ISIDRO V.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-105586 December 15, 1993
Facts:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the land in dispute in Nueva Ecija. Aniceta Garcia, the overseer of the land,
allowed Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land in 1985. The occupancy was subject to the condition that Isidro will vacate the
premises upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental, while converting the swamp into a fishpond. In 1990, private
respondent through the overseer demanded the return of the land. Isidro, however, denied its return, claiming that he had spent effort and invested
capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for an unlawful detainer was initiated. Private respondent stated that she is the owner of
a parcel of land situated in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, which petitioner is illegally occupying; that petitioner has taken advantage of the
tolerance of her sister in allowing him to occupy the land on the condition that he (petitioner) would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioners
defense was that: (a) the complaint was triggered by his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b) the subject land is a fishpond and therefore is
agricultural land; and (c) lack of formal demand to vacate exposes the complaint to dismissal for insufficiency of cause of action. The MTC and the
RTC denied jurisdiction to the case since it declared in its findings that the land in dispute is an agricultural one and the same should only be
subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). However, upon appeal, CA set aside the decision of
the lower courts ordering the petitioner to vacate and surrender the land in dispute to Natividad Gutierrez. The CA ruled that since there was no
tenancy arrangement between the private respondent and the petitioner, the private respondent possesses the property in dispute by mere
tolerance and when such possession ceased as such upon demand to vacate by the petitioner, then, private respondent became a squatter in said
land.
Issue:

WON there was a tenancy relationship between the parties.

Ruling:

No. There was no tenancy relationship between the parties.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms and conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor or lessee. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a
sharing of harvests between the parties.
In this case, the MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint primarily because the subject is an agricultural land. Despite the land in
dispute being a fishpond, this does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute. Petitioner failed to show that there was sharing of
harvest or paying rent for the use of the land. Thus, the requisites for a tenancy relationship were not met. Moreover, the agreement between the
overseer and petitioner was for petitioner to occupy and use the land by mere tolerance of the owner. Petitioner Isidro failed to refute that Garcia
allowed him to use the land subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate it upon demand.
Thus, there was no tenancy relationship between the parties.

ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, LOLITA T. SUPLICO, ENRIQUE T. SUPLICO, JR. and DAVID T. SUPLICO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
FEDERICO ARMADA. G.R. No. 103103 June 17, 1996
PONENTE: VITUG, J
FACTS:

Isabel Tupas was the registered owner of a parcel of rice land. She leased her landholding, excluding the 33,438-square-meter portion
already tenanted, to petitioner Enrique P. Suplico, her brother-in-law, under a contract that was set to expire on 31 May 1982.

In 1979, Armada started tilling an area of 32,945 square meters under an agreement with Enrique Suplico. Armada undertook to till the
land while Suplico agreed to provide the farm implements and work animals. Suplico was to receive from Armada 62 cavans from the
palay harvest per crop yield by way of rental for the use not only of the land but also of the work animals and a hand tractor. Private
respondent resided with his family in a farmhouse on the land.

Years later, Suplico threatened to eject Armada from the property, Armada initiated, on 03 May 1982, an action for damages and
injunction against Suplico in the Court of Agrarian Relations ("CAR") in Bacolod City. The complaint averred that Armada was the tenantfarmer of around 2.5 hectares of the property of Isabel Tupas having been instituted as such tenant in 1979 by her administrator, herein
petitioner Enrique Suplico, to whom he religiously paid the fixed rental of 62 cavans of palay per crop yield.

In his answer with counterclaim, Suplico interposed the special defense that Armada was not a tenant-farmer but a seasonal hired farm
laborer with a fixed compensation, and that his services could be terminated anytime before or, at the worst case, upon the expiration of
their contract in May 1982.

The trial court rendered its decision declaring private respondent a bona fide agricultural lessee. The dispositive portion of the decision
stated:
1. Declaring plaintiff FEDERICO ARMADA a bona fide agricultural lessee of the landholding in question with an area of two and
a half (2 1/2) hectares more or less belonging to the intervenors;
2. Permanently enjoining the defendant/intervenors from ejecting or removing plaintiff from his landholding aforementioned
situated in sitio Langka, Brgy. Taloc, Bago City;
3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant/intervenors two hundred fifty-four (254) cavans of palay as back rentals or their
money equivalent, less whatever amount may have been paid or deposited with the court after this date; and
4. Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims for damages for lack of and/or insufficiency of evidence.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, on 29 November 1991, affirmed the decision of the court a quo and considered Armada to be a share
tenant.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Armada should be held a tenant farmer entitled to security of tenure or a mere hired farm
laborer.
HELD: Yes, Armada is a tenant farmer.

Private respondent was in actual possession of the land and he there resided with his family in a farmhouse, just like what a farm tenant
normally would.

Private respondent and his wife were personally doing the farm work of plowing, planting, weeding and harvesting the area. The
occasional and temporary hiring of persons outside of the immediate household, so long as the tenant himself had control in the
farmwork, was not essentially opposed to the status of tenancy.

The management of the farm was left entirely to private respondent who defrayed the cultivation expenses.

Private respondent shared the harvest of the land, depositing or delivering to petitioner Enrique Suplico the agreed 62 cavans of palay
per crop yield. Jesus Mesias, the licensed ricemiller of Taloc, attested to Suplico's having received from private respondent the cash value
of the rental payments from "the first crop of 1979 and each crop thereafter up to the first crop of 1983, inclusive." The rental payments
made thereafter were received by petitioner Lolita Suplico, court appointed police officers, or the barangay captain.

AGRA - Bejasa v. CA 335 SCRA 191, 7/6/2000

Facts:
On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land with Pio Malabanan. In the contract,
Malabanan agreed among other things: "to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase or procure calamansi, citrus and rambutan seeds or
seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants are thereon existing, to make the necessary harvest of fruits, etc." Malabanan hired the Bejasas to
plant on the land and to clear it.
On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land and Malabanan was under no obligation to share the
harvests with Candelaria. Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died.
On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration
over the disputed land. On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaimes wife with
a term of one year.
On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15, 000.00 in consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na
bunga" agreement, with a term of one year. After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victorias demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to
stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest.
On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for confirmation of
leasehold and home lot with recovery of damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan, and the trial court ruled in favour of the Bejasas.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:

Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas.

Ruling: No. There was no tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas.
The elements of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there
is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.
With Malabanan and the Bejasas, Malabanan allowed the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the land but he did not have the authority to
give consent to the creation of a tenancy relation. Even if he did, still no such relation existed as there was no proof that they shared the harvests.
In Chico v. Court of Appeals, said that self-serving statements are inadequate, proof must be adduced.
With Candelaria and the Bejasas, between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner never gave her consent. The
Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria.
With Dinglasan and the Bejasas, they did not have the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement. The
only agreement between them is the "aryenduhan", which states in no uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the term of the
contract.

RODRIGO ALMUETE and ANA ALMUETE, petitioners, vs. MARCELO ANDRES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
A parcel of landl was awarded by the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to petitioner Rodrigo Almuete in 1957.
Since then, Rodrigo Almuete exercised exclusive possession of the property, cultivating it and planting thereon.
However, unknown to Rodrigo Almuete, on August 17, 1979, an Agrarian Reform Technologist filed a field investigation and inspection report
stating that the whereabouts of the original awardee of the subject property, Rodrigo Almuete, was unknown and that he had "waived all his rights
as a NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control and financial hardship." It was also stated therein that "the actual occupant of the land
is Marcelo Andres since April 1967 to date." She recommended to the Director of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Tuguegarao, Cagayan
that the award in favor of Rodrigo Almuete be cancelled and that the land be awarded to respondent Marcelo Andres. The latter was granted and
issued a homestead patent.
DAR issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-52521 in the name of Marcelo Andres, which certificate was registered in the Registry of
Deeds of Isabela. Shortly thereafter, Marcelo Andres, accompanied by ten (10) other persons armed with bolos and other bladed implements,

entered the subject property, claiming exclusive right of ownership and possession. They felled the narra trees, converting the same to lumber, and
destroyed the mongos planted by the Almuetes. Marcelo Andres gained control, and took possession, of approximately half of the subject property.
Rodrigo Almuete wasted no time in complaining to the DAR authorities of Marcelo Andres' encroachment into and occupation of the subject
property. It was only then that he learned that the subject property had been titled in the name of Marcelo Andres and that the award in his favor had
been cancelled because he had allegedly abandoned the subject property. Upon Rodrigo Almuete's inquiry, the records of the local office of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) showed that he was still the listed owner of the subject property. Consequently, Rodrigo
Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor
of plaintiffs.
Andres failed to appeal; thus, the trial court's decision became final and executory. On February 15, 1994, a writ of execution was issued. Marcelo
Andres filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, but the trial court did not act on it on the ground that it had no more jurisdiction over the case.
Andres filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. He argued that since the subject property was agricultural land covered by a
homestead patent, exclusive jurisdiction was with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (or DARAB), not with the regular courts.
Respondent Andres also stressed that the original action was for ejectment, which was cognizable by the municipal trial courts, not by the Regional
Trial Courts. Consequently, for want of jurisdiction, the trial court's decision was null and void; and cannot be enforced by writ of execution or any
other legal means. A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Does the case fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB?
Ruling:
No. The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was for recovery of possession and reconveyance of title. The issue to be resolved was who
between petitioner Rodrigo Almuete and respondent Marcelo Andres has a better right to the subject property considering that both of them are
awardees of the same property. It was thus a controversy relating to ownership of the farmland, which is beyond the ambit of the phrase "agrarian
dispute." No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would so characterize the
relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.
" Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
following elements are indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

LEONARDA L. MONSANTO, petitioner, vs. JESUS AND TERESITA ZERNA AND COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 142501. December 7, 2001]
FACTS:
Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna, overseers of some banana plants on the land owned by Leonarda Monsanto, were charged with qualified theft.
The land was principally devoted to coconut trees. The accused allegedly harvested and carried away coconuts from the said plantation, which
were then processed into copra with a total value of P6,162.50.
The accused were acquitted of the criminal charge stating that the harvest was done, not for the purpose of stealing the coconuts or the copra, but
more to confirm their claim that they were tenants of the land. In fact the lack of intent to gain was shown by the fact that they immediately
deposited the proceeds with the barangay captain and did not even claim a share in the proceeds of the copra.
The barangay captain was ordered to deliver the amount of P5,162.50, representing the proceeds from the copra sold by the accused. Petitioner
prayed that remaining sum of P1,100 be returned to her as well.
Counsel for the accused averred that the amount P1,100.00 (P340 for the harvesting cost and P760 for labor cost) was due to the accused as
compensation for their labor and equity demands that they be entitled to it.

Court of Appeals: RTC had no jurisdiction because the dispute involved an agricultural tenancy relationship, the matter fell within the primary and
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). It added that inasmuch as the RTC had no
jurisdiction to rule on the civil aspect of the case ergo, it had no appellate authority over the matter under a writ of error.
ISSUES:
1] Whether or not the accused are entitled to the amount of P1,100.00 as compensation for labor in harvesting the coconuts and processing these
into copra
2] Whether or not the Regional Trial Court is automatically divested of jurisdiction over a criminal case where an agrarian issue is argued as a
defense, no matter how flimsy?
HELD:
1] Yes. The accused are entitled to the amount of P1,100. Firstly, the trial court considered the return of the P1,100 as part of the civil aspect of the
criminal case for which they are acquitted. Where there is no crime committed, there can be no civil liability that can arise from the criminal action or
as a consequence thereof.
2] The RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction when it effectively ruled on the agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties. However, it should
have confined itself to the determination of whether private respondents were guilty of qualified theft, instead of automatically awarding the
proceeds of the copra sale to petitioner. As an offshoot of the agrarian dispute between the parties, the issue is cognizable exclusively by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The DARAB, under Section 1, paragraph (a), Rule II of the Revised Rules of
Procedure, exercises primary jurisdiction. The provision reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically,
such jurisdiction shall extend over but not [be] limited to the following:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements -- whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise -- over
lands devoted to agriculture, including (1) disputes concerning farm workers associations; or (2) representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangement.
Case dismissed.

G.R. No. 78517

February 27, 1989

GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES,respondents.
FACTS:
The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead
patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27
and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform
(MAR for short).
On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform,
P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other
Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.
Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.
Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land
Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.
On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial
Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.
On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.
Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same
was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.
On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment rendered on March 3, 1987

ISSUE:
Whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
RULING:
The question certainly calls for a negative answer.
We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them
ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act
No. 141. Thus,
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build
a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the
citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain
degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the
satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)
In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by
the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or
utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise
contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'
Daez v CA, 325 SCRA 856, December 17, 2000
Facts:
Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by
respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was
subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as amended by Letter of Instruction Armed with an affidavit,
allegedly signed under duress by the respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers, Eudosia Daez applied for the
exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private
respondents. The application of the petitioner was denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally
denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for
retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Regional Director allowed Daez to retain the subject land but the DAR
Secretary reversed that decision. She appealed to the Office of the President which ruled in her favour. Respondents appealed to the CA which
reversed the decision of the Office of the President.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of application for exemption under PD 27 would bar an application for retention under RA 6657.
Held:
The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise
of a landowners right of retention are different. Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are
one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was,
thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her
appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory.

FLORENCIA PARIS vs DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, et al

G.R. No. 139083, August 30, 2001

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Homesteads are not exempt from the operation of the Land Reform Law. The right to retain seven hectares of land is subject to the condition
that the landowner is actually cultivating that area or will cultivate it upon the effectivity of the said law.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon with an area of 10.6146 hectares, more or less,
and another property with an area of 13.2614 hectares. The said parcels are fully tenanted by private respondents herein who are
recipients of Emancipation Patents in their names pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27 notwithstanding the fact that neither
the tenants nor the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) [has] paid a single centavo for the said land.
Petitioner and the tenants have not signed any Land Transfer Production Agreement. Petitioner and her children have been deprived of
their property without due process of law and without just compensation, especially so that the tenants have already stopped paying
rentals as of December 1988 to the damage and prejudice of petitioner.
Petitioner contends that: First, since she is entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under P.D. 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares
each for her children under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to acquire the subject land
and, second, the Emancipation Patents precipitately issued to them are null and void for being contrary to law. Petitioner further alleged
that she owns the subject property covered by OCT No. P-4985 as original homestead grantee who still owned the same when Republic
Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is entitled to retain the area to the exclusion of her tenants.
Respondents alleged that when the subject lands were covered under P.D. 27, the petitioner was repeatedly informed and invited by the
DAR Office at Valencia, Bukidnon to thresh out the matter; that petitioners right to retain seven (7) hectares is not absolute since she
owns other agricultural landholdings, thus disqualifying her to retain the area, aside from the fact that she has other properties sufficient to
support her family as shown in the Certification of the Provincial Assessors Office listing down the petitioners landholdings. They likewise
prayed that the Emancipation Patents issued to private respondents and their peaceful possession of their farm lots be respected.
The Court of Appeals (CA affirmed the ruling of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) declaring the private
respondents to be full owners of the land they till pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228; Declaring the
validity of the Emancipation Patents issued to private respondents hence this case before the SC.

ISSUES:
IIIIII-

Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act [are] exempted from the operation of land reform.
Granting arguendo that homesteads are not exempt, whether or not the Emancipation Patents issued to the respondents are
valid notwithstanding lack of payment of just compensation.
On the assumption that homesteads are exempt from land reform and/or the emancipation patents are illegally issued hence,
void, can the respondents be ejected from the premises in question

HELD:
I-

No, Petitioners homesteads not exempt from Land Reform. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the Emancipation Patents
issued to respondents, makes no exceptions whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere therein does it appear that lots obtained by
homestead patents are exempt from its operation.
PD 27 states: In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner
is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it.
Even under the current primary law on agrarian reform, Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, to
petitioners lands are subject to land reform.

which the application of PD 27 is suppletory,

SEC. 6. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any
public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as
commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be
awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age;
and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have
been covered by PD 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereund er; Provided, further, That
original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the landowner is cultivating the
area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents
will not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their
direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.
In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully
tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any part thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no
right to retain any portion of her landholdings.
II-

Respondents are entitled to the lands they till, subject to the determination and payment of just compensation to petitioner.
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of PD 27 reads as follows:
For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the er pursuant to this Decree, the value of
the land shall be equivalent to two and one-half (2 ) times the average harvest of three normal crop years immediately
preceding the promulgation of this Decree; The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) per centum per
annum, shall be paid by the tenant in fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations[.]
Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land,
including interest, within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents complied with the requirement of full payment of the cost of the parcels of
land. As they themselves admitted, their value had not even been determined yet. In the absence of such determination, the Court cannot
rule that just compensation has already been fully paid.

Necessarily, the lease rentals admittedly paid by respondents until December 1988 cannot, at this point, be considered as full settlement
of the value of the lands or as just compensation for them. The value the subject lands was never determined; thus, there is no
amount that can be used as basis for applying the lease rentals.
Under the circumstances, actual title to the subject lands remains with petitioner. Clearly then, under PD 27 and EO 228, the application
of the process of agrarian reform to the subject lands is still incomplete.
III-

The tenants cannot be ejected. Section 22 of RA 6657 expressly states that actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be ejected
or removed therefrom. Furthermore, there is no reason for ejecting the tillers with respect to the area of five hectares, which petitioner
may choose to retain. Section 6 of RA 6657 further states:
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner; Provided, however,
That in case the area selected for retention by the land owner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to
remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant
chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a lease holder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this
Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land
retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests
his choice of the area for retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farm workers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected.
Under the current law, landowners who do not personally cultivate their lands are no longer required to do so in order to qualify for the
retention of an area not exceeding five hectares. Instead, they are now required to maintain the actual tiller of the area retained, should
the latter choose to remain therein.

ATLAS FERTILIZER CORP. v DAR

FACTS:

Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-in-intervention Archies Fishpond, Inc.
and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d),
17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of
1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional.
Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the Constitution in the following manner:
1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article XIII of the
constitution limits agrarian reform only to agriculture lands.
2. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are differently situated, and differently
treat aquaculture lands and other industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional guarantee of the equal
protection of the laws.
3. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against other industrial
workers even as Section 1 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in economic and employment
opportunities.
4. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its government-induced investments in aquaculture even as Sections 2 and 3, Article
XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.

First argument: Petitioners contend that in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[5] this Court has already ruled
impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not agriculture lands. In aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms, the use of land is only
incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity and, hence, as held in Luz Farms, they too should be excluded from R.A. 6657 just
as lands devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the same reason.
Second argument: They contend that R.A. 6657, by including in its coverage, the raising of fish and aquaculture operations including
fishponds and prawn ponds, treating them as in the same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution and is, therefore, void. During the debates of the Constitutional Commission, it appears that to exclude
industrial lands, to which category lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms belong is the intention of the framers.

ISSUE:
Whether fishponds and prawn ponds are included in the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
HELD:
While the Court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted squarely with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt
the Legislative and the Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment, said law or act.
R.A 7881 was approved by Congress amending some provisions of R,A 6657. R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn
farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions
has become moot and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.

REPUBLIC VS. CA
342 SCRA 189 (October 5, 2000)
Facts:
Private respondent, Green City Estate and Development Corporation, purchased and acquired parcels of land with a combined area of
approximately 112.0577 hectares situated at Brgy. Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province of Rizal from Marcela Borja vds. De Torres. The tax
declarations classified the properties as agricultural.
On June 16, 1994, DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to the
Comprehensive Land Reform Law (CARL). Private respondent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from
agrarian reform pursuant to DAR Admin. Order No. 6 and DOJ opinion No. 44. However DAR Regional Director recommended a denial of the said
petition on the ground that private respondent failed to substantiate their allegation that the properties are indeed in the municipalitys residential
and forest conservation zone and that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor irrigable.
Private respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from CARP coverage. It alleged that the property should be
exempted since it was within the residential and forest conservation zones of the town plan/zoning ordinance of Jala-Jala. The amended petition for
exemption showed that a portion of about 15 hectares of the land is irrigated riceland which private respondent offered to sell to the farmer
beneficiaries or to the DAR. However, DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application for exemption of private respondent, on the grounds
that the land use plan of Jala-Jala, which differs from its land use map, intends to develop 73% of Barangay Punta into an agricultural zone; that the
certification issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is not definite and specific; and that the certification issued by the
National Irrigation Authority (NIA) that the area is not irrigated nor programmed for irrigation, is not conclusive on the DAR, since big areas in the
municipality are recipients of JICA-funded Integrated Jala-Jala Rural Development Projects.
The case was appealed to CA and the latter reversed the judgment and rendered a decision declaring those portions of that land be
exempt from CARP. Thus, DAR filed a petition of review by certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject parcels of land are exempt from the coverage of the CARL.
Ruling:
Yes!
RA 6657 (CARL) defines agricultural as land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial land. The land use map of the municipality, certified by the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC) of
Jala-Jala and the report of the commission constituted by the Court of Appeals established that the properties lie mostly within the residential and
forest conservation zone.
As to the DARs contention, that the subject properties have already been classified as agricultural based on the tax declarations, was erroneous
since there is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would
proscribe any further inquiry.
Moreover, the commissioners report on the actual condition of the properties confirms the fact that the properties are not wholly
agricultural. The finding that 66.5 hectares of the 112.0577 hectares of land of private respondent have an average slope of 28 degrees provides
another cogent reason to exempt these portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of the CARL is clear on this point when it provides that
all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
The petition was denied and the challenged decision was affirmed.

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CA

FACTS:
The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA[1] affirming the decision of DARAB ordering the
compulsory acquisition of petitioners property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa was the registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. The said parcels of land
are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area. [3]
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985,
respondents filed a civil case[4] seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner
sought the ejectment of private respondents. Respondents petitioned the DAR for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the
CARP. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a notice of coverage to petitioner and invited its officials or representatives to a
conference and came up with the decision that the landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner filed with the MARO a
Protest and Objection on the ground that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18%
and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. [7] The DARAB ruled against the
petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.
ISSUE:
WN the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of
R. A. No. 6657.
RULING:
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067) provides:
Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department
of Natural resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by
the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or
interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters.
Watersheds may be defined as an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from
adjacent watersheds. Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The

answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not declared the property as watershed
area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as PARK by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as
certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a
Resolution[26] voiding the zoning classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is now classified as agricultural
land.
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent
domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given
political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.[27]
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform [28] we held that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL
may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of
land in question form a vital part of a watershed area.[29]
Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a watershed or part of the protected area for watershed purposes. Ecological
balances and environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be interconnected. Property developers and tillers of the land must be aware of
this deadly combination. In the case at bar, DAR included the disputed parcels of land for compulsory acquisition simply because the land was
allegedly devoted to agriculture and was titled to SRRDC, hence, private and alienable land that may be subject to CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey and reassessment. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of
land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. In a report of the Ecosystems Research and Development
Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds, they
concluded that:
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the
Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and
endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct
siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest
covers which acts as recharged areas of the Matang Tubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the
Matang Tubig structures they couldnt care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly
affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities
like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately
stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degredation threatens the livelihood of
thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be
immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.
Hence, the following are recommended:
7.2 The Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial assistance.
7.3 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of immediate rehabilitation.
7.4 A comprehensive and detailed watershed management plan and program be formulated and implemented by the Canlubang Estate in
coordination with pertinent government agencies.[30]
Also, DENR Secretary Alcala submitted a Memorandum for the President (Subject: PFVR HWI Ref.: 933103 Presidential Instructions on the
Protection of Watersheds of the Canlubang Estates at Barrio Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna) which reads:
It is the opinion of this office that the area in question must be maintained for watershed purposes for ecological and environmental considerations,
among others. Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP beneficiaries will be affected, it is important that a larger view of the situation
be taken as one should also consider the adverse effect on thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected and
maintained for watershed purposes.
The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if possible, an alternate area be allocated for the affected farmers, and that the Canlubang
Estates be mandated to protect and maintain the area in question as a permanent watershed reserved.[31]
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the
most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of
flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has
slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No. 6657, Section 10, provides:
Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production
centers, church sites and convents appurtenent thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked
by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act.

Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory
acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a reevaluation of the issue.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved
to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary
restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.
No costs.

LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.
192 SCRA 51
Facts: Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business. They allegedly stand to be adversely
affected by the enforcement of some provisions of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law directing "corporate farms" which
include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" and distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales
and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation.
They argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry.
They question the constitutionality of the laws, guidelines and rules mentioned and also prayed for an issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order to public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry
raisers.
Issue: WON the provisions are constitutional.
Held: No, the provisions questioned are unconstitutional. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the
meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. There is simply no reason to include livestock
and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. The provisions are therefore ruled unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative
of due process.

LAND BANK V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995
Facts:
Three petitioners, Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago and the Agricultural Development Corporation are landowners whose
landholdings were acquired by DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the
DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9 Private
respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their
names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in
bonds. Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of
RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989. The lower court rendered judgement in favor of the private respondents.
Issue:
WON the opening of trust accounts is valid in lieu of the deposits in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR.
Ruling: No. The opening of trust accounts is not valid in lieu of the deposits in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR.
Sec. 16(e) of RA 6657 says that, Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response
from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance
with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines...
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative
Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as
heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds".

ROXAS & CO., INC. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, [source: http://documents.tips/documents/roxas-vs-ca56709263ecd49.html]
G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999
FACTS:
(1) Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all
located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area. Hacienda
Caylaway is 867.4571 hectares in area.

(2) Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance
with the CARL.
(3) Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing
its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway
from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to other uses.
ISSUE: Whether the Haciendas Palico. Banilad and Caylaway, all situated in Nasugbu,Batangas, are non-agricultural and outside the scope of
Republic Act No. 665
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that The DAR itself has issued administrative circulars governing lands which are outside of CARP and may
not be subjected to land reform. Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1996 declares in its policy statement what landholdings are outside the
coverage of CARP. The AO is explicit in providing that such non-covered properties shall be reconveyed to the original transferors or owners. These
non-covered lands area. Land, or portions thereof, found to be no longer suitable for agriculture and, therefore, could not be given appropriate
valuation by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
b. Those were a Conversion Order has already been issued by the DAR allowing the use of the landholding other than for agricultural purposes in
accordance with Section65 of R.A. No. 6657 and Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1994;
c. Property determined to be exempted from CARP coverage pursuant to Department of Justice Opinion Nos. 44 and 181; or
d. Where a Presidential Proclamation has been issued declaring the subject property for certain uses other than agricultural. In the present case,
Proclamation 1520 dated November 20, 1975 is part of the law of the land. It declares the area in and around Nasugbu, Batangas, as a Tourist
Zone. It has not been repealed, and has in fact been used by DAR to justify conversion of other contiguous and nearby properties of other parties.
Furthermore, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, affirmed by the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Batangas, expressly defines the property
as tourist, not agricultural. The power to classify its territory is given by law to the local governments.

Sigre v. CA

[source: scribd]

GR Nos. 109568 and 113454

8 August 2002
FACTS:
Matias Yusay owned a parcel of irrigated rice land in Iloilo, in which Ernesto Sigre was a tenant. Sigre previously had been paying Yusay a lease
rental of 16 cavans per crop, but stopped paying in 1991-92. Instead, he remitted the payments to the LBP pursuant to DARs Memorandum
Circular No. 6 (MC 6), which set the guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer
program of PD 27.
Lilia Gonzales, co-administratrix of Yusays estate, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with the CA, seeking to prohibit the LBP from
accepting Sigres leasehold rentals. According to Gonzales, she had no notice that DAR had already fixed the value of the land. Her petition also
assails the validity of MC 6 and PD 27.

The CA then declared MC 6 null and void, and directed the LBP to return to Gonzales the lease rentals paid by Sigre, and Sigre to pay the rentals
directly to Gonzales.
ISSUE 1: W/N PD 27 sanctions MC 6.
YES. It was pursuant to PD 27 that MC 6 was issued by the DAR. The Circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenantfarmers lease rentals to the landowner were not credited in his favor against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a
perpetual obligor for said purchase price. Since the assailed Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of PD 27, it is therefore
valid.
ISSUE 2: W/N an irreconcilable conflict exists between PD 816 and MC 6, such that PD 816 must prevail over MC 6.
NO. PD 816 provides that the tenant-farmer shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the property has been determined
or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, MC 6 mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to the LBP the lease rental after
the value of the land has been determined. Thus, there is no incompatibility between these two. On the contrary, the two supplement each other as
they set the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the agricultural property.
ISSUE 3: W/N PD 27 is unconstitutional for setting limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation.
NO. Jurisprudence has upheld the constitutionality of the said decree. Moreover, the determination of just compensation under PD 27 is
not final or conclusive, because unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation by DAR, the parties may bring the dispute to
court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation.
ISSUE 4: W/N RA 6657 superseded or repealed PD 27.

NO. According to EO 229, PD 27 as amended shall continue to operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder.
Whatever provisions of PD 27 that are not inconsistent with RA 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer
under PD 27 are retained even with the passage of RA 6657.

Association of Small Landowners v. DAR Secretary

[source: scribd]

GR Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777, 14 July 1989

FACTS:
GR No. 79777: PD 27, EOs 228 & 229 Nicolas Manaay and his wife own a 9-hectare rice land; while Agustin Hermano, Jr. owned 5. They both
have four tenants each on their respective landholdings, who were declared full owners of the said lands by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD
27.
The Manaays and Hermano question the constitutionality of PD 27 and EOs 228 and 229.
GR No. 79310: PP 131, EO 229 Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District in Negros, as well as Planters Committee, Inc. seek
to prohibit the implementation of PP 131 and EO 229 for being violative of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and
equal protection.
Subsequently, the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP), Manuel Barcelona, and Prudencio Serrano filed their own petitions, which
also assailed the constitutionality of the abovementioned statutes.
GR No. 79744: EOs 228 & 229 Inocentes Pabico alleges that the then DAR Secretary placed his landholding under the coverage of OLT, in
violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to tenants, who then
refused to pay lease rentals to him. He then protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under OLT and asked for the recall and
cancellation of the said CLTs, which was denied without hearing. Although he filed an MR, EOs 228 and 229 were issued, rendering his MR moot
and academic because the said EOs directly effected the transfer of his land to his farmers-tenants.
GR No. 78742: PD 316 The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines invokes the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the
statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
Because PD 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his
farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the landowner shall have been determined, they petitioned the Court
for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention.
ISSUE #1: W/N PD 27, PP 131, and EOs 228 and 229 were validly enacted.
RULING:
YES. The promulgation of PD 27 by Pres. Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained and there is
no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of Pres. Aquino to promulgate PP 131 and EOs 228 & 229, the same was
authorized by Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not
rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to RA 6657 whenever
not inconsistent with its provisions.
ISSUE #2: W/N the CARP fund provision in PP131 conforms to the requirements of a valid appropriation.
RULING:
NO. PP 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of the said fund, for that is not its principal purpose.
An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of
the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
ISSUE #3: W/N PP 131 and EO 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits.
RULING:
NO. This argument is no longer tenable because RA 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law. As such, landowners
who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under PD 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by RA 6657 under the conditions therein
prescribed.
ISSUE #4: W/N the content and manner of just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is violative of the Constitution.
NO. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no other, what is being dealt with here is not the
traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The
initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at this time. The invalidation of the said section will result
in the nullification of the entire program.

ISSUE #5: W/N the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well-accepted principle of eminent domain by divesting the landowner of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just compensation.
NO. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full owners of the land they acquired under PD 27,
after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.

Land Bank of the Philippines

vs.
Court of Appeals and Jose Pascual
G.R. No. 128557

[source: academia]

December 29, 1999

FACTS:
An action for mandamus was filed by Jose Pascual after the refusal of Land Bank of the Philippines to pay private respondent pursuant to the final
decision rendered by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). LBP was ordered to pay Php 1.9M plus interest as just compensation to
Jose Pascual. The computation was based on the increased value of the Government Support Price, which was Php 300 per cavan of palay and
Php 250 per cavan of corn. The petitioner refused to pay the respondent alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and that it acted
beyond its authority. It also asserted that the writ of mandamus could not be issued, as there are other remedies available in the ordinary course of
law.
ISSUE:
Is the Land Bank of the Philippines bound to pay the Php 1.9M plus 6% interest per annum as just compensation to Jose Pascual?
LAW:
EO 228 provides that the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by PD 27 shall be based on the average gross production determined by the
Barangay Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and related issuance of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The average gross production shall be multiplied by 2.5, the product shall be multiplied by Php 35, the government
support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or Php 31, the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on
October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost
to the farmer and compensation to the landowner.
RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in granting the compensation of Php 1.9M but it deleted the 6% interest per annum, as it is
no longer applicable. Administrative Order No. 13, which provides compensation to landowners for unearned interests is no longer applicable since
the PARAD already increased the GSP from Php 35 to Php 300 per cavan of palay and from Php 31 to Php 250 per cavan of corn.

Santos vs Land Bank

Sept. 7, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in Agrarian Case No. RTC 94-3206 for the determination of just compensation regarding properties which
were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 in 1972. On August 12, 1997, the Regional Trial Court fixing the amount of P49,241,876.00 to be the just
compensation for the irrigated and unirrigated ricelands with areas and ordering Defendant Land Bank of the Philippines to pay [p]laintiff the
amount of FORTY-FIVE MILLION SIX HUNDRED NINE-EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE AND 34/100 (P45,698,805.34) PESOS
A preliminary valuation in the amount of P3,543,070.66 had in fact been previously released by the Land Bank in cash and bond; thus deducting it
from the total amount adjudged, the balance unpaid amount[ed] to P45,698,805.34 which was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be paid in
accordance with RA 6657.
"The Land Bank remitted the amount of P948,857.52 to the Clerk of Court on December 24, 1997 and released the amount of P3,621,023.01 in
cash and Land Bank Bond No. AR-0002206 in the amount of P41,128,024.81 to the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution praying that the payment of the compensation be in proportion of
P8,629,179.36 in bonds and P32,499,745 in cash, alleging that the cash portion should include the amounts in the Decision representing the
interest payments.
"Respondent Regional Trial Court presided over by a new judge, resolved the two motions on April 24, 1998. It held that the payment of just
compensation must be computed in the manner provided for in Section 18, Republic Act No. 6657: "WHEREFORE, Defendant Land Bank of the
Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the [p]laintiff the [c]ash [b]alance of FIVE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY TWO THOUSAND EIGHTYFOUR and 37/100 (P5,792,084.37), Philippine [c]urrency and the amount of THIRTY FIVE MILLION, THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY and 16/100 (P35,336,840.16) PESOS in government instruments or bonds to fully satisfy the Judgment herein in the
amount of forty-nine million two hundred forty one thousand eight hundred seventy six (P49,241,876.00) pesos, Philippine [c]urrency as just
compensation due the [p]laintiff.
Issue: How much should be paid in cash and how much also should be paid in bonds, to fully satisfy the judgment herein rendered in the amount
of P49,241,876.00.
Whether or not the amendment claimed by Santos on April 24, 1998 to the August 12, 1997 judgment was illegal.

Ruling
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) provides that just compensation to landowners shall be paid in cash and bonds.Hence, a trial
court decision directing the payment of such compensation "in the manner provided by R.A. 6657" is not illegally amended but is merely clarified by
an order, issued during the execution proceedings, that such amount shall be paid in cash and bonds.
The judgement does not revise, correct, or alter a decision which has become final and executory but only iterates and makes clear the essence of
the final judgement is not an illegal amendment of said decision. The August 12, 1997judemnet mandated compensation to the petitioner in the
manner provided by RA 6657."
SC understands that petitioner desires to be paid in cash; afte all, his compensation is long overdue. However it cannot be granted because it is not
sustained in the law. In Assoc. of Small Land Owners vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform: It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium
for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent
domain. What we deal with is revolutionary kind of expropriation.
it is clear from the judgment that the compensation was to be paid "in the manner provided by RA 6657."

G.R. NO. 172551 : JANUARY 15, 2014

[source: http://lawphil.blogspot.com/]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, Respondent.

BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered of owner of a 27-hectare parcel of agricultural land (property) in Calamba,
Laguna. On April 30, 1999, the government placed the property under the coverage if its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the property at P1,126,132.89. Yatco did not find the valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter
to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), which then conducted summary administrative
proceedings for the determination of just compensation.
The PARAD valued the property at P16,543,800.00, using the property current market value. LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD ruling.
Instead it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation.
RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200 per square meter based on the RTC branch 35 and 36. RTC-SAC did not give
weight to the LBP evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and
failed to consider the valuation in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
The CA dismissed LBP appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC-SAC determination of just compensation for the property was proper?
HELD: The RTC-SAC determination of just compensation for the property was not proper.
Civil law : determination of just compensation under the DAR
The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the original
and exclusive power to determine just compensation for lands under CARP coverage. To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section
17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors required to be taken into account to correctly determine just compensation. The law (under Section 49
of R.A. No. 6657) likewise empowers the DAR to issue rules for its implementation. The DAR thus issued DAR AO 5-98incorporating the law listed
factors in determining just compensation into a basic formula that contains the details that take these factors into account.
That the RTC-SAC must consider the factors mentioned by the law (and consequently the DAR implementing formula) is not a novel concept. In
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, we said that the RTC-SAC must consider the factors enumerated under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as
translated into a basic formula by the DAR, in determining just compensation.
In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, we again affirmed the need to apply Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657 and DAR AO5-98 in just compensation cases. There, we considered the CA and the RTC in grave error when they opted to come up with their
own basis for valuation and completely disregarded the DAR formula. The need to apply the parameters required by the law cannot be doubted; the
DAR administrative issuances, on the other hand, partake of the nature of statutes and have in their favor a presumption of legality. Unless
administrative orders are declared invalid or unless the cases before them involve situations these administrative issuances do not cover, the courts
must apply them.
The RTC-SAC adopted Branch 36 valuation without any qualification or condition. Yet, in disposing of the present case, the just compensation that it
fixed for the property largely differed from the former. Note that Branch 36 fixed a valuation of P20.00 per square meter; while the RTC-SAC, in the
present case, valued the property at P200.00 per square meter. Strangely, the RTC-SAC did not offer any explanation nor point to any evidence,
fact or particular that justified the obvious discrepancy between these amounts.
In ascertaining just compensation, the fair market value of the expropriated property is determined as of the time of taking. The time of taking refers
to that time when the State deprived the landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State acquires title to the property or as of
the filing of the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

As a final note and clarificatory reminder, we agree that the LBP is primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation for all
private lands acquired for agrarian reform purposes. But this determination is only preliminary. The landowner may still take the matter of just
compensation to the court for final adjudication.