Social Justice Reviewer

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SOCIAL JUSTICE
BELLO, CASTRO, CUALOPING, ESGUERRA, GANDINGCO, TRIAS, VILLANUEVA, WENCESLAO

TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION 1 03
A. ISAE V. QUISUMBING ...... 03
SECTION 2 04
SECTION 3 04
A. SSS V. CA .......... 04
B. EAGLE SECURITY V. NLRC 05
C. ABBOTT LABORATORIES V. ALCARAZ ... 06
D. DIAMOND TAXI V. LLAMAS ... 07
E. THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE V. GONZALES ..... 08
SECTION 4 09
A. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM ... 10
B. HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC .... 11
C. MADDUMBA V. GSIS . 12
D. LUZ FARMS V. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM ... 13
E. DAR V. DECS ... 14
F. ARCHBISHOP V. SECRETARY ... 15
G. HEIRS OF SANDUETA V. ROBLES ... 16
SECTION 5 17
SECTION 6 18
SECTION 7 18
SECTION 8 18
SECTION 9 18
SECTION 10 .. 18
A. PEOPLE V. LEACHON ..... 18

SECTION 11 .. 19
SECTION 12 .. 19
SECTION 13 .. 19
SECTION 14 .. 20
SECTION 15 .. 20
SECTION 16 .. 20
SECTION 17 .. 20
SECTION 18 .. 20
A. CARINO V. COMMISION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 21
B. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY V. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 22
C. SIMON V. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS .... 23
D. CHR EMPLOYEES V. CHR .. 24
SECTION 19 .. 25
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10368 . 26

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership,
use, and disposition of property and its increments.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
V. QUISUMBING
Key take-away: Equal work for equal pay.
DOCTRINE: Public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is
beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against
these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to the give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities. The very
broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, to act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
FACTS:
Presidential Decree 732 created International School Inc. It is a
domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded
local-hires (Housing, Transportation, Shipping costs, Taxes,
Home leave travel allowance)
o Paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than
local-hires.
The School justifies the difference on two "significant

economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely:
(a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor
union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members" of the School, contested the difference in salary
rates between foreign and local-hires.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a valid classification for the distinction
of salary rates?
2. Whether or not foreign-hires belong to the same bargaining
unit as the local-hires
RULING:
1. No!!!
The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities."
International law likewise proscribes discrimination. General
principles of law include principles of equity
Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of
employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor
Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed."
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to
leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates
without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and
they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the
same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires'
limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates.

The Court found the point-of-hire classification employed by

respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates
of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of
the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy
2. NO!!
However, The Court agrees that foreign-hires do not belong to
the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
Hence, The benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably
related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion
of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a
bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group
the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
Section 2.
The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and
self-reliance.
The two principal activities which the State is commanded to

attend in order to achieve the goals of social justice are:
1. The creation of more economic opportunities and more
wealth; and
2. Closer regulation of the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property in order to achieve a more equitable
distribution of wealth and political power.
LABOR
Section 3.
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,

collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers and the preferential use of
voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and
shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster
industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the
fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
ET AL. V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.
Key take-away: SSS has no right to strike.
DOCTRINE: SSS is one such government-controlled corporation
with an original charter. Its employees are part of the civil service and
are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum
prohibiting strikes.
FACTS:
The officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike
and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing
non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS
members from transacting business with the SSS
The strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to
work

The strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS

suffered damages as a result of the strike.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SSS employees have the right to strike?
RULING: NO!
There is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right
of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether
such recognition also includes the right to strike.
The court held that they must resort to the intent of the
framers of the organic law to help them understand the
meaning of these provisions of the constitution.
Mr. LERUM: it does not mean that because they have
the right to organize, they also have the right to strike.
That is a different matter.
In the absence of any legislation allowing government
employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from
striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular
No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
o Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was
repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974,
expressly banned strikes by employees in the
Government, including instrumentalities exercising
governmental functions, but excluding entities
entrusted with proprietary functions
o Memorandum Circular No. 6, 1987 of the Civil
Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which,
"prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees ... enjoins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service."
Government employees may, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of
the terms and conditions of employment which are within the

ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate
government agencies for the improvement of those which are
not fixed by law.
But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes,
walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in
the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to
their demands.
Therefore, SSS is one such government-controlled corporation
with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the
case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
EAGLE SECURITY V. NLRC
DOCTRINE: This joint and several liability of the contractor and the
principal facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers'
performance of any work, task, job or project, thus giving the workers
ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS:
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
PTSI) and Eagle Security Agency, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as EAGLE) entered into a "Contract for Security Services"
wherein the latter agreed to provide security services in the
formers premises.
November 5, 1985, a complaint was filed by private
respondents Rodolfo Dequina et al. for unpaid wage and
allowance increases under Wage Order Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6" **
with interest plus damages and attorney's fees.
Labor arbiter rendered a decision, ordering Eagle and PTSI to
pay jointly and severally the complainants.
Petitioners assail the decision of the NLRC finding them
jointly and severally liable to the security guards for payment of
the minimum wage and cost of living allowance increases
under the wage orders. Both PTSI and EAGLE point to the

other as the one who should be solely liable for paying the
increases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principal and the contractor are jointly and
severally liable for the payment of the minimum wage and cost of living
allowance increases to security guards under Wage Order Nos. 2, 3, 5
and 6?
RULING: YES!!!
The solidary liability for the amounts due the security guards
finds support in Articles 106,107 and 109 of the Labor Code:
o ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor.

Whenever an employer enters into a contract with
another person for the performance of the former's
work, the employees of the contractor and of the
latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of this Code. In the
event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay
the wages his employees in accordance with this
Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable
with his contractor or subcontractor to such
employees to the extent that he is liable to employees
directly employed by him.
o ART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of
the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply
to any person, partnership, association or corporation
which, not being an employer, contracts with an
independent contractor for the performance of any
work, task, job or project.
o ART. 109. Solidary liability. The provisions of
existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every
employer or indirect employer shall be held
responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for
any violation of this Code. For purposes of
determining the extent of the civil liability under this
Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers.
This joint and several liability of the contractor and the

principal is mandated by the Labor Code to assure compliance
of the provisions therein including the statutory minimum
wage [Art. 99 of the labor code]
The contractor is made Liable by virtue of his status as direct
employer. The principal, on the other hand, is made the
indirect employer of the contractor's employees for purposes
of paying the employees their wages should the contractor be
unable to pay them.
This joint and several liability facilitates, if not guarantees,
payment of the workers' performance of any work, task, job or
project, thus giving the workers ample protection as mandated
by the 1987 Constitution [See Article II Sec. 18 and Article
XIII Sec. 3].
ABBOTT LABORATORIES V. ALCARAZ
Key take-away: The services of an employee who has been engaged on

probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (a) a just
or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the
employer.
DOCTRINE: The State shall regulate the relations between workers
and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the
fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to
investments, and to expansion and growth.
FACTS:
On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the
position. In Abbotts offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was
to be employed on a probationary basis.
Alcaraz accepted the said offer and received an e-mail from
Abbotts Recruitment Officer confirming the same. Attached

to the e-mail were Abbotts organizational chart and a job

description of Alcarazs work.
On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract
with Abbott.
On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting where she
was informed that she failed to meet the regularization
standards for the position of Regulatory Affairs Manager.
Thereafter, she was requested to tender her resignation, else
they be forced to terminate her services. She was also told that,
regardless of her choice, she should no longer report for work
and was asked to surrender her office identification cards. She
requested to be given one week to decide on the same, but to
no avail.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her

employment
RULING:
The services of an employee who has been engaged on
probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following:
(a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards prescribed by the employer.
A punctilious examination of the records reveals that Abbott
had complied with the above-stated requirements. This
conclusion is largely impelled by the fact that Abbott clearly
conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and responsibilities as
Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to, during the time of her
engagement, and the incipient stages of her employment.
Furthermore, Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code states that if the termination is
brought about by the failure of an employee to meet the
standards of the employer in case of probationary employment,
it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the
employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date of
termination.
Nonetheless, despite the existence of a sufficient ground to

terminate Alcarazs employment and Abbotts compliance with
the Labor Code termination procedure, it is readily apparent
that Abbott breached its contractual obligation to Alcaraz
when it failed to abide by its own procedure in evaluating the
performance of a probationary employee.
Records show that Abbotts PPSE procedure mandates, inter
alia, that the job performance of a probationary employee
should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee
at least twice. Abbott is also required to come up with a
Performance Improvement Plan during the third month review
to bridge the gap between the employees performance and the
standards set, if any. In addition, a signed copy of the PPSE
form should be submitted to Abbotts HRD as the same would
serve as basis for recommending the confirmation or
termination of the probationary employment. In this case, it is
apparent that Abbott failed to follow the above-stated
procedure in evaluating Alcaraz.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights.
DIAMOND TAXI V. FELIPE LLAMAS, JR.
Key take-away: Workers shall be entitled to security of tenure.

DOCTRINE: Under the Constitution and the Labor Code, the State
is bound to protect labor and assure the rights of workers to security of
tenure tenurial security being a preferred constitutional right that,
under these fundamental guidelines, technical infirmities in labor
pleadings cannot defeat.
FACTS:
Llamas worked as a taxi driver for petitioner Diamond Taxi,
owned and operated by petitioner Bryan Ong.

On July 18, 2005, Llamas filed before the Labor Arbiter a

complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners.
The petitioners denied dismissing Llamas. They claimed that
Llamas had been absent without official leave for several days.
They also pointed out that Llamas committed several traffic
violations in the years 2000-2005 and that they had issued him
several memoranda for acts of insubordination and refusal to
heed management instructions.
Llamas alleged that he had a misunderstanding with Aljuver
Ong, Bryans brother and operations manager of Diamond
Taxi, on July 13, 2005. Consequently, when he reported for
work, Bryan refused to give him the key to his assigned taxi
cab unless he would sign a prepared resignation letter. He did
not sign the resignation letter.
ISSUE: Whether Llamas abandoned his work or had been

constructively dismissed
RULING:
The dismissal of an employees appeal on purely technical
ground is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate on
protection to labor. Under the Constitution and the Labor
Code, the State is bound to protect labor and assure the rights
of workers to security of tenure tenurial security being a
preferred constitutional right.
In this case, Llamas action against the petitioners concerned
his job, his security of tenure. This is a property right of which
he could not and should not be deprived of without due
process. But, more importantly, it is a right that assumes a
preferred position in our legal hierarchy.
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when, in
dismissing Llamas appeal, it allowed purely technical
infirmities to defeat Llamas tenurial security without full
opportunity to establish his cases merits.
While the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory, this requirement should not, however,
be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of

preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping.
A careful consideration of the circumstances of the case shows
that the NLRC should have given due course to Llamas appeal
despite the initial absence of the required certificate.
Furthermore, to constitute abandonment of work, two
elements must concur: (1) the employee must have failed to
report for work or must have been absent without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been a clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship
manifested by some overt act.
And, to successfully invoke abandonment, whether as a ground
for dismissing an employee or as a defense, the employer bears
the burden of proving the employees unjustified refusal to
resume his employment. Mere absence of the employee is not
enough. Guided by these parameters, the petitioners unerringly
failed to prove the alleged abandonment.
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE V.

BEATRIZ O. GONZALES
Key take-away: The right to hold a position is a right that enjoys
constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may itself change according
to the nature of the position.
DOCTRINE: Congress may change the qualifications and shorten
terms of existing offices. When done in good faith, this does not violate
the public officers security of tenure.
FACTS:
Gonzales was appointed provincial administrator of the
province of Camarines Norte by then Governor Padilla on
April 1, 1991. It was for a permanent capacity.
In 1999, Governor Pimentel, though an investigation
committee,
found
Gonzales
guilty
of
gross
insubordination/gross discourtesy and dismissed Gonzales

Gonzales appealed to the CSC, and the CSC gave her a sixmonth suspension instead of dismissal.
Pimentel reinstated Gonzales in 2000 pursuant to the CSC
resolution, but dismissed her the next day for lack of
confidence.
o Argues that the position has been converted to a
highly confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160
and therefore Gonzales no longer enjoys security of
tenure
ISSUES:
1) WON Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator
position from a career service to a primarily confidential, noncareer service position.
2) WON Gonzales has security of tenure
RULING:
1) YES. The position has been reclassified. RA 7160 made
substantial changes, which reclassified the position of
provisional administrator.
o Made the position mandatory for every province (as
opposed to the discretion of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan)
o Amended qualifications for the position added
residence and good moral character requirement, and
reduced work experience requirement from 6 years to
5 years.
o Made the provincial administrator coterminous with
its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career
service position that is primary confidential.
YES*. (By definition does not violate security of tenure, but
she was still validly removed from office)
Congress may change the qualifications and shorten terms of
existing offices. When done in good faith, this does not violate
the public officers security of tenure.
o So long as the changes are aimed at the office and not
the incumbent.
In this case, RA 7160 significantly modified many aspects of

provincial administrator position, but this change was not
aimed to prejudice Gonzales.
Gonzales permanent appointment is immaterial to her
removal
o The nature of the position she occupied at the time of
her removal should be considered, NOT the nature of
the position at the time she entered the service.
The primarily confidential employees term of office expires
when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. The
employee is not removed or dismissed but her term
merely expires.
Loss of trust and confidence is considered just cause
provided by law in termination of employment.
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

Section 4.
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation.
In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.
Goals of Agrarian Reform:

1. Efficient production;
2. A more equitable distribution of land which recognizes
the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are
landless to own the land they till; and
3. A just share of other or seasonal farm workers in the fruits

of the land.
Agricultural Lands are only those lands which are arable and
suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands.
Non-agricultural lands and lands previously converted to
non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by
government agencies other than DAR are exempt from land
reform.
ASSOCIATION OF THE SMALL LANDOWNERS OF THE
PHILIPPINE V. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
DOCTRINE:
Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for
a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation
of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property
under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
To the extent that the law prescribes retention limits for landowners,
there is an exercise of police power. But where it becomes necessary to
deprive owners of their land in excess of the maximum allowed, there is
compensable taking and therefore the exercise of eminent domain.
FACTS:
On 8 August 1963, the Congress of the Philippines in line with
the above-stated principles had enacted R.A. No. 3844,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code.
On 21 October 1972, P.D. No. 27 was promulgated to provide
compulsory acquisition of the private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners.
On 17 July 1987, E.O. No. 228 was issued to declare full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and to
provide for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the

decree as the manner of their payment.
On 22 July 1987, Presidential Proclamation No. 131 was issued
to institute a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP),
and E.O. No. 229 to provide the mechanics for its
implementation.
On 10 June 1988, R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, was enacted,
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with
its provisions.
G.R. No. 79310

This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be
simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is
traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no
such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No.
229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative
of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be
taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.
ISSUE: Whether or not agrarian reform is an exercise of police power
or eminent domain.
RULING:
Yes, it is a valid exercise of eminent domain.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the
comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear
the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now
10

glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also
from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own
feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude
will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be
his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will
give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And
where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see
in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now
at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities
and dark resentments and rebuild in it the music and the
dream.
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1) R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional
objections raised in the herein petitions.
2) Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to
the State only upon full payment of compensation to their
respective owners.
3) All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under
P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4) Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of
retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention
rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions
therein prescribed.
FACTS:
HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC

Key take-away: The farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) of the Hacienda
Luisita, under the CARL, have the option to remain as stockholders of
the Hacienda Luisita Incorporated (HLI).
DOCTRINE: The stock distribution scheme granted by Section 31 of
the CARL is no longer an available option under existing law. Still,
there is no infringement on the rights of the farmworker-beneficiaries
(FWBs) as they have the option to remain as stockholders thereof.
Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac was a 6,443-hectare mixed

agricultural-industrial-residential expanse owned by the
Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), owned
and/or controlled by Jose Cojuangco, Sr. Group.
Martial law administrators, however, commenced a case against
Tadeco to acquire Hacienda Luisita.
During the administration of President Corazon Cojuangco
Aquino, the Office of the Solicitor General moved to withdraw
the governments case against Tadeco. The CA dismissed the
case, subject to the PARCs approval of Tadecos
proposed stock distribution plan (SDP) in favor of its
farmworkers.
Tadeco then organized a spin-off corporation, HLI, as vehicle
to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this
purpose, Tadeco conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion
(4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of
Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock.
o This was met favorably by the farmworkerbeneficiaries (FWBs).
o Tadeco and the FWBs formally entered into a Stock
Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA).
The HLI applied for a conversion of 500 hectares of land of
the hacienda from agricultural to industrial use.
o The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approved
the application subject to certain conditions, including
upholding the SDOA with the FWBs.
HLI later ceded 300 hectares of the converted land to
Centennary in exchange for 12M shares of stock.
o The same property was later sold by Centennary to
LIPCO.
o In turn, LIPCO sold the same to RCBC.
An additional 80 hectares of land were later detached from the
hacienda by virtue of the governments Subic-Clark-Tarlac
Expressway (SCTEX) project.
o Out of the original 4,915 hectares of the hacienda,
only about 4,335 remained intact.
o
11

After conflicting motions filed by representatives of the HLI,

on the one hand, and the FWBs, on the other, the PARC
recalled/revoked the stock distribution proposal (SDP).
Furthermore, the PARC declared that the subject lands in
controversy are now under the compulsory coverage of the
CARP.
o EO 229 created the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Thus, the present controversy.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 31 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which permits stock transfer in lieu of
outright agricultural land transfer, is unconstitutional
RULING: CONSTITUTIONAL; the FARM did not meet the
requisites for standingthat is, both the act of raising the issue at the
earliest opportunity and the lis mota are wanting.
Regardless, there is no infringement on the constitutional
rights of the farmers. They are issued stock certificates, which,
although not ownership per se, is a recognition of their
entitlement to the land tilled.
Furthermore, the stock distribution scheme granted by Section
31 of RA 6657 is NO LONGER an available option under
existing law.
The Supreme Court ruled on the matter thusly:
o The
Court DENIED the
petition
of
HLI
and AFFIRMED the PARC resolution placing the
lands subject of HLIs SDP under compulsory
coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the
CARP, with the MODIFICATION that the original
6,296 qualified FWBs were given the option to remain
as stockholders of HLI. It also excluded from the
mandatory CARP coverage that part of Hacienda
Luisita that had been acquired by RCBC and LIPCO.
MADDUMBA V. GSIS
Key take-away: GSIS can be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at
face value.
DOCTRINE: Land reform expropriation is a sacrifice for the
landowner. Requiring him to accept Land Bank bonds instead of
money is another sacrifice. To further compel him to discount these
bonds is unfair.
FACTS:
Maddumba won a public bidding for a house and lot in Sta.
Ana, Manila.
The bid was subject to a condition of 35% down payment.
10% as proposal bond and 25% to be paid after the receipt of
notice of award/acceptance of bid. Maddumba enclosed a
managers check and cash to complete the proposal bond.
After receipt of notice of award, Maddumba offered to pay the
25% in Land Bank bonds but GSIS rejected the offer so
Maddumba offered to pay cash for all future payments.
When 2nd monthly installments became due, Maddumba
wrote a letter to the GSIS board requesting that they accept his
Land Bank bonds as payments. He invoked Section 85 of RA
3844, which states that bonds issued by Land Bank may be
used for payment of assets of GOCCs.
Board was willing to accept the bonds, but wanted a
discounted rate of 18%
o Claimed that PD 251 amended RA 3844 by deleting
the provision that bonds must be accepted at face
value.
o Claim that accepting bonds at face value would impair
the actuarial solvency of GSISS and prejudice its
capacity to pay benefits and claims to its members.
ISSUE: WON GSIS can be compelled to accept Land Bank notes at
face value?
12

RULING: YES.
The intent of Section 85 is to cushion the impact of

dispossession, and the SC interpreted this provision with that
intent in mind.
Sacrifices by landowner in expropriation:
o Will seldom get the compensation he desires.
o Acceptance of Land Bank bonds instead of money
Further compelling a landowner to use Land Bank bonds at a
discount (i.e. reducing the value of the bonds) imposes an
additional burden on the landowner.
PD 251 cannot be relied upon. Implied repeals are frowned
upon and in this case there is no indication that that was the
intent of the legislature.
Even if it were true that GSIS actuarial insolvency would be
impaired, the judiciary can only interpret and Implement the
spirit of the law. New legislation must be made to fix any
potential issues that may arise.
LUZ FARMS V. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Key take-away: "Agricultural land" does not include land devoted to
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionallymandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
DOCTRINE:
The State shall undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations.
FACTS:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved
RA No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry

and swine in its coverage.
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section
11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms).
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business and together with others in the same business
allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of
Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and
Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 and of the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under
R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules
and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as
promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989.
ISSUE: The constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A.

No. 6657, insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.
RULING:
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated
agrarian reform program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as
defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds,
fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
13

From the discussion of the Committee, Section II of R.A. 6657

which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the
definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that
the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered
by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no
reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of
agrarian reform.
Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the
inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, are DECLARED null
and void for being unconstitutional.
DAR V. DECS
Key take-away: The Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage

extends to both public and private agricultural lands which are suitable
for agriculture. In the case at bar, DECS cannot claim an exemption
from said coverage because the subject lands are not being actually,
directly, and exclusively used for educational purposes.
DOCTRINE: DECS land leased for agricultural purposes, is NOT
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or the
Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage.
FACTS:
The subject lands (located in Negros Occidental) in
controversy were acquired by Respondent DECS through a
donation by the late Esteban Jalandoni.
In 1985, Respondent DECS then undertook a lease
agreement
with
ANGLO
AGRICULTURAL
CORPORATION for 10 agricultural crop years. It was later
renewed for an additional 10 agricultural crop years.
In 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be
permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed
a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage
with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of

Escalante.
After investigation by MARO, a Notice of Coverage was sent to
DECS stating that subject lands are now covered by CARP.
Thereafter, the DAR Regional Director approved the
recommendation.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform affirmed the Order of the
DAR Regional Director, while the Court of Appeals set it
aside.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL); and,
(2) Whether or not the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of the
CARP
RULING:
(1) YES, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of
the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
Section 4 of the CARP states and defines the general
coverage of the program, i.e. ...all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public
domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No
reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account, ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the
specific limits of the public domain;
14

b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific

limits as determined by Congress in the preceding
paragraph;
c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to
or suitable for agriculture; and
d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that
can be raised thereon.
Records show that the subject properties were formerly
private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban
Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS.
The Supreme Court said that, in order to be exempt from
the coverage:
o The land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and
found to be necessary;" and
o The purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools
for educational purposes."
o DAR correctly pointed out the following:
That the subject lands were leased to ANGLO
AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, not nearby
schools or for educational purposes
That the land per se, and not the income derived
therefrom, that is exempt from coverage
(2) YES, the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP.
Section 15 of the CARP vests the power to identify

beneficiaries with the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
o The Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC),
organized under the CARP, is tasked with the
registration of beneficiaries. They shall furnish a
Notice in the barangay hall listing the names of the
beneficiaries.
o In the case at bar, together with the determination by
the MARO that the subject lands are covered by the
CARP, BARC performed its mandate.
Administrative act which the judiciary cannot

interfere with
Thrust of social justice
o The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless
farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the
underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and
to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those
who seek its benefit, it is the means towards a viable
livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life. The objective
of the State is no less certain: "landless farmers and
farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to
promote social justice and to move the nation toward
sound rural development and industrialization."
ARCHBISHOP V. SECRETARY
Key take-away: Petitioner Archbishop, the owner of several agricultural

lands, cannot claim an exemption that is not contemplated by law.
DOCTRINE: The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) has truly
noble goals, and these noble goals should not be stymied by the
creation of exemptions or exceptions not contemplated by the law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Archbishop is the registered owner of lands in
Camarines Sur. These lands are primarily used for the planting
of rice, corn, and coconut trees.
Petitioner applied for exemption from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree
No. 27 (hereafter PD 27).
o Said petitions were denied by the Regional Director of
the Department of Agricultural Reform (DAR)
Archbishop appealed from the order of the Regional Director,
and sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands planted
with rice and corn, which were registered in the name of the
15

Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres.

o Said appeal was denied by the DAR Secretary
o The subsequent motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied
The Court of Appeals dismissed both the petition and motion
for reconsideration of Archbishop.
o His contentions were as follows:
That he holds the lands in trust for the benefit
of his followers as cestui que trust;
That the deeds of donation transferred to him
imposed numerous fiduciary obligations; and,
That he is not the landowner contemplated
by PD 27 and the CARL.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL)
RULING: NO, Archbishop cannot claim an exemption that is not
contemplated by law.
The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without
qualification as to under what title the land is held or what
rights to the land the landowner may exercise. There is no
distinction made whether the landowner holds "naked title"
only or can exercise all the rights of ownership.
o A clear reading of the laws reveal that no exceptions
may be permitted as these would frustrate the
revolutionary intent of the law, which is the
redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit of
landless farmers and farmworkers.
There can be no claim of more than one right of retention per
landowner.
o PD 27 and Section 6 of the CARL clearly set forth the
retention limits per landowner.
Archbishops contention that he is merely an administrator of
the donated properties will not serve to remove these lands
from the coverage of agrarian reform.
Section 10 of the CARL enumerates an exclusive list of

exemptions
HEIRS OF ROMULO D. SANDUETA V. ROBLES

Key take-away: The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in
the Constitution, balances the effects of compulsory land acquisition by
granting the landowner the right to choose the area to be retained
subject to legislative standards. Basically, this case shows that Congress
can impose limitations and qualifications in the exercise of the right to
retention
DOCTRINE: Agrarian reform include all agricultural lands, subject
to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations. This case talks about three laws in relation to the
retention rights of landowners when lands are obtained from the latter
in order to pursue a more equitable distribution of wealth and power
(especially favoring the farmers).
The three laws in question:
1. PD 47 (by P. Marcos): implemented the Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) Program
a. There are 2 requisites for land to fall under this
program: (1) Applies to rice or corn fields only; and
(2) There must be a system of share-crop or leasetenancy
b. The right to retain not more than 7 hectares of land
2. RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Land Reform), Sec. 6:
modified the retention limit under PD 47
a. The right to retain: (1) not more than 5 hectares of
land; and (2) an additional 3 hectares of land per child
subject to qualifications
b. There are 2 requisites to be able to obtain the
additional 3 hectares: (1) child must be at least 15
years old; and (2) they are actually tilling the land or
there is direct management over the same
16

3. LOI 474: a limitation for both PD 47 and RA 6657
a. The following cannot exercise their right of retention:
(1) persons with other agricultural lands of more than
7 hectares; or (2) persons with lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive adequate income to
support themselves and their families
FACTS:
Petitioners are heirs of Romulo and Isabela Sandueta who are
owners of several agricultural lands in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte
o Land A: 13.7 hectares big (the sizes are important in
applying the laws)
o Land B: 4.6 hectares
Land B, prior to its sale to Sps. Sandueta, was being leased by
several tenants of its original owner
The leased portion was placed under the OPT Program
pursuant to PD 47
This land was awarded to the tenants-farmers through
Emancipation Patents (EPs)
Petitioners then filed a petition seeking their right to retention
pursuant to RA 6657
o To annul the EPs of the tenants
o To compel tenants to pay back rentals
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officers decision: deny petition
but retain the 5 hectares of Land A in favor of petitioners
DAR Regional Directors decision: deny petition but retain 5
hectares of Land A in favor of petitioners since the children
cannot claim the additional 3 hectares (since they are absenteelandowners therefore they do not actually till nor exercise
active management over than lands)
The heirs were not happy of the location of the retained 5
hectares so they appeal to exercise their right of choice but
they were denied because the 5 hectares does not fall under
OLT Program (only RA 6657 was applied to them)
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners are entitled to avail any retention right
under Section 6, RA 6657?
RULING:
NO.
If the land (Land A) does not fall under OLT Program (such as
in the case), the remedy is not retention but rather, an
application for exemption. As mentioned earlier, Sec 6, RA
6657 cannot apply in this case because the heirs are disqualified
for not actually tilling the land or exercising any direct
management over the lands.
Also, LOI 474 disqualified petitioners from exercising their
right to retention. Persons who:
1. Own other agricultural lands of more than seven
hectares in aggregate areas; or
2. Lands used for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes are not allowed to acquire any retention
right.
Land A is actually not under the OLT Program. They should
not petition to exercise their right to retention. They should
exercise mere right of ownership over Land A.
Section 5.
The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent
farmers organizations to participate in the planning,
organization, and management of the program, and shall provide
support to agriculture through appropriate technology and
research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and
other support services.
Beyond redistribution of land, the State must ensure that

redistributed land will be efficiently productive and effectively
beneficial for all concerned.
17

Section 6.
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the
disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including
lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to
agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their
ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its
own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the
manner provided by law.
Section 7.
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen,
especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the
communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and
offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through
appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources.
The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers
shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of
marine and fishing resources.
The reach of agrarian reform extends beyond private agricultural

land to other natural resources, even including the use and
enjoyment of communal marine and fishing resources and offshore
fishing grounds.
Section 8.
The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the
proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote
industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of
public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment
for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their
choice.
The relation between industrialization and agrarian reform should

be a mutually beneficial relationship.
.
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
Section 9.
The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of
urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment
opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such
program the State shall respect the rights of small property
owners.
The word reform carries the meaning that what is sought is not
just proper urban land use or zoning but also the righting of
inequitable land distribution. It thus includes authorization to use
expropriation for redistribution of urban land.
Section 10.
Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their
dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just
and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken
without adequate consultation with them and the communities
where they are to be relocated.
PEOPLE V. LEACHON
Key take-away: The enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the
alleged squatters the opportunity to present their case before a
competent court where their rights will be amply protected and due
process strictly observed.
18

FACTS:
7 August 1990Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego
Escala was charged of violating the Anti-Squatting Law or PD
772 before the RTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro presided
by the respondent judge.
After the presentation of evidence, the respondent judge issued
an Order dismissing the said cases for lack of jurisdiction.
CA reversed RTCs decision and ordered for the continuation
of trial of subject criminal cases.
Instead of conducting the trial, respondent Judge dismissed the
cases motu proprio once more, opining that PD 772 was
repealed by Sections 9 and 10 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Anti-Squatting law is repugnant to the Constitution?
2. W/N Judge Leachon committed GADALEJ dismissing the
criminal cases?
RULING:
1. NO.
PD 772 conforms to the 1987 Constitution, protects the rights
of a property owner against unlawful and illegal intrusion.
The constitutional requirement that the eviction and
demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just
and human manner. It means that the person to be evicted be
accorded due process.
The enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged
squatters the opportunity to present their case before a
competent court where their rights will be protected and due
process strictly observed.
In the case at bar, after the prosecution had rested its case and
without giving the three accused the opportunity to present
their evidence, the Judge dismissed the cases motu proprio.
There is no showing that the constitutionality of PD 772 was
ever raised. Consequently, such issue cannot be given due

course because it was not raised at the earliest opportunity.
2. NO.
The Judge did not err in dismissing the criminal cases as he
ratiocinated that if the three accused be convicted it will run
afoul to the constitutional provisions as it will not be effected
in accordance with law and in just and humane manner.
Under the Constitution, what makes the eviction and
demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is
when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a
just and humane manner.
HEALTH
Section 11.
The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach
to health development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12.
The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower
development, and research, responsive to the countrys health
needs and problems.
Section 13.
The State shall establish a special agency for disabled persons for
their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their
integration into the mainstream of society.
Two principles:
o Integration a unified health delivery system which combines
western and traditional medicine as well as public and private
sectors.
19

o
Comprehensiveness health promotion, disease prevention,

education and planning.
WOMEN
Section 14.
The State shall protect working women by providing safe and
healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal
functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance
their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation.
ROLE AND RIGHTS OF PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS
Section 15.
The State shall respect the role of independent peoples
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within
the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective
interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
Peoples organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with
demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with
identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.
Section 16.
The right of the people and their organizations to effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and
economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall,
by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation
mechanisms.
Peoples organizations:
o Defined in section 15.
o Need not be juridical persons.
o Must be independent, meaning not controlled by
manipulative forces in or out of government.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 17.
(1) There is hereby created an independent office called the
Commission on Human Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four
Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of
office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of
the Commission shall be provided by law.
(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential
Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its
present functions and powers.
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall
be automatically and regularly released.
Section 18.
The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following
powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and
cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention
facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Governments compliance with
20

international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law;
and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided
by law.
Commission on Human Rights (CHR)

o A constitutional creation although not on the same level as the
Constitutional Commissions (CoA, CSC, Comelec).
o No fiscal autonomy. All changes have to be approved by the
Department of Budget and Management.
o Powers are only investigative
For the purposes of investigating violations of human
rights committed by anyone.
Has no power to prosecute.
May not issue writes of injunction or restraining orders
May not issue subpoenas
o Has jurisdiction only over civil and political rights, and
therefore no jurisdiction over socio-economic rights.
o However pursuant to section 19, congress may expand the
jurisdiction of the CHR by law.
CARINO V. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Key take-away: The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) does not

have adjudicatory powers. It can only exercise its power to investigate
on civil and political human rights violations.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations invoking civil and political rights. However, it cannot try and
decide cases as courts of justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do. It is

merely a fact-finding body. It may receive evidence and make findings
of fact but it cannot apply the laws to factual conclusion in order to
solve a controversy.
FACTS:
On September 1990, Manila Public School Teachers Assoc
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT)
undertook a mass concerted action to emphasize their
unheeded petition for grievances addressed to the government
(especially towards DECS)
Petitioner Carino, Secretary of DECS, ordered the 800 teachers
to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal
Failure to follow the return to work order, private respondents
were dismissed from their work, placed on preventive
suspension and were replaced by other teachers as the
investigation commenced
MPSTA filed with the RTC and SC against Secretary Carino
for violating the teachers right to strike and their right to due
process
CHR sent a subpoena to Secretary Carino requiring his
attendance to the dialogue with the 42 complainants
Secretary Carino disregarded the order stating that CHR has (1)
no cause of action; and (2) no jurisdiction to hear such case of
teacher-complainants
The CHR held that failure of DECS Secretary to send his
answer and evidence, the CHR will continue to decide on the
case using the testimonies and evidence submitted by the 42
teachers alone.
ISSUE: W/N the CHR has the power under the Constitution to try
and decide, or hear and determine, as a court or a quasi-judicial body?
RULING:
No.
21

The CHR has no jurisdiction to so. The most it can do in the

way of adjudicative power is to INVESTIGATE such as
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
The CHR can receive evidence and ascertain therefrom the
facts of the controversy but they CANNOT apply the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided and determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals provided by law.
The 1987 Constitution created the CHR as an independent
office to replace the old Presidential Committee on Human
Rights. Their powers are specified under Section 18 of Article
13 of the Constitution.
Investigate:
o Ordinary sense: examine, explore, inquire, delve into, probe
into, research on, study, to inquire systematically
o Legal meaning: patient inquiry or observation; an
administrative function that does not require hearing
Adjudicate:
o Ordinary sense: adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle finally, pass judgment on rights and
duties
o Legal meaning: settle in the exercise of judicial authority
In this case, the matter cannot be resolved by CHR nor can it reverse a
decision by DECS. The proper procedure that can be done in this case
is:
1. CHR can investigate on the issue
2. It can file its report with the DECS
3. If its findings are contrary to those of DECS, it can file its
investigatory report to CSC
As for the teacher, the correct way of resolving their issue is:
1. Administrative proceeding with DECS
2. If decision is unfavorable to them, file an appeal with CSC or

with the SC and not with the CHR
3. It can only ask CHR to help them gather factual information
that can aid in resolving the issue at hand
CONCURRING OPINION: J.Paras
He is basically emphasizing that the defense of human rights should be
afforded to EVERYONE. It should not be a monopoly against one
class of persons (like government).
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY VS
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Key take-away: The Commission on Human Rights is a creation of the
Constitution although it is not on the same level as the Constitutional
Commission. In essence, the Commissions power is only investigative.
DOCTRINE: CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction. (It may only be issued by the judge of any
court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice
of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court.)
FACTS:
May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating
certain parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as
the Cavite Export Processing Zone (CEPZ).
For purposes of development, the area was divided into Phases
I to IV. A parcel in Phase IV was bought by the Filoil Refinery
Corporation, formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc.
The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several
individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural
products therein without permission from EPZA or its
predecessor, Filoil.
22

To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981,

paid a P10,000 financial assistance to those who accepted the
same and signed quitclaims.
Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles,
Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoez filed in the respondent
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint
(Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for justice and other reliefs
and remedies (Katarungan at iba pang tulong).
The CHR conducted an investigation of the complaint.
On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction
commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor
Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing
further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until
further orders from the Commission and to appear before the
Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue.
On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista
issued another injunction Order reiterating her order of May
17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public
Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of

injunction or restraining Order against supposed violators of human
rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts
complained of?
RULING: No.
The CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasijudicial
body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in
the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasijudicial
agency or official.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or

need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction
on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution
would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by
the Constitution or by law
The preventive measures and legal aid services mentioned in
the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies
(including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR
may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary
investigation.
SIMON V. COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Key take-away: CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its

operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
It all started from a Demolition Notice" issued in 9 July 1990
which was signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the Petitioners) in
his capacity as Executive Officer of the Office of the City
Mayor in Quezon City
In the said notice, the respondents were given a grace period
of 3 days to vacate the subject premises of North Edsa
because the land is intended to be developed as a Peoples
Park.
A group led by private respondent Fermo filed a letter
complaint with the CHR
23 July 1990CHR issued an Order directing the petitioners
to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at
North Edsa and ordering petitioners to appear before the
CHR.
23

28 July 1990Petitioners still carried out the demolition of the

stalls and squatters situated at the subject premises
notwithstanding the Order issued by the CHR
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not civil rights were violated?
2) Whether or not CHR has a jurisdiction over the matter in
citing petitioners in contempt?
RULING:
1) NO.
The records of 1986 deliberations of the ConComm aimed to
delineate the scope of human rights.
Mr. Garcia: There are actually six areas where this Commission
on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights
of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other
crimes committed against the religious.
o Civil Rights defined as: those (rights) that belong to every
citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the rights
of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of contract, etc. Or rights appertaining to a
person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community.
Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
In the case at hand, by looking at the standards above, it
cannot be concluded that the order for the demolition of stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia of the respondents can fall within
the compartment of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights intended by the Constitution.
2) YES. The 1986 ConComm deliberations intended for the
CHR to be a quasi-judicial body.
Cite for contempt against the petitioners was NOT PROPER.
The CHR is constitutionally mandated to adopt its

operational guideline and procedures, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules,
its power to cite and hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt.
HOWEVERto cite for contempt should be understood
to apply ONLY to VIOLATIONS of its adopted
operational guideline and rules of procedure essential to
carry out its investigational powers.
Power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons
who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly
withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
o The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us, is not
investigatory in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess.
PADILLA, J. dissenting:
I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls (sari-sari
stores and carinderia) is a prima facie case of human rights
violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of
the said private respondents under the definition of civil rights
mentioned in by the majority opinion and which the CHR has
unquestioned authority to investigate.
I submit the CHR should be given wide latitude to look into
and investigate situations, which may involve human rights
violations.
CHR EMPLOYEES V. CHR
Key take-away: The grant of autonomy should cease to be a
meaningless provision. Neither does the fact that the CHR was
admitted as a member by the CFAG ipso facto clothed with fiscal
24

autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag
obtainable by membership.
FACTS:
Congress passed RA 8522 otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1998 (GAA of 1998)
RA 8522 which provides for Special Provisions applicable to all
constitutional offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy.
Pursuant to these special provisions, CHR through its then
Chairperson adopted an upgrading and reclassification scheme
among selected positions in the Commission.
19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution no. A98-055
providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grades of the
following positions in the Commission (Attorney VI, Director
III, Financial Management Officer II, Budget Officer III,
Accountant III, Cashier III, Information Officer V)
Likewise, it provided for the creation and upgrading of the
following positions (Security Officer II; Attorney V and
Security Officer I)
CHR issued Resolution no. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998
wherein the CHR collapsed the vacant positions to provide for
additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
Among those positions are as follows: one Attorney III; four
Attorney IV; one Chemist III; three Special Investigator I; one
Clerk III and one Accounting Clerk II.
These reclassification scheme by the CHR was disapproved by
DBM pursuant to existing laws (Constitution and
Compensation Standardization Law or RA 6758)
ISSUES:
1) W/N CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy?
2) W/N CHR can validly implement reclassification scheme
without DBMs prior approval?
HELD:
1) NO.
CA relied on the mistaken premise that CHR belongs to the
species of constitutional commissions. As expressed in the
maxim expression unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the
CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, the fiscal autonomy
entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other
than those provided by law.
The grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless
provision. Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as
a member by the CFAG ipso facto clothed with fiscal
autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a
tag obtainable by membership.
2) YES.
Pursuant to RA 6758 and to Jurisprudence, DBM shall
establish and administer Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government.
CHR recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve
the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its
three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. Thus, it
is now estopped from claiming approval from DBM is a
superfluity.
Section 19.
The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human
rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission,
taking into account its recommendations.
25

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10368
Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of
2013
PURPOSE/OBJECTIVES:
1. Recognizes the heroism and sacrifices of human rights violations
victims (HRVVs) during the regime of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from September 21,
1972 to February 25, 1986; and
2. Acknowledges its moral and legal obligation to recognize and
provide reparation to the victims.
HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS CLAIMS BOARD (HRCVB)

-
a quasijudicial body to receive, evaluates and process claims, award

reparation, and recognizes the victims by enshrining their names in
the Roll of Human Rights Violations Victims
WHO MAY APPLY?
A person who is a human rights violation victim (HRVV)

HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIM (HRV) refers to a person
whose human rights were violated by persons acting in an
official capacity and/or agents of the State as defined herein. In
order to qualify for reparation under this Act, the human rights
violation must have been committed during the period from
September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986. Provided,
however, That victims of human rights violations that were
committed one (1) month before September 21, 1972 and one
(1) month after February 25, 1986 shall be entitled to
reparation, under this Act if they can establish that the
violation was committed:
a.
By agents of the State and/or persons acting in an official

capacity as defined hereunder;
b. For the purpose of preserving, maintaining, supporting or
promoting the said regime; or
c. To conceal abuses during the Marcos regime and/or the
effects of Martial Law (Section 3 of this Act)
1. Claimants who are conclusively presumed to be HRVV under
the law (Section 17 of this Act);
These are the following: (a) the class suit and direct action
plaintiffs in the Human Rights Litigation Against the
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos in the US Federal District
Court of Honolulu, Hawaii who won a favorable
judgment; and (b) the HRVVs recognized by the Bantayog
ng mga Bayani Foundation.
2. Legal heir/s, or authorized representative of HRVVs who are
deceased, incapacitated, or involuntary disappeared. (Section
23 of this Act)
Human rights violation (HRV) refers to any act or omission
committed during the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25,
1986 by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the
Statesuch violation/s are determined in point basis.
MANNER OF APPLICATION
Where to file? Human Rights Victims Claims Board E. Virata

Hall, E. Jacinto St. UP Diliman, Quezon City
Period of application: 6 months FROM THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT (May 12, 2014 to November
10, 2014)
o Failure to apply within the period is deemed to be a
WAIVER.
o There is no fee for the filling of applications or
appeals.
26

VIOLATION
POINTS
Killing of persons exercising their civil and political 10 POINTS

rights; Involuntary disappearance (still missing) as
defined in RA1035[3] ;
Torture and/or rape or sexual abuse;
6-9 POINTS
Detention without a valid warrant of arrest issued by a 3-5 POINTS

civilian court;
Force or intimidation causing involuntary exile from 1-2 POINTS
the Philippines;
Force intimidation or deceit causing unjust or illegal 1-2 POINTS
takeover of business, confiscation of property,
deprivation of livelihood, etc;
Kidnapping or otherwise exploiting children of 1-2 POINTS
persons suspected of committing acts against the
Marcos regime; sexual offenses against human rights
victims who are detained.
DOCUMENTS REQUIRED FOR CLAIMING:

The applicant shall submit the following to support eligibility as a
claimant:
1. Application Form;
2. Detailed notarized statement of the human rights violation;
3. Proof of filiation and relationship issued by the National
Statistics Office (NSO) of Office of the Local Civil Registrar.
In the absence thereof, affidavits of at least two (2)

disinterested individuals;
4. In case the HRVV is physically incapacitated to file the
application personally, a notarized authorization showing proof
of identity of the authorized representative and his/her bona fide
relationship with the victim;
5. In case of mental or psychological disability of the HRVV,
proof of filiation and relationship of the nearest next of kin in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on succession
issued by the NSO or Office of the Local Civil Registrar.
TO PROVE THE HRV, THE FOLLOWING ARE REQUIRED
(one or more):
a) NSOissued or local death certificate;
b) Warrant of arrest, seizure orders (PDA, PCO, ASSO), mission order
and other similar documents;
c) Certification by custodial government agencies on the fact of
detention, carpeta, police blotter, NBI files, release papers and other
similar documents;
d) Doctors affidavit, medicolegal, autopsy or pathology certificate or
report, and other similar documents;
e) Declassified documents from the Department of national Defense
and other government agencies;
f) Court records;
g) Original or duly certified lawyers records;
h) Photographs with affidavit of proper authentication;
i) Sworn statement of two (2) codetainees or two (2) persons who
have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the HRV;
j) Secondary sources of information from reliable sources may be
presented such as church/nongovernment organization report,
books documenting HRVs, news clippings or other similar
documents;
k) Other documents and evidence attesting the occurrence of the
incident and violations or that may be required for the award of any
reparation.
27

PROCEDURE FOR APPLICATION:
Step 1 Accomplish application form and attach notarized statement
about the Human Rights Violation/s, together with other documents to
support eligibility and proof of human rights violations. See list of
documents in Nos. 7 & 8.
Step 2 Submit application and documents to the receiving section of
the Secretariat. Complete applications will be referred to the encoding
section. Incomplete applications will be returned to applicant for
completion.
Step 3 Applicants photograph and fingerprint will be taken.
Acknowledgement Receipt will be issued, to be used for identification,
for tracking claims and for receiving reparation.
St.UP Diliman, Quezon City

Email: secretariat@hrvcb.gov.ph
PROHIBITED ACTS
PROHIBITED ACTS
Imprisonment of eight (8) to ten
(10) years,
Disqualification from public office
Filing of a fraudulent, fictitious

or spurious claim by any
claimant.
Once the applications are filed:

a) The Board will evaluate each individual claim and decide on
eligibility to receive monetary reparations.
b) The preliminary list of eligible claimants will be published to give
opportunity for the filling of opposition and/or appeal.
c) The final list of eligible claimants will be published after all
oppositions and/or appeals have been received.
d) The monetary award per claim will be determined within thirty (30)
days from publication of the final list of HRVVs.
MONETARY REPARATION DISTRIBUTION and

APPLICATION FORMS
1. After the monetary award for all claims has been finally
determined, distribution shall be scheduled by the Board and
each claimant shall be duly notified of the details for delivery of
monetary reparations due him/her.
2. You may get a copy of an application form duly issued by the
Board at its office or at onsite satellite offices: Human
Rights Victims Claims Board E. Virata Hall, E. Jacinto
PENALTIES
Misuse, embezzlement or
misappropriation of reparation
funds by any member of the
Board, its Secretariat, public
officer, employee of an agency
or any private individual
mandated to implement the
Act
Commission of fraud in the
processing of documents and
claims of HRVVs, or
conspiracy with any individual
to commit the same by any
member of the Board, its
Secretariat, public officer,
employee of an agency or any
private individual mandated to
implement the Act
and employment and

Deprivation of the right to vote
and be voted for in any national or
local election, even after the service
of sentence unless granted absolute
pardon.
Penalty under the Revised Penal

Code and relevant special penal
laws.
Penalty under the RPC
28

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