Speech Acts, Communicative Competence and the Paradox of Authority

Author(s): R. R. McGuire
Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter, 1977), pp. 30-45
Published by: Penn State University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237010
Accessed: 02-07-2016 13:24 UTC
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Speech Acts, Communicative Comptence

and the Paradox of Authority
R. R. McGuire
". . . in every speech act the telos of reaching an understanding

[Verstaendigung] is already inhrent."

Jrgen Habermas
The focus of this paper is on a vnrable and vexing issue of social
and politicai philosophy: the paradox of authority. The first part of

the paper attempts to provide a brief but clear exposition of the

highly nuanced issue, making extensive rfrence to Robert Paul
Wolff s provocative study.1 The second part of the paper is an exposition and discussion of P. H. Nowell-Smith's rcent original and
subtle effort to rsolve the paradox through the employment of the
notion of speech acts.2 It will be argued that although this attempt

is in part successful, vestiges of positivism in Nowell-Smith's account forestali a satisfactory resolution of the problem. He is simply unable to meet the force of the paradox: What are the criteria for

determining when authority is legitimate?

In the final part of the paper an attempt will be made to

demonstrate how expanding the theory of speech acts by means of
Habermas' theory of communicative comptence successfully meets
the force of the paradox.3 This approach considers not only the
speech act but the entire speech situation. In the course of the dis-

cussion the criteria of an ideal speech situation as a practical

hypothesis is articulated. The connection between the conditions
for ideal discourse and an ideal form of life is exhibited. Moreover,

it is shown that the requirements for an ideal speech situation include linguistic conceptualizations of the traditional ideas of truth,

freedom, and justice. Utilizing thse criteria in the critique of

systematically distorted communication, it becomes possible to dis-

tinguish between rational and irrational speech situations rational and irrational speech acts. Having established this distinction, it is then possible to analyze authority in terms of speech acts,

while maintaining a normative basis for distinguishing between

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 10, No. 1, Winter 1977. Published by The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London.

30

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PARADOX OF AUTHORITY 3 1

legitimate (rational) and illegitimate (irrational) authority. In this

manner a philosophical synthesis between a descriptive linguistic
analysis of authority and an analysis of the normative foundations
of the structure of communication is achieved. Rational authority is

revealed as only consistent with the minimization of socially un-

necessary constraints and th maximization of individuai

autonomy.

What really is the diffrence between a gunman ordering me to

hand over my wallet containing twenty-five dollars and a judge
ordering me to pay a twenty-five dollar traffic fine? Presumably the
most obvious diffrence is that the latter has the legitimate authority

to do so, while the former does not. This is quite apparent, but the
matter of clarifying just what legitimate authority is has proved to
be a most arduous task. No matter how one looks at it, the claim of
legitimacy seems to involve moral obligation. But it is not clear how

in either case I should exercise any moral autonomy, since I do not

really hve a viable choice in either situation. Nor is it clear how the
exercise of legitimate authority is any more in my self-interest than

the gunman's exercise of brute force. Certainly in both cases I am

out the twenty-five dollars. If I really had a choice in either of the

situations, it does not appear that it would be rational for me to

obey either command.
In his essay on the foundations of politicai authority, Robert Paul

Wolff argues that there is a fundamental dilemma involving the

politicai authority of th state and the moral autonomy of th individuai: Authority is the defining mark of th state in that it is the

state which has the right to rule.4 Autonomy is the primary

Obligation of man insofar as he may regard himself as the author of

his own dcisions and hence morally responsible. But if man has a
continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of autonomy

there seems to be no way to establish the moral force or the

legitimacy of submission to th commands of th state. Wolff concludes that because of this fundamental conflict between ruler and

ruled "the concept of a de jure legitimate state would appear to be

vacuous, and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only

reasonable politicai belief for an enlightened man."5
In a rcent paper P. H. Nowell-Smith has attempted to refor-

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32 R. R. McGUIRE

mulate the issue in such a manner that the above so-called

"Paradox of Authority" is dissolved. Nowell-Smith's strategy is to

replace WolfFs approach with a refined descriptive analysis of the
concept of authority and to attempt to demonstrate that WolfFs
difficulties are methodologically generated. He maintains that we

should proceed by providing a thorough description of what

authority /5. At the outset we should recognize that such a
description is fundamentally diffrent from one which we might
give for such familir empirical objects as apples and chairs. The
abstract concept of authority is always manifested in speech acts. It

is exercised, granted, abused, denied, and so on. These speech acts

taken together constitute a practice. Nowell-Smith's claims are:
(1) that we cannot understand what authority is unless we understand the complex practice: and (2) that when we do understand
the practice there is no further question as to what authority /5.
Let us examine more closely Nowell-Smith's Substantive conclusions. Setting aside for now what Weber refers to as charismatic

authority, Nowell-Smith adopts H. L. A. Hart's view that claims

and counter-claims of authority always appeal to the existence of a
rule or set of rules. Rules in this sens obviously involve more than
regularities, habits, or customs. In order for it to be said that a rule
exists within a community, non-conformity must involve criticism.

It is maintained that such a system of rules may be viewed from

either an internai or an external perspective. One who takes the internai point of view endorses or utilizes the rules, adopting them as
his own guide for behavior. Taking the external point of view only

involves the rcognition and description of a set of rules toward

which some particular group takes the internai point of view. There
is no personal endorsement of rules involved if one restricts oneself
to the external point of view. Thus it may be said that an individuai

who does not take the internai points of view regarding prevailing
rules of th society within which he or she lives may comply with the

rules, but does not obey them. In such a case th individuai follows
the rules but does not recognize the right of the ruler to command.
Armed with this distinction Nowell-Smith reformulates WolfPs

question, "Can a rational and morally autonomous man submit to

authority?" The question now becomes, "Can a man adopt the internai point of view towards a System of rules that he has not

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PARADOX OF AUTHORITY 33

himself made without sacrificing his rationality or his moral

autonomy?" Nowell-Smith sees no reason why he cannot, as long
as one does not confuse unlimited and supreme authority. That is to

say that any moral obligation which one has to obey commands,
consistent with a System of rules towards which one has adopted the
internai point of view, is defeasible insofar as it conflicts with other
moral obligations. As a consquence, it is argued, one may refuse to

obey an order without denying the right of the person to give the
command.

At this point Wolff would hold that the question which persists is

whether or not any government has de jure authority. Nowell-

Smith's response to that question is simply that it cannot be

answered in th abstract. One can raise this question only inside
politicai space, in regard to a particular government. Restricting

ourselves to a particular government, we may claim that

government has de facto authority. If we do so, we are stating a
politicai fact concerning the adoption of the internai point of view
by Citizens toward that government. If on the other hand we claim

that the government has de jure authority, we are making no such

claim of a politicai fact. Rather, we are in the act of endorsing the
System of rules from which the authority of the government is
derived - we are assuming the internai point of view toward thse
rules. Thus, my claim "Government X has de jure authority" is very

much akin to my speech act "I promise to obey the commands of

Government X." In this situation there are no normative con-

sidrations marshalled as a means of justifying the authority of this

particular state. I am merely uttering my acceptance of the

legitimate authority of this state, and you are left to agre or disagree.

Let us now turn the discussion to a considration of what has

been gained and what has not been gained from Nowell-Smith's
methodological overhaul. We may begin by noting that in asserting
that the internai point of view is defeasible, Nowell-Smith is claiming that the dcision to submit to authority is contingent upon one's

own judgment of the broad issues involved. Our moral obligation

to th state is limited by those moral obligations which we take to
hve a higher priority. Insofar as any connection is established
among moral autonomy, rationality, and authority, we are simply

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34

R.

R.

McGUIRE

left with the conclusion that the morally responsible and rational
person must exercise his judgment in deciding whether or not to
obey the commands of th state. If a particular citizen informs us
that his government has de jure authority, the only thing that we
can infer from his utterance is that he has decided to obey the commands of th state, although at some future time he may decide that

those commands conflict with some other overriding moral commitment.

The Paradox of Authority occurs only because man exists in

social organizations. Insofar as Nowell-Smith has construed the
issue in terms of speech acts he has correctly perceived language as
a universal medium within which the social life of the human

species unfolds. The move away from vague abstractions to careful

descriptions of symbolically mediated interactions and the

rcognition of their essential connections to socio-cultural forms of

life is to be commended. But Nowell-Smith's methodological moves

conclude just as he is about to establish some real friction. His

rigidly descriptive methodology involves him in a rampant

relativism under the guise of a rigorous objectivity. We are each left
pondering our own subjective criteria in deciding whether or not to
obey particular commands of th state. I may dislike obese officiais

and you may hve an aversion to baldness. Can we say nothing of a

more sustantive nature on the matter? Hve we reached bedrock

once we hve expressed our intuitions concerning the pertinent

speech acts? Are there not some rational criteria which we may ail
utilize in deciding not to obey certain commands of th state? Is
there not some connection between thse criteria and moral

autonomy? And insofar as we deny any such criteria do we not cir-

cumscribe knowledge in such a way as to block any rational

assesment and criticism of the social and politicai status quo?
Wolff regards thse question as germane to philosophical in-

quiry, but is unable to transcend his conflicting abstract

dichotomies. Altering mthodologies, Nowell-Smith believes that
qua philosopher our task is essentially completed once we hve
provided a descriptive analysis of authority in terms of speech acts.
Presumably ail that remains is perhaps some refining and polishing

of the analysis, while it is apparent that the old positivistic

dichotomies - fact/value, normative/descriptive - are retained.

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PARADOX OF AUTHORITY 35

The extent to which thse dichotomies are warrante! has been th

focus of a long-standing dispute between positivists and criticai

theorists. Quite obviously the alternative positions turn on broad

epistemological and methodological issues. And certainly the

amassing of decisive arguments with which to undermine the
positivist bifurcations is beyond th scope of the prsent paper. The

purpose hre is only to demonstrate how assuming the posture of

criticai theorist enables us to provide an analysis of the norms of
rational speech acts. Whereas Nowell-Smith leaves us with only the
nebulous principle of defeasibility and our intuitions with which to
decide whether or not to adopt the internai point of view, it is hre

argued that there are norms of rational speech; there are criteria
which enable us to claim that in one case it is rational and moral to

adopt the internai point of view toward a System of rules, while in

another case it is not. We see that once we rejoin the essential con-

nection between human knowledge and interest, severed by the

positivists, we establish real friction - a crucial link between
rationality and human mancipation.
Jrgen Habermas' efforts hve been directed toward the construction of a generai theory of communication within which this
connection plays a prominent rle. He has, by means of his theory
of communicative comptence, attempted to provide an analysis of
the structure of communication which rests upon a normative basis;

which exhibits the fundamental norms of rational speech. In illuminating the fundamental norms of rational speech he displays
such speech situations as essentially free from constraint. While his
efforts are without question still somewhat programatic, they con-

stitute a bold and imaginative attempt to enrich the theory of

speech acts. On this analysis it is not only possible to construe
authority in terms of speech acts, it is also possible to establish the

relation among rationality, autonomy, and speech acts. The establishment of thse relations provides criteria with which to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate authority.
Let us examine this analysis more closely, recalling first the
salient claims of the theory of speech acts. Searle maintains that:
Speaking a language is engaging in a (highly complex) rulegoverned form of behavior. To learn and master a language is
(inter alia) to learn and to hve mastered thse rules . . . when

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36

R.

R.

McGUIRE

I, speaking as a native speaker, make linguistic

characterizations ... I am not reporting th behavior of a
group but describing aspects of my mastery of a rule-governed

skill.6

He goes on to add that:

The reason for concentrating on the study of speech acts is
simply this: ail linguistic communication involves linguistic

acts. The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has

generally been supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, or even

the token of the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the

production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the

performance of the speech act. . . . More precisely, the

production or issuance of a sentence taken under certain conditions is a speech act, and speech acts . . . are th basic or
minimal units of communication.7

And finally, Searle points out that, "... a theory of language is

part of a theory of action, simply because speaking is a rulegoverned form of behavior."8

Habermas shares thse major claims with Searle. Moreover, he

utilizes Searle's analysis of utterances in terms of propositional con-

tent and illocutionary force. The propositional content roughly establishes the connection of the communication with the world of

events and objects, while the illocutionary force establishes the

mode of communication between speaker and hearer, as well as the
pragmatic context of the propositional content. But, whereas Searle
and his followers restrict their inquiry to the description and articulation of linguistic rules, Habermas expands his inquiry in such
a manner as to consider the contextual conditions in which com-

munication takes place and in which linguistic rules are mastered.

In particular, Habermas is concerned with describing the requirements for an ideal speech situation, which might serve as a
model for rational, unconstrained communication. Maintaining
that language is one of the fundamental mdiums, along with work

and domination, within which the social life of the human species
unfolds, Habermas attempts to display the connection between the
conditions for ideal communication and the conditions for an ideal

form of life. Thus, the norms for rational speech must be seen as
embedded in a rational form of life. As such, his efforts may be con-

strued as a practical hypothesis, serving as a guide for the in-

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PARADOX OF AUTHORITY 37

stitutionalization of communication and the critique of what he

refers to as systematically distorted communication.
The outlines of the theory of communicative comptence may be
succinctly generated. To this end we may commence by noting
Habermas' approving rfrence to Wittgenstein^ claim that the

concept of reaching an understanding lies in the concept of

language.9 Habermas puts it: "... in every speech act the telos of

reaching an understanding [Verstaendigung] is already inhrent."10 That is to say that all communication occurs against the
background presupposition of the possibility of reaching some consensus. "With the very first sentence the intention of a generai and

voluntary consensus is unmistakably enunciated."11 The impor-

tance of this notion of consensus merits more extensive direct

quotation. Underscoring understanding as the essential function of

linguistic communication Habermas writes:
Every understanding reached is confirmed in a reasonable consensus, as we say; otherwise it does not represent a 'real' understanding. Comptent orators know that every consensus attain-

ed can in fact be deceptive; but they must always have been in

possession of the prior concept of rational consensus underlying the concept of a dception (or merely compulsory) consen-

sus. Reaching an understanding is a normative concept;

everyone who speaks a naturai language has intuitive

knowledge of it and therefore is confident of being able, in prin-

ciple, to distinguish true consensus from a false one.12

Habermas' theory of universal pragmatice (of which the theory of

communicative comptence is a part) is an attempt to unpack the

normative implications of the universally, if naively, held concept
of possible understanding.

In considering the entire speech situation Habermas begins by

distinguishing between two related forms of communication: communicative action and discourse. He argues that insofar as we participate in communication we usually do so against a background
of mutually assumed validity Claims (Geltung sansprche). This
means that there is already some underlying consensus which
makes possible the exchange of speech acts in functioning language
games. This consensus includes claim: (1) that utterance is under-

standable; (2) that propositional content is true; (3) of the correctness and appropriateness of performatory component; (4) of

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38 R. R. McGUIRE

authenticity of sincerity (wahrhaftig) of speaking subject. Insofar as

ail of thse claims remain unquestioned or unchallenged we are

engagea in communicative action.
The claim of comprehensibility or understandability is only
realized to th extent that some understanding is achieved through

communication. The claim of authenticity is established to the extent that the motives of the speaker are revealed in extended interaction. At length we are able to discern whether or not the

speaker is genuinely engaged in communicative action or merely

pretending to do so for some ulterior motives. But what are we to
do if claims (2) or (3) are challenged? How are we to seule disputes
concerning the truth of utterances, the correctness of norms for ac-

tion, the appropriateness of norms? It then becomes necessary to

alter our communication in such a manner as to restore the

background consensus. We must enter into a mode of communication which Habermas refers to as discourse. "Discourses are
performances in which we seek to show the grounds for cognitive

utterances."13

In discourse the participants do not exchange expriences, nor do

they carry out actions or exchange information. Rather, they establish constraints upon action and only attempt to offer arguments

and provide justifications. Habermas maintains, moreover, that

participation in this mode of communication requires a sharp distinction between questions of genesis and validity. In a sens one
performs an epoche so as to eliminate possible motives, and thus
assume a stance of mutuai effort to reach understanding. This includes withholding judgment in regard to the existence of the very

objects of communicative action (things, events, persons, and

utterances). These objects, as well as norms, are viewed solely from
the perspective of possible existence.14 Thus, a crucial consquence

of assuming the communicative posture of discourse is that

"... facts are transformed into states of affairs which may or may
not be the case, and norms are transformed into recommendations

and warnings which may be correct or appropriate but also incorrect or inappropriate."15
In this manner the participants remove all motives except the
willingness to corne to an understanding. Habermas claims that the

normal context of communicative action contains an implicit

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PARADOX OF AUTHORITY 39

rfrence to such discourse. Subjects engagea in communicative

action make at least three mutuai assumptions: (1) the other intentionally holds the stated beliefs; (2) the other intentionally follows
the norms in which they engaged; (3) if pressed, the other is capable
of discursively justifying these norms and beliefs. In short, Haber-

mas maintains that these suppositions of accountability are a normal feature of functioning language games.
It may, of course, be argued that this assumption of accountability is for the most part counterfactual. And this Habermas
readily concdes: "We know that institutionalized actions do not as
a rule fit this model of pure communicative action, although we
cannot avoid counterfactually proceeding as if the modeis wcre
really th case - on this unavoidable fiction rests the humanity of
intercourse among men who are still men."16 The point is that these

assumptions are necessary conditions of the ideal of rationally

founded discursive agreement. The possibility of discursive

agreement forms the background against which communicative
action takes place.
If we accept the possibility of discursive agreement, the immediate obstacle which then confronts us is establishing how it is

that we distinguish between "true" and "false" discursive

agreement. Certainly those acquainted with the
Mannheim/Horkheimer controversy are familir with the dis-

quieting difficulty encountered in the effort to prevent the

historicism of criticai theory from degenerating into a relativistic

sociology of knowledge.17 This is a problem which is, to be sure,

both crucial and challenging. After all, a fundamental thesis held by

Habermas is that discursive justification is a normative concept -

that there is an essential connection between knowledge and interests. This contrasts sharply with the prevailing positivist view
that truth Claims must be decided solely by rfrences to the prevail-

ing order. Moreover, it is quite obvious that it is essential to make

sense of this claim if a distinction between rational and irrational

speech acts, legitimate and illegitimate authority, is to be sustained.

Habermas formultes two interconnected key notions in an effort
to rsolve this longstanding difficulty: the consensus theory of truth

and the ideal speech situation (Sprechsituation). It should, of

course, be clear that he does not construe truth in terms of a factual

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40 R. R. McGUIRE

consensus; that subjects hve arrived at a consensus does not secure

the truth of the consensus. Furthermore, it should be apparent that
further discursive justification will not remove us from the circle of

"bad infinity."
Instead, Habermas' strategy trades upon his effort to provide an
analysis of what is involved in giving good grounds or reasons for

accepting a discursive claim.18 He attempts to display the

characteristics of superior argumentation. In so doing he is not con-

cerned with illiminating syntactical or semantic properties, but

something much more akin to the pragmatic grounds for accepting

an argument. In this connection he has recently w ritten:

. . . Peirce and Toulmin hve both seen the rationally

motivating force of argumentation in the fact that the progress

of knowledge takes place through substantial arguments. The

latter are based on logicai inferences. but they are not ex-

hausted in deductive Systems of Statements. Substantial

arguments serve to redeem or to criticize validity claims,

whether the claims to truth implicit in assertions or the claims

to correctness connected with norms (of action and valuation)

or implied in recommendations and wamings. They hve the
force to convince the participants in a discourse of a validity

claim, that is, to provide rational grounds for the rcognition of

validity claims. Substantial arguments are explanations and

justifications. That is, pragmatic unities, in which not sentences

but speech acts (sentences employed in utterances) are connected. ... In theoretical discourses - consensus is produced
according to rules of argumentation diffrent from those ob-

taining in practical discourses - which serve to justify

recommended norms. However, in both cases the good is the

same: a rationally motivated dcision about the rcognition (or
rejection) of validity claims.19
In the context of discourse, participants dismiss ail motives except
th cooperative effort to arrive at a consensus, based only upon the
force of the better argument. This is essentially what is involved in a
rationally motivated rcognition of validity claims. And it isjust this

which is involved in genuine agreement or justified consensus. As

Habermas sees it, unless we are to cali the very meaning of dis-

course and speech into question, we must concede that the

possibility of such agreement is implicit in our every discursive par-

ticipation.

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PARADOX OF AUTHORITY 4 1

In point of fact our actual discourse clearly is not free from par-

ticular and systematic constraints and distortions. Habermas discusses this at length,20 and it is on this account that he directs his
attention to an analysis of the conditions within which a justified

consensus is possible; an analysis of the structure of communication, free from constraint, domination, and distortion: the
ideal speech situation.
The ideal speech situation must satisfy a generai symmetry re-

quirement: for all participants there must be a symmetrical distribution of chances to slect and employ speech acts, as well as to
assume dialogue rles.21 Each speaker must have an equal opportunity to initiate and continue discourse (communicative speech
acts). Each participant must have the same chance to subject ail
opinions to discussion and criticism. That is to say that ail of the
participants may give reasons for or against any statement, explanation, interprtation, or justification (constituative speech
acts). AH of the speakers must, in addition, have an equal chance to
utilize speech acts which express their intentions, attitudes, and
feelings (reprsentative speech acts). Finally, each participant must
be allowed the same opportunity to command, permit, and allow

(regulative speech acts). In regard to this structure of communication Habermas comments:

If under thse conditions a consensus about the recommen-

dation to accept a norm arises argumentatively, that is, on the

basis of hypothetically proposed, alternative justifications, then

this consensus expresses a 'rational will.' Since all those

affected have, in principle, at least the chance to participate in

the practical dlibration, the 'rationality' of the discursively
formed will consists in th fact that th reciprocai behavior expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a cornmon interest ascertained without dception. The interest is common because the constraint-free consensus permits only what

ail can want; it is free of dception because even the in-

terprtations of needs in which each individuai must be able to

recognize what he wants become the object of discursive willformation. The discursively formed will may be called 'rational'

because the formai properties of discourse and of the

deliberative situation sufficiently guarantee that a consensus

can arise only through appropriately interpreted, generalizable
interests, by which I mean needs that can be communicatively

shared.22

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42 R. R. McGUIRE

The conditions of the ideal speech situation are quite clearly rooted
in the conditions of the ideal form of life. Included within this

model of communication are the interconnected linguistic conceptualizations of "truth," "freedom," and "justice." These are the
norms that are built into Habermas' model of rational speech.

As earlier noted, there is no denying that the ideal speech

situation is not an empirical reality, but neither is it merely a
hypothetical construct. Habermas regards it as a "reciprocai supposition unavoidable in discourse,"23 at worst "... a fiction that is
operatively effective in communication."24 It is, as he prefers to cali
it, more the anticipation of an ideal speech situation with which we

are concerned. This anticipation functions as a criticai standard

against which we may measure any actually achieved consensus.
Only insofar as an actually attained consensus approaches this standard may it lay claim to the status of rational consensus.25 The ideal
speech situation and the theory of communicative comptence must

be seen as a practical hypothesis, serving at least as a guide for the

institutionalization of discourse.
Habermas contends that what levtes us out of nature is the

single thing whose nature we can know: language. Autonomy and

responsibility are posited through the very structure of language.26
And this anticipated form of communication is an anticipated form
of life:

. . . only in an emancipated society, whose members' autonomy

and responsibility had been realized, would communication
hve developed into non-authoritarian and universally practical dialogue from which both our model of reciprocally constituted ego identity and our idea of true consensus are always
implicitly derived. To this extent the truth of Statements is bas-

ed on anticipating the realization of the good life.27

Nowell-Smith has argued convincingly that it is a mistake to cast
the analysis of authority in terms of an absolute dichotomy between
the authority of th state and the autonomy of th individuai. It is

just this rigid dichotomy which gnrtes the insoluble Paradox of

Authority. His alternative method is to provide a rigorous descriptive analysis of what authority is, contributing the important obser-

vation that authority is always manifested in speech acts. A con-

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PARADOX OF AUTHORITY 43

clusion of the analysis is that when a person makes the claim,

"Government X has de jure authority," that person must be construed as being in the act of endorsing the particular System of rules

represented by Government X. In the uttering of this speech act

they hve taken the internai point of view toward this System of
rules. Nowell-Smith adds, of course, that this endorsement must be

viewed as always defeasible.

The analysis which Nowell-Smith provides falls short because he
has lost sight of two important considrations. The first is that,
while the paradox may be methodologically generated, there is an
underlying concern which lends it its significance. We do want to
know whether or not it is possible for there to be any System of rules

or authority which are consistent with human freedom. If, indeed, it

is th case that there is no absolute compatibility between authority

and autonomy, then we want to know at least which Systems of

rules maximize individuai autonomy. We want to discern not only
what authority is, but what legitimate authority is, where we define
legitimate or rational authority as that most consistent with human
autonomy.

The second area of concern is his failure to consider adequately

the fact that speech acts are the production of sentence tokens under

certain conditions. It is apparent that coercive conditions exist,

whereby persons hve no choice but to adhre to the internai point
of view. The conditions, furthermore, under which most speech acts
are issued contain either overt or subtle factors of constraint and

distortion. At least hypothetically, we can characterize the conditions along a spectrum, the extremes of which are totally coerced

speech acts and autonomously formulated speech acts. Moreover,

we must recognize that thse conditions are forms of life, within
which the Systems of rules are embedded. They may be characteriz-

ed as rational or irrational, according to the degree of autonomy

allowed. Nowell-Smith's proccupation with normative neutrality
results in his ignoring thse conditions and in his overlooking the
fact that we may characterize speech acts uttered in these various
contexts as more or less rational. It may well be an instance of what

authority is when a person is coerced or deceived, in whatever

fashion, to say, "Government X has de jure authority," but it most
certainly is not an instance of what rational or legitimate authority

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44

R.

R.

McGUIRE

is. In view of this, Nowell-Smith's assurance, that taking th inter-

nai point of view is always defeasible, rings hollow.

Human beings exist as social beings, within social organizations
and structures. The absolute autonomy of a state of nature is at best

an undesirable fiction, and it is pointless to try to reconcile this

abstract "negative" freedom with th authority of th state.

Freedom is, indeed, eminently a politicai concept. It can exist for
th individuai only within a specifically structured state, a rationally organized society.28 The rational state reflects the interests of its

Citizens by eliminating socially unnecessary constraints on human

freedom.29 What are required are more spcifie criteria with which
to fili out this generai formula. And it is to this end that Habermas,
focusing upon the structure of communication, directs his efforts.

In contrast to Nowell-Smith, Habermas' analysis of the conditions within which a justified consensus is possible provides us
with a model of the conditions of rational or legitimate authority.

With this analysis we hve grounds for the claim that a particular
endorsement is, indeed, an irrational speech act. We hve a clearly
articulated model of communicative structures which allows for the

formation of a rational will and which fully accounts for the inhrent telos of reaching an understanding through communication.

We hve a cohrent theoretical framework with which to support

our claim that, insofar as Systems of rules and norms contribute to

systematically distorted communication, insofar as they exist as

systematic barriers to discursive will formation, they are irrational.

Insofar as communication structures are permeated with constraint, domination, and distortion they are irrational. And insofar

as they create a fiction of reciprocai accountability, concomitantly

creating idologies by sustaining the "legitimacy" of thse very

structures, they are irrational. They are irrational and hence

illegitimate - involving no moral obligation.
Department of Philosophy

State University of New York, College at Brockport

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PARADOX OF AUTHORITY 45

NOTES
1 Robert Paul Wolff, In Dfense of Anarchism (New York, 1970).
2 P. H. Nowell-Smith, "What is Authority?" Philosophie Exchange 2 (1976).
3 Jrgen Habermas, "Towards a Theory of Communicative Comptence," Inquiry

13 (1970), 360-75; "Technik und Wissenschaft ^'Ideologie' " (Frankfurt, 1968), in

Towarda Rational Society, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1970); Knowledge and
Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1971); Theory and Practice,
trans. John Viertal (Boston, 1973); see also T. A. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Comptence," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3 (1973), 135-56
4 Wolff, In Dfense of Anarchism.
5 Ibid., p. 19.

6
7
8
9

John Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1970), p. 12.

Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 17.
Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 17.

10 Ibid.

11 Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie," p. 163.

12 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 17.
13 Ibid., p. 18.
14 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
15 Ibid., p. 19.
16 Habermas, "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen
Kompetenz," in Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie - Was leistet die
Systemforschung? J. Habermas and N. Luhman (Frankfurt, 2nd ed., 1971), p. 120.
17 See Max Horkheimer, "Ein Neuer Ideologie Begriff?", Archiv fr die Geschichte
des Sozialismus und die Arbeiterbewegung 15 (1930); for a criticai discussion see
Martin Jay, "The Frankfurt School's Critique of Karl Mannheim and the Sociology
of Knowledge," Telos 20 (1974), 72-89.
18 Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien" in Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift fr
Walter Schulz (Pfullingen, 1972).
19 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. A. McCarthy (Boston, 1975), p. 107.
20 Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication," Inquiry 13 (1970),
205-18.

21 Habermas classifies speech acts into: (1) communicatives, (2) constatives,

(3) reprsentatives, (4) regulatives; see "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer
Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz," pp. 111-12.
22 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 108.
23 Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," p. 258.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., "This anticipation alone is the warrant that permits us to join to an actually

attained consensus the claim of a rational consensus. At th same time it is a criticai

standard against which every actually realized consensus can be called into question

and tested."

26 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 314.

27 Ibid. For excellent discussions of Habermas' universal pragmatice within the
broader context of politicai economy see Trent Schroyer "The Dialectical Foundations of Criticai Theory; Jrgen Habermas' Metatheoretical Investigations," Telos

12 (1972), 93-114; and The Critique of Domination (New York, 1973).

28 See Herbert Marcuse, Ngations: Essays in Criticai Theory, trans. Jeremy J.
Shapiro (Boston, 1968). p. 39.

29 See Erich Fromm, Fear ofFreedom (London, 1942), pp. 26, 232. The term is here
usedrin Fromm's sense: "freedom to" rather than only "freedom from."

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