sta. Inez, Almeda
Subdivision this stabbing incident
happened?
A: In the street near the artesian well sir.
Q: Do you know where is that street?
A: Sta Inez St., Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz,
Bian, Laguna sir.

Q: You said a while ago that accused Arnold

Gatchitorena, Jessie Garcia, Joey Pamplona
repeatedly [stabbed] Mauro Biay, do you
know these three accused?
A: Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you kindly step down from your seat and
tap the three accused that you have pointed
to us to be the persons who stabbed and
killed your brother Mauro Biay?
Court:
Police Officer Dionisio will you kindly accompany
the witness.
PO2 Dionisio:
Yes sir.
Fiscal:
I would like to manifest Your Honor, that the
witness was crying when she was
pointing to the three accused, uttering
that "Sila ang pumatay sa aking
kapatid"!.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What is the name of that person wearing that
blue t-shirts?
A: Arnold Gatchitorena sir.
Q: We would like to confirm if he is really Arnold
Gatchitorena pointed to by the
witness? TCcSDE
Interpreter:
50

The person pointed to by the witness

wearing blue t-shirts identified himself
as Arnold Gatchitorena.
Fiscal:

Q: You said that your brother was stabbed

successively by the three accused, how did
it [happen] Madam Witness?
A: They called him sir.

Do you know the name of second person whom

you tapped on his side wearing white tshirts?

Q: Who was called?

A: Mauro Biay sir.

A: Yes sir.

Q: Who called Mauro Biay?

Q: What is his name?

A: It was Jessie who called sir. DTcASE

A: Jessie Garcia sir.

Q: When you said Jessie, are you referring to Jessie

Garcia, one of the accused in this case?

Interpreter:

A: Yes sir.

The person pointed to by the witness

identified himself as certain Jessie
Garcia.

Q: When Mauro Biay was called by Jessie Garcia,

what was [M]auro Biay doing there?
A: Mauro Biay approached sir.

Fiscal:
Likewise Madam Witness, do you know the name
of a person in longsleeves polo shirtscheckered?

Q: By the way Madam Witness, do you know why

Mauro Biay was in that place where the
incident happened?

A: Yes sir, Joey Pamplona sir.

A: Yes sir.

Interpreter:

Atty. Pajares:

The person pointed by the witness identified

himself as certain Joey Pamplona.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How far were you from Mauro Biay when he was
being stabbed by the three accused Joey
Pamplona, Jessie Garcia, and Arnold
Gatchitorena?
A: Seven (7) arms length sir.

Witness would be incompetent Your Honor.

Court:
Witness may answer.
Fiscal:
Why was he there?
A: He was selling "balot" sir.
xxx xxx xxx
51

Fiscal:

A: He was struggling to free himself sir.

When Mauro Biay approached Jessie Garcia, what

[did] Mauro Biay do, if any?
A: Jessie Garcia twisted the hand of my
brother and placed the hand at his back
sir.
Q: Who were the companions of Jessie Garcia when
he called [M]auro Biay?
A: Joey Pamplona and Jr. Gatchitorena sir.
Q: When you said Jr. Gatchitorena are you referring
to Arnold Gatchitorena?
A: Yes sir.
Q: So that when Jessie Garcia called Mauro
Biay, he was together with Arnold
Gatchitorena and Joey Pamplona?
A: Yes sir.
Q: If you know Madam Witness, what did Joey
Pamplona and Arnold Gatchitorena do
after Jessie Garcia twisted the arm of
Mauro Biay on his back?
A: Arnold Gatchitorena repeatedly stabbed
[M]auro Biay at his back and also Jessie
Garcia also stabbed my brother
sir. ECISAD
xxx xxx xxx

Q: You said that he was struggling to free himself,

why did you say that he was struggling to
free himself?
A: Because I could see sir.
Q: You see what?
A: Because that three were repeatedly stabbing
Mauro Biay sir. EcTaSC
Q: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay, what was
Joey Pamplona doing to Mauro Biay, if
you can still remember?
A: He was also repeatedly stabbing my
brother sir.
Q: Aside from that stabbing, what else if any
Joey Pamplona was doing to Mauro
Biay?
A: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay Joey
Pamplona was also struggling
[strangling] the neck of Mauro Biay sir.
Q: You said that Mauro Biay was stabbed by
the three accused successively, was
Mauro Biay hit by these stabbing?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Why do you know that he was hit by
stabbing of the three?

Q: Were you able to know the weapon used

to stab Mauro Biay?

A: Because I saw the blood oozing from the

part of his body sir.

A: It was like a shiny bladed instrument sir.

Q: Now, what happened to Mauro Biay, when he

was stabbed and hit by the successive
stabbing of the three accused?

Q: Now, what was the position of Mauro Biay when

being stabbed by the three accused?

52

A: The victim Mauro Biay was suddenly slumped

face down on the ground sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you learn if any when you went to the
hospital to see your brother [M]auro Biay?
A: He was already dead sir.
Even under cross-examination, Dulce Borero was unwavering,
straightforward, categorical and spontaneous in her narration of
how the killing of her brother Mauro took place. 10 Notably, her
testimony as to the identification of Garchitorena as the one who
stabbed Mauro Biay was even corroborated by defense witness
Miguelito Gonzalgo, 11 thus: EaScHT
Q: From the time you saw these two persons near
the artesian well, what happened after that,
mr. witness?
A: Mauro Biay slumped on the floor and I saw
Junior stabbed once more the victim
but I am not sure if the victim was hit
at the back, ma'am.
Q: How far were you from the two when you saw
the incident, mr. witness?
A: More or less 7 to 8 meters, ma'am.
Q: Were there anything blocking your sight from
the place where you were standing to the
place of incident, mr. witness?
A: None, ma'am.
Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of Borero, we sustain
the lower court in giving her testimony full faith and credence.
Moreover, the prosecution's version is supported by the physical
evidence. 12 Borero's testimony that the victim was successively
stabbed several times conforms with the autopsy report that the
latter suffered multiple stab wounds. 13 CSTDIE

Accused-appellant Pamplona's argument that there were

inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses Borero
is not convincing. He specifically points out that in the direct
examination of Borero, she stated that it was Jessie Garcia who
twisted the hand of Mauro Biay backwards when the latter
approached the former. 14In the cross-examination, she stated
that it was Joey Pamplona who strangled the victim when the
latter approached Jessie Garcia.

The seeming inconsistencies between her direct testimony and

her cross-examination testimonies are not sufficient ground to
disregard them. In People v. Alberto Restoles y Tuyo, Roldan Noel
y Molet and Jimmy Alayon y De la Cruz, 15 we ruled that:
. . . minor inconsistencies do not affect the
credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to
strengthen rather than weaken their credibility.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect either the
substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the
weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may
even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they
guard against memorized falsities.
Moreover, such inconsistencies did not contradict the credibility of
Borero or her narration of the incident. On the contrary, they
showed that her account was theentire truth. In fact, her
narration was in harmony with the account of defense witness
Gonzalgo. We note further that both the Sworn Statement 16 of
Borero and her testimony before the lower court 17 were in
complete congruence.
Undoubtedly, accused-appellants' identities as the perpetrators
were established by the prosecution. The prosecution witness was
able to observe the entire incident, because she was there. Thus,
we find no reason to differ with the trial court's appreciation of
her testimony. Positive identification, where categorical and
53

consistent, and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the

part of the eyewitnesses on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial. 18
Accused-appellant Garcia's alibi has no leg to stand on. In People
v. Desalisa, 19 this Court ruled that:
. . . for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove not only that he was at some other
place when the crime was committed, but also that
it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity
through clear and convincing evidence.
Here, the crime was committed at Binan, Laguna. Although Garcia
testified that he was still riding a bus from his work in Blumentritt
and arrived in Binan only at 11:00 P.M. or two hours after the
killing incident, still, he failed to prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity. His alibi must fail.
Accused-appellant Garchitorena's defense of insanity has also no
merit. Unlike other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have
established a more stringent criterion for the acceptance of
insanity as an exempting circumstance. 20 As aptly argued by the
Solicitor General, insanity is a defense in the nature of confession
and avoidance. As such, it must be adequately proved, and
accused-appellant Garchitorena utterly failed to do so. We agree
with both the CA and the trial court that he was not totally
deprived of reason and freedom of will during and after the
stabbing incident, as he even instructed his co-accusedappellants to run away from the scene of the crime.
Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no
conspiracy, as "there was no evidence whatsoever that he aided
the other two accused-appellants or that he participated in their
criminal designs". 21 We are not persuaded. In People v.
Maldo, 22 we stated:
"Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a

felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not

essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the
acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent
to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint
purpose, concert of action or community of
interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit
by each of the conspirators for the act of one of
them is deemed the act of all." (citations omitted,
emphasis ours)
In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants
were together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their
common objective. Garcia grabbed the victim's hands and twisted
his arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled
him and straddled him on the ground, then stabbed him. The
victim was trying to free himself from them, but they were too
strong. All means through which the victim could escape were
blocked by them until he fell to the ground and expired. The three
accused-appellants' prior act of waiting for the victim outside
affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common
design and purpose. CTSAaH
Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among
the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent
and the character of their participation, because the act of one is
the act of all. 23
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength should be
appreciated against the accused-appellants. Abuse of superior
strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, considering that a situation of
superiority of strength is notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor and is selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. 24 This circumstance was alleged in the
Information and was proved during the trial. In the case at bar,
the victim certainly could not defend himself in any way. The
accused-appellants, armed with a deadly weapon, immobilized
the victim and stabbed him successively using the same deadly
weapon.
54

All told, the trial court correctly convicted the accused-appellants

of murder, considering the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. Since an aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength attended the commission of the crime, each of
the accused-appellants should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of death in accordance with Article 63 25 of the Revised Penal
Code. Murder, under Article 248 26 of the Revised Penal Code, is
punishable by reclusion perpetuato death. Following Article 63 of
the same code, the higher penalty of death shall be applied.
In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, 27 otherwise
known as the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole should instead be imposed. Accordingly,
accused-appellants shall be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of the penalty of
death.
While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death
and the offense is still heinous. 28Consequently, the civil
indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00. In People v.
Quiachon, 29 we explained that even if the penalty of death was
not to be imposed on appellant because of the prohibition
in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 was
still proper. Following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, 30 the
said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death
penalty, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of
the crime.
Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity by the trial court
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Civil indemnity is mandatory and
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than
the commission of the crime. Likewise the award of P50,000.00
for moral damages is modified and increased to P75,000.00,
consistent with recent jurisprudence 31 on heinous crimes where
the imposable penalty is death, it is reduced to reclusion
perpetua pursuant to R.A. 9346. The award of moral damages
does not require allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of

the heirs, since the emotional wounds from the vicious killing of
the victim cannot be denied. 32 The trial court's award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall, however,
be reduced to P30,000.00, also pursuant to the latest
jurisprudence on the matter. 33
As to the award of actual damages amounting to P16,700.00, we
modify the same. In People v. Villanueva, 34 this Court declared
that ". . . when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of
temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount". In the light of such ruling, the
victim's heirs in the present case should, therefore, be awarded
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. AECacS
The award of P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity is justified.
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity.
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1)
the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work
no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws. 35 It cannot be disputed that the
victim, at the time of his death, was self-employed and earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. The
computation arrived at by the trial court was in accordance with
the formula for computing the award for loss of earning
capacity. 36 Thus,
Award for = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross
annual income - 50% (GAI)]
lost earnings
= 2/3 [80-29] x P24,000.00 - P12,000.00
= (34) x (P12,000.00)
= P408,000.00
55

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC

No. 00765, finding the three accused appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder is herebyAFFIRMED WITH the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed
on accused-appellants is REDUCED to RECLUSION
PERPETUA without eligibility for parole pursuant to RA
9346; (2) the monetary awards to be paid jointly and severally by
the accused-appellants to the heirs of the victim are as follows:
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages; (3) P408,000.00 for loss of
earning capacity; and (4) interest is imposed on all the damages
awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully
paid. 37 ScaAET

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Garchitorena y Camba, G.R. No. 175605, [August 28,
2009], 614 PHIL 66-94)

[G.R. No. 175926. July 6, 2011.]

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY
MILAN
AND
JACKMAN
CHUA, accusedappellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
This is an appeal by Henry Milan and Jackman Chua from the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934
dated May 10, 2006. Said Decision affirmed that of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) convicting them and one Restituto Carandang for
two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061, Q-01-100062 and Q-01-100063,
the Informations for which read:
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100061
That on or about the 5th day of April 2001, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength
and with treachery and evident premeditation,
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO, by
then and there shooting the latter several times
with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber hitting
him on the different parts of the body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot
wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of
the immediate heirs of said PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO
Y SALGO.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or
with insult to the public authorities. 2
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100062
That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
56

intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength

and with treachery and evident premeditation,
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, by
then and there shooting the latter several times
with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber,
hitting him on the different parts of the body and
as soon as the said victim fell on the ground, by
placing a hand grenade (sic) underneath the body
which directly caused an explosion and mutilated
the body which directly caused the death of SPO2
WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount
as may be awarded to them under the provisions of
the Civil Code. aDSAEI
That the crime was committed in contempt of or
with insult to the public authorities. 3
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063
That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill with evident premeditation and with treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal
violence upon the person of SPO1 WILFREDO
MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, by then and there
shooting the latter with the use of a firearm of
unknown caliber, hitting him on his neck thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries, the
offender thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as
a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it
by reasons or causes independent of the will of the
perpetrators, that is the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said SPO1 WILFREDO

MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, to the damage and

prejudice of the said offended party.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or
with insult to the public authorities. 4
On May 15, 2001, accused-appellants Carandang, Milan and Chua
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
The prosecution evidence, culled from the testimonies of Senior
Police Officer (SPO) 1 Wilfredo Montecalvo, SPO1 Rodolfo Estores,
Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Virgilio Calaro, P/Supt. Manuel
Roxas and Dr. Wilson Tan, yielded the following version of the
facts:
In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the
La Loma Police Station 1 received a request for assistance from
the sister of accused Milan regarding a drug deal that would
allegedly take place in her house at Calavite St., Brgy. Salvacion,
Quezon City. The station commander called SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar
Red and instructed him to talk to Milan's sister, who was in their
office. SPO2 Red, accompanied by Police Officer (PO) 2 Dionisio
Alonzo, SPO1 Estores and SPO1 Montecalvo, talked to Milan's
sister. Thereafter, SPO2 Red formed a team composed of the
officers who accompanied him during the interrogation, with him
as team leader. The team received further instructions from the
station commander then proceeded to Calavite Street aboard two
vehicles, a mobile patrol car and an unmarked car. 5
When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m., 6 they
alighted from their vehicles and surrounded Milan's house. SPO1
Montecalvo's group went to the left side of the house, while SPO2
Red's group proceeded to the right. The two groups eventually
met at the back of the house near Milan's room. The door to
Milan's room was open, enabling the police officers to see
Carandang, Milan and Chua inside. SPO2 Red told the group that
the persons inside the room would not put up a fight, making
them confident that nothing violent would erupt. However, when
the group introduced themselves as police officers, Milan
immediately shut the door. 7 cAaETS
57

PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall
and
propelling
them
inside
the
room.
PO2
Alonzo
shouted "Walang gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting PO2
Alonzo and SPO2 Red who dropped to the floor one after the
other. Due to the suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2
Red were not able to return fire and were instantly killed by the
barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was right behind
SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the assailants when
Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground.
SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan, "Sugurin mo na!" Milan
lunged towards SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire
his gun and hit Milan. SPO1 Estores went inside the house and
pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out. 8
Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival of P/Sr.
Insp. Calaro, Chief Operations Officer of the La Loma Police
Station 1, and P/Supt. Roxas, the Deputy Station Commander of
Police Station 1 at the time of the incident. 9 SPO1 Montecalvo
was brought to the Chinese General Hospital. Milan stepped out
of the house and was also brought to a hospital, 10 but
Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside the house for
several hours. There was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender
of Carandang and Chua, during which they requested for the
presence of a certain Colonel Reyes and media man Ramon
Tulfo. 11 It was around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight when
Carandang and Chua surrendered. 12 SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo
were found dead inside the house, their bodies slumped on the
floor with broken legs and gunshot and grenade shrapnel
wounds. 13
Dr. Winston Tan, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted the post-mortem
examination of the bodies of SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo. He found
that the gunshot wounds of Red and Alonzo were the cause of
their deaths. 14
According to SPO1 Montecalvo's account, Dr. Bu Castro of the
Chinese General Hospital operated on him, removing a bullet
from the right portion of his nape. SPO1 Montecalvo's
hospitalization expenses amounted to P14,324.48. He testified

that it was a nightmarish experience for him as he feared that he

might be paralyzed later on. 15
The defense presented the three accused as witnesses, testifying
as follows:
Carandang claims that he had no firearm during the incident, and
that it was the police officers who fired all the shots. He was in
Milan's house during the incident in order to ask Milan to
accompany him to convert his cellular phone's SIM card. When he
arrived at Milan's place, he found Milan and Chua playing a card
game. A short time later, there was banging on the door. The door
of the house was destroyed and gunfire suddenly erupted,
prompting him to take cover under a bed. Chua cried out to him
that he was hit and that he might lose blood. Milan ran outside
and sustained injuries as well. There was an explosion near the
door, causing burns on Carandang's left arm. Gunfire continued
coming from different directions for two to three minutes.
Suddenly, the place became dark as the lights went
out. 16 ESTAIH
Since gunshots were still heard every now and then, Carandang
stayed in the house and did not come out. Col. Tor, the new Chief
of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Sikatuna, negotiated
for Carandang to come out. Carandang requested for the
presence of his wife, Col. Doroteo Reyes and media man Ramon
Tulfo. He went out of the house at around midnight when the
three arrived. 17
Milan testified that he was at home in Calavite St. at the time of
the incident. He knew Carandang for seven months. Chua was
their neighbor. While playing a card game inside his room, they
heard someone pounding at the door. He stood and approached
the door to check. The door was destroyed, and two unidentified
men barged in. Gunshots erupted. He was hit on the left side of
his body. He ran out of the room, leaving Chua and Carandang
behind. As he was doing so, he saw his mother lying down and
shouting "Itigil niyo ang putukan; maraming matatanda
dito!" Milan was then hit on his left leg by another gunshot. 18
58

Chua testified that he went to the house of Milan at around

noontime of April 4, 2001 to play a card game. They played inside
Milan's ground floor room. Five to ten minutes later, Carandang
arrived and laid down on the bed. Chua did not pay much
attention as Milan and Carandang discussed about cellular
phones. Later, they heard a loud banging in the door as if it was
being forced open. Milan stood up to see what was happening.
Chua remained seated and Carandang was still on the bed. The
door was forcibly opened. Chua heard successive gunshots and
was hit on his left big toe. He ducked on the floor near the bed to
avoid being hit further. He remained in that position for several
hours until he lost consciousness. He was already being treated at
the Chinese General Hospital when he regained consciousness. In
said hospital, a paraffin test was conducted upon him. 19
P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, later testified that the paraffin test on Chua yielded a
negative result for gunpowder nitrates, but that performed on
Carandang produced a positive result. She was not able to
conduct a paraffin test on Milan, who just came from the
operating room when she saw him. Milan seemed to be in pain
and refused to be examined. 20
On April 22, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 21 finding
Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of two counts of murder and
one count of frustrated murder: SCHIac
WHEREFORE, finding the accused RESTITUTO
CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN
CHUA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder described and penalized under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article
63 of the same Code, for the killing of SPO2
Wilfredo Pilar Red and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo qualified
by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each
other, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
murder and to indemnify the heirs of the victims,
jointly and severally, as follows:

To the heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red:

1.P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2.P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3.P149,734.00 as actual damages; and
4.P752,580.00 as compensatory damages.
To the heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo:
1.P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2.P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3.P139,910.00 as actual damages; and
4.P522,960.00 as compensatory damages.
Likewise, finding the accused Restituto Carandang,
Henry Milan and Jackman Chua guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated
murder, described and penalized under Article 249
in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2, having acted
in conspiracy with each other and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years
of prision mayor to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, and to indemnify the
victim Wilfredo Montecalvo as follows:
1.P14,000.00 as actual damages;
2.P20,000.00 as moral damages;
3.P20,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees;
and
4.To pay the costs. 22
Carandang, Milan and Chua appealed to this Court. 23 The
appeals were separately docketed as G.R. Nos. 16051012. 24 Pursuant, however, to the decision of this Court in People
59

v. Mateo, 25 the appeals were transferred 26 to the Court of

Appeals, where they were assigned a single docket number, CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934.

The court a quo erred in holding that there was

conspiracy among the appellants in the case at
bar.

On May 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed

Decision modifying the Decision of the trial court: HSDaTC

II.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76,
in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061-63 finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of Murder and one (1) count of
Frustrated Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1)In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01100062, accused-appellants are hereby ordered to
pay the heirs of PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2
Wilfredo P. Red an indemnity for loss of earning
capacity in the amount of P2,140,980.69 and
P2,269,243.62, respectively; and
2)In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, accusedappellants are hereby instead sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
With costs against the accused-appellants. 27
Milan and Chua appealed to this Court anew. 28 Carandang did
not appeal, and instead presented a letter informing this Court
that he is no longer interested in pursuing an appeal. 29 On April
9, 2008, Milan and Chua filed a Supplemental Appellant's Brief to
further discuss the Assignment of Errors they presented in their
September 28, 2004 Appellant's Brief:
I.

Assuming arguendo that conspiracy exists, the

court a quo gravely erred in convicting them of the
crime of murder and frustrated murder instead of
homicide and frustrated homicide only, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery not having
been duly proven to have attended the commission
of the crimes charged. 30
The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in
conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged. Thus,
despite the established fact that it was Carandang who fired the
gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all
three accused were held equally criminally responsible therefor.
The trial court explained that Carandang, Milan and Chua's
actuations showed that they acted in concert against the police
officers. The pertinent portion of the RTC Decision reads:
Milan, Carandang and Chua were all inside the
room of Milan. Upon arrival of police officers Red,
Alonzo and the others and having identified
themselves as police officers, the door was closed
and after Alonzo and Red pushed it open and as
Alonzo shouted, "walang gagalaw," immediately
shots rang out from inside the room, felling Alonzo,
then Red, then Montecalvo. Chua was heard by
Estores to shout to Milan: "Sugurin mo na" (tsn,
October 16, 2001, page 8). And as Milan lunged at
Montecalvo, the latter shot him. DCcAIS
That the three acted in concert can be gleaned
from their actuations. First, when they learned of
the presence of the police officers, they closed the
door. Not one of them came out to talk peacefully
with the police officers. Instead, Carandang opened
60

fire, Alonzo and Red did not even have the chance
to touch their firearms at that instant. 31
In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals further expounded on
the acts of Milan and Chua showing that they acted in concert
with Carandang, to wit:
In the present case, when appellants were alerted
of the presence of the police officers, Milan
immediately closed the door. Thereafter, when the
police officers were finally able to break open said
door, Carandang peppered them with bullets. PO2
Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result
while SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally wounded.
Then, upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on
the floor and seriously wounded, Chua ordered
Milan to attack the police officers. Following the
order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but the
latter, however, was able to shoot him.
At first glance, Milan's act of closing the door may
seem a trivial contribution in the furtherance of the
crime. On second look, however, that act actually
facilitated the commission of the crime. The brief
moment during which the police officers were
trying to open the door paved the way for the
appellants to take strategic positions which gave
them a vantage point in staging their assault. Thus,
when SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were finally able to
get inside, they were instantly killed by the sudden
barrage of gunfire. In fact, because of the
suddenness of the attack, said police officers were
not able to return fire.
Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in
the
conspiracy
consisted
of
lending
encouragement and moral ascendancy to his coconspirators as evidenced by the fact that he
ordered Milan to attack the already fallen police
officers with the obvious intention to finish them

off. Moreover, he did not immediately surrender

even when he had the opportunity to do so but
instead chose to stay with Carandang inside the
room until their arrest. 32
Milan and Chua object to the conclusion that they were in
conspiracy with Carandang due to their acts of closing the door
and not peaceably talking to the police officers. According to
them, those acts were caused by their being frightened by the
police officers who were allegedly in full battle gear. 33 Milan and
Chua further assert that the fortuitous and unexpected character
of the encounter and the rapid turn of events should have ruled
out a finding of conspiracy. 34 They claim that the incident
happened so fast, giving them no opportunity to stop
Carandang. 35 aIcDCT
Appellants contest the factual finding that Chua directed Milan to
go after SPO1 Montecalvo, alleging that they were both unarmed
and that there was no way for Milan to attack an armed person.
What really happened, according to them, was that Milan ran out
of the room for safety and not to attack SPO1
Montecalvo. 36 Milan claims that he was already injured in the
stomach when he ran out, and it was natural for him to seek
safety.
Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered "Sugurin mo na!" to Milan,
appellants argue that no crime was committed due to the same
as all the victims had already been shot when said words were
shouted. 37 Furthermore, it appears to have been uttered as a
result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and did not inherently
carry with it inducement or temptation. 38
In the Supplemental Brief, Milan and Chua point out that the
assault on the victims was the result of the impulsive act of
Carandang and was not a result of any agreement or a concerted
action of all the accused. 39 They claim that when the shootout
ensued, Chua immediately dove down near the bed while Milan
ran out of the room out of fear. 40 It is allegedly hard to imagine
that SPO1 Montecalvo with certainty heard Chua utter the
61

phrase "Sugurin mo na," considering that the incident happened

so fast, there were lots of gunshots. 41
To summarize, Milan's and Chua's arguments focus on the lack of
direct evidence showing that they conspired with Carandang
during the latter's act of shooting the three victims. However, as
we have held in People v. Sumalpong, 42 conspiracy may also be
proven by other means:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not
establish the actual agreement among the
conspirators showing a preconceived plan or
motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of
concerted action before, during and after the
crime, which demonstrates their unity of design
and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all
regardless of the degree of participation of
each. 43
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired
with Carandang was established by their acts (1) before
Carandang shot the victims (Milan's closing the door when the
police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait
in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua's directive for Milan
to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milan's following such instruction).
Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts
are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or
that Milan's act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made
him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are
convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the
minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered
principals by direct participation. DHaECI
Appellants' attempt to instill doubts in our minds that
shouted "sugurin mo na" to Milan, who then ran towards
Montecalvo, must fail. SPO1 Estores's positive testimony
this matter prevails over the plain denials of Milan and

Chua
SPO1
44 on
Chua.

SPO1 Estores has no reason to lie about the events he witnessed

on April 5, 2001. As part of the team that was attacked on that
day, it could even be expected that he is interested in having only
the real perpetrators punished.
Furthermore, we have time and again ruled that factual findings
of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the
evidence on record. 45 It was the trial court that was able to
observe the demeanors of the witnesses, and is consequently in a
better position to determine which of the witnesses are telling the
truth. Thus, this Court, as a general rule, would not review the
factual findings of the courts a quo, except in certain instances
such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific
evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding
of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the
findings of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings
of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties. 46
Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a
finding of conspiracy. Unlike evident premeditation, there is no
requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient
period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation
and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on the very moment the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject
felony. 47
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milan's act of
closing the door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing
Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the
police officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of
62

appellants and Carandang to prevent any chance for the police

officers to defend themselves. Treachery is thus present in the
case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is
that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims
to defend themselves or to retaliate. 48
The trial court correctly sentenced appellants to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061
and Q-01-100062. The penalty for murder under Article 248 49 of
the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Applying
Article 63 50 of the same Code, since there was no other
modifying circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the penalty that should be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. ECSHAD
In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the Court of Appeals correctly
modified the penalty for the frustrated murder of SPO1
Montecalvo. Under Article 50 51 in connection with Article 61,
paragraph 2 52 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
frustrated murder is one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to
death, which is reclusion temporal. Reclusion temporal has a
range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Its medium period,
which should be applied in this case considering that there is no
modifying circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months the range of the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty under Section 1 53 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty should then be
within the range of the penalty next lower to reclusion
temporal, and thus may be any term within prision mayor, the
range of which is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The modified
term of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, is
within these ranges.
The civil liabilities of appellants should, however, be modified in
accordance with current jurisprudence. Thus, in Criminal Case
Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, the award of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for each victim must be increased to
P75,000.00. 54 In cases of murder and homicide, civil indemnity

of P75,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 are awarded

automatically, without need of allegation and proof other than the
death of the victim. 55 Appellants are furthermore solidarily liable
to each victim for P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, which is
awarded when the crime was committed with an aggravating
circumstance, be it generic or qualifying. 56 However, since
Carandang did not appeal, he is only solidarily liable with Milan
and Chua with respect to the amounts awarded by the Court of
Appeals, since the Court of Appeals' Decision has become final
and executory with respect to him. The additional amounts
(P25,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages) shall be borne only by Milan and Chua, who are hereby
held liable therefor solidarily.
In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the solidary liability of Milan
and Chua for moral damages to SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo is
likewise increased to P40,000.00, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence. 57 An award of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages
is also warranted. 58 The additional amounts (P20,000.00 as
moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages) are
likewise to be solidarily borne only by Milan and Chua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 01934 dated May 10, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1.In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01100062, appellants Henry Milan and
Jackman Chua are held solidarily liable for
the amount of P25,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to
the heirs of each of the victims, PO2 Dionisio
S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red, in
addition to the amounts to which they are
solidarily liable with Restituto Carandang as
held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934. Thus, to
summarize the rulings of the lower courts
and this Court:
63

a.The heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red are

entitled
to
the
following
amounts: DEHcTI

iii.P139,910.00
as
actual
damages to be solidarily borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

i.P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,

P50,000.00 of which shall be
solidarily borne by Carandang,
Milan
and
Chua,
while
P25,000.00 shall be the solidary
liability of Milan and Chua only;

iv.P2,269,243.62 as indemnity for

loss of earning capacity to
be
solidarily
borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

ii.P50,000.00 as moral damages to

be
solidarily
borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iii.P149,734.00
as
actual
damages to be solidarily borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iv.P2,140,980.00 as indemnity for
loss of earning capacity to
be
solidarily
borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
and
v.P30,000.00
as
exemplary
damages to be solidarily borne
by Milan and Chua only;
b.The heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo are
entitled to the following amounts:
i.P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 of which shall be
solidarily borne by Carandang,
Milan
and
Chua,
while
P25,000.00 shall be the solidary
liability of Milan and Chua only;
ii.P50,000.00 as moral damages to
be
solidarily
borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

v.P30,000.00
as
exemplary
damages to be solidarily borne
by Milan and Chua only;
2.In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, appellants
Henry Milan and Jackman Chua are held
solidarily liable for the amount of P20,000.00
as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages to SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo, in addition to the amounts to
which they are solidarily liable with Restituto
Carandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the
lower courts and this Court, SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo is entitled to the following
amounts: aHIDAE
i.P14,000.00 as actual damages to be
solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan
and Chua;
ii.P40,000.00
as
moral
damages,
P20,000.00 of which shall be solidarily
borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua,
while P20,000.00 shall be the solidary
liability of Milan and Chua only;
iii.P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to
be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua
only; and

64

iv.P20,000.00 as reasonable attorney's

fees,
to
be
solidarily
borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua.
3.Appellants are further ordered to pay interest on
all damages awarded at the legal rate of Six
Percent (6%) per annum from date of finality
of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Milan, G.R. No. 175926, [July 6, 2011], 669 PHIL 5981)

[G.R. No. 201860. January 22, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO
SULINDAO, EDDIE MALOGSI (deceased) and
ALFEMIO MALOGSI,* accused-appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
This is an appeal from a Decision 1 dated May 16, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00364, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie
Malogsi and Alfemio Malogsi, which affirmed with modifications
the Decision 2 dated January 31, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, Branch 11 that convicted appellants
Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and
Alfemio Malogsi for the felony of murder under Article 248 of

the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 931272.

The genesis of this court case can be traced to the charge of
murder against the appellants in the trial court via an
Information 3 dated July 16, 1993. The accusatory portion of said
indictment reads:
That on or about the 11th day of July 1993, at 7:30
in the evening more or less at barangay Salucot,
municipality of Talakag, province of Bukidnon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
with (sic) one another, with intent to kill, by means
of treachery, armed with guns and bolos, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack,
assault and sho[o]t PIONIO YACAPIN, hitting his
back and left leg, inflicting wounds that cause[d]
his death thereafter.
To the damage and prejudice [of] the heirs of the
deceased PIONIO YACAPIN in such sum they are
entitled under the law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. AIDcTE
On September 27, 1993, the appellants were arraigned. All four
(4) accused pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the charge leveled against
them. 4
The factual backdrop of this case as condensed in the trial court's
assailed January 31, 2005 judgment and adopted by the Court of
Appeals in its similarly assailed May 16, 2011 Decision is
reproduced hereunder:
Evidence for the Prosecution
Prosecution's first witness, Ronie Dacion, a
14[-]year old stepson of the victim, Pionio Yacapin,
testified that on July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the
65

evening he saw accused Marcelino Dadao, Antonio

Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and [A]lfemio Malogsi
helping each other and with the use of firearms
and bolos, shot to death the victim, Pionio Yacapin
in their house at Barangay Salucot, Talakag,
Bukidnon.
The testimony of the second witness for the
prosecution, Edgar Dacion, a 12[-]year old stepson
of the victim, corroborates the testimony of his
older brother Ronie Dacion.
Prosecution's third witness, Nenita Yacapin, the
widow of the victim, also corroborates the
testimony of the prosecution's first and second
witness. The said witness further testified that she
suffered civil and moral damages [due to] the
death of her husband.
Prosecution's fourth witness, Bernandino Signawan,
testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening
of July 11, 1993, Ronie and Edgar Dacion reached
to [sic] his house and related to him that their
stepfather was killed by accused Eddie Malogsi,
[A]lfemio Malogsi, Marcelino Dadao and Antonio
Sulindao. Witness Signawan further testified that
on the following morning, he and the other people
in Ticalaan including the barangay captain, Ronie
and Edgar Dacion returned to the house of the
victim and found the latter already dead and in the
surrounding [area] of the house were recovered
empty shells of firearms.
Prosecution's fifth witness, SPO2 Nestor Aznar,
testified that he was the one who prepared the
sketch of the but where the incident happened and
further testified that the four accused were in the
custody of the government and in the following
morning of the incident, he was at the scene of the

crime and found in the yard of the hut eight (8)

garand empty shells caliber 30m[m].
The prosecution presented its sixth and last
witness, Modesto Libyocan, who testified that on
the evening of July 11, 1993, at Barangay Salucot,
he saw in the house of the victim, Pionio Yacapin,
lights caused by flashlights and heard several
gunshots from the house of the victim, and that the
family left their house on that evening and went to
Ticalaan where they learned that Pionio Yacapin
was killed in his house and that early the following
morning, July 12, 1993, he was with some
companions, barangay officials of Ticalaan in the
house of the victim where they found him dead and
sustaining gunshot wounds. AcDaEH
Evidence for the Defense
Defense's first witness, Police Inspector Vicente
Armada, testified that on July 30, 1993, at 11:00 in
the morning, he conducted an examination for
paraffin test on all four accused with the findings
that they yielded negative result . . . .
The defense presented Eddie Malogsi, one of the
accused, as its second witness, who testified that
on July 11, 1993 at 7:30 in the evening, he was at
the farm of a certain Boyle together with his
brother, [A]lfemio Malogsi, one of the accused
herein, being a worker of that farm. He further
testified that on the said date and time, he never
fired a gun.
Defense's third witness, [A]lfemio Malogsi, another
accused in this case, corroborates the testimony of
his brother and co-accused, Eddie Malogsi, that on
the said date and time above-mentioned, he was at
the farm of a certain Boyle with his brother and
66

that they heard several gunshots. He further

testified that he never owned a garand rifle.
Another accused, Antonio Sulindao, defense's
fourth witness, testified that on the date and time
above-mentioned, he was at Salucot together with
his family and at 7:30 . . . in the evening, he heard
some gun shots. He further testified among others,
that he has no grudge . . . with the victim prior to
the incident.
The testimony of defense's fifth witness, Fernandez
Saplina, [was to] establish the defense of denial
and alibi in so far as accused Marcelino Dadao, that
on the whole evening of July 11, 1993, accused
Marcelino Dadao was all the time at his house in
San Fernandez, Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon, and
there was no occasion that said accused went
outside or left his house on the said date and time.
The said witness further testified that he visited
the accused at the municipal jail of Talakag,
Bukidnon, where he was detained for having been
the suspect in the killing of Pionio Yacapin.
The defense presented its sixth witness, Camilo
Dumalig, who corroborates the testimony of
Fernandez Saplina to the effect that accused
Marcelino Dadao has been residing at San
Fernandez, Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon at the time
of the incident on July 11, 1993 which place is
about 7 kilometers from the place of the incident.
Defense's seventh witness, Venancio Payonda,
father-in-law of accused Antonio Sulindao, testified
that the latter was in his house the whole day of
July 11, 1993.
The defense presented as its last witness, accused
Marcelino Dadao, who testified that three (3)
months prior to July 11, 1993, he had been staying

at the house of one Fernandez Saplina at Sitio San

Fernandez, Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon, which is
about 7 kilometers away from the house of the
victim. He further testified that on July 11, 1993, he
did not leave the house of Fernandez Saplina until
the following morning. 5 DTCAES
After trial was concluded, a guilty verdict was handed down by
the trial court finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murdering Pionio Yacapin. The assailed January 31, 2005
Decision disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds accused, EDDIE MALOGSI, [A]LFEMIO
MALOGSI, ANTONIO SULINDAO and MARCELINO
DADAO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, as defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the said four accused are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and are
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, the amount
of SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00)
as moral damages and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages and to pay
the cost of the suit. Pursuant to Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated January 20,
1992, the bailbonds of all four accused are hereby
ordered cancelled and the latter are ordered
detained, pending resolution of any Appeal that
may be pursued in this case. 6
Appellants elevated their case to the Court of Appeals. During the
pendency of the appeal, the appellate court acted on a
Manifestation filed by Rogelio Tampil, bondsman for Eddie
Malogsi, who sought the cancellation of the memorandum of
encumbrance that was reflected in his land title (Original
Certificate of Title No. P-13825, Entry No. 165683) for the reason
that Eddie Malogsi had already died on August 25, 2003. Thus, on
February 11, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
granting Tampil's request. 7 Subsequently, after considering the
67

pleadings and memoranda of the parties, the Court of Appeals

issued its May 16, 2011 Decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
ACCORDINGLY, this appeal is DISMISSED and the
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
modification the P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages shall be
awarded in addition to the moral and exemplary
damages already awarded by the lower court. 8
Hence, appellants, through counsel, seek final recourse with the
Court and reiterate the following assignment of errors from their
Appellants' Brief filed with the Court of Appeals:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH WHEN THE
SAME WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. 9
The foregoing arguments were later on amplified by appellants'
Supplemental Brief. 10 ECaScD
Appellants reiterate that their guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt because the testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution were afflicted with inconsistencies and
improbabilities, thus, making them of doubtful veracity.

Furthermore, appellants faulted the trial court for disbelieving

their alibis and for disregarding the fact that the paraffin test
which all of them were subjected to produced a negative result.
Appellants also underscored the fact that they did not take flight
despite the knowledge that they were made suspects in the
murder of Pionio Yacapin. Lastly, appellants maintain that the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength should not
have been appreciated as it was not alleged in the criminal
information filed against them.
The petition is without merit.
In fine, the pivotal issue raised by appellants in questioning the
validity of their conviction for the crime of murder is whether or
not the eyewitness testimonies presented by the prosecution,
specifically that of the two stepsons (Rome and Edgar Dacion)
and the widow (Nenita Yacapin) of the deceased victim, Pionio
Yacapin, are credible enough to be worthy of belief.
We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of
such a factual question is best left to the sound judgment of the
trial court and that, absent any misapprehension of facts or grave
abuse of discretion, the findings of the trial court shall not be
disturbed. In People v. De la Rosa, 11 we yet again expounded on
this principle in this wise:
[T]he issue raised by accused-appellant involves
the credibility of [the] witness, which is best
addressed by the trial court, it being in a better
position to decide such question, having heard
the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under grueling examination. These
are the most significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth,
especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire
proceedings, the trial court can be expected to
determine, with reasonable discretion, whose
testimony to accept and which witness to believe.
Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters
68

will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts

or
circumstances
of
weight
have
been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so
as to materially affect the disposition of the
case. . . . .
Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that
the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is
presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit. 12 In the case at bar, no
imputation of improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses was ever made by appellants.
Furthermore, appellants contend that the prosecution witnesses
made inconsistent and improbable statements in court which
supposedly impair their credibility, such as whether or not the
stepsons of the victim left for Ticalaan together to report the
incident, whether the accused were still firing at the victim when
they left or not, and whether or not the accused went after the
stepsons after shooting the victim. We have reviewed the relevant
portions of the transcripts pointed out by the appellants and have
confidently arrived at the conclusion that these are matters
involving minor inconsistencies pertaining to details of immaterial
nature that do not tend to diminish the probative value of the
testimonies at issue. We elucidated on this subject in Avelino v.
People, 13 to wit:
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and
its capacity to assimilate all material details of a
given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances
in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their
probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial
and insignificant details do not discredit a
testimony on the very material and significant
point bearing on the very act of accusedappellants. As long as the testimonies of the
witnesses corroborate one another on material
points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot
destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor

details do not undermine the integrity of a

prosecution witness. (Emphasis omitted.)
Notwithstanding their conflicting statements on minor details,
Ronie, Edgar and Nenita positively identified appellants as the
perpetrators of the dastardly crime of murder committed on the
victim which they categorically and consistently claimed to have
personally witnessed. CHaDIT
In order to counter the serious accusation made against them,
appellants put forward the defense of alibi which necessarily fails
in the face of positive identification. It is a time-honored principle
in jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi
since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently
unreliable. 14 Hence, it must be supported by credible
corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to
the accused. 15 An examination of the record would indicate that
Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi were unable to present a corroborating
witness to support their alibi that they were working at a farm
owned by a certain Boyle on the date and time of Pionio Yacapin's
murder. While the witnesses presented by the defense to
corroborate the respective alibis of Marcelino Dadao and Antonio
Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives who are hardly the
disinterested witnesses that is required by jurisprudence.
With regard to appellants' assertion that the negative result of the
paraffin tests that were conducted on their persons should be
considered as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can only declare
that such a statement is misguided considering that it has been
established in jurisprudence that a paraffin test is not conclusive
proof that a person has not fired a gun. 16 It should also be noted
that, according to the prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi
held firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of Pionio
Yacapin while Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao purportedly
held bolos. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the latter
two tested negative for powder burns because they were never
accused of having fired any gun. Nevertheless, the evidence on
record has established that all four accused shared a community
of criminal design. By their concerted action, it is evident that
they conspired with one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and
69

should each suffer the same criminal liability attached to the

aforementioned criminal act regardless of who fired the weapon
which delivered the fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim.
In People v. Nelmida, 17 we elaborated on the principle of
criminal conspiracy and its ramifications in this manner:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises
on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith
decide to pursue it. Once established, each and
every one of the conspirators is made criminally
liable for the crime actually committed by any one
of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the
agreement to commit a crime may be deduced
from the mode and manner of the commission of
the offense or inferred from acts that point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest. As such, it does not matter
who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the
actors incurs the same criminal liability, because
the act of one is the act of all. (Citation and
emphasis omitted.)
As to appellants' argument that their act of bravely reporting to
the police station to answer the serious charge of murder against
them instead of fleeing militates against a finding of any criminal
liability on their part especially in light of the dubious evidence
presented by the prosecution, we can only dismiss this as a
hollow line of reasoning considering that human experience as
observed in jurisprudence instructs us that non-flight does not
necessarily connote innocence. Consequently, we have held:
Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not
necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and
even erratically in externalizing and manifesting
their guilt. Some may escape or flee a
circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt while

others may remain in the same vicinity so as to

create a semblance of regularity, thereby
avoiding suspicion from other members of the
community. 18
Contrary to appellants' claim that the aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength was used by the trial court to qualify
the act of killing committed by appellants to murder despite it not
having been alleged in the criminal information filed against
them, the text of the assailed January 31, 2005 Decision of the
trial court clearly shows that, even though abuse of superior
strength was discussed as present in the commission of the
crime, it was not appreciated as either a qualifying or generic
aggravating circumstance. ADScCE
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court
appreciated treachery, which was alleged in the information, as
an aggravating circumstance which qualified the offense to
murder. This is proper considering that, even if abuse of superior
strength was properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve
to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is
jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed
in the latter. 19
Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when
the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. 20Furthermore, we have also held that the essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning,
done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. 21 In the case at bar, the manner by which Pionio
Yacapin was killed carried all the indubitable hallmarks of
treachery. We quote with approval the following discussion of the
Court of Appeals on this matter, to wit:
70

Treachery, which was alleged in the information,

was duly proven by the prosecution. The Court
notes, in particular, the testimony of Nenita
Yacapin who declared that when the victim was
making a fire in the kitchen, she heard shots and
she saw the barrel of the gun inserted on the
bamboo split walling of their house. Exhibit "B",
the anatomical chart certified by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) personnel, shows the
relative location of the gunshot wounds sustained
by the victim. The chart indicates that the victim
was shot from behind. Clearly, the execution of
the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate. 22(Citations
omitted.)
After reviewing the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the trial
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we declare that the
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellants
is correct and should be upheld. Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the
penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
proper penalty is reclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.23
Anent the award of damages, it is jurisprudentially settled that
when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. 24
Thus, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00 25 is proper. Likewise, the award of temperate
damages, in lieu of actual damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00 26 is warranted considering that the death of the
victim definitely caused his heirs some expenses for his wake and
burial though they were not able to present proof.

However, we must modify the amounts of moral and exemplary

damages already awarded in order to conform to existing
jurisprudence. Therefore, the exemplary damages awarded
should
be
increased
from
P20,000.00
to
P30,000.00. 27 Moreover,
there
being
no
aggravating
circumstance present in this case, the award of moral damages in
the amount of P75,000.00 should be decreased to
P50,000.00. 28 Lastly, the interest rate of 6% per annum is
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this
ruling until fully paid. 29
Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals did not rule on the
effect of the death of Eddie Malogsi during the pendency of this
case. Considering that no final judgment had been rendered
against him at the time of his death, whether or not he was guilty
of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even
assuming that he did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex
delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and, by analogy, our
ruling in People v. Bayotas. 30 Therefore, the present criminal
case should be dismissed with respect only to the deceased Eddie
Malogsi.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 16,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00364 is
hereby AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The amount of exemplary damages to be paid by appellants
Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio Malogsi is
increased from Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);
(2) The amount of moral damages to be paid by appellants
Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio Malogsi is
decreased from Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); caIDSH
(3) Appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio
Malogsi are ordered to pay the private offended party interest on
71

all damages at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment; and
(4) Criminal Case No. 93-1272 is DISMISSED with respect to Eddie
Malogsi in view of his death during the pendency of this case.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Dadao, G.R. No. 201860, [January 22, 2014], 725
PHIL 298-317)

[G.R. No. 195196. July 13, 2015.]

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ESTANLY OCTA y BAS, accusedappellant.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J p:
Before us is a Notice of Appeal 1 dated 30 July 2010
from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated 19 July 2010
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03490, affirming the Decision 3 dated
15 May 2008 in Criminal Case No. 04-224073 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 48, Manila, convicting
accused-appellant Estanly Octa y Bas, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. aDSIHc
As culled from the records, the prosecution's version is
herein quoted:
In the morning of September 25, 2003,
around 6:40 A.M., Johnny Corpuz (Johnny) and

Mike Adrian Batuigas (Mike Adrian) were on board

a Honda Civic Car colored silver with Plate No.
UPT 697 travelling on Buenos Aires St., Sampaloc,
Manila when their way was blocked by a
Mitsubishi box type Lancer car colored redorange. The four (4) armed occupants of the
Lancer car alighted. Johnny did not open the door
of the Honda Civic car but one of the armed men
fired his pistol at the left window of the civic car,
thus compelling Johnny to open the locked door
of the car. The armed men went inside the car
and Johnny was ordered to transfer at the back
seat at that time. Inside the car, Johnny was
handcuffed, blindfolded and was even boxed. The
armed men asked for the names and telephone
numbers of his mother-in-law. The armed men
called his mother-in-law giving the information
that Johnny was in their custody and they would
just meet each other at a certain place. They
travelled for a while and then they stopped and
Johnny was brought to a safehouse.
After Johnny and Mike were kidnapped, the
kidnappers communicated with Johnny's wife Ana
Marie Corpuz (Ana Marie) giving the information
that they have in their custody her husband
Johnny and her brother Mike Adrian. Ana Marie
tried to confirm the kidnapping incident by
talking to her husband, who confirmed to his wife
that he and Mike Adrian were indeed kidnapped
and they were in the custody of their abductors.
Ana Marie sought the assistance of the PACER
[Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response] and
stayed in a PACER safehouse located at P. Tuazon,
Cubao, Quezon City. During her stay, she had
several communications with her husband's
kidnappers. The latter started demanding the
amount of P20 million for the release of her
husband and her brother but the amount was
72

considerably reduced up to the time that Ana

Marie was able to raise the amount of
P538,000.00 which was accepted by the
kidnappers.
Finally, on September 30, 2003 at 10 PM,
the kidnappers set up the manner on how the
ransom money would be delivered. Ana Marie
travelled to Quiapo Church, then to Quezon City
circle up to SM Fairview and to Robinsons
Fairview. She was made to stop at Red Lips Beer
House and go to the nearby Caltex Auto Supply
where she would see a man wearing a red cap
and who would ask her "saan yong padala ni
boss". She was instructed to deliver the wrapped
bundled ransom money to the man wearing red
cap. When she saw the man with red cap, she
was asked for the money. At first, she did not give
the money because she wanted to be sure that
she was giving the money to the right man. Using
her own cellphone, she called up the man who
had been instructing her all along and asked him
to confirm if the man in front of her is the right
man
to
give
the
ransom
money
to,
saying "kausapin mo muna ito kung siya ba." The
man in the phone and the man in the red cap
talked for a while in another dialect which Ana
Marie did not understand. When she asked the
man to give back her cellphone to her, he refused
and, instead instructed her to give the money to
him. She described the man wearing red cap to
be goodlooking, lightly built, in his early 20s,
around 5'4" in height and with dimples, which she
later identified in court as accused Estanly Octa.
On October 1, 2003, Johnny was released
by his captors after the payment of ransom
money. He was detained for the duration of six
(6) days. After his release, he removed his

blindfold and handcuffs but he could hardly

regain his sight and see things. He flagged down
a private pick-up and learned that he was in
Camarin, Caloocan City. He asked a favor that he
be driven to Meycauayan, Bulacan where he took
a jeepney to Monumento, and from there, he took
a taxi bound home. When he was released, his
brother-in-law Mike Adrian was also released. 4
The defense recounted a different set of facts, to wit:
. . . [O]n September 25, 2003, he was still
in Daet, Camarines Norte working as a welder in
the welding shop of his uncle Edwin delos Reyes.
He went to Daet on the second week of August
2003 and returned to Manila when he was called
by his father sometime in November 2003. In
addition to his defense of denial and alibi, he
clings to the theory that he himself was a victim
of abduction. He testified that, on December 1,
2003, while crossing the street, his way was
blocked by a van and thereafter, two (2) persons
alighted and a gun was poked at him then he was
boarded inside the van. His hands were tied and
eyes covered. The incident happened at Susano
Road, Camarin, Caloocan City. He was eventually
brought to the PACER Office, Camp Crame,
Quezon City. He claims that he was tortured to
admit the charge filed against him. At the
PACER's office, he was presented to a State
Prosecutor of the DOJ but he claimed he was not
assisted by counsel. He said that he did not
submit himself for medical examination. He
categorically stated that, when he was inquested
by a State Prosecutor, he did not tell of the
alleged torture that he suffered because he was
afraid. 5
On 4 December 2003, accused-appellant was arrested
by the operatives of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
73

Response (PACER) on S[u]sano Road, Camarin, Caloocan City,

in connection with another kidnap for ransom incident. He was
identified by prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz from a
police line-up as the person who had received the ransom
money from her. 6 ETHIDa
Consequently,
on
26
February
2004,
an
Information 7 was filed against accused-appellant charging
him with the crime of kidnapping for ransom as follows:
That on or about 6:40 a.m. of September
25, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating,
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap
and deprive JOHNNY L. CORPUZ and MIKE ADRIAN
BATUIGAS, a minor, of their liberty and against
their will by means of threats and intimation with
the use of firearms, and then bring them through
the use of a motor vehicle to a house, wherein
they were detained for a period of six (6) days,
and that the abduction of the said victims was for
the purpose of extorting Php538,000.00 was
actually delivered to the above-mentioned
accused in exchange for the release of the
victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 8
When arraigned on 5 July 2004, accused-appellant,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on
the merits then ensued. 9
On 15 May 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision, 10 the
dispositive portion of which is herein quoted:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused
Estanly Octa y Bas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the felony charge [sic] and pursuant to
law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer maximum

prison term of reclusion perpetua and to pay the

private aggrieved party of the following:
1. The amount of P538,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages;
2. The amount of P100,000.00 as moral
damages; and
3. The amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and cost.
In view of the conviction of the accused,
the Manila City Jail is ordered to commit his
person to the National Penitentiary immediately
without necessary [sic]delay.
SO ORDERED. 11
In so ruling, the RTC ruled that prosecution witness Ana
Marie Corpuz, wife of victim Johnny Corpuz, steadfastly
testified that she gave the ransom money in the amount of
P538,000 to accused-appellant. She did not waiver in
identifying and describing him as good-looking, wearing red
cap, light in built, in his early 20's, 5'4" and with dimples. The
assertion of Ana Marie Corpuz that accused-appellant was
sporting dimples was squarely corroborated by the court's
observation when he took the witness stand. 12
The trial court also viewed the act of receiving ransom
money as sufficient evidence to establish accused-appellant's
conspiratorial act in the kidnapping for ransom of the victims
in this case. 13
With respect to the defense of denial and alibi, the RTC
found them to be inherently weak as opposed to the
straightforward testimony of Corpuz. The claim of accusedappellant that he was abducted did not convince the court
either, inasmuch as it was not supported by evidence, nor was
it the subject of an investigation.14
Upon intermediate appellate review, the CA rendered a
Decision 15 promulgated on 19 July 2010, to wit: TIADCc
74

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing

premises, the appeal in this case is DENIED and
the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 48, in Manila in Criminal Case No. 04224073 finding Estanly Octa y Bas guilty of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to
pay P538,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost, is
hereby AFFIRMEDin toto.
SO ORDERED. 16
The CA found the positive identification of accusedappellant by prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz to be
unwavering and steadfast. It stressed that his positive
identification, when categorical, consistent, straightforward,
and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, would prevail over mere
alibi and denial. 17 Such positive identification constituted
direct evidence, and not merely circumstantial evidence. 18
Moreover, the CA ruled that accused-appellant had been
rightly found to be a co-conspirator in this case. At the time he
received the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still
continuing, since both victims were still illegally detained by
the kidnappers. Accused-appellant's act of taking the ransom
money was an overt act made in pursuance or furtherance of
the complicity. 19
Hence, the instant appeal. 20
ISSUES
In seeking a reversal of the decisions of the CA and the
RTC, accused-appellant Octa argues that:
1. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite
the prosecutions' failure to positively identify him
as the ransom taker; 21

2. The trial court gravely erred in finding him to be a

conspirator to the crime charged; 22 and
3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him of the
crime
charged
based
on
circumstantial
evidence. 23
THE COURT'S RULING
We deny accused-appellant's appeal.
When the credibility of a witness
is at issue, the findings of fact of the trial
court are accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect, more so if
those findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court.
In his Brief, accused-appellant contends that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he
was the one who received the ransom money. He primarily
argues that prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz could not
have positively ascertained the identity of the ransom taker,
because the area where the transaction took place was dark,
and the man was wearing a cap. Neither did Corpuz declare in
her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the person who received the
ransom money was sporting a dimple, a fact that she
mentioned on direct examination. 24
Accused-appellant further insinuates that the police
might have influenced his out-of-court identification in the lineup when they informed Corpuz that they had apprehended
some people who were suspects in other kidnap for ransom
cases, and that information might have conditioned her mind
that the ransom taker had already been apprehended. 25
We disagree.
In People v. Basao, 26 the Court held that:
[T]the matter of assigning values to declarations
on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge, who
75

had the unmatched opportunity to observe the

witnesses and to assess their credibility by the
various indicia available but not reflected on the
record.
The demeanor of the person on the stand can
draw the line between fact and fancy. The
forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the
quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered
look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the
guilty blanch these can reveal if the witness is
telling the truth or lying through his teeth. 27
xxx xxx xxx
[Thus], when the credibility of a witness is in
issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
said findings are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect. This is more true if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court,
since it is settled that when the trial court's
findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally binding upon
this Court. Without any clear showing that the
trial court and the appellate court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, the rule
should not be disturbed." 28
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found Corpuz to
be a credible witness who had categorically testified that she
saw the face of the ransom taker, and that he was actually the
accused-appellant.
The
fact
that
Corpuz
failed
to
declare
in
her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the ransom taker was sporting
a dimple was not fatal to her testimony because she was able

to positively and categorically identify accused-appellant

during the police line-up and in open court.
Even accused-appellant's insinuation that Corpuz could
have been influenced by the police during the line-up cannot
be given weight in the face of his positive identification as the
ransom taker. On this point, we agree with the observation of
the CA that "assuming arguendo that the accused-appellant's
out of court identification was defective, her subsequent
identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially
attended it. We emphasize that the 'inadmissibility of a police
line-up identification . . . should not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent in-court identification."' 29
To hold an accused guilty as a coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.
Accused-appellant also claims that he cannot be
considered as a conspirator to the kidnapping in the absence
of concrete proof that he actually participated in the execution
of the essential elements of the crime by overt acts
indispensable to its accomplishment. His receipt of the ransom
money transpired only after the kidnapping had been
consummated and was not an essential element of the
crime. 30
We disagree.
On point is our dissertation in People v. Bautista, 31 to
wit:
Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Where all the accused acted in concert at the
time of the commission of the offense, and it is
shown by such acts that they had the same
purpose or common design and were united in its
execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established.
76

It must be shown that all participants performed

specific
acts
with
such
closeness
and
coordination as to indicate a common purpose or
design to commit the felony. AIDSTE
xxx xxx xxx
Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a
co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There
must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Taking these facts in conjunction with
the testimony of Dexter, who testified that
accused-appellant
was
the
one
who
received the ransom money . . . then the
commonality of purpose of the acts of
accused-appellant together with the other
accused can no longer be denied. Such acts
have the common design or purpose to
commit the felony of kidnapping for
ransom.
Thus, accused-appellants' argument that
he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is liable as
a principal for being a co-conspirator in the crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the
RPC,
as
amended
by R.A.
7659 . . . . 32 (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the
time accused-appellant received the ransom money, the crime
of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still
being illegally detained by the kidnappers. 33 While his
receipt of the ransom money was not a material element of
the crime, it was nevertheless part of the grand plan and was
in fact the main reason for kidnapping the victims. 34 Ransom

is money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the

redemption of a captured person or persons; or payment that
releases from captivity. 35 Without ransom money, the
freedom of the detained victims cannot be achieved.
The positive identification of
accused-appellant constitutes direct,
and not merely circumstantial,
evidence.
Accused-appellant's contention that he was convicted
based only on circumstantial evidence deserves scant
consideration. We agree with the conclusion of the CA that
"[Corpuz] testified that she gave the ransom money to
accused-appellant, and as the trial court declared, his act of
receiving the ransom money is sufficient conspiratorial act in
the commission of the kidnapping for ransom. The positive
identification of the accused-appellant then constitutes direct
evidence, and not merely circumstantial evidence." 36
With respect to the penalty imposed, we agree with the
imposition by the RTC and the CA on accused-appellant of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua,considering the prohibition on
the
death
penalty. 37 To
conform
to
recent
jurisprudence, 38 we hereby modify the exemplary damages
awarded by increasing the amount from P50,000 to P100,000.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No.
03490
is AFFIRMED
WITH
MODIFICATION.Accusedappellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay P538,000 as actual
damages, P100,000 as moral damages, and P100,000 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Octa y Bas, G.R. No. 195196 , [July 13, 2015])

[G.R. No. 196735. May 5, 2014.]

77

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS
VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA,
WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL
BELTRAN ALVIR, accused-appellants.

DECISION

LEONEN, J p:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students,
faculty, and research personnel should feel safest. After all, this is
where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in this
world are peacefully nurtured and debated. Universities produce
hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade
misplaced concepts of perverse brotherhood for these hopes.
Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity. This has
resulted in a senseless death whose justice is now the subject
matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are prosecuted. It is
even more extraordinary that there are credible witnesses who
present themselves courageously before an able and experienced
trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this
society for hooliganism disguised as fraternity rumbles. The
perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of
their actions. They must do so for there is an individual who now
lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams of his family.
Excruciating grief for them will never be enough. EScIAa
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to
1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near
the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying

baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries

that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died
from his injuries.
An information 1 for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q9561133, was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris
fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla,
Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L.
Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George
Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict
Guerrero, and Rodolfo Pealosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 219. The information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise, conspiring, confederating with other
persons whose true names, identities and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained,
and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, and with evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superior
strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and
cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA,
by then and there hitting him on the head and
clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries
which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the
attempted murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members Cesar
Mangrobang,
Jr., 2 Cristobal
Gaston,
Jr., 3 and
Leandro
Lachica, 4 and the frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity
members Mervin Natalicio 5 and Arnel Fortes. 6 Only 11 of the
accused stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero,
remained at large.
78

A trial on the merits ensued.

The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, Dennis Venturina, Mervin Natalicio,
Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix Tumaneng, 7 and Cesar Magrobang, Jr.
are all members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On December 8,
1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 p.m., they were having lunch at
Beach House Canteen, located at the back of the Main Library of
the
University
of
the
Philippines,
Diliman,
Quezon
City. 8 Suddenly, Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brods, brods!" 9
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho
Fraternity, he looked around when Venturina shouted, and he saw
about ten (10) men charging toward them. 10 The men were
armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, and their heads were
covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts. 11 Within a few
seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him
with their lead pipes. 12 During the attack, he recognized one of
the attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask
fell off. 13 aICcHA
Lachica tried to parry the blows of his attackers, suffering
scratches and contusions. 14 He was, however, able to run to the
nearby College of Education. 15 Just before reaching it, he looked
back and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla
holding lead pipes and standing where the commotion
was. 16 Both of them did not have their masks on. 17 He was
familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla because he often saw
them in the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) and
Zingapan used to be his friend. 18 The attack lasted about thirty
(30) to forty-five (45) seconds. 19
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma
Rho, he looked to his left when Venturina shouted. 20 He saw
about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing
masks, running toward them. 21 He was stunned, and he started
running. 22 He stumbled over the protruding roots of a
tree. 23 He got up, but the attackers came after him and beat
him up with lead pipes and baseball bats until he fell

down. 24 While he was parrying the blows, he recognized two (2)

of the attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva
since they were not wearing any masks. 25 After about thirty (30)
seconds, they stopped hitting him. 26 He was lying on his back
and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to five
(5) men coming toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero. 27 This
group also beat him up.28 He did not move until another group of
masked men beat him up for about five (5) to eight (8)
seconds. 29 When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the
ground. 30 Several bystanders brought him to the U.P. Infirmary
where he stayed for more than a week for the treatment of his
wounds and fractures. 31
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he
also looked back when Venturina shouted and saw a group of men
with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces of
cloth around their heads. 32 He ran when they attacked, but two
(2) men, whose faces were covered with pieces of cloth, blocked
his way and hit him with lead pipes. 33 While running and
parrying the blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle
Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo because their masks fell
off. 34 He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to the Main
Library. 35 He then decided that he needed to help his fraternity
brothers and turned back toward Beach House. 36 There, he saw
Venturina lying on the ground. 37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating
Venturina up with a lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming
to hit Venturina. 38 When they saw him, they went toward his
direction. 39 They were about to hit him when somebody shouted
that policemen were coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran
away. 40 CcAITa
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Arnel Fortes. Fortes accompanied
him to his car so they could bring Venturina to the U.P.
Infirmary. 41 When they brought the car over, other people,
presumably bystanders, were already loading Venturina into
another vehicle. 42 They followed that vehicle to the U.P.
Infirmary where they saw Natalicio.43 He stayed at the infirmary
until the following morning. 44
79

According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he

immediately stood up when he heard someone shout,
"Brods!" 45 He saw a group of men charging toward them
carrying lead pipes and baseball bats. 46 Most of them had
pieces of cloth covering their faces. 47 He was about to run when
two (2) of the attackers approached him. 48 One struck him with
a heavy pipe while the other stabbed him with a bladed
instrument. 49 He was able to parry most of the blows from the
lead pipe, but he sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his
left forearm. 50 He was able to run away. 51 When he sensed
that no one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach House
Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and
George Morano. 52 He decided to go back to the canteen to help
his fraternity brothers. 53 When he arrived, he did not see any of
his fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who attacked
them. 54 He ended up going to their hang-out instead to meet
with his other fraternity brothers. 55 They then proceeded to the
College of Law where the rest of the fraternity was already
discussing the incident. 56
According to Arnel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran
when he saw the group of attackers coming toward
them. 57 When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting
Venturina. 58 He was also able to see Warren Zingapan and
George Morano at the scene. 59
Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of
Education, boarded a jeepney to the College of Law to wait for
their other fraternity brothers. 60 One of his fraternity brothers,
Peter Corvera, told him that he received information that
members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing of the Main
Library and were regrouping in SM North. 61 Lachica and his
group then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and
identify their attackers. 62
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown
at them. 63 Lachica saw Robert Michael Beltran Alvir and Warren
Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan. 64 They had no choice but
to get away from the mall and proceed instead to U.P. where the
Sigma Rho Fraternity members held a meeting. 65

On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho

advised the victims to lodge their complaints with the National
Bureau of Investigation. 66 Their counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told
the U.P. Police that the victims would be giving their statements
before the National Bureau of Investigation, promising to give the
U.P. Police copies of their statements. In the meantime, Venturina
was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital on
December 8, 1994. He died on December 10, 1994. 67 IEAaST
On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was conducted on the
cadaver of Dennis Venturina. 68 Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medicolegal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, found that
Venturina had "several contusions located at the back of the
upper left arm and hematoma on the back of both
hands," 69 "two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the
head, 70 generalized hematoma on the skull," 71 "several
fractures
on
the
head," 72 and
"inter-cranial
hemorrhage." 73 The injuries, according to Dr. Victoria, could
have been caused by a hard blunt object. 74 Dr. Victoria
concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head injuries. 75
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes,
and Gaston executed their respective affidavits 76 before the
National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-legal
examinations 77 with their medico-legal officer, Dr. Aurelio
Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found that Mervin Natalicio
had "lacerated wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear,
and on the fingers; contused abrasions on both knees; contusion
on the left leg and thigh," 78 all of which could have been caused
by any hard, blunt object. These injuries required medical
attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from
the date of infliction. 79
Dr. Villena found on Arnel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head
and on the right leg which could have been caused by a blunt
instrument." 80 These injuries required hospitalization for a
period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from date of
infliction. 81 He also found on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a "healed
abrasion on the left forearm which could possibly be caused by
contact with [a] rough hard surface and would require one (1) to
80

nine (9) days of medical attention." 82 He found on Leandro

Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and
lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side." 83 On
Christopher Gaston, Jr. he found "lacerated wounds on the
anterior chest, left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both
hands; contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and
lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side." 84
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its
evidence-in-chief, the court granted the demurrer to evidence
filed by Rodolfo Pealosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not
identified by the prosecution's witnesses and that he was not
mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the
prosecution. 85
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced
their own statement of the facts, as follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera, 86 a member of the U.P. Police, he
was on foot patrol with another member of the U.P. Police, Oscar
Salvador, at the time of the incident. They were near the College
of Arts and Sciences (Palma Hall) when he vaguely heard
somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went to the place where the
alleged rumble was happening and saw injured men being helped
by bystanders. They helped an injured person board the service
vehicle of the Beach House Canteen. They asked what his name
was, and he replied that he was Mervin Natalicio. When he asked
Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to reply but instead
told him that his attackers were wearing masks. Oscar
Salvador 87 corroborated his testimony. DAaIEc
Benjamin Lato, 88 a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen,
likewise testified that the identities of the attackers were
unrecognizable because of their masks. He, however, admitted
that he did not see the attack; he just saw a man sprawled on the
ground at the time of the incident.
Frisco Capilo, 89 a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main
Library, was buying a cigarette at a vendor located nearby. From
there, he allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that ten

(10) men, wearing either masks of red and black bonnets or with
shirts covering their faces, came from a red car parked nearby. He
also saw three (3) men being hit with lead pipes by the masked
men. Two (2) of the men fell after being hit. One of the victims
was lifting the other to help him, but the attackers overtook him.
Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then saw students helping
those who were injured. He likewise helped in carrying one of the
injured victims, which he later found out to be Arnel Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda
Panganiban, 90 testified that she and her friends were in line to
order lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a commotion
happened. She saw around fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) masked
men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any mask
fall off. Her sorority sister and another U.P. student, Luz
Perez, 91 corroborated her story that the masked men were
unrecognizable because of their masks. Perez, however, admitted
that a member of Scintilla Juris approached her to make a
statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon, 92 testified on
substantially the same matters as Panganiban and Perez. She also
stated that she saw a person lying on the ground who was being
beaten up by about three (3) to five (5) masked men. She also
stated that some of the men were wearing black masks while
some were wearing white t-shirts as masks. She did not see any
mask fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano, 93 accused-appellant Danilo
Feliciano, Jr.'s mother, her son was in Pampanga to visit his sick
grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son
went to Pampanga before lunch that day and visited the school
where she teaches to get their house key from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, 94 he had not been
feeling well since December 5, 1994. He said that he could not
have possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was
absent even from work. He also testified that he wore glasses
and, thus, could not have possibly been the person identified by
81

Leandro Lachica. He also stated that he was not enrolled in U.P. at

the time since he was working to support himself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla, 95 he and another classmate,
Michael Vibas, were working on a school project on December 8,
1994. He also claimed that he could not have participated in the
rumble as he had an injury affecting his balance. The injury was
caused by an incident in August 1994 when he was struck in the
head by an unknown assailant. His testimony was corroborated
by Jose Victor Santos 96 who stated that after lunch that day,
Medalla played darts with him and, afterwards, they went to
Jollibee.
Christopher Soliva, 97 on the other hand, testified that he was
eating lunch with his girlfriend and another friend in Jollibee,
Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They went back to U.P. before 1:00
p.m. and went straight to their fraternity hang-out where he was
told that there had been a rumble at the Main Library. He also met
several Sigma Rhoans acting suspiciously as they passed by the
hang-out. They were also told by their head, Carlo Taparan, not to
react to the Sigma Rhoans and just go home. Anna
Cabahug, 98 his girlfriend, corroborated his story.
Warren Zingapan 99 also testified that he was not in U.P. at the
time of the incident. He claimed to have gone to SM North to buy
a gift for a friend's wedding but ran into a fraternity brother. He
also alleged that some Sigma Rhoans attacked them in SM North
that day.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its
decision 100 with the finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren
Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other
penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 101 The trial court,
however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo,
Gilbert
Magpantay,
George
Morano,
and
Raymund
Narag. 102 The case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered
archived by the court until his apprehension. 103

The trial court, in evaluating the voluminous evidence at hand,

concluded that:
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court
is of the considered view that of the ten accused,
some were sufficiently identified and some were
not. The Court believes that out of the amorphous
images during the pandemonium, the beleaguered
victims were able to espy and identify some of the
attackers etching an indelible impression in their
memory.
In
this
regard,
the
prosecution
eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw the
attackers rush towards them wielding deadly
weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of
wood and bladed ones, and pounce on their
hapless victims, run after them, and being present
with one another at the scene of the crime during
the assault. Although each victim had a very strong
motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently
behind bars, not one of them testified against all of
them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were
all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting
Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could
have easily tagged each and every single accused
as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric
assault to make sure that no one else would
escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness
named only one or two and some were candid
enough to say that they did not see who delivered
the blows against them. 104 cAEDTa
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua,
the case was brought to this court on automatic appeal. However,
due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal, 105 the case was
remanded to the Court of Appeals. 106 In the Court of Appeals,
the case had to be re-raffled several times 107 before it was
eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for
the writing of the decision.
82

On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First

Division of Five, affirmed 108 the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, with three (3) members concurring109 and one (1)
dissenting. 110
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this
court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants attacked
private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court
by both parties, the issue may be further refined, thus:
1. Whether
accused-appellants'
constitutional
rights were violated when the information
against them contained the aggravating
circumstance of the use of masks despite
the prosecution presenting witnesses to
prove that the masks fell off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court
of Appeals correctly ruled, on the basis of
the evidence, that accused-appellants were
sufficiently identified. SECcAI
I
An
information
is
when
the
accused
is
apprised
of
the
charge
him
to
enable
him
to
his defense

sufficient
fully
against
prepare

It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against

them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that
the prosecution should not have included the phrase "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since
they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the
accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.

It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held

to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law." 111 This includes the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty and "to be informed of the nature and
accusation against him." 112
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the
prosecutor against the accused, in compliance with the due
process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date
of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-eo, 113 this court has stated that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it
enables a person of common understanding to
know the charge against him, and the court to
render judgment properly. . . . The purpose is to
allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense,
precluding surprises during the trial. 114
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the
phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance
being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state
an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not
be appreciated as such. 115 It was, therefore, incumbent on the
prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order
for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by
the trial court.
83

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance

because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain
anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that
tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks fell
off does not prevent them from including disguise as an
aggravating circumstance. 116 What is important in alleging
disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was
a concealment of identityby the accused. The inclusion of
disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently
apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they
were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the
accused were not wearing masks is also not violative of their right
to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused.
Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is the act of
all." 117 This would mean all the accused had been one in their
plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on
to prove that some of them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of
murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder. All that is
needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of
the crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details
as to the time, place, and persons involved in the
offense. EaHATD
II
Findings
of
the
when
affirmed
appellate
court,
to great weight and credence

trial
by
are

court,
the
entitled

As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when

affirmed by the appellate court, are given great weight and
credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People
v. Daniel Quijada, 118 as follows:

Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the

trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect.
For, the trial court has the advantage of observing
the witnesses through the different indicators of
truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush
of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready
reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious
shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn,
the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage
and mien. 119
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People
v. Leticia Labarias, 120 this court stated that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual
findings of the trial court on the reasonable
assumption that it is in a better position to assess
the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies
of the witnesses, who reveal much of themselves
by their deportment on the stand. The exception
that makes the rule is where such findings
are clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when
they are tainted with bias or hostility or
are so lacking in basis as to suggest that
they were reached without the careful study
and perceptiveness that should characterize
a judicial decision. 121 (Emphasis supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance
since the presumption is always in favor of innocence. It is only
upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that a conviction is
sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution
and forty-two (42) witnesses for the defense were put on the
84

stand from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three (83)-page decision,

the trial court acquitted six (6) and convicted five (5) of the
accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it cannot be said
that the trial court acted arbitrarily or that its decision was "so
lacking in basis" that it was arrived at without a judicious and
exhaustive study of all the evidence presented. TSEcAD
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great
persuasive value, there is also nothing that precludes this court
from coming to its own conclusions based on an independent
review of the facts and the evidence on record.
The
accused
identified
by
the prosecution

were
the

sufficiently
witnesses
for

The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible. In
its decision, the trial court stated that:
. . . . Although each victim had a very strong
motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently
behind bars, not one testified against all of them. If
the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all
Sigma Rhoans,
were
simply
bent
on
convicting Scintilla Juris members for that
matter, they could have easily tagged each
and every accused as a participant in the
atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure
no one would escape conviction. Instead,
each eyewitness named only one or two and
some were candid enough to say that they
did not see who delivered the blows against
them.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan,
Dennis Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified to have
seen it all but they could not, and did not, disclose
any name. Lachica, on the other hand, said that he
did not have the opportunity to see and identify
the person who hit him in the back and inflicted a

two-inch cut. His forearm was also hit by a lead

pipe but he did not see who did it. Natalicio, one of
the other three who were hospitalized, was
severely beaten by three waves of attackers
totalling more than 15 but he could only name 3 of
them. He added, however, that he would be able to
recognize those he saw if he would see them
again. Of them, Mangrobang pointed to at least 5
but he stressed that he did not see Zingapan,
Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario, Daraoay, Denoista,
and Penalosa during the onslaught. Gaston could
have named any of the accused as the one who
repeatedly hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed
him but he frankly said their faces were covered.
Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly beaten by
several groups but did not name any of the
accused as one of those who attacked him. The
persons he identified were those leading the pack
with one of them as the assailant of Venturina, and
the two others who he saw standing while he was
running away. He added that he saw some of the
accused during the attack but did not know then
their names. 122 (Emphasis supplied) ETDHaC
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the
incident," 123 there would be slight inconsistencies in their
statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas,124 it was previously
observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses
testifying on the occurrence of a crime to
give varying details as there may be some
details which one witness may notice while
the other may not observe or remember. In
fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect
dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it
could
mean
that
their
testimonies
were
85

prefabricated
supplied)

and

rehearsed. 125 (Emphasis

According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify Alvir,

Zingapan, and Medalla; 126 Natalicio was able to identify
Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva; 127 and Fortes was able to
identify Feliciano, Medalla, and Zingapan. 128 Their positive
identification was due to the fact that they either wore no masks
or that their masks fell off.
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an
eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find ways to identify the
assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the criminal
could be apprehended. It has also been previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of
criminal violence to strive to see the looks and
faces of their assailants and observe the manner in
which the crime was committed. Most often the
face of the assailant and body movements thereof,
creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily
erased from their memory. 129 STcDIE
In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked
assailants could have lost their masks. It had been testified by the
victims that some of the assailants were wearing masks of either
a
piece
of
cloth
or
a
handkerchief
and
that
Alvir, 130 Zingapan, 131 Soliva, 132 and
Feliciano 133 had
masks on at first but their masks fell off and hung around their
necks. Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco
Capilo during cross-examination who observed that some of the
attackers were wearing masks and some were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris
Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there
were a lot of people eating in the Beach

House Canteen, and then running towards

different directions, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some
were not?
A Yes, sir. 134
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have
had the presence of mind to take a look at their assailants if they
were identifiable. Their positive identification, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, must be upheld to be credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's
testimony credence while Gaston's testimony was found to be
"hazy." This argument is unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that
the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris members identified by
Mangrobang "should not be misinterpreted to mean that the
testimony of Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication." 135 The
court went on to state that they "were exonerated merely
because they were accorded the benefit of the doubt as their
identification by Mangrobang, under tumultuous and chaotic
circumstances were [sic] not corroborated and their alibis, not
refuted."136 There was, therefore, no basis to say that
Mangrobang was not credible; it was only that the evidence
presented was not strong enough to overcome the presumption of
innocence. cDCSET
Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered
"hazy" 137 by the trial court only with regard to his identification
of Zingapan's companion. Gaston testified that he saw Zingapan
with Morano, with Zingapan moving and Morano staying in place.
Fortes, however, testified that both Zingapan and Morano were
running after him. Lachica also testified that it was Medalla, not
Morano, who was with Zingapan. Because of this confusion, the
trial court found that there was doubt as to who was really beside
Zingapan. The uncertainty resulted into an acquittal for Morano.
86

Despite this, the court still did not impute doubt in their
testimonies that Zingapan was present at the scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further
prove that its decision was brought about only upon a thorough
examination of the evidence presented. It accepted that there
were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victims but that
these were minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled that
"[s]uch inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual
'for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.'" 138
Evidence
as
gestae may
have
little
this case

part

be

of
admissible
persuasive
value

the res
but
in

According
to
the
testimony
of
U.P.
Police
Officer
Salvador, 139 when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the
bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the
attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be
evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception, . . . ." 140 All other kinds of testimony are
hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of
Court,however, provide several exceptions to the general rule,
and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. Statements
made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res
gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae. 141

In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, 142 this court has previously

discussed the admissibility of testimony taken as part of res
gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of
the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b)
the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. ASIDTa
xxx xxx xxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those
circumstances which are the undesigned incidents
of a particular litigated act and which are
admissible when illustrative of such act." In a
general
way, res
gestae refers
to
the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow
out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character
and
are
so
spontaneous
and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule
on res gestaeencompasses the exclamations and
statements
made
by
either
the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after
the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were
made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The
test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration,
or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it
87

characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the

transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony. 143 cSATDC
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully
eating lunch on a school campus is a startling occurrence.
Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made
immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact,
admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido, 144 however, this court has stated that "in
accord to ordinary human experience:"
. . . persons who witness an event perceive the
same
from
their
respective
points
of
reference. Therefore, almost always, they have
different accounts of how it happened.
Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of
witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects
because
different
persons
have
different
impressions and recollections of the same incident.
. . . 145 (Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible,
have little persuasive value since the bystanders could have seen
the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different
points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the
time of the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks on
at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were
unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of
the victims who witnessed the entirety of the incident from
beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of
the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight
than that of the victims.
The
the

belated
victims
do

identification
not
detract

by
from

their
positive
the appellants

identification

of

It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the
incident to the U.P. Police or the Quezon City Police but instead
executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation four
(4) days after the incident gives doubt as to the credibility of their
testimonies. CaEATI
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera 146 testified that on their way
to the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed the victims who all told him
they could not recognize the attackers because they were all
wearing masks. Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang 147 testified to the effect
that when she asked Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio
answered that he did not know because they were masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case
belong to rival fraternities. While this court does not condone
their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded
that there are certain practices that are unique to fraternal
organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the
identities of their attackers but chose not to disclose it without
first conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This probability
is bolstered by the actions of Sigma Rho after the incident, which
showed that they confronted the members of Scintilla Juris in SM
North. Because of the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it
would not have been prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate against
the wrong fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P.
Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make the police officer or the
doctor's testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It
should not be forgotten that the victims actually witnessed the
entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera, and Dr.
Mislang were merely relaying second-hand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation
four (4) days after the incident also does not affect their
credibility since most of them had been hospitalized from their
88

injuries and needed to recover first. Since a fraternity moves as

one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait
until all of them were well enough to go to the National Bureau of
Investigation headquarters in order to give their statements.

more frequent, which might possibly have desensitized the U.P.

Police in such a way that would prevent their objectivity in the
conduct of their investigations. The victims' reliance on the
National Bureau of Investigation, therefore, is understandable.

Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the

advice of their senior "brods" and their legal counsel that they
executed their sworn statements before the National Bureau of
Investigation four (4) days after the incident.

III

The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of

Investigation instead of to the U.P. Police was the call of their legal
counsel who might have deemed the National Bureau of
Investigation more equipped to handle the investigation. This
does not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since
they were merely following the legal advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of
Investigation is better equipped than the U.P. Police to handle the
investigation of the case. As stated in the U.P. College of
Economics website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with
maintaining campus security. Their station is
located
in
front
of
the
College
of
Architecture. HaECDI
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain
peace and order, secure and protect lives and
property, enforce basic laws, applicable Quezon
City Ordinances, and University Rules and
Regulations including policies and standards; and
to perform such other functions relative to the
general safety and security of the students,
employees, and residents in the U.P. Diliman
Campus. . . . . 148 (Emphasis supplied)
It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily for
campus security. They are by no means an actual police force that
is equipped to handle a full-blown murder investigation.
Fraternity-related violence in U.P. has also increasingly become

Alibi
positive
victim

cannot
prevail
identification

over
of

the
the

It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the

positive identification of the victim. 149 In People v. Benjamin
Peteluna, 150 this court stated that:
It is a time-honored principle that the positive
identification of the appellant by a witness destroys
the defense of alibi and denial. Thus:
. . . . It is well-entrenched that alibi and
denial are inherently weak and have always
been viewed with disfavor by the courts due
to the facility with which they can be
concocted. They warrant the least credibility
or none at all and cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the appellant by the
prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it
is not enough to prove that appellant was
somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he must also demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. Unless substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of
any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an
exonerating justification[,] is inherently weak
and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant
impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes selfserving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than
89

the declaration of credible witnesses who

testify on affirmative matters. 151 TcDAHS
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their
attackers while the accused-appellants merely offered alibis and
denials as their defense. The credibility of the victims was upheld
by both the trial court and the appellate court while giving little
credence to the accused-appellants' alibis. There is, thus, no
reason to disturb their findings.
Accused-appellants
correctly
murder,
and
treachery
in
of the crime

charged
there
the

were
with
was
commission

According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal

Code, the accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder.
Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling
within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or
of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity; cEAaIS
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed
with lead pipes and baseball bats attacked Dennis Venturina and
his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the
offense committed against Dennis Venturina was committed by a
group that took advantage of its superior strength and with the

aid of armed men. The appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled

out the presence of treachery in the commission of the offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. 152
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz, 153 this court stated
that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The
essence of treachery is that the attack comes
without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to
be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the
persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted. 154 (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accusedappellants, ruled that contrary to the findings of the trial court,
there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that
although the attack was sudden and unexpected, "[i]t was done
in broad daylight with a lot of people who could see
them" 155 and that "there was a possibility for the victims to
90

have fought back or that the people in the canteen could have
helped the victims." 156
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were
eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they
would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden
attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead
pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows
was with their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back
against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a
minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders
being able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no
opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend
themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this
case. DAEcIS
The
presence
makes
all
of
appellants
liable
and attempted murder

of
the
for

conspiracy
accusedmurder

In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants

were found guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina and the
attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.
Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The
appellate court, however, modified their liabilities and found that
the accused-appellants were guilty of attempted murder only
against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang,
Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and
Mangrobang "were no longer chased by the attackers," 157 it
concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from
pursuing them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows that
they did not have the intent to do more than to make them suffer
pain by slightly injuring them." 158 It also pointed out that the

wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been done

with an intent to kill." 159 Thus, it concluded that the accusedappellants would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was
conspiracy among the accused-appellants 160 and the appellate
court sustained this finding. 161Conspiracy, once proven, has the
effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of
their degree of participation, thus:
Once an express or implied conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and
character
of
their
respective
active
participation in the commission of the crime
or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law
the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing
rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when
two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of
one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively,
each individual whose evil will actively contributes
to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the
whole, the same as though performed by himself
alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable
for acts other than his own, "when two or more
persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each
is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The
imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case where
this Court held that HcaATE
. . . it is impossible to graduate the
separate
liability
of
each
(conspirator) without taking into
consideration
the
close
and
91

inseparable relation of each of them

with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted
by common agreement . . . The
crime must therefore in view of the
solidarity of the act and intent which
existed between the . . . accused, be
regarded as the act of the band or
party created by them, and they are
all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the
malefactors conspired and confederated in
the commission of the felony proved,
collective liability of the accused conspirators
attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the
court
shall
not
speculate
nor
even
investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators
present
at
the
scene
of
the
crime. . . . . 162 (Emphasis supplied)
The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose from a
single incident wherein the accused-appellants were armed with
baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest
amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run
away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands
of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the
moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the
accused-appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was
proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the
seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine
the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only
as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and
whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accusedappellants guilty only of slight physical injuries. It would be
illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of

the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio,

and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and
Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the
accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable
for that intent to kill.
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the
murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin
Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes,
and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also
the effect on the five other lives whose once bright futures are
now put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado.
There is now more honor for them to accept their responsibility
and serve the consequences of their actions. There is, however,
nothing that they can do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully
compensate for his senseless and painful loss. EDSAac
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court;
neither will it be the last. Perhaps this case and many cases like it
can empower those who have a better view of masculinity: one
which valorizes courage, sacrifice and honor in more life-saving
pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of
the Philippines. It colors the stories of many who choose to
expend their energy in order that our people will have better
lives. Fraternity rumbles are an anathema, an immature and
useless expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a culture that
retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at dangal."
This kind of shameful violence must stop.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 01158 dated November 26, 2010 is AFFIRMED insofar as the
accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla,
Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
92

Murder
in
Criminal
Case
No.
Q95-61133
with
the MODIFICATION that
they
be
found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q9561136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, [May 5, 2014])

[G.R. No. 189833. February 5, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. JAVIER MORILLA Y
AVELLANO, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J p:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier
Morilla y Avellano (Morilla) from the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed his conviction and that of his co-accused
Ronnie Mitra y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing
them 2 to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P10,000,000.00 each.
The Regional Trial Court Judgment
On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang)
and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan (Dequilla) were charged in a criminal
information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay
Kiloloran, Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, one of
them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of
Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an
organized/syndicate crime group as they all help
one another, for purposes of gain in the transport
of illegal drugs, and in fact, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually aiding and
abetting one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously transport by means of
two (2) motor vehicles, namely a Starex van
bearing
plate
number
RWT-888
with
commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a
municipal ambulance of Panukulan, Quezon
Province, methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug which is commonly known
as shabu, and with an approximate weight of five
hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos,
without authority whatsoever. 3
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City 4 on 1 August
2007 convicted Morilla and his co-accused Mayor Mitra, then
incumbent
Mayor
of
Panukulan,
Quezon,
of
illegal
transport 5 of methamphetamine
hydrochloride,
commonly
known as shabu, with an approximate weight of five hundred
three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos. However, it absolved
Dequilla and Yang due to the prosecution's failure to present
sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense charged. The
dispositive of the decision reads: IaDTES
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered finding accused Ronnie Mitra y
Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie Yang y
Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
93

their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are

ordered immediately released from custody unless
held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered
retained by the Court as representative sample
which is still in the custody of the PNP Crime
Laboratory is ordered turned over to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition. 6
The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers
on the vehicles driven by Mayor Mitra and Morilla, one with
control number 888 and the other an ambulance with plate
number SFK-372, as the police officers have already acquired
prior knowledge that the said vehicles were suspected to be used
for transportation of dangerous drugs. During the checkpoint in
Real, Quezon, the information turned out to be accurate and
indeed, the two accused had in their motor vehicles more than
five hundred kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride. 7
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he
was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that
he was merely requested to transport them to Manila on board his
Starex van. He explained that he only accommodated the request
of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat. It
likewise dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack
of knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that
he thought that he was just transporting wooden tiles and
electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other
passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother
to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an
accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor
Mitra as they were caught in flagrante delicto of transporting
dangerous drugs in two vehicles driven by each of them. Absent
any convincing circumstance to corroborate their explanations,
the validity of their apprehension was sustained. 8

The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was

based on the testimonies of the four accused themselves. It was
found by the trial court that the two vehicles, the Starex van
driven by Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van driven by Morilla,
left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which was
ahead of the ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up
by the police officers. However, the ambulance driven by Morilla
was stopped by police officers. Through the untinted window, one
of the police officers noticed several sacks inside the van. Upon
inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks contained
narra wooden tiles. Unconvinced, the police officers requested
Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further inspection.
When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline
granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request
Morilla to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police
officers that he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade
them to let him pass. 9 His request was rejected by the police
officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks turned out
to
be
sacks
of methamphetamine
hydrochloride. 10 This
discovery prompted the operatives to chase the Starex van of
Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to overtake the van and
Mayor Mitra was asked to stop. They then inquired if the mayor
knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives noticed that his van
was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance.
Thus, Mayor Mitra was also requested to open the door of the
vehicle for inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to
settle the matter but the same was rejected. Upon examination,
the contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks
of methamphetamine hydrochloride. 11
The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were
acquitted by the trial court for failure on the part of the
prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
court ruled that Dequilla's and Yang's mere presence inside the
vehicle as passengers was inadequate to prove that they were
also conspirators of Mayor Mitra and Morilla. 12
The Court of Appeals Decision
94

On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the

trial court. It upheld the finding of conspiracy between Mayor
Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to transport several
sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their
respective vehicles. The singularity of their intent to illegally
transportmethamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown
when Morilla agreed to drive the ambulance van from Infanta,
Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra, who drove the lead
vehicle, the Starex van. 13

to Morilla's failure to assert it as a ground in a motion to quash

before entering his plea. 18

The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of

knowledge of the illegal contents of the sacks. The claim that the
sacks were loaded with wooden tiles was implausible due to the
obvious disparity of texture and volume. 14

The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.

Court's Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed. HSDaTC
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he
may be convicted for conspiracy to commit the offense charged
sans allegation of conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether
the prosecution was able to prove his culpability as alleged in the
Information. 15
We dismiss his arguments.
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1 (b), Rule 115 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure 16 to substantiate his argument
that he should have been informed first of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information
itself failed to state the word conspiracy but instead, the
statement "the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent
mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all
belong to an organized/syndicated crime group as they all help
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously transport . . . ." He argued that conspiracy was only
inferred from the words used in the Information. 17
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in
the information, at this point, is deemed to have been waived due

Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and

presented his defenses to contradict the allegation of conspiracy
before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to
assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. 19

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. 20 To determine conspiracy, there must be a common
design to commit a felony. 21
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the
date he was apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was
part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of
dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came
together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a
common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts
of some complete whole. 22 In this case, the totality of the
factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired
with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous
drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous
drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was
able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police
operatives. When it was Morilla's turn to pass through the
checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a
routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor,
the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed
he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not
have told the police officers that he was with the mayor. ADSIaT
95

His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents

of the sacks and he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate
superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears no
merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in
the act of transporting the dangerous drugs on board their
vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs
Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another." 23 It
was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the
ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a
Starex
van
going
to
Manila.
The
very
act
of
transporting methamphetamine
hydrochloride is malum
prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law.
The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous
drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent,
motive or knowledge. 24
In a similar case of People v. Libnao, 25 this Court upheld the
conviction for illegal transportation of marijuana of Libnao and
Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag full of marijuana leaves
when they were flagged down on board a passing tricycle at a
checkpoint.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, 26 the
penalty
for
illegal
transportation
of methamphetamine
hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from six years and one
day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1683, 27 the penalty was amended to life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos. The
penalty was further amended in Republic Act No. 7659, 28 where
the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos.

From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of

P10,000,00.00 to be paid by each of the accused but amend the
penalty to reclusion perpetua following the provisions of Republic
Act No. 7659 and the principle of retroactive application of lighter
penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least
thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for
pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely:
perpetual special disqualification, etc. Life imprisonment, on the
other hand, does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration and carries no accessory penalties. 29
The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People, 30 thus: EHCaDS
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and
as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the
same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It
should be recalled that at the time of the
commission of the crime on September 6, 1991,
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1683. The decree
provided that for violation of said Section 15, the
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be
imposed.
Subsequently,
however, R.A.
No.
7659 further introduced new amendments to
Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new
amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15
was changed from "life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00" to
"reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10 million." On the other
hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section
20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425in that the new
penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be
applied depending on the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner
the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No.
96

7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating

that R.A. No. 7659could be given retroactive
application, it being more favorable to the
petitioner in view of its having a less stricter
punishment.

[G.R. No. 187536. August 10, 2011.]

We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held:

"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028,
29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the
amendatory law, being more lenient and
favorable to the accused than the original
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
should
be
accorded
retroactive
application, . . . ."
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty
than life imprisonment, and considering the rule
that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the
accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect," the
penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner
is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the
penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion
perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by
the trial court upon petitioner, the same being
more favorable to him. 31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and
the assailed 13 July 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with
respect to the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion
Perpetua instead of Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of
P10,000,000.00 by each of the accused. ETCcSa
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No. 189833 (Resolution),
[February 5, 2014], 726 PHIL 244-255)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. MICHAEL BOKINGO alias

"MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE
COL, accused-appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:
For review is the Amended Decision 1 dated 14
November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00658, finding appellants Michael Bokingco 2(Bokingco) and
Reynante Col (Col) guilty as conspirators beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. DIEcHa
On 31 July 2000, an Information 3 was filed against
appellants charging them of the crime of murder committed as
follows:
That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in
the City of Angeles, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, armed
with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by
means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse
of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
97

and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his

head and other parts of his body with said
hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION
fatal wounds on his head and body which caused
his death. 4
On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while
Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed
to the crime charged. 5
The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were
residing in a house along Mac Arthur Highway in Balibago,
Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop, which formed part of
his house. He also maintained two (2) rows of apartment units
at the back of his house. The first row had six (6) units, one of
which is Apartment No. 5 and was being leased to Dante
Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasion's brother-in-law, while the other row
was still under construction at the time of his death.
Appellants, who were staying in Apartment No. 3, were among
the 13 construction workers employed by Pasion. 6
The prosecution's evidence show that at around 1:00
a.m. on 29 February 2000, Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes
inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door,
passed by him and went out of the back door. 7 A few minutes
later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed
to said unit to check. He peeped through a screen door and
saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing
Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and
attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued
and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingco's neck
and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase
Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio
proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion
was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio
went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion's body lying flat
on the kitchen floor. Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the
hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later while Vitalicio was
treated for his injuries. 8

Elsa testified that she was in the master's bedroom on

the second floor of the house when she heard banging sounds
and her husband's moans. She immediately got off the bed
and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her
way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house but Col
suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes and
poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa was wounded when
she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas. 9 Col then
instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa
informed him that she does not know the combination lock.
Elsa tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards the
back door by holding her neck and pulling her backward.
Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the
screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay na
siya." 10 Col immediately let her go and ran away with
Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she
saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own
blood. 11
PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police
Station No. 4 in Barangay Salakot, Balibago, Angeles City. At
1:20 a.m. of 29 February 2000, he received a phone call
regarding the incident. He, together with a certain P/Insp.
Maniago, proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an
investigation. He noticed a pool of blood on the cemented
floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw hammer with a green
lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the
kitchen sink. A lead pipe measuring 40 inches and a chisel
were also found in the nearby construction site. The police
went to Angeles University Medical Center afterwards. PO3
Dayrit saw Pasion lying in one of the beds while Vitalicio was
still loitering around the emergency room. He approached
Vitalicio and Elsa who both informed him of the
incident. 12 He prepared a police report on the same day
narrating the result of his investigation. 13
Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor
Lucina Dayaon, jotted down notes during the preliminary
investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he
98

conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the
killing several days before because they got "fed up" with
Pasion. 14
The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr.
Esguerra), contained the following findings: DaACIH
1. Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds
2. Body in rigor mortis
3. Contusion with hematoma, right medial
infraorbital region extending to the right of
the root of the nose.
4. Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular
region.
5. Contusion with hematoma, right angle of
mandible.
6. Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular
region.
7. Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.

13. 2 stab wounds, non-penetrating, anterior chest,

13 cm to the left of the anterior median line,
3 cm below injury (12) 14 cm the right of the
anterior median line 4 1/2 on below injury
(12). Wound 0.8 cm in length, both
extremities round.
14. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar shape, 3 cm
length, left shoulder.
15. Lacerated wound, right eyebrow area, Cshaped 2 1/2 cm length.
16. Lacerated wound, lateral angle, right eye, 0.8
cm length.
17. Lacerated wound, right supraorbital region,
medial aspect, 2 cm length.
18. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar, 5 cm length,
occipital region 5 cm length involving all
layers of the scalp with brain tissue seen on
the gaping wound.

8. Contusion with hematoma, right fronto-parietal

region.

19. Lacerated wound, 4 cm length, C-shaped 2 1/2

cm to the right of injury (18) 1 1/2 cm below,
wound involving the whole scalp.

9. Contusion with hematoma, right supraorbital

region.

20. Lacerated wound, left post-auricular region, Cshaped 4 cm length, 3 cm length.

10. Abrasions, linear, confluent, proximal third,

right leg anterior 2 1/2 x 6 1/2 cm.

21. Lacerated wound left post-auricular region,

region of the squamous part of the left
temporal bone, C-shaped (2) 3.5 cm and 4
cm lengths.

11. Contusion with hematoma, left shoulder, level

of head of left humerus.
12. Stab wound, anterior chest along the anterior
median line, 7 cm above the nipple line, 0.8
cm length, 0.5 cm wide and 1 cm deep,
hitting and puncturing the manubrium
sterni, not entering the thoracic cavity. Both
extremities round.

22. Lacerated wound, right mandibular region 4 cm

length, 1 cm wide.
23. Lacerated wound, stellate, 5.5 x 5 x 5 cm, right
fronto-parietal region with brain tissue out of
the gaping wound.
99

24. Lacerated wound, right submandibular region

0.3 x 3.5 cm.
25. Lacerated wound, right cheek 0.8 cm length.
26. Depressed, complete fracture, occipital bone
right with stellate linear extensions, with
gaping, with brain tissue maseration.
27. Skull fracture, right fronto-parietal region,
depressed, complete, C-shaped with linear
extensions, with gaping of bone with brain
tissue maceration and expulsion.
28. Hemorrhage, massive, subdural and epidural.
29. Brain tissue damage. 15
Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on
his skull proved fatal. 16 acAIES
Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco
recalled that he was sleeping in Apartment No. 3 at around
1:20 a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened by
Pasion who appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to
know why he did not see Bokingco at the construction site on
28 February 2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed
at the apartment the whole day, Pasion suddenly hit him in the
head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit
Pasion. They both struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit
Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right after the incident. He
was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June
2000. 17 During the cross-examination, Bokingco admitted
that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion. 18
Col confirmed that he was one of the construction
workers employed by Pasion. He however resigned on 26
February 2000 because of the deductions from his salary. He
went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was apprehended and
brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw
Bokingco who pointed to him as the person who killed Pasion.
He insisted that he doesn't know Bokingco very well. 19

On 16 December 2004, the trial court rendered

judgment 20 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MICHAEL
BOKINGO alias MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE
COL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being the two
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse
of confidence to be considered against both
accused and the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty in favor of accused Bokingo
only, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of DEATH. Each accused is ordered to
indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the
amount
of
Seventy
five
thousand
pesos
(P75,000.00) to pay the heirs of the victim
Seventeen
thousand
six
hundred
pesos
(P17,600.00) as actual damages, Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney's fees, Twenty five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs. 21
In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the findings of the trial court but reduced the penalty
to reclusion perpetua in view ofRepublic Act No. 7659, thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant REYNANTE
COL is found GUILTY as conspirator beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery
and evident premeditation and with the attendant
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse
of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances.
The proper imposable penalty would have been
death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
100

of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is further

ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion
in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate
damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs. 22
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration 23 and
called the appellate court's attention on the omission to rule
on Bokingco's fate when it rendered the challenged decision.
Appellants also noted the absence of other evidence, aside
from Bokingco's admission, to prove that conspiracy existed in
the instant case. Appellants maintained that the admission
made by Bokingco cannot be used as evidence against his
alleged co-conspirator. Appellants also took exception to the
findings of the lower courts that the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime
and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the
crime. 24
The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by
including the criminal liability of Bokingco in its dispositive
portion of its Amended Decision, which reads:CDAEHS
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants MICHAEL
BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL are found GUILTY as
conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER
as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by
treachery and evident premeditation and with the
attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating
circumstances. The proper imposable penalty
would have been death. However, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9346, the accused-appellant
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion

Perpetua without the possibility of parole (in

accordance with Section 3 of the said law). Each of
the accused-appellants is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the
amount
of
Seventy
five
thousand
pesos
(P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate
damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs. 25
Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution
dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the parties to
submit their Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from notice
thereof if they so desire. 26 Appellants manifested that they
are no longer filing a Supplemental Brief and are adopting
their arguments in the Appellant's Brief submitted before the
Court of Appeals. 27 The appellee likewise manifested that it
is dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental Brief. 28 The
instant case was thus submitted for deliberation.
In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals'
Amended Decision, two issues were raised: 1) whether the
qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict
appellant Bokingco of murder and 2) whether appellant Col is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed
Pasion. Bokingco made two (2) separate and dissimilar
admissions: first, in his extrajudicial confession taken during
the preliminary investigation where he admitted that he and
Col planned the killing of Pasion; and second, when he
testified in open court that he was only provoked in hitting
Pasion back when the latter hit him in the head. On the basis
of his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged for
murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery.
Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of
murder. They question the presence of treachery in the
101

commission of the crime considering that no one from the

prosecution witnesses testified on how Pasion was attacked by
Bokingco. They also submit that evident premeditation was
not proven in the case. They belittle Bokingco's extrajudicial
admission that he and Col planned the killing. The attendance
of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of
confidence was likewise assailed by appellants. They aver that
nighttime was not purposely sought but it was merely coincidental that the crime took place at that time. Neither has
trust and confidence been reposed on appellants by the victim
to aggravate the crime by abuse of confidence. Appellants
claim that they were living in an apartment owned by Pasion,
not because the latter trusted them but because they worked
in the construction of the victim's apartment.
On the other hand, the OSG emphasizes that the
prosecution has established that Pasion was defenseless when
fatally attacked by Bokingco and there was no opportunity for
him to defend himself from the unexpected assaults of
Bokingco. The OSG agrees as well with the trial court's
findings that evident premeditation, nighttime, and abuse of
confidence attended the commission of the crime.
We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be
appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the absence of
any proof of the manner in which the aggression was
commenced. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution
must prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in
a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him. 29 Nobody witnessed the commencement
and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio
managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he
failed to see the victim at that time. 30
Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed
Pasion. 31 But the admitted manner of killing is inconsistent
with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident
premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence
of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was

determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly

indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c)
a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the
execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 32 It is indispensable to show how
and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had
elapsed before it was carried out. 33 In the instant case, no
proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was
devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated
when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. 34 Despite the fact
that Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion,
the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the
attack. STCDaI
It was during the preliminary investigation that
Bokingco
mentioned
his
and
Col's
plan
to
kill
Pasion. 35 Bokingco's confession was admittedly taken
without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1)Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have
competent
and
independent
counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
In People v. Sunga, 36 we held that "the right to counsel
applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed
'critical stages' in the criminal process. The preliminary
investigation can be no different from the in-custody
interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a
preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the
102

State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of

pursuing those who might be liable for criminal
prosecution." 37 In said case, Sunga made an uncounselled
admission before the police. He later acknowledged the same
admission before the judge in a preliminary investigation.
Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while
he did have a counsel, for the latter's lack of vigilance and
commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually denied his
right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held
inadmissible. 38 In the instant case, the extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible against Bokingco because he was
not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession
was taken before a judge.
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of
the crime is anchored on the presumption that there was
evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident
premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated.
There was no evidence to show that Bokingco purposely
sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in this case. Taking into account
that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded
that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion. However,
there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to
facilitate the commission of the crime.
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is
proper for Bokingco for failure of the prosecution to prove the
presence of the qualifying circumstances.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the
applicable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance alleged and
proven in the instant case, the penalty should be applied in its
medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall

be within the range of prision mayor in any of its periods as

minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the
maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1
day to 12 years, while reclusion temporal in its medium
period, ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years
and 4 months. Therefore, the indeterminate penalty of six
years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years,
eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum
is appropriate under the circumstances. 39 The award of
exemplary damages should be deleted as no aggravating
circumstance was proven.
Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator.
He contends that to hold him guilty as co-conspirator, it must
be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, Col asserts that Bokingco's uncounselled testimony that
appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance
considering the fact that there was no other evidence which
will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsa's
statements during trial, such as the presence of Col inside her
house and his forcing her to open the vault of the pawnshop,
as well as the alleged statement she heard from
Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," are not adequate to support
the finding of conspiracy. DcHaET
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Col's
conviction of murder by conspiracy by mentioning that
starting from the declaration of Bokingco, the victim's wife,
Elsa, also positively declared that Col blocked and attacked
her with a knife when she tried to check on her husband. She
was left alone by Col when he was told by Bokingco that the
victim was already dead. For the OSG, appellants' acts are
indicative of conspiracy. The OSG contends that the
prosecution witnesses had no ill-motive to lie and falsely
accuse appellants of the crime of murder.
The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy
between appellants.
We disagree.
103

This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper

deference to the factual findings of the trial court, owing to
their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. 40 However, this rule admits of exceptions,
namely: 1) when the trial court's findings of facts and
conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or 2)
when certain facts of substance and value likely to change the
outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower court,
or 3) when the assailed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts. 41 The second exception obtains in
this case.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct
participation in the case before us, it is necessary that
conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to
commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during, and after the commission of the
crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from
the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose
and
design,
concerted
action,
and
community
of
interest. 42 Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of
conspiracy. 43
As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same
quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as
clearly as the commission of the crime. 44

Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that

happened on that time and date when you
were in your master's bedroom?
A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back
portion of our building where we reside.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds
in the wee hours of the morning on that day
when you were in your master's bedroom?
A: I wondered why and I immediately went down to
the kitchen since the door of the kitchen was
directly leading to the back door or back
portion of the building where the apartments
were situated.
Q: Why, on what floor is this master's bedroom
located?
A: Second floor.
Q: Were you actually able to go down and see what
was happening?
A: Yes, sir, but I was only able to reach the stairs
leading to the kitchen. I was not able to go
out of the kitchen because I was
blocked. DHcEAa
Q: You were blocked by whom?

The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa's

testimony that appellants fled together after killing her
husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.

A: By Reynante Col.

Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack.

Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was being
attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa's house and
allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault, thus:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Are you referring to the same Reynante Col, the

accused in this case?

xxx xxx xxx

104

Q: You said you were blocked by Reynante Col. How

did he block you?
A: As soon as I reached the stairs, I was blocked by
Reynante Col and he was situated near the
back door of the pawnshop. There is a
pawnshop in the front portion of our
residence.

A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was

able to see him poke the sharp object under
my chin and I bowed my head a little to
avoid the tear gas. I was wounded under my
chin and I felt the sharpness of the
object. 45
xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you saw him near the door of your

pawnshop, did you confront him?

Q: What else happened while he was doing that to

you?

A: Yes, sir.

A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to

be silent.

Q: How did you confront him?

A: I asked him, Reynante, what are you doing here?
Q: What was the reaction of Reynante Col?
A: He ran towards me and sprayed something into
my eyes and he put a sharp object under my
chin. (Witness demonstrating by putting her
hand under her chin)
Q: How far was he before he attacked you?

Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?

A: To open the combination of the vault.
Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the
combination of the vault?
A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.
Q: What vault are you referring to?
A: Vault of the pawnshop.

A: Probably, from the witness stand up to the chair

of Fiscal Hilario. Maybe two steps away from
him. (Around 3 meters)

Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference

to your residence?

Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and

what part of your body was hit?

A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back

is our kitchen.

A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.

Q: When you refused to open the vault of the

pawnshop, what did Reynante Col do about
it? DAaHET

Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic)

sprayed with tear gas?
A: It was "mahapdi" (painful).
Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you
able to see something or a sharp weapon
under your chin?

A: He did not say anything.

Q: How about you, was there anything else you
did?
A: I offered him money so he will not kill me.
105

Q: When you offered him money so he will not kill

you, did he agree?
A: No, sir.
Q: What else happened next when he did not agree
to your offer of money?
A: He dragged me going towards the back door. 46
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically
inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At
the most, Col's actuations can be equated to attempted
robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against
appellants before it was amended, on motion of the
prosecution, for murder. 47
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col
that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the
place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards
the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that
there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they
were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they
separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill
Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he
sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while
Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col
was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingco's extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against
Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort.
Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of
a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or
omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding
only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her coaccused, and is considered as hearsay against them. 48 An
exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made
by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating

to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or
declaration. 49 In order that the admission of a conspirator
may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by
evidence other than the admission itself; second, the
admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. 50 As we have previously discussed, we did not
find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of
conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no
probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Bokingco's judicial admission exculpated Col because
Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter
hit him in the head.
All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no
sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col
is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. The Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of
accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another
cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10)
days from notice.
Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. He is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years (6) and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum
Appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Noli
Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as
106

temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as

attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. ITcCSA
||| (People v. Bokingo, G.R. No. 187536, [August 10, 2011], 671
PHIL 71-94)

[G.R. No. 132895. March 10, 2004.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE
PADAYHAG, appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 260, National Capital Judicial
Region, in Criminal Case No. 95-86, finding appellants Elizabeth
Castillo ("Castillo") and Evangeline Padayhag ("Padayhag") guilty
of Qualified Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention 2 and
sentencing them to death.
The Information 3 charging Castillo, Padayhag and Imelda
Wenceslao with the crime of kidnapping, reads:
That on or about March 1, 1995, in Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused
ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG,
conspiring together, confederating, and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away, and

seriously detain HORACIO CEBRERO IV @ "Rocky",

a five years old child (sic), which kidnapping or
serious detention lasted for more than three (3)
days thereby depriving him of his liberty, and
which was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the parents of the victim, to the
damage and prejudice of the victim himself and his
parents.
The said accused IMELDA CASTILLO WENCESLAO,
without having participated in the said crime as a
principal, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously participated (sic) in the execution
of the crime by previous and simultaneous acts by
allowing and furnishing the use of her residence
where victim Horacio Cebrero IV was kept knowing
him to have been taken by principal accused
Elizabeth Castillo and Evangeline Padayhag without
the consent of his parents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on 10 May 1995, both Castillo and Padayhag
initially pleaded guilty. However, on 18 May 1995, Castillo and
Padayhag withdrew their plea of guilt. They entered a plea of not
guilty on 3 August 1995. Imelda Wenceslao remains at large.
The prosecution submitted documentary evidence and presented
eight witnesses, namely: (1) Horacio Cebrero IV ("Rocky"), the
victim; (2) Rosanna Baria, the victim's "yaya"; (3) Luis Cebrero,
the victim's father; (4) Sandra Cebrero, the victim's mother; (5)
Staff Sgt. Alejandro Delena of the Philippine National Police
("PNP"); (6) Wivino Demol, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines ("AFP") Intelligence Security Group, army surveillance
and search team; (7) Capt. Raniel Ramiro, also of the AFP
Intelligence Security Group; (8) and Staff Sgt. Manual Iglesias of
the PNP.
The defense presented only two witnesses: Castillo and Padayhag
themselves.
107

The Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") summarized the

prosecution's version of the incident in the appellee's brief, as
follows:
On March 1, 1995, Rosanna Baria was employed as
one of the household helpers of Mr. and Mrs. Luis
De Guzman Cebrero at their residence in Classic
Homes, B.F. Paraaque, Metro Manila (p. 26, tsn,
August 3, 1995). In the morning of said date,
Femie, another housemaid of the Cebreros' and
Baria's relative, bathed and dressed up Rocky, the
couple's six year old son and afterwards advised
Baria that someone, who was also a Cebrero
househelper, will fetch Rocky (p. 28, supra). At
about 8:00 a.m., a tricycle arrived. On board was a
woman, whom Baria pointed to in court and who
gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p.
26, supra). Baria assisted Rocky to board the
tricycle. The tricycle brought Rocky and the
woman, whom Rocky pointed to in court and who
gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p. 9, tsn,
August 3, 1995), to a nearby "Mcdonald's".
Thereat, they were joined by another woman (p.
13, supra) whom Rocky pointed to in court and who
gave her name as Elizabeth Castillo (p. 9, supra).
The three proceeded to a house far from the
"Mcdonald's" (p. 13, supra) where Rocky slept "four
times" (p. 14, supra).
At about 5:30 p.m. of March 1, 1995, Luis Cebrero
arrived home from work. When his son DJ arrived,
he informed his father that Rocky did not attend
school. Luis Cebrero asked Baria (pp. 45, tsn,
August 22, 1995) who told him that Rocky was
fetched at home by a woman to attend a birthday
party (p. 5, supra). Informed thereof, Mr. Cebrero
then called up his friends and went to the police
station to report that his son was missing (p.
9, supra).

At about 7:30 p.m. that night, Luis Cebrero

received a telephone call from a woman saying,
"Ibigay mo sa akin ang ATM card mo o ang bata"
(p. 10, supra). Luis replied, "Kailangan ko ang
bata". The woman asked how much money was in
his ATM and Luis replied P40,000.00. Luis then
requested to talk to his son but the woman said,
"Hindi puwede, malayo dito ang anak mo at
tatawag na lang uli ako." (p. 10, supra).
Luis Cebrero decided to connect a tape recorder to
his phone. On March 2, 1995, at about 7:20 p.m.,
his phone rang. The caller was a woman telling
him, "Bigyan mo ako nang isang million", to which
he replied, "Hindi ko kayang ibigay ang isang
million". The caller told Luis that she will call back
later on (pp. 1112, supra).
The Cebreros informed the authorities that two of
their maids were hired from an agency, the
General Services, Inc. at Paraaque. Major Ordoyo
of the Intelligence Security Group, Philippine Army
(PA) sent Sergeants Rempillo and Iglesias to the
agency to verify this. The two were furnished by
General, Services, Inc. with the personal data of
the maids named Elizabeth Castillo and Jasmine
Nuez (pp. 1314, tsn, March 12, 1996).
When the caller did not contact Luis Cebrero the
following day, March 3, 1995, he instructed his wife
to raise some money. From the bank, Mrs. Cebrero
withdrew P800,000.00 in P1,000.00 denomination.
The bank provided Mrs. Cebrero a list containing
the serial numbers of the money withdrawn (pp.
1516, supra).
On March 4, 1995, at about 9:30 p.m., Luis Cebrero
received a telephone call. The caller was a woman
who asked, "Ano nasa iyo na ba ang pera"? Luis
answered, "Hindi ko kayang ibigay sa iyo ang
108

halagang iyon, kalahati lang ang kaya kong ibigay".

The caller said, "Sige, puede na yan (p. 17, supra)
and instructed Luis Cebrero to be in Paco, Obando,
Bulacan, alone, at about 2:00 a.m.; that at Paco,
Obando, Bulacan, is a "Farmacia Dilag" and beside
it is a street which Luis must follow until he reaches
the church called "Sabadista" where he should drop
the money (p. 18, supra). Luis Cebrero received
another call on that same night instructing him to
stop in front of the Farmacia Dilag and walk on the
street beside it going to a chapel and to drop the
money on the chapel's terrace (p. 19, supra).

Puzzled by the sudden disappearance of the two

women, Sgt. Delena and his team remained at the
stake-out area. The team befriended the residents
of the place, one of whom was a certain Joselito
Torres who claimed to be the former boyfriend of
Elizabeth Castillo whom he recognized from the
picture shown to him by Sgt. Delena. Torres
informed the ISG team that Castillo had already left
for Mindanao. Sgt. Delena immediately
communicated the information, including the
address of Gigi Padayhag in Navotas, to his
commanding officer (p. 19, supra).

Informed of the place for the pay-off, on March 4,

1995, Major Ronnie Eleazar, Commanding Officer of
the Intelligence Security Group (ISG), Philippine
Army, briefed his men on Rocky's kidnapping and
assigned them their respective tasks in the
stakeout they will undertake around the pay-off
area (pp. 67 tsn, January 30, 1996). At about
11:00 p.m. of March 4, 1995, Sgt. Alejandro Delena
and his ISG team, proceeded, to Obando, Bulacan
for the stakeout. After positioning themselves near
the stakeout site, a car arrived and stopped in front
of the chapel. The man alighted and placed a bag
in front of the chapel and immediately left (p.
10, supra). After about forty (40) minutes, two
women appeared, proceeded to where the bag was
dropped. On seeing the bag, the women laughed
and left. After about two (2) minutes, the two
women returned, picked up the bag and
immediately left (pp. 1112, supra). The ISG team
searched the area around the drop-off place but
the two women were nowhere to be found (p.
17, supra). In court, Sgt. Delena pointed to and
identified Castillo and Padayhag as the two women
he saw in front of the chapel in Obando, Bulacan
and who, later on, picked up the bag dropped by
Luis Cebrero (p. 12, supra).

At about 9:00 p.m. of March 5, 1995, Luis Cebrero

was at home when a tricycle stopped in front of his
house. Somebody knocked at the door and when
Luis Cebrero opened it, he saw his son, Rocky (pp.
2324, tsn, August 22, 1995).
On March 12, 1995, an ISG team headed by Sgt.
Manuel Iglesias was dispatched to Navotas to
locate "Gigi" Padayhag at the address furnished by
Sgt. Delena. The team found Padayhag who upon
being apprised of the kidnapping of Rocky Cebrero,
voluntarily went with the ISG team to Camp Crame
to clear her name (p. 14, tsn, May 22, 1996).
Upon the instruction of the ISG, Sgts. Delena and
Demo were ordered to proceed to Dipolog City to
look for Castillo (pp. 2021, tsn, January 30, 1996).
Sgt. Delena arrived in Dipolog City on March 13,
1996. He was briefed and shown the area where
Castillo could be found (p. 23, supra).
When Sgt. Demol arrived in Dipolog City, he and
Sgt. Delena coordinated with the PNP stationed at
Barangay Tulong, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte (p.
41, tsn, March 12, 1996). Thereat, Sgt. Demol
requested for the assistance of persons from
Barangay Mitimos, where Castillo was believed to
109

be hiding. The PNP assigned them two barangay

officials of Mitimos who, when shown the picture of
Castillo, said that the woman in the picture is in
Barangay Mitimos (p. 46, supra).
Upon the request of the police, the two barangay
officials conducted a daily surveillance on Castillo.
On March 18, 1995, Sgt. Demol reported to the ISG
headquarters that Castillo was in Barangay
Mitimos. In turn, Sgt. Demol was advised that ISG
will be sending him, through JRS Express, copies of
the list of serial numbers of the bills used as payoff and a DOJ subpoena (p. 54, supra). Upon receipt
of said documents, Sgt. Demol applied for a search
warrant (p. 58, supra) which was granted by the
Dipolog City Regional Trial Court on March 21, 1995
(p. 57, supra). The search warrant was shown to
Elizabeth Castillo and her father who signed the
same (pp. 6061,supra). The search yielded a black
bag placed in a carton inside the house (pp. 6162)
containing money in P1,000.00 bills in the total
amount of P277,000.00 (p. 68,supra). The serial
numbers of the recovered money bills appeared in
the list furnished to Sgt. Demol by ISG (pp. 88
89, supra). Thereafter, the money was deposited
with the Regional Trial Court at Dipolog City (p.
89, supra).

Prosecuted for kidnapping and serious illegal

detention, Evangeline Padayhag and Elizabeth
Castillo initially pleaded guilty upon arraignment
and were each meted the penalty of life
imprisonment (p. 4, tsn, August 3, 1995). The trial
court, however, on motion based on improvident
plea, ordered the withdrawal of the plea of guilty
and directed the re-arraignment of Castillo and
Padayhag.

After trial, Castillo and Padayhag were convicted of

kidnapping and serious illegal detention as
charged. 4
Appellants maintain their innocence and present their own
version of the events in their brief, as follows:
1. Accused ELIZABETH CASTILLO was a
househelper at the Cebrero household from
December 1993 to January 1995. She did the
cleaning of the house, laundry of dirty clothes, and
also took care of Rocky, son of Luis and Sandra
Cebrero;
2. Accused Evangeline Padayhag, also a
househelper, is a friend of Elizabeth Castillo. The
two met sometime in 1994 at Paco, Ubando,
Bulacan, when Padayhag worked in the household
of Julito Lawagon, the latter being the neighbor of
Helen Lim, Elizabeth Castillo's sister;
3. Upon assumption from work, Castillo was
promised by Mrs. Sandra Cebrero a monthly salary
of one thousand two hundred pesos (P1,200.00);
4. Castillo, however, was never given
compensation during her entire employment in the
Cebrero household;
5. Castillo was also not treated nicely by the
Cebrero spouses. When something gets lost in the
house, she was always the one being blamed,
although the children were the ones getting the
things. Besides, they say bad words against her.
Thus, she has no other choice but to leave her
work;
6. Castillo had been consistently demanding from
the Cebrero spouses her unpaid wages for one
year; but her demands remained unheeded;
110

7. Having reached only elementary education,

Castillo believed that the only effective way for her
to claim back her unpaid wages is to use Rocky,
son of the Cebrero Spouses;
8. On 1 March 1995 Castillo called Padayhag,
telling the latter that her boyfriend is sick. At that
time, Padayhag was already working at Jelaya St.,
B.F. Homes, Paraaque under the employ of Lulu
Sablan. Castillo fetched Padayhag. The two,
however, did not go to see Padayhag's boyfriend
but instead they went to a playground;
9. Castillo then instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky
from his house at Cesar Virata St., B.F. Homes,
Paraaque, Manila. When Padayhag asked why she
wanted to see Rocky, Castillo answered that she
missed the boy. Padayhag obliged to the request,
knowing that the latter would not do any harm to
the boy;
10. It was only the first time that Padayhag saw
Rocky;
11. She brought the child to a market at B.F.
Paraaque, where Castillo was waiting. The three
went on a stroll. Thereafter, they went to the house
of Imelda Wenceslao, Castillo's sister, at Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. Castillo noticed that Rocky
had a fever, so she requested Vangie to buy a
medicine;
12. Padayhag was not told by Castillo as to when
the latter would return the boy. Padayhag did not
sense anything wrong with what had happened as
she believed that Castillo only took Rocky for a
stroll;
13. Imelda Wenceslao asked why they brought a
child along with them. Castillo answered that she
just wanted to see the boy. Wenceslao then asked

if they asked permission from the parents, and

Castillo answered "no";
14. At night, Castillo talked to Mr. Luis Cebrero over
the phone to inform him that Rocky was with her.
Mr. Cebrero told her not to harm the boy. No threat
or demand for ransom was ever made by the
accused to the Cebrero spouses. She never asked
Mr. Cebrero how much money he had in the bank;
15. The following day, 2 March 1995, Castillo called
Mr. Cebrero again to tell him that she could not yet
return Rocky because he still had a slight fever. She
also told Mr. Cebrero: "Hindi nyo ako
sinusuwelduhan". He asked her: "Magkano ba ang
kailangan mo?" She did not answer. Then Mr.
Cebrero said: "May pera ako rito, kalahating
milyon." At that moment, Castillo hanged-up the
phone;
16. Castillo denied in her Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated 25 August 1999, attached as Annex "A" and
made an integral part hereof, that she demanded
one million (P1,000,000.00) from the Cebrero
spouses;
17. On the evening of 4 March 1995, when Castillo
called Mr. Cebrero, he asked them where they
were. The accused told him that they were in Paco,
Ubando, Bulacan, near a Protestant Church. Mr.
Cebrero then said: "Pupunta ako riyan bandang
2:00 ng madaling araw (March 5, 1999) na may
bitbit na pera at ilalapag ko ito sa may simbahan";
18. On 5 March 1995, at around 4:30 a.m. Castillo
and Padayhag went out to buy "pandesal". They
noticed that at a post near a Church, a dog was
trying to pull a black plastic bag. They picked it up
and brought it home. When they opened it, they
111

found five bundles of money, in P1,000.00

denomination;
19. At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Mr.
Cebrero heard a tricycle stop in front of their
house. Someone knocked at the door, and when he
opened the door, he saw Rocky;
20. On 11 March 1995, Capt. Raniel Ramiro,
Intelligence Security Group of the Philippine Army,
together with his men, after coordinating with
Caloocan Police, arrested Evangeline Padayhag at
her residence at Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City.
The military men did not have a warrant of arrest
at this particular operation;
21. The military were civilian-dressed. They
pretended to be Padayhag's cousins who came
from abroad, and they "invited her to a birthday
party". However, they brought her to Fort Bonifacio
for interrogation. It was only then that Padayhag
learned that her companions were military men;
22. At Fort Bonifacio, the police coerced Padayhag
to confess to the crime, threatening her: "Pag hindi
ka pa umamin, kami na mismo and bibitay sa iyo".
Padayhag, however, did not confess to the
commission of the crime. She was then brought to
Camp Crame at Quezon City on that same date;
23. The following day, 12 March 1995, during the
custodial investigation, a certain Major Meneses
was exerting pressure on Padayhag to reveal where
the P500,000.00 is. She told Major Meneses: "Wala
akong pera na ganoon kalaki." He said to her: "Pag
hindi ka umamin, papatayin na kita talaga!" Her
answer was: "Patayin nyo man ako, hindi ako
aamin dahil wala akong ganoong kalaking pera."
Major Meneses then slapped Padayhag and hit her
with a stool on her leg;

24. Major Meneses also threatened Padayhag that

if she would not confess to the crime, he would
submerge her on a drum. They forcibly brought her
to a toilet room. She saw there two big drums.
Major Meneses then told her: "Iyong mga hindi
umamin, nilulublob namin dito sa drum". Padayhag
shouted. Thereafter, someone knocked at the door
and said: "Pakawalan n'yo na iyan dahil marami
nang tao". They brought her out of the room and
handcuffed her;
25. SPO1 Larry Pablo was likewise threatening
Padayhag: "Pag hindi ka pa umamin, ihuhulog na
kita sa bintanang ito!" (They were on the third floor
of a building) "Alam mo ba kung ilan na ang
naihulog namin diyan? Panlabindalawa ka na sa
ihuhulog namin diyan!";
26. During the custodial investigation, Padayhag
was not assisted by a counsel, nor has she waived
her right to counsel. She was coerced by the police
into signing an extrajudicial confession without
even explaining to her the contents thereof;
27. Atty. Eranio Sedillo only arrived one hour (1 hr.)
after Padayhag had already signed the questioned
extrajudicial confession;
28. Elizabeth Castillo was arrested at Mitimos,
Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte on or about 21 March
1995. Police officers came to her house, and when
they informed her that they were looking for the
money, she voluntarily gave it to them;
29. The approximate amount of money taken by
Castillo was only twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
She returned the rest of the money to the police
who arrested, her;

112

30. Castillo vehemently denied in her Sinumpaang

Salaysay (par. No. 14) that she returned only
P227,000.00;
31. Castillo and her escorts were fetched in Manila
by a van. Inside the van, they blindfolded her. They
removed her blindfold when they reached Camp
Crame;
32. Major Meneses and SPO1 Larry Pablo
investigated her. She was slapped by Pablo, forcing
her to admit where the money is;
33. During the investigation, Pablo poked a gun on
her, then forced her to write what he would say to
her. He instructed her to write: "Na kapag hindi ko
isasauli ang lahat ng pera ay pwede n'yo na akong
patayin". Castillo followed the instructions because
of fear. 5
In an 11-page Decision, of which nine pages were devoted to the
recital of facts, the trial court found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses more credible and gave no weight to
Castillo and Padayhag's defenses. The trial court convicted
appellants on 17 December 1997 and imposed on them the death
penalty, thus:
Originally, both accused pleaded guilty to the
offense and were meted the penalty of life
imprisonment. However, shortly thereafter, they
moved to withdraw their plea claiming it was
precipitate, which the court allowed and proceeded
with a full-blown trial.
Accused Elizabeth Castillo demanded money from
Rocky's parents for the release of the latter. She
told his father to bring the money to Obando
Bulacan. The Court can only imagine the pain,
worry, fear and anxiety of the boy's parents while
their youngest son was under detention.

Ransom is money, price or consideration

demanded for the redemption of a captured person
or persons, a payment that releases from captivity"
(Corpus Juris Secundum 458). The testimony of
Elizabeth Castillo that she did not know about the
money cannot be given weight. Two hundred
Seventy Seven Thousand (P277,000.00) Pesos was
found among her things, the bills bearing the same
serial number as the money paid to her. DTEScI
The court has taken a hard look in determining the
liability of Evangeline Padayhag as it seems that
her only participation in the crime was picking up
the boy from his house. Although she did not get
part of the ransom the fact is that she fully and
directly cooperated and did her part to carry out
the resolution of her co-accused. Under these facts
there was conspiracy to extort ransom. People
versus Kamad Akiran, 18 SCRA 239.

The Court is convinced that the prosecution has

established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, ELIZABETH CASTILLO and
EVANGELINE PADAYHAG are sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of death. Further, they are hereby
ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of Five
Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages and Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages plus
costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED. 6
Appellants seek the reversal of their conviction by raising the
following assignments of error:
I
113

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MISAPPRECIATING

(SIC) THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THERE WAS CONSPIRACY TO EXTORT RANSOM IN
THIS CASE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION OF EVANGELINE
PADAYHAG.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING
THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE CASE AT BAR. 7
We affirm the trial court's judgment convicting Castillo. However,
we acquit her co-accused Padayhag.
To sustain a conviction for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, 8 the
prosecution must establish the following: (1) the offender is a
private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any
other manner deprives the victim of his liberty; (3) the act of
kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the commission of
the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical
injuries are inflicted on the victim or threats to kill are made; or
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a
public officer. 9
Appellant Castillo's Liability
Castillo asserts that the victim's parents did not pay her wages
when she worked as a maid of the victim's family. 10 She claims
that it was this injustice, her educational level and her ignorance
of the law, which impelled her to take Rocky. She faults the trial
court for refusing to consider this. Castillo is mistaken. Whether or

not her employer failed to pay her salary is irrelevant. No amount

of perceived injustice can serve as justification for any person to
retaliate through the commission of another crime. The trial court
was therefore correct in disregarding Castillo's claim that Rocky's
parents committed injustice on her.
Castillo's claim of injustice cannot justify in any way her demand
for ransom. Ransom is "money, price or consideration paid or
demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity." 11 Thus, even if she had a
right to demand payment of her unpaid wages, the money she
actually demanded and eventually received, is still ransom.
Castillo's reliance on her low educational level is similarly
unavailing. The penalty for kidnapping for ransom is the singular
and indivisible penalty of death. This bars the application of any
alternative, mitigating or aggravating circumstance. 12
Mr. Cebrero admitted that he was unable to identify his son
Rocky's abductors. De Lena and Iglesias, the police officers who
did the stake-out during the "pay-off," testified that the two
women suddenly disappeared after retrieving the plastic bag
containing the ransom. The police officers' inability to explain how
two simple maids managed to give 5 carloads of police officers
the slip severely discredits their account of what happened that
day.
Rocky's testimony, however, leaves no room for doubt. Only six
years of age when he testified, Rocky was candid and direct in his
recollection, narrating events as a young boy saw them happen,
thus:
COURT
Alright. Rocky, when Vangie went to fetch you
from your house.
A Yes.
COURT
You took a tricycle.
114

A Yes.
COURT
Where did you go?
A I do not know.
PROS. FONACIER
Your Honor, please, may we request that the rule
on evidence be not strict on this boy. The
witness is of tender age.
ATTY. SOLUREN
There is no strict implementation as to what the
Honorable Prosecutor stated. There is no
strict implementation of the rules of court. In
fact, we are very lenient but the fact is, the
child said he does not know. But the
question is he was giving the answer to
this witness.
COURT
Ask another question.
Q Rocky, nang sumakay kayo ni Vangie sa tricycle,
nakita mo ba si Beth Castillo?

Q Noong nasundo na ninyo si Beth, saan kayo

nagpunta?
A Sa bahay nila.
Q Kaninong bahay?
A Hindi ko alam.
Q Malayo ba sa McDonald o malapit. Sinabi mo
kanina, nagpunta kayo sa bahay nila?
A Yes.
Q Iyong bahay na pinuntahan ninyo, malayo sa
McDonald?
A Malayo.
Q Anong sinakyan ninyo?
A Hindi ko alam.
Q Noong dumating kayo doon sa bahay na hindi
ninyo, bahay, natulog ka ba doon?
A Yes.
Q Ilang beses ka natulog doon?
A 4 sleeps.

A Nakita namin si Beth sa McDonalds. Malapit sa

amin.

Q Pinakakain ka ba sa bahay na pinuntahan ninyo?

Q Rocky, nakita ninyo si Beth. Ngayon, tatlo na

kayo, ikaw, si Beth at si Vangie?

Q Ano ang pinakakain sa iyo?

A Yes.
Q Rocky, noong magkasama na kayong tatlo, saan
kayo nagpunta?
A Nasundo namin si Beth.

A Yes.

A Champorado and fish.

Q Sino ang nagpapakain sa iyo?
A Vangie.
Q Sino si Vangie. Puede mo bang ituro sa amin?
PROS. FONACIER
115

The witness is pointing to accused Evangeline

Padayhag as the Vangie he was referring to.
Q Doon sa 4 sleeps mo sa bahay na iyon, saan ka
pa nila dinala?
A Pinauwi na ako.
Q Sinong kasama mo noong pinauwi ka?
A Wala, pero mula sa McDonald, naiwan na ako sa
tricycle hanggang sa bahay. 13
Unshaken by rigorous cross-examination, Rocky's testimony
would have been more than enough to convict Castillo. The
testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient
to convict. 14 But there is more. The evidence on record amply
supports the factual findings of the trial court. Both the evidence
of the prosecution and the defense establish the commission of
the crime.
Castillo admitted she instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky on 1
March 1995:
Q And as a result of sitting at the palaruan, Miss
witness, what happened next?
A Pinasundo ko si Rocky kay Vangie, mam.
Q And why did you ask Vangie to fetch Rocky, Miss
witness?

Q And after Rocky fetched by Vangie, what

happened next?
A Ipinasyal po namin si Rocky, mam. 15 (Emphasis
supplied)
She also testified that she had no permission from Rocky's
parents to take the child with her:
T Saan kayo nananghalian?
S Doon po sa bahay ng kapatid ko.
T Noong dumating kayo doon, ano naman ang
sinabi ng kapatid mo sayo?
S Ang sabi niya, bakit daw may kasama kaming
bata.
T Ano naman ang naging sagot mo kay Imelda?
S Sabi ko pinasyal lang po namin.
T Hindi tinanong ni Imelda kung bakit pinasyal nyo
ang bata, kung may paalam yong bata doon
sa kanyang magulang?
S Tinanong po.
T Ano naman ang sinabi mo sa kanya?
S Sinabi ko gusto ko lang makita si Rocky.

A Kasi po naalala ko pagnamamalengke ako at

kasama ko si Rocky, lagi po kaming
pumupunta sa palaruan, mam.

T Pero, ano ang sinabi mo noong tinanong kung

may paalam ang bata sa kanyang magulang,
anong naging sagot mo sa katanungan niya?

Q And then what happened next, Miss witness?

S Ang sabi niya baka daw pagalitan kami.

A Sinundo po ni Vangie si Rocky, mam.

T Ano naman ang naging sagot mo?

Q Whom did Vangie fetch, Miss witness?

A Si Rocky po, mam.

Your Honor, may we asked (sic) the witness to be

more responsive with her answer.
COURT
116

What was the question, please?

Stenographer:
(Reading back the question)
T Noong tinanong ni Imelda kung may paalam ang
bata sa mga magulang, ano ang sagot mo?
S Ang sabi ko po hindi, walang paalam.
T Ano ang naging reaction ng iyong kapatid na si
Imelda?
S Bakit daw hindi nagpaalam. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)
Castillo testified that, during the period of Rocky's detention she
called Rocky's father, Mr. Cebrero, to wit:
Q What happened next Miss witness?
A Tinawagan ko po ang mga Cebrero.
Q Who of the Cebreros did you call up?
A Si Luis Cebrero po, mam.
Q What happened next after that?
A Pagtawag ko po kay Mr. Luis Cebrero tinanong po
niya sa akin kung nasaan si Rocky, mam.
Q And what is your reply?
A Sinabi ko po na nandidito sa amin, mam.
Q After that what happened next?
A Nagalit po si Luis Cebrero sa akin, mam.
Q And what did you do when Luis Cebrero got
angry?
A Tinanong po niya ako kung magkano ang
kailangan ko, mam.

Q And what else did he say, Miss witness?

A Sinabi po niya sa akin na huwag ko raw pong
sasaktan si Rocky, mam.
Q And then what else?
A Pinipilit po niya ako na kung magkano daw ang
kailangan namin na pera, pagkatapos hindi
ko na po sinagot ang tanong niya, mam.
Q And then what happened next?
A Binaba ko na po iyong telepono,
mam. 17 (Emphasis supplied)
The number and time of these calls coincided with the calls Mr.
Cebrero received from Castillo telling him that she had Rocky and
instructing him to pay the ransom for Rocky's release.
Additionally, Castillo by her own admission placed herself at the
time and place where the "pay-off" occurred:
T Sa pangatlong araw naman, nandoon ka pa rin
ba at saka si Rocky?
S Opo.
T Sa bahay ni Imelda?
S Nagpaalam po ako sa kapatid ko na maghahanap
muna ako ng trabaho.
T Si Vangie, saan naman siya noon?
S Nandoon pa rin sa Dagat-dagatan po.
T Si Rocky naman?
S Andoon po sa bahay ng kapatid ko.
T Mga anong oras yon na nagpaalam ka na
maghanap ng trabaho?
S Umaga po ako nagpaalam.
117

T Kung ganoon umalis ka ng umagang yan?

S Sa may Julo po.

S Opo.

T Ano yong Julo?

T Saan ka naman pumunta?

S Malapit po iyan sa Obando.

S Naghanap po ako ng trabaho.

COURT

T Saan ka naghanap ng trabaho?

S Sa may bandang Bulacan po.
T Sa may Paco Obando, doon ka ba pumunta?
S Hindi po.
T Saang parte ka ng Bulacan pumunta?
S Malapit po sa may Hindi ko na po matandaan
yong pinuntahan namin.
T Malapit sa may?
S Papunta na po ng Obando, pero hindi nakarating
doon.
T Saan ka pumunta doon para maghanap ka ng
trabaho?
ATTY. SOLUREN
Already answered, Your Honor, that the place
papunta ng Obando pero hindi pa
nakakarating sa Obando.

Saang bayan ng Bulacan yon?

S Yon lang po ang alam ko. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
Beyond a feeble excuse that she was in Obando in order to look
for employment, Castillo provides no other plausible reason why
her presence at that place, at such an opportune time should not
be taken against her as additional evidence of her guilt. To
attribute this to coincidence, as Castillo would probably have us
do, taxes one's credulity.
The same can be said of her inability to explain how the ransom
money was found in her possession when she was caught by
policemen in Dipolog. Castillo plainly contradicts herself on this
point. In Castillo's brief, she admitted going to the "pay-off" site
on the day Mr. Cebrero was told to leave the ransom for Rocky's
release. Castillo admitted she found at the site a black plastic bag
filled with money and brought it home. 19 However in her
testimony before the trial court, she maintained that the first time
she saw the same plastic bag was when it mysteriously appeared
in her luggage when she went to Dipolog:
Q And thereafter, Miss witness, what happened
next?
A Hinanap ko iyong mga kagamitan ko po, mam.

STATE PROSECUTOR FONACIER

That is why I am asking.
COURT
What place is that? Witness may answer.
T Anong detalyadong lugar?

Q And for what purpose you looked at your things,

Miss witness?
A Para ayusin po iyong mga kagamitan ko para
makapagpahinga na po ako, mam.
Q What happened next, Miss witness?
118

A May nakuha ako na isang plastic bag sa loob ng

aking bag, mam.
Q And what is this plastic bag about, Miss witness?
A May laman po na pera, mam.
Q And how much money was there in that plastic
bag, Miss witness?
A Hindi ko po alam.
Q And what did you observe about the money in
the plastic bag?
A Nagulat po ako, mam.
Q And why were you surprised?
A Hindi ko po kasi lubos na maisip na ang bag na
aking dala dala ay may laman na isang
malaking halaga na pera, mam.
Q And what did you do after learning that there
was money inside your bag, Miss witness?
A Pinabayaan ko na lang po at inaantay na may
kumuha na lang po niyon sa akin
mam. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
Castillo insists that she took Rocky simply because she missed
him, and wanted to spend time with him. At the same time, in her
brief Castillo claims that what spurred her to take Rocky was her
desire to get her unpaid wages from the Cebreros. 21
Castillo also points out that Rocky came along freely with them,
was not harmed, and was even cared for during his detention.
This argument is pointless. The essence of kidnapping is
deprivation of liberty. For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary
that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him
harshly. 22 Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it
becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly
restrained the victim. Leaving a child in a place from which he did

not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam
around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation
of liberty. For under such a situation, the child's freedom remains
at the mercy and control of the abductor.
Next, Castillo explains that she called Mr. Cebrero not to ask for
ransom but to tell him that Rocky was with her and unharmed.
Castillo admitted that Mr. Cebrero pleaded with her not to harm
Rocky. Castillo failed to explain, however, why she did not inform
Mr. Cebrero of their exact whereabouts so that Mr. Cebrero could
fetch Rocky. Her failure to inform Mr. Cebrero clearly shows she
kept Rocky in detention considering she called Mr. Cebrero several
times while she had physical control over Rocky.
Castillo's explanation that she decided to return Rocky only when
he was no longer sick is also implausible. In the first place, she
failed to explain why she did not return the child the moment she
found out he was sick. That would have been the more prudent
course of action at that time. However, one day after the "payoff" on 4 March 1995, Rocky suddenly appeared by himself at the
Cebreros' home on 5 March 1995. Any reasonable person would
conclude that the pay-off and the return of the child were related
events. Castillo would have us attribute this to coincidence.
Castillo would also have us believe that what prompted her
sudden departure for Dipolog, where she was eventually
captured, was her inability to find employment in Manila. And yet
Castillo does not explain why she tried to bring Padayhag along
with her to Dipolog.
Finally, Castillo points out that the prosecution coached Rocky's
testimony. True, Rocky admitted he did not know the contents of
the document he signed in front of the fiscal. 23 Rocky also
stated that he was told to testify that Padayhag forced him to go
with her, and finally, that he must accuse both appellants as his
abductors. 24These admissions, damaging as they may sound,
are of little use to appellants. The reason is simple. The facts to
which Rocky's testimony pertains to are the very same facts
Castillo herself admitted on the witness stand. Even if we were to
discredit Rocky's testimony entirely, the facts of his kidnapping
119

stand proven by no less than Castillo's own admission on the

witness stand and in her brief.
With the evidence Castillo's own testimony established, the
prosecution's witnesses did little more than corroborate what
Castillo herself had admitted. Since Castillo admitted in open
court that she instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky even without
the parents' permission, we find her explanations futile. Her
allegations of torture and of signing a sworn statement without
counsel are useless.. After claiming to have been tortured into
making her sworn statement, logic would have it that Castillo
should have debunked the contents of that statement through her
testimony. Instead, she freely and voluntarily recounted events as
she narrated them in her sworn statement. Moreover, there is no
allegation that the trial court decided her guilt based on her
sworn statement. The trial court based its decision on the
testimonies of all the witnesses, including Castillo's.
In sum, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
Castillo's guilt.
Appellant Padayhag's Liability
The same cannot be said of Padayhag. Our review of the evidence
on record shows that the prosecution failed to prove Padayhag's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We reiterate the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens
the entire case for review on any question including those not
raised by the parties. 25 This becomes even more imperative in
cases where the penalty imposed is death.
Padayhag's sole involvement in this entire episode is her act of
fetching Rocky and bringing him to where Castillo was waiting for
them. Padayhag then went strolling with the two, went to the
house of Castillo's sister together with Castillo and Rocky, and
then later left the house. From this fact alone, the prosecution
would have us rule that Padayhag acted in conspiracy with
Castillo. The prosecution contends that without Padayhag's help,
Castillo could not have abducted Rocky.

We are not persuaded.

There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag
acted in concert with Castillo to commit the same criminal act. To
hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must
be a sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly and
definitely links the accused to the commission of the crime
without any space for baseless suppositions or frenzied theories
to filter through. 26 Indeed, conspiracy must be proven as clearly
as the commission of the crime itself. 27
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1)
singularity of intent; and (2) unity in execution of an unlawful
objective. The two must concur. Performance of an act that
contributes to the goal of another is not enough. The act must be
motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither joint nor
simultaneous action is per sesufficient indicium of conspiracy,
unless proved to have been motivated by a common design. 28
Padayhag's act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her
complicity with Castillo's plan, a plan Padayhag did not even
know. Both appellants testified that Padayhag met Castillo only
because Castillo told Padayhag that Padayhag's boyfriend was
sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they were to visit
Padayhag's boyfriend that the two met. When they met,
Padayhag realized that Castillo had deceived her:
Q Why? (sic) Elizabeth Castillo fetched you on
February 28, 1995 and why did you decide
to leave your employment?
A Kasi sabi po niya sa akin ang boyfriend ko raw ay
maysakit, sir.
Q And could you tell us who is that boyfriend of
yours?
A Si Jessie Mercader po, sir.
Q And what is the address of Jessie Mercader, at
that time, February 28, 1995?
120

A Sa Caloocan City po, sir.

Q And you said he was sick. What was his
sickness?
ATTY. SOLUREN
Your Honor, that is misleading.
COURT
Reform your question.
Q Madam witness, you said that you were informed
that your boyfriend was sick. Did you go and
see your boyfriend?
A Sumama po ako kay Elizabeth Castillo pero hindi
na po kami natuloy pumunta doon, sir.
Q For what reason you did not go?

COURT

Q Ano ang sinabi sa iyo bakit mo susunduin ang

bata?
A Namimiss na raw po niya iyong bata at nais
niyang makita, Your Honor.
COURT
Tapos ikaw ang pinasundo niya doon sa bata?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Tapos noon dalhin sa Caloocan, ano pa, sinabi pa
rin niya namimiss niya ang bata ganoon uli
ang sinabi niya sa iyo?

A Hindi po sinabi sa akin ni Elizabeth Castillo, sir.

A Wala na po siyang sinabi sa akin, Your Honor.

Q So, you did not come to find out what was the
sickness of your boyfriend?

COURT

A Hindi na po sir.

Hindi ka ba nakahalata na may mali doon sa

pangyayaring iyon?

Q Are we made to understand, madam witness,

when you left your employer on 28 February
1995 for the reason that your boyfriend was
sick, you did not actually go and see your
boyfriend?

A Ang pagkakaalam ko po ay ipapasyal lamang

niya ang bata, Your Honor.

A Opo, sir. 29

COURT

After the two spent the day together, Castillo beseeched

Padayhag to fetch Rocky citing as reason her love for the child
and a desire to spend time with the boy. Padayhag is a young lass
from the province who only finished Grade Two. Padayhag was
thus easily misled by the more worldly Castillo. Padayhag's
testimony reveals her naivet:

Q Sa Caloocan?
A Opo, Your Honor.

Tapos umalis ka na pagkatapos ninyong kumain

doon ng kapatid niya?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Ipinasyal ba niya ang bata?
121

A Hindi ko na po alam kasi umalis nga po

pagkatapos kumain, Your Honor.
COURT
Kailan niya sinabi sa iyo na ibabalik ang bata?
A Wala po siyang sinabi kung kailan, Your Honor.
COURT
Ganoon ba ang alam mo sa pamamasyal?
A Siya naman po ang nagyaya, Your Honor. 30
Her ignorance and susceptibility to confusion becomes more
evident in the following exchange:
COURT
Kailan ka ba umalis kay Mr. Julito Luwagon?
A Hindi ko pa matandaan, Your Honor.
COURT
Pero sabi mo kanina ay pitong buwan ka doon?
A Opo pitong buwan ako roon pero hindi ko po
matandaan kung anong buwan, Your Honor.
ATTY. SOLUREN
She only finished Grade II, Your Honor.
COURT
Yes I know it but she would know that she works
for seven (7) months. Alam mo ba na
December 1994 ka nagsimula mangamuhan
kay Julito Luwagon?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT

Enero, Pebrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo at Hulyo

tama ba iyon?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Papaano nangyari noong Enero 1995 ikaw ay
nagtratrabaho na kay Lulu Sablan?
A Itinuro po sa akin ni Elizabeth Castillo na magapply ng trabaho sa may BF Homes, Your
Honor.
COURT
Kailan kayo nagkita nitong si Elizabeth Castillo?
A Noong January lang po, Your Honor.
COURT
Saan kayo nagkita?
A Pinaalis niya po ako doon sa pinagtratrabahuan
ko sa may Dagat Dagatan, Your Honor.
COURT
Alam mo ba kung ilang buwan mayroon ang isang
taon?
A Hindi ko po alam, Your Honor.
COURT
Pero alam mo ang mga buwan, Enero, Pebrero. . .
alam mo iyon?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Sige nga sabihin mo nga sa akin kung anu-ano ang
mga buwan?
122

A Enero, Pebrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo, Hulyo,

Agosto, Setyembre, Oktubre, Nobyembre at
Disyembre po, Your Honor. 31
Padayhag's confusion in the way she answered the questions
propounded to her only highlights the fact that she was not aware
of Castillo's plans and was vulnerable to the latter's manipulation.
Her straightforward and wide-eyed admission of facts that
incriminate her demonstrate a level of honesty that can only be
found in those who do not know the art of deceit. Far from a cold
and calculating mind, Padayhag strikes us as one whose
innocence often leaves her at the mercy of her more worldly
peers. It is clear that she acted with the full belief that Castillo
was doing nothing wrong. Whatever moved her to do what
Castillo asked of her is up for speculation. What matters is that
her motivation in fetching Rocky was not to kidnap the boy. To
impose criminal liability, the law requires that there be intentional
participation in the criminal act, 32 not the unwitting cooperation
of a deceived individual.
In its brief the prosecution itself cites that any inquiry as to the
liability of an individual as a conspirator should focus on all
acts before, during and after the commission of the crime. 33 We
have done precisely that, and it is precisely why we rule for her
innocence. After her stroll with Castillo and Rocky, she left when
Castillo brought the boy to her sister's house in Caloocan. 34 She
never visited nor contacted Castillo afterwards. She remained at
her house and refused to go with Castillo when the latter
suddenly tried to coax her to go to Dipolog. None of the money
used as ransom was found in her possession. Her involvement in
the "pay-off" was never established. The testimony of two
prosecution witnesses, Sgt. De Lena and Sgt. Iglesias, claiming
that Padayhag was with Castillo when the latter picked up the
ransom in Obando, is contradicted by Castillo's admission in open
court that she brought along a certain "Mila" and not
Padayhag. 35 In addition, the testimonies of these two police
officers suffer from their failure to explain how they suddenly lost
track of the two women who took the ransom in front of their very
eyes.

All these circumstances illustrate the absence of any hint of

conspiracy. We also find that the prosecution failed to prove
Padayhag's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. InPeople v.
Gonzales 36 we held:
In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption
of innocence stands as a fundamental principle of
both constitutional and criminal law. 37 Thus, the prosecution has
the burden of proving every single fact establishing
guilt. 38 Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be
removed. 39 The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no
reason to convict. 40 Within this framework, the prosecution must
prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need
not even speak at all. The presumption of innocence is more than
sufficient.
The failure to prove Padayhag's involvement as a conspirator
reveals how tenuous the evidence is linking her to the crime.
Padayhag's culpability hinges on how her act of fetching Rocky
and bringing him to Castillo formed part of a concerted effort to
kidnap the child. The act of fetching the boy, by itself, does not
constitute a criminal offense. By itself, it is not even sufficient to
make her an accomplice. For a person to be considered an
accomplice there must be a community of design, that is,
knowing the criminal design of the principal, the co-accused
concurs with the latter. Mere commission of an act which aids the
perpetrator is not enough. As we explained in People v. Cual: 41
The cooperation that the law punishes is the
assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist
without the previous cognizance of the criminal act
123

intended to be executed. It is therefore required in

order to be liable as an accomplice, that the
accused must unite with the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation.
There was therefore a need for clear and convincing proof that
this single act was committed to kidnap the child. The prosecution
failed to prove this. Padayhag explained that Castillo coaxed her
into fetching Rocky through another deception and by playing on
her feelings of sympathy and friendship. Castillo corroborated this
on the witness stand. The prosecution failed to prove otherwise.
The facts, as established show that the only thing Castillo told
Padayhag was to fetch Rocky because Castillo missed her former
ward. Upon reaching the house of the Cebreros, the boy's nanny
handed over to Padayhag the child. There is no allegation or
evidence that Padayhag knew the criminal plan of Castillo.
Neither is there any hint that Castillo told Padayhag to abduct the
boy, or to misrepresent herself or use means that would have led
Padayhag to suspect that Castillo had some criminal design. Nor
was there any proof that Padayhag knew that Castillo had no
permission from the boy's parents. The appearance of the boy
itself, newly bathed and dressed for a stroll, would have led
Padayhag to believe whatever story Castillo contrived to ask her
in fetching the boy.
A criminal conviction must stand on the strength of the evidence
presented by the prosecution, and not on the weakness of the
defense of the accused. The prosecution should have done more
to establish Padayhag's guilt. Instead, the prosecution left a lot of
room for other possible scenarios besides her guilt. This is a fatal
error. The presumption of innocence imposes a rule of evidence, a
degree of proof that demands no less than total compliance. As
we explained in United States v. Reyes: 42
The presumption of innocence can be overborne
only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
which means proof, to the satisfaction of the court
and keeping in mind the presumption of
innocence, as precludes every reasonable

hypothesis except that which it is given to support.

It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a
probability, even though strong, that the fact
charged is more likely true than the contrary. It
must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable
and moral certainty a certainty that convinces
and satisfies the reason and conscience of those
who are to act upon it. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, we find Padayhag's explanation sufficiently
supported by circumstances aside from Castillo's testimony.
Padayhag's acts before, during and after the crime all point to the
conclusion that she was no more than an unwitting tool of
Castillo. Castillo misled her into a meeting. Castillo again misled
her into fetching Rocky. Castillo never met or contacted her after
the day of Rocky's abduction. Castillo also testified that she did
not bring Padayhag along with her when she went to Obando on
the day that coincided with the "pay-off." The only circumstance
linking Padayhag to that event is the shaky account of two police
officers who admitted that their quarry inexplicably disappeared
before their very eyes. Even the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, by itself, cannot prevail over the
constitutional presumption of innocence. 43 Nothing links
Padayhag to the demand for ransom. She never received any part
of the ransom, precisely because she did not even know it
existed.

Penalty and Damages

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, 44 the penalty of
death is imposed upon proof that the kidnapping was committed
to extort ransom from the victim or any other person. We find
that the prosecution has established Castillo's guilt for this crime
beyond reasonable doubt. However, Castillo's pecuniary liability
must be modified to conform with jurisprudence. The award of
exemplary damages must be deleted in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance. Mr. Cebrero testified that their family
suffered serious anxiety at the possibility of not seeing Rocky
124

again. 45 The pain and anguish they experienced justifies the

award of moral damages. However, we reduce the trial court's
award of moral damages to P100,000 in line with current
jurisprudence. 46
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 260, National Capital Judicial Region, in
Criminal Case No. 95-86 convicting appellant Elizabeth Castillo is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elizabeth Castillo is
sentenced, to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay the victim
P100,000 as moral damages. The award for exemplary damages
is deleted for lack of legal basis. The trial court's Decision
convicting appellant Evangeline Padayhag is REVERSED. We
ACQUIT Evangeline Padayhag and order her immediate RELEASE
from confinement unless held for another lawful cause. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to report to the
Court, within five days from notice, compliance with this Decision.

VELASCO, JR., J p:
The instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal
cases 2 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) involving no less than
36 former officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public
Highways (MPH) and several suppliers of construction materials
for defalcation of public funds arising from numerous transactions
in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District in 1977. Because of
the sheer magnitude of the illegal transactions, the number of
people involved, and the ingenious scheme employed in
defrauding the government, this infamous 86 million highway
scam has few parallels in the annals of crime in the
country. SAcCIH
The Case

SIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO

TORREVILAS, 1 petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Petitioners Simon Fernan, Jr. and Expedito Torrevillas seek the

reversal of the December 4, 1997 Decision 3 of the SB in the
consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 1640, 1641, 1642, 1643, 1818,
1819, 1820, 1821, 1822, 1823, 1879, 1880, 1881, 1882, 1883,
1884, 1885, 1886, 1887, 1888, 1889, 2839, 2840, 2841, 2842,
2843, 2844, 2845, 2846, 2847, 2848, 2849, 2850, 2851, 2852,
2853, 2854, 2855, 2856, 2857, 2858, 2859, 2860, 2861, 2862,
2863, 2864, 2865, 2866, 2867, 2868, 2869, 2870, 2871, 2872,
2873, 2874, 2875, 2876, 2877, 2878, 2879, 2880, 2881, 2882,
2883, 2884, 2885, 2886, 2887, 2888, 2889, 2890, 2891, 2892,
2893, 2894, 2895, 2896, 2897, 2898, 2899, 2900, 2901, 2902,
2903, 2904, 2905, 2906, 2907, 2908, 2909, 2910, 2911, 2912,
2913, 2915, 2917, 2918, 2919, 2920, 2921, 2922, 2923, 2924,
2925, 2926, 2927, 2928, 2929, 2930, 2931, 2932, 2936, 2937,
2938, and 2939, 4 all entitled People of the Philippines v. Rocilo
Neis, et al., finding them guilty of multiple instances of estafa
through falsification of public documents; 5 and the subsequent
August 29, 2000 SB Resolution which denied their separate pleas
for reconsideration. DaACIH

DECISION

Petitioner Fernan, Jr. disputes the adverse judgment in only six (6)
cases, namely: 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918; while
petitioner Torrevillas seeks exoneration in nine (9) cases, namely:

In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, upon finality of
this decision, let certified true copies of the records of this case
be forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 132895, [March 10, 2004], 469
PHIL 87-121)

[G.R. No. 145927. August 24, 2007.]

125

2855, 2856, 2858, 2859, 2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and

2932. IEAacT
Both petitioners assert their strong belief that their guilt has not
been established beyond reasonable doubt and, hence,
exculpation is in order.
The Facts
The SB culled the facts 6 this way:
On June 21, 1978, COA Regional Director Sofronio
Flores Jr. of COA Regional Office No. 7, directed
auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes to
verify and submit a report on sub-allotment advises
issued to various highway engineering districts in
Cebu, particularly, the Cebu City, Cebu 1st, Cebu
2nd and the Mandaue City Highway Engineering
Districts. Complying with the directive, they
conducted an investigation and in due course
submitted their findings. Their report (Exhibit C)
confirmed the issuance of fake Letters of Advice of
Allotments (LAAs) in the districts mentioned. They
discovered that two sets of LAAs were received by
the districts. One set consists of regular LAAs
which clearly indicated the covering sub-allotment
advices and were duly signed by Mrs. Angelina
Escao, Finance Officer of the MPH Regional Office.
The LAAs were numbered in proper sequence and
duly recorded in the logbook of the Accounting,
Budget and Finance Division. The other set consists
of fake LAAs which do not indicate the covering
sub-allotment advice and were signed by Chief
Accountant Rolando Mangubat and Engr. Jose
Bagasao, instead of the Finance Officer. These fake
LAAs were not numbered in proper sequence; they
were mostly undated and were sometimes
duplicated. They could not be traced to the files
and records of the Accounting, Budget and Finance
Division. The accounting entry for the

disbursements made on the fake LAAs was debited

to the Accounts-Payable Unliquidated Obligations
(8-81-400) and credited to the Checking Account
with the Bureau of Treasury (8-70-790).
Nevertheless, the expenditures were taken from
obligations of the current year (1978) because all
the supporting papers of the payment vouchers
were dated in that year. The entries in the journal
vouchers filed with the MPH Regional Office were
adjusted every month to 8-81-400 (unliquidated or
prior years obligation), 8-83-000 (liquidated or
current year obligations) and 8-70-700
(Treasury/Agency Account). All of these were
approved for the Finance Officer by Chief
Accountant Rolando Mangubat. Mangubat,
however, had no authority to approve them
because since October 1977, he had already been
detailed to the MPH Central Office. There were
indications that the practice had been going on for
years.
xxx xxx xxx
Due to these serious irregularities, then President
Marcos created a Special Cabinet Committee on
MPH Region VII "Ghost Projects Anomalies" which in
turn organized a Special Task Force composed of
representatives from the Finance Ministry
Intelligence Bureau (FMIB), National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Treasury and the
Commission on Audit. The mission of the task force
was to conduct a wider and more extended
investigation in all the fifteen (15) highway
engineering districts of MPH Region VII, including
the Cebu First Highway Engineering District, the
1977 questionable disbursements of which are the
subject matter of these cases.CAIHTE
xxx xxx xxx
126

For a better understanding of these highways

cases, the flow in the release of funds to the
various agencies of the government and the
control devices set up for disbursement and
accounting of public funds should first be
explained. A chart (Exhibit B) graphically shows the
flow of allotments from the Ministry down to the
district level.
On the basis of appropriation laws and upon
request made by heads of agencies, the then
Ministry of Budget released funds to the various
agencies of the government by means of an Advice
of Allotment (AA) and a Cash Disbursement Ceiling
(CDC). The Advice of Allotment is an authority for
the agency to incur obligations within a specified
amount in accordance with approved programs and
projects. The Cash Disbursement Ceiling is an
authority to pay. Upon receipt of the AA and CDC
from the Budget, the Central Office of the agency
prepares the Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) and
the Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC)
for each region, in accordance with the
disbursement allotment. These are sent to the
Regional Office. Upon receipt, the Budget Officer of
the region prepares the corresponding Letters of
Advice of Allotment (LAA) which are forwarded to
the various districts of the region (The amount that
goes to each district is already indicated in the
Advice of Allotment). Only upon receipt of the LAA
is the district office authorized to incur
obligations. DAaHET
Now, how are funds released by the Regional Office
to the different districts and ultimately paid out to
contractors, the District Engineer submits to the
Regional Director a request for allotment in
accordance with the program of work prepared by
the former. This procedure starts with the

preparation of a Requisition for Supplies and

Equipment (RSE) in the District Office by the Senior
Civil Engineer, approved by the District Engineer,
and signed by the Chief Accountant of the Highway
Engineering District, who certifies as to the
availability of funds. The RSE is then submitted to
the Regional Director for approval. Once it is
approved, a Request for Obligation of Allotment
(ROA) is prepared by the Chief Accountant of the
district Senior Civil Engineer. The ROA signifies that
a certain amount of district funds has been set
aside or earmarked for the particular expenditures
stated in the RSE. On the basis of the ROA, the
District Office puts up advertisements, [conducts]
biddings, makes awards and prepares purchase
orders which are served on the winning bidder. The
District Office also prepares a summary of
deliveries with the corresponding delivery receipts
and tally sheets, conducts inspection and prepares
the General Voucher for the payment of deliveries.
Once the General Voucher (GV) has been prepared,
the corresponding check in the form of a Treasury
Check Account for Agency (TCAA) is drawn by the
Disbursing Officer and finally released to the
contractor. HISAET
At the end of every month, the Report of Checks
Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDD) is
prepared, listing all the checks issued during that
period. The RCIDDO is submitted to the accounting
division of the region. Upon receipt of the RCIDDO,
the Regional Office draws a journal voucher,
debiting the account obligation (liquidated or
unliquidated obligation, whichever is applicable),
and crediting the account Treasury Check Account
for Agency (TCAA). The RCIDDO is recorded in the
Journal of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing
Officers (JCIDDO) and posted in the general ledger
at the end of each month. AcHCED
127

Simultaneous with the flow of the RCIDDO, the

ROAs are summarized in the Reports of Obligations
Incurred (ROI) in the District Office, once or twice a
month, depending upon the volume of
transactions. The ROI is then submitted to the
Regional Office. Upon receipt of the ROI, the
accountant of the Regional Office draws a journal
voucher taking up the following entry: debiting the
appropriation allotted (0-90-000) and crediting the
obligation incurred (0-82-000). This is recorded in
the general voucher and posted to the general
ledger at the end of each month. The journal
voucher is prepared, closing the account 8-70-709
to 8-71-100-199 at the end of each month. It is also
recorded and posted to the general ledger. At the
end of the month, the balances of each account
shown in the general ledger are summarized in a
statement called the trial balance. The trial balance
is submitted to the MPH Central Office in Manila
where it is consolidated with other trial balances
submitted by other regional offices. DCATHS

xxx xxx xxx

The elaborate accounting procedure described
above with its system of controls was set up
obviously to make sure that government funds are
properly released, disbursed and accounted for. In
the hands of untrustworthy guardians of the public
purse, however, it proved to be inadequate. There
were loopholes which an unscrupulous person
adroit in government accounting could take
advantage of to surreptitiously draw enormous
sums of money from the government. aASDTE
Sometime in February, 1977, accused Rolando
Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido
(Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner),

and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH Region VII,

met at the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu
City and hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off
large sums of money from government coffers.
Mangubat had found a way to withdraw
government money through the use of fake LAAs,
vouchers and other documents and to conceal
traces thereof with the connivance of other
government officials and employees. In fine, the
fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of LAAs
and RSEs so that the amount covered by each
general voucher is less than P50,000.00 to do away
with the approval of the Regional Auditor; the
charging of disbursements to unliquidated
obligations due the previous year to provide the
supposed source of funds; and the manipulation of
the books of account by negation or adjustment,
i.e., the cancellation of checks through journal
vouchers to conceal disbursements in excess of the
cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to
reflect such disbursements in the trial balances
submitted to the Regional Office. aCTcDH
Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to
join him. All three agreed to help him carry out his
plan. They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays.
Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or
selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the
gross amount. Preagido on her part manipulated
the General Ledger, Journal Vouchers and General
Journal thru negative entries to conceal the illegal
disbursements. Thus, in the initial report of the
auditors (Exhibit D), it was discovered that the
doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped
notice due to the following manipulations:
"The letter-advices covering such allotments
(LAA) were generally not signed by the
Finance Officer nor recorded in the books of
128

accounts. Disbursements made on the basis

of these fake LAAs were charged to the
unliquidated Obligations (Account 8-81-400),
although the obligations being paid were not
among those certified to the unliquidated
obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of
the preceding year. To conceal the
overcharges to authorized allotments,
account 8-81-400 and the excess of checks
issued over authorized cash disbursements
ceiling, adjustments were prepared monthly
through journal vouchers to take up the
negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a
negative credit to the Treasury Checking
Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790.
These journal vouchers in effect cancelled
the previous entry to record the
disbursements made on the basis of the fake
LAAs. Thus, the affected accounts (Accounts
8-81-400 and 8-70-790), as appearing in the
trial balance would not show the irregularity.
The checks, however, were actually issued."
The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious
conspiracy. Other government employees, tempted
by the prospect of earning big money, allowed
their names to be used and signed spurious
documents.
Although the anomalies had been going on for
sometime (February 1977 to June 1978), the PNB
and Bureau of Treasury had no inkling about it until
the NBI busted the illegal operations. (Some of the
recipients of the stolen funds spent lavishly and
bought two cars at a time). The reason for this is
that, at that time, the PNB and Bureau of Treasury
were not furnished copy of the mother CDC and the
local branch of the PNB did not receive
independent advice from the PNB head office in

Manila. There were no deposits of money made

with the PNB from which withdrawals could be
charged. Only CDCs were presented to it, and not
knowing that some of the CDCs were fake, the PNB
branch paid out the checks drawn against them.
The bank had also no way of knowing what amount
was appropriated for the district; consequently, it
did not know if the limit had already been
exceeded. Only an insider steep in government
accounting, auditing and banking procedures,
particularly their flaws and loopholes, could have
pulled off such an ingenious and audacious
plan. HIACEa
xxx xxx xxx
Focusing our attention now on the anomalies
committed in the Cebu First District Engineering
District, hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First
HED for brevity, the Court finds that the same
pattern of fraud employed in the other highway
engineering districts in MPH Region VII was
followed. The Cebu First HED received from Region
VII thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs)
in the total sum of P4,734,336.50 and twenty-nine
(29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs), amounting to
P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1, 1977 to
December 31, 1977. But apart from this, the Cebu
First HED appears to have also received for the
same period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs
amounting to P4,680,694.76 which however, could
not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA)
or matched to the Advices of Cash Disbursement
Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH and
Regional Office. This is highly irregular and not in
consonance with accounting procedures. aIEDAC
It was also made to appear that the payments were
made for alleged prior year's obligations and
129

chargeable to Account 8-81-400, obviously

because, they were not properly funded.
Furthermore, the list of projects in Region VII for
1977 showed that Cebu First HED completed
rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and
bridges in its districts from February to May 1977,
with expenditures amounting to P613,812.00. On
the other hand, the expenditures for barangay
roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to
P140,692.00, and these were all completed within
the period from November to December, 1977.
These completed projects were properly funded by
legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of
only P754,504.00. However, an additional amount
of P3,839,810.74 was spent by the Cebu First HED
for maintenance of roads and bridges for the same
year (1977) but the same could not be traced to
any authoritative document coming from the
MPH. ISEHTa
xxx xxx xxx
A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from
fake LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando
Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII and
Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer,
also of Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became
the vehicles in the disbursement of funds
amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers
purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of
the aforementioned materials allegedly used for
the maintenance and repair of the national
highways within the Cebu First HED. Despite the
enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74,
the roads and bridges in the district, as found out
by the NBI, did not show any improvement. As
testified to by several barangay captains, the road
maintenance consisted merely of

spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the

national highway.
Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged
maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional
amount of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no
other purpose than to siphon the said amount from
the government coffer into the pockets of some
officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu
First HED, as well as the suppliers and contractors
who conspired and confederated with them.
The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat,
Jose Sayson, and Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH Region VII, were found
guilty in all 119 counts and were accordingly sentenced by the
SB. The other conniver, Delia Preagido, after being found guilty in
some of the cases, became a state witness in the remainder. On
the basis of her testimony and pertinent documents, Informations
were filed, convictions were obtained, and criminal penalties were
imposed on the rest of the accused.DICSaH
On the other hand, petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the
MPH assigned to the Cebu First Highway Engineering District.
Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among the accused in Criminal
Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918 allegedly for
having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries of
materials, used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding
number of general vouchers. Fund releases were made to the
suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these general
vouchers. cSTCDA
The Information against Fernan, Jr. in SB Criminal Case
No. 2879 reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando
Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escao,
Delia Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra,
Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde,
Josefina Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila
del Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona,
130

Leonardo Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan, Ramon

Quirante, Mariano Montera, Mariano Jarina, Leo
Villagonzalo, Asterio Buqueron, Zosimo Mendez,
Simon Fernan, Jr. and Juliana de los Angeles
forestafa thru falsification of public and commercial
documents, committed as follows: AcHSEa
That on, about and during the period
from December 1, 1976 up to January 31,
1977, both dates inclusive, in the City of Cebu and
in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo Neis, Assistant
District Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat,
the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of
Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez, Regional
Highway Engineer of same Regional Office,
conniving with each other to defraud the Philippine
Government with the indispensable cooperation
and assistance of Angelina Escao, Finance Officer
of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways;
Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of same
Regional Office; Camilo de Letran, Chief Accountant
of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director,
MPH, Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar, then Assistant
Director MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget
Officer, MPH, Region VII; Matilde Jabalde,
Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII;
Josefina Luna, Accountant II, MPH, Region VII; Jose
Sayson, Budget Examiner, MPH, Region VII,
Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII;
Leonila del Rosario, Chief Finance and Management
Service, MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar,
Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Abelardo
Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant, MPH, Central
Office; Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising
Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Agripino
Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III, MPH, Central
Office; Ramon Quirante, Property Custodian of
Cebu I HED; Mariano Montera, Senior Civil Engineer

Engineer of Cebu I HED; Mariano Jarina, Clerk in the

Property Division of Cebu I HED; Leo Villagonzalo,
Auditor's Aide of Cebu I HED; Zosimo Mendez,
Auditor of Cebu I HED; Asterio Buqueron,
Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED; Simon
Fernan, Jr., Civil Engineer of Cebu I HED and Juliana
de los Angeles, an alleged supplier, all of whom
took advantage of their official positions, with the
exception of Juliana de los Angeles, mutually
helping each other did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the
falsification of the following documents, to
wit: ISTDAH

1.Request for Allocation of Allotment

2.Letter of Advice of Allotment
3.Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling
4.General Voucher No. B-15
5.Check No. 9933064
6.Abstract of Bids
7.Purchase Order
8.Statement of Delivery
9.Report of Inspection
10.Requisition for Supplies or Equipment
11.Trial Balance
by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of
Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash disbursement
ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of advice of allotment
(LAA) to cover the purchase of 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 7 for
use in the repair of the Cebu Hagnaya Wharf road from
Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00, when in truth and in fact, as all the
131

accused knew, the same were not true and correct; by making it
appear in the voucher that funds were available and that there
were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the
aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was made and
approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding
purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder; that the
road construction materials were delivered, inspected and used in
the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to
payment when in truth and in fact, as all the accused know, all of
the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the
foregoing falsifications, the above-named accused were able to
collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of TWENTY
EIGHTTHOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine Currency,
in payment of the non-existing deliveries; that the said amount
of P28,000.00 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance
submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showing its financial
condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher, as a
designed means to cover-up the fraud; and the accused, once in
possession of the said amount, misappropriated, converted and
misapplied the same for their personal needs, to the damage and
prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total amount
of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(P28,000.00), Philippine Currency.

2880

3.
2881

Dates of

Main Documents Items Allegedly

Commission

Falsified

2879

December 1, 1976
up to January 31,
1977

Purchased 2914

General
1,400 cu. m. of
Voucher No. B-15; item 108 for use in
Check No.
9933064;

1.

3.

Criminal
Case
No.

2.

January 2, 1977 up
to February 28,
1977

2.

The Informations in the six (6) cases involving Fernan, Jr. were
essentially identical save for the details as highlighted in boldface
above. For ease of reference, Fernan, Jr.'s criminal cases are
detailed below:

1.

1.

2.

2885

CONTRARY TO LAW.

December 1, 1976
up to January 31,
1977

the repair of the

Cebu Hagnaya

January 2, 1977 up

1.

to January 31,
1977
2.
3.
October 1, 1977 up
to November 30,
1977

1.
2.

Wharf road fro

Km. 50.30 to K
60.00
Request for
1,400 cu. m. o
Allocation of
item 108 for u
Allotment 101-12- in the repair o
105-76;
Bogo-CurvaGeneral
Medellon road
Voucher No. B-55; from Km. 110
Check No.
to Km. 119.00
9933104;
Request for
Approximately
Allocation of
1,500 cu. m. o
Allotment 101-2- item 108 for u
56-77;
the repair and
General
rehabilitation
Voucher No. Bdamaged road
245;
and bridges b
Check No.
Typhoon Aring
9933294;
the Tabogon-B
provincial roa
from Km. 92 t
Km. 98
Request for
PhP30,000.00
materials for use
Allocation of
in the repair a
Allotment 101-12- rehabilitation
112-76;
Daan-Bantaya
General
road from Km
Voucher No. B-76; 127.00 to Km.
Check No.
9933125;
General
1,200 cu. m. o
Voucher No. Bitem 108 for u
927;
the rehabilitat
Check No.
the Cajel-Lugo
9403425;
Barbon baran
road
132

2918

January 2, 1977 up
to February 28,
1977

1.

General
Voucher No. B107;
Check No.
9933157;

1,500 cu. m. of
item 108 for the
rehabilitation of the
2.
Cebu North
Hagnaya Wharf
road from Km. 71
to Km. 76
On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused
in Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, 2859, 2909, 2910, 2914,
2919, and 2932.
The Information against Torrevillas in SB Criminal Case
No. 2855 reads as follows: TSHIDa
The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando
Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escao,
Delia Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra,
Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde,
Josefina Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila
del Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona,
Leonardo Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan, Ramon
Quirante, Jorge de la Pea, Leo Villagonzalo, Asterio
Buqueron, Expedito Torrevillas, Mariano Montera
and Rufino V. Nuez for estafa thru falsification of
public and commercial documents, committed as
follows: EaSCAH
That on, about and during the period
from June 1, 1977 up to June 30, 1977,
both dates inclusive, in the City of Cebu and
in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo
Neis, Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED
I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant
of Region VII of the Ministry of Public
Highways and Adventor Fernandez, Regional
Highway Engineer of same Regional Office,
conniving with each other to defraud the
Philippine Government with the
indispensable cooperation and assistance of

Angelina Escao, Finance Officer of Region

VII of the Ministry of Public Highways; Delia
Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of
same Regional Office; Camilo de Letran,
Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de
Veyra, Regional Director, MPH, Region VII;
Heracleo Faelnar, then Assistant Director
MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget
Officer, MPH, Region VII; Matilde Jabalde,
Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region
VII; Josefina Luna, Accountant II, MPH,
Region VII; Jose Sayson, Budget Examiner,
MPH, Region VII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I,
MPH, Region VII; Leonila del Rosario, Chief
Finance and Management Service, MPH,
Central Office; Engracia Escobar, Chief
Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Abelardo
Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant, MPH,
Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla,
Supervising Accountant, MPH, Central Office;
Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III,
MPH, Central Office; Ramon Quirante,
Property Custodian of Cebu I HED; Jorge de
la Pea, Auditor of Cebu I HED; Leo
Villagonzalo, Auditor's Aide of Cebu I HED;
Asterio Buqueron, Administrative Officer of
Cebu I HED; Expedito Torrevillas,
representative of the Engineer's Office, Cebu
I HED; Mariano Montera, Senior Civil
Engineer of Cebu I HED; and Rufino V. Nuez,
an alleged supplier, all of whom took
advantage of their official positions, with the
exception of Rufino V. Nuez, mutually
helping each other did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
and/or cause the falsification of the following
documents, to wit:
133

1.Request for Allocation of Allotment

101-10-186-76; 10-190-76; 10192-76; 10-188-76; 10-180-76
2.Letter of Advice of Allotment
3.Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling
4.General Voucher No. B-613
5.Check No. 9403099
6.Abstract of Bids
7.Purchase Order
8.Statement of Delivery
9.Report of Inspection
10.Requisition for Supplies or
Equipment
11.Trial Balance
by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the
Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of
cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding
letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase
of 153.63 m. t. of item 310 8 for use in asphalting of
the Toledo-Tabuelan road at Km. 108.34 to Km.
109.52, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused knew,
the same were not true and correct; by making it appear in
the voucher that funds were available and that there were
appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the
aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was
made and approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a
corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the
winning bidder; that the road construction materials were
delivered, inspected and used in the supposed project and
that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in
truth and in fact, as all the accused know, all of the
foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the

foregoing falsifications, the above-named accused were

able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount
of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY
ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48,431.85), Philippine
Currency, in payment of the non-existing deliveries; that
the said amount of P48,431.85 was not reflected in the
monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office by
Region VII showing its financial condition as the same was
negated thru the journal voucher, as a designed means to
cover-up the fraud; and the accused, once in possession of
the said amount, misappropriated, converted and
misapplied the same for their personal needs, to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the
total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100
(P48,431.85), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Torrevillas cases were substantially the same save for the
details highlighted in the aforequoted typical accusatory pleading.
For ease of reference, Torrevillas' criminal cases are particularized
as follows:
Criminal
Case
No.

Dates of

Main Documents Items Allege

Commission

Falsified

Purchased

2855

June 1, 1977 up to
June 30, 1977

Request for
Allocation of
Allotment 101-10186-76; 10-19076; 10-192-76; 10188-76; 10-18076;
General
Voucher No. B613;
Check No.
9403099;

153.63 m. t. o
item 310 for u
asphalting of
Toledo-Tabuela
road from Km
108.34 to Km.
109.52

2.
3.

134

2856

June 1, 1977 up to
June 30, 1977

1.

2.
3.
2858

June 1, 1977 up to
July 31, 1977

1.

2.
3.
2859

June 1, 1977 up to
June 31, 1977

1.

2.
3.
2909

September 1, 1977
up to November
30, 1977

1.
2.

Request for
Allocation of
Allotment 101-1015-76; 9-201-76;
8-152-76; 8-15376; 9-181-76; 9184-76
General
Voucher No. B619;
Check No.
9403105;
Request for
Allocation
Allotment 101-6234-76; 6-237-76;
6-239-76; 6-24176; 6-240-76
General
Voucher No. B629;
Check No.
9403115;
Request for
Allocation of
Allotment 101-763-76; 8-102-76;
8-121-76
General
Voucher No. B631;
Check No.
9403117;
General
Voucher No. B928;
Check No.
9403426;

153.76 m. t. of
item 310 for use
2910
in
the asphalting of
the ToledoTabuelan road
from Km 108.34 to
Km. 109.52
2914

September 1, 1977
up to November
30, 1977

1.
2.

October 1, 1977
up to November 30,
1977

1.
2.

151.35 m. t. of
item 310 for use in
the asphalting2919
of
the ToledoTabuelan road
from Km. 108.34
to Km. 109.52

110.01 m. t. of
2932
item 310 for use in
asphalting of the
Toledo-Tabuelan
road from Km.
108.34 to
Km.109.52

January 2, 1977 up
to February 28,
1977

1.
2.

June 1, 1977 up to
July 31, 1977

1.

2.
3.

barangay road
1,200 cu. m. o
item 108 for u
the rehabilitat
of the MagayCanamukan,
Compostela
barangay road
General
1,200 cu. m. o
Voucher No. Bitem 108 for u
927;
the rehabilitat
Check No.
of the Cajel-Lu
9403425;
Barbon baran
road
General
1,550 cu. m. o
Voucher No. Bitem 108 for u
244;
the repair and
Check No.
rehabilitation
9933293;
damaged road
bridges at the
Toledo-Tabuela
national road
Km. 71 to Km
Request for
250 gals of
Allocation of
aluminum pai
Allotment 101-7- 324 gals of re
83-76; 7-84-76; 7- lead paint for
124-76; 8-153-76; in the mainten
8-170-76;
of national roa
General
and bridges
Voucher B-643;
Check No.
9403130;
General
Voucher No. B929;
Check No.
9403427;

1,200 cu.m. of item

The Sandiganbayan's Ruling
108 for use in the
rehabilitation The
of anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of petitioner
the Buanoy- Fernan, Jr.; and in its December 4, 1997 Decision, it found him
criminally liable in the six (6) cases against him, thus: ISCcAT
Cantibas, Balaban
135

In Criminal Case No. 2879, the Court finds

accused JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE,
MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ,
MARIANO JARINA and SIMON FERNAN, Jr.,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals
in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a
fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty
Eight Thousand Pesos (P28,000.00); and, to pay
their proportionate share of the costs. 9 (Emphasis
supplied.) AcICTS
In Criminal Case No. 2880, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA,
ZOSIMO MENDEZ, and SIMON FERNAN,
Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as coprincipals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of
Public Documents as defined and penalized in
Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a
fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the

Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty

Eight Thousand Pesos (P28,000.00); and, to pay
their proportionate share of the
costs. 10 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2881, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO
MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN,
Jr., GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt as coprincipals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of
Public Documents as defined and penalized in
Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a
fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty
One Thousand Pesos (P31,000.00); and, to pay
their proportionate share of the
costs. 11 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2885, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO
MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN,
Jr., GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt as coprincipals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of
Public Documents as defined and penalized in
Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
136

minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and

one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a
fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs. 12 (Emphasis
supplied.) CIHAED
In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN,
Jr.,GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as coprincipals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of
Public Documents as defined and penalized in
Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a
fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty
Seven Thousand Pesos (P27,000.00); and, to pay
their proportionate share of the
costs. 13 (Emphasis supplied.) ITcCSA
In Criminal Case No. 2918, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, SIMON
FERNAN, Jr. and ISMAEL SABIO,
Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as coprincipals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of
Public Documents as defined and penalized in

Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the

Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a
fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs. 14 (Emphasis
supplied.) TAHcCI
Petitioner Torrevillas suffered the same fate and was convicted in
the nine (9) criminal cases, to wit: cSHIaA
In Criminal Case No. 2855, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA, and EXPEDITO
TORREVILLASGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru
falsification of Public Documents as defined and
penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance,
hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify,
jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines
in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four
Hundred Thirty One Pesos and 85/100
137

(P48,431.85); and, to pay their proportionate share

of the costs. 15 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2856, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA and EXPEDITO
TORREVILLASGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru
falsification of Public Documents as defined and
penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance,
hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify,
jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines
in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Two Pesos and 84/100
(P48,472.84); and, to pay their proportionate share
of the costs. 16 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2858, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA
and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of
Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as
defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal relation
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance,
hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)

years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision

mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify,
jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines
in the amount of Forty Seven Thousand Seven
Hundred Thirteen Pesos and 9/100 (P47,713.09);
and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs. ETIHCa

In Criminal Case No. 2859, the Court finds

accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals
in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a
fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty
Four Thousand Six Hundred Eighty pesos and
65/100 (P34,680.65); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs. 17
In Criminal Case No. 2909, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, FLORO
JAYME and EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt
as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru
138

falsification of Public Documents as defined and

penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance,
hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify,
jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines
in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine
Hundred Pesos (P27,900.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs. 18 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2910, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, FLORO
JAYME and EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt
as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru
falsification of Public Documents as defined and
penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance,
hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify,
jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines
in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine
Hundred Pesos (P27,900.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs. 19 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds

accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN,
Jr.,GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as coprincipals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of
Public Documents as defined and penalized in
Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a
fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty
Seven Thousand Pesos (P27,000.00); and, to pay
their proportionate share of the costs. (Emphasis
supplied.) aIHSEc
In Criminal Case No. 2919, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA,
ZOSIMO MENDEZ, EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS and ISMAEL SABIO, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals
in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a
fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
139

(P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the

Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty
One Thousand Pesos (P31,000.00); and, to pay
their proportionate share of the
costs. 20 (Emphasis supplied.) HITAEC
In Criminal Case No. 2932, the Court finds
accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON,
RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA,
PEDRITO SEVILLE and EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru
falsification of Public Documents as defined and
penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance,
hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify,
jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines
in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Seven
Hundred Sixty Two Pesos and 58/100 (P44,762.58);
and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs. 21(Emphasis supplied.) DSITEH
Petitioners made the supplication before the court a quo to recall
the adverse judgments against them which was declined by the
August 29, 2000 SB Resolution. HcSCED
Firm in their belief that they were innocent of any wrongdoing,
they now interpose the instant petition to clear their names.
The Issues
Petitioners put forward two (2) issues, viz:

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN TOTALLY IGNORED

PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE BURDEN OF CONVINCING
THE HON. COURT THAT THE DELIVERIES OF THE ROAD MATERIALS
ATTESTED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THEM WERE NOT GHOST
DELIVERIES RESTS WITH THE ACCUSED AND NOT WITH THE
PROSECUTION. acHETI
II
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING
PETITIONERS AS CO-CONSPIRATORS DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
WOULD IMPLICATE THEM AS CO-CONSPIRATORS AND JUSTIFY
THEIR CONVICTION.
The Court's Ruling
We are not persuaded to nullify the verdict.
Petitioners' guilt was established beyond reasonable
doubt
Petitioners mainly asseverate that their guilt was not shown
beyond a peradventure of doubt and the State was unable to
show that government funds were illegally released based on
alleged ghost deliveries in conjunction with false or fake tally
sheets and other documents which they admittedly signed.
We are not convinced.
Our Constitution unequivocally guarantees that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. 22 This sacred task unqualifiedly means
proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
Definitely, "reasonable doubt" is not mere guesswork whether or
not the accused is guilty, but such uncertainty that "a reasonable
man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the
evidence." Reasonable doubt is present when

I
140

after the entire comparison and consideration of all

the evidences, leaves the minds of the [judges] in
that condition that they cannot say they feel an
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
truth of the charge; a certainty that convinces and
directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason
and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. 23
A thorough scrutiny of the records is imperative to determine
whether or not reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of accused
Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas.
Petitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents as defined and
penalized under Articles 318 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, thus: EIAaDC
ART. 318.Other deceits. The penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of
the damage caused and not more than twice such
amount shall be imposed upon any person who
shall defraud or damage another by any deceit not
mentioned in the preceding articles of this
chapter. cASTED
ART. 171.Falsification by public officer, employee;
or notary or ecclesiastical minister. The penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
4.Making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts;
ART. 48.Penalty for complex crimes. When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less

grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary

means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. cATDIH
The complex crime is pruned into the following essential
elements:
For estafa
1.Deceit: Deceit is a specie of fraud. It is actual fraud, and
consists in any false representation or contrivance whereby one
person overreaches and misleads another, to his hurt. There is
deceit when one is misled, either by guile or trickery or by other
means, to believe to be true what is really false. 24
2.Damage: Damage may consist in the offended party being
deprived of his money or property as a result of the defraudation,
disturbance in property right, or temporary prejudice. 25

For falsification
1.That the offender is a public officer, employee, or
notary public;
2.That he takes advantage of his official position;
3.That he falsifies a document by committing any
of the acts defined under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code. 26
Before the SB, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated
September 1, 1988 was entered into between the State and the
accused with the following stipulations and admissions:
(1)To expedite the early termination of the instant
cases and abbreviate the testimony of Mrs. Delia
Preagido, the prosecution and the accused have
agreed to reproduce and adopt as the testimony of
Preagido in the instant cases, her previous
testimonies in Criminal Cases Nos. 889, etc.
141

(Mandaue City HED '78 cases), on May 18 and 19,

1982 and in Criminal Cases Nos. 1446-1789, etc.
(Danao City HED '77 cases) on November 10, 1987
and March 14, 1988, both on direct and cross
examination . . . without prejudice to whatever
direct and/or cross examination question, that may
be propounded by the Prosecution and the accused
on said State witness, which questions will only be
limited to the fake or irregular LAA's and SACDC's
issued to Cebu I HED in 1977, the sale of such fake
or irregular LAA's and SACDC's issued to Cebu I
HED in 1977, the sale of such fake or irregular
LAA's and SACDC's in said engineering district in
the said year and the participation of the accused
thereon; cSIADa
(2)That in the event Mrs. Delia Preagido is
presented to testify as a State witness in the
instant cases without reproducing and adopting her
previous testimonies in the Mandaue City HED '78
and the Danao City HED '77 cases, she will identify
documents and exhibits which have been
previously marked and identified by other
prosecution witness . . . .
(3)That in the previous testimonies of Mrs. Delia
Preagido in the Mandaue City HED '78 and the
Danao City HED '77 cases, she identified twenty-six
separate lists containing names of officials and
employees of MPH, Regional Office No. VII, of the
various Highways Engineering Districts in MPH,
Region VII, and the MPH Central Office who have
allegedly received money or various sums from
1977 to 1978 out of the proceeds or sales of fake
LAA's in 1977 and 1978 and, therefore, to obviate
Mrs. Preagido's previous testimony of these lists,
the Prosecution hereby reproduces and adopts
specifically such testimony and the markings of the
lists, i.e., Exhibits 'KKK', 'KKK-1' to 'KKK-25' in the

Mandaue City HED '78 cases and Exhibits '0000',

'0000-1' to '0000-25' in the Danao City HED '77
cases, substituted or re-marked accordingly as
'Exhibits 'LL', 'LL-1' to 'LL-25' in the instant
cases. 27
As a result of this MOA, the testimony of state witness Preagido
on the modus operandi of the conspirators, or the unique and
distinct method of procedure by which the malversation of public
funds in Region VII of the MPH was perpetrated and
accomplished, dealt a major blow to the defenses raised by
petitioners. Preagido's vital testimony, wherein she identified the
methods, documents, exhibits, and other pertinent papers that
led to the crafting of fake Letters of Advice of Allotment
(LAAs), 28general vouchers, disbursement of funds for nonexistent projects, general vouchers, and other documents, was
not even successfully refuted or overturned by
petitioners. HaTSDA
Preagido confirmed and admitted under oath that the illegal
disbursement of public funds pertained to non-existent projects
and was supported by fake LAAs, fake general vouchers, and
other pertinent papers that were also falsified. The fake LAAs and
general vouchers were, in turn, supported by signed tally sheets
that pertained to alleged ghost deliveries of road construction
materials for non-existent or illegal projects.
The fake tally sheets, delivery receipts, reports of inspection,
requests for supplies and materials, and other related documents
signed on separate occasions by petitioners, which were attached
as supporting documents to corresponding general vouchers; the
alleged amounts and quantities of road construction materials
delivered; and the specific fake general vouchers, checks, and
other pertinent documents issued which led to the illegal
disbursement of funds are summarized as follows: ICcDaA
Petitioner Fernan, Jr.
Criminal Specific
Case

Exhibits

Main
Documents
Falsified

Items Allegedly FAKE L

Purchased

that au
142

No.
purchase
2879

T-86-f-1, etc.
(Tally Sheets)

1.
2.

2880

T-87-f-1, etc.
(Tally Sheets)

1.

2.
3.
2881

T-104-g-1, etc. 1.
(Tally Sheets)
2.
3.

2885

T-89-f-1, etc.
(Tally Sheets)

1.

2.

General Voucher
No. B-15;
Check No.
9933064;

1,400 cu. m. of
item 108 for use
in the repair of
the Cebu
Hagnaya Wharf
road from Km.
50.30 to Km.
60.00
Request for
1,400 cu. m. of
Allocation of
item 108 for use
Allotment
in the repair of
101-12the Bogo-Curva105-76;
Medellon road
General Voucher from Km. 110.00
No. B-55;
to Km. 119.00
Check No.
9933104;
Request for
Approximately
Allocation of
1,500 cu. m. of
Allotment 101-2- item 108 for use
56-77;
in the repair and
General Voucher rehabilitation of
No. B-245;
damaged roads
Check No.
and bridges by
9933294;
Typhoon Aring at
the TabogonBogo provincial
road from Km. 92
to Km. 98
Request for
Materials for use
Allocation of
in the repair and
Allotment 101rehabilitation of
12112-76;
the DaanGeneral Voucher Bantayan road

3.

Not numbered
2914
contrary to
official
procedure

T-115-g-1, etc. 1.
(Tally Sheets)
2.

2918
Not numbered
contrary to
official
procedure

T-116-f-1, etc. 1.
(Tally Sheets)
2.

No. B-76;
Check No.
9933125;
General Voucher
No. B-927;
Check No.
9403425;

from Km. 127.00

to Km. 136

1,200 cu. m. of
item 108 for use
in the
rehabilitation of
the Cajel-Lugo,
Barbon barangay
road
General Voucher 1,500 cu. m. of
No. B-107;
item 108 for the
Check No.
rehabilitation of
9933157;
the Cebu North
Hagnaya Wharf
road from Km. 71
to Km. 76

Not num
contrar
official
procedu

Petitioner Torrevillas
Criminal Specific
Not numbered
Case
Exhibits
contrary
to
official No.
procedure
2855

T-33-f
(Delivery
Receipt); T-

1.

33-f-1 (Daily
Tally Sheet);
Not numbered
contrary
to official

2.

procedure

3.

2856

T-34-f

1.

Main
Documents
Falsified

Items Allegedly FAKE L

Purchased

that
author
purcha

Request for
Allocation of
Allotment 10110186-76; 10-19076;
10-192-76; 1018876; 10-180-76;
General Voucher
No. B-613;
Check No.
9403099;
Request for

153.63 m. t. of
item 310 for use
in asphalting of

Not num
contrar
official

the Toledo-

procedu

Tabuelan road
from Km.
108.34 to Km.
109.52
153.76 m. t. of

Not num
143

(Delivery
Receipt); T34-f-1 (Daily
Tally Sheet);
2.
3.
2858

T-35-f
(Delivery
Receipt); T35-f-1 (Daily

1.

Tally Sheet);
2.

2859

T-36-f
(Delivery
Receipt); T36-f-1 (Daily

1.

Tally Sheet);
2.
3.
2909

T-113-b
(Request for
Supplies and
Equipment);
T-113-d

1.

Allocation of
Allotment 1011015-76; 9-201-76;
8152-76; 8-15376; 9-181-76; 9184-76
General Voucher
No. B-619;
Check No.
9403105;
Request for
Allocation
Allotment 101-6234-76; 6-23776;
6-239-76; 6-24176; 6-240-76
General Voucher
No. B-629;
3. Check No.
9403115;
Request for
Allocation of
Allotment 101-763-76; 8-102-76;
8121-76
General Voucher
No. B-631;
Check No.
9403117;
General Voucher
No. B-928;
2. Check No.
9403426;

item 310 for use contrary to

in the asphalting official
of the Toledo-

procedure

Tabuelan road
from Km 108.34
to Km. 109.52

151.35 m. t. of
item 310 for use
in the asphalting
of the Toledo-

Not numbered
contrary to
official
procedure

Tabuelan road
from Km.
108.34 to Km.
109.52
110.01 m. t. of
item 310 for use
in asphalting of
the Toledo-

Not numbered
contrary to
official
procedure

Tabuelan road
from Km.
108.34 to
Km. 109.52
1,200 cu. m. of
item 108 for use
in the
rehabilitation of
the Buanoy-

Not numbered
contrary to
official
procedure
144

145

2910

2914

2919

(Report of
Inspection); T113-c
(Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)
T-114-c
(Request for
Supplies and
Equipment);
T-114-e
(Report of
Inspection); T114-f
(Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)
T-115-c
(Request for
Supplies and
Equipment);
T-115-e
(Report of
Inspection); T115-f
(Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)
T-117-g
(Delivery
Receipt); T117-g-1, etc.
(Daily Tally
Sheets)

Cantibas,
Balaban
barangay road

1.
2.

1.
2.

1.
2.

Km. 83
Request for
250 gals of
Allocation of
aluminum paint
Allotment 101-7- 324 gals of red
83-76; 7-84-76; lead paint for
7General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of
Not numbered
124-76; 8-153use in the
No. B-929;
item 108 for use contrary to
76;
Check No.
in the
official
8-170-76;
maintenance of
9403427;
rehabilitation of procedure
2. General Voucher national roads
the MagayB-643;
and bridges
Canamukan,
3. Check No.
Compostela
9403130;
barangay road
On the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that they either
signed the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of
inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other related
documents which became part of the supporting documents that
General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of
Not numbered
led to the issuance of general vouchers and eventually the
No. B-927;
item 108 for use contrary
disbursement
to
of public funds. 29 The tally sheets are statements
Check No.
in the
official of delivery that purportedly indicated the specified quantities of
9403425;
rehabilitation of procedure
materials for the construction and maintenance of roads that
the Cajel-Lugo,
have been delivered on supposed project sites on given dates at
Barbon barangay
specific places.
road

General Voucher
No. B-244;
Check No.
9933293;

1,550 cu. m. of
item 108 for use
in the repair and
rehabilitation of
damaged roads
and bridges at
the ToledoTabuelan
national road
from Km. 71 to

2932

1.

Not num
contrar
official
procedu

As a result of petitioners' signatures in the tally sheets and/or

delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and
materials, and other supporting documents which became the
Not numbered
basis for payment to suppliers public funds were released via
contrary
to
general
vouchers and checks to the said suppliers despite the fact
official that the latter did not make any deliveries in accordance with
procedure
projects allegedly funded by mostly fake LAAs.
The accusation that there were no actual deliveries of road
construction and maintenance materials in support of projects or
otherwise funded by LAAs was proven true by the testimonies of
the various barangay captains and residents of the barangay who
were supposed to be benefited by the construction and repair
activities of the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. The
146

testimonies of these barangay captains and residents are

summarized as follows: 30
1.MACARIO LIMALIMA, Barangay Captain of
Barangay Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, testified that
his barangay is traversed by the national highway
stretching to a distance of 2 kilometers and 750
meters (Km. 122; Km. 123 to 125). He described
the road as full of potholes. Except for filling up
these potholes with "anapog" or crushed
limestone, no major repairs were undertaken on
the said road in 1978 or in previous years. (TSN.,
pp. 6-14, June 5, 1986). 31
2.FELOMINO ORBISO, Barangay Captain of Cawit,
Medellin, Cebu, from 1972 to 1981, testified that
his barangay is traversed by the national highway,
stretching from Km. 125 to Km. 127.9. He
described the road as a rough or dirt road. No
improvement was ever made on this road whether
during the year when he gave his statement to the
NBI (1978) or in previous years. The road remained
in bad shape, with numerous potholes which the
camineros merely filled up with limestone. (TSN.,
pp.14-19, June 5, 1986). 32
3.TIMOTEO ANCAJAS, Barangay Captain of
Paypay, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, from 1972 to 1982,
testified that his barangay is traversed by the
national highway, stretching from Km. 132 to Km.
134 1/2, or a distance of 2 1/2 kilometers. He
described the portion of the highway as a rough
road with potholes. He stated that the only
improvement done on this road was the filling up of
the potholes with "anapog" or crushed limestone
and this was done only once in 1977. It even took
the camineros three months from the time the
limestones were delivered to start working on the
road. (TSN., pp. 20-26, June 5, 1986). 33

4.LUCIA PEAFLOR, Barangay Captain of Don

Pedro, Bogo, Cebu, from 1966 to 1982, testified
that her barangay is traversed by the national
highway, stretching from Km. 103 to Km. 105 1/2,
up to the boundary of San Remigio, and from the
boundary to Daan Bantayan, a distance of more
than 3 kilometers. It was only in 1984 or 1985
when this portion of the national highway was
asphalted. Prior to that, the road was maintained
by filling up the potholes with crushed limestone or
"anapog." These potholes started to appear
between January and June of 1977. However, as
alleged by her in her affidavit (Exh. II-1-d), these
potholes were filled up only from January to June,
1978. (TSN., pp. 28-46, June 5, 1986). 34
5.MARCELO CONEJOS, Barangay Captain of
Tapilon, Daan Bantayan, from 1972 to 1982,
testified that his barangay is traversed by the
national highway, stretching from Km. 130 to Km.
134, or a distance of 4 kilometers. In 1977, said
portion of the national highway was in bad
condition and that nothing was done to improve it
until 1982, except for the time when the potholes
were filled up with crushed limestones. (TSN., pp.
48-56, June 5, 1986). 35
6.REMEDIOS FELICANO, Barangay Captain of
Looc, San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982,
testified that her barangay is traversed by the
national highway, stretching from Km. 109 to Km.
110. She described said portion of the national
highway as "stoney." The only maintenance work
undertaken to improve the road was the filling up
of potholes with crushed limestone which
camineros gathered from the roadside. (TSN., pp.
57-67, June 5, 1986). 36
7.ALBERTO BRANSUELA, a resident of Barangay
San Jose, Catmon, Cebu, from 1974 to 1978,
147

testified that barangay San Jose is traversed by the

national highway (Km. 58), covering a distance of
1/2 kilometer more or less. He stated that while
this portion of the national highway was already
asphalted as of 1977, there were potholes which
the camineros filled up with anapog taken from the
roadside. (TSN., pp. 69-80), June 5, 1986). 37
8.CARIDAD PUNLA, Acting Barangay Captain of
Barangay Corazon, Catmon, Cebu, from 1977 to
1982, testified that the Poblacion of Catmon is
traversed by the national highway, stretching from
Km. 57 to Km. 58. In 1977, only more than 1/2 of
this portion of the national highway was cemented
while the remaining portion was asphalted. While
said portion of the national highway already had
cracks and potholes as of 1977, the real problem
was the uneven elevation of the surface of the
shoulder of the road. No general repair was
undertaken by the authorities to correct the
uneven elevation, except for the work done by the
camineros who covered up the potholes. (TSN., pp.
81-89, June 5, 1986). 38
9.FELIPE MOLIT, Barangay Captain of Bao, Sugud,
Cebu, from 1975 to 1982, testified that barangay
Bao was traversed by the national highway,
stretching from Km. 59 to Km. 60 1/2. He described
said portion of the national highway as a gravel
road surfaced with anapog. In 1977, the said road
already had potholes which maintenance men filled
up with anapog beginning in March, 1977. The
anapog was hauled in from Km. 64, the usual
excavation place of anapog. It took only 3
truckloads of anapog to cover the entire length of
the 1 1/2 kilometers traversing their barangay.
(TSN., pp. 90-99, June 5, 1986). 39
10.LEONARDO PINOTE, Barangay Captain of
Barangay Argawanon, San Remigio, Cebu, from

1972 to 1980, testified that his barangay is

traversed by the national highway covering a
distance of 1/2 kilometers more or less. In 1977,
this portion of the national highway was a rough
road with potholes. In the same year, camineros
worked on the road, using wheelbarrows, shovels
and rakes, pitching up the potholes with anapog.
(TSN., pp. 29-35, June 6, 1986). 40
11.PEDRO ORSAL, Barangay Captain of Poblacion,
San Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980,
testified that his barangay is traversed by the
national highway, from Km. 107 to Km. 110, or a
distance of three kilometers more or less. In 1977,
the road from Km. 107 to Km. 108 was a gravel
road. It was properly maintained by the highways
people, and every time potholes appeared on the
road, they would be filled-up with anapog. This
material was dumped along the road by trucks of
the Bureau of Public Highways. On the other hand,
the road leading to the heart of the poblacion was
asphalted, but with potholes. In 1977, the potholes
were filled up by camineros with gravel delivered
by dump trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways.
It was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted
and extended from the junction of the poblacion to
the adjacent barrio of Looc. . . . (TSN., pp. 36-45,
June 6, 1986). 41
The inescapable conclusion from the aforementioned testimonies
of the barangay captains and residents of Cebu whose respective
barangay are traversed by the national highway is that there
were no actual major repair works undertaken on the national
highway except the filling of potholes by crushed limestone
(anapog). Clearly, there were no deliveries of supplies and
materials for asphalting and repair of roads described in the tally
sheets and other supporting documents signed by
petitioners. ISEHTa
148

While petitioner Torrevillas presented Vice-Mayor Emigdio

Tudlasan of Tabuclan, Cebu, who testified that he saw the
asphalting of the Tabuclan Road from kilometers 18 to 19, said
testimony is not conclusive on the actual delivery of the supplies
indicated in the tally sheets, as Tudlasan was not present at the
time of alleged delivery. Moreover, his testimony runs counter to
the testimonies of Barangay Captain Remedios Feliciano of Looc,
San Remigio, Cebu and Barangay Captain Pedro Orsal of
Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu. Feliciano testified that she
was Barangay Captain of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to
1982; that her barangay is traversed by the national highway,
stretching from km. 109 to km. 110; and that the only work
undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of potholes with
crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside.
On the other hand, Orsal testified that he was Barangay Captain
of Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980; that
his barangay is traversed by the national highway, from km. 107
to km. 110; that in 1977, the road from km. 107 to km. 108 was a
gravel road maintained by the highways people, and every time
potholes appeared on the road, they would be filled-up
with anapog, which was dumped along the road by the Bureau of
Public Highways; and that it was only in 1978 when the road was
re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion to
the adjacent barrio of Looc. aEHIDT
Compared to the testimony of Vice-Mayor Tudlasan, the
testimonies of Barangay Captains Feliciano and Orsal are entitled
to more weight and credit, and are more credible considering the
fact that they are residents of the area where the road
supposedly to be repaired is located plus the fact that they saw
only limestone, not asphalt, that was used in the repair of the
road in 1977. The testimonies of Feliciano and Orsal are further
buttressed by the findings and statements of government
witnesses, namely Ruth Inting Paredes, Supervising
Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor assigned to Region VII;
Felicitas Cruz Ona, Supervising COA Auditor assigned to the main
COA office; Federico A. Malvar, Senior National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Agent of the Anti-Graft Section and member of
the COA NBI team assigned to investigate the anomalies; Rogelio

C. Mamaril, Supervising NBI Agent of the Anti-Fraud and Action

Section; and Delia Comahig Preagido, Accountant III, MPH, Region
VII to the effect that the general vouchers and LAAs that
corresponded to the aforementioned tally sheets signed by
petitioner Torrevillas were fake or falsified. Undeniably, the
government witnesses have no motive to testify falsely against
petitioner Torrevillas and, hence, credible. We conclude that there
were no actual deliveries of supplies for asphalting of road and
repair on kilometers 108 and 109, which were the subjects of
Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and 2859. CAcDTI

Glaring is the finding of the SB that the Cebu First Highway

Engineering District, to which petitioners were assigned, had fake
LAAs totaling to PhP4,924,366.50, while the fake Cash
Disbursement Ceilings issued amounted to PhP6,271,150. 42 The
Cebu First Highway Engineering District had also issued checks
per unrecorded reports in the total sum of
PhP1,135,176.82. 43 Therefore, the total illegal disbursements in
the Cebu First Highway Engineering District alone were a
staggering PhP12,330,693.32 circa 1977. DCISAE
Of this total, petitioner Fernan, Jr. freely admitted signing tally
sheets which pertained to non-existent deliveries of road
construction supplies and materials totaling
PhP146,000, 44 including PhP27,000 in Criminal Case No. 2914
where petitioner Torrevillas was among the co-accused. 45 These
tally sheets were attached as the supporting papers to fake
general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments
to suppliers. SEIcHa
These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Juliana de los
Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, and 2914)
and Ismael Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case No. 2918). 46
On his part, petitioner Torrevillas voluntarily admitted to signing
tally sheets, reports of inspection, requisitions of supplies and
equipment, and other pertinent documents totaling an even
greater amount of PhP337,861.01, 47 including PhP27,000 in
149

Criminal Case No. 2914 where petitioner Fernan, Jr. was among
the co-accused. 48 These documents signed by petitioner
Torrevillas were likewise attached as supporting papers to fake
general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments
to suppliers. DISHEA
These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Rufino V. Nuez
(Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and 2859), Juliana de los
Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2909, 2910, and 2914), Ismael Sabio,
Jr. (Criminal Case No. 2919), and Manuel Mascardo (Criminal Case
No. 2932). 49
These general vouchers and checks could not be traced to
genuine LAAs. Ergo, there were no actual deliveries of supplies
and materials for the road repair and rehabilitation in Region VII,
which were the subjects of the criminal cases where petitioners
were charged.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that
all the essential elements of the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents were present. There is no
question that petitioners, at the time of the commission of the
crime, were public officers civil engineers assigned to the
MPH. Their signing of tally sheets and related documents
pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road repair and
construction constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of
their official positions, especially considering that they had the
duty to inspect the purported deliveries and ascertain the
veracity of the documents and the statements contained in
them. ISHaCD
The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false recitals
of material facts which the petitioners had the duty to verify and
confirm. These tally sheets were attached as supporting
documents to fake LAAs and subsequently became the bases for
the disbursement of public funds to the damage and prejudice of
the government. Indubitably, there exists not even an iota of
doubt as to petitioners' guilt.

The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public

documents are present in the cases against petitioners, as
follows: IcDHaT
1.Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas made it appear
that supplies for road construction and maintenance were
delivered by suppliers allegedly in furtherance of alleged lawful
projects when in fact said supplies were not delivered and no
actual asphalting or repair of road was implemented. In doing so,
petitioners: DaAISH
1.1.Were public officers or employees at the time
of the commission of the offenses;
1.2.Took advantage of their official position as
highway engineers; and
1.3.Made untruthful statements in several
narrations of fact.
2.Damage: The government disbursed PhP146,000 in the case of
Fernan, Jr. and PhP337,861.01 in the case of Torrevillas, as
payments to various suppliers for the delivery of non-existent
supplies. ADEHTS
By way of defense, petitioners posit that the tally sheets and
other documents could in fact be traced to genuine LAAs that
were in the custody of the NBI. Unfortunately, these genuine LAAs
were not introduced in evidence. It is an age-old axiom that s/he
who alleges something must prove it. Petitioners' assertion that
the documents they signed were all genuine and duly covered by
genuine LAAs was substantiated only by their own self-serving
and uncorroborated testimonies. We hesitate to give much weight
and credit to their bare testimonies in the face of clear,
convincing, overwhelming, and hard evidence adduced by the
State. DIcTEC
If the genuine LAAs were vital to their defense, and they firmly
believed that the documents were indeed in the custody of the
NBI, then petitioners could have easily procured the compulsory
process to compel the production of said documents. However,
150

petitioners miserably failed to avail of subpoena duces

tecum which the court a quo could have readily granted. The
inability to produce such important and exculpatory pieces of
evidence proved disastrous to petitioners' cause. Their conviction
was indeed supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt which
was not overturned by defense evidence. cDCIHT
Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another
Petitioners vigorously claim error on the part of the lower court
when it made the finding that they were co-conspirators with the
other parties accused despite the dearth of evidence to amply
demonstrate complicity. cHaCAS
We are not convinced by petitioners' postulation.
Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to
the shoulders of the prosecution. Considering, however, the
difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled
jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence.
In People v. Pagalasan, the Court explicated why direct proof of
prior agreement is not necessary: DASEac
After all, secrecy and concealment are essential
features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies
are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime, showing that they
had acted with a common purpose and design.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two
or more persons aimed their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness
of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There
must be intentional participation in the transaction

with a view to the furtherance of the common

design and purpose. 50
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2) structures of
multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle"
conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub")
dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the
"spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the same
way as with legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and
then retailer and consumer. 51
We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the
"wheel" conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons who constituted the
massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by
a single hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia
Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and
Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate "spokes" of
the conspiracy. Petitioners were among the many spokes of the
wheel. IAcTaC
We recall the painstaking efforts of the SB through Associate
Justice Cipriano A. Del Rosario, Chairperson of the Third Division,
in elaborating the intricate web of conspiracy among the accused,
thus: TICDSc
Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson
to join him. All three agreed to help him carry
out his plan. They typed fake LAAs during
Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of
negotiating or selling fake LAAs to contractors at
26% of the gross amount. Preagido manipulated
the general ledger, journal vouchers and general
journal through negative entries to conceal the
illegal disbursements. In the initial report of COA
auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes it
was discovered that the doubtful allotments and
151

other anomalies escaped notice due to the

following manipulations: CIaASH
"The letter-advices covering such allotments
(LAA) were not signed by the Finance Officer
nor (sic) recorded in the books of accounts.
Disbursements made on the basis of these
fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated
obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the
obligations being paid were not among those
certified to the unliquidated obligations
(Account 8-81-400) at the end of the
preceding year. To conceal the overcharges
to authorized allotments, account 8-81-400
(sic) and the excess of checks issued over
authorized cash disbursements ceiling,
adjustments were prepared monthly through
journal vouchers to take up the negative
debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative
credit to the Treasury Checking Account for
Agencies Account 8-70-790. These journal
vouchers in effect cancelled the previous
entry to record the disbursements made on
the basis of fake LAAs. Thus the affected
accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790),
as appearing in the trial balance, would not
show the irregularity. The checks, however,
were actually issued." 52

The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious

conspiracy. Other government employees,
tempted by the prospect of earning big
money, allowed their names to be used and
signed spurious documents. aSCDcH
xxx xxx xxx
3.Cebu First Highway Engineering District Anomalies

Focusing our attention now on the anomalies

committed in the Cebu First District Engineering
District, hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First
HED for brevity, the Court finds that the same
pattern of fraud employed in the other highway
engineering districts in MPH Region VII was
followed. The Cebu First HED received from Region
VII thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs)
in the total sum of P4,734,336.50 and twenty-nine
(29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs), amounting to
P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1, 1977 to
December 31, 1977. But apart from this, the Cebu
First HED appears to have also received for the
same period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs
amounting to P4,680,694.76 which however, could
not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA)
OR MATCHED TO THE Advices of Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the
MPH and Regional Office. This is highly irregular
and not in consonance with accounting
procedures. ICAcTa
It was also made to appear that the payments were
made for alleged prior year's obligations and
chargeable to Account 81-400, obviously because,
they were not properly funded. Furthermore, the
list of projects in Region VII for 1977 showed that
Cebu first HED completed rehabilitation and/or
improvement of roads and bridges in its districts
from February to May, 1977, with expenditures
amounting to P613,812.00. On the other hand, the
expenditures for barangay roads in the same
district in 1977 amounted to P140,692.00, and
these were all completed within the period from
November to December, 1977. These completed
projects were properly funded by legitimate LAAs
and CDCs in the total amount of only P754,504.00.
However, an additional amount of P3,839,810.74,
152

was spent by the Cebu First HED for maintenance

of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but
the same could not be traced to any authoritative
document coming from the MPH.
The following payments for materials purchased for
the year 1977 were made to appear as payment
for prior year's obligation and were paid out of fake
LAAs:
Supplier

No. of
Vouchers

Kind of
Materials

Measurement

Rufino Nuez
J. delos Angeles
Iluminada Vega
Florencio
Gacayan
Ismael Sabio, Jr.
FBS Marketing
Cebu Hollow
Blocks
Bienvenido
Presillas
T.R. Eustaquio
Ent.
Santrade Mktg.

29
21
11
10

Item
Item
Item
Item

4,640,275 mt
22,290 cu.m.
8,325 cu.m.
7,800 cu.m.

6
3
2

Item 108
6,198 cu.m.
Lumber
Hollow Blocks

Equip. Rental

Office Supplies

310
108
108
108

Johnson
Products
Pelagia Gomez
1
Item 108
2,000 cu.m.
M & M Ent.
1
Paints
Freent Ind.
1
Office Supplies
Total
The NBI also discovered that there were purchases
of materials in 1977 that were charged to current
obligations but paid out of spurious LAAs, to
wit: caSEAH
Supplier

No. of
Vouchers

Kind of
Materials

Measurement

Rufino Nuez

11

Juliana delos
Angeles
Iluminada Vega
Florencio
Gacayan
Vicon Ent.
Ismael Sabio, Jr.
Jabcyl Mktg.

16

Item 310
Item 108
Item 108

162,549 m.t.
5,000 cu.m.
13,280 cu.m.

3
2

Item
Item
Item
Item

1,000 cu.m.
307 cu.m.
3,600 cu.m.
2,400.00 cu.m.

1
5
3

111
200
108
108

Steel Frame
Item 108
Bridge
Materials

6,950 cu.m.

Total
Grand Total
A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from
fake LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando
Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII and
Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer,
also of Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became
the vehicles in the disbursement of funds
amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers
purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of
the aforementioned materials allegedly used for
the maintenance and repair of the national
highways within the Cebu First HED. Despite the
enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74,
the roads and bridges in the district, as found out
by the NBI, did not show any improvement (Exhibit
II). As testified to by several barangay captains, the
road maintenance consisted merely of spreading
anapog or limestone on potholes of the national
Highway.
Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged
maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional
amount of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no
other purpose than to siphon off the said amount
from the government coffer into the pockets of
153

some officials and employees of Region VII and the

Cebu First HED, as well as the suppliers and
contractors who conspired and confederated with
them. 53
After a close re-examination of the records, the Court finds no
reason to disturb the finding of the anti-graft court that
petitioners are co-conspirators of the other accused, headed by
Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat, who were similarly
convicted in practically all the 119 counts of estafa. Undisturbed
is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and in the absence
of strong and compelling reasons or justifications, it will accord
finality to the findings of facts of the SB. The feeble defense of
petitioners that they were not aware of the ingenious plan of the
group of accused Mangubat and the indispensable acts to defraud
the government does not merit any consideration. The State is
not tasked to adduce direct proof of the agreement by petitioners
with the other accused, for such requirement, in many cases,
would border on near impossibility. The State needs to adduce
proof only when the accused committed acts that constitute a
vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of the
objective of the conspiracy. In the case at bench, the signing of
the fake tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of
inspection, and requests for supplies and materials by petitioners
on separate occasions is vital to the success of the Mangubat
Group in siphoning off government funds. Without such fabricated
documents, the general vouchers covering the supply of
materials cannot be properly accomplished and submitted to the
disbursing officer for the preparation of checks. cHAaEC
State witness Ruth Paredes, Supervising COA Auditor, elaborated
on the procedure regarding the award of the contract more
specifically to the payment of the contractor or supplier. Once the
Request for Supplies and Equipment is approved by the Regional
Office, the Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) or the
request for funds is signed by the District Engineer pursuant to
the approved plans and budget and signed by the district
accountant as to availability of funds.

The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and award
the contract to the lowest bidder. The Purchase Order (PO) is
prepared and addressed to the winning bidder. Upon delivery of
the supplies and materials, the supplier bills the district office for
payment. Consequently, the requisitioning officer will prepare the
general voucher which must be accompanied by the following
documents:
a.The ROA;
b.The PO;
c.The abstract of Bid together with the Bid quotations;
d.The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets; and
e.The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier.
After the preparation and submission of the general voucher and
the supporting documents, the disbursing officer shall prepare
and draw a check based on said voucher. The check is
countersigned by an officer of the district office and/or the COA
Regional Director based on the amount of the check.
Thus, it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts,
the general voucher cannot be prepared and completed. Without
the general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply
cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Without the check
payment, the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully
consummated. Thus, petitioners' acts in signing the false tally
sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the
consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents. Surely, there were ghost or false deliveries of
supplies and materials as convincingly shown by the testimonies
of the barangay captains, officials, and residents of the areas
where the materials were allegedly used. More importantly, if
there were actual deliveries of materials made, then there would
be no need to fake the LAAs because the suppliers will have to be
paid the cost of said materials plus a reasonable profit. As a
result, there is nothing or not much to share with the more than
30 or so co-conspirators, for the suppliers would not be too dim154

witted to part with even their cost in buying the materials they
allegedly supplied. Moreover, the fake delivery receipts and tally
sheets signed by petitioners were linked to the general vouchers
upon which check payments were made to the suppliers who
were found guilty of participating in the fraud. With respect to
petitioner Fernan, Jr., he signed tally sheets on the ghost
deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and Ismael Sabio, Jr. On the
part of petitioner Torrevillas, he signed false tally sheets and
delivery receipts on supplies allegedly delivered by Rufino V.
Nuez, Juliana de los Angeles, Ismael Sabio, Jr., and Manuel
Mascardo. Lastly, the checks issued to these suppliers based on
general vouchers supported by the false tally sheets and general
vouchers signed by petitioners cannot be traced to any genuine
LAAs, resulting in the inescapable conclusion that these LAAs
were unauthorized; hence, fake or fabricated. These are
undisputed tell-tale signs of the complicity by petitioners with the
Mangubat syndicate.

In People v. Mangubat, the court a quo elucidated the conspiracy

in the Cebu highway scam in a trenchant manner:
Where the acts of each of the accused constitute
an essential link in a chain and the desistance of
even one of them would prevent the chain from
being completed, then no conspiracy could result
as its consummation would then be impossible or
aborted. But when each and everyone of the
accused in the instant cases performed their
assigned tasks and roles with martinet-like
precision and accuracy, by individually performing
essential overt acts, so much so that the common
objective is attained, which is to secure the illegal
release of public funds under the guise of fake or
simulated public documents, then each and
everyone of said accused are equally liable as coprincipals under the well-established and
universally-accepted principle that, once a
conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven, the act

of one is the act of all and such liability exists

notwithstanding no-participation in every detail in
the execution of the offense. 54
In sum, the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the
State on the conspiracy among the accused including petitioners.
The conviction of petitioners must perforce be sustained. aTADcH
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the December 4,
1997 Decision of the SB in the consolidated criminal cases subject
of this petition. aDcHIS
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Fernan v. People, G.R. No. 145927, [August 24, 2007], 557
PHIL 555-605)

[G.R. No. 168852. September 30, 2008.]

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L.
TAN, respondents. *

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution 1 dated March 7,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution 2 dated July 11,
2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.aDHCAE
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The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven
L. Tan (Steven) were married. 3 Out of this union, two female
children were born, Kyra Danielle 4 and Kristen Denise. 5 On
January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner
filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) 6against Steven and her parents-in-law,
Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before
the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents,
were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon
her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5), and
(i) 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 8 otherwise known as the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004". TACEDI
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice 9 granting
petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad
Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law
of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on
Opposition 11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that
respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal
interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and
safety of victims of violence. DCScaT
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution 12 dismissing the
case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-inlaw of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as
respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of
law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius". 13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration 14 contending that the doctrine of necessary
implication should be applied in the broader interests of
substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified

Motion for Reconsideration 15 arguing that petitioner's liberal
construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No.
9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged
victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No.
9262. ACcTDS
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution 16 denying
petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned
that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No.
9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the
law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES
PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF
SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004". 17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the
light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which
explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy"
under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No.
9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the
family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as
indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the
case. IaEHSD
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered
by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that
the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a
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former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that

allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual
determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for
review; that respondents cannot be characterized as
indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the
case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering
the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and
their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." CScaDH
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual
or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the
suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. For purposes of
this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory
application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of
this Code. Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code

shall be supplementary to such laws, unless

the latter should specially provide the
contrary. (Emphasis supplied) AHDcCT
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be
applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is
silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno, 18 the Court applied suppletorily the
provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to
cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the
"Revised Motor Vehicle Law", noting that the special law did not
contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. SCcHIE
In People v. Li Wai Cheung, 19 the Court applied suppletorily the
rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC
in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations
of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972", considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury, 20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles
17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words "principal",
"accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise
known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995", because said words were not defined therein, although the
special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the
persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment. HCacDE
In Yu v. People, 21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions
on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing
Checks Law", noting the absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People, 22 the Court applied
suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision
therein. TcaAID
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With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under

Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No.
9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC
shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of
the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily.

(4) Destroying the property and personal

belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of
the woman or her child; and HCATEa

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262.

For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal
design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators,
and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of
them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals. 23

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the

purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman
or her child may include individuals other than the offending
husband, thus:

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly

recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children. The crime of violence against women
and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in
public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
property of the woman or her child against her/his
will;

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or

violence; . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. . . . The protection

orders that may be issued under this Act shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening
to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly
or indirectly; . . . (Emphasis supplied) TIEHSA
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of
the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. This Act shall be liberally
construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their
children. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law 24 and
that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the present
case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of
the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent,
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meaning and spirit the protection and safety of victims of

violence against women and children. ACSaHc
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the
maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application
here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary
rule of statutory construction". It is not of universal application.
Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of
the legislature. 25
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great
length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the
conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However,
conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out
in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the
present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. 26 It is thus
premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this
controversy is centered only on the determination of whether

respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262.

The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon
after a trial on the merits. aTADCE
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no
longer delve on whether respondents may be considered
indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise
in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as
the dismissal of the petition against respondents is
concerned. IEaATD
SO ORDERED.
||| (Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852, [September 30,
2008], 588 PHIL 532-543)

159