MACALINTAL V.

COMELEC
Facts: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others: (1) That the
provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting
provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election; (2) That the provision allowing the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so. Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No.
9189 violate Article IX-A of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall
be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
(Emphasis supplied). He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power
to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A.
No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control
of either the executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate
rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the
rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the
petition of any interested party, including the legislators.
Issue: Whether or not the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee violates the independence of
COMELEC.
Held: Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be an independent COMELEC, the
Court has held that "[w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that
the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government. R.A.
No. 9189 created the JCOC. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor
and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission.. However, aside from its monitoring
and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend
and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19];
and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for
the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC. By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189,
Congress has empowered the COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act." This provision of law follows the usual
procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative agency
the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the
administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation. 47Once a law is enacted and approved, the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress
relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to
approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review,
amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.
OMBUDSMAN v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts: The CSC approved the Qualification Standards for several positions in the Office of the Ombudsman including
that for Graft Investigation Officer III. On September 29, 1999, the members of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG), namely: the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), CSC, Commission on Audit (COA), Commission
on Human Rights (CHR), petitioner and this Court adopted Joint Resolution No. 62. Section 7(3), Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 enumerates exclusively and restrictively the specific positions under the Career
Executive Service, all the holders of which are appointed by the President and are required to have CES eligibility;
WHEREAS, the Constitutional Commissions, the Supreme Court, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Office
of the Ombudsman are empowered to appoint officials and employees to positions belonging to first level up to
third level of their respective agencies, and that they are not presidential appointees. CFAG jointly resolves that all

career third level positions identified and classified by each of the member agency arenot embraced within the
Career Executive Service (CES) and as such shall not require Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) or Career
Executive Service (CES) Eligibility for purposes of permanent appointment. Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul
Elmer M. Clemente and Jose Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr. were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of petitioner by
the Ombudsman. The CSC approved the appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire security
of tenure, they must obtain CES or Civil Service Executive (CSE) eligibility which is governed by the CESB. By
January 2, 2003 letter to the CSC, the Ombudsman requested for the change of status, from temporary to
permanent, of the appointments of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus effective December 18, 2002 invoking the
ruling of Inok Case stating that the letter and intent of the law (PD 807 Civil Service Law)is to circumscribe the
Career Executive Service (CES) to CES positions in the Executive Branch of Government, and that the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights are not covered
by the CES governed by the Career Executive Service Board.
Issue: WON independent offices specifically authorized by the Constitution to appoint will not be subjected to Civil
Service Law and Rules
Held: The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in the Inok case cannot be made the basis for changing the
employment status of De Jesus. Let it be stressed that nowhere in the aforesaid decision states that the Office of
the Ombudsman or the other constitutional agencies mentioned therein are exempt or are not covered by the Civil
Service Law and Rules. On the contrary, the same decision declares that these bodies are covered by the civil
service system. Basic is the rule that all appointments in the government service, particularly the career service,
must be in accordance with the qualification requirements as laid down under existing civil service rules and
regulations. Such policy is in line with the Commissions mandate to professionalize the civil service. The
requirements spelled out in the Qualification Standards (QS) Manual are designed to determine the fitness of the
appointee in a certain position. These requirements are indispensable in order to satisfy the Constitutional mandate
that appointment in the civil service shall be made according to merit and fitness. While it is true that constitutional
agencies such as the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to appoint its officials in accordance with law,
such law does not necessarily imply that their appointment will not be subject to Civil Service Law and Rules;
otherwise, these independent bodies will arrogate upon themselves a power that properly belongs to the Civil
Service Commission.